Encyclopædia

of

Religion and Ethics
Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics

EDITED BY
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TO

SIR JOHN MAURICE CLARK, BARONET

PUBLISHER

AND

FRIEND
In issuing this, the twelfth, volume of The Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, I wish to thank those who have assisted me in the work.

And first let me name the Publishers, Messrs. T. & T. Clark, and their Staff, above all Sir John M. Clark, Bart., to whom I have taken the liberty of dedicating it. The Printers also, Messrs. Morrison & Gibb Ltd., deserve the thanks of all concerned, and mine most of all; and especially must their able and accurate Readers be remembered.

What shall I say of my accomplished and loyal Staff? Besides Dr. Selbie and Dr. Gray, whose names are on the title-page, I must mention Mr. J. F. Grant and Mr. T. Riach. Not less deserving than these are the two sisters Miss M. C. Macdonald (now Mrs. Laburn) and Miss D. R. Macdonald (now Mrs. Dow), to whom most of all is due the minute accuracy of the Encyclopedia. With them let me name my Secretary, Miss H. Robertson, who was with me at the planning of the Work and has guided its course to the end. I must also mention our indispensable Librarian, Miss E. M. Mitchell, and Miss B. Wisely, the Typist, whose work has often won the admiration of the authors of articles.

Many scholars have aided with their contributions and with their counsel. I cannot name them. But I must say one thing. The Encyclopedia would not have been what it is if I had not had in every department of study covered by it at least one man upon whom I could rely for advice.

The names of the translators have never appeared. The translations from the French have for the most part been made by my assistants. The German translations are almost all due to the Rev. Alexander Grieve, M.A., D.Phil. Mr. Albert Bonus, M.A., has translated nearly all the Italian work. Either Professor W. R. Morfill or Dr. E. H. Minns has been responsible for the Russian translations. A few articles written in Danish were translated by the Rev. John Beveridge, B.D.

The editing of a work like The Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics is undoubtedly difficult, but it has brought me into touch with so many men of ability and generosity, and has enabled me to make so many friendships, that the pleasure of it has far outweighed its pain.

An Index Volume is in course of preparation.

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SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Hebrew).

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TUNGUS, TURKS, YAKUT.

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TONSURE (Buddhist), Wheel of the Law, Wisdom Tree.

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Thags.

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Sun, Moon, and Stars (Chinese).

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Superstition.

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War, War-gods (Greek and Roman), Water, Water-gods (Greek and Roman), Wings (Greek and Roman).

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Tutelary Gods and Spirits, Water, Water-gods (Primitive and Savage), Yawning.

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Usury (Babylonian).

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Sweat, Sweat-house.

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Vallabha, Vallabhabhacharya.
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War, War-gods (Semite), Water, Water-gods (Babylonian, Egyptian).

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Sufi, Suhrawardi, 'Umar al-Khayyam. 

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UNIVERSALISM.

OEELE (Baron Félix von).
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SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Introduction).

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SUPRALAPSPARISM.

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Voodoo.

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War.

Patton ( Walter Melville), M.A., Ph.D., D.D.
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Suicide (Muhammadan), Sunnites.

Pearson (A. C.), M.A., Litt.D.
Regius Professor of Greek in the University of Cambridge; editor of Fragments of Sophocles, Euripides' Helena, Heracleide, and Phainissa, Zeno and Cleenothes: Fragments.

Transmigration (Greek and Roman), Vows (Greek and Roman).

Fellow of the Royal Society and of the British Academy; Edwards Professor of Egyptology in the University of London.

Transmigration (Egyptian).

Pinches (Theophilus Goldrude), L.L.D. (Glas.), M.R.A.S.
Lecturer in Assyrian at University College, London, and at the Institute of Archeology, Liverpool; Hon. Member of the Société Asiatiqute.

Sumero-Akkadians, Tammuz.

Pope (Robert Martin), M.A. (Camb. and Manchester).
Author of Introduction to Early Church History, and other works.

Western Church.

Poussin (Louis de la Vallée), Docteur en philosophie et lettres (Lège), en langues orientales (Louvain).
Professeur de sanscrit à l'Université de Gand; Membre de l'Académie royale de Belgique; Hébert Lecturer (1916); Membre de la R.A.S. et de la Société Asiatiqute; Membre correspondant de l'Académie impériale de Petrograd; Correspondant de l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient.

Suicide (Buddhist), Tantrism (Buddhist), Worship (Buddhist).

Price (Ira Maurice), Ph.D., L.L.D.
Professor of the Semitic Languages and Literatures in the University of Chicago; author of The Manuscripts of the Old Testament, The Great Cylinder Inscriptions of and B of Gudea, and other works.

Toltec.

Reed (James Smith), M.A., L.L.D., Litt.D.
Fellow and late Tutor of Gonville and Cains College, Cambridge; Professor of Ancient History in the University of Cambridge; editor of the Académies and other works of Cierco; author of Municipalities of the Roman Empire.

Worship (Roman).

Reyn (Michel), LL.D., D.Litt.
Professor of History of the Civilization of the Far East in the University of Paris; formerly Professor of Law in the Imperial University of Tokyo and Legal Adviser to the Japanese Government; author of Le Shinnotisme.

Worship (Japanese).

Rivers (W. H. R.), M.A., M.D., F.R.S., F.R.C.P.
Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge; President of the Anthropological Section of the British Association, 1911; author of The Todas, History of Melanesian Society, Kinship and Social Organisation.

Todas.

Robinson (Henry Wheeler), M.A. (Oxon. and Edin.).

Tongue.

Rose (Herbert Jennings), M.A. (Oxon.).
Professor of Latin, University College of Wales, Aberystwyth; sometime Fellow of Exeter College, Oxford.

Suicide (Introductory), Thrace.

Rose (Horace Arthur), I.C.S. (retired).
Superintendent of Ethnography, Punjab, 1901-06; author of A Glossary of Punjab Tribes and Costes, and other works.

Udasis.

Ross (William), M.A., B.D.
Minister of the United Free Church at Edinburgh.

Voluntaryism.

Rous (William Henry Denham), M.A., Litt.D.
Headmaster of the Porse Grammar School, Cambridge; University Teacher of Sanskrit; President of the Folklore Society, 1904-06.

Tithes (Greek), Votive Offerings (Greek).

Sapir (Edward), Ph.D.
Chief of Anthropological Division, Victoria Memorial Museum, Ottawa, Ontario.

Vancouver Island Indians.

Schiller (Frederick Canning Scott), M.A., B.Sc. (Oxon.).
Fellow and Senior Tutor of Corpus Christi College, Oxford; author of Riddles of the Sphinx (new ed. 1910), Humanism (1903, new ed. 1912), Studies in Humanism (1907, 1912), Plato or Protagoras? (1908), Formal Logic (1912), etc.

Teletaphy, Value.

Scott (Ernest Findlay), B.A., D.D.

Valentinianism.

Seaton (Mary Ethel), M.A. (Lond.).
Sometimes Lecturer at Girtou College, Cambridge.

Swan-maidens.
AUTHORS OF ARTICLES IN THIS VOLUME

SELIGMAN (Mrs. Brenda Z.), London.
Veddas.

SELIGMAN (Charles G.), M.D., F.R.S., F.R.C.P.
Professor of Ethnology in the University of London; President of the Anthropological Section of the British Association, 1915; author of The Melanomcasts of British New Guinea; joint-author of The Veddas.

SHOREY (Paul), Ph.D., LL.D., Litt.D.
Professor and Head of the Department of Greek in the University of Chicago; Roosevelt Professor at the University of Berlin, 1913; Member of the American Institute of Art and Letters.

Summa Bonum, Theognis.

SHOWELOW (Grant), Ph.D.
Professor of Latin in the University of Wisconsin; Fellow in the American School of Classical Studies at Rome, 1898-1900; author of The Great Mother of the Gods (Dissertation), 1901; With the Professor, 1910; translator of Ovid's Heroides and Amores (Loeb Classical Library), 1914.

Taurbolium.

SKEES (Edward Ernest), M.A.
Fellow, Senior Tutor, and Classical Lecturer of St. John's College, Cambridge; author of The Anthropology of the Greeks, and Hero and Leander, translated in verse from the Greek; editor of Æschylus's Prometheus Vinctus, the Homeric Hymns, etc.

TORCH (Greek and Roman).

SMITH (Charles Ryder), B.A., D.D. (Lond.)
Professor of Systematic Theology in Richmond College, Surrey; author of The Bible Doctrine of Society in its Historical Evolution.

Theocracy.

SMITH (Vincent Arthur), M.A., Litt.D.
Late of the Indian Civil Service (retired); author of Aoko in 'Rules of India,' Early History of India, A History of Fine Art in India and Ceylon, Akbar the Great Mogul, Oxford History of India.

Vaisali, Vikrama Era.

SOARES (Theodore Gerald), M.A., Ph.D., D.D.
Professor of Preaching and Religious Education, and Head of the Department of Practical Theology, in the University of Chicago.

Sunday Schools.

STEVENS (Mrs. Sinclair), M.A., Sc.D.

Svetambaras, Worship (Jain).

STOKES (George J.), M.A. (Trinity College, Dublin).
Of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law; Professor of Philosophy and Jurisprudence in University College, Cork, National University of Ireland; author of The Objectivity of Truth.

Universality.

SCHANTZ (John Reed), Ph.D.

Tilgat, Tsinshian, Wakashan.

TAKAKUSU (Jyun), M.A., D.Litt. (Oxford), Dr. Phil. (Leipzig).
Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Tokyo.

Yuan-Chwang, Fa-Hian, and I-Tseng.

Professor of Moral Philosophy in the United College of SS. Salvador and Leonard, St. Andrews; late Fellow of Merton College, Oxford; Fellow of the British Academy; author of The Problem of Conduct (1901), Elements of Metaphysics (1903), Varia Socratica (1911).

Theism.

TESSITORI (Dr. D. P.).
Late of Udine, Italy; editor of the Uvaesamala of Dhammapada.

YOGIS (Kanphata).

THOMAS (Edward Joseph), M.A. (St. And. and Camb.), B.A. (Lond.), Under-Librarian of Cambridge University; editor of Buddhist Scriptures; joint-editor of Mahabodidasa and Jataka Tales.

Sun, Moon, and Stars (Buddhist).

THOMAS (Northcote Whitridge).
Elève diplômé de l'Ecole pratique des Hautes Études; Corresponding Member of the Société d'Anthropologie de Paris; Member of Council of the Folklore Society; author of Thought Transference, Kinship Organization and Group Marriage in Australia.

Transmigration (Introductory and Pritive).

THURSTON (Herbert), B.A., S.J.

Xavier.

UNQUAERT (Francis Fortescue), M.A.
Fellow and Tutor of Balliol College, Oxford.

Ultramontanism.

UNQUAERT (William Spence), M.A., D.Phil.
Senior Professor of Philosophy in the Scottish Churches College, Calcutta; Fellow and Member of Syndicate of Calcutta University.

Theosophy.

Formerly Professor of Tibetan in University College, London; Hon. Correspondent of the Archeological Survey of India; author of The Buddhism of Tibet, Lhasa and its Mysteries.

Swat or Udyāna, Tibet.

WATT (Hugh), M.A., B.D.
Professor of Church History in New College, Edinburgh.

Zwingli.

WELSFORD (Enid Elder Hancock), Fellow of Newnham College, Cambridge.

Sun, Moon, and Stars (Teutonic and Balto-Slavic).
AUTHORS OF ARTICLES IN THIS VOLUME

Werner (Alice), L.L.A. (St. And.),

Zanzibar and the Swahili People.

Professor of Dogmatic Theology at the Dominican House of Studies, Hawkeyard Priory, Staffordshire.

Thomism.

Honorary Secretary and editor of the Baptist Historical Society; Member of the American Historical Association; author of Roman Catholic and Protestant Bibles, Missionary Achievement; editor of A Baptist Bibliography, The Works of John Smyth.

Trappists.

Wilde (Norman), Ph.D.
Professor of Philosophy in the University of Minnesota.

Welfare.

Williams (Norman Powell), M.A., B.D.
Chaplain Fellow of Exeter College, Oxford; Lecturer in Theology at Exeter and Pembroke Colleges; Examining Chaplain to the Bishop of Newcastle.

Tradition.

WogiharA (Unrai), Ph.D.
Professor of Shya-kyo-daigaku, Tokyo, Japan.

Vasubandhu.

Workman (Herbert B.), M.A., D.Lit.
Principal of Westminster Training College; Member of the Board of Studies in the Faculty of Theology, London University; author of The Dawn of the Reformation, The Letters of John Hus, Persecution in the Early Church, and Christian Thought to the Reformation.

Wyclif.

Yapp (Sir Arthur Keysall), K.B.E., Officier de l'Ordre de la Couronne (Belgium), Wen Hu (China).
National Secretary of the Y.M.C.A.

Young Men's Christian Association.

Youngert (Sven Gustaf), Ph.D., D.D.
Professor of Philosophy and History of Religion at Augustana College and Theological Seminary, Rock Island, Ill.

Vows (Teutonic).
## CROSS-REFERENCES

In addition to the cross-references throughout the volume, the following list of minor references may be useful:

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LISTS OF ABBREVIATIONS

I. GENERAL

A.H. = Anno Hijrae (A.D. 622).
Ak. = Akkad.
Alex. = Alexandrian.
Amer. = American.
Apoc. = Apocalyptic.
Apoc. = Apocrypha.
Ar. = Arabic.
Arab. = Aramaic.
Arm. = Armenian.
As. = Asiatic.
Assyr. = Assyrian.
AT = Altes Testament.
Av = Authorized Version.
AVm = Authorized Version margin.
AY = Anno Yzagird (A.D. 639).
Bab. = Babylonian.
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LISTS OF ABBREVIATIONS

III. FOR THE LITERATURE

1. The following authors' names, when unaccompanied by the title of a book, stand for the works in the list below.

Beauchê 6Beirtrage zur sem. Religionsgesch., 1888.
Baldwin = Dict. of Philosophy and Psychology, 3 vols. 1901-05.
Benzing = Heb. Archäologie, 1894.
Brund = Sachan = Syr. = Etwen Rechtsbuch aus dem fünften Jahrhundert, 1880.
Darem = Sagiolo = Dict. des ant. gree. et rom., 1888-90.
Denzinger = Enchiridion Symbolorum, Freiburg im Br., 1911.
Denzinger = Die Philo. d. Upanishads, 1899 [Eng. tr., 1906].
Doughty = Arabia Deserta, 2 vols. 1888.
Grinn = Deutsche Mythologie*, 3 vols. 1875-78, 1890, 1894.
Hamburger = Recl desensympdyj£e des Bibel u. Talmud, i. 1870 (1892), ii. 1883, suppl. 1886, 1891 f., 1897.
Hölder = Altschamanischer Sprachwechsel, 1891 ff.
Howitt = Native Tribes of S.E. Australia, 1904.
Jubainville = Cours de Litt. celtique, t. xii., 1883 ff.
Lagrange = Études sur les religions sémitiques, 1904.
Lane = An Arabic-English Lexicon, 1883 ff.
Lepsius = Denkmäler aus Agypten u. Äthiopien, 1849-60.
Lichtenberger = Enzy. des scienca religieuses, 1876.
Liddell = Handbuch der nordischen Epigraphik, 1898.

2. Periodicals, Dictionaries, Encyclopedias, and other standard works frequently cited.

AA = Archiv für Anthropologie.
AAOd = American Antiquarian and Oriental Journal.
AE = Archiv für Ethnographie.
AEG = Assy. and Eng. Glossary (Johns Hopkins University).
AG = Abhandlungen der Göttingen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften.
AGPhil = Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.
AH = American Historical Review.
AHT = Ancient Hebrew Tradition (Hommel).
AJPh = American Journal of Philology.
AJPs = American Journal of Psychology.
AJPJe = American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education.
AJSL = American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literature.
AJTh = American Journal of Theology.
AMG = Annales du Musée Guimet.
APES = American Palestine Exploration Society.
AP = Archiv für Papyroverforschung.
AR = Anthropologisch Review.
AW = Archiv für Religionswissenschaft.
AS = Acta Sanctorum (Bollandus).

Bertr-Chipiez = Hist. de l'art dans l'antiquité, 1881 ff.
Preller = Römische Mythologie, 1883.
Réville = Religion des peoples non-civilisés, 1885.
Riehm = Handwörterbuch d. alt. Mythologie*, 1893-94.
Robinson = Biblical Researches in Palestine, 1856.
Roscher = Lex. d. gr. u. röm. Mythologie, 1884 ff.
Schenkel = Bibel-Lexicon, 5 vols. 1890-75.
Schürer = GJ* 3. vols. 1898-1901 [HJP, 5 vols. 1890 ff.]
Schwally = Leben nach dem Tod, 1892.
Siegfried-Stade = Heb. Wörterbuch zum AT, 1893.
Smend = Lehrbuch der alttest. Religionsgesch., 1890.
Smith (G. A.) = Historical Geography of the Holy Land, 1897.
Smith (W. K.) = Religion of the Semites*, 1894.
Spencer = Principles of Sociology*, 1895-96.
Spencer-Gillen = Native Tribes of Central Australia, 1890.
Spencer-Gillen = Northern Tribes of Central Australia, 1904.
Swete = The OT in Greek, 3 vols. 1893 ff.
Taylor (E. B.) = Primitive Culture*, 1891 [1903].
Weber = Jüdische Theologie auf Grund des Talmud u. versammlten Schriften*, 1897.
Wiedemann = Die Religion der alten Agypter, 1890 [Eng. tr., revised, Religion of the Anc. Egyptians, 1897].
Wilkinson = Manners and Customs of the Ancient Egyptians, 3 vols. 1878.
Zunz = Die gottesdienstlichen Vorträge der Juden*, 1892.

ASC = Abhandlungen der Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften.
ASoc = L'Année Sociologique.
ASWT = Archaeological Survey of W. India.
AZ = Allgemeine Zeitung.
BAG = Beiträge zur alten Geschichte.
BASS = Beiträge zur Assyriologie u. sem. Sprachwissenschaft (ed. Delitzsch and Haupt).
BCH = Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique.
BE = Bureau of Ethnology.
BG = Bombay Gazetteer.
BJ = Bellum Judaicum (Josephus).
BL = Brampton Lectures.
BLE = Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique.
BOL = Bibl. and Oriental Record.
BS = Bibliotheca Sacra.
BSA = Annual of the British School at Athens.
BSAA = Bulletin de la Soc. archeologique à Alexandrie.
BSG = Bulletin de la Soc. de Géographie.
BTS = Buddhist Text Society.
BW = Biblical World.
BZ = Biblische Zeitschrift.
**LISTS OF ABBREVIATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PASE</td>
<td>Proceedings of the Anthropological Soc. of Bombay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PB</td>
<td>Polyglott Bible (English).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>Primitive Culture (Tylor).</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEFM</td>
<td>Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Memoirs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEFS</td>
<td>Palestine Exploration Fund Statement.</td>
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<tr>
<td>PG</td>
<td>Patrologia Graecae (Migne).</td>
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<tr>
<td>PJ</td>
<td>Preussische Jahrbücher.</td>
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<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>Patrologia Latina (Migne).</td>
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<tr>
<td>PQN</td>
<td>Punjab Notes and Querias.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>Popular Religion and Folklore of N. India (Crooke).</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRJR</td>
<td>Presbyterian and Reformed Review.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRS</td>
<td>Proceedings of the Royal Society.</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRSE</td>
<td>Proceedings Royal Soc. of Edinburgh.</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTS</td>
<td>Pali Text Society.</td>
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<tr>
<td>RA</td>
<td>Revue Archéologique.</td>
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<td>RAnh</td>
<td>Revue d'Anthropologie.</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAS</td>
<td>Royal Asiatic Society.</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAasyr</td>
<td>Revue d'Asyriologie.</td>
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<tr>
<td>BB</td>
<td>Revue Biblique.</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBEW</td>
<td>Reports of the Bureau of Ethnology (Washington).</td>
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<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Revue Critique.</td>
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<td>RCelt</td>
<td>Revue Celtique.</td>
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<td>RCA</td>
<td>Revue Chrétienne.</td>
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<td>RDM</td>
<td>Revue des Deux Mondes.</td>
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<tr>
<td>RE</td>
<td>Realencyclopaedia.</td>
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<td>REG</td>
<td>Revue des Etudes Grecques.</td>
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<td>REgy</td>
<td>Revue Égyptologique.</td>
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<tr>
<td>REl</td>
<td>Revue des Études Juives.</td>
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<tr>
<td>REth</td>
<td>Revue d'Ethnographie.</td>
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<tr>
<td>RRG</td>
<td>Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart.</td>
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<tr>
<td>RHLR</td>
<td>Revue d'Histoire et de Littérature religieuses.</td>
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<tr>
<td>RHR</td>
<td>Revue de l'Histoire des Religions.</td>
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<td>RPM</td>
<td>Revue du monde musulman.</td>
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<td>RN</td>
<td>Revue Numismatique.</td>
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<td>RP</td>
<td>Records of the Past.</td>
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<td>RPPh</td>
<td>Revue Philosopique.</td>
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<td>RQ</td>
<td>Römische Quartalschrift.</td>
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<tr>
<td>RS</td>
<td>Revue sémitique d'Épigraphie et d'Hist. ancienne.</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSA</td>
<td>Recueil de la Soc. archéologique.</td>
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<td>RSI</td>
<td>Reports of the Smithsonian Institution.</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTAP</td>
<td>Recueil de Travaux relatifs à l'Archéologie et à la Philologie.</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTF</td>
<td>Revue des traditions populaires.</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTPh</td>
<td>Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie.</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTTr</td>
<td>Recueil de Travaux.</td>
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<tr>
<td>RVV</td>
<td>Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten.</td>
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<tr>
<td>RWW</td>
<td>Reaarlö rerbuch.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SBAW</td>
<td>Sitzungsberichte d. Berliner Akademie d. Wissenschaften.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SBB</td>
<td>Sacred Books of the Buddhists.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SBE</td>
<td>Sacred Books of the East.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SBOT</td>
<td>Sacred Books of the OT (Hebrew).</td>
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<tr>
<td>SK</td>
<td>Studien und Kritiken.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMA</td>
<td>Sitzungsberichte d. Münchener Akademie.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWAW</td>
<td>Sitzungsberichte d. Wiener Akademie d. Wissenschaften.</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAPA</td>
<td>Transactions of American Philological Association.</td>
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<tr>
<td>TASI</td>
<td>Transactions of the Asiatic Soc. of Japan.</td>
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<tr>
<td>TC</td>
<td>Tribes and Castes.</td>
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<tr>
<td>TES</td>
<td>Transactions of Ethnological Society.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ThLZ</td>
<td>Theologische Litteraturzeitung.</td>
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<tr>
<td>TkJ</td>
<td>Theol. Tijdschrift.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRHS</td>
<td>Transactions of Royal Historical Society.</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRSE</td>
<td>Transactions of Royal Soc. of Edinburgh.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TS</td>
<td>Texts and Studies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSBd</td>
<td>Transactions of the Soc. of Biblical Archeology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU</td>
<td>Texte und Untersuchungen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAI</td>
<td>Western Asiatic Inscriptions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZA</td>
<td>Zeitschrift für Assyriologie.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZATW</td>
<td>Zeitschrift für die alttest. Wissenschaft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZCK</td>
<td>Zeitschrift für christliche Kunst.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZCP</td>
<td>Zeitschrift für celtische Philologie.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZDA</td>
<td>Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZDMG</td>
<td>Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZDPV</td>
<td>Zeitschrift des deutschen Palästina-Vereins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZE</td>
<td>Zeitschrift für Ethnologie.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZK</td>
<td>Zeitschrift für Keilschriftforschung.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZKG</td>
<td>Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZKT</td>
<td>Zeitschrift für kathol. Theologie.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZM</td>
<td>Zeitschrift für die Mythologie.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZNTW</td>
<td>Zeitschrift für die neuest. Wissenschaft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZPPh</td>
<td>Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Pädagogik.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZTK</td>
<td>Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZVK</td>
<td>Zeitschrift für Volksskunde.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZVWB</td>
<td>Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechts-wissenschaft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZWT</td>
<td>Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie.</td>
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[A small superior number designates the particular edition of the work referred to, as KAT², LOT⁶, etc.]
SUFFERING.—I. INTRODUCTION: THE FACT AND THE PROBLEM.—Suffering, as a feature of life in this earth, is too obvious and too familiar to need description. Sentimentality and denunciation are alike superfluous. Suffering is all but universal. From the point where, in the evolutionary process, a brain is developed, upward through all ranks of being, suffering is an unvarying element in experience. It appears in endless variety. Some of it belongs to animals in their natural conditions as an accompaniment of their life-story or as a consequence of their predisposed habits. It is, however, in human life that suffering most abounds. A great deal of human suffering is what we term roughly ‘physical pain,’ though, in point of fact, the suffering of a self-conscious being must be radically distinct from that of a living creature in whose sentient life the thought of personality has not yet dawned. Physical pain is found in many degrees of intensity, from that which is easily bearable, at least by persons in normal health, to that which is appalling to look upon, and must constitute an unimaginable anguish. If we pass from physical suffering to that which is mental and moral, we are overwhelmed by the mass and the magnitude of the agonies that are the lot of mankind. From the sorrows of childhood, deeper than the observer can calculate, to the stony griefs of age, untold and ungauged, there is a range of suffering beyond all enumeration and conception, baffling the imagination, affronting the intelligence.

The worst feature of human suffering is the chaotic nature of its distribution. If strong men alone were sufferers, we would comfort ourselves by noting the gladness of little children; but children suffer, often with an intensity which seems too awful for the tender frame to endure and yet survive. If the guilty alone suffered, we might have some kind of theodicy to fit the facts; but the innocent suffer; they are the greatest sufferers. If we had to consider only our own pains, we might find a reason for them, or at least we could retreat to the fastness of our unconquerable soul. When, however, it is the pain of others that confronts us, we feel that our explanations are an impertinence. The clue to their sufferings is not to be found in any supposed rationale of our own.

The deepest element in the problem of pain is that so much suffering is meaningless, as far as our most careful thought can discern. After we have noted causes the removal of which would certainly reduce the quantity of pain in the world, after we have seen the ends which it may be supposed to serve, there remains a surplusage of pain unaccounted for by our largest theory. It is this surplusage that forms the heart of the mystery of suffering. If there is any meaningless pain in the world, it cannot, surely, be the best of all possible worlds. How can a world crossed by such a bar sinister be the expression of wisdom, power, or goodness?

‘The dilemma of Epicurus is still with us: if God wishes to prevent evil but cannot, then he is impotent; if he could but will not, he is malevolent; if he has both the power and the will, whence then is evil?’

The challenge to theism is direct. There is probably little theoretic atheism among ordinary men and women. But it is certain that in multitudes of cases faith has suffered shipwreck on the rock of meaningless pain. To this form of unbelief women are peculiarly prone. Suffering appeals to their sympathy. Their acquaintance with it is wide and intimate. They feel, more deeply than men, the waste and cruelty of it; and they are accordingly brought to doubt the existence of a God who is at once almighty and all-merciful. In their case, too, scepticism means more than it does to the majority of men. It is not merely the abandonment of a theory. It is the ruin of a life, through the loss of the hope which alone makes life endurable. In all ages the pressure of this problem of pain has been felt. It may even be said to be the driving force in all philosophy and in every great religion.

How shall man be reconciled to life? What view of the world must be taken if man is to live worthily in it? What estimate of life must be held if it is to be at least endurable? How are the facts of suffering to be adjusted to the sense of value and the inspiration of hope, which are the springs of fruitful labour?

II. THE LEADING ATTEMPTS AT SOLUTION.—

1. Pessimism.—Frankly and definitely, suffering is so wide-spread and so intense that the verdict of W. R. Sorley and others, The Elements of Pain and Conflict in Human Life, p. 48.
of open-eyed and unprejudiced observers must be that the world is an intolerable place to live in, and that the solution is unendurable.

The classical example of this solution of the problem of pain is the doctrine of Buddhism, which, in the heart of the 19th cent., was rendered popular Schopenhauer. Pessimism is always the same. It is interesting for its verdict, not for its discussions. Buddha's Four Noble Truths—pain, the origin of pain, the destruction of pain, and the eightfold holy way—are the conclusion of the whole matter. The first contains the result of direct observation. Suffering perception is pain. It is the worst-of-the-worse and miserable. The second traces this universalretchedness to its source in 'thirst,' the desire which attaches the soul to worldly objects and leads to 'becoming': an infinite series of new existences, with a monotonous repetition of birth, pain, and death. The third points out the means of deliverance from life and from suffering, viz., cessation of desire. Let desire cease; then the thread of life will be snapped; then the fountain of suffering will cease to flow. The fourth is Buddha's plan of salvation, containing a careful account of the steps by which the extinction of desire is to be accomplished. Among these morality has its place; and Buddhist ethic has a mild lustre of its own. The crown of the procedure, however, is contemplation. Schopenhauer's 'path' includes art, but, otherwise, is scarcely an improvement upon Buddha's. The issue for both is the same—the cessation of desire, the abandonment of the will to live.

To discuss the philosophy of pessimism (q.v.) would be wasted labour. The Buddhist psychology, with its rigidly atomic sensationalism, has gone to the scarp-hamp. Schopenhauer's dependence on Kant does not give his system considerable weight in the very presence of the development of pessimism, or the final demonstration of its weakness, must be sought elsewhere. Pessimism pursues the empirical method. The first question to be asked is as to the validity of this method and as to the certainty of 'truth' reached by means of it. Can the worthlessness of life be established by any enumeration of details? The question is not as to the possibility of balancing the pessimist's miseries and affords no other of a more cheering nature. Optimism cannot be established by such means. The real question is as to the method itself. The pessimist inference from the facts of pain is not really drawn by mere generalization. It rests on a preconceived theory of values, by which all the facts of life are tested. Pessimism is simply discounted hedonism. If the highest good is pleasure, life is certainly not worth living; for pleasure in any case is not to be had, on any terms whatever, in human experience, to such a degree as to counterbalance the damming facts of pain. If the Creator was bound to secure for His creatures a life of pleasure, He certainly has failed to do so. His power has not been equal to His good intentions. If He exists, we must conceive of Him as stern of His omnipotence, or even as an enemy of the ethical laws of the most precarious. If appeal be made to experts in living, the answer will be that happiness is not the chief good for man and cannot be conceived as the chief end of creation. That place of eminence belongs to moral goodness.

Our question as to the world, accordingly, must be: Is it so framed and ordered that moral goodness is being wrought out therein, not merely in spite of, but actually by means of, the suffering that is to be found in all human life? It is to be observed, however, that the answer might be obtained by an appeal to religion, or, at least, to theology. We might be quite convinced that virtue is the highest good for man, and we might indicate the posture that virtue grows to its maturity through the discipline of pain; still, if there is no principle of happiness, and there is no relation at all to character and cannot be related to the chief end of creation, the theistic conclusion remains open to doubt. It may even become more difficult to maintain the logical position of the moralist, if it be shown that morality is not to be established by argument at all, and that theism is warranted by some other process than that of logical demonstration. In that case the challenge of suffering would be met, but not on ethical grounds.

2. Stoicism.—Another answer to the challenge of suffering is to the effect that, while pain is real and may be very acute, it is one of those indifferent things which a wise and strong man may not allow it to disturb him in any way. The Stoic philosophy is the elaboration of this answer, by means of a full apparatus of metaphysics, psychology, and ethic. Stoicism, however, is more than a philosophical theory. It is an attitude to life. It reappears in noted personalities, when the insistent evils and disorders of the world drive men to the inner region of their own souls, to find there a refuge nowhere else discoverable. The circumstances under which classical Stoicism arose are familiar. It was an age of individualism. No relief or satisfaction could be found in any form of life open to man in the world of that day. Men could not go into the world and find the counterpart of their own moral nature. They could not lose themselves in the activities of city or nation and in the relations of society. They had to find their own highest welfare. And this for two reasons: no city or nation was left standing in its independence; and the soul of man had grown so great in its needs and capacities that it could no longer be satisfied within the limits of civic or national activities, however intense and vivid these might be. Man had discovered himself. He knew now that nothing less than the universe would meet his requirements of a satisfying life. Here, then, is the Stoic gospel, which is at once a philosophy and a message of salvation. The ultimate reality is reason. We may speak of Nature or of God. In any case there is one principle at work in the world and in man. Stoicism is, in this aspect, optimism. It believes in a principle which underlies all phenomena and is moving through all events to complete victory. This principle is the life of all that is, both within man and beyond him. It is a principle of reason and of harmony. It is inherently good; and its supremacy is the highest welfare of the world and of man. The ethical theories, accordingly, are supposed to be derived from the natural or with reason; or, speaking religiously, it is harmony with the will of God. The ancient Stoic doctrine of providence has the fervour of intense religious conviction. It is strange at first sight that such an abstruse philosophy should have any room for a theo-eristic acknowledgment of the facts of pain and evil. It is to be noted, however, that the ultimate reason has been reached in Stoicism too easily. It is, after all, a negation of the vast and confusing facts of a miserable and perplexing experience. It is the bare affirmation of an abstract principle which ought to be the truth of all things and, in point of fact, is reproduced in scarcely any of them. Reason is everything; and yet reason is nowhere. Stoic optimism is a faith; but the Stoic estimate of facts is dark and pessimistic. What, then, is man to do, praised as he is between reason, which is his true nature, and a world in which man and things are so irrational? What attitude is he to take towards such brute facts as hunger and cold, oppression and cruelty, bereavement and ruin? He is not serene and hard. The wise man will choose reason. He will be absolutely sure that this choice brings him a good of which no power in man or in things can really be the possible possession of the absolute best. His harmony with reason sets him in a charmed circle, into
which nothing irrational and evil can ever enter. Pain racks his body; but his body is not his reason. Death robs him of wife or child; but they are not himself, and all his friends that cannot invade the citadel of his own peace. We read the aphorisms and cannons of an Epictetus with a shudder. So calm, so logical, so inhuman! It ought to be noted, however, that the attitude of complete detachment towards pain and evil is an advance upon a view such as that of Aristotle, which regards them as obstacles in the way of a perfect life. So far as they are obstacles.

The perfect life has simply nothing to do with them. The wise man will not court them; but he will not allow them to disturb his serenity. He will make their occurrence in his experience the occasion of manifesting his consistency with reason. He will even benefit by their presence, inasmuch as his conquest of them will invigorate his strength and enable him to gain a yet greater superiority over them. But, in themselves, they have no relation to his inner life, which is complete without them and does nothing to them. At this point our admiration for the Stoic attitude reaches its highest pitch.

Here also our criticism begins. The reason, which is the Stoic's God, and highest good, is not positively related to the manifold experiences of life. It is not in and through them that reason is revealed to man. The man who attains the fullness of his being. Very specially, pain and evil serve no end of reason, and the supreme principle of the universe has no relation to them. Man, in union with that principle, has no duty with regard to them, save to repel them and to refuse them the tribute of an emotion. It is not on these lines that the worth of life can be vindicated or an idealized construction of the universe be established. The Stoic conclusion is mere negation, abstraction, and emptiness. It is good only for defiance; but defiance is not victory over pain; and far less is it transmutation of evil into the means of a greater good.

Yet is it good, even for defiance? Stoicism has too easily assumed that man can choose the reason of the universe and identify himself with it. A painful doubt develops. What if a man's self be the main obstacle to his being identified with God? In abandoning all things finite and particular, will he not need also to surrender himself? Thus the very essence of the Stoic practice and the Stoic gospel turns out to be a counsel of despair. In the night of my self I am to defy the world. But who am I? The very essence of finitude, the very aye of contrast with the reason which is the harmony of the universe. My utmost willing, then, is weakness. Upon my resistance falls the doom of impotence and impotence. Victory is turned to defeat. Self-confidence is no longer possible; for self is the secret of failure. When Stoicism has reached this point, it is ready for a philosophy, or a religion, which shall start where it ended and make the condition of man's achievement of the highest good, not his self-assertion, but his self-surrender. The challenge of suffering might now be met in a different way—not by resistance, but by acceptance. Pain might become, not an obstacle in the path of the perfect life, not even a thing indifferent to man's inner good, but the opportunity and the instrument of his death to self, and therefore, also, of his complete self-realization. Stoicism began with optimism and ended in pessimism. It must, however, be the period and lead to our optimism upon a deeper view of evil than an empirical pessimism had ever reached. Such a stage beyond Stoicism is found in one direction in Neoplatonism, and by another path in Christianity. 3. Meliorism. A further answer to the challenge of suffering than that offered by Stoicism was very prevalent during the recent war. The world, it is admitted, is full of virulent evils and untold sufferings. The answer is, that such evils are to be fought. They are not to be accepted as an irresistible fate or as the appointment of an almighty and sovereign Disposer of events. They are evil, and evils, continually. Judged by the human conscience, they exist only to be resisted, defeated, banished from the experience of the race. They are a challenge to love, sympathy, honour, to be met by sacrifice, and above all by unending war. All intelligences are summoned to take part in this war for peace, this struggle for the abolition of suffering. Among the hosts engaged in this life-and-death conflict some individuals, both human and superhuman, occupy the position of leadership, as well in strategy as in the actual fighting. Commander-in-chief of this army is God. He is not what absolutism, or orthodox theism, has conceived Him to be. He is not the inscrutable ground of all being, the omnipotent will, the omnipotent mind by whose unalterable decree all things in creation are predetermined. He is a finite being, and of course His reason is also finite and human. He in this fight, which is no shadowy and spectral combat, but is for Him as for man tragically real, a genuine life or death struggle. We can indeed scarcely imagine His being defeated ultimately; but He has not won yet. Nay, He cannot win unless He secures the co-operation of man. In this tremendous conflict human beings cannot be neutral. If they are not for Him, they are against Him, slackers, traitors, or open enemies. He sends out a great call for volunteers; and all who have a spark of generosity or heroism will rally to His side. They will fight with the sword of the spirit, which comes from sympathy with the oppressed and tortured everywhere, and with the desperate energy of those who see the issue plainly. They are fighting for their all, for the very life of humanity, and humanity's radiant and high-souled Leader. Every woe pulled down, every disease routed, every social wrong redressed, is a battle won in the long campaign, a stage to the final, all-comprehensive victory. Suffering is being eliminated. Progress is being made. The end, if not in sight, is reasonably secure.

But the practical value of meliorism must rest ultimately in the value of the universe, which the Stoics held to be the same as that of the individual. If these are invalid, their results cannot be permanent. Now the presuppositions of meliorism are mainly three: (1) the universe is conceived as growing in time, its future, strictly speaking, unpredictable; (2) God Himself is avowedly a finite being, in time, sometimes described even as young, with a future before Him in which He has still to make good; (3) the issue of the conflict is, in the nature of the case, uncertain, though every successive victory and the inexhaustible resources of intelligence, human and superhuman, give ground for hope. It is not too much to say that each one of these presuppositions is disputable. Not one of them has won universal consent. Together they constitute a huge hypothesis. If regarded as more than this, they become sheer dogmatism; and dogmas are but iron rations at best, and are soon exhausted.

The error both of Stoicism and of meliorism lies in trying to turn what is partial into an absolute. Because a man is summoned to oppose the evil that threatens him, he should not be prepared to learn that he can carry on till the victory is his. Suppose, however, that this rough dualism between the good man and the wicked world does not represent the whole picture. Suppose that the real source of evil is not without, but within, and that
the conflict that is being waged in the world is the image and the outcome of a more devouring strife that rages in man’s own soul. Then the result will be, as happened in the history of Stoicism, that self must give up its self-sufficiency and must seek the truth of the good, pain, and God must break his self-surrender, and see in its attainment of virtue and knowledge the disclosure and the communication of One who includes the universe in His consciousness and that of the individual. Then the fighter may carry on without anxiety and without self-confidence, because the victory has been won already, not by himself, but by the Power which is working in him, whose servant and vehicle he is. The end of any war is not uncertain, though it can be reached only through a sacrificial ministry.

I ought to be added that meiosis makes no pretension of having solved the problem of pain. It knows no more than any other theory why pain should ever be; and it cannot be blamed for refusing to face the question. A goner detector, however, is its inability to provide hope or comfort for those sufferers who are not taking part in the successful victories, or are not directly beneficiaries of the universal good, not by self-assertion, but by self-surrender, and see in its attainment of virtue and knowledge the disclosure and the communication of One who includes the universe in His consciousness and that of the individual. Then the fighter may carry on without anxiety and without self-confidence, because the victory has been won already, not by himself, but by the Power which is working in him, whose servant and vehicle he is. The end of any war is not uncertain, though it can be reached only through a sacrificial ministry.

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due to the disability of a finite consciousness. From this point of view the problem of evil may be solved; but the solution is really pantheistic.

The criticism of Hume, and the yet more destructive work of Kant, have made the dominance of an abstract Absolute truth impossible for modern thought. The finite has come to its rights. The principle of freedom is too strongly entrenched in the convictions of men ever to be relegated to the sphere of the negative, even if it means that modern optimism can no longer take the position of pantheism, and so affirm the sole reality of good as to destroy the possibility of evil. Its proof must now consist in arguing that evil is inseparable from the highest good, that the highest good is attainable only through the conquest of evil. This argument consists fundamentally in a special reading of the facts of human life. It may be presented as a deduction from an idealist philosophy, or it may appear as an induction from data empirically reached. Fundamentally it is a judgment of value, as intuition of the significance of life, and is reached by either the a priori or the a posteriori method.

There is no evil except for a rational being, who is capable of willing a good which he identifies with the absolute good, but which is in reality dependent upon him. The possibility of willing this lower good is inseparable from the existence of free agents, who, by the nature of the higher through experience of the lower, it is just the high destiny of man and the infinite perfection of God which makes it inconceivable how there should be a universe, containing beings who realize what is the meaning of their own life and of the whole, unless those beings pass through the long and painful process by which the absolutely good is revealed as that which can overcome the deepest depths of evil.1

Watson, from whom these words are quoted, develops them into a view of human nature and history which shows that, the higher the conception of the good, the deeper will be the insight into evil. The man who knows himself a sinner knows no sin is alien to him. He is the supreme sinner of the universe, the chief of sinners; and in the act in which he confesses and dies to his sin the violated order is rectified; and the guilt which he so profoundly acknowledges is lifted to the shoulders of Another, and he is free for ever. Watson does not in this passage explicitly apply this profound conception of an optimism, vindicated through a deeper pessimism than Buddha or Christianity, which is the least known of all the characteristics and the only possible evil. Plainly, however, the one problem lies within the other. The deepest evil man can suffer is the division within his own spirit. Let him come with the Absolute he healed, and his breach with nature cannot fail to be healed likewise. The truth of nature is spirit. If the unity of spirit rise triumphant above the dualism that a false assertion of freedom has wrought, there can be left nowhere in the universe any element of difference, and therefore of evil, which is not in process of being transcended in the realization of the ultimate good.

Many writers who do not adhere to Watson's type of idealism base their ethical view of the universe on the facts which he emphasizes. The world was certainly not framed to produce the pleasure of all sentient creatures or the happiness of human beings. The highest good is moral, and moral good can be attained by man only through a process of discipline. A world which made goodness easy would make true goodness impossible. By work, by suffering, and by his own character is perfected. The ethical and optimistic inference is more securely drawn from a world with imperfections, in conflict with which character is refined, then as a result of which either neither physical nor moral evil was present. It is possible to believe that the Creator of such a

1 See art. LEIBNIZ and PESSIMISM AND OPTIMISM.
world is good and wise and allembracing, whereas such a faith would be valueless if the world were a machine for turning out mechanical perfection. This does not mean, of course, that for every pain we suffer there shall be a corresponding good. Physical suffering comes to us through our place in a cosmic order whose laws operate with absolute impartiality. We would prefer that it were otherwise? Yet in such a world, and in such a world alone, can the hypothesis of a personal God be sustained. An individual of regulated, observed, fact, the good is making progress towards a victory, which may be delayed, but which stands in no reasonable doubt. One difficulty lies in the path of such modest optimism, viz. the fate of the individual. Most upholders of this view take refuge in the idea of personal immortality. It is granted that the general optimistic estimate requires that there shall be a balance of good for the individual as well as for the race, seeing that the individual is an end in himself, and not a mere link in a chain. But in the vast majority of individuals this balance is not struck within time and space. It is necessary, therefore, to postulate another life, in which the wrongs and sufferings of this world shall be rectified and their memory lost in the realization of perfect good.

The highest remedy is Loro, which turns upon the supremacy of moral worth, and the function of pain in realizing it in the history of individuals and of the race, is intellectually unanswerable. The conclusion is: it is not fatal, it is not good, it is not the case. Under these conditions, it is not needed. It may be that in this case pain is; and pain is inexpressible by a process of reasoning. Over against every phase of the argument stands the intractable pain, or, rather, there stands the pitiful army of the sufferers. Optimism appears satisfactory only when we stand back from the facts. Stated in the midst of them, and our philosophy is smitten into silence. A world, with pain in it—and such pain!—cannot be the best of all possible worlds.

Of course, Omar Khayyam's aspiration is ridiculous. We cannot grasp this sorry scheme of things entire, cannot sway the harshest truths with an understanding heart's desire. None the less, we turn from the best that the optimist can say to the contemplation of a universe which contains such 'things' in it and are conscious of a hauntingly cruel consciousness: they do not fit the lock. Suffering remains a mystery and a challenge to thought.

5. The Christian doctrine of providence.—It cannot be doubted that Jesus had the whole fact of pain present to His mind. He lived in the midst of suffering. Yet it did not present itself to Him as a problem. Certainly He made no explicit reference to the questions with which Job wrestled. His compassions flowed forth unheeded by any theory of the causes of pain. He never viewed suffering as other than a great evil. He devoted a large part of His ministry to its alleviation. But He never stood before it confounded or paralyzed. If He was conscious of its challenge to the God of His adversary, He never argued with an unanswerable heart's desire. None the less, we turn from the best that the optimist can say to the contemplation of a universe which contains such 'things' in it and are conscious of a hauntingly cruel consciousness: they do not fit the lock. Suffering remains a mystery and a challenge to thought.

This experience is not a mystic rapture, to be attained in rare moments by those who have leisure to cultivate the conditions leading to such remote and perilous heights. It may be reached by children, or by those who consent to become as little children. It is peculiarly accessible to sufferers. It is reached in the act by which man surrenders his separateness of will and commits himself trustfully to the divine love as it moves in the midst of all the circumstances. Such an experience cannot be translated directly into a theory of pain. It contains more than any theory can express. All noble idealism seeks to interpret its fulness; and, apart from it, no philosophical solution can be more than an attractive speculation.

The Christian doctrine of providence (q.v.) articulates the leading ideas which are implicit in this experience, and by means of them seeks to exhibit the relation of God to the history of the world. It does so, however, under the distinct understanding that the experience of communion with God, while it is central and all-comprehensive, can be drawn upon to provide ready-made answers to the questions which intellect may raise regarding the course of nature and of human life. The divine love is the answer to the problem. The highest remedy is the unconditional love of God in the life of the Son of God. But this does not mean that a book could be written, solving, on the whole and in every detail, the mystery of pain. No reasoning power can reach a sanctuary where at once comforts and remedies the soul that pain has shattered. The Christian is an optimist, but not a theorist. He knows God. He has seen Him in Christ. God is love. That is the secret. There is no truth outside of love, no power that can withstand love. It dominates the universe. It is almighty. When it is reproduced in man, it is the greatest thing in the world. The doctrine of providence simply says, in different connexions, that the divine love is sure of itself, knows its own design, is baffled by no obstacles, overcomes all enemies, is moving to an end, guaranteed in Christ, which is none other than God's perfect communication of Himself in and to a universe which responds with the 'Amen' of absolute faith and unshaken devotion. Christian optimism blends the confident assertion of love's supremacy with a deep appreciation of the mystery of suffering. Yet the Christian does not employ this key to meet the question of why and wherefore, either as to the presence of pain in the world at large, or as to any individual experience. He bears witness to the fact of love. The acceptance of that fact introduces the sufferer to an experience in which all questionings are transcended in a great possession. Christianity accordingly stands apart from theorectic optimism. It does not, of course, impugn the function of pain, by which philosophers and poets have sought to establish their hopeful conclusions. It can use such instances of beneficial pain as illustrations of its own central truth. It doubts, however, their adequacy to establish, by intellectual demonstration, results so magnificent. It is in full sympathy with their spirit. But it rests its optimism on a different basis; and it presents its results not so much to those who contemplate suffering from without, in order to satisfy their questions, as to those who know it from within, that they may know it better and enter through it into fellowship with God.

(a) The ground of Christian optimism.—The Christian doctrine of providence stands at one point in profound and significant agreement with such an idealism as is revealed in the writings of Caud and Watson. It believes that the problem of pain is part of the wider and deeper problem of moral evil. It does not stay to discuss the fact of
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physical evil before it has dealt with the graver problem of sin. It presents itself as the token of a breach with God, confident that, if that has been met and healed, no other discord can remain finally unresolved. Nature finds its truth in man.

Physical suffering has its analogue in the division which exists between the human soul and God. Reconciliation with God will be the final solution of a mystery of pain which reverberates throughout the universe. In spite of this parallelism, however, the Christian viewpoint is not an idealism, but idealism is not Christianity. The vital question for both is the reconciliation of man and God. How is it achieved? Idealism answers, In an idea. Christianity ventures its all on an historic fact. Idealism pursues the soul to its deepest consciousness of guilt and declares that there already is the reconciliation. The consciousness of guilt is possible only to a soul fundamentally at one with God. In awaking to a sense of his guilt, man knows himself reconciled at once to God and the universe. The spiritual unity is gained; the unification of all experience is thereby guaranteed. Christianity deepens the diagnosis and exhibits a different remedy. In sin man has the universe against him. It reacts to his sin in perpetual judgment, registering in his character and his career, in loss and death, the condemnation which man's attack upon the universal order has brought upon him. This automatic reaction does not stand apart from the will of God. It reflects one aspect of the divine mind regarding sin and carries out one part of the divine dealing with it. But sin is not the ultimate reality of the moral world; and judgment is not the whole mind and will of God. This is the measure of the reconciliation.

The reconciliation is accomplished not in an idea, but in the action of God. The love of God goes into action coincidently with the sin of man. It is true that God's experience of time must differ from ours in a manner necessarily inconceivable by us; so that it is not improper to speak of an eternal act of love and an eternal atonement. But the standpoint of Christianity is, definitely historical. Sin is in time. Sin-bearing is in time also. Love can reconcile the world to God only if it pass to the world's side and in the world realize experimentally the whole meaning of sin. It must enter into this life's experience more tragically than any penitent sinner ever has passed through. 'Christ died for our sins' (1 Co15). It is the first, the only, Christian gospel. In the action and passion of a life crowned by the Cross Christ is not another than God. He is God, in a temporal experience, manifesting an eternal fact. Love has gone to the utmost limit of sin and suffering and has returned bearing the fruits of that unimaginable agony in a world reconciled, mankind redeemed, sin and evil judged, exposed, broken. The fact of sin—that is pessimism. The fact of Christ—that is optimism. Christianity confronts the world of sin and suffering with the deeper suffering of divine sin-bearing love. All else things have to it to say is an inference from that basal fact. Its doctrine of providence consists in developing the significance of that fact for the varied discipline of life.

'\"The Christian faith in providence is an immediate inference from the Christian experience of redemption, and it is an intuition as vast and unqualified as the redeeming love on which it rests.\"'

To be reconciled to God is to be reconciled to life. To be at one with God is to be at home in the universe. The reactions of the order with which we now live in harmony set like a tide towards our perfection. 'All things work together for good to them that love God.' Love has taken the place of the cross and is being possessed by it, we possess all things.

'The NT is lyric; but it is not a freak of poetic fancy. It is the song of a victory won, the record of an experience, not the less reliable that it is amazing, an inference which is strictly logical, from the greater to the less, though it surpass all calculation. The God of redemption, who had delivered him up for us all, how shall he not with him also freely give us all things?' (Ro 8:8).

(b) The Christian attitude towards suffering.—

(1) Pain means obstruction of life. It is essentially evil. It is not the intention of God that any of His sentient creatures should suffer. It is not possible to say to every sufferer, 'God sent you this; He has laid this affliction upon you.' This judgment upon suffering as evil will be assailed from many points of view, scientific, ethical, and religious. Suffering, it will be said, is inevitable, as an element in the evolution of the world. It has been experienced by innumerable sentient creatures, millennia before man appeared on the earth, before the first sin was committed. Suffering, it will be urged, is a splendid moral discipline. It is, therefore, a good, of which no man can complain that he has had too much. It is alleged to reply that the Author and Object of Christian faith, the Revealer and the Organ of the infinite love, did not think so. He steadfastly set Himself to reduce the sum of pain. So far as we know, He never met a case of pain which He did not relieve, if the conditions were present for His doing so. In such action He Himself suffered exceedingly. For such a man to make suffering necessary to the fulfillment of His redeeming vocation (Mt 8:7). But His doing so cannot be construed as an approval of pain. Rather was it a judgment upon sin as an evil to be removed at any cost of pain. This judgment, moreover, was not an implicit hedonism. It would be ridiculous to make such a suggestion regarding the teaching of Jesus. He never taught that it was a primary concern of God's love to keep His creatures immune from suffering. He absolutely denied that the crown of life was pleasure. But this cannot be construed to mean that He regarded suffering as a good, or as necessary for the attainment of life, or to purge the soul of religion. It does imply, however, that He regarded the condition of the world as abnormal. He occupies the point of view of the religious mind of Israel in looking upon the world as standing in intimate and vital relation with human life. There is a strict relevance between these two. If there be evil in man, there will be pain in nature. Nature stands so far near to spirit that it thrills responsive to the breach that sin has wrought between the human spirit and the divine. Paul is enlarging the same idea inherited from the OT, and reinterpreted through the death and resurrection of the Redeemer, when He speaks of the 'sighing of creation,' of its subjection to μακραίσθη and its share in the hope of redemption (Ro 8:22). There is suffering in nature; and there is suffering in man as part of nature. And all suffering, in nature or in little children, is the exposition and illustration of that which, in self-conscious and self-determining man, is sin. Dognosticism regarding the origin of sin and suffering is foreign to the approach for a theory is to bring the Eternal within the limits of time. We have nothing to do with origins. We have to do only with meanings and values. And this is the meaning which Christianity puts upon suffering. It means life is evil; and it means evil. The first thing to be done with it is
not to discuss it or apologize for it, but to relieve it, if possible, and at least administer the healing of sympathy. This, then, is the first position of Christianity with respect to pain: it is not God's will for His creatures that they should suffer; His mouth shall be closed from His universe for evermore.

(2) Pain is not an unanswerable challenge to theism. It is not inconsistent with the supremacy of love. Love has attained a final victory in an event which occurred in time. Love has snatched victory from defeat. It has transmuted the foulest crime of man into the instrument of the divine redemption. It has done this greatest thing. How shall it not accomplish all lesser things in the same order? He who redeems from sin will not be baffled by suffering. It is to be noted carefully that Christian thought, in claiming that God is not hindered by the obstacle of pain, is not passing from ethical to non-ethical considerations, giving up love to take up power. What Christian experience finds in the Cross of Christ is not an incident, an act over and done with, like the punishment of a criminal. It is the historic revelation of that which is in essence timeless, and endures through all time, and triumphs in all history. In the Cross of Christ is the supreme revelation of the divine immutability. God is present in all pain. He suffers in all suffering. He is the chief sufferer in the world.

This is the doctrine of the Cross, the surest affirmation of faith: 'In all their affliction he was afflicted.' The incarnation of God in Christ is the deepest truth of the divine relation to the world. Nicene orthodoxy is not orthodox enough. Mired by the Greek conception of the Absolute, it ascribes divinity to One who, nevertheless, has an experience of which God is incapable. But the God whom faith finds in Christ is the only God there is. He suffers in all that sin has wrought, and His suffering is the redemption of the world. Christianity meets the challenge of pain, not by anxious computations of the amount of good which may be extracted from the agonies that fill the records of time, but by the unveiling of the sufferings of God. The Cross is the only Christian apologia. Only through the suffering of God is it tolerable to suppose that a world with pain in it is finally triumphing and carrying on within its tragic history the energy of the omnipotent redeeming love. We time-determined consciousnesses cannot pretend to understand God; but we know that He has made an estimate that is sure and pierces the inevitable mists of time. God is love. This know. For the rest we can afford to wait.

(3) Christianity sets out in the name and by the power of a victory already won, on its age-long vacation—the conquest of sin and suffering. To accept at God's hands the deliverance He has wrought by pain is to be committed to a perpetual war with pain. The campaign is world-wide. The battles are innumerable. The fundamental strategy is to utilize for every instance of pain the energy of love, which is the very nature of God and is available and adequate for the redemption of man. In this plan, if by any chance: theology and Church policy have fallen behind the actual experience of Christians and have failed to push home the victory.

Three lines of action are prescribed by the consciousness of redemption.

(1) The employment of pain, as is here that optimism is most at home. Browning has rung out the answering bell of sympathy. It is absurd to assume that in a sinful world the perfecting of souls is won through suffering. We are to react on the pains we endure, and so make them subservient to the inmost will of moral stability. We have to be swift and earnest in this subjection of pain to our uses; for the opportunity of exploiting it passes with passage of time. We are to lay to heart the thought which finds eloquent expression in Ugo Foschi's 'Sermon in the Hospital':

'While we suffer, let us set our souls
To suffer perfectly: since this alone,
The sick soul, which is this world's special grace,
May here be perfected and left behind.'

All this is to be accepted, rejoiced in, and practised. The only reservation to be made is that such considerations be not used as a Christian justification of pessimistic optimism as a theory. The data are not broad enough. The victory of the Cross was the first instance of the victory of truth being in danger of being attacked in detail and made to yield hoity to the conqueror. This is the paradox of the higher life of man. Apart from the faith in triumphs that have been won the irrelevant pain in nature and history would rout the most consistent optimist.

(ii). The mastery of conditions. This is the sphere of organized ministry. All such service, whether operated by idealists or materialists, Christians or non-Christians, is a demonstration that the conditions of human life are abysmal, and that, before full victory can be enjoyed these conditions must be improved. Another preoccupation, however, has to be made if such ministerial aid to sufferers is to be completely successful, and is to be the world-wide. By this means the idea of the cure of the sick soul is the cure of the cause, and the hope of the last is the hope of the every day. He who suffers, who, of course, is the primary minister, will find that the cure of his soul is dependent on the cure of the world.

(iii). The direct exhibition of the ultimate cure of pain, viz. the love of God in Christ. This is not an extravagance of unreasoning enthusiasm. It is sober fact, verified by innumerable instances; God's love does heal pain. If the love of God were remittent in proportion as the evil of the world, what would remain? This is not an abstract speculation; it is a question whose answer cannot be arithmetically complete, and yet is absolutely plain in the limits of bounds of human endurance and satisfaction. We must make thorough work of the category of solidarity. Soul, body, and man, race as it will, are helpless but for the revelation of the sons of God. Man's part in this comprehensive conquest of pain corresponds to the leadership of the world. In him the meaning and value of the world are consciously apprehended and uttered. By him only have they been generously ministered, and the forces which should have filled the world with the peace and joy of functions normally operating and perfectible applied have been hindered, and man and nature have been put to illimitable torture. It is not morbid when a man sees in the pain of innocent children, of wronged workers, of the poor even of the criminals, in the highest rank, the sign and seal of his own sin, the issues of a mighty evil in which he is indispensable. It is the simple fact.

Therefore men has special work to do in the healing of pain. He has to receive the healing which love can bestow in his own experience, allowing it unhindered exercise as he is reconciled to God and to life. He has to become the conscious organ of that healing to all who suffer. He is never to inflict pain except in so far as pain, in the conditions under which we live (themselves abysmal), is the instrument of moral or physical benefit. He is to be ceaselessly the channel of the love of God to man. Simply by being in the communion of God, one living in the divine love becomes source and centre of healing to the souls and bodies of all around. The evidence is matter of daily experience. Yet the power of healing is not a bare physical force. It requires conscious appropriation and direction. Love that heals is not magic but, as so effectively as a vocation, accepted and fulfilled. The specific task of love belongs to the manifold opportunities of life, and these are innumerable. They include all ministries of help. In particular, the hospital obligation is clear. The one to whom love is doing its reconciling and healing work, One is witness, the other is prayer. The Church, called into being by love's deed, has been

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slow in its recognition of these evident duties—
slower, and less confident, in respect of the second thing, that is, the direct function and high privilege of humanity do chiefly consist. By prayer man enters the sanctuary of the divine immunence. In prayer the indwelling love of God, by the operation of a new centre of energy from which to work. Prayer is the liberation of the spiritual energies that are saving the world. Prayer provides God with the conditions without which an Omnipotence that is, moral, and not physical, would not act. The question will be asked, Does this mean that any given pain can be relieved by prayer? The answer must be that dogmatism and prediction are forbidden by the organic structure of the universe. No man sins by himself or suffers by himself, and no man is redeemed for himself alone. It is impossible to cut a man out of the texture of his existence and operate on him as though he were an unrelated atom moving in empty space. We have no calculi by which to work out the measurements of the individual's sin and sufferings or to forecast the immediacy and completeness of his deliverance. At the best answer must not "limit God." He certainly does not fling about His powers, healing at haphazard. But with equal confidence we may affirm that His healing power is exerted in the medium we name "prayer" and have permitted it to operate. The ordo salutis here is fixed and cannot be altered: first the reconciliation, then the healing; first the faith that confounds itself absolutely to God in Christ, then the faith that refuses no gift of God.

The experience recorded in the NT is normative. First, believers owned Jesus Lord, then they received the Spirit. The love to which they committed themselves lived on in them, and brought mightily. No complete catalogue of such operations could be given. But among the lists that are given we read of healings (1 Co 12:28). The gifts of the Spirit are not magical, and there is nothing stereotyped in the activities produced by them. It would be ridiculous to infer from the presence of a certain gift in the NT communities that it must be actual in the Church at all ages. The gifts were created for use. If the use ceased, the gift was withdrawn. But it is fair to regard healing as a sporadic and passing manifestation of the Spirit's presence! Healing of the world's pain is certainly a present reality and an assured reality. Is it proper to make a distinction here and say that we will believe in the forgiveness of sins, but draw the line at the relief of pain? It may be that sects which we justly condemn for their absurd metaphysic and their ridiculous jargon, and for faults graver still, have such influence as belongs to them because they have been bold enough to rely on a healing power which belongs to the love that was, in Christ, the reconciliation of the world. It may be that the Church has to learn in this matter from those whom, quite justifiably, it has excluded from its fellowship. In any case, the conquest of pain is the work of omnipotent atoning love; and in prayer man co-operates with God in healing the hurt of humanity and of the world.

(4) Christian faith is more than conqueror of pain and can do much more for the sufferer than relieve him of his distress. Christianity teaches the transmutation of pain. Those who love God find that all things, pain included, work together for good. As they go on to experience of suffering, they make a still more wonderful spiritual discovery. In their pain they are not alone. They meet in that sequestered place Another, and He too is a sufferer. These two pains, theirs and His, draw together into the unity of suffering—He in them, and they in Him; their pain His, His pain theirs. This is not to escape from pain. It is to take out of pain the element which makes it an evil. When the self is surrendered to the love of God in Christ, the sting of pain, which is sin, is taken out of it. It becomes straightway part of a life-fellowship with redeeming love. It must not transmit a counter current of pain. It has been taken up into the pain that is the price of the world's redemption. There is no question of diminishing the value of love's redeeming deed on the Cross. But the method of triumphant love rem meme The agony undergone the method of Calvary. The sufferings of Christ rise like a tide in the souls of His people (Phil 3:3, Col 1:24). Their sufferings take on the quality of His. They are ministerial, vicarious, sacrificial. They are not on that account less hard to bear. Were shame and spitting, thorns and nails, less painful because Jesus bore them as part of His obedience? Suffering born with Him is suffering still. It is, however, bearable, and far more than bearable. It is utterly changed. It is not a fate, but a vocation, the highest service that a soul can render to God or man. Its evil is blotted out. It is a moment in the being of the highest good. This does not mean that in every suffering a believing man will be conscious that it is good. The pain may inhibit the sense of joy, even as it did with that man in the leper's house, and be taken and retained by the servant of God as the crown of his ministry, even as Jesus refused to come down from His Cross.

Perhaps James Hinton overstates the thought when he suggests that our feeling of pain in sacrifice is due to the lack of a perfect love in us. Sacrifice is pain; but in deepest anguish we know it preferable to the best that the world can give.

Remembering these things, what should we consider the presence of pain in the world to mean? . . . Does it not mean that a world in which so much of pain is present, is adapted—was altogether made—to be the scene of an overpowering, an absorbing love? . . . The reason we are made, or seem as if we were made for pain, is that we are made for love, . . . What is the happiness God has meant us for, the happiness to which human nature is fitted, to which it should aspire? Should it be that from which the painful is banished, or that in which pain is latent? Should pain be merely absent, or swallowed up in love and turned to joy? . . . The pain that is latent in man's bliss is latent, too, in God's; in His most as He is highest: and that great life and death to which the eyes of men are ever turned, or wandering ever are scaled, reveals it to us.

All pains may be summed up in sacrifice; and sacrifice is—of course it is—the incarnation of joy.

This is a nobler optimism than that which rests its case on the fruitfulness of benefit out of pain. Drowning, who is the poet of the one, has not missed the other:

1 I think this is the authentic sign and seal
2 Of Godship, that it ever waxeth glad,
3 And more glad, until bloomless blossoms burst,
4 Into a rage to suffer for mankind,
5 And recommence at sorrow: drops like seed
6 After the blossom, ultimate of all the ideal

The mystery of pain, then, is hid with Christ in God and becomes the open secret of the universe. All pain is a symbol of the suffering of God, and fulfils the function of sacrifice. These innumerable untold and incalculable pains of all of humanity are drawn into the compass of the atoning suffering of God. The sign of the Cross is upon a world of sin. The ministerial, vicarious, sacrificial quality of suffering begins to the history of the world. Its presence is ever more closely marked as the scale of being rises. It can be traced in each stage of the 'ascent of man.' It can be followed along the whole course of history, as if blood and tears are the visible signs of that which flows through human history. It is useless to make computations, and ask, Was even redemption worth such a price? It would

1 The Mystery of Pain 2, pp. 57, 58, 59, 60, 62.
2 Redemption's Adventure.
not be, if the price paid were merely human pain. But within the human pain is hid the anguish of crucified love. It is part of 'the reproach of Christ.' Because the infinite love shares this pain, it is transmitted. It becomes part of the price which God must pay for the redemption of man. Nothing could apologize for God, not any benefit wrung from tortured bodies and slaughtered souls, if He merely looked on from a throne of omnipotence. But a God who suffers is immune from criticism and does not need our defence. The suffering of love has redeemed the world and has not lost its redeeming power.

Confessedly, this is a faith, not a theory. It is not the less, but the more, sure on that account. It is not a precarious inference from insecure premises. Its premises are the love and suffering of God, revealed in the ministry and the Cross of Christ, and apprehended in the act which commits the soul to their redeeming power. Faith is not an act finished in a spasm of emotion. It is the assumption of an attitude towards God and towards life, warranted and established by God's redeeming act.

Faith, says a great Christian teacher, 'is the whole being and attitude of the soul as determined by the saviour-love of God in Christ.' Love, and that love which He evokes in us, and on that love and that alone, it rests."

Therefore, Christian optimism is not a document which is written, signed, sealed, and delivered to a suffering world to solve the whole problem of suffering. It is the outcome of an experience. Experience cannot be gathered up, put aside. It lives and grows from a centre. Those who will know the force of its demonstration must occupy the central standpoint. As that is reached in the act of self-commitment to the appeal of divine suffering love, it can be explained only in the continued action of communion with God. Faith in divine providence is not easy. Did any serious thinker ever imagine a state of mind in which faith would rest on an argument? Faith is a post held in the midst of a furious attack which never ceases. It can be held only in prayer. Prayer is at once communion and co-operation with God. In both aspects it carries with it confirmation of faith. Without it faith withers and dies. As we live by receiving the divine love and by acting in the power of it, even to the last limit of devotion, the world where men suffer reveals itself as still within the compass of a sovereign purpose which through pain is passing to its victory. And prayer is the concentrated power of that life, the life of receiving and of giving. Prayer, therefore, conveys the final proof of divine providence for the day. Prayer is the daily prayer of suffering coming into the light of divine victorios love.

(5) Lastly, the Christian view of pain is available for comfort. Comfort for such suffering as the world is full of cannot consist in words.

'The philosopher's generalisations faller, and only the professional politician, babbling about all being for the best, keeps on talking. His observations are highly admirable. But even faith is almost ashamed of them. It is better to say nothing. There is simply nothing to be said."

The only offer of comfort that will not insult the sufferer comes from the love of a God who can and does suffer. This is the knowledge we have of Him. Where suffering is He is, in the fullness of a power won by His own pain. In Him there is no comfort. A world without suffering love at the heart of it would be an atheistic world. The last word regarding it would be unrelieved pessimism.

Comfort is the work of God within the soul. It is direct, immediate, as the divine Spirit enfolds the human in the unity of a mutual indwelling. Its action is beneath the eye of the observer; yet, when there is no eye to see, no heart to pity. It is the privilege of creatures whose consciousness is other than human. It upholds those who are not conscious of its operations. Beneath their pain there is a divine experience which they do not know. It is withheld from pessimism, only because it holds thus profoundly the truth of the divine innanence. Only so is it withheld from blasphemy, as it beholds the agonies of the world. Even so, it is freedom with which Christ has clothed us, and does it lay upon those who have received the Divine consolations the duty of ministering to those who suffer. Their fulfilment of this duty consists in making themselves the vehicles of redeeming love. They have nothing of their own to give. The comfort they can give is simply the comfort they have received, and that is the love of God. Whatever they say and do will be effective as it bears witness to, and is the medium of, this—the only medicine for human hurt. In many cases silence will be the most perfect human vehicle of the divine comfort.

The Christian view of pain does not warrant the conclusion that in the case of the individual all suffering will cease. The organism is disorders, and the elimination of pain cannot take place at haphazard. The doctrine of divine victorios love, however, rests on the eternal victory of love, of which the time-development of the world contains the progressive achievement. It, therefore, becomes a power of victory which will end the pain of time—the complete reconciliation of the world.

Without this, comfort in suffering would be incomplete. God has no comfort to give if He is uncertain of what He had in mind. Love is triumphant over sin and suffering; therefore both sin and suffering will cease to be. The final message of Christianity to a suffering world is one of an immortal hope:

'There shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain; for the former things are passed away.'

the authority of Oriental tradition. Noldeke then cites a number of passages showing that, in the first two centuries of Islam, garments of coarse wool were worn by the community, and especially by those who followed an ascetic way of life. The words *labasa* 7- *saf*, 'he clad himself in wool,' occur frequently in the early literature and signify that the person to whom they are applied has renounced the worldly life and become an ascetic; at a later period, when asceticism passed into mysticism, *labasa* 'saf' generally means 'he became a Sufi.' In Persian too the ascetic is often called *jasaknian*, i.e. 'wearing a woolen garment.' The old Muslim ascetics who clothed themselves in wool borrowed this practice from Christian hermits or monks. When Hamnund b. Salama († A.D. 784) came to Basra, he said to Farqad al-Sanji, who appeared before him in a woolen garment, 'Put off this (embolium) of Christianity.' Such garments are described as *zīyi al-
mitak̄an*, 'the dress of the Christian ascetics.' A *hadith* put in the month of the Prophet states that Jesus Himself used to wear them.

We are told by Jami 3 that the name 'Sufi' was first borne by Abū Ḥisham al-Kašfa, a contemporary of Ṣūfyan b. ‘Aṣir, mentioned in al-Thauri’s Risâla, 1878. According to Qushairi, 4 it came into vogue before A.H. 200 (= A.D. 818). Al-Sarrāj mentions the view that it was invented by the people of Baghda. Although the precise origin of the term is obscure, it seems to have gained currency during the period of transition from asceticism to mysticism, about the end of the 2nd cent. of the Hijra, and may have come into some stage in that process. No weight can be attached to the apocryphal traditions which seek to prove that the appellation existed in the Prophet’s time or even that it was current back into the pre-Islamic age. The Sufis of the 3rd and 4th centuries are claimed to be the true spiritual descendants of Muhammad, considered themselves fully justified in fabricating evidence in support of their assertion. So far as the present writer is aware, the first Arabic writer to use the word ‘Sufi’ is Jāḥiz of Basra († A.D. 869), who refers to ‘the Sufis amongst the pietists’ (al-
ṣīfīn wa-’l-
naṣībīn) and enumerates the names of several who were famous for their eloquence. In the present article the terms ‘Sāfi’ and ‘Ṣāfi’ are to be understood in their ordinary sense, viz. as equivalent to ‘Muhammadan mystic’ and ‘Muhammadan mysticism,’ although the former term is used occasionally by al-Thauri’s Risâla, 1878, and later works of the same type, who should hesitate to describe as mystics in the proper meaning of the word. In Persian and Turkish poetry ‘Ṣāfi’ sometimes means the sense of ‘hypocritical pietist’ or ‘dissolute free-thinker’ and may be used as a term of reproach by poets who are themselves Sufis of a different sort.

2. Origin and early development.—The beginnings of mysticism in Islam take us back to the great ascetic movement which arose largely under Christian influence, during the 7th cent. A.D. This is reflected in the biographical works containing notices of eminent Sufis, which include the names of many of these early ascetics.

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intense religious exaltation, an overwhelming consciousness of human frailty, an all-pervading fear of God, and utter submission to His will. There was no organized monastic life, though some ascetics wandered to and fro accompanied by a few friends, on held prayer-meetings in their own houses or temples, and they studied the Qur'an or meditated on their spiritual experiences.

Baṣra seems to have been the centre of an anti-
ritualistic party who laid stress on the higher
aspects of asceticism, regarding it as essentially
an inward thing, a matter of individual personal
consciousness of the Muslim faith, organized more
closely the divine unit and contented to account for its development
and indeed for its origin. If there were more gods
than one, says the Koran, the heavens and the earth must have come to and fro, and any attempt to make a god "good" metaphorically, speculation quickly leads to something
like the monothelians, or the necessarily inconsistent
Him and man is that the former is eternal, the latter transient. The relation between God and man is essentially; the question of the relationship of God, or not. The former supposition leads to polytheism, the latter, to neoplatonism. If, then,
God is not outside matter, He must in a way be identical with
and the most thoughtful of the Sufis, accepting this conclusion, said that the Sufis were more

Theoretically, there is no reason why the Sufis should not have received their pantheistic goal in some such fashion as this, and probably they did, although in most cases it was a truth grasped
intuitively from mystical experience rather than the result of philosophical reflection. But, in
seeking to explain how they advanced from quietism to pantheism, we cannot proceed on the
assumption that they were wholly impervious to non-Islamic ideas. The influence of Christianity,
Neo-Platonism, and Buddhism is an undeniable
fact. It was in the air and inevitably made itself
felt. Of its extent and importance we have ample
evidence, although the materials at our disposal seldom allow us to trace its exact course.

During the 3rd cent. Sufism enters decisively
on a new course. The ascetic and quietist spirit,
though still strong, is overshadowed by speculative monotheistic tendencies which had
hitherto remained in the background but now
assert themselves with increasing boldness.
Notwithstanding the dominant and vital part which
they have played in the further development of
Sufism, it is a mistake to identify its triumph
with the origin of Sufism. Nor is it less a mistake
to describe them as an entirely foreign element which flowed into Sufism from outside and rapidly
transformed it, so that all at once it became
different in kind. The germs of Sufi pantheism
are to be found in the Qur'an:

E.g., xcviii, 88: 'Everything is perishable (ḥālīlā) except the face (injūl) of Allah'; lv, 201: 'Every one on the earth is passing away (malt), but the glorious and honoured face of thy Lord abideth forever'; and ii, 106: 'Wheresoever ye turn, there is the face of Allah.'

Certainly the Muslim mystics might have arrived independantly at the conclusion that Allah is the only
God of the universe.

* It is conceivable that this notion may have come into Islam from outside; on the other hand, speculation on the doctrine of the divine unity appears sufficient to account for its development
and indeed for its origin. If there were more gods
than one, says the Koran, the heavens and the earth must have come to and fro, and any attempt to make a god "good" metaphorically, speculation quickly leads to something
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The main features in the evolution of Sufism in the 3rd cent. may be set forth as follows.

The older Sufis had sought to bring every
together, and thought of their lives in harmony with
the divine will—an ideal which expressed their
conception of Allah as a transcendent personality,
'the Lord of created beings,' and which they
attained by means of asceticism. This theory and
practice naturally produced (1) the doctrine of
divine love, which is the highest positive form of
quietism, and (2) ecstasy, which is frequently a
result, either involuntary or intentional, of ascetic
exercises. Although the early Sufis were more or
less orthodox, their relation to Islam being not
unlike that of the medieval Spanish mystics to the
Roman Catholic Church, a religion of love and
passion, late results which seem to have come into effect
sooner or later. ribbi declared that she had no
SUFIS

How to use the Sufis.

The history of the Sufis, as well as their teachings, reveals a deep connection with the mystical traditions of other cultures. It is possible to find parallels in the Sufi teachings with those of other religions, such as Hinduism, Buddhism, and Christianity.

One example will suffice. The mystical knowledge of God peculiar to the Sufis is denoted by the term sunnat al-qiyas, i.e., universal knowledge or revelation. It is defined in this sense by several Sufis of the 3rd cent., but we owe the first important speculations on its nature to Ibn 'Arabi (Kitdb al-Mahjuh, 11, 1906), of whose Persians, it is said, he was the head of the sect (the Sufis), to all descends from it. The Sufis regard it as an exegyptian; it yet shows the significance of the man. Now, Ibn 'Arabi was a Copr or Prophet; he is described as a philosopher and a scientist of Greek wisdom; during his life he was regarded by many as a divinity (free-thinker). Here we have plain indications that, as soon as mysticism begins to develop, it draws inspiration from the doctrine concerning "a god or higher knowledge which can be taught with safety"—as Ibn 'Arabi also says—"only to the "perfect" or "fully initiated."' And while Ibn 'Arabi cented the Sufi's supreme experience as a super-intellectual God-given knowledge, peculiar to those who are "sons of God with their hearts" and ultimately involving complete unconsciousness ("the more a man knows God, the more he is lost in Him"), he never makes use of the term fa'at, which is associated with the mystic, the god-intoxicated, the Pick-this, or the Pick-exalted; Fa'at must be regarded by "passing-away"; it may be applied to the appearance of evil qualities or, in its political, to the individuality of the whole individual self of the human. Possibly the term was derived by Muslim mystics from a Vedantic term, but no certain evidence of this was quoted above, but in Krishna's words, where it first came into prominence, it must have been deeply colored by Perso-Indian ideas. The definition of fa'at as a moral state, and of the means by which the extinction of all passions and desires is brought about, agrees so exactly with the definition of nirvana that Buddhist influence cannot be denied. As regards the pantheistic aspect of fa'at, the Vedanta and similar forms of Indian thought readily suggest themselves. Here again the lives and writings of representative Sufis, in conjunction with other historical evidence, provide the only trustworthy clue. Bhavar was a native of Bharat, his grandfather was a Zoroastrian and his master in Sufism a Kurd. He learned the mystical doctrine of passing-away (fa'at) in the divine unity from Abu 'Ali al-Suhrawardi, a celebrated mystic of Sufism. He was a lover of beauty and a practiser of "watching the breath" (passan ansat) and described it as the highest form of asceticism. The chanting of the fa'at is probably reflected in the utterances which his legend records, even if their authenticity may be questioned—"for example, 1

1 Idea and Grundlagen, p. 141.

2 Many illustrations of the close parallelism between the leading ideas of Hellenistic religious philosophy and those of early Sufism may be found in the introduction to Heiberg's The Book of the Dead, tr. A. J. Wensineck, Leyden, 1919, p. 17.

3 Jami, Nafahat al-insan, p. 46.


5 Ibn 'Arabi, al-Hamdu l'l-walid, 1904, p. 91.


7 Tadkhirat al-nilumi, I, 192, 10; tr. T. W. Rhys Davies, The Tadhkira of Al-Baladhuri (PTS), London, 1903, p. x.

1. I went from God to God, until they cried from me in my, "O Thon!"

2. Verily, I am God, there is no God except me, so worship me. Glory to me! How great is my majesty!"

3. "Nothing is better for man than to be without sight, having no knowledge, nor anything, that he acts, and besides, there is no凡是, all, he is with all."

4. "Creatures are subject to states, but the gnostic has no state, because his vestiges are obliterated and his individuality (taswi'i) passes away in the individuality of Another and his traces are effaced at the beginning of the world."

At this time earnest Sufis did not habitually and openly indulge in the language of 'delicitation.' The doctrine underlying it was esoteric, reserved for adepts in theosophy, who usually were more discreet than Bāyazīd and Hāllāj. They saw the necessity of keeping their mystical theories in close touch with the religious life which they professed. Consequently the Qur'an and the Sunna were proclaimed to be the standard to which not only speculation but also spiritual feelings and states must conform.

Let us now consider the methods whereby a reconciliation was effected and take a general survey of the religions existing between Sufism and Islam.

3. The Law, the Path, and the Truth.—The Qur'an contains a few passages from which it can fairly be argued that Muhammad had in him something of the mystic, but that book as a whole is no better fitted than the Pentateuch to form the basis of a system of mysticism. Nevertheless, among the Sufis, adopting the Shi'ite principle of allegorical interpretation (ta'wīl), were able to prove to their own satisfaction that every verse and word of the sacred text hides treasures of meaning which God reveals to the elect—meanings which flash upon the inward eye in moments of rapt meditation. So much being granted, one can imagine that it was easy to show, in a Nilistic fashion, that any mystical doctrine whatsoever and to maintain that Sufism was really the exoteric teaching of the Prophet communicated by him to his son-in-law, Ali b. Abi Ta'b. From the same principle it follows that the Sufi interpretation of Islam admits an endless variety of divergent and even contradictory beliefs and practices, all of which are equal valid in kind, though not in degree, since the meanings of the Qur'an are infinite and reveal themselves to each mystic in proportion to the spiritual capacity with which he is endowed. Hence the Sufis are not a sect, and there is no uniform doctrine or interpretation which is called 'Sufism.' This many-sidedness is signified in the term is exemplified by the innumerable attempts made to define it. Similarly, the attitude of the Sufis towards Muhammadan religions law depends on a subjective criterion. Some punctiliously fulfilled their ritual obligations, while at the same time they recognized that forms of worship have only a relative value in comparison with the 'works of the heart,' or are altogether worthless except as symbols of spiritual realities. To make the pilgrimage, e.g., is to journey away from sin; to put on the pilgrim's garb (ḥajj) is to cast off with one's every-day clothes all sensuous thoughts and feelings. This is a well-known doctrine of the Isma'īlis, from whom the Sufis seem to have borrowed it. Others are antinomian, whether they be free-thinking and free-living dervishes, genuine mystics like the Mahánānis described by Hujwīrī, whose fear of men's praise caused them deliberately to act in such a way as to incur reproach, or gnostics supremely indifferent to the semblances of religion and
morality in a phantom world. Many Sufis, however, insist that, normally at any rate, perfect realization of the Truth (haqiqat)—i.e., the consummation of the mystical knowledge (‘ilm)—is not simply acquisition of the Law (shar‘at) but includes it as a facet or aspect of the whole. This view will be better explained if we give a brief account of its ethical and psychological basis.

The Sufis regarded themselves as a peculiarly favoured class, possessing an esoteric knowledge of the Qur‘an and the apostolic traditions, and using mystical-expressive language which an ordinary Muslim could understand. This fostered a feeling of brotherhood, and it was not long before traces of organization began to appear. Eminent mystics gathered round them groups of disciples (adā'ī) for private instruction and in course of time became recognized teachers, heads of mystical schools, and abbots presiding over convents where Sufis were trained. It was generally held that for those entering on the religious life a teacher was indispensable. A self-trained mystic, who had not passed through the discipline prescribed by a spiritual director (shaykh, pir, murshid), was looked upon with great suspicion. He lay with them to decide whether the novice, after his probationary period, should be granted leave to take the vow of obedience to his master which was exacted from all candidates for initiation. Hujwīrī mentions three years’ probation.

The first year is devoted to service of the people (i.e., the Sufis); the second year to service of God, and the third year to watching over his own heart. He can serve the people, only when he places himself in the rank of servants and all others in the rank of masters, i.e., he must regard all, without exception, as being better than himself and must deem it his duty to serve all, of God, only when he cuts off all his selfish interests relating either to the present or to the future life, and worships God for God’s sake alone. And he can watch over his heart, only when his thoughts are collected and every care is discussed, so that in communion with God he guards his heart from the assaults of badness (a small at first) for private instruction and in course of time became recognized teachers, heads of mystical schools, and abbots presiding over convents where Sufis were trained. It was generally held that for those entering on the religious life a teacher was indispensable. A self-trained mystic, who had not passed through the discipline prescribed by a spiritual director (shaykh, pir, murshid), was looked upon with great suspicion. He lay with them to decide whether the novice, after his probationary period, should be granted leave to take the vow of obedience to his master which was exacted from all candidates for initiation. Hujwīrī mentions three years’ probation.

On taking the vow of initiation, the novice was invested by his shaykh with the khirqa or turba‘a‘a‘, a garment made of pieces of cloth stitched together, which in later times superseded the woolen dress worn by the original Sufis. This ceremony marked his admission (al-bā‘it) or brotherhood (adā‘ī) into the order. Occasionally a Sufi might be invested with two khirqas by different shaykhs, as happened to Abū Sa‘īd ibn Abī ‘l-Khair. The veneration which the Sufi places on the various titles is characteristic of the devotion which the Sufi feels towards his master. Dhu ‘l-Nūn went so far as to say that the true disciple should be more obedient to his master than to God Himself. The rule, method, and religious practices involved in the veneration of the shaykh and followed by the disciple constitute the Path (tariqā). Accordingly, the Path has no fixed and uniform character; its details are determined by the individuality of the teacher. The tariqas of the dervish orders exemplify this divergence. Broadly speaking, the Path corresponds to the via purgativa of medieval Christian mysticism. Hunger, solitude, and silence are the chief weapons employed in war against the Flesh (nafs). The ascetic and ethical discipline is divided into a progressive series of stations (maqamat), which the learner must traverse, making himself perfect in every one of them before advancing to the next. They vary in number and order, but the first place is usually occupied by ‘repentance’ or ‘conversion’ (taubah), i.e., turning away from sin towards God. The moral ideal of the Sufis is unfussiness, whether the form of the remaining worldly possessions and desires, sincerity in word and deed without regard for the good opinions of others,

patience, humility, charity, or trust in God and single-hearted devotion to His will. These are the fruits of the Path, but its true end is attained by means of exercises in spiritual meditation and recollection. The practice of recollection (dhikr) is the disciple for ecstatic experiences. It may be that he will never reach that end; ecstasy is an inaequable gift of divine grace and cannot be extorted. But the Sufi recommended a method of producing the state of mind in which ‘revelation’ of the unseen was most likely to occur. They called it dhikr (‘recollection’), set the highest value upon it, and prescribed it as the supreme act of Sufi religious devotion. The simplest form of dhikr is the continual repetition of the name Allah or of some short litany, accompanied with intense concentration on the sound of the holy names. This exercise might be assisted by other means, such as flagellation and holding the breath, until the sense of personality gradually disappeared in a state of trance.

The first stage of dhikr is to forget self, and the last stage is the effacement of the thinker in the act of thought, without consciousness of thought, and such absorption in the object of thought that it is as if one were to return to the subject matter. The concerted performances of dhikr, with music and dancing, were introduced by the great Sufi saint Nāsir-Allah al-Ba‘lī. These ceremonies are noted by Hujwīrī. Such prayer-services, as is well known, play an important part in the ritual of the dervish orders.

A general view of Sufi psychology, so far as it bears on the ecstatic life, may be obtained from Qushairī or from the more systematic treatment of the subject by Ghāzalī in the second half of his Ḥaḍīth. There are four terms which, taken together, comprise the sensual, spiritual, and intellectual natures of man: (1) nafs, the appetitive nature; (2) ‘ayn, the intelligence. The nafs, being the seat of the passions, is wholly concerned with the satisfaction of all the selfish interests relating either to the present or to the future life, and worships God for God’s sake alone. And he can watch over his heart, only when his thoughts are collected and every care is discussed, so that in communion with God he guards his heart from the assaults of badness (a small at first) for private instruction and in course of time became recognized teachers, heads of mystical schools, and abbots presiding over convents where Sufis were trained. It was generally held that for those entering on the religious life a teacher was indispensable. A self-trained mystic, who had not passed through the discipline prescribed by a spiritual director (shaykh, pir, murshid), was looked upon with great suspicion. He lay with them to decide whether the novice, after his probationary period, should be granted leave to take the vow of obedience to his master which was exacted from all candidates for initiation. Hujwīrī mentions three years’ probation.

On taking the vow of initiation, the novice was invested by his shaykh with the khirqa or turba‘a‘, a garment made of pieces of cloth stitched together, which in later times superseded the woolen dress worn by the original Sufis. This ceremony marked his admission (al-bā‘it) or brotherhood (adā‘ī) into the order. Occasionally a Sufi might be invested with two khirqas by different shaykhs, as happened to Abī Sa‘īd ibn Abī ‘l-Khair. The veneration which the Sufi places on the various titles is characteristic of the devotion which the Sufi feels towards his master. Dhu ‘l-Nūn went so far as to say that the true disciple should be more obedient to his master than to God Himself. The rule, method, and religious practices involved in the veneration of the shaykh and followed by the disciple constitute the Path (tariqā). Accordingly, the Path has no fixed and uniform character; its details are determined by the individuality of the teacher. The tariqas of the dervish orders exemplify this divergence. Broadly speaking, the Path corresponds to the via purgativa of medieval Christian mysticism. Hunger, solitude, and silence are the chief weapons employed in war against the Flesh (nafs). The ascetic and ethical discipline is divided into a progressive series of ‘stations’ (maqamat), which the learner must traverse, making himself perfect in every one of them before advancing to the next. They vary in number and order, but the first place is usually occupied by ‘repentance’ or ‘conversion’ (taubah), i.e., turning away from sin towards God. The moral ideal of the Sufis is unfussiness, whether the form of the remaining worldly possessions and desires, sincerity in word and deed without regard for the good opinions of others,
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(meqāth) is a saint (wall); no further testimony is required, since the doctrine that a saint who violates the Law is thereby shown to be an impostor, is implied by the very essence of the ecstatic fit. Ibn Khaldun illustrates this. Ecstasy not being confined to one sex, the Sufi legend includes a long roll of women, to whom a separate section is sometimes allotted in some of the larger collections. In accordance with the theo-pathetic character of Muslim saints, their miracles (ka-bin-ma‘d = qayṣara) are described, not as wrought by them, but as granted or manifested to them; and, while the higher Sufis declares that reliance on miracles hinders the elect from penetrating to the innermost shrine of the Truth, and that the greatest miracle is the substitution of a good quality for a bad one, the popular walli could even if he wishes, avoid the reputation of being gifted with powers which Muslims call 'extraordinary' and Europeans 'supernatural.'

The saints form an invisible hierarchy by which the greater saint controls the lesser. Thus the head stands the qadī (‘axis’), under him inferior grades of sanctity—qudud, antūd, obrād, abdād or abulād, etc.—the members of each class increasing in magnitude with its distance from the qadī. Probably this idea is derived over by the Sufis from the Shi'ites and Ismā'īlīs.7

The Sufi theory of ecstasy recognizes two aspects of the experience of oneness with God. These aspects are symbolically linked with the two forms of fanā (‘passing-away’ from individuality), faqīl (‘self-loss’), sukr (‘intoxications’), with their positive counterparts beqīd (‘abiding in God’), wujūd (‘finding God’), and sulq (‘sobriety’). In the controversy which arose as to the relative values of the ecstatic state and the subsequent return to consciousness,1 it is easy to discern the same motives as ranged Sufis on opposite sides in regard to the question. Were they antinomian or not? From the standpoint of pure Sufism there is nothing beyond the supreme negation of self, when the mortal disappears’ and religion no longer exists; but the Sufis who are more than nominal Muslims to set the life in God against and above the death to self, and to find the highest mystical experience in the state of dhu-wujūd, none of which is the moment of ecstasy.

The full circle of deification must comprehend both the inward and outward aspects of Deity—the One and the Many, the Truth and the Law. It is not enough to escape from all that is creatorily without entering into the eternal life of God the Creator as manifested in His works. The Sufis in God (beqīd), after having passed away from selfhood (fanā), is the mark of the Perfect Man, who not only journeys to God, i.e., passes from plurality to unity, but in and with God, i.e., continuing in the unitive state, he returns with God to the phenomenal world from which he reconstitutes and manifests unity in plurality. In this descent... he brings down and displays the Truth to mankind while fulfilling the duties of the religious life.

Such a compromise could not restore the balance European. The Sufis might do homage to the Law, but they ranked it below the Truth and even below the Path. And, if the Truth is above the Law, yet not in contradiction with it, then this view was plausible that, when a man has attained to the Truth, all his acts and words are holy and in harmony with the spirit of the Law, however they may seem to clash with its letter. Still, a

via media had to be secured, even at the price of illogical concessions on both sides.

A Persian Sufi, writing in the 8th century, hint that his contemporaries have given the name of “law” to their insts, call their own senseless fantasies “divine knowledge,” the heart and affections of the animal soul “divine love,” heresy “poverty,” excess passion “pity,” deceit and falsehood “a passing away from self,” neglect of the Law of the Prophet “the mystic path.”

1 In A.D. 1945 Qushairi published his famous ‘Epistle on Sufism’ (Kisla fi ‘ilm al-ta‘ṣawwuf), recalling to his fellow-mystics how in past times great Sufis spoke and behaved as good Muslims and set an example of piety which their unruly successors had almost forgotten. That these tests were not made in vain was due above all to Ghazālī. He fused the traditional and mystical elements into one mass. His work was lasting because it took shape not so much from the force of his mind as under the pressure of a searching spiritual experience: he had worked out and solved the problem in himself before he gave the result in his books. Fifty years after the appearance of Qushairi’s Risāla Ghazālī resigned the professorship of theology and canon law which he held in the Nizamīya college at Baghdad and went into retirement as a Sufi. Only has told us, as fascinating as Newman’s Apologia how his studies and meditations at last made his conversion inevitable, through what struggles he shed off philosophy, scholasticism, and legalism, and gained the certainty that the central truth of religion lies in the inner life of the soul. 21

By frankly accepting the main Sūfi position Ghazālī gave a new meaning to Islām and an assured place within its fold to many earnestly religious men and women whom the formalists would have driven out if they could. Henceforth Islām is in large measure a mystical faith. But Ghazālī always remained a Muslim in two essential points: (1) his reverence for the religious law, (2) his view of the nature of God. He shut the door against pantheism by insisting on the dogma that the Divine Being is personal, unique, distinct from all other beings. In so far as the human soul has these attributes, it is capable of knowing God; but it can never be identified with God. Our knowledge of God depends on His will to make Himself known through revelation to prophets and saints whom He created. This left ‘Allāh spiritualized and brought near to men’s hearts, but still ‘Allāh, not the All in One. It may be said that Ghazālī belongs to Islām rather than to Christian mysticism, and that, inasmuch as he is not a pantheist, he is not a typical Sūfi. This seems true. On the other hand, while Sūfis who are pantheists often use language implying belief in a personal God, such belief is by no means inconsistent with the full theory of fanā, or at least may be sincerely combined with it.

4. God, man, and the universe.—Upon the foundation of mystical mysticism the Sufis built a theology and a philosophy of which the forms are as various in content and expression as the materials are diverse in kind. It is a notable fact that the oldest development to prophetic and saints whom he

1 Qurʾān, xviii. 64–65.
6 Ibid., p. 193.
8 See art. Entités and Morality (Muslim).
10 See Literature.
and duality, as an external object. He brought forth from non-existence an image of Himself, endowed with all His attributes and names. This divine image is Adam, in and under which is the essence of the One in whom God is. Nevertheless, however, maintaining certain distinction between the divine and human natures. Even in their mystical union, the absolute being and the manifest world is infused in— not confused with—humanity (nabīt), as wine in water; hence the ‘drifted’ man cries, ‘I am not Adam, I am a man! ’The essence of God has a marking of the divinity of the Halijian doctrine, together with its author’s use of the heretical term hādhā (‘infusion’ or ‘transformed’) which is translated by the Sufis, and later Sufis, take care to give it a monistic interpretation; Ibn al-'Arabi, e.g., reduces the hādhā and māshīṣ (mutative and transformative) to ‘two aspects of one reality. Yet, the same quality of the divine, to which Sufism owes to Halij, can hardly be overestimated. His doctrine, though formally rejected, introduced and established in Islam the revolutionary idea that there is a principle of difference in the Absolute itself.

An important school of Sufis, whose watchword is ‘the unity of being’ (wadat al-wujud or tābihāt), hold that reality is one, that all apparent multiplicity is a mode of unity, and that the phenomenal is the outward manifestation of the real. Their views may be illustrated by giving some account of a work entitled The Man perfect in Knowledge of the Last and First Things by 'Abd al-Karim al-'Jili, a mystic of the 15th century A.D.

The essence of God is unknowable per se; we must seek knowledge of it through its names and attributes. It is a substance with two accidents, eternity and everlastingness; with two qualities, creative and creatureliness; with two descriptions, uncreated and origination in time; with two names, Lord and slave (i.e. God and man); with two aspects, the outward or visible, which is the present world, and the inward or invisible, which is the next world. True being, as such, has neither name nor attribute; only when it gradually descends from its absoluteness and enters the realm of manifestation do names and attributes appear imprinted on it. The sum of these names is the phenomenal universe, which is phenomenal in the sense that it shows reality under the form of externality. Although the distinction of essence and attributes must be admitted if we are to think of the universe at all, the two are ultimately one, like water and ice. The so-called phenomenal world—the world of attributes—is no illusion; it really exists as the self-revelation or other self of the Absolute. It expresses God’s idea of Himself; for, as Ibn al-'Arabi says,

‘We ourselves are the attributes by which we describe God; our existence is merely an objectification of His existence. God is a name, a thought, a thing that exists, while we are necessary to Him, in order that He may be manifested to Himself.’

The simple essence, apart from all qualities and relations, Jili calls ‘the darkness’ (al-‘awd). It develops consciousness by passing through three stages which modify its purity and simplicity. The first stage is oneness (ahdāyāt), the second is ‘He-ness’ (hwajyāt), the third is ‘I-ness’ (anijyāt).

By this process of descent absolute being becomes the subject and object of all thought and reveals itself as divinity with distinguishable attributes embracing the whole series of existence. While every appearance displays some attribute of reality, man is the microcosm in which all these attributes are united, and in him alone does the Absolute become conscious. In all its diverse aspects, this can only mean that the Absolute, having completely realized itself in human nature, returns into itself through the medium of human nature, or, in mystics, through God and man become one in the perfect man—the divinely rapt prophet or saint—whose religious function as a mediator between man and God corresponds with his metaphysical

2 'Abd al-‘Azīz, ed. Madīnah, p. 83.

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The more completely and universally the idea of God is presented, in all its dimensions, the more perfect its contact with the mind must be. Religious revelation through a prophet contains the fullest measure of the God idea. Of these the most considerable three, from the standpoint of Islam, are: Allah, the Creator of the universe through emanation, the One who reveals Himself in the Abbreviated Book of His treasures; Jesus, the Son of God, who, from that one point of view He is above all other beings, while from this one point of view His prevailingly Ilesus-in-His-Book of His treasures. Their mistake lies in the limitation to which they have subjected the principle that God becomes man in a form of which the human mind can find no face to face such of which contains what is in all; and so they will beheld it in its and declare Him to be absolutely One.

5. Sufi poetry.—Among the practices devised by the Sufis for the purpose of stimulating religious emotion there is none more potent than that which they name "audition" (sama'), i.e. listening to music and song. Sufis who were thrown into ecstasy on hearing a few lines of verse chanted inadverfently by a singing-girl or with intention by one of themselves. Such verses were usually erotic, but not mystic; the allusions were such as to make any direct and explicit supply to the hearer. In Sufi poetry, of course, it is otherwise; here the poet's meaning is mystical, however sensuous may be the form in which it is veiled. And the verses are so arranged as to be like such unutterably that, unless we have some clue to the intention of the writer, we cannot easily decide whether we are reading an ode of human love or a hymn addressed to the Deity. If it be asked why the Sufis make such large use of erotic and bacchanalian symbolism, the answer is that they could find no analogy more suggestive and better adapted to shadow forth the sacred power of enthusiasm and ecstasy which their poets describe.

1 Wine, beer, and beauty are epiphanies of Verity, Nor is it which is revealed under all forms seen. 
Wine and beer are the transport and light of the knower; 
Behold! The beauty, for it is hidden from none.  
Wine, beer, and beauty, all are pleasant, 
Neglect not to embrace that beauty.
2 Restore the soul to its dying self, and for a season.
Sustainability you will be freed from the dominion of self, 
Upon the elevation of the soul is the face of the wine.
3 The barge is his eye drunken and down with wine.

This poetry is the chief glory of Persian literature. It may be studied in the quatrains attributed to Abú Sa'd b. Abi-Khair, in the poems of Paride (died A.D. 1159). Jalal-ud-din Rumi (O.), and Jamā', or in the Gulshāni Bāz of Maham Shabestari. Whinfield's edition of the last-named work is provided with explanatory notes and may be recommended as the best introduction to the subject. In Arabic this genre of poetry takes a more conventional form, which is not so attractive to Western readers, but the odes of him al-Fārisī are exceedingly fine, while those of Ibn al-Arabi, in spite of their resonant style, contain some passages of great beauty. Of the Turkish Sufis the poet most interesting is Nəşirî, a fervent admirer of Hallaj and a member of the sect known as Husāris, who derive their title from the mystic sign X, and have recourse to the letters of the alphabet and to combinations of these. The Sufi poet is not directly concerned with metaphysics.

1 He let his heart be wholly filled by the sublime conceptions of all-embracing Unity and all-conquering Love which form the real basis whereon all the rest is built... He sees how the Truth is in the one aspect oneness, which afterward he comprehends the universe through emanation after emanation; how the Primal Intelligence, first rayed out from the One, rays out in turn the Primal Soul; how the Divine Names cast their light upon the darkness of not-being, each atom of which mirror-like reflects one.
He sees how the Artful Attributes of the Truth are reflected in the existence of hell and the devils, and how the Beautiful Attributes are reflected in this of Paradise and the angels.
He further sees how Man reflects all the Attributes, Artful and Beautiful alike, and is thus the Microcosm, running up the universe in himself. He thus sees how it is the Truth alone that is acting through all things, and moreover how this action is a never-ending, never-cessing process, every existence atom being each instantly clothed with a fresh phenomenal efflux radiated from the Source of Existence, and being again stripped off of it, so that the whole coming and going is momentarily being annihilated and re-created, though the successive acts of destruction and construction are never one another in such swift succession that they are wholly imperceptible, and all appears as one uninterrupted line, even as an unbroken circle of fire is seen in a single space, and yet is believed quickened and extinguished. But the poet may not rest content with the mere perception of these inexpressible mysteries; indeed, they have so revealed them to him as to impel him to seek reunion with the Truth.

2 God, as the poet conceives Him, is the eternal Beauty which by the necessity of its nature desires to be loved, made manifest, and the object of all love. Even earthly love is a type of spiritual, a bridge leading to reality. The soul, being divine in its essence, longs for union with that from which it is separated by the illusion and illusion of the body, and this longing aspiration, which urges it to pass away from selfhood and to rise on the wings of ecstasy, is the only means whereby it can return to its original home. Love transmutes into pure gold that base phenomenal alloy of which every creature partakes. While reason is dualistic, love unifies by transcending thought.

3 He comes, a moon whose like the sky ever saw, awake or dreaming, Crowned with eternal flame no cloud can lay.
Look, from the farmhouse of the Lord, my soul is swimming, and ruined all my body's house of clay.
When dust the Giver of the grape my lovely heart befriended, Wine fixed my bosom and my veins filled up, But when his image in my body possessed, voice descended:— "Walt, down! O wretched Wine and peerless Cup!"

Love's mighty arm from roof to base each dark abyss is heaving Where nothing remains catch a golden ray.
My heart, when Love's wonderful golden heart into its viewing, Leapt headlong in, with "Find me now who may!"

The following passages further illustrate the manner in which this principle is applied by Sufi poets.

Love is the final cause of creation:

"In solitude, where Being sighs in solitude, And all the universe still lingers stay, Concealed in the dim light, One Being was.
From rent "I"-or "Thou"-man, and spirit Of all from dross, Beauty, Supreme, Unmasked except unto Himself By its own light, yet fraught with power to charm. The souls of all..."

But Beauty cannot break, Concealment and the veil, one Soul and beauty Unseen and unmasked, 'twixt love all bonds And from its presence-came to the world. Heaven itself..."
Wherever Beauty dwells,
Such is its nature and its heritage
From Everlasting Beauty, which emerged
In a form of tragic purity to shine upon
The worlds, and all the souls which dwell therein.

1. Each speck of matter did His constitute
And God is the beauty of His visage.
From the rose
Flashed forth His beauty, and the nightingale,
Singing, ‘He is loved madly.’ From the candle
The die cast the inscrip which beguiles
The moth to the flame.

Beware! say not, ‘He is All-Beautiful,
And we live lovers.’ Thou art but the glass,
And He the face confronting it, which casts
Its image on the mirror. He alone
Is manifest, and Thou in truth art hid.

Pure love, like beauty, coming but from Him
Revels itself in thee. If steadfastly
They cast not requital, then will at length perceive
He is the mirror also; He alike
The Treasure and the Caution,
And ‘Thou’
Have here no place, and are but phantasmes
Vain and unreal.

Love is the essence of all religions:
‘Soul of mine, thou knowest Light: be not far, O be not far!’
Love of mine, thou Vision bright: be not far, O be not far!’

See well how the Turban glistens, yet the Paraclete girdles me.

Cord and Waffle I bear light: be not far, O be not far!
True Parece and true Brahaman, a Christian, yet a Mussulman,
Thou I trust supreme by Right: be not far, O be not far!
In God’s Love of persons, all persons are one alone;
Thy Face is there my sole delight: be not far, O be not far!’

The same principle enables the Sufi poet to solve the problems of evil and predestination.
The more a love dwells, the deeper it generates the divine purposes.
Love is ‘the legitimate of heavenly mysteries,’ the eyes-saw which clears the spiritual eye and makes it clasped and open.

Through love we can discern that evil, so far as it has any real existence—and in relation to God it has none—is a good in disguise or, at the worst, a necessary condition for the manifestation of good.
As regards predestination, perfect love imparts identity of will and thus abolishes the conflict between freedom and necessity.

‘The word “compulsion” makes me impatient for love sake:’
‘Be he who loves not that is lettered by compulsion.
This is close communion with God, not compulsion.
The shining of the sun, and not a dark cloud.

The lyric poetry of Sufism reaches its highest mark in the pantheistic hymns describing the state of fana (negation of individuality) and bagh (affirmation of universal consciousness).
‘Lo, for to myself an unknown, now in God’s name what was
I adore not the Cross or the Crescent, I am not a Glauber nor
East nor West, land nor sea is my home, I have kin nor with angel nor gnome,
I am rather at heart of fire nor of foam, I am shaped not of dust nor of dew.
I was born not in China after, not in Sogdian and not in Buhzb; Not in India, where the rivers are, not Iraq nor Khurasan I grew.
In this world nor that world I dwell, not in Paradise, neither in hell.
Yet not from Eden and Bawrak I fell, not from Adam my lineage I drew.
In a place beyond uttermost Place, in a tract without shadow of trace.

Soul and body transcending I live in the soul of my Love One knew.

Though many of these poems are exquisite in formal beauty, it is difficult to regard them as products of conscious literary art, and the present writer is inclined to accept the statement that the odes of Al-Jalāl al-Din Rūmī, Ibn al-Fārābī.

Ibn al-‘Arabi, and other Sufi poets were often composed in the influence of ecstasy, in the context of their peculiar and fact analogous to what is known as ‘automatic writing.’ Their rhythm and melody, combined with the symbolic form in which they are clothed, give them an uncanny power of communication to the reader the same feeling of rapture by which their composer was inspired: and the effect is greatly enhanced when they are chanted with an accompanying accompaniment, as is customary among Sufis engaged in dhuhr. While students of this poetry cannot ignore the conventional rules of interpretation which assign a fixed allegorical meaning to a large number of words that are commonly used in such a context, a method may easily be pushed too far. Ibn al-‘Arabi’s commentary on the Tarjumān al-‘Ashariyy, shows that even the author of a mystical ode is sometimes unable to state his meaning in words. Each element appears only at intervals and seldom with its first intensity in narrative romances, which depict the soul’s love of God and its ultimate union with Him as the theme of two human lovers—e.g., Yusef and Zulaikha, Khulil and Maynun, and Abūl-Asbaḥ—and didactic poems, of which the Mawsū‘ is the most celebrated.

LITERATURE.—This art is supplementary to, and should be read in conjunction with, the preceeding. The fact that many of the present writer’s opinion, it would be premature to aim at giving a historical classification of the subject, since the modern materials are not yet available. Further information concerning the doctrines of individual Sufis will be found in the arts, Al-Khalil al-Mukhtar, Hallaj, Hallajan, al-Mamluk, MANSUR, and Shams al-Din ibn al-‘Arabi, AS-SHAMI, and SHA’RAWI. See also, Eissfeldt (Mohammedan), Connected with Dervish (Moslem), Dervish, and Christian, Mohammedan.


(3) Doctrines.—Most of the important European books and papers on Sufism have already been mentioned in the present art, or in the various art, enumerated above. These titles are not repeated here. The art follows, M. Schraub, ‘Heben zur Gesch. der theologischen Bewegungen im Islam,’ Emd, iii., (1880) 219 ff.; G. Borchert, ‘Studien über die Gesch. des Mohammedaner,’ J. 99, 1894, pp. 460 ff., and 1895, pp. 460 ff. (concerning the different grades of Sufis, the sufis, and the inferior saints).—M. Schraub, ‘Heben zur Gesch. der theologischen Bewegungen im Islam,’ Emd, iii., (1880) 219 ff.; G. Borchert, ‘Studien über die Gesch. des Mohammedaner,’ J. 99, 1894, pp. 460 ff., and 1895, pp. 460 ff. (concerning the different grades of Sufis, the sufis, and the inferior saints).

SUGGESTION.—Suggestion is the production of a reaction by an ideational process, but without deliberation on the part of the subject thereof. The term applies also to any attempt by the subject or by another person to awaken such a reaction. A suggestion is any idea that determines, or is used for the purpose of determining, the outcome of such a non-deliberative process.

The qualification "by an ideational process" is introduced in differentiation of primary instinct-acts. Such acts, though they may be secondarily initiated by an idea or mental image (as when a letter makes me angry with the writer of it), require as their primary stimulus nothing but an appropriate sense-presentation. Suggestion, on the other hand, is primarily ideational. The most typical suggestions are those that are conveyed by language. Gesture, in the broad sense of significant bodily motions, postures, and inarticulate vocalization, comes next. Natural phenomena act suggestively only when they have antecedently acquired a meaning, as when one avoids poison ivy, or quickens one's pace upon hearing distant thunder.

The term 'reaction,' as here used, refers to both psychical and bodily responses. It includes beliefs, hallucinatory perceptions (affecting an appropriate stage of the emotional aspects), stimulation of involuntary muscles and of certain glands, particular contractions of voluntary muscles and muscle-systems, even extended chains of such contractions, and finally, in all these fields, inhibitions and functional paralyses as well as stimulations.

A reaction is 'deliberate' when it is made after attention has been given to alternatives, and with the alternatives in view. Associated with the idea that defines any alternative is a tendency towards something beyond itself as merely this idea now presents. Because of these associated tendencies ideas may be said to compete with one another and therefore to involve inhibitions as well as positive stimulations. In deliberation there is mutual inhibition of two or more competing ideas, whereas popular thought correctly conceives that pause or postponement is a mark of deliberate conduct and of deliberate believing. Suggestion, on the other hand, implies the absence of deliberate competition, inhibition, and pause. All that is necessary is that attention should be withheld from some of the ideas appropriate to the given situation, and focused or "narrowed down" to one idea or coherent chain of ideas. Thereupon the associated tendency that has just been referred to is automatically instated.

How such associated tendencies should be conceived has been a matter of debate. W. McDougall, emphasizing the subconscious character of the connections here involved, and also the close relation of suggestion in general to "psychic phenomena," is of the opinion that any adequate analysis of suggestion must rest at last upon a theory of the subconscious. William James used the phrase "ideo-motor action" to designate what he regarded as a mental law, namely: 1

1 See art. HYPNOTISM, 2 Principles of Psychology, p. 226.

Every representation of a movement awakens in some degree the actual movement which is its object; and awakenings in a majority of cases, it is not by mental act, but by a sympathetic representation present simultaneously to the mind. 2

On the other hand, E. L. Thorndike opposes to the 'ideo-motor' theory, and adheres to the following far simpler theory: an idea may produce a movement in either of two ways—by imaging an object that awakens an instinctive response, or, under the ordinary law of habit, by re-creating something that has previously been associated in the subject's experience with the suggestive idea. The reason why the idea of bending my first finger produces actual bending, according to Thorndike, as the idea of the finger being bent and the actual bending—have been experienced together heretofore. The very first flexions of the finger, it may be added, occurred reflexly, without any previous present idea thereof. Just as the sight of a glass of water upon my dinner-table induces me to drink water that I do not want, habit is clearly the explanation. 3

This theory enables us to bring all the psychological and physiological manifestations of suggestion under the same two heads, habit and instinct.

Both are found in Antony's handling of the Roman rabble. The opinion of the artists concerning Caesar's death was reversed, not by the weighing of pros and cons, but by bringing attention back again and again to essentially the same point, i.e., by narrowing attention so that the old attitude of admiration for Caesar the conqueror was reinitiated. In addition, Antony arouses various instincts, as when he works upon curiously until the crowd demands to hear the will that he pretends to withhold.

It is evident that suggestion is not an exceptional, rare, or abnormal phenomenon, but an omnipresent fact of all mind whenever its reactions are upon the ideational level. In hypnosis competing ideas may be inhibited to an extraordinary degree, but there is no fixed line of conflict between the ideas gradually brought on and fully normal mental action. Similarly the ordinary effects of cheerful or of gloomy expectation are merely heightened in the extreme and truly remarkable facts of suggestive therapies.

The process of suggestion has, as such, no particular relation to the truth or the falsity of what is suggested. One may arrive by suggestion at true beliefs or at ethical, or correctly or incorrectly or even wrong attitudes and conduct. Suggestion is an ordinary device of oratory and of preaching, as it is also of advertising and of salesmanship. Recent works on 'business psychology' present what may fairly be called a technic that is parallel to that of physicians who employ psycho-therapy. Thus far the ethical aspects of influencing buyers by suggestion have not been examined as carefully as the technic.

If any one should doubt whether the deliberate influencing of men to act without deliberation is ever justifiable, the following considerations would have to be considered: (1) There are numerous cases in which the ends of deliberation are defeated by the process of deliberation itself, as when too meticulous weighing of possible consequences or overconceived insistency upon complete certainty prevents the action that a situation calls for. One way to get such a person over his 'dead centre' is precisely to narrow his attention to one of the alternatives until action ensues. (2) When an instinctive capacity for noble emotions and attitudes has become dull from disuse, one simply lacks considerations that are needed for deliberation. A psychological pre-condition of all deliberation is appreciation of the pertinent alternatives. What is to be done for a man, then, whose habits preclude any feeling of the force of a pertinent alternative? The obviously rational procedure is by processes of suggestion to draw his attention upon some object that may awaken an instinctive response of the desirable sort, and then to lead him to include this fresh experience among the data of his deliberate thinking. (3) Whether we will or not, a large factor in education, particularly in the development of standards and ideals in the young, is suggestion emanating from adults, especial
ally parents and teachers. A purely rationalistic education is a psychological impossibility. Hence it is a custom of educators to take at least some measures for determining the sorts of suggestion to which pupils shall be exposed. M. W. Keating argues for careful, deliberate planning of this part of teaching.1

On the other hand, suggestion is, on the whole, a process of repetition or of maintaining some status quo ante rather than a process of criticism and rationalization. The repetition is likely to be done alone rather than with some conscious or deliberate effort. A process of suggestion, directed to alone or to oneself, is more or less social process, current, or conversational. It would be a mistake, nevertheless, to suppose that truly ethical action requires nothing but deliberation. Ethical situations are made real to us, especially situations that call for reform, by some kindling of elemental processes that include strong satisfactions or their opposites. Thus it comes to pass that great sermons commonly interweave strong suggestions with analysis and even argument.

To exhibit the whole significance of suggestion in religion would require an historical catalogue of practically all experience. Primitive fears connected with taboo and with spiritism were propagated from individual to individual and from generation to generation by suggestion. The same is true of the rejoicing that accompanied some of the ceremonies. Priesthoods acquired and retained their power by narrowing the attention of worshippers by means of sense stimuli of various sorts focused upon some point that required concentration. The mystery of all ages have practised auto-suggestion under the name of contemplation or interior prayer. Modern revivals have produced a sense of sin, conversion (reversal of attitudes), and of likes and dislikes, and assurance or the witness of the Spirit chiefly by suggestion. Indeed, managers of revival campaigns at the present day are accustomed to organize preaching, singing, personal work, and advertising of various kinds upon a strictly suggestive basis. Not the least item is the careful preparation of the public mind, sometimes for weeks in advance of the first public meeting. Priests and preachers, as 'the jerks,' 'the power,' 'speaking in tongues,' and 'interpretation of tongues' present as a whole cases of suggestion. They are usually initiated by a spontaneous automatism which is then imitated (by oneself and by others) without deliberation, but often with support from passages of Scripture. The idea of a baptism 'with fire' has similarly fulfilled itself here and there.2

The phenomena of suggestion reach their climax in human masses, whether crowds (which involve spatial propinquity) or a public whose opinions and attitudes are formed by common reading material or even by statements passing from month to mouth. It is a fact of common observation that in a crowd one may act 'like a different person,' accepting as truth what one could not ordinarily believe, and conducting oneself contrary to one's ordinary standards. The mechanism whereby crowd suggestion acquires this remarkable power is as follows. (1) Certain instinctive capacities are strongly stirred by the massing of appropriate stimuli, in a group situation is peculiarly interested in the movements of his fellows, and is sensitive to their approvals and disapprovals. Here is the basis for a quickening or excitement of

1 Suggestion in Education.

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the mind through the mere presence of others, as also for watching and following others, and for subordinating one's own actions to those of others in the presence of a sentiment generally held by the mass. (2) A crowd usually assembles under the influence of some common thought. Even when this is not the case, conversation tends to reproduce a common thought. Moreover, under the stimulus of the excitement already referred to, some individual—either one with relatively few inhibitions or one with strong convictions—suggestions on the duenna—suggestions are likely to speak aloud. This often precipitates the thinking of the entire mass. It is now as if each one were suggesting to every other one the idea that has come to expression. Thus sentiment rolls up like a snowball. (3) This narrowing of attention, as already indicated, involves an equally strong inhibition upon ideas that would ordinarily appear as competitors. Therefore strong, impulsive action occurs spontaneously and appears to the subject to be natural and justifiable. A crowd is incapable of fine discriminations and of skill; its acts tend towards the simplicity and crudity of instinct; and therefore, in this case, a human association easily acts less socially (as far as ends and consequences are concerned) than its members would do if they faced the same moral issue individually.

All that has just been said applies also to masses that are unified by means of the public press. Our present means of communication are so swift and so all-pervasive that men feel the presence of one another almost the world over at almost the same instant. Communities that are a thousand miles apart get the same news, often word for word, at about the same hour; the effect that results is that in one community now becomes an item of news in the other; action as well as idea thus spreads. This is the process whereby a whole nation rises to succour sufferers from earthquake or from fire, or to repel an invader. Thus, too, political opinions as well as fashions of dress and of speech spread with great rapidity.

A study of suggestion as a means of governing men in the State as well as in the Church will show that one of the basal differences between types of organization lies in the degree to which suggestion, as compared with deliberation, is officially used. At the tribal level of organization, communal action is commonly achieved by suggestion of the crowd type, as in dances and other ceremonies, and in the personal leadership of the chief. In the monarchical State, as in sacramental religion, men are ruled partly by direct command (which is, under some conditions, a potent mode of suggestion), and partly by pageantry and other sensuous or sentimental appeal that ever reawakens a traditional attitude of loyalty. The underlying psychological principle of democracy, on the other hand, is deliberate group action. A deliberative group is one in which unity is sought, not by withdrawing attention from alternatives, but by mutual incitement to pause and weigh alternatives before acting. This type is most fully developed in bodies that have formal rules of order. Here, as a preliminary to each commence, the entire group prays, the chairman saying, 'Are there any remarks?' Then, as if challenging each individual to full, deliberate self-expression, he asks, 'Are you ready for the question?' This procedure has been devised so as to prevent any undue influence being exercised by the crowd becomes a unit by the suppression of individual inhibitions, the deliberative group achieves its unity precisely by inviting the expression of competing views and by spreading it far and wide for inspection and unforced selection. The ballot, in popular government, is an organ for essentially
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the same type of delibration on the scale of the local community or of the nation.


GEORGE A. COE.

SUHRAWARDI.—Suhraward, a small town in the Jilil provine of Persia, has given its name to two celebrated mystics whose lives, characters, and opinions present a remarkable contrast, though both were born in the same decade. Of Shihâb al-din 'Umar b. 'Abdallah al-Suhrawardi (A.D. 1144-1234) it is enough to say that he was a Sufi of the conventional type, that he adhered to the strict precept of Franciscan and Capronian, and that his writings include a well-known treatise on Sifism—the 'Awârif al-ma'ârîj—and a polemical work directed against the study of Greek philosophy, which he considers heretical. His name was al-Zahir, in his own time he was denominated the khalil al-Nasir. His contemporary, Shihâb al-din Yahâyâ b. Amirâk al-Suhrawardi (A.D. 1138-91), after studying jurisprudence and philosophy at Maragha, devoted himself to the mystical philosophy, led the wandering life of a dervish, and finally settled in Aleppo. While some of his earlier books were written under the influence of Aristotle, he was at heart a Platonist, as is shown by the title and contents of his chief work, the Ihkâmât 1-al-ishrâq ('Philosophy of Illumination')—whence the school of mystics who follow him are called Ishraqis (al-ishrâqûn). Being an enthusiast as well as a bold and original thinker, he made no attempt to disguise the anti-Platonic tendency of his doctrines. It cannot be denied that from the orthodox standpoint they were detestable and heretical, though at first he was an adherent of al-Malik al-Zahrâ, the son of Saladin, he was condemned and executed by order of that prince in 1191. The name of 'martyr' (shahid) was refused to him; he is generally known as Shihâb al-din al-Mu'âiqli (al-Suhrawardi the slain) or al-Shihâb al-Mu'âiqli.

In his theory of illumination he combines Neo-Platonic and Persian ideas. The source of all things is the Absolute Light (al-nil al-qahir), that which is visible requires no definition, and nothing is more visible than light, whose very nature consists in manifestation.

1 'The Primal Light, therefore, has no reason of its existence beyond itself. All that is other than this original principle is dependent, contingent, possible. The 'not-light' (darkness) is not something distinct proceeding from an independent source. It is an error of the representatives of the Magian religion to assert that Light and Darkness are distinct realities created by two distinct creative agencies. The relation between them is not that of contrast, but of existence and non-existence. The affirmation of Light necessarily postulates its own negation—darkness, which it must illuminate simply in order to be itself. This Point is the source of all motion. But its motion is not change of place; it is due to the law of illumination which constitutes its very essence. The number of illuminations it produces from it is infinite. Illuminations of intense brightness become in their turn the source of darkness, so that the scale of brightness gradually descends to illuminations too faint to beget other illuminations. All these illuminations are medullae, or in the language of theology angels through whom the infinite varieties of being receive life and sustenance from the Primal Light.'

2 We may distinguish two illuminations, i.e. the modes of being possessed by the Primal Light (1) pure, abstract, formless; (2) accidental, derivative, possessing form. The pure light is self-conscious substance (spirit and soul), knowing itself through itself, for 'what has existence in itself is light.' The accidental light is related to the pure light as effect to cause and only exists as an attribute in association with the illuminated object (body), which is not matter in Aristotle's use of the term, but the negation necessarily implied in the nature of light.

The experimental fact of the transformation of the primary elements into one another points to this fundamental Absolute matter which, with its various degrees of grossness, constitutes the various spheres of material being. It is of two kinds: (a) dark substance, (b) dark forms, i.e. qualities; and the combination of these two makes up a material body. Since darkness is nothing but the absence of light, and light is identical with reality, the substance and forms of the universe consist of illuminations derived from the Primal Light in infinite gradations of intensity. It follows that everything partakes of reality in proportion to the radiance which it receives and towards which it ever moves with a lover's passion. In order to drink more and more of the original fountain of Light. This perpetual flow and ebb of desire produces the revolutions of the heavenly spheres, the processes of nature, and all human activities. The abstract light (First Intelligence) is less perfect than the Primal Light (God), in contemplating which it becomes conscious of its imperfection, whereas there arises in it a darkness that is the ground of plurality in the sensible world. While the entire universe is eternal as emanating from the eternal Light, but contingent if regarded as the object of irradiation, some illuminations are simple, others compound and therefore inferior. The intelligences, the celestial spheres, the souls of the heavens, time, motion, and the archetypes of the elements belong to a higher world, which may be called eternal in contrast with all below it, though in the relation existing between them posteriority but parallelism is implied. Suhrawardi, like Plato, conceives a world of Ideas—he declares that it was revealed to him mystically—in which every kind of subsundary thing exists as a substance in itself. The wise men of Persia (Zoroastrians), he says, gave names to many of these pure lights (Ideas); e.g., they named the Idea of water Khurâd (May), that of trees Murâd (July), and that of fire Ardibilîsât (April).

As each species is endowed with its distinctive qualities and preserved by its guardian Idea—the lord of the species' ('hadâw 'unwar')—so the Idea of the human body is 'the holy spirit' or universal Reason, while bodies individually are types of rational souls. The body being pure light, it imparts illumination to the body through the medium of the animal soul. It operates with the five external and the five internal senses, which correspond to powers residing in the ideal archetype. Thus vision, knowledge, memory, imagination, etc., are essentially not perceptive functions but illuminative acts of the soul. Obeying the principle that what is lower in the scale of being loves what is higher, the soul longs to be initiated towards the Formless.
SUICIDE (Introductory)

world of light, and it advances towards this end according as it seeks to become perfect in philosophy and the practice of virtue. By so doing it develops a mystical perception (shumq) which clears all doubts away. Shumq, as Suhrwardi tells us, was the name of the speculations set forth in the Hikamut l-tishrih. In one passage he seems to hint that he himself is the gubb, the mysterious head of the Sfi hierarchy, for he asserts that the philosophy of illumination was taught by Empedocles, Pythagorans, Plato, and the Zoroastrian sages, and that the world is never without one some who possesses the doctrine and can expound of it unerringly. If the stranger, he adds, is God’s viceroyent (khulafa Allah) on the earth, then Attainment of firmi2 unites the soul with God, but does not mean that one substance is absorbed in another. No two souls can be completely alike.

1 The individual souls, after death, are not united into one soul, but continue different from each other in proportion to the illumination they received during their companionship with physical organisms. ... Some souls probably come back to the world in order to make up deficiencies. The doctrine of transmigration cannot be proved or disproved from a purely logical standpoint, though it is a probable hypothesis agrees so as to be desired for the future welfare of the soul. All souls are thus constantly journeying towards their common source, which calls back the whole universe when this journey is over, and starts another cycle of being to reproduce in almost all respects the history of the preceding cycles.

2 Suhrwardi agrees with Gzah to hold that the world could not be better than it is. Evil is a negation depending on the motion and darkness which, as we have seen, are involved in the nature of light; it is associated with the effects and does not proceed per se from the First Cause; if it existed per se, it would not be evil. In his clear and symbolic exposition of the Sufi philosophy Shahih Muhammad Iqbal calls attention to Suhrwardi’s intellectual independence and to the skill with which he moulded his Neo-Platonic materials into a whole. A premonition of thought, uniting speculation and emotion in perfect harmony. Mystic and (in a sense) pantheist as he was, he regards the external world as real and never loses touch with it.

Reynold A. Nicholson.

SUICIDE.


Hindu (A. BIRRIEDALE KEITH), p. 33.

SUICIDE (Introductory).—Before attempting any discussion of this diseases in the subject of ethics or religion, we should note that in many cases — probably the majority, among civilized peoples—either no moral judgment can be passed upon the act or at least great allowance must be made for the mental condition of the agent. Lunacy not infrequently involves such complete loss of the instinct of self-preservation that the patient, even where agnosia is not present, will unwittingly commit acts injurious both to himself and others without any knowledge of what he is doing. So in dementia praecox 'self-respect, modesty and the instinct of self-preservation are quite absent'; and the result is various absurd, criminal, or indelent acts, including suicide for a trivial reason or none at all. Again, dementia paranoid, or chronic paranoephalia, although like many forms of mental diseases it generally produces intense and unreasoning attachment to life, often involves accessions of wild, self-directed fury, such as that in which Gye de Manpassant tried to kill himself,4 but the most typical examples are those of melancholia. We quote part of Tanzi’s admirably lucid account:

4 In some cases of melancholia scenes of the most horrible and sanguinary nature, which are represented to the patient’s mind as sincere and as connected with the most disgusting images on account of their hideousness, becomes transformed into a milder obsession. The obsession, meeting with but slight resistance in an exhausted and abject brain (i.e. one almost if not quite deprived of will-power), becomes so imperative as to drive the patient not merely to the commission of acts corresponding to it, such as suicide in its most horrible forms.

5 The state in which these acts occur—the raptus melancholici—is quasi-insomniacal. But suicide often takes place in less time than this, when the patient is not wholly irresponsible, but

is actuated by motives the importance of which his disease—like that of the sick in the story of the seventh of St. Mark—fixes on the heart with the greatest degree of intensity. But even so, they are always to be considered even if there be no other means of relief. The passions of the patient, as far as they are in his power to control, are to be regarded as those of a diseased nature, and the motive of the act must be determined by the state of the patient’s mind, and not by the consequences of the act.

Japanese (T. HARADA), p. 35.

Jewish (G. MARGOLIOUTH), p. 37.


Besides the references given in the art., M. Horten, Die Philosophie der Erkenntnisse nach Suhrwardi (Abhandlungen zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte, xxxvii.), Jaffe, 1912; A. Klein, Gesch. der Philosophie des Islams, Leipzig, 1889, p. 5ff.; C. Brockelmann, Gesch. der ar:it., Berlin, 1903-1902, i. 147.

1 See art. SHIFR.

2 Carra de Vosq, p. 687.

3 See art. NR.

4 A Handbook of Mental Disease, 619 gives a case (p. 641) of a patient who believed that he was inanimate and killed himself by blowing up his house. An apparently unattached suicide is described on p. 622.

5 Tanzi, p. 23.

6 Ec. 519.

7 Ec. 519.
Sexual emotions, especially in women. Hence such suicides are particularly common among adolescents. As there is admittedly a close connection between sexual and religious emotions, especially in their more exaggerated and wild form, we may place some at least of the religions of suicide (see below) in this category.1

In most cases of this kind the patient's insanity is easily recognizable; and even in those instances where a melancholia propria, i.e., the more refined and characteristic form of insanity, is long and hard to recognize, and perhaps regarded as such impulses as part of the normal mental life of an individual. 2

In many cases of this kind suicide is frequently regarded as the outcome of a malignant, and may even be the result of a normal, inclination. 3

When a person of this kind attempts to commit suicide, he is usually successful, and does not wish in general to be cured. 

To the several classes of more or less non-moral acts of self-destruction should be added the very large number of instances in which the person who is about to commit suicide is temporarily insane, and is really not responsible for what he is about to do. 

To the several classes of more or less non-moral acts of self-destruction should be added the very large number of instances in which the person who is about to commit suicide is temporarily insane, and is really not responsible for what he is about to do. 

... (but) death by famine was attended by some obvious disadvantages. It was slow; it opened the door to repentance; it occasioned a constant repetition of robberies. But the number of actual cases of the same kind. Clearly, then, when a person imagines himself to be insane, he is, as it would be regarded as an ordinary lunatic who does not know what he is doing or imagines that he has good reasons for his act, or he will do any other thing that he desires, on more or less rational grounds, that he wishes to end his life. It is still harder to pass satisfactory moral judgment on a man who, either for himself or others, apparently sane but perhaps really neurotic, whose suicidal, but is an inadequate one—a small injury, real or supposed, to honour, or even so trivial a cause as a wager. 

Suicides of this kind sometimes amount to a sort of epidemic. When one member of a family has ended his life, the recurrence of the anniversary of his death, the sight of the weapon that the person died by, or some such casual association has been known to drive a relative to follow his example, until as many as seven of one household have died by their own hand. 5

Epidemics, extending through an entire city, or even wider; 6 have not been unknown, in ancient or modern times, and are frequently associated with religious mania. These are probably hysterical, as hysteria is easily communicable, and tends to produce, especially among women, an epidemic mania. 

To all these classes of more or less non-moral acts of self-destruction should be added the very large number of instances in which the person who is about to commit suicide is temporarily insane, and is really not responsible for what he is about to do. 

Suicide by violent nervous shock, disease, grief, excesses of one sort or another, etc., become temporarily unbalanced to a slight degree. These causes are so many that it is questionable whether any one whose life is of normal length is absolutely sane during every waking moment of it. 7 We need not doubt that the charitable verdict of the average coroner's jury, 'suicide while of unsound mind,' is in a large percentage of cases quite in accordance with medical facts. 

But our primary interest is in the act of one who, being perfectly sane, takes his own life. The question whether such an act is justifiable, and, if so, when and under what circumstances, has been answered in the most various ways by peoples of different degrees of culture, from the lowest savages to members of the highest civilizations, ancient and modern. Some account of these answers has been given elsewhere. 8 We propose now to consider the attitude taken by religions savage and civilized, and by the leading schools of moral philosophy.

1. Religion. Various faiths have taken every conceivable view of suicide, from recommending it to resolutely and uncompromisingly opposing it. As the grounds for the former view are less obvious to us, it is well to begin by briefly discussing them. First in the list stand those fanatic beliefs, including degraded forms of Christianity, whose votaries have been impelled to kill themselves, often in most painful ways, to attain a blissful immortality or to avoid something which they regarded as polluting.

Many of these people, and other such religions suicides, were undoubtedly in a condition of hysteria, if not actual madness. We have a parallel to such self-destruction in the most horrible of the rites of Kybele—which took place on the dies syncinis, at least in its earlier form. 9 On this occasion the devoees of the goddess, wrought up to a pitch of frenzy by an exciting and elaborate ritual, not only wounded themselves, but performed the act of self-emasculation, thereafter joining the ranks of the Guli. Turning now to medical evidence, we find such mutilation named along with suicide and manslaughter as typical of some forms of lunacy. We have thus two closely related acts, both involving loss of the instinct of self-preservation, arising, not from ordinary, but from a temporary insanity, or from a deliberate and aroused to a perverted or degraded religious instinct.

But religious suicides are not always maniacal. We need only allude in passing to the innumerable instances of Frazier, familiar to us from the result of violent nervous shock, disease, grief, excesses of one sort or another; of suicide, or of suicide from some other cause; 10 and of the very widespread belief among many tribes that the soul of one who kills himself will be punished by the gods, or will receive some other penalty.

1 See Mercier, pp. 354-357.
2 For other instances of mental disease resulting in suicide during more or less complete irresponsibility see Tanzi, pp. 321 (alcoholism), p. 221 (epilepsy).
4 Several examples in Tanzi, p. 594.
5 See ibid., p. 221.
6 E.g., at Miletus; see Plutarch, De Iside et Osiris, p. 519, 6 (wholesale suicide by hanging of the young women from some temple tower); cf. W. de Leau, "The Suicide of Cleopatra," Macmillan, p. 14.
7 Tanzi, p. 585.
8 Mercier, p. 137.

1 See art. ETHICAL.
4 Tanzi, p. 533.
lower strata of human history we have numerous examples of savages who regard suicide as perfectly justifiable (a) because the deceased will in the next world have a body in the same state as his present one. (b) This naturally leads to the conclusion that voluntary suicide is praiseworthy for meditation of a grave or long and wasting illness, since it will avoid a maimed or helpless life after death. Such suicides are practically examples of euthanasia (q. v.). Or (b), because some people regard it as honourable and therefore as procuring a more than usually pleasant lot in the next world, not merely avoiding an unpleasant one. Obviously such ideas are not widespread or unqualified, or they would result in the extinction of the peoples holding them. They mostly take this form; a dependent — wife, vassal, or slave — is so closely bound to his or her superior that death cannot sever the tie; therefore, just as in any earthly journey the vassal will faithfully attend his lord, so, when his lord dies, the most honourable course is to follow and continue to serve him. Such fidelity will, it may be expected, result in due honour among the dead.

So at the death of a king of Benin his favourites and servants used to compete with each other for the privilege of being burned alive with the king's body in order that they might attend and minister to the other world, and 'the first to die was deemed the most fortunate of those ever allowed' to give evidence of this.2 Similarly among the early Germans 'notice in common utanam as prorsum superstitio princi palis sancta diucessisse,' and higher civilization Persians were capable of similar devotion to their king. But this is hardly a religious idea; more definitely connected with religious belief is the Hindu sati (q. v.).

Religious opposition to suicide is to be found in all, or nearly all, strata of civilization. Probably the chief, if not the intrinsic reason for this among primitive races is simply the dread of the ghost. The self-destructor must have been greatly wronged or troubled in some way, or he would not have acted as he did; therefore his ghost will be an unusually troublesome and revengeful spirit, like that of all aventahvatos — to borrow the convenient Greek term. Hence, either he must be appeased by the death of his enemy, if known, or by offerings of some kind, or else he must be rendered harmless. A natural way to accomplish this is to mutilate or destroy the corpse — in fact, to treat it much as medieval Europe did a madman, in the hope that the ceremony of cremation, or burning, would, in accordance with the common idea, would easily generate enough the belief that the act of burning, under these circumstances, would make the crime wicked, i.e. strongly displeasing to whatever deity the community worshipped. It should be noted, however, that among some people this is not a very advanced stage of culture suicide is objected to on religious grounds, but so scrupulous methods of treating the corpse are in vogue. The Exclusive of North Borneo held that those who die by their own hands live miserably in the next world; but the bodies are not burned or mutilated, nor is there any fear of them shown3 unless their unconceivable burial or the spot where they are found may be taken to be a precautionary measure indicating fear.4

This vague idea of suicide as a crime has been taken over by several higher religions and explained by them in the light of their ethical and eschatological beliefs. Thus for an uncorrupted and logical form of Buddhism it is clearly for forbidden, since it violates the first of the five funda-


mental precepts, 'Kill not any living thing.' 1 A religion — it can scarcely be called a philosophy — which presents certain striking parallels to that of Gautama gave an elaborate justification of its prohibition of suicide. To the Orphic — Pythagorean doctrine was the present of duty to mortification and lengthening of life, i.e. the form of imprisonment; therefore to kill one's self was to attempt, quite vainly, to shirk a deserved penalty. 2 This view, with various modifications, was taken up by Plato, and is regarded as an important theocological of later philosophy. 3

The natural Roman religion perhaps condemned suicide originally and in theory. So Sertorius tells us that the ibert pontifices beds the body of one who had himself to be cast forth unburied; and the later Servius Daniellis adds on the authority of Consus Hemsia that the idea of the disgracefulness of suicide dates from the time of Tarquinius Superbus. More cowerth is notion from Varro 4 and in the conclusion that inhuman were denounced the regular funeral rites. We have no hint, however, that the various suicides of legend and history were otherwise than honourably treated. Possibly the objection was not to suicide in general, but to hanging, regarded as foragoria, any rate, the rhetorical discussions of the subject 6 quote no native religious scruple.

The opposition of Christianity has from an early date been of the most considered kind. It is true that nothing in the NT directly prejudices such an attitude, but certain Patristic writings make it obvious that by their time the discussion had taken the form of an inquiry whether self-destruction was an office of one of the superior classes, and whether any class of the superior classes, and whether any sanction to such a crime (acculus), as he repeatedly calls it, may be conduced in the case of a woman whose honour is in danger, or in any case, if he arrives at any conclusion. His reasons are chiefly: (a) that suicide is an act which precludes the possibility of repentance, 3 and that it is a form of homicide, and therefore a violation of v. the sixth commandment, 4 not justified by any of the exceptions, general or specific to that commandment, which have been divinely established, 5 and aggravated by the fact that the person thus killed has done nothing worthy of death. 6 To commit suicide one must avoid violating the best of a greater sin to escape a lesser. 7 But even St. Augustine himself was obliged to admit the possibility of exceptions, since in his day several persons who had taken their own lives were recognized officially as martyrs — an indication, even if other proofs were lacking, that the opposition of suicide to was of gradual growth. It is suggested that what is now regarded as a special divine ordnance superseded the general law, which nevertheless remains in full force for all ordinary persons. This remains in substance the position of orthodox Catholicism. It is not insignificant that in the most developed of all mediaeval works on eschatalogical subjects, although the possibility of repentance at the very moment of a violent death is admitted, the examples are chosen from persons killed in battle or by assassins. 8 Nor has orthodox Protestantism been any less emphatic; indeed, its rejection of the doctrine of purgatory makes it still more uncompromising in condemnation of suicide and less hope-
ful with regard to the future destiny of suicides. Judaism in its later forms strongly denounces self-destruction, but the OT says nothing which could reasonably be held to justify this, unless we adopt the Augustinian view of the meaning of the sixth commandment. Probably the Hebrews, until late post-Exilic times, must be counted among those races to whom suicide is simply one of the various possible forms of death and calls for no special comment. 2

2. Ethics.---All the different views of suicide taught by various religions re-appear, with additions, in the various ethical systems. The religious side of Plato's views has already been mentioned. Both he and Aristotle objected to self-destruction as cowardly and an offence against the State, which thus loses a citizen. Plato also declares it unnatural, since a man is his own closest friend. But both are willing to allow it in some cases—incurable pain, or disgrace so great as to make life no longer worth living. The flood of individualism which resulted from the overthrow of the old political life by the Macedonian conquest swept away the second of the above arguments; and consequently we find much discussion of suicide in the letters in which he writes, and a decided tendency to condone or even countenance it. Its most whole-hearted upholders are those who deny immortality, or at least personal immortality; for they readily embrace the ancient Greek view that death is the cure for all ills. A thoroughgoing exponent of this view and insister upon the misery of life was Heseglin the Cyrenean, who, according to Cicero, was forbidden by King Ptolemy to lecture on that topic, owing to the number of suicides which took place among his hearers. Less extreme doctrines were prevalent among the Stoics, who before the time of Posidonius generally denied personal immortality and without exception refused to admit that death was an evil or life a good. Both being 'indifferent,' since neither is a virtue or a vice, it follows that sometimes one and sometimes the other is 'preferable'; hence it is 'reasonable' for even the perfectly wise man to kill himself if it will benefit his friends or his country, or will free him from great pain or incurable disease for tilting reasons, however, was condemned.

Epiktetos, perhaps the most infallible member of this school, held the matter thus: 'In an imaginary dialogue: Epiktetos declares, 'You can no longer endure to be bound to this wretched body! ... Let us go whence we came; let us at length throw off the fetters with which we have been weighed down. ... Wait for God, sirs; when He gives the signal and sets free those who shall depart to live in the present, endure to live in the place where He has stationed you. ... Wait, do not depart unreasonably.'

Again, what may be written, 'You may depart unreasonably.' The room is smoky. If only moderately, I will stay; if there is too much smoke, I will go. Remember this, keep fast hold on it—the door is open. ... You must live in Gyara.' Very well. But Gyara seems to me a very smoky room. So I will go to a habitation in which no one can prevent me dwelling; a habitation which is open to everyone.'

The Epicureans did not indeed recommend suicide in general; but that death, although an evil, is not one which can touch or harm us is one of their fundamental principles. 'When we are, death is not present; when death is present, then we are not,' says the founder of the sect.

The suicide of the ordinary unphilosophical man, Laertius stigmatizes as self-destructive, since it is caused by fear of the very death which is committed. The Cyrenes were to be absolutely indifferent to life and death as to everything else and are accused of having 'diligently endeavored to achieve death for little or no reason,' while some Skeptics were equally insensible. In Rome, where originally suicide appears to have been rare, the famous case of Caius Gracchus, who killed himself for the most part inspired by Greek teaching, generally soiled. Medival ethics added nothing new.

Perhaps the greatest contribution of modern times to the rational treatment of the matter is the consideration noticed in the opening paragraphs of this article, that many suicides are non-moral and entirely the result of the specific mental diseases. Apart from this, and considering only cases where the agent is fully rational, the characteristic feature of the ethical discussions of the subject is their elimination of the theological elements in the arguments. Hume's famous essay 'Of Suicide' being the last important work to pay them much attention. Perhaps the school most nearly favourable to suicide is Utilitarianism; for, starting from the definition of a good act as one which increases the sum total of human happiness (identified with pleasure), one can easily imagine cases where the death of a man by his own hand would cause little or no pleasure to anyone, and would be more or less completely a source of pleasure to many. The more metaphysical schools disapprove it, either as an insult to humanity in general as embodied and existent, the 'perfect man' (Kant) or as a final assertion of the will to live (Schopenhauer). There is also a tendency, arising from a contemplation of such medical facts as those already mentioned, to remove it altogether from the field of ethics—a view of suicide to be an exaggeration of a truth. The general trend of non-theological thought on the part of the ordinary educated man is towards a compromise between the extreme latitude towards suicide represented by Stoicism and the extreme rigidity of the Kantians. That self-destruction is now and then justified by circumstances is admitted by most; and it is quite as widely admitted that those circumstances must be of an extreme and unusual kind to make the act anything else than cowardly and otherwise immoral.

LITERATURE.—Besides the works given under Euthanasia, the following may be cited: E. Tanti, A Text-book of Mental Disease, Eng. tr., London, 1910; C. Mercier, Sanity and Insanity, 200, 1910, and similar accounts; J. G. Frazer, 649, p. 1911-14; J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism, 30, 1869 (many subsequent ed.).

II. J. ROSE.

SUICIDE (Buddhist).---1. Introduction.---We are concerned only with 'religious suicide' and the Buddhist views thereon, not with the various kinds of suicide mentioned in Buddhist literature, interesting as they may be. The position of the old Indian ascetics in regard to suicide may be summarized as follows. While the majority of sects were addicted to rapid methods of death—throwing oneself down from a mountain, etc.—the Jains (and probably also the disciples of Gsoka) considered those methods vulgar and evil.

1 De Rer. Nat. Hist. iii. 79 ff.
2 Lucr. IV. 1099, 1100.
3 Lucr. IV. 1075, 1076, 1077.
4 See art. Euthanasia.
5 Plato, Laws, xxii. c. 3; Aristotle, Eth. Nic. v. 1398v, with J. Burnett's note.
6 See art. Suicide (Greek and Roman) and note the clumsiness of the Latin, as compared with the Greek, expressions for suicide. The word 'suicide' itself, although of Latin derivation, is impossible as a Latin compound.
7 See art. Euthanasia.
8 See art. Suicide (Greek and Roman) and note the clumsiness of the Latin, as compared with the Greek, expressions for suicide. The word 'suicide' itself, although of Latin derivation, is impossible as a Latin compound.
10 See art. Suicide (Greek and Roman) and note the clumsiness of the Latin, as compared with the Greek, expressions for suicide. The word 'suicide' itself, although of Latin derivation, is impossible as a Latin compound.
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12 See art. Suicide (Greek and Roman) and note the clumsiness of the Latin, as compared with the Greek, expressions for suicide. The word 'suicide' itself, although of Latin derivation, is impossible as a Latin compound.
SUICIDE (Buddhist)

who thus kill themselves are reborn as demons. While practising starvation, the Jain must avoid any desire for death (maragdayan). 2. Renouncing all food and drink, I patiently wait for my end.

2. Buddhism condemns asceticism. — Any austerity which is likely to weaken body or mind is forbidden. The Jains and many others saw in asceticism and physical pain (dikha, tapas) a formula that would bring them from sin. Suicide by starvation is the ascetic act par excellence. While vocal sins are destroyed through silence (mumtu) and mental sins through 'respiratory restraint,' bodily sins are destroyed through starvation (hrdaya), and lust is crushed through mortification. Buddhism had better methods of crushing lust and destroying sin—the realization of the impermanence of pleasure and of the non-substantiality of the ego, the experience in trance (bhyanata) of a happiness which has nothing to do with pleasure and destroys in a man any infatuation for pleasure. It was thus enabled to dispense with ascetic methods.

3. Buddhism condemns suicide. — There is a celebrated text:

"A monk who preaches suicide, who tells man: 'Do away with this wretched life, full of suffering and death, and the facts prove murder; he is not a monk.'"

A man must live his allotted span of life. He cannot avoid, by suicide, the suffering which are the result of his former evil deeds; nor can he win sooner, by a voluntary death, the reward of his good deeds. Everything comes to him who waits. To that effect Buddha employs the P'yanisi the shrillest of the women who cuts open her body in order to see whether her child is a boy or a girl.

It seems also that suicide from religious motives is not effective. Buddhists object to 'thirst for non-existence' (vibhavatayat), as they object to 'thirst for existence' (bhavatayat). A saint must abide in indifference, without caring for life, without caring for death. He will not commit suicide in order to reach nirvana sooner. Is not suicide a desperate act of disgust and desire, disgust of existence, desire of rest?

4. Buddhism admits suicide. — We have therefore good reasons to believe (1) that suicide is not an ascetic act leading to spiritual progress and to nirvana, and (2) that no saint or arhat—a spiritually perfect—will kill himself. But we are confronted with a number of instances which prove beyond dispute that we are mistaken in these two important conclusions. On the one hand, suicide may be in certain cases the actual cause or the occasion of the attainment of arhatship, although in other cases it may be premature and sinful. On the other hand, arhats commit suicide. In illustration of the first point, we may quote the story of the attempted suicide of (1) Sisa, (2) Sappadzos, and (3) Vakkali; for the second the suicide of (4) Vakkali and (5) Godhika.

1 The girigadana or bhipptaya is pitripayanakhetthya (H. Jacobi, Ausgewichte Erzahlungen in Mahahartri, Leipziz, 1880, p. 21; A. Weber, Fragment der Dharmasut, Berlin, 1866-68, p. 206).


3 Vakkali suicide. It is voluntary or not, destroys sin (see J. J. Meyer, Hindu Tales).

4 On v. 99, Magadha, L. 97; SBE i, 1910, i.e. 'Suicide,' the references to vols. xxii. and xliv.

5 Sappaddos, i.; see SBE xil. (1914) 4.

6 Dhipada-Nigha, ii. 227; Dintawaka of the Buddha, ii. 250 (SBE iii, London, 1919).

(1) Sisa was distressed at not obtaining spiritual progress after seven years of endeavour. She said: 'What have I to do with this wretched life (sappadaya)? I will die through hanging.' But, just before death, she was tied round her neck, she was turning her thought towards enlightenment (sujata), as was her former wife, and gained arhatship. Had it not been for the moment the rope loosened from her throat and fell.

(2) The story of Vakkali is to the same kind. This monk was overpowered by passion (suset) and never obtained concentration. This distressed him so much that he was about to commit suicide when he washed with a ramnitied cloth. The Buddha commanded him to go. Desperate at being no longer able to see the Master, Vakkali decided to commit suicide by throwing himself down from a mountain, saying: 'What have I to do with this life, if I can no longer see Him? At this moment a sage appeared and prevented him from thus destroying the conditions of his reaching the Path (anagamaj).'

(3) Vakkali was suffering from a painful illness. Bhagavat came to comfort him and said: 'Your death will be a holy one, and an auspicious one (parvpati). When the Master had gone, Vakkali uttered for the last time the Buddhist profession of faith (universal transitoriness) and took the sword.

(4) Godhika was unable because of disease to remain in a certain state of meditation. He thought: 'If I were to take a sword, Mara would destroy the Buddha and told him: 'If you desire to destroy the Buddha, you must use your sword skillfully.' But, as the rope was tied round his neck, he did it, and the Buddha said: 'There is no limit to the regard for life; they achieve insight (sappadaya) and reach the self-surrender.' This was the beginning of ones (dharmikapratipada) the way of salvation by destroying one's self'; having removed thirst and the root of thirst (that is, ignorance), Godhika is an arhat.

5 The nirvana of the great saints. — Vakkali was an arhat, but, as he did not possess the power of 'loosening the sappadaya' of life, he had, in order to die, to take the sword. On the other hand, Sakyamuni and Buddha amongst the saints of Mahayajjapati Gotami in the Apyadana—possess such a power. The Sanskrit Abhidharma teaches that it belongs to the saints who have reached the nirvapdayaparinirvan {nirvana without result).

In the case of Sakyamuni we have to deal with a voluntary death; in the case of Mahayajjapati, who has to obtain permission of Sakyamuni before she resolves to die, we have to deal with a voluntary death of a slightly different character. The Pratyekabuddhas, like Sakyamuni, decide for themselves when the 'time' has arrived; their method is to rise a few cubits above the ground and burn themselves.

We can easily understand that a Buddha, when he has set in motion the wheel, when he has elected two chief disciples—brihat, when he has done what he set out to do—is daily and every day to enter into the final rest. The case of an arhat is not different; the arhat also has achieved what he had to achieve—i.e. he has removed the slightest kind of desire. If he is not, like a Buddha, capable of abandoning life in a quiet way, there is no reason why he should not have recourse to more drastic methods.

6. Mahayana praises and deprecates suicide as self-surrender and worship. — The saint of the new Buddhism must, before reaching nirvana, spend millions of lives in charity, worship, and meditation. 'Abandoning one's existence (alatmens layaparicched), alatanga layaparicched is to be looked upon as the best self-sacrifice, for to give one's body is better than to give alms, and also as the best
worship, for to turn one’s body as an offering is certainly more meritorious than to kindle lamps at a shrine. We may refer (1) to the story of the future Sakyamuni giving his body to feed a starving tiger, and (2) that of the monk Sumana, who, dissatisfied with his previous worship although painful and extravagant, filled his body with all sorts of oil and set it on fire. 2

The Buddhists have practised in that way many heroic deeds (dukkhavada), some of which are told in the canon of ancient Buddhism (Charityapada, Jataka); the new scriptures are inexhaustible on this topic.

In accordance with the principles of the new Buddhism and the Légende dorée of the eternal Buddhism, self-surrendering culminating in voluntary death has been held in honour in various Buddhist countries. It happens (or it used to happen) that Chinese monks beg for fuel, build a funeral pyre, sit cross-legged on it, cover their head with linen soaked in oil, and set themselves on fire. With some branches of Buddhism (Mahayana, the T’ien-t’ai), the ‘burning of the skull’ is an essential part of ordination as a ‘future Buddha’—a symbol of the holocaust for which human courage is nowadays iniquitous. 3

The Burmese L’it-sing says that Indian Buddhists abstain from suicide and, in general, from self-torture. 4 Whether this statement be accurate or not—A. Barth did not believe it to be quite accurate anyway—he is ready to strongly deprecate such practices. One of the chief aims of Sántideva in his Sikṣākramanachakraya, 5 ‘A Compendium of the Rules of the Disciple of the Present Era’, is to elucidate this point: In what measure is a disciple—a beginner—to imitate the heroic deeds of the bodhisattvas of old? The disciple is ready, willing, and resolved even to commit sin and to burn in hell for the sake of another, not to mention sacrificing his limbs and body; but he must avoid any mistake in the realization of his resolve. The question is whether in such and such a case sacrifice or self-denial is really useful to our fellow-creatures; there is not some other means of procuring universal welfare. To sum up, the sacrifice of one’s body is not in accordance with a wise estimate of the spiritual needs of a beginner.


I. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN.

SUICIDE (Chinese).—Suicide is at least not uncommon in China. Literature and history supply illustrations. In a Chinese novelette the heroine commits suicide on the grave of her betrothed lover to avoid the marriage arranged for her with his rival, and that rival thereupon takes his own life in order to be in the world at once his quest for his bride and vengeance on her lover. Among some eight hundred biographical

2 Sūkadharmaapadippitā, xxii, tr. i. Kern, S.B.U. (1884).
3 See J. J. M. de Groot, Le Caus du Mahayana en Chine, Amsterdam, 1893, pp. 50, 217, 227. It is recorded that in the Japanese temples, professional suicide was not unknown. In 1422 a large company of persons, having heard a stirring sermon by a zealot to the effect that poison might gainly yield to calling on the name of Amida, committed suicide by walking into the sea while repeating the ‘Namu Amida Butsu’. 4


notices in W. F. Mayer’s Chinese Kernels’ Manual, 5 27 instances of suicide are recorded—generals after defeat, a tyrant to escape his impending doom, a dethroned ruler, statesmen whose advice, like Alcibiades’, has not been followed, men who, with a programme of professed reform, desired to enforce their counsel by this last proof of their earnestness, a captive to avoid exile, hopeless prisoners, ministers who, having incurred the displeasure of their sovereigns, were allowed to die there rather than by the hands of the executioner, a rebel whose plot was discovered, women to avoid a marriage deemed by them to be shameful, an upright servant rather than commit a murder enjoined on him, a minister of justice under whose subordinates capital punishment was unduly frequent, those moved by loyalty to a deceased master, by grief for the death of father or son, or by shame for a son’s treachery.

In addition to suicides on such occasions as these, some of which will be noted as peculiarly Chinese, cases also occur in which misery (e.g., hopeless leprosy) drives to suicide. More frequent are cases in which suicide is committed in an access of passion, sometimes with the view of involving one’s adversary in legal proceedings in this world, or less frequently with the hope of harassing him by violations of the vengeance ghosts.

Hanging, leaping down a well, and opium poisoning have been perhaps the most common methods of suicide; the last may diminish in frequency under the present opium restrictions.

In the absence of accurate statistics it is impossible to estimate the ratio of deaths by suicide to the total population. The general impression is one of a rare and probably well-founded, is that suicide is much more frequent than in Great Britain. This greater frequency, if it is assumed as fact, may be accounted for by the low value put on individual life, a tendency to ungenerous rage, and the fact that social and religious feelings do not rigorously inhibit suicide, but rather in certain circumstances (e.g., where marriage is being urged on a widow or a bride whose betrothed bridegroom has died) approve it.


SUICIDE (Greek and Roman).—I. GREECE.—Under the name ‘suicide’ we here include all forms in which the individual kills himself intentionally, whether he does it of his own free will or upon compulsion, and whether the end of his action be selfish or altruistic.

1. Legendary suicides.—The earliest definite mention of suicide in Greek literature is the case of Epikaste (Iokaste), the mother of Oedipus of Thebes, in the Nekyia. 6 Odysseus tells how in Hades ‘I saw the mother of Oidipios, fair Epikaste, who wrung an awful deed in ignorance of mind, marrying her own son. And he said plain his father and he married her. And presently she made it known to men, then he in lovely Lydia endued sorrow and ruled over the Kadmeus by the grievous counsel of the gods. But she went to the house of Hades, fastened : high access from the lofty hall, hidden by her wool. And to him she let sorrows in the aftertime full many, even all that the knyges of a mother bring to pass.’ 7

The precise motive for suicide is not very clearly indicated here, or rather Homer does not distinguish clearly between the horror of Epikaste, the despair of Oedipus, and his self-inflicted act when life has lost all that makes life worth living, and (2) no blame attaches to suicide in itself.

1 New ed., London, 1890.
2 Hom. Od. xi. 271 f.
SUICIDE (Greek and Roman)

But the most famous and indeed the typical heroic suicide is that of Ajax. Homer does not mention his suicide explicitly, but it is clearly alluded to in Od. xi. 548 ff., where Odysseus expresses his regret at having obtained the arms of Achilles:


His suicide was recounted in the Athênaia of Arktinos in connexion with the arms of Achilles to Odysseus. It is to be noted that so far there is no mention of madness or of an attack by Ajax upon the heroes. These incidents were, however, recounted in the Little Iliad of Leschae. Also, whereas in Od. xi. 555 it is emphasized that the death of Ajax was mourned by the Greeks equally with that of Achilles, the Little Iliad told of the withholding of burial honours. But even so there is nothing to indicate that the suicide in itself was considered blameworthy. It is an act quite in accordance with the haughtiness and self-sufficiency which characterize Ajax in Homer, and of which the famous ‘silence of Ajax’ in Od. xi. 553 ff., so admired by the author of the treatise On the Heroic Art, is a fitting expression. The suicide of Ajax is the typical act of a great soul which cannot brook dishonour.

A motive of a lesser kind which prompts to suicide is excess of sorrow for the dead. The feeling is best exemplified in the Sibylline to Homer. If I lose thee, it were better for me to go beneath the earth,” says Andromache to Hector, in the same spirit in which David cries, ‘Would God I had died for thee, O Abdon, my son my son! ’ There is no horror in Homer any express mention of suicide for this reason, but Antikleia is referred to in terms which are hardly consonant with any other explanation than that she died by her own hand.

Eumaeus says to the disguised Odysseus: ‘Laertes still lives, but even more he prays to Zeus that life may perish from his limits within his halls; for he mourns exceedingly for his son that is gone and for his wedded wife, whose death beyond all else he knew grievest and brought him to unlimted age. She in grief for her glorious son perished by a miserable death (λαμαθικά φαντάσαι), so may none perish who dwells here friendly to thee and doing friendly deeds.”

The natural inference from these words is strongly confirmed by the reference to her in Od. xi. 84 ff. and 197 ff. The inter story said frankly that she hanged herself.

The list of such suicides is a long one.

Alcman, father of Thersander, had arranged with his son when he left for Crete, carrying the annual tribute of the Athenians to the Minotaur. Thersander was sent to Delos, where, having slain the monster, a white sail should be hoisted upon the returning vessels. Thersander forgot to take down the black sail which was flying; and Alcman, thinking that his son had perished, threw himself from the rock on which he was keeping watch into the sea (Σικυων) which thenceforth bore his name. Erigone, daughter of Icarus, hanged herself when she found the dead body of her father. 12 Thersander committed suicide when his daughters had hanged themselves. 12 When Euklides throws herself on the funeral pyre of her husband, her father Iphikrates threatens to commit suicide by starvation. 13

A special case of suicide to avoid shame is that to escape sexual dishonour.

Legend told how the Lexibakian rock received its name from Leukatas, who, to escape the unwelcome attentions of Apollo, plunged into the sea off the island of Leukas. 20 Phaonius tells how the women of Naxos of Leukata hanged themselves to escape the violence offered them by certain Lacedaemonians. 21

4 [Longinus, ix. 24.] “To the same effect a chapter on the evils of human passion.”
5 Od. xix. 323.
6 Il., xii. 416.
7 Od. xiv. 323 ff.
8 Il., xii. 416.
9 Ibid., xiv. 416.
10 Il., xii. 416.
11 Iliad, ibid. 11, etc.
12 Iliad, xiii. 5.
13 Iliad, xiii. 36.
14 Iliad, xiii. 56.
15 Iliad, xiii. 279.
16 Iliad, xiii. 3.

1. Suicide, in the sense of self-devotion for one’s country, has always occupied a prominent place in patriotic saga. Proclus, the last king of Athens, is a famous example.

The Lacedaemonians, under pressure of famine, resolved to invade Attica. At first they consulted the Delphic oracle as to their prospects of taking Athens and, receiving an answer that they would be successful if they did not kill the Athenian king, marched on the city. The Corinthians, who were in the city, secretly communicated to the Athenians the purport of the oracle, and the Lacedaemonians, thinking of themselves as a large army, resolved to besiege the beleaguered city and proceeded to gather firewood. When two enemy scouts approached him, he drew his sword, turned one of them with his hilt, whereupon the other, taking him for a burglar, drew his sword and slew him, thus rendering the capture of Athens impossible.

There is the similar story of Makari, daughter of Herakles and Deianeira. That such a death was deemed a glorious one is sufficiently attested.

2. Heroic suicide—The motives which in the Homeric poems seem mainly to be regarded as prompting to suicide are of a heroic nature—the sense of dishonour suffered or impending, the devotion of a high purpose, or the intolerable sorrow of a personal loss. 24

The sense of the common ills of humanity is by no means ignored—παραθηκη υπο θεον θεον θεαν ανθρωπους. 18 But there is no pessimism. Whatever the evils that darken human life, they seem to be a good thing to him who lives as the sun, and the darkest shadow that falls athwart Homeric life is the sense not of its burden but of its brevity. Life at any level is to be preferred to the useless round of an unending story.

But with the rise of religion, as witnessed in the poetry of the age succeeding the Homeric, we have a view of life which is frankly pessimistic. Hesiod conceives the present to be an age of iron, thrown into darker relief by the picture of a happier golden age gone by. 19

That life is an evil has become a commonplace. 20 πατωμα μεν μεθ φυλας εκθρασαν θειος 21 is a doctrine which becomes a buckled-rhyme phrase of later poetry—τω μεν διπαται ρευματοσ, κραπτον εις φοιλ μεθ φυλας εξειτη. 20 The logical consequence of this view of life is that man is justified in ending what he cannot mend. Whether, in fact, this pessimistic view of life actually induced a more increased practice of suicide is more difficult to establish. But in any case motives of a less heroic kind seem now to be recognized as worthy causes of suicide. Thus poverty is expressly recognized by Theognis 23 as a sufficient cause.

3. The historians.—In the historians of the 5th cent. suicide is not a particularly prominent feature, and belongs generally to one or other of the types already noticed.

Herodotus relates the legend of Nitokris, who, in order to escape punishment for her misdeeds, committed suicide by leaping into a room full of ashes. 25 Arion is compelled by the ferrymen either to commit suicide, with the prospect of being buried ashore, or to jump into the sea. 26 The daughter of Mykenos, being violated by her father, hanged herself from a tree. 27 Shame was the motive for the suicide of Spargapises, leader of the Massagetai, who, in a state of intoxication were surprised and killed or captured by the Persians. 28 And we have the parallel stories of Olympos, who, ashamed to return to Sparta when his company was killed, slew himself at Thyrai, 29 and of Panteus, who, having survived the disaster at Thermopyla, on his return to Sparta, being held in dishonour, hanged himself. 30

1 Avic. c. Leukatia, 34 ff.
2 Parker, I. vii. 2, 3; Euphor. Henckelidr.
3 Euphor. Henckelidr., iv. viii. 49.
4 Works, i. 171.
5 Theognis, 388.
6 Theognis, 388.
8 Parker, i. 749.
9 Parker, i. 759.
10 Parker, i. 191.
11 Parker, i. 749.
12 Parker, i. 759.
13 Parker, i. 759.
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29 Parker, i. 759.
30 Parker, i. 759.
In Thucydides we read how in 427 B.C. the Corcyrean democrats sent the temple of Hera and, persuading some fifty of the suppliants (belonging to the oligarchic party) to stand their trial, condemned them to death. They were put to death in the place, or with strips torn from their own clothes. This night went on during the greater part of the time, until in one way or another, by their own hands or by the hands of others, they followed the building and got to know what was happening, they refused to come out. Then the Corcyrean populace broke a hole in the roof through which they showered tiles and arrows at those within. The prisoners tried to shelter themselves as best they could. Most of them put an end to their own lives. Some thrust into their throats arrows which were shot at them; others strangled themselves with clothes. When they found they were left in the place, or with strips torn from their own clothes. This night went on during the greater part of the time, until in one way or another, by their own hands or by the hands of others, they followed the building and got to know what was happening, they refused to come out. Then the Corcyrean populace broke a hole in the roof through which they showered tiles and arrows at those within. The prisoners tried to shelter themselves as best they could. Most of them put an end to their own lives. Some thrust into their throats arrows which were shot at them; others strangled themselves with clothes. When they found they were left in the place, or with strips torn from their own clothes.

In Xenophon, Hell. vii. ii. 36, we have the familiar motive of shame. Kirippo, when the Syracusan fleet under his command was captured by Iphikrates (373 B.C.), "took the spear, the sword, and the shield, and disappeared."

So Hell. vii. iv. 9, when the invading Achaeans were attacked in camp by the Corinthians, when they deserted, the Elean hipparch, who was held responsible for the attack, committed suicide (364 B.C.).

But the suicide which is more prominent in Xenophon is of the romantic type, described as ἐκκόπαστον, ἐσφάγματα ἔσω, which love faithful unto death refuses to be comforted otherwise than by sharing the fate of the beloved. Cyrus himself died, and eight of his best followers fell over him (κατεργά ήσσου). And Artapates, the most faithful of his staff, when he saw that Cyrus had fallen, is said to have leapt from his horse and thrown himself on the body of his king, so that the king ordered him to be slain over Cyrus (ἐσφάγματα αὐτῶν ἱψότω). But others say that he drew his sword and killed himself over him (κατεργά ἐσφάγματα). We have the same motive in the story of Panthela, so beautifully told by Xenophon.

The emotional value of this motive has made it very prominent in literature, as, indeed, it has everywhere and at all times been actually a very common cause of suicide.

It is familiar to the OT.3 Already in Homer Antilochus holds the hands of Achilles, lost in his grief for Patroclus he should cut his throat; and, even if suicide is not meant, Andromache's anguish for Hector almost makes her die.4 Most familiar perhaps of all is the case of Lucretia, the woman of Protesilaus, to whom she was married just before his departure for Troy. There Protesilaus was the first to leap ashore and, after slaying many Trojans, was killed by Hector. After his death his wife grieved for so much that Hermes for pity brought back Protesilaus from the dead. At first Lucretia, thinking he had actually returned from Troy, rejoiced, but when he returned to Hades he alone of all the others who fell there held her hands over his head—this for the blessed reunion hereafter: ‘Ere now for human love, for dead wife, for dead son many a man has gone willingly to the house of Hades, drawn by the hope that in the world beyond they might see and be with those they loved.5

4. Compulsory suicide.—A special interest attaches to Xenophon, Hell. vii. vi. 36, when the execution by compulsory suicide of Theramenes in 403 B.C., he says: ‘When, being compelled to die, he drank the hemlock (θάλαμον ἅμων), it was said that he threw what was left of it in the game of catullus, crying: “This for the fair Kritias!” ’ This is the first occurrence of the word θάλαμον in the historians and the only one in Xenophon. When the practice of execution by compulsory poisoning was introduced in Athens we do not know, nor when hemlock first became the recognized medium. The use of hemlock for this purpose, we may with probability suppose, first became regular in the latter part of the 5th cent. B.C. Even in the orators, however, references to it are surprisingly rare. It is not mentioned in Antipholus. Andocides mentions it only once.6 Lycurgus refers to it twice.7 It is not found in Democritus or Euphorion. Diarrhetic hemlock, however, had the advantage of hemlock-drinking over other more...

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1 Musaeus, op. cit.; Stat. Theb. vi. 432; Verg. Georg. iii. 238; Ovid, Her. 17, 18.
2 iv. ii. 5; cf. the case of Skedon (v. xiii. 3).
3 Hell. iv. viii. 38 f.
4 1 Cor. xiv. 39; Eph. iii. xvi. 32.
5 Polybios, vi. 14; Herod. i. 45.
6 jbid., xvi. 36; 1 Cor. xiv. 39.
7 jbid., xvi. 36; 1 Cor. xiv. 39.
SUICIDE (Greek and Roman)

Legends told how, when Dionysos first came to Attica with the new gift of wine, he was hospitably entertained by Ikarios, to whom he revealed his intoxicating boon. Ikarios gave the wine to some drunks who in their drunken frenzy killed their would-be benefactor. His daughter, Erigone, guided to the spot by his faithful dog Stairn, hanged herself on a tree. Then there broke out among the Athenian women an epidemic of hanging, which abated only when the Athenians discovered the cause and instituted the Areia festival in honour of Erigone.

Plutarch tells of a similar outbreak at Miletos, which, obscure in origin, was generally attributed to atmospheric conditions:

'...A strange and terrible affliction once came upon the maidens of Miletos, from some obscure cause—mostly it was conjectured that some poisonous and ecstatic temperament of the atmosphere produced in them a mental upset and frenzy. For there fell suddenly upon all of them a desire of death and a mad impulse towards hanging. Many hanged themselves before they could be prevented. The words and the tears of their parents, their persuasions of their friends, had no effect. In spite of all the ingenuity and cleverness of those who watched them, they succeeded in getting out of their keep and bringing on their misery. The Athenians held that the fact that they were fearful in the face of the two most awful things in the world—death and pain—could not support the appearance of disgrace nor bear the thought of shame after death.'

Theramenes, in whose time hemlock as a means of suicide appears to have come into vogue, was native of Ceos and we have seen above that Theramnes ascribes to the Cenians certain improvements in the method of preparing that poison. There is evidence that at some period the custom by which hemlock was a recognized practice—'if not a legal regulation—in Ceos for persons who had passed the age of 60, Strabo 6 (63 B.C.—A.D. 23), speaking of Iulis, the chief town in Ceos, birthplace of Simonides and his nephew Bucylides, 

'καταβαίνεις ὁ βούλης τῆς λήστης τους νόμους, ὃς μαρτυρεί καὶ τίμησερος (542—291 B.C.) 'καταβαίνεις τῆς λήστης τους νόμους, ὃς μαρτυρεί καὶ τίμησερος (542—291 B.C.)' καταβαίνεις τῆς λήστης τους νόμους, ὃς μαρτυρεί καὶ τίμησερος (542—291 B.C.)' καταβαίνεις τῆς λήστης τους νόμους, ὃς μαρτυρεί καὶ τίμησερος (542—291 B.C.)'

Stephanus of Byzantium 9 writes to the same effect.

So too ΄Αλία, Valerius Maximus, who wrote under Tiberius, attests a similar practice for Massilia, soeller of the Cean practice as he had actually witnessed it.

In Thebes, too, the treatment of suicides attracted some remark. In Athens such differential treatment as we hear of seems rather than of a legal nature. The suicide as a victim of violence belongs to the class of those whose spirits 'walk.' According to a statement in Suidas, suicides and other victims of violent and untimely death were buried in a special place. We find a similar ordinance given by Plato. To:

The order of such ideas belongs the Athenian custom of burying the hand which wrought the suicide.

1 Servius and Zonara in Varr. Hist. 5.40, 50. 20, 30, 1.2.

3 Vitruvius, ii. 4: Pollux, iv. 55; Hesych. s.s. Αἴανθος and "Αἴανθος; Etymologya Magna, ed. F. Snyteur, Leipzig, 1886, s.s. Αἴανθος; school; Schol. B. xii. 29; Athene, xiv. 615 B. F. For this and other swinging rites of GIF. pl. iii., The Dying God, Athens, 1931, N.Y. 2, p. 577 C.

6 D'Host, Mularcin Virtutes, 240 D—D.

7 Hist. Plat. i. xvi.

8 Id. rhet. Hist. ix. 18.

9 Plato, Phenaion, 77, 3: comp. Tert. Hist. i. ch. 22.

10 Inf. Hist. ii. 22.

11 Plato, Phenaion, 117.

12 ΄Αλία, Varr, Hist. iv. 28; Athen. xvi. 557 C.

13 Plato, Phenaion, 117.

14 ΄Αλία, Varr, Hist. iv. 28; Athen. xvi. 557 C.

15 Plato, Phenaion, 117.

16 ΄Αλία, Varr, Hist. iv. 28; Athen. xvi. 557 C.
deed apart from the suicide's body.1 Josephus, in mentioning the custom, adds the unsatisfactory reason that the hand was regarded as alien to the body.2 It is more natural to connect the practice with the idea of the soul of the suicide 'walking' — perhaps to prevent his ghost from attacking the living.3

6. Philosophy.—As regards the attitude of the philosophic schools, the teaching of the Pythagoreans is condemned suicide. Against him, according to Orphic or Pythagorean doctrine, the soul is undergoing in the body a penitential discipline for ante-natal sin.4 Hence suicide is an unwarranted rebellion against the will of God on the part of the individual, whom it behoves to wait until it please God to set him free.

If we may infer his position from the Phaedo and the Laws, condemns suicide in grounds which we would characterize as religious. Religious, too, are the grounds on which Aristotle appears to regard suicide as reprehensible.5 Aristotle treats suicide as an offence not against the individual, but against the State and that of a religious kind, as involving the city in pollution and requiring therefore penalties of a religious nature. No doubt Aristotle had in view such cases as those of deliverance as the severance of the right hand and the like, to which we have referred above.

Stoic teaching was decidedly favourable to suicide. Life and death being for the wise man indifferent (πάραιτα, πάρα), morally neither good nor evil, the question of suicide resolves itself for him into a decision whether life or death is in a given case preferable. Life in accordance with nature being the Stoic ideal,6 when the conditions essential to that ideal are no longer fulfilled, suicide becomes a reasonable deliverance (ελεγχόμενος ἐγερών). Thus suicide may be demanded by a man's duty to his country or his friends or by a condition of severe pain or of physical disablement or incurable disease.7 The paradox of the Stoic position is that the question of 'to be or not to be' is decided not with regard to virtue or vice, but with regard to the ἀδιάφορα, the 'indifferent' things. It is a question of τὰ καθήκοντα τὰ δὲ παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον.8 Hence it may be proper (καθῆκον) for the happy to continue to live, for the unhappy to die.9 Goodness or badness per se has no bearing on the question.10 There is, indeed, little that differs from the Platonic position in the statement of their doctrine in Diogenes Laërtius.11 But the danger of the Stoic doctrine lay in the facility with which comparatively trivial discomforts might be held to justify suicide.

Zeno (c. 399 B.C.), the founder of the Stoic school, is said, according to one account, to have taken his own life because he had stumbled and wrenched his finger.12 Cleanthes, his successor, having developed a gum-balsam, restrained from food by the advice of his doctors for two days. The treatment was successful, and the doctor, relaxed the regime and allowed him παντα τὰ αὐτῶν, all the usual foods. But Cleanthes, having gone so far in the path of death, persisted to the end.13 For the Stoics the length or brevity of life was a matter of indifference.14

The Cynics, too, favoured suicide. Antisthenes

SUICIDE (Greek and Roman)

she is a suicide and thus not admitted immediately to the realm of Hades. 1 We have seen above that according to one tradition, the dead Ajax was deprived of certain rites of burial. The same feeling is at the bottom of the practice of severing the body from the rigd and reposing it apart from the rest of the body. So in our own country suicides used to be buried at the marches in a no man's land: or, if in the churchyard, the body must be passed over the wall and not enter by the gate. As we pointed out, this horror of shedding of blood, all interference with the natural bounds of life, so regarded with a peculiar horror the shedding of kindred blood (μακαριανας, ὀψις ἄγαλμα), 2 Ixion, who first introduced this crime—ἐμπέφανος ἀληθέως πρώτος, ο λέοντας ζήτας—won for himself a choice wreath. 3 The supreme case of kindred blood 4—which is the term used by Sophocles to denote the patricide of Oidipus—is suicide. The Greek language hardly distinguishes between self-murder and murder of kin. The suicide belongs to the class of the victims of violent and untimely death—(μακαριανας, ὀψις ἄγαλμα, ἐκθεσις, λιθανος)—the murdered, the dead on birth or in nonage, 5 the unborn victim of abortion, 6 regarding the fate of whom the popular mind was peculiarly sensitive. It seems probable that these religious and popular beliefs, the popular active theories were the really active motives at all periods of ancient Greece in condemning the practice of suicide.

II. ROMAN.—1. Heroic suicide.—What we may call the heroic type of suicide—committed either to escape intolerable shame or for great causes which seem to demand the sacrifice of the individual life—was, though common, in character the exception of the Roman Republic. Such suicides were a prominent feature in the early history of Rome, and the tradition of them undoubtedly exercised a powerful influence upon later conduct.

The typical example of self-sacrifice for the fatherland is that of the Decii. According to modern authorities, the story is true only of the younger Decius. But, in any case, both are enshrined in Livy's matchless prose. The elder, P. Decius Mus, devoted himself in 337 B.C. in a battle with the Latins near Mount Vesuvius, when he was in command of the left wing. A precisely similar story is told of the younger Decius, who at the battle of Sentinum in 293 B.C. devoted himself to death, charging into the densest ranks of the Gauls, as he fell, to escape intolerable dishonour is illustrated by the story of Lucertis, the victim of the nula lido 7 of Sextus Tarquinii. Her story is too familiar to be told here. 8

2. Penalties of suicide.—We have seen that suicide by hanging was regarded by the Greeks as a shameful type of death. When Oidipus discovers the nature of his sin, he can find no stronger words to describe his deeds than to say that they are ἐφίλετον ἀφρῶς, i.e. such as to say suicide by hanging could not expiate. The Roman feeling seems to have been precisely similar. If we quote the case of Amata, wife of King Litanus, it is obvious how active is the interesting matter preserved by Sivinus in his commentary on the passage. Vergil tells us that

1 ὡς είναι τέκτων τεινεντων προσπήθαν, ιμεσί κυρίος, ἤμες καὶ τεκτα ἀναλίαν
2 ὡς είναι τέκτων τεινεντων προσπήθαν, ιμεσί κυρίος, ἤμες καὶ τεκτα ἀναλίαν
3 ἡ ξύλινη τάξις, τάξις καὶ ἀναλίαν
4 Πέτρος, ἀπόλλωνας, ἐν Ἀρχέλάοις ἐν 1606. σημ. 317–325, καὶ Σ. Βιντ, ἐν Ἀρχέλαοι ἀρχέλαοι, 1812,
5 ἡ ξύλινη τάξις, τάξις καὶ ἀναλίαν
6 ἡ ξύλινη τάξις, τάξις καὶ ἀναλίαν
7 ἡ ξύλινη τάξις, τάξις καὶ ἀναλίαν
8 ἡ ξύλινη τάξις, τάξις καὶ ἀναλίαν
9 ἡ ξύλινη τάξις, τάξις καὶ ἀναλίαν
10 ἡ ξύλινη τάξις, τάξις καὶ ἀναλίαν
friends and requested us to consult his physicians about the issue of his illness, with the intention of voluntarily departing from this life. Although this was not his intention, his other friends did not think he would be able to resist to the pressure that was being applied to him. For it was necessary that he be made to understand that his goods should be confiscated; for if his death were voluntary, he might have committed suicide against his will. For if he were not able to resist the pressure of his other friends, he thought he would, in a certain manner, be able to resist the pressure of his own will, that is, the pressure of his own death. Therefore, he was induced to commit suicide, an act which was eminently high and praiseworthy. For to rush to death under the pressure of one's own will, is more than what many have done: but deliberately to weigh the multitude of advantages and disadvantages, to accustom oneself to the idea of death, without rejecting the point of life or death, is the conduct of a great soul.

In Ep. iii. 16 Pliny celebrates the heroic conduct of Arrin, who, when his husband Ccecilia Petus was condemned for his share in the conspiracy of Scribonianus against Claudius in A.D. 42, encouraged or helped his husband to commit suicide, first stabbing herself and then handing the dagger to her husband with the words 'Painte, non dolet.' This famous suicide is the subject of an epigram of Martial:1

A somewhat similar story is told in Pliny.2 A special interest attaches to the type of suicide mentioned by Pliny in Ep. iii. 9. Cicero Clasius, consul of Octavia a.D. 96-99, was accused of having been an instigator of suicides and was anticipated by death—probably suicide.3 I'll accusations vel fortuita vel voluntaria morte penitentia morte ipsius damnatus fuisse fuerit ut cunum credit eamdatar, volumine exire de vita, cum defundit non possit; its mirum proferre damnationes morte fugisse, quem etiam manus aliquod manum pandat consulul, egresso quoddam consulul

References are frequent under the Empire to the self-destruction of judgment by suicide. In a well-known passage4 Tacitus explains the motives, referring to the year A.D. 54, as being dire of the executioner and the desire to secure certain posthumous advantages which the suicide had over the condemned in respect of the disposal of his person and his property. Normally, it appears, the goods of a condemned person were confiscated, and he forfeited the rites of burial. The suicide, on the other hand, did not forfeit the rites of burial, and many disadvantages remained valid. These advantages constitute what Tacitus calls the 'premio festinandi.'5 In practice, however, there seems to have been considerable variation in the treatment of the goods of such a suicide. The case of the Emperor of the Roman Empire and his suicide goods were confiscated as a matter of course.6 It is clear from the evidence of Tacitus himself that even under the Empire suicide before sentence did not always save the suicide's goods from confiscation.7

The perplexities of the question and the various distinctions made may be seen in Justinian, Dig. xviii. 21:1 'De domo eorum qui ante sensentiam vel mortem sui conscius vel accusatores corruerunt,' where § 3 forms an important document with regard to suicide:

Persons accused of or caught in crime who, through fear of the charge hanging over them commit suicide, have no heirs.8 'Lapinianus,' however, writes that, when guilty persons who have committed suicide assign their goods to others, their goods are not forfeited to the fiscus.9 For it is not the fact of guilt that is involved, but the fact of the guilty conscience is held in the case of an accused person as tantamount to a confession of guilt. Therefore, for the confiscation of the goods of suicides, it is required that they must either have been accused or caught in the criminal act. Accordingly, however, to the receipt of the executioner of the goods of a person who, lying under an accusation, commits suicide are rescinded the persons who were accused of or caught in the crime of which he was accused such that, if condemned, he would have been able to be either a friend or a petitioner.

1 Ep. iii. 7.
3 Autem, vit. v. 8.
4 Ibid. vi. 29.
5 Ibid. 26.
6 Ibid. iv. 21; cf. Livy, vi. 1: 'indico emum maro adopropus, ut volucrum magna pars crederent....'
7 Ibid. xiv. 33.
8 Ibid. xi. 22.
9 Ibid. xvi. 71.
10 Ibid. xii. 25.
11 Ibid. xii. 48.
12 Ibid. xiv. 16.
13 Ibid. xv. 70.
14 Tac. An. xvi. 21.
15 Ibid. xvi. 34.
16 Nat. Rom. 63.

that a person who was accused of a petty theft, even if he committed suicide by hanging, was not in such case that his property should be confiscated, but that he would have been taken from himself, had he been convicted of the theft. Therefore, the mere act of suicide, if the charge in which he was implicated were of such a nature as to constitute him a convict, would have involved the loss of his property. If, on the other hand, a person committed suicide from weariness of life or impatience of pain or the like, he was entitled, according to Valerius, to the free property. According to a rescript of the emperor Hadrian, if a father, or accused of knavey, or accused of any other manner of crime, commits suicide, he would not be allowed to be his son, and therefore his goods were not to be confiscated.

Other examples of this type of suicide in Tacitus are P. Vitellius,1 M. Emilius Scaurus,2 Planica,3 L. Piso died before his trial by a 'more opportune' which was probably suicide.4 A notable feature of the Empire is the use of compulsory suicide as a means of execution. Intimation is conveyed, more or less explicitly, to the party concerned that his death is destined. The advantages of this form of compulsory death over actual execution were apparently partly aesthetic, but probably the main advantage was that it seemed to make the guilty person his own judge and executioner and thus relieved the emperor of the business which necessarily attached to an actual execution. This method left to a man his 'choice of death'—what was known as 'liberum mortis arbitrium,'5 or merely 'moris arbitrium.'6

Other examples of compulsory suicide recorded in the Annales of Tacitus are Silanus, Pompea, Sabina, Silvania, Narcissus, Julius Montanus,7 Thrasius Flaccus, Claudius Borean and his daughter,8 Valerius Asiacicus,9 Arruntius,10 Antius,11

Three examples may be selected as being the suicides of notable men with regard to whose last moments we possess detailed records—the poet Lucan, the historian Tacitus, and Hadrian.

The suicide of Lucan in A.D. 65 is thus described by Tacitus:12

Eum M. Annae Lucani caedem imperat [a.e. Nero]. In praeminentes, unis fridnere pecuniae, ut paulatim ab extremis cedere spiritum, servandi abscindere, et compositum, quod urruere, neciam vigilare, neciam victoriae, neminem mortem inimicio obesse tradisse, versus inepti retulit [Pharsal. iii. 66-69], exspect illi supreme vox fut.13

The suicide of Nero has often been described. The account given by Suetonius14 is too long to quote. The story of Seneca's death is told in Tacitus, Ann. xvi. 44-46.

It appears that in those times every suicide was more or less a passer, who was expected to make his suicide remarkable by some notable word or act. Hence Tacitus remarks: 'Senecio, ... et

1 Tac. An. x. 8.
2 Ibid. vi. 20.
3 Ibid. 26.
4 Ibid. iv. 21; cf. Livy, vi. 1: 'indico emum maro adopropus, ut volucrum magna pars crederent....'
5 Suet. Domit. S.
6 Tac. An. xxxi. 33.
7 Ibid. xx. 22.
8 Ibid. xi. 22.
9 Ibid. xiv. 71.
10 Ibid. xii. 25.
11 Ibid. xiv. 16.
12 Ibid. xiv. 70.
13 Cf. Sueton. Vit. Liv. i: 'Impetuante aemulo libertas arbitrio, coalitus ad patrem de corrige corrigendi quoddam versus suis exstrictam, adpetitusque haurgi, brachia ad secutus versus medio praebuit.'
14 Nero, 14.
The individual point of view was much insisted upon in the later Stoicism. The same set of notions about circumstances and right and wrong which make suicide, in another not. A situation of intolerable shame, for instance, might be for an ordinary man a sufficient ground for suicide. Yet it might be the duty of another man, whose case is less essential to the State, to reject the temptation. A man’s death must be in consonance with his life.

Peregrinus, according to Lucian, ἐξ ἐννοιας χρηστοῦ τοῦ δοκεῖ ἐκεῖνος ὑπὲρ τῆς παραβίατος χρήσεως τῆς Ἱερημίας Ἑβδομάδος, Ἰερουσαλήμ ἀπεδοχεῖ;¹

This doctrine of ‘propriety’ is expounded in a well-known passage of Cicero’s de Officiis, which is of course based upon Faustus.²

III. CONCLUSION.—Our review, then, of the history of suicide among Greeks and Romans shows that at all times the only valid motives against the practice of suicide have been, in the main, not ethical but religious. And consequently the penalties attached to suicide are not so much civil as religious. They affect a man’s condition not here but in the hereafter. The withholding of the rites of burial, the severance of the right hand, and so forth, all belong to the religious circle of ideas. When religious values ceased to have any meaning and were not replaced by other values, then, as in the case of the Christian, the genuine antagonism to suicide. When, on the other hand, the life hereafter was so emphasized that in comparison with that after life the life here seemed of little account, there was an obvious impulse to suicide. But that impulse was resisted and deserted—by Plato on the ground of a higher law, a great mystery which demands that we remain in our prison-house till God shall please to set us free; by the Neo-Platonists because suicide is ipso facto detrimental to the soul. The whole question is admirably put in Macrobius, Comm. in Somn. Scip. 1. 13:

1) Ἕκας Παυσανίδισ τετάρτη σελίνα ἀπόνοιας Παύσανίων ἐξεκείρετο. Oportet, inquit, animam post hominem liberam corporis passuum inveniunt. Quam qui de corpore violenter extrudit, liberam esse non putavit. Quia enim suum sapis nequaquam comparat, aut pertaetis necessitatis in multum conclusum ad hoc descendit act olim; quae contra ilium passiones habetur; ergo est ante suum sordidus pullus, hoc ipso tamen, quod exitum sordidum, sedes est. Denuo mortem debere amittit animae corporis. Sed non semet egressum, superstes corpus, sed corpus sibi adexitum, in locum, in qua infecta manus est, perversantur: cum contra ilia animae, quae se in hac vita vincula corporis philosophiae morte discessurit, adhuc extante corpus casulo et ridiculos inseruntur.


SUICIDE (Hindu).—I. Vedic.—In view of the devotion to life and its pleasures which marks the Rigveda, and which is reflected in the disapproval therein implied of the practice of svi, it is not surprising that no trace of the custom of religions suicide can be found in that text. Nor in the later Sānavātins the Brāhmaṇas is there any clear recognition of such a usage, unless we accept the suggestion of Hillebrandt⁴ that the consecration ceremony (tīrṇa)⁵ which is an essential preliminary to the most important rites, is in reality a faked form of the older practice of suicide by fire. While it is true that the generation of heat in the man who undergoes the rite is an important feature of it, the purpose of this practice, as of the fasting which constitutes even a more essential

1 Lucian, Peregrin. 23.
3 Ἐννοια (GLAT III. 2), Strassburg, 1897, p. 153.
4 See R. Lindner, Die Eipka oder Wege für das Sonnenfahr, Leipzig, 1578.

1 Ann. vi. 70. 2 Ib. viii. 29. 3 Ib. xiv. 63. 4 Ch. 15. 5 Tiberia, 66. 6 Gallus, 22. For other cases of suicide c. Græca, 3. Just. Cst. 36. Casual. 31. 7 De Fin. iii. 60. 8 Ch. Seneca, Ep. xii. 10; Epitetus, Dissert. i. 24: τί σιν καθῆλεν μετὰ αὐτοῦ ἥ σῶμα συνελθεῖ. 9 Ch. Seneca, Ep. vii. 10; Seneca, Ep. cix. 23. Vol. xii. 3.
element of the ceremony, may much more naturally be
deemed to be produced, the psychological condi-
tion best suited for the performance of the sacrifice.

There are, however, in the Brahmansas, twofold
views; broadly speaking, there is the way towards
the approval of suicide from religious motives.

In the first place, there is developed the concep-
tion that the proper sacrifice is that of a man’s self,
and there is a Dionysiac sacrifice that of a priest;
and in the second place, in the latest of the great
Brahmanas, the Sutrapatha, the closing act of both
the purusamadha and the sarvamadha, the human
and the universal sacrifices, is the giving away
by the performer of the whole of his posses-
sions, including in the latter case even the land,
and his wandering into the forest, doubtless as a
preliminary to an early death. The teaching of the
Upanisads, which emptied empirical life of all
true reality, held out union with the infinite
as the result of knowledge, and glorified the cessa-
tion of existence, must have tended to the same
result. 

As originally taught, the practice is attested by
the Brahmanas, for in the Vaisishya and the
Saktasattva, which is explicitly laid down that the sadnyadhi, who has acquired full
knowledge of the truths, the doctrine of the
sages, may choose death by voluntary starvation, by drowning
by fire, or by a hero’s fate. Earlier evidence (and
beetter proof of usage) is afforded by notices in the
Dharmanirdeshas: in Vaisishya it is expressly stated
that the world of Brähman is obtained by entering the
fire; and in Apastamba, in an interesting dis-

cussion which ends with a defence of secular life
and aims, it is admitted that in one view the ideal
was for an ascetic first to live on fruits, roots,
grass, and leaves only, then on those things alone
which become spontaneously detached, then on
water, then on air, and finally on ether alone.

With the testimony of Vaisishya the record of
the death on a pyre erected by his own wish of
Kalanos, an Indian follower and friend of Alexander,
who fell ill at Pasargada and decided on death,
without the opposition of the king, rather than after
his mode of life.

2. Buddhism and Jainism.—It is characteristic
of the general sanity of Buddhism in its earliest
form that the Buddha appears to have disapproved of
suicide, as he disapproved of all excesses of any
acetic thought. But it would be surprising if the
influence both of Brähmanism and of Jaimism had
not had its effect in making suicide respectable in
certain circumstances. Not only is the duty of
self-sacrifice deemed to excuse the action of the
bodhisattvas in committing suicide with the definite
aim of being reborn as the fish whose flesh alone
can save the people from disease, but self-destruc-
tion appears to be approved if undertaken with
the desire of securing rebirth in such a condition as
will permit entry into the Buddhistic order.

While this attitude is exceptional in Buddhism,
Jainism firmly recognizes and commends religious
suicide. It is dealt with at length in the Āyur,
the first Aīgī, and its preliminaries are described
in detail in the Ayurapachakkhāya and the Sinh-
āya. The second and fourth of the Pañinas in one
recounting. But suicide is not permitted promiscu-
ously; it is allowed to those ascetics who have ac-
quired the highest degree of perfection, and it is in
essence consists of giving up begging; and lying
in the dharamapura, the man is said to have the
right to hunger and thirst. Frequent mention is made of
death being thus brought about by a month’s
abstinence (kāramāte); this fate is recorded of the
Tirthakarmas; and that of Kṣanaka, and that of
Kendaka, of the layman Ambaśa, and of all
those celebrated in the Vaiśnavagama. At this
supreme moment of his career the ascetic must not
long after rebirth in this world or as a god; he must not wish to live on desire sensual pleasures,
but equally he must not seek for death to come
more swiftly. The final condition thus reached
by the sage (sammghajjante) is one of complete
mental and physical collapse. Practically identical
with it appears to be the pañalabāhiya, the last
of the eight stages of man’s existence as taught
by Gātika Madhahāputta. The popularity of the
practice is attested by the number of texts of
Jainism: in 1172 thus died the great secolar
and statesman Hemaachandar, followed in a short
time by his patron Kumārapāla; in 1912 a monk
at Ahmādābād, though in perfect health, starved himself to death in forty, or in thirty, days; and in
the following year a nun at Rājākot, having previously
weakened herself by austerities, died after two
or three days’ fast. Suicide, however, is still
not permitted to others than ascetics, and non-religious
suicide is regarded with especial horror by the
Jains, as they disapprove of all taking of life.

The problem of reconciling these two views is
sometimes as small as the Jains by the Brahmansal schools.

3. Hinduism, medival and modern.—Hinduism
stands firmly on the position reached in the
Dharmanirdeshas, which permits religious suicide,
while censoring ordinary forms of self-murder.
Mann expressly permits a Brähman, in circum-
stances explained (doubtless correctly) by his com-
mentators as disease or great misfortunes, to walk
straight on in a north-easterly direction subsisting
on water and air until his body sinks to rest, and
declares that a Brähman who has got rid of his body by any of the means practised by ancient
sages obtains the world of Brähman; and Mehi,
to whom the book is addressed, interprets the methods in question as
drowning oneself in a river, leaping from a height,
burning, or starvation. The Mahābhārata fully
recognizes the wickedness of suicide; nevertheless
the prince Bādurgha and his ministers resolve to die
by starvation, and for this purpose, as the ceremony
is a religious rite, douts old garments and holy
grace, drinks water, and applies his mind to de-

tion, though his purpose is eventually defeated.
An interesting tale, which appears also in the
Pāñchaentatra, is that of the hunter for whom a
pigeon roasts itself as a guest-offering; the
wife of the bird declines to survive her hus-
bond, and is saved from their sacrifice, resects him and himself ends his life by fire.

A new aspect of suicide appears in connexion with the
development of the devotion paid to the sectarian deities which is characteristic of Hindu-
ism, for suicide now means not so much absorption
in an impenetrable absolute as union with a very
personal deity. The idea is reflected in the
mythical account of the history of Mira Bai, the

2. n.n., vi. 1 ff.


6. The Treatise is probably wandering on without
till death takes place.
7. xxvii. 2.
8. xxvii. 2.

11. The Treatises is probably wandering on without
till death takes place.
12. xxviii. 4.
13. xvii. 2.
14. xxvii. 2.
15. xxvii. 2.
16. xxvii. 2.
17. xxvii. 2.
18. xxvii. 2.
19. xxvii. 2.
20. xxvii. 2.
21. xxvii. 2.
22. xxvii. 2.
23. xxvii. 2.
24. xxvii. 2.
25. xxvii. 2.
26. xxvii. 2.
27. xxvii. 2.
28. xxvii. 2.
29. xxvii. 2.
30. xxvii. 2.
31. xxvii. 2.
32. xxvii. 2.
33. xxvii. 2.
devotees of Kṛṣṇa in the time of Akbar, who is recorded to have disappeared into a fissure which showed itself for a moment in the image of her chosen deity, at a divinity and a sacrifice to take place at Dwārakā. Similar considerations doubtless prompted some of the comparatively rare suicides which took place during the yātra of Visnukṣeṇa as Jagannātha. In the Chaitanya cult, the devotee who thus teaching the fame of the shrine was largely due, nor any of his followers appears to have encouraged or approved this form of worship; no allusion is made to it in the elaborate accounts of the car processions by Kṛṣṇadāsa or by Abhīnātī Fagl. It is not impossible that the conception may have been borrowed from a Saiva sect, some fusion of the two cults having taken place at Puri, but Chaitanya's own end was mysterious, and in his lifetime he had sought mystic union with the god in ecstatic trance, so that the occasional suicides of ardent devotees beneath the wheels of the car of Jagannātha can hardly be deemed unnatural or surprising.\(^1\)

The wide-spread nature of the custom, and its prevalence both with and without Brahmanical sanctions, are attested by Nicholas T. Collinrode from personal observation just at the opening of the 19th century. In 1802 the legislature intervened to prevent the practice of suicide on the island of Sagar, at the mouth of the Ganges, where, in pursuance of vows, not only were children cast into the sea to be devoured by sharks but grownup persons voluntarily underwent the same fate. This practice was confined to the lower castes, as was also the custom by which men used annually to hurl themselves from a precipice in the mountains south of the Narmadā, sacred to Kākabhūṣaṇa, in fulfilment of vows undertaken at an earlier period. This rite was carried out by mountaineers: great concourses gathered at the place on the new moon of Phalgunī, the day appointed for the ceremony, and it is significant of the passion for public recognition as part of the motive of such suicides that the man committing this fate was wont to proclaim his intention publicly and, attended by a band of musicians, to promenade in the neighbouring towns collecting alms. On the other hand, not only did the practice of anti (p. 343) flourish under Brahmanical auspices, but the custom of suicide by drowning at the specially holy spot of the junction of the Jumna and the Ganges was approved, while the practice of leper consenting to burial alive was promulgated by the grant of obsequies which were otherwise denied. The Saivas also allowed suicide by cutting the throat before the image of Śiva at the temple of Vīrankavīṣṭā, near Mūrānpur. Interference with these rites was gradual, but the final adoption of the principle of treating as a criminal offence participation in a ritual suicide has deprived the act of much of its religious character, though it is of course impossible to prevent suicide on the part of those who regard such a fate as a logical outcome of the religious convictions which they hold.

So far as religious suicide has been approved in India, it is significant that it has been in cases of men who have lived a full life and acquired a high measure of ascetic power, and that suicide in other cases has never been authorized and has instead been strongly condemned. There is obviously comparatively little essential distinction between the practice of ascetics and a pitch which deprives the ascriptive mental and physical quality, and the actual termination of life; an intermediate stage is furnished by the cataleptic condition which the Yogi seeks to induce, and of which the most famous case is that of Haridas, who even survived burial for considerable periods.\(^2\)

But in its essence the practice can hardly be traced to any origin other than the effort to supply a rationale for the old and infallible method by which the aged head of a family might be cast out to die, when he became too old to rule or be of service to his kindred—a usage for which there is clear evidence in the Pṛṣaṇa.\(^3\) In some of the Buddhist Avadānas of the elders there was substituted the doctrine that in old age it was the duty and privilege of a man to adopt a hermit's life, unless he preferred to terminate of his own will the existence which had become burdensome. The essentially popular character of the practice is proved conclusively by the pertinency with which the Jains have maintained it from the earliest period, though the doctrine of the sanctity of life as adopted by them would otherwise have forbidden approval of the custom.


A. DERRIDALE KEITH.

**SUICIDE (Japanese)**—Japan is known as a country in which an unusually large number of people commit suicide. According to the latest statistics, compiled by the Bureau of Statistics of the Japanese Government, the number of deaths by suicide in the ten years preceding 1915 was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Number of Deaths</th>
<th>Deaths per Million Inhabitants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>38,909,309</td>
<td>902,447</td>
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<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>39,524,471</td>
<td>1,021,254</td>
<td>2.59</td>
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<td>1910</td>
<td>40,068,384</td>
<td>1,044,334</td>
<td>2.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>41,355,364</td>
<td>1,045,906</td>
<td>2.53</td>
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<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>42,282,758</td>
<td>1,007,436</td>
<td>2.38</td>
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<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>53,362,903</td>
<td>1,027,557</td>
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<td>1914</td>
<td>54,142,481</td>
<td>1,010,315</td>
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</table>

The same returns give the number of deaths by suicide according to sex and age, as shown on Table I. Accoding to the methods employed, the number of deaths is as shown on Table 2. Some of the principal causes of suicide are shown on Table 3.

Among the methods of suicide used by Japanese the following three are unique and worthy of mention:

1. **Hāridārī ("belly-cutting")**, more commonly

   1. H. Garbe, Séismologie und Völkern (=O.T.A. iii. 14), Stassburg, 1899, p. 17.

2. **Yoga** ("body-cutting")

3. **Shimōdachigasa** ("mouth-casting")

   \(1\) See art. JANAPADA.

   \(2\) See art. JANAPADA.

   \(3\) See art. JANAPADA.
### Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Sex</th>
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<th>1909</th>
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<td>79</td>
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<td>135</td>
<td>108</td>
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<td>64</td>
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<td>80</td>
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<td>115</td>
<td>116</td>
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<td>16-29</td>
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<td>236</td>
<td>399</td>
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<td>316</td>
<td>314</td>
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<tr>
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<td>324</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>390</td>
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<td>773</td>
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### Table 2.

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<td>—</td>
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<tr>
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### Table 3.

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<th>1910</th>
<th>1911</th>
<th>1912</th>
<th>1913</th>
<th>1914</th>
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<td>Business failure</td>
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<td>125</td>
<td>136</td>
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called seppuku, was, until the promulgation of the new criminal code in 1873, a method of punishment frequently required of offenders from the nobility and the military class. The laws of the Tang period in China, which for several hundred years had been the model of the Japanese legal system, recognized three forms of capital punishment: beheading, strangulation, and self-execution. The last was allowed to offenders of rank, that they might escape the shame of public death at the hands of others. The criminal laws of Japan allowed self-execution to members of the royal family and to others above the fifth court-rank, except in cases of high treason. Harakiri dates from the Taira and Minamoto period in the 12th cent. and was widely practised during the Sengoku period of internal strife. During the Tokugawa period the practice developed into a complicated system with much etiquette and formality. *It was not more suicide. It was an institution, legal and ceremonial, invented in the middle ages, by which warriors could expiate their crimes, apologize for error, escape from disgrace, redeem their friends or prove their sincerity.*1

The most notable historical case of harakiri is that of the 47 Ronin, in 1703. The daimyo Asano had been obliged to commit harakiri to atone for an unjustifiable attack upon Kira, a nobleman in the Shogun's palace. A band of devoted followers, after long effort, avenged their master by assassinating Kira. They gave themselves up to justice and, under sentence, committed harakiri at the

SUICIDE (Jewish).

37

homes of the dairingos to whom, in groups, they had been promised, and these were usually placed with respect at a Buddhist temple in Tokyo; and to this day many admirers of their chivalrous loyalty pay homage at their tombs.

Although karakiri as a site was usually selected in some garden facing a residence, sheltered at the back and sides by curtains of white cotton. Within the curtained enclosure were placed two mats covered with a mattress of light blue. The couple, faithful to their mattress in the presence of superintending witnesses, with a kinsman or special friend to act as an assistant. He was clothed in special garments, and, after certain formal ceremonies, was handed a short sword with which to make the horizontal cut through the abdomen. The cut having been made, it was the duty of the assistant to behead the sufferer, that the agony of death might be short.

Though karakiri is no longer recognized as a form of public execution, the method is still not uncommon among those who seek to avoid the humiliation of public condemnation and punishment or the supposed disgrace of capture by the forces of an enemy in battle.

(2) Shinju or asatsuiki ('dying between two parties') is the death together of unhappy lovers who had previously refused to flee. It is a particularly lot and entrance upon a happier life in the next world. For the accomplishment of shinju drowning has been the most frequent method, the lovers often tying themselves together with a strong rope. So common was this form of suicide among the lower classes during the Tokugawa period that in 1729 the Shogunate issued special regulations forbidding it, refusing formal burial to the bodies, and compelling them to be made to serve any one who might survive the attempt. At present shinju is of frequent occurrence; and in recent years other forms of death, such as poison or mutilation beneath trains, have been employed.

(3) Junshi is suicide upon the death of one's lord or master with the idea of following him into the next world. In ancient times this was an act of loyalty required by custom, until the emperor Suinin (29 B.C.—A.D. 70) ordered the substitution of clay images for the bodies of attendants and favourite animals. Junshi was revived during the feudal period, not as a requirement, but as a voluntary custom whereby loyal followers, through karakiri, expressed their devotion to their masters. The drowning of almost the entire Taira clan in the western sea at the downfall of that clan and the junshi of hundreds of the family of Hojo Taka
toki at the end of his career are among the most striking manifestations of this junshi spirit. The custom was forbidden by the Shogunate in 1744, and, before the opening of the Meiji era, had become uncommon; but solitary cases have occurred from time to time. Of these the most startling in recent times was the death by karakiri of General Nogi and his wife, at the time of the funeral of the emperor Meiji, in Sept. 1912.


TASURO HARA. SUICIDE (Jewish).—Only a very few cases of suicide are recorded in the OT. The ancient Hebrews were, on the whole, a naïve people, joyously fond of life, and not given to tampering with the natural instinct of self-preservation. Nor are there any few instances recorded on the ordinary level of accidental occurrences. The case of Ahithophel (2 S 17:10) is the only one that, in the modern mind at any rate, excites loathing and reproportion. The suicide of Zinuri (1 K 10:19) and of Ahimelech (killed at his own request by his arm-bearer [Jg 16:33]) only leaves us cold; whilst, on the other hand, the death of Samson (Jg 16:30—31) and of Saul and his arm-bearer (1 S 31:4—6) inspire us with a sense of awe and a certain kind of admiration, rather than any other feeling.

But, when after the people of the persuasion became more and more affected by some of the evil influences and around them, and the difficulties and perplexities of existence kept on increasing, a much less wholesome attitude towards suicide itself perceptible. And, as cases of suicide became more frequent, it was at last found necessary to give a name to the evil. A suicide was thus, in exact legal terminology, described as 'one who purposely destroys himself.' In accordance with a general Rabbinic principle of legislation, an effort was, moreover, made to find support in the Scriptures for the new ideas and enactments which the practice of suicide brought in its train. In Midrash Rebahh, 34, the prohibition of suicide is thus derived from the wording of Gn 9:6, the little word הָרָדַע (killed), the little word זֶלַע (to take), and שֵׁלָשׁ (thrice) has been taken to imply 'thrice to take thy soul diligently' has been considered capable of a similar interpretation, and some have even held that 'Thou shalt not commit murder' is 'thrice against the Ten Commandments. An indignantly re
dicted suggestion to commit suicide rather than suffer is also by some discovered in Job 29:18 (cf. H. H. Schacht, Das menschliche Leben, Berlin, 1846—48, p. 250).

Considering some confusion of ideas which the elaborate treatment of the subject by J. Hamburger may produce in the reader's mind, it seems necessary to state that the Rabbinie, like the Christian and Moslem, has no conception of the act entirely excludes submission to a death of martyrdom from even the category of conditioned or per mission suicide, so long as the victims do not, under the stress of fear or suffering, lay violent hands on themselves (or, by mutual discovery, on one another).

The difference between an act of self-destruction during martyrdom and martyrdom pure and simple is illustrated by the striking case of Hananah b. Taryason, who, whilst suffering the pangs of death by fire during the Haydrian persecutions, is reported to have replied to his disciples' suggestion that he should open his mouth, so that the fire should enter it and consume him more quickly, in these words: 'I wish that he who has given life should take it away, but let not a man destroy himself.' 'Now, then, take the other hands, and carry the executioner to hoop up the flames and otherwise hasten his end.'

We must, therefore, limit ourselves to cases in which the act of death is, in the literal sense of the term, self-inflicted, though a division into different categories is at the same time necessary. Concerning suicide induced by the martyr spirit of patriotism we find instructive information in Josephus, where both sides of the argument are forcibly stated from the points of view of philosophers, and men of the world.

In the speeches addressed to the Jewish garrison of Masada their commanding Eleazar lays special stress on their resolve, made long ago, 'never to be servile to the Romans, nor to any other than God himself,' and then exhorts them to receive their punishment for their past sins from none other than the Deity, 'as executed by every hand'; and, on the other hand, that the heretics had not yet produced the desired effect, he adds, among other things, the further argument that death 'affords our souls their liberty, and sends us into a place of purity, where they are to be insensible to all sorts of misery,'

1 suhur
3 Art. 'Selbstmord,' in Realencyclopaedie, Talmudic part.
4 T.B., 'Abibuth Zarah, 16a.
5 BJ viii. 61.
SUICIDE (Muhammadan)—SUICIDE (Semitic and Egyptian)

S. MARGOLIS

SUICIDE (Muhammadan).—There is no specific text of the Qur'an which forbids suicide, though it would seem that the texts which bear upon the taking of one's own life in general are sufficiently clear as to their purpose to include any kind of willful killing in private life. The following verses will indicate the bearing of the Qur'an upon the subject: 1

'If it is not for any soul to die, save by God's permission written down for an appointed term by the Maker of all things (xxii. 199; iii. 129) the spirit of the act is, of course, the same as caused the self-destruction of Rasa'd, as related by Ra'id ibn Al-Munajj, c. iii. 101; and with the permission at Madinah may be fairly compared the typical medieval instance of the death of a large number of Jews in York in the year 1186.'

Joseph was, therefore, not under similar conditions, is revealed in D.J. 311, viii. 3

In the speech which, after the fall of Jotapata, he addressed to his followers, he bade them take their lives and properties, he compares a suicide to a pilot who, out of fear of a storm, should sink his ship of his own accord, reminds them that it is a violation of God's command, an act to cast aside the soul by which God had committed to it, and exhorts them not to undermine, by an act of self-destruction, 'to run away from God, who is the best of all masters.' 1

A somewhat analogous, though much more pitiable, class is well represented by the case 2 of 400 captive boys and girls who, when they understood that they were being carried off for a life of shame, determined to end their lives by drowning. To quite another category belong a certain number of persons who are reported to have committed suicide under the stress of acute remorse for certain acts of theirs. 3 A different case, again, is that of the executioner of Hannibal b. Tetradyon, already referred to, who, on receiving in vain the dyer's assurance of freedom, is said to have destroyed himself in the flames in which the saint had died, in order to enter at once on his inheritance. His reluctance to accept the promise of freedom is, therefore, a threat of punishment from their respective fathers. 4

The judgment of a person who, in his own legal phraseology, has been proved a felo de se, is, in the main, left to God (272), 5 though a person reconciled to his end by the law is a subject of judicial chastisement (272 n2). 6 With regard to the treatment of the body of a suicide, there is a mention in the speech of Josephus referred to of the custom which demanded that the remains should lie exposed till sunset. In Steinhath, ii. 17 it is enacted that one should neither render one's garments for a suicide nor bare the shoulder or engage in any other formal mode of mourning. Care is taken, however, not to offend the feelings of the relatives of the act. 8

The treatment of the body of a suicide, there is a mention in the speech of Josephus referred to of the custom which demanded that the remains should lie exposed till sunset. In Steinhath, ii. 17 it is enacted that one should neither lend one's garments for a suicide nor bare the shoulder or engage in any other formal mode of mourning. Care is taken, however, not to offend the feelings of the relatives of the act. 8

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1 The manner in which Josephus finally escaped death, while his companions were killed, is accurately described in D.J. iv. viii. 7.

2 See, e.g., Ben Sdr. 15, 57b; T. B., Gitit, 57b.

3 See, e.g., Geona's Babbed, ch. 49; T. Babbed, Bashai, 86 b. Rashii in the mention of Herachia (a doubtful case, however) in T. B. Abkh. Darakh, 188.

4 Steinhath, i. 14.

5 According to the late author, Maimon., Mishne Torah, Hilkhoth Beqevah, ch. ii. 5

6 Y. H. 2, xl. 5

7 Also embedded in, e.g., Yeb. D. 26a, § 245.

8 See Hanak, end of art. 'Selichot,' where references relating to this point are given.

1 See D. I, e.t. 'Suicide.'

2 Walter M. Patton.
the deed was committed in order to avoid a form of death that was considered particularly disgraceful.

An early and classical example of this is the suicide of King Saul of Israel (1 Sam 15:31). Israel’s armies had been defeated by the Philistines, Saul had accused his son Jonathan of cowardice and thrust him through wither sword; last these unrecriminated corpses were then thrown through, and above. Naturally the armour-bearer was afraid to do this, so Saul fell upon his own sword and ended his life. Clearly the deed would not have been committed for the mere purpose of death, but in order to avoid defeat and shame. The sacred mark of circumcision; they were doubly unclean.

He took his own life only in order to avoid dying by such unholy手段 after having been tortured by these means.

A second case is that of Saul’s armour-bearer. When he saw that his king had committed suicide he followed the example of his master. His motive may have been in part the same as Saul’s; it may have been in part desparation at the death of his chief. At all events the armour-bearer, like Saul, took his own life only when a death which he regarded as disgraceful was inevitable.

Closely analogous to the suicide of Saul was the death of Abimelech, the son of Oldon (Jdt 7:4). Abimelech had made himself king of Shechem and a small territory about it; he sought to enshrine his dominion by the conquest of the city, a city some miles to the north-east of the city beyond which the city he drew near to the wall, where a woman threw a millstone on his head and broke his skull. He thereupon committed his armour-bearer to thrust him through, lest it should be said of him that a woman slew him, and the armour-bearer obeyed Abimelech. The death was not his own, since the death-wound was inflicted by his own command, it was murder.

A similar case in the Macabean period is reported in 2 Macc 14:37-46. A certain Rabba, imprisoned in a tower in Jerusalem, was about to be executed. Suddenly his soul left his body, his spirit was useless, fell upon his sword. As the wound thus inflicted was not fatal, he threw himself from the tower. When that did not kill him, he disembowelled himself.

At least two instances are recorded among the Hebrews in which traitors committed suicide.

Ahabbel, one of David’s trusted advisors, had been Abimelech's master and conspired against Abimelech. When he saw that David had eluded the traitors and that civil war would follow, he hanged himself. Similarly, Iddo, the seer, the begetter of Jesus Christ, when he saw that, as a consequence of his prediction, he was to be put to death, he committed suicide (14:27). Possibly his effort to end his life in this manner fails, for another account (Ac 14:19) implies that he, like Ahabbel, died by being disembowelled.

Conscience, then, at least, sometimes, drove traitors to end their own lives. Both the reasons for suicide which can be traced in ancient Israel operated in the case of Shaminash-shum-ukin, king of Babylon, 683-645 B.C.

He headed an extensive conspiracy against his brother and successor, Ashurbanipal, of Assyria. When Ashurbanipal, having defeated Shaminash-shum-ukin’s army and the forces of his allies, besieged him, Shaminash-shum-ukin, reduced to extremities, thrust himself into a burning pit, the flames falling into the hands of his brother.1 His rebellion had been exposed in, conspiracy and attempted assassination by his armoured men.2 This attempt was frustrated when the Assyrians on rebel—a prospect that might well drive a man to the less painful death of a burning pit. Shaminash-shum-ukin might have faced this, as much as another had done, had it not been for an accussing conscience.

The cases cited sufficiently reveal the ancient Semite attitude towards suicide. It was resorted to only in extreme cases.

2. Egyptian. — The attitude of the ancient Egyptians towards suicide was in general like that of the Semitic. The love of life was strong in the Egyptian. They counted the seclusion of the dead and such that it presented to them deterrents of various kinds. The inscriptions present us with two sources of information on the subject, one practical, the other theoretical.

In the reign of Thamos III (1398-1190 B.C.) a conspiracy against the life of the king was formed in the hor os, in which a number of high officials were implicated. The king apprehended this and his commissioners, to bring the criminals. From the records of this commission we learn that at least seventeen persons, who were found guilty, were left to themselves and permitted to take their own lives. It was in a way compulsory suicide.

Death by the hands of others was, however, apparently regarded as less humiliating than death at the hands of an executioner. An eighteenth person, when found guilty, committed suicide, apparently to the regret of the commission. It appears from this record that the punishment of high and formerly trusted officials was probably accomplished by the ancient Egyptian government in this way.

An interesting document written during the Middle Kingdom (2000-1650 B.C.), which is here translated by Erman and Brentano,1 The Dialogue of a Misanthrope with his Own Soul,2 indicates that, in the milieu of Egyptian feudal development, as the failure of old religions formed the stage is now closed and a sense that which speaks of life attained power, suicide was contemplated by some as an escape from life’s ills.

The beginning of the papyrus is lost, but from what remains it is clear that the writer has been in the field of warfare.

In the beginning, to find a man as to his own name, that is lost.

It was forsaken by his friends; even his brothers left him unarrested.

Deserted by all, he was robbed by his neighbors.

His former good deeds were forgotten. Although a wise man, when he would plead his own cause, he was thrust aside.

His name would have been revered, was deified.

He then determined to take his own life, but, as he stood on the brink of the grave, he was turned in favor and refused to accompany him. The dialogue then began.

The soul’s first reason for not going with him was the fear that there would be no tomb to cover his death. This afforded the misanthrope an opportunity to expose to his soul the utter futility of all mutilating the world and other achievements. The soul had counselled death by burning, but had then shrunken from that, as there would be no surviving friend to stand by the hero and make the mortal offerings. He undertook these duties himself, but then the soul refused death in any form, declaring that, even when the great built pyramids and endowed mortuary services, their tombs were in time neglected and permitted to fall into ruins, so that they were in no better case than the poor.

His soul urged that it was good for men to *follow the glad day and forget care.3 The misanthrope then proceeds to demonstrate that life, instead of being an opportunity for pleasure, is far more intolerable than death. The demonstration is embodied in four poems addressed to his soul. The first of these pictures the unjust abhorrence in which the manor’s nation羧就觉得 world by the world. The second sets forth the corruption of society. The third describes the changes of death as a glad release, justifiable suicide. It runs as follows: 4

1. Death is before me to-day
   (Like the recovery of a sick man)
   Like going forth into a garden after sickness.

2. Death is before me to-day
   Like the odour of myrrh,
   Like sitting under a sunny wind.

3. Death is before me to-day
   Like the odour of lotus flowers,
   Like sitting on the clouds of drunkenness.

4. Death is before me to-day
   Like the course of a freshet,
   Like the return of a man from the war-salute to his house;
   Death is before me to-day
   Like the clearing of the sky,
   Like a man looking thereto within to which he knew not.

5. Death is before me to-day
   As a man longs to see his house
   When he has spent years in captivity.

The fourth poem contributes to the argument in favour of suicide by expressing the conviction that in the ‘beyond’ that justice which is unattainable in this world will be experienced.

1 He who is yonder
   Shall seise (the culprit) as a living god,
   Indicting punisher of wickedness on the door of it.

2 He who is yonder
   Shall stand in the celestial barque,
   Cushing that the choice of the offerings there be given to the temples.

3 He who is yonder
   Shall be a wise man who has not been repelled,
   Praising to see when he speaks 4

This document shows how world-weary Egyptians looked at suicide 3,000 years ago. An interesting feature of the point of view is that it betrays no

1 Ancient Records of Egypt, iv. p. 456.

2 For a more complete account of it, see J. H. Breasted, Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt, pp. 139-156.

3 As translated by Brentano, p. 156.

consciousness that self-destruction is wrong. In this respect it is striking contrast to the Talmud. Rabbi Eleazar says that Gn 9 means that ‘I (God) will require your own blood from you’—a clear recognition of the sinfulness of suicide. The Semitic misanthrope, so far from betraying any such consciousness, seems to hold that the fact in the world beyond he can not only attain the justice that is denied him here, but also assist in the establishment of justice, is a reason for hastening by his own hand his release from life’s intolerable conditions.


SUKHARS.—See Rukhars.

SUMATRA.—See Java, Bali, and Sumatra.

SUMERO-AKKADIANS.—I. The term.—The ethinic expression ‘Sumero-Akkadian’ does not occur in the inscriptions, but, as the compound Kengi-Ura, translated by the Semites as Sumer u Akkad, is found, it is a perfectly legitimate name for the mixed population which of old occupied the alluvial plain of the Tigris and the Euphrates, where they flowed into the Persian Gulf.

2. Probable derivation of the names.—Many suggestions have been made as to the origin and meaning of Kengi or Kingi-Ura and Sumer u Akkad, but it must be admitted that both these points are doubtful even now.

J. D. Prince suggests that it may be a combination of ki (long form of ki), ‘land,’ and the reed, ‘land of reeds’ being a misapprehension of Babylonian ki, Chinese, however, Kengi or Kingi is rendered simply by mui, ‘country,’ and is used also as the sign for ‘the country’ in the sense of ‘our native land.’ This being the case, it is probable that the above forms are manifold from ki-ji, the name of the first character, suggesting that ki-jia may have been the unaltered form. As to Ura, that is the pronunciation given to the character ura, superimposed, when they are used for Akkad. This group also stands for the highlands of Anzu and of Palestine, and therefore indicated a mountainous region. That the Akkadian Semites (not, as formerly supposed, the Sumarians) came from some highland district is quite possible, and the name may be the meaning of Ura. Akkad, however, is probably shortened from Kengi-Ura, which in the time of the northern districts of Babylonia. In Gn 10 Akkad is named as one of the cities of Nimrod’s kingdom, after Tilb (Babylon), but Agade seems to have been the chief city before the fall of that capital city. In addition to Kingi, Sumer is also expressed by the character ura, which has, perhaps, to be pronounced uraina, ‘the land of the holy tongue,’ or language. The ideogram identified in the religious services of the Babylonian temple, and attested as sacred from prehistoric times. The connection of Sumer with the OT Shinar (Shinar) is still uncertain. Suggestions will be found in holds iv, 561, which makes it a changed form of Sininga, for Kingi-Ura, for Kingi-Ura, the best.

3. The earthly paradise.—The tract wherein lay Edin, ‘the good city,’ and the land of Tilumun, which traditionally enjoyed, in the beginning, the happiness and the innocence of the golden age, seemingly always appealed to the imagination of the ancient peoples. Here, more than in other localities, was a desire for a earthly paradise on earth. It was this, apparently, which led to the designation of Adam’s first dwelling-place as a garden eastward, in Eden (Gn 2). In the olden (Sumarian edenu) which, however, seems not to occur as a place.

Bara Qamma, 915.

Materials for a Sumerian Lection, Leipzig, 1905-08, P. 27.

There is apparently another (variant) form for Kingi, viz. Kingu, but this may be due to a pun (see P. 27). Gn 15, however, for Dur stands for a reservoir or waterway, baru would indicate the watershed of the Tigris and the Euphrates—see below, § 6 (c).

If, however, Baru stands for a reservoir or waterway, baru would indicate the watershed of the Tigris and the Euphrates—see below, § 6 (c).

See below, § 6 (c).

1 We leg das Paradisie, Leipzig, 1931.
2 See also PSE xxl, 1911, 161, xxv, 1914, 154; RevF xxiv, 1918, 161 ff., 258; and cf. art. Babel, Amyth of the Semite), vol. 11, P. 191.
3 See Babylon and China in Babylonian and Oriental Records, 1, 1905, p. 65; Old Babylonian and their Chinese Derivations, part ii, 1987-88, 73; also, cf. P. 149, 161 ff., 221, 251 ff.
4 See ‘The Accadian, in PSXX in 1909, five papers, Ideograms common to Accadian and Chinese, 1913, xiii, three papers.

1 See below, § 6 (c).
that linen (ken, Semiticized as kiššu) was one of the fabrics which the ancients wove, spread on their beds, and wore, and plates (banitir), and used ovena (ubun). Apparently the only simple identification of the metal was silver, 'silver' and gold being described as the 'day-bright' and the 'reap-bright' metals respectively. It is supposed that the only iron at first known—once 'black' metal was called nigna or nanna, and was probably originally pronounced anuqa (Semiticized as anuq). They knew of fire, and used braziers, and a modification of the character for 'fire', expressing the word 'now' (go), suggests the purification of the metal, and the consideration of pottery and bronze, and its uses.

5. Languages and literature. (a) There has been much difference of opinion as to the existence of the non-Semitic Sumerian language as distinguished from the Semitic Akkadian. Halevy and his followers have even contended that it was merely an 'allography'—an invention of the Sumerites for expressing their own language in another way. Such an expression as 'to pour out speech' (qude), however, for 'to call,' 'announce,' is probably too foreign to the Semitic mind to admit of such an idiom replacing the common Semitic nāšu—so also, 'to set the breast' (gupr) for 'to resist,' Sumerian, moreover, has an involved and more widely-differing grammatical construction. The complicated system of verbal incorporations, the absence of case-endings, the use of 'opposed' characters instead of 'opposites,' and other peculiarities, stamp Sumerian as being a language which Sumerites would be most unlikely to invent. Concerning its connexion with old Egyptian, there seems to be no immediate affinities with regard to both characters and words, but the theory has not been very generally accepted. Many admit, on the other hand, that Turkish contains a certain number of similar roots, such as māš (dead) and dā in enamek, 'to be,' and yrum and yrum in yrumek, 'to go;' du and de in demek, 'to speak,' etc. Turkish, however, with its longer history, has naturally developed many new forms, and the numerals differ, but perhaps it is recognizable as a very late relative of Sumerian in its pronouns.

(b) Akkadian is now accepted as the correct designation of the speech of the Semites of Babylonia, derived from what was apparently the most ancient Semitic settlement in the tract, viz. the kingdom of Agade. Akkad, as already remarked, was called by the Sumerians uthur, and the ideograph bar, by which it is expressed, is suggested by J. Sayce, 3 referring to the baris, the heroes which were regarded as 'the life of the land,' viz. the Tigris and the Euphrates. There is some uncertainty as to the division in which the Akkadian-Assyrian language should be placed, but it may, perhaps, best be considered as a branch of the Aramaic and the Canaanitic forms of Semitic speech. Its verbal conjugations belong to the former, whilst the consonantal system of its roots resembles that of the Semitic languages to which Hebrew belongs. In the use of the words, however, Akkady-Assyrian struck out a line of its own. Thus 'hand' is not tāš (Heb., Arab., etc. pād), but ụš, marsh 'naval' is not tāsh, as in Hebrew, but dūša; 'servant' is not ēbēr or ụš, but words, the comparatively rare ēbēr having been borrowed at an early date from W. Semitic speech. On the other hand, the roots of the words for 'God,' 'God,' and 'knowledge' are the same as in some other Semitic languages. The Heb. melekh, 'king,' and aru, 'prince,' are represented in Semitic-Assyrian by karru, 'king,' and madāru, 'petty king' respectively. 'Home' (bašu) and 'street' (ēlās) are from the same roots as in the other Semitic languages, but in Akkadian a quite different form is used. Other Semitic languages used the word kēlātum, from Sum.-Akk. (ḫakallu), 'palace,' 'great house,' in Sumerian. Similarly the Sumerian 'woman' and the Akkadian 'woman' have different roots. Hebrew used the Sumerian dialectic ụr, which appears as ụrū (for ụrū or ụrū) in the name of Jerusalem.

(c) Out of the Sumerian-Assyriac legends and

mythical stories have been dealt with in the art.

6. BELLODON: THE ASSYRIANS AND HEROES AND GODS (Babylonian). It is naturally difficult to distinguish the nationality of each legend, but most of them have a more or less Sumerian foundation. Among the distinctively Sumerian legends of Babylonia must be mentioned that of Ut-napishtim and his five successors, as well as those of Alapars or Adaša, Tamunzu, and Euelușkus. From their names it seems that the ancestors of the hero of the Flood, and of those of the Semites, and the hero of whose legend the Flood itself is now proved to be so, notwithstanding that his names, Atrak-šanas and Ut-napishtim, 8 are Semitic. This is shown by the very noteworthy earlier version in the University Museum, 2 which is written in the Sumerian language, without any Akkadian rendering.

In this text the mother-goddess ( Nin-tu, Aruru, and Zir-
panitu) are one of her seven, and the god of the Flood, Ut-napishtim, and the hero of whose legend the Flood itself is now proved to be so, notwithstanding that his names, Atrak-šanas and Ut-napishtim, 8 are Semitic. This is shown by the very noteworthy earlier version in the University Museum, 2 which is written in the Sumerian language, without any Akkadian rendering.

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SUMERO-AKKADIANS

It begins with a description of Tilmun, the glorious and pure (or holy); there Enki (Es) and his spouse (Danakina) had their home, and on that account the original or legendary home of Tilmun was that of the god and the goddess. It is generally considered that Enki was the origin of Tilmun, the Greeks, who lived in this happy land were not afflicted by any of the troubles that beset the world. Every creature did exist. This happy state of things, however, was seemingly not to last, for the water-god,氨酸 readers to destroy the field (probably meaning the whole district) by means of a flood. This was to last for nine periods of a month each, and when mankind would disappear, outer waters where it melts. There was one man, however, who was faithful to the deities, and he was known, according to Langdon's translation, 'Esel' or King walked on the boat. The context seems to show that the great and pious personage whom the god thus favoured was Uttu, who had been saved by deity owing to his faithfulness. After the gap which occurs here Uttu seems to be engaged in gardening, he being becomes, like Noah, an agriculturist.

After another gap certain plants, possibly cultivated by Uttu, are spoken of, and it is stated which of them (probably Uttu) might or might not eat. One of the forbidden plants Langdon regards as the caseis, but this is doubtful. The parallel between this story and the Creation-stories in Genesis, where Adam is forbidden to eat of the tree of life and the tree of knowledge, is noteworthy, though what is attributed to the first man in the one is attributed to a prototype of Noah in the other. But Uttu's plants were not trees, and they apparently didn't have roots.

Among other Sumerian legends may be noted the story of Enlil and Ninlil, the older Bel and Belit, the legends of Marduk, and probably of Ishtar's descent into the world. It is said that the Ur of Nergal, the god of plague and death, Nergal and Eres-kii-gal, Enlil, Tiisark, and the Labbu-serpent, together with others of which none is known, may be added. Besides the legends there are many historical documents, of which the most noteworthy are the inscriptions of E-anna-tum (Sède du Pouvoir), En-anna-tum II. (cone), Ur-nin-gina (cone), Gudea (dates uncertain), and others, which have been set down upon a tablet, Erinhani, the god of the market and the house, tablet, by persons who were contemporary with or slightly later in time. As the dynasty of Ur seems to have been Sumerian, it is probable that detailed histories of the kings existed, and a fragment of one dealing with Sargartu and his son Dunug is known. This is the period (2500 B.C.) when the transformation of the Sumerian states into a Sumero-Akkadian collection of nations may be said to have taken place.

There are numerous temple-records and accounts, inventories, lists, a few letters and contracts, and chronological lists and mathematical tablets. The Sumerian lists of words are uncomparable with Semitic-Akkadian understandings. These, as well as the lists of names (places and men), are generally classified.

(d) From a religious point of view, the Akkadian legends are of the most valuable service. It seems improbable that the accounts of the Creation and the Flood first published by George Smith were Semitic compositions, though based upon Sumerian originals. This is implied by the fact that most of the names, especially those of deities (Anu, the heaven-god, Enlil, the older Bel, Ea and Danakina, the god and goddess of the waters, Merodach, the god of the gods, Anar and Kishar, the boat of heaven and the boat of earth, etc.) are Sumerian, though Tiamat (Tiwat), the dragon of chaos, King, her spouse, and Mumun, their son, seem to be Semitic-Akkadian.

The following is a list of deities in the late period of the Sumero-Akkadians may be realized when it is remembered that Sumerian names in their pantheon exceeded enormously those of Semitic origin.

—Sanmats, the sun, Bel and Belita (Belites), which have been assimilated to Shamash, the sun-god. One of the chief popular deities in the Sumero-Akkadians may be realized when it is remembered that Sumerian names in their pantheon exceeded enormously those of Semitic origin.

—Samas, the moon, Shamash, the sun-god, who are represented as the city deities of Ur and Uruk.

—Ninlil, the goddess of the moon, who is represented as the city goddess of Lagash and Uruk. She is generally stand for Merodach and his spouse, Ninhur, the teacher, and his spouse, Tanatimitum, 'she who bears,' Adam (Assyr. Adad) or Rammun (Haddur or Rimmon), and certain other descriptive names of women. The great flood was a period of existence only after the Sumerian cult had conquered. Everything tends to show that the Sumerian element of the population preponderated in religious matters, as in the literature and the art of the Sumero-Akkadians.

7. Social life.—Sumerian influence in the land of the Sumero-Akkadians was, in fact, evident in every phase of their life. The system of government was a 'great man' (beard) or 'king' (Sem. furri), who had under him various officers, and was represented in the more important civic centres by a 'head-man' (go-yen, Sem. šulitan, 'he who holds')—subjector mayor. To lighten the weight of the supreme ruler, the tables indicate that he had numerous 'servants,' or royal or vice-regal secretaries, whose cylinder-seals appear (generally beautifully- engraved specimens of insinuado art) on the documents written or drawn up on the king's or the šulitan's behalf. During the time of the dynasty of Babylon the šulitan sank to the position of administrator or officer—probably something like a mayor.

Other officials were the superintendent (anu-dina), often, apparently, the king's treasurer and palace-steward; the business-agents (dumurjan), who acted sometimes as under-secretary of the whole kingdom or half a kingdom. Naturally, there were business-agents of various kinds, and belonging to the same class were appointed to the Ur of Nergal, the god of the market and the house, tablet, by persons who were contemporary with or slightly later in time. These classes of officials had to do with the transport of 'drink, food, and oil,' and were mainly employed in political matters. The number of documents referring to the transmission of goods, etc., suggests the existence of something analogous to post offices over 2500 years B.C. Passing over the nimipur, 'director' or 'governor,' of whom there were several grades; the labu-sarru, 'grain-measurer' (Lau) or 'cassia- bearer (Tilmun), we have the saq-masga, 'district-chief,' the ninaz-akinu, director of reservoirs, springs, or watercourses, the mara, director of the fisheries, the as-sarru, director of rations, etc. Among the lesser civil servants were the caretakers, labourers, gardeners, scribes, barbers, teachers, tour guides, or 'seers,' and finally also hair-dressers (Sum. šat, Akkadian gabbalu)—a few of them being women. Connected with the royal and temple domains were also a number of shops, carpenters, tailors or cloth-workers, goat-herdsmen, shepherds, ass-herdsmen, butchers, gate-keepers, and valets.

Though it may be held that these details are of but little importance, they all tend to show how highly organized were the Sumero-Akkadians at an exceedingly early date, and the social and industrial system which they had initiated naturally formed the foundation of those of the Babylonians and the Assyrians later on. One list of late date (perhaps a copy of an earlier one) from Nineveh dated 880-850 B.C. contains about 200 official titles or designations, some of them ethnic, like 'the Iturite,' 'the Assyrian secretary,' 'the Aramaean secretary,' etc. Priests and temple officials, judges and law-courts officials, were also to be found with the Sumero-Akkadians, as with the Babylonians and Assyrians at all times.

8. Ethical character.—The numerous names of men compounded with those of deities show, independently of the temple worship and ceremonies, how religious the Sumero-Akkadians were. Each city had its favourite deity, and every man worshipped the form or aspect, shown by the appellation of the deity who was sacred as his, or his family's special protector. In addition to their religious tendencies, however, they were exceedingly superstitious, and fond of inanitions and charms, of the efficacy of which they never in danger of being cured by these means, and in all probability other advantages which men are accustomed to seek could be attained by the same means. At the head of these was the consumption of one's enemy by melting away his waxen effigy, the cutting off his life by the cutting of a string or thread symbolizing it, and the like. When seeking a sick or a dead, they gave them the deity who was sick, or dead, whose rays and wind, penetrating everywhere, revealed to them 1

1 See art. CHAMANS AND AMULETS (Assyr.-Babylonian).
everything that passed on the earth. They were therefore the gods of judgment and justice, and appeal was made to them that the sign or pronouncement asked for might be true.

In this period the Sumerian manner, was probably not better than their neighbours, but there is one point which is worthy of note, viz. that in their literature, so far as we are acquainted with it (with the exception of the legend of Gilgames and the Epic of Creation), other than its monumental or obscure passages are exceedingly rare. Moreover, it is in the same legend of Gilgames that the greatest hostility to the goddess Ishtar or Venus is shown—hostility which brought upon her hero all the misfortunes which afterwards befell him. Slavery seems to have been in full force among the Sumerian-Akkadians, but there is no proof that slaves were ever ill-treated. Ruthlessness in war was also not one of their failings, as far as their records are preserved, and they were probably the superiors of the Assyrians at all times in that respect. As a nation, whether the states be taken individually or as a whole, there is no doubt that they had a high opinion of learning and the advantages to be gained therefrom. To all appearance it was a meritorious thing to know the records of the patriarchs, and the place of Holy Scriptures, and to be acquainted with the history of their land, which enabled them to judge of the dealings of their gods with their rulers during their long existence as a nation. In like manner, a knowledge of the methods of legal procedure enabled their scribes to employ themselves usefully by drawing up contracts; and those who made a specialty of such things could read the signs in the heavens and make known all kinds of omens, thus earning the gratitude of their fellow-citizens and their own living by the fees of those whom they served. Whatever their defects, their records exhibit them as worthy people, equal in social progress to all their contemporaries at the early age at which they flourished.

§ 9. Early Sumerian dominion.—Whether the Sumerians or the Akkadians entered Babylonia first is another uncertain point, but it is to be noted that the earliest documents are in the Sumerian language, and the earliest records refer to Sumerian kings. Legends, ritual texts, hymns, compositions, and other inscriptions are Sumerian at the earlier periods, and, when these documents came to be translated, the Sumerian text always preceded the Akkadian or Semitic. Their entry into Babylonia or Assyria have taken place about 5000 B.C. or earlier, but the Semitic-Akkadians probably became prominent only about 2500 B.C. The Semites, however, were certainly numerous in the country at an earlier date, and were steadily growing in power. Sargon of Agade or Akkad seems to have reigned about 2350 B.C. (Nabonidus's date for this ruler is equivalent to 2300 B.C.), and he was certainly not the first ruler of Semitic race. The presence of such Semitic-looking names as Qadmum and Zzagip, 'the scorpion,' who reigned before the mythical Etanna,' notwithstanding that we have to make allowance for the inordinate lengths of their reigns, probably takes back Semitic-Akkadian domination in Babylonia to a date which can hardly be later than 4000 B.C. In that case we may carry back Semitic-Akkadian domination to 4500 or 5000 B.C., and even 4000 B.C., if we are not speaking of

10. Babylonia under Sumero-Akkadian rule.—
(a) The large states.—The number of states into which Babylonia was divided until the time of Hammurabi (2350-2140 B.C.) was very uncertain, but it can hardly have been less than 40 or 50. This, naturally, only shows that each state had its own ruler, and claimed independence from all its neighbours. As may be imagined, the total of these states varied at different times, owing to the constant expansion of the state. But it is easily possible to trace the gradual absorption of their smaller neighbours by the larger or more predominant centres of civilization. The name of each little state was generally that of its capital, and it is thus that we have the names of the great cities and other larger or smaller centres of civilization.

As has been remarked above (§ 4), the usual word for 'country' was kur, but another largely used is worthy of notice, viz. 'kallam, written with the sign *lem.* This identification of the land with its people implies a strong sense of nationality in the minds of the non-Semitic Sumerians, but was less pronounced in the minds of the Semitic-Babylonians after the time of Nebuchadrezzar.

(b) The smaller foundations.—Through the capitals and larger cities (as understood in those days) were numerous, there were many smaller centres and settlements, sometimes founded by prominent agriculturists or traders, but in many cases they were religious foundations. Among the former may be mentioned the city of Illi-Uras (al Ilia Ura) and the 'upper city of Enhannu (al Enhanna ou) of the tablet 23 of the Raphel collection, where also we find Larsa and Pulikku (Larsa hip, Dér al Pulikku hip, 'the fortification of the city Pulikku') mentioned. No. 26 of the same collection refers to the cities of men named Anat-Ili, Sin-nar-maiti, etc., 'the Taribun district' (for taribum), the 'god Enki district' (for Enki), the 'new Broad-street district' (for sare dudug-gi) and the 'capital city,' etc. There were also special provisions for the reception of the temple revenues, paid in kind.

11. The Sumero-Akkadian view regarding their national god.—The idea gained by the study of the inscriptions is that the people of Babylonia (and probably of Assyria also) looked upon their dwelling-place as a holy land. Every state, every foundation, had its deity, and visits to the holy places were meritorious acts. First and foremost, apparently, we have the paradise-city Eridu, the abode of the god Ea—the city whose ideograph was sometimes used, in later times, to express the land of Babylonia in general. Next came the great capital, Bâbel (Sum. Ka-dingira), 'the gate of God'—probably a folk-etymology brought about by the name Babâlam, which was possibly (with Babâlam) the true form. Near Babylon was Cûna (Cutha), the city of the god Nergal, and Dairûn, the ancient Delium, where Urâs (one of the names of Ur-ura) had his seat. Other foundations were Mûrû, where the god Mûrû (Haleed or Rimmon) was worshipped, Qatân, the seat of the god Qatân, and Lasimû, that of the god Lasimû, the swift runner. These similar names of the cities and their patron-gods remind us of Assûr, the old capital of Assyria, 3000 B.C. or uncertain in the time of Hammurabi, and the worship of the national god Assûr, and Nineveh,
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Modern ethical philosophy has at various times sought its constitutive principle in the will of God, the law of duty, the problem of the origin of the moral sense, the ideas or ideals of perfection, personality, progress, and evolution. For ancient ethics the ultimate reference was to the idea of good.

1. Definitions and early ideas of the good.—In its broadest acceptance 'good' is simply the term of general approval which no developed language lacks. Etymology cannot help us to a closer definition, for the etymology of ὧδος is not known and cannot be equated with the Hebrew word for 'good.'

The conjectural psychology of primitive man is of no avail, for it is uncertain, and in any case Homer was already far beyond that stage. It is obvious that primitive man did not draw our sharp distinction between moral good and other good or desirable things. There is abundant evidence in and out of Greek literature for the universal specification of good to courage in war, high birth, wealth, and other objects of approval or desire. A unifying definition of good will always remain either a more or less plausible generalization from extant literature or an arbitrary deduction from metaphysical first principles. The Platonic Euthyphro and Lysis may serve as anticipatory illustrations of all such attempts, though the one nominally discusses holiness and the other the primal object of love or friendship (the idea).

The Euthyphro leads to the insupportable dilemma of the problem debated by scholasticism: Does God love holiness (or the good) because it is holy, or is it holy because God loves it? The Lysis refers all particular loves to the primary love of which and which seems to be the good. But what intelligible motive is there for loving the good save as a remedy against evil? Near the end of the dialogue, in the attempt to define the good, in anticipation of Stoic terminology, the oikeios, the 'own,' the 'proper,' (or, as Emerson sometimes renders it, the 'friendly'), and by calling evil the 'alien.' The association in the Lysis of the good with the end or purpose dominates all later discussions and is the basis of most modern definitions from Schopenhauer to Herbert Spencer and William James. It is of course not explicit in pre-Socratic literature.

2. Homer.—In Homer we find the ethical meaning of good already existing side by side with its unmoral or half-moral use in the sense of brave or well-born. This has been and will be denied. But it is the only reasonable interpretation of such passages as Achilles' saying: 'Every good and sensible man loves and cherishes his own bride.'

The fact that Homer also speaks of a good meal, and of the ministerial services which the worst sort of ruler to the good, need not signify more than does our own language about a good dinner or the best citizens. The abstract use of the neuter ὧδος, 'a good thing,' is also found in Homer and in Herodotus.

3. The pre-Socrates.—The philosophical discussion of the good begins with Socrates. But a few passages of the pre-Socrates might be regarded as anticipatory. The ideas of Heraclitus suggest the idea of the relativity of the good, and are eloquently developed by the Platonic Protagoras. And Aristocles says that Empedocles' use of the opposites love and hate is equivalent to the doctrine that good is developable by good things. It is in philosophy found the beginnings of a classification or scale of goods in the famous scolium:

'Health is the best when all is done,
AWN 12.0 T. cf. St. Symv. 305 E.

It is with latent reference to that that Plato affirms with emphasis that not even health takes precedence of the virtue or good of the soul. It may be the highest of popular or so-called goods. It is not the good.

4. Socrates and Xenophon.—The Xenophonic Socrates identifies the good with the useful: 'If you ask me for a good that is good for nothing, I do not know it, nor have I any use for it.' There is no proof that this is a genuine report of distinctive Socratic teaching and no presumption that Xenophon had any ideas on the subject which he did not pick up from Plato.

5. Plato.—Plato's doctrine of the good has been obscured by the unnecessary mystery that has been made of its allegorical elaboration in the imagery of the sun, the divided line, and the cave in the Republic. The essential meaning of this allegory is that the different notions of the good, the so-called sciences, is only an empirical and a rhetorical. The statesmen or Socrates' reformulated republic must possess this vision and this insight. They can attain it only through the scientific and philosophical education which preserves and the practical experience of affairs with which it must be supplemented.

Further than this Plato does not wish to define the idea of good 1 as a nature, that is to say, any intrinsic or formal property possessed by the entire moral and social ideal embodied in the Republic and the Laws.

Plato's is the earliest and most effective presentation of these ideas. But no obvious thought has occurred of the many other moralists. Locke uses it to prove that moral rules are not innate or self-evident, since their 'truth ... plainly depends upon some other antecedent ... from which they must be deduced.' Hobbins expresses it thus: 'Every ethical reasoning has validity only so far as the disputants recognize a definite primaire value which determines all more

1 Od. xv. 351.
2 For the further pre-philosophic history of the word and its synonyms see Schindel. Ethisch der alten Griechen, i. 520 ff., and Thesaurus. In this matter, as in all study of Greek philosophy, entire precision is attainable only by thinking in the Greek terms, if need be, transliterated.
4 Met. 983 a 2.
5 Rep. 503 C. Laws, 561 B, 728 D.
6 Met. vi. 8. 3
7 565 A f., 569 D ff., 514 f.
9 Rep. 503 C, 534 D.
10 Wr. 333 A.
11 ib. 539 B f., 566 C.
12 E.g., the sketch, or ὀρθογραφία, of Rep. 504 D is the system of the definitions of the virtues given in bk. ii. of the Protagoras. 316 B f., Gorgias. 505 B.
13 For the ethical meaning of the word good, etc. see Essays concerning Human Understanding, bk. i. ch. iii. 4.
Plato did not object to the Greek equivalent of utility, but he did to ἀληθή, as Cicero did to vera, voluptas. In Laws, 733 A, Plato substitutes χάριν, but to make his meaning clear he, in sentence which Epicurus might have written,1 allows ἀληθή.2

To return to the idea of good, the Socratic censure of Anaxagoras in Phædo, 98, is sometimes misunderstood. That Epicurus truly says is that it is too simple to constitute the underlying significance of Plato's allegory. The difficulty is in the prevailing quest for subtler or more mystical interpretations to obtain a history for the demand made upon us that this in fact was Plato's essential meaning. It is then, as we shall see later, mere misapprehension when modern scholars identify the idea of good with God, confuse its plain ethical and political interpretation by the introduction of the metaphysical problems common to all Platonic ideas, or read into its ethical application in the Republic all the teleological developments of the Timæus. A part from this misapprehension, Plato's doctrine of the good is his entire ethical and social philosophy as collected from the minor dialogues, from the discussion of utilitarian hedonism in the Protagoras, Plato's first psychological analysis of the same problem in the Phædo, and the 9th book of the Republic, 593 B ff. Throughout the minor dialogues the undefinable good is the test that all affirmative claims of the virtues or exaggerated claims of the sophists fail to pass. The phrasing of Republic, 505 B ff., is equivalent to this reference to these discussions. The virtue which we are trying to define, the ability of which you boast, must be a good, Socrates urges, and the interlocutor is unable to show that it is always and unconditionally good. The consistency and symmetry of this method point directly to the idea of good as the Republic as the symbol of an absolute good, and to the Platonic guards' knowledge of it as distinguishing them from the politicians, the sophists, and their pupil disciples whom Socrates puts to confusion.

The other approach to the problem of the good is through the hedonistic utilitarian controversy. Is the good pleasure or is it something higher, virtue, knowledge, or communion with God?4 The Sophists of the Protagoras formally articulates the obvious hedonistic utilitarian argument in a way that leaves nothing for Epicurus and very little for Bentham and Mill to add. The eloquent rejection of the point of view in the Phædo and Republic is then an inconsistency only for critics who fail to observe by what nice distinctions Plato's affirmations are guarded or who refuse to interpret the apparent antimony by the psychology of the Phædo and the conclusion of the whole matter in the Laws.5 The measured preponderance of pleasure might arguably be the right measure if pleasure were really measurable or reliably measured6 or if what the multitude call pleasures were really pleasant.7 Plato's final feeling is aptly expressed in the words of Matthew Arnold:

'...that joy and happiness are the magnets to which human life forever turns, and that the reader, confused by his mind by doubting. The real objection is to low and false views of what constitutes happiness. Plato apprehends ability and words to employ because they have been so used as to suggest such views.'8

2 Cf. Shorey, Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 22, Class. Phil. x. 325, Jowett, Intro. to his tr. of the Phædo, 162, Epic. iv. 24. 'In eating homoeas rel ac semen unam

The comparison of the idea of the good with the sun is of great interest for the study of the theory of religion, but need not detain us here. The words to employ because they have been so used as to suggest such views.

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mythical, and superstitious. In Apuleius 'Pellucilis a Ephesu' actually over a contest which might cause it to be mis-
taken for one of a list of demons.1

6. The idea of good and God.—The identification
of the idea of the good with God could do no
harm if taken merely as religious poetry. The
goodness of God is His chief attribute both
as a negative criterion in the theological canons
of the 
Eöpexia—so to the Stoics held that God was
the cause of good only, never of evil—and positively
in the teleology of the Tiwanes. Plato is perhaps
not unwilling to hint at the identification in such
passages as Rep. 506 c and 517 b. But the
idea of good are both expressions of the highest
ethical ideal, and the language which Plato used
of both is, as Emerson and Arnold would put it,
a ejaculation 'thrown out as it were at certain
great objects which the human mind makes
and feels.'2 As Epictetus says,

'God is beneficient, but the good also is beneficient. It
is natural therefore that the true nature of the good should be in
the same region as the true nature of God.'3

But in fact the two terms and the two ideas came
to Plato in different trains of thought and as
symbols of distinct traditions, and could not
be identified without wresting the Platonic texts from
the plain purport of their contexts and attributing
him a system of metaphysics which he did not
care to construct.4 By the same methods of inter-
pretation Epicurus could identify God and the idea of
the good in the philosophy of Jesus with the aid
of Mt 195, Mk 1018, Lk 155.

7. The minor Socrates.—We shall make only
briefer reference to the so-called minor Socratics.
The fundamental theory of the Cyrenaic hedonism
differed little from that of Epicurus and of the
Socraticus of the Platonic Protagoras, though special
points of distinction were laboured in the schools.
The idea of good are both expressions of the highest
badness that only the pleasure of the present moment counts, perhaps
because 'the next may never come,' is a tempera-
mental attitude rather than a philosophy. This
attitude was widely held by many anecdotes, and
strongly appealed to Homer.5 Walter Pater's
Renaissance and the chapter on the 'New Cyrena-
icism' in Marino the Epicurean commend the
Cyrenaic position to the modern generation
in the form: 'Be perfect in regard to what
is here and now.' 'Burn always with this hard,
gem-like flame.'

Cynicism is only a crude, harsher anticipatory
form of Stoicism. Antistheus is said to have
affirmed toil and hardship (r
g
) to the good and
to have prayed, 'Let me be mad rather than feel
pleasure.'6

We do not know enough about the 'Megarians' to
interpret Eudicles' pronouncement that the
one is good,7 though Comperz undertakes
to interpret it.

8. Aristotle.—The first sentence of Aristotle's
Ethics and the first sentence of the Politics repeat
as a truism the main thought that emerges from
the Platonic quest for the good. Aristotle
recognizes that the problem of ethical theory is to
assertn and define the nature of this good that
can be shared in by men of different action and choice presuppose. As he proceeds,
Aristotle seems to repudiate the debt to his teacher,
to which every page of the Ethics testifies, by his
insistence on metaphysical objections to the theory
of ideas in general and so to the idea of good in
particular.8 The polemic has of course no relevance
to the ethical problem. And, when Aristotle con-
templatively asks,9 How would a weaver or a
carpenter be profited by knowing the absolute
idea of good?10 he forgets that he himself has just
borrowed the Platonic imagery of the unifying
'skóras, or aim, to prove that a generalized concept
of the good will be practically helpful.11 As Sir
Thomas Browne aptly puts it,

'Aristotle, while he labours to refute the ideas of Plato, falls
upon one himself. His sumnum bonum is a chimera, and
there is no such thing as his felicity.'12

Aristotle himself admits that the synonym
happiness, 
epihelmu
c, which he attributes to the good, is
only a blank cheque.13 Happiness is of course,
as Plato said before him and after, 'our
being's end and aim.'14 Cicero, while repudiating
pleasure, assumed happiness to be the end as a
matter of course,15 and Leslie Stephen says:

'Good means everything which favors happiness . . . nor can
any other intelligible meaning be assigned to the word.'16

It depends upon you conception of happiness or
your definition of pleasure whether, with Epicurus,
Bentham, and Herbert Spencer, you add pleasure
as a third synonym or with Plato, Cicero,
Cerules, Haulet, Macaulay, Arnold, and Jowett,
protest that to this idea is either to confuse the right
use of language or to suggest a false ideal of happiness.
The definition of happiness with which Aristotle
fills out the blank cheque is a somewhat lame
and feeble concept of the good, and is no
answer. What hinders us, he asks, from pronouncing happy
the man who energizes in accordance with
complete virtue and is sufficiently equipped with
external goods, not through any chance time,
but for a complete life?18 Later philosophers
interpreted the Aristotelian definition of happiness as
a trimming compromise between Epicurean hedonism
and the severe idealism of Plato's Gorgias and the
Stoics. Cicero sometimes argues that in theory
there can be no adequate sanction for virtue except
on the Stoic principle that nothing else is a good.19
Sometimes he affirms that in practice the Peripa-
tetes, who regulated external goods, give no
larger place to them in their own lives than do the
Stoics, who evade this concession by a change of
terminology and denominate what the rest of man-
kind call goods not goods, but 'preferred.'20

Otherwise Aristotle's contribution to our topic
is slight. He is not deeply interested in the funda-
mental problem.21 He reviews the hedonistic con-
troversy, in substance conciliating with Plato, but
unable to make out from the time of condensing
superiority to Plato's pursuit of edification.22 The
poetical alliteration of the idea of the good in
the Résépahn would of course be unsympathetic if it
were incomprehensible to him. But the statement
of an eminent scholar, that he never alludes to it,
overlooks the fact that Plato's distinction there
between the method of pure dialectic and that of
the sciences23 is one of Aristotle's fundamental
ideas recurring throughout his writings.

In the end Aristotelianism, in this matter as
in others, comes back to an extreme form of the
Platonism which it begins by repudiating. In
Neo-Platonic interpretation and the mystery of
the Middle Ages and the Renaissance the desire
by which the Aristotelian first mover moves the
heavens is the yearning of all creation towards
him as the supreme good. This interpretation is
supported by concomitator two or three and anti-

1 Apol. xxvii.
2 Ibn Taimiyah, c. 806; cf. Ep. 396 E: de nœmirtrœq
3 Ecclus. 57.
4 Discourses, 291.
5 Cf. Skorony, 'Idea of Good,' p. 181., Unity of Plato's
Thought, p. 17.
7 St. of ii, 106., Ep. i, 18., xiv. 14., 23.
8 T. V. D. Bay Louet, c. 104.
9 Ecclus. 56 E. 11.
10 Ecclus. 56 E. 11.
11 Ecclus. 57.
12 Ecclus. 57.
13 C. 107 a 8.
14 Ecclus. 57.
15 Ecclus. 57.
16 Ecclus. 57.
17 Ecclus. 57.
18 Ecclus. 57.
19 Ecclus. 57.
20 Ecclus. 57.
21 Ecclus. 57.
22 Ecclus. 57.
23 Ecclus. 57.
ons verbs in the Aristotelian text, was blended with the poetical doctrine of Platonic love as the aspiration for ultimate beauty identical with ultimate good. But this theme would demand a volume.

9. The post-Aristotelian schools.—The summum bonum was one of the two or three chief topos of debate in the post-Aristotelian schools. Cicero tells an amusing story of a Roman pro-consul who proposed to convene a world's congress of philosophers and settle the question once for all.

Locke argues from the diversity of human tastes that the philosophers of old did in vain inquire whether summum bonum consisted in riches, or bodily delights, or virtue, or contemplation. Locke's argument has been used against the utilitarian preference of all things to 'happiness' or pleasure by Coleridge, Hazlitt, Macaulay, and many other. Edith Mill says, "the question concerning the summum bonum is the same thing as that concerning the foundation of morality. And it is idle to expect men to cease discussing that. Horace, e.g., had no metaphysician. He is interested only in "good magis ad nos pertinent, et nescire malum est," and he sums up the history of the science in three problems:
(1) Divitis bonum, an sint virtute beat?, which was the primary man's conception of the difference between the Peripatetic and the Stoic good; (2) Quid ad amicitias, usus recteque, trahat nos, the compatibility of disinterested friendship with human advantage; (3) A virtus equa sit virtutibus, quae vellex, qui lex egressus could eyes.

Locke's impatience of the question is perhaps a survival of Renaissance distaste for the scholasticism of the medieval literature of nominalistic pure as seen in Albert's report of the treatise of Paralas.

The title of Cicero's de Finibus exhibits the continuation of the theme of the good. Cicero resumes for all practical purposes the net outcome and the influence on modern literature of the post-Aristotelian discussion of the summum bonum.

10. The Epicureans.—The Epicureans revived the thesis of Plato's Protagoras and insisted that pleasure 'rightly understood' is the only conceivable end for a sentient creature. They then, like modern utilitarians, devoted themselves to the revaluation or the restatement in their terminology of all ethical values—what the Epicurean in Cicero's styles 'ed am adn accommodare Turquent nostros,' fit our examples of human virtue into the theory.

They also, like their modern analogues, complained bitterly of the critics who had misunderstood their meaning. These tactics irritate Cicero, who says that he knows the meaning of the Greek 'bonum' only as a synonym of the Latin 'bene.'

The Epicurean summum bonum may be discussed in a corner. No one would dare proclaim it to a large audience. And the heroic deeds of Greek and Roman heroes who gave their lives for their country are sufficient proof that the quadrupled opinion will not prevail.

11. The Stoics.—The Stoic doctrine is more sympathetic to the moralist and the orator and has the further interest of a strictly deduced and ingeniously elaborated scientific system. In essence

1 Cf. Emerson, Nature, ch. ii. 'God is the all-fair.'
2 See, e.g., Epicurus in Hicks, p. 171; Seneca, ep. 64, 88; Cicero, in Fin. i. 20, 22; ib. ii. 4, 22; ib. ii. 17, 9, 25.
3 The fragments are most conveniently consulted in M. Aurina's Epicureanorum veterum fragmenta, 3 vols., Leyden, 1805-08. The more significant of these texts are correctly translated in R. D. Hicks, Stoic and Epicurean.
4 Epicurus in Hicks, p. 171. 5 De Fin. i. 10.
6 See, e.g., Epicurus in Hicks, p. 172; Seneca, ep. 64, 88; Cicero, in Fin. i. 20, 22; ib. ii. 4, 22; ib. ii. 17, 9, 25.

it is the old paradox of the Soctates of the Gorgias, that nothing is really good except the good moral. All other so-called values are either non-existent or insignificant, when weighed against this. 'Sunt enim Socrates pluraque mirabilis Stoicorum,' says Cicero in Laelius, 44, and in the Tuscules, v. 12, he takes for the text of the entire doctrine a fragment of Plato's Menexenus.

In the refutation of Epicurean hedonism and the working out of the system the supreme end was variously defined and deduced, and the schools and sects of philosophers were minutely classified by the various 'ends' or principles of the supreme good which they held. The demonstration that pleasure is not the end and the detailed deduction of Stoic ethical principles could take their start from the idea of nature and the life according to nature or from the abbreviated formula, the constant life. The statement from nature, as set forth in Cicero, presents nothing analogous both with the 17th and 18th cent. philosophy of 'self-love' and with the modern logic of evolution. Pleasure is not the end, because it is not in fact the beginning, of animal or human activity. The earliest and fundamental constat of all sentient life is not towards pleasure as such, but towards self-preservation. The pleasure is, so to speak, a by-product. Upon this supremeness in the rational animal man the recognition that the true self, the higher self, is the spiritual life of man, the beginning of his true life, then becomes the end. And it matters little in practice whether all other ends are annihilated or merely dwindle to insignificance in comparison with this. Thus Cicero sometimes treats the entire suppression of the animal or lower self as a falsity of Stoicism, and Cicero, or Epicurus, or Plato, or Aristotle, or Proclus, or Plotinus, or any innumerable company of men, or an indescribable condition of absolute and disregarded life.

12. The sceptics.—The various schools of sceptics impartially assailed all dogmatic systems. But they did not for that reason admit that they lacked a moral ideal or the conception of the supreme practical end. Their scepticism was meant to the end of tranquillity or impermanency of soul and the guidance of life by reasonable probability.

13. Developments of Platonism: the ascetic ideal.—In the Greek-Roman empire, the literature of moral and religious edification reproduces all these points of view and ideas, but retains little interest in the dialectic of the schools and the philosophy of ethics. The influence of Platonism reveals itself not only in the softening and refinement of Stoic technicality and paradox, but also in the increasing prominence of another idea, if not idea, of good—the ideal of detachment from the world and the flesh and approximation to God through the lonely purity of a spiritual and contemplative life. Plato's Phaedo and the eloquent digression of the Theaetetus are the classic expression of Greek idealism of virtue. It is a human mood or temperament of renunciation and reaction. The opposition of the theoretical and the practical life was debated in the Antiope of Euripides, and this personal ideal of an intellectual, attributes to Pythagoras the three types of life associated with the tritipartite psychology of Plato's Republic and employed as an ethical commonplace in the beginning of Aristotle's Ethics. Therefrom philosophy was the way of life, and the summum bonum was the happiness embodied in or to be attained by the wise man. The latent and still unresolved contradiction between the social conception of the Virtue and this personal ideal of an intellectual, salvation and happiness is apparent already in Plato and Aristotle. The artist Plato paints two companion pictures of the Socrates of the

2 Cic. de Fin. ii. 11; cf. Lucullus, 42, de Fin. v. 7, Tusc. v. 30, 32.
3 De Fin. iii. 9, 11.
4 Von Arnim, i. 45; Buxtorf, iv. 83.
5 De Fin. iii. 9, 11; ib. i. 16, 11, iii. 5, 5.
6 Cic. de Fin. iii. 5, iv. 7, 9.
7 Buxtorf, i. 16, ii. 5, 5.
8 See, e.g., Horatius, ep. 1; m. e. egregia. 9 Cic. de Fin. iv. 14, 24, 26, Tusc. v. 17.
10 De Fin. iv. 15, 17; cf. Sextus Empiricus, 1714 sqq.; de Cato, 1718 sqq. 11 De evang. presbytero saeculo.
12 De Fin. v. 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26.
13 Reconstructed from the quotations in Plato's Gorgias, 465 E ff.
14 12105 B 15.
15 Cf. von Arnim, i. 166-71, the collection 'les Ascètes et insipidistes,'
SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Introductory)

Synopsis and the Socrates of the Phaeon and leaves their reconciliation to the ingenuity of modern interpretation. Will the sage take part in politics? To this question of the later schools the Platonic idealists: 'Out of the politics of his own city, the city of God.' But Plato's practical decision appears in the prescription of the Republic that the philosopher must descend into the fellowship of man; in his journeys to the court of Syracuse, and in his devotion of the last years of his life to the laborious composition of the Laws.

In Aristotle the contradiction is disguised, but pervades the entire Ethics. Happiness is activity in accordance with virtue, but if finally appears that there are intellectual as well as moral virtues, and the highest activity is the pure contemplation of thought which the student may enjoy interrupedly and God eternally. The life in accordance with ethical virtue is secondary. The Stoi sage is distinguished from the Cyrenaeic and Epicurean in Honezz by his immersion in political activities.

Chrysippus said that Aristotle's theoretical life was only a form of hedonism. The literature of Stoicism harps on the words carpe diem, as the literature of to-day on the words 'social' and 'socialized.' And many modern critics have taken the Stoics at their own estimate and praised Stoicism on this score as against Platonism. But Cicero points out that in fact the Academy and the Lyceum were the chief schools of oratory and political science. And Seneca says epigrammatically:

'Quorum tamen nemo ad rempublicam accessit, nemo non solus.'

14. Neo-Platonism. The divorce between culture and life in the declining period of the Greco-Roman empire confirmed these tendencies, and Neo-Platonism, the predominant philosophy of the last three centuries, constructed its system and its ideal out of the eloquent passages of the Phaedo, the Gorgias, the Republic, and the Theaetetus that Plato answers; 

Hebrew (M. A. Canney), p. 80.
Jewish. See Introduction.
Semitic. See Introduction.

SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Introduction).

In every quarter of the globe the star-studded heavens have attracted the attention and challenged the scrutiny of mankind. Very especially was this the case in the low-lying plain of Babylonia, with its pellicul atmosphere, and hence the study of astrology and astronomy, while practically universal, reached a remarkably high stage of development in that region. On the one hand, the fixed stars, of various degrees of brilliance, are ranged immovably in groups that stamp themselves upon the visual organs; while, on the other, the moon, the sun, and the five visible planets seem to be constantly changing their respective positions. Such phenomena were interpreted by primitive man in a subjective and anthropomorphic fashion, and his notions regarding them were still in vogue when genuine scientific inquiry entered the field, so that until about 1500 A.D. astrology and astronomy remained an inextinguishable mass of confusion.

1. The seven planets. In the northern regions of the Old World every object was regarded by the primitive mind not merely as personal, but also as sexual. In the north-east the twin concepts of Yang and Yin long survived amongst the Chinese as a philosophical formula, classifying all existing things as male (= good) or female (= evil). Persian dualism retains the twofold principle in its most incisive form. In the Middle Ages, Christian ideas were for a time excessively influenced by the antithesis of God and Satan, though here the sexual dichotomy characteristic of the primitive mind has disappeared.

Now this tendency of the aboriginal mind towards sexual personification left some of its earliest deposits upon the observation and study of the stars. Even the simplest observations of the planetary movements brought to light the striking fact that


2 See works cited in the footnotes.

3 Paul Shorey.
the elongations of the two inferior planets, Mercury and Venus, never reached beyond a certain limit, and that these bodies traversed the zodiac as if held within a narrow groove. The moon and the three superior planets were less restricted in their motions. It was therefore quite in keeping with the imaginative and symbolizing proclivity of the primitive intellect to represent the Sun, Mercury, and Venus as the family, travelling, in relatively close company, like nomads in the ecliptic. Of this family the Sun came to be regarded as the father, Venus as the mother, and the others were looked upon as more vagrant males, who on occasion, however, might act as a disturbing influence in the union of the Sun and Venus.

In speculations of a still earlier period it was the sun and moon alone that formed the marriage relationship, the sun being usually the husband and the moon the wife; only in exceptional cases were the positions reversed. Even now, too, the relations between sun and moon were represented as homosexual and pederastic. But in the ancient Orient and in Egypt the septet of planets had already begun to assume an independent character. In comparison with the two greater luminaries that the idea of a marriage between sun and moon hardly left a trace behind.

In the most remote ages the periods of revolution peculiar to the several planets had been studied, with results which led to their being arranged in the following sequence (with the earth, of course, at the centre of the universe)—Moon, Mercury, Venus, Sun, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn. The sun's superiority in size was enough of itself to give him the median position. The planets named before the sun alternated as morning and evening stars, or in other ways; and of the twofold characteristic thus exhibited one aspect might be regarded as good and the other as evil. The three last-named, or exterior, planets formed a triad by themselves, and they appeared to the observer as less under the control of the sun than his own family or the moon. The middle place amongst them was occupied by Jupiter, who might thus be deemed their king, and the king as such, according to Oriental ideas, was considered the sun, the giver of life and light, was likewise good, it followed that Mars and Saturn must be evil—by the principle of alternation, namely, which is the basis of such classifying and one's coat-buttons, in ideas about even and odd, and in other primitive superstitions. Mars with his relatively short period of revolution became the youthful turbulent demon, while the slowly-revolving Saturn was figured as the hoary-headed begetter of evil.

Not only, however, do men look upwards towards the planets, but the planets themselves look downwards upon men and events on the earth. They were even supposed to impress their own characters upon earthly affairs, intervening therein as their nature prompted. In the case of the sun and the moon the action was obvious to all, and by analogy it was attributed to the other five planets as well. These ideas were so simple and natural that, at the time when, in the oldest civilized lands, such as Babylonia and Egypt, the earliest scientific observations and records of the planetary motions were collected, they had permeated all study of the subject. The consequence was that these naive ideas continued to mingle with the subsequent results of genuine astronomical inquiry. Aboriginal man came upon a fresh vein of ideas when he divined a mutual connexion between the lustre of the stars and that of the metals. The metals with which he was acquainted being precisely seven in number, it was natural to associate with them, not the fixed stars, but the seven planets. The parallels were as follows: the Sun with gold, the Moon with silver, Mars with iron, Mercury with quicksilver, Jupiter with tin, Mars with copper, and Saturn with lead. Hence in medieval, and even until modern, times, the metals were indicated by the planetary symbols. Then alchemy attached special symbols to other substances; and as alchemy and astrology were intimately connected with each other throughout their entire course, it may be well to give a list of the symbols used by alchemists in the Middle Ages:

- ☀ gold, ☡ silver, ☢ iron, ☣ quicksilver, ☤ tin, ☥ copper, ☦ lead, ☧ antimony, ☩ lime, ☩ sulphur, ☪ tartar, ☫ salt, ☬ sulphuret, ☭ sulphuric acid, ☮ ammonia, ☰ distillate and sublimate, ☱ precipitate. As will be shown in dealing with the horoscope, the symbols of the four traditional elements were derived from the two 'houses' known as ἐπόγευς and μεσογέως respectively.

We have thus sketched the main lines of thought by which the planets came to have their particular significance in astrological speculation. More remote considerations must here be left aside. Suffice it to say that, in the final scheme of astrology, Mercury became the lord of wisdom, cunning, arts, and eloquence and was likewise bi-sexual; Venus became the lady of love; Mars, the lord of war and violence generally; Jupiter, the ruler of gods and men; Saturn, the lord of cruelty and truculence. The Sun, Jupiter, and Saturn were propitious by day, and the Moon, Mars, and Venus by night. The planets infected with their own qualities such as were born under their influence, but in certain situations their normal action might be completely reversed.

2. The ecliptic and the zodiac.—Civilized man is still affected by the variation of times and seasons, and in a yet higher degree this was the case with primitive man. The latter could hardly remain indifferent to changes of temperature and weather in their connexion with day and night, or with summer and winter, or, again, with the varying position of the sun in the sky. In his inquiring mind his interest in the heavens was quite as great as his desire to take note of the fluctuating brightness of the moon at night. He noted that the period of menstruation coincided with that of a lunar revolution. In the life of primitive man, accordingly, there was no concern of importance but was somehow related to the movements of the sun or the moon. As soon, however, as the planets came to be regarded as endowed with personality, the interventions of sun and moon in human affairs began to be thought of as the conscious and voluntary actions of higher beings, whose purpose it was to bring the fortunes of nations, monarchs, and individual human beings to bear on continuous correlation with their own particular activities in the higher sphere.

The planets Venus and Mercury, being represented as respectively the wife and the son of the sun, must inevitably, according to human notions, exert an influence upon the actions of the being personified as husband and father. But, this being so, it was impossible to leave Mars and Saturn out of account. Now these five smaller planets, equally with the larger two, confined their movements to a certain narrow belt of the firmament. The only difference between the circular paths of the sun and the moon and the
paths of the smaller planets is that the latter exhibit certain peculiar convolutions, which were called epicycles, and may be illustrated by a curved line as follows: \( \Gamma \) or \( \Lambda \). The orbits of the sun and the moon, no doubt, also showed many deviations from the path of simple revolution about the observer's own point of view. But the only changes which a dweller on the earth could discern in the smaller planets was the shifting of their several positions among the fixed stars, and their concomitant variations in apparent magnitude. Investigation of these planets, therefore, did not reach beyond investigation of their paths in the firmament.

After sunset about one-half of all the stars are visible. The great mass of these lie in the broad equatorial circle of the heavens between the sun and a point 180° E. of the sun. The lines bounding the stars of the circumpolar vault and those of the southern hemisphere are not constant, but fluctuate inversely. The stars, however, that come into consideration in regard to the planetary orbits travel from east to west, passing below the horizon one after another, so that just before sunrise the other half of the stars, i.e., those lying between the sun and midnight, are again visible. Thus, an examination of the sky made twice in one night, viz., shortly after sunset and shortly before sunrise, will embrace practically every important phenomenon in the starry heavens. These accordingly were the two times of astronomical observation to which prime importance was ascribed throughout antiquity, and in relation with which all observations were brought.

In the course of one night, then, primitive man could see almost all the stars visible in our latitude. One of the few exceptions was formed by the stars which happened to be situated in the sun's meridian for the time being. Their light was lost in the sun's beams, and they were meanwhile invisible. After sunset and before sunrise, moreover, there was a short period of twilight, causing a degree of obscuration such that brighter stars remained visible only when they were over 12°, and fainter stars only when over 15°, E. or W. of the sun. In virtue of the sun's movement in the zodiac, the observer of the morning and evening sky might witness the following phenomenon. On a particular evening of the year a star, especially one situated in the zodiacal belt, would be visible for a few minutes after sunset, and for a few minutes after sunrise. Now, such a star remained invisible for a certain time every year, and the astrologer spoke of it as being "combust," i.e. dissolved in the overpowering beams of the sun. Then, after a period of 24 to 30 days, according to its brilliance, the same star reappeared shortly before sunrise. The star's disappearance from the evening sky in the west was termed its heliacal setting, and its reappearance in the morning sky to the east its heliacal rising.

In the astronomy and astrology of both East and West throughout the entire ancient era the heliacal rising and setting of groups of stars were carefully noted, and employed in registering the date of events. So far, the earliest known instance of this, found more than once in historical records, is the heliacal rising of Sirius, the \( \alpha \) of the Egyptians, which was pronounced \( \alpha \) or \( \beta \), and translated to ἀργες τος της Ιέρων, by the Greeks. By this means, long before the building of the pyramids, the Egyptians were able to calculate the length of the sidereal year, as well as a particular era of about 1500 years, at the end of which the first day of the sidereal year coincided with that of the tropical year. Half-way through the period of invisibility the star and the sun lie in the same meridian. The corresponding proximity of a star to any of the planets but the sun is called a conjunction, and every conjunction was astrologically of great importance. But when the sun and the corresponding pair, the occurrence is known as the conical rising of the star in question. It is to this conical rising, not as in ancient times to the sidereal rising, that the phenomenon is attached by modern scientific astronomy.

The Egyptian sacred year was subsequently adopted by the Romans as the Julian year, with the intercalation of a day in every fourth year. This computation allowed for the fact that the sun seems to move forward some \( \pi \) radians of his orbit every day. This might have suggested a division of the ecliptic into 360 parts, only a trudging error being thus involved. What was actually done, however, was to divide the great circle into 360 parts, involving a still larger error of adjustment. The calculation of the yearly period and its division into twelve months—of which we shall treat more fully below—together with many other things, were thereby greatly simplified. But the sun's orbit of 360 degrees, with a day for each degree, left some 3\(^1/2\) days of every year out of account. Now we still speak of a solstitial solstice and a solstitial equations. The meaning thereby the two points at which the sun reaches his greatest declination north and south respectively. Originally, however, the residual 3\(^1/2\) days were divided between the two solstices, the sun being actually represented as passing in his declination, so that he could still traverse the 360 degrees of the ecliptic in 360 days. In the ancient Egyptian calendar this whole redundant period was transferred to the time just anterior to the heliacal rising of Sirius, five days being inserted in ordinary, and six in leap (or temple) years. In the early Roman calendar the intercalation was made at the winter solstice. To the Babylonian calendar, which, with a displacement of the year's beginning, is still in use as the Jewish calendar, we must return when we deal with lunar computations. But it noted here, however, that for astrological and astronomical purposes the Babylonians placed the compensatory interval for the most part at the beginning of spring, but sometimes at the beginning of autumn.

The time at which this yearly intercalation was made was dependent in the main upon the fixing of the zero meridian in the movable vault of heaven. The points through which this zero line might be conveniently drawn were many. Once it was fixed, astronomy and calendar were brought into harmony, and a definite instant established for commencing the day. The Babylonians began the day with sunrise, and the year with the spring equinox, thus placing the zero of the ecliptic upon the first point of Aries. Among the Jews, the day began with sunset, and the civil year with the autumn equinox; and, had the Jews studied astronomy independently, they would have drawn the zero of the ecliptic through Sirus. In the early Roman, as in our modern, calendar the day is reckoned from midnight, and the year from the winter solstice; hence, therefore, the zero would lie in the first point of Capricorn. The Romans, however, as classical writers inform us, borrowed their astronomy and astrology from Babylon, and accordingly it is the Babylonian zero point that is found among the Romans, as also in later developments, and even in the astronomy of the present day. The Egyptians fixed their year from the rise of Sirius on the ecliptic, the corresponding zero meridian passing through Sirus. With this, however, the beginning of the day did not harmonize, for, according to notices found in the Mantheparvane and other hieroglyphic texts,
the Egyptian day was reckoned from sunrise. This
dislocation likewise is probably due to Babylonian
influence of a very remote date.

We have seen that the ecliptic, and indeed the
circle of the zodiac, divided into degrees, took
account correspond approximately with the sun's daily
change of position among the stars throughout one
year. These divisions, however, were found in
conveniently small, and their eclipse of a degree
when portions was divided into constellations, each having an arc
of 30 degrees, and three subdivisions of 10 degrees, or
decanates. This division came about in two
ways. In the first place, at any given time some-
thing like one-twelfth of the ecliptic was "comb-
bust"; and, secondly, each of these twelfth was
traversed by the sun in about the same time as the
moon required for one complete revolution.

In this way the annual course of the sun was
furnished with the 12 zodiacal signs of the ecliptic.
Moreover, in the earliest times the synodical
period of the moon was divided into three, viz.
waxing, dominant, and waning moon, and this
division was adhered to by later astrology. Now
to each of these synodical thirds of the moon's
course corresponded a movement of the sun extend-
ing to some 10 degrees, and thus in time arose the
idea of the division of the ecliptic into 30 degrees.

The trisection of the moon's period just noted
probably led in very remote times to the institution
of weeks of ten and five days. It does not appear,
however, from what we have so far learned of
ancient Eastern history, that these measurements
had any practical significance. It was only in
astrology and astro-mytology, with its historical
legends, that the 30 deccanates (or the 72 semi-
decanates) were actually made use of. This chron-
ometry, no less than that explained above, was in
vogue throughout Babylonia and Egypt, if not else-
where. (A final vestige thereof was the Egyptian
practice of assigning 401 susabti to the dead—
365 for the days of the year and 36 as guardsians
for the ten-day weeks.) In astrology of the higher
type, to the time of Kepler, calculations were
made by means of the degree and, above all, of the
decanate; and the moon from her tenth to her
twentieth day was always spoken of as being in
her domain. In general, however, the method of
reckoning which was adopted for both
astronomical observation and astrological inter-
pretation, was that of the well-known 12 zodiacal
signs, although these were variously designated in
the several civilized lands of antiquity. It like-
wise appears that the division of the astrological
scheme of months, as appears from the following
parallelism: Libra, tawret (Bab.), Tishri (Heb.),
followed by Scorpio, arsh-enennu (Bab.), Mar-
cheshan (Heb.); then Sagittarius, kisilum (Bab.),
Kisley (Heb.), etc. The names of the months were
also indicative of their meteorological conditions;
thus, e.g., the winter rainy season was symbolized
by Capricornus (originally the marine animal
Hippocampus guttulatus), Aquarius, and Pisces,
all in some way connected with water.

Here, moreover, we again meet with the practice
of portioning out good and evil, or rather male
and female, alternately. Astrologically the zero point
of this distribution lay between Cancer and Leo,
approximating, therefore, to that of the Egyptian
Siris-year. Leo, Libra, and Sagittarius came to be
recognized as male; Virgo, Scorpio, and Capricornus
as female. It is worthy of remark that as a result
of this law of alternation the astrologer was actu-
ally forced for thousands of years to speak of
Taurus as feminine. Then the planets the zodiacal
signs, and also allotted severally to the planets; thus Cancer was assigned to the moon,
Leo to the sun, Gemini and Virgo to Mercury,
Taurans and Libra to Venus, Aries and Scorpio to
Mars, Sagittarius and Pisces to Jupiter, and Capri-
cornus and Aquarius to Saturn. The particular
planet was called the 'lord of the mansion' belong-
ing to its respective sign or signs. Tradition tells
us, however, that the 360 degrees (or 30 degrees
of the mansion). (Those of the Egyptians have
been transmitted to us not only by the reports of
Marcus Manilius, but also by an annalane notice
found in the so-called Papyrus of the 12 zodiacal
signs. Likewise survive in the Coptic designations of
the months. A comparison of the various lists shows
us that in the course of thousands of years the tradition remained unaltered, though in that of
Mandulis there is a dislocation to the extent of one
zodiacal sign.)

The ecliptic of the sun is traversed approxi-
mately also by the moon, and in relation to the
latter it was measured by a unit of the sun's
course, viz. the arc described by the moon in one
day. In order to correspond, therefore, with the
moon's period of 28 days, the ecliptic was divided
into 28 lunations. But as the sun, during the moon's sidereal period, has moved
nowward by about two lunar stations, astrological calculation assumed a period of about 30 lunations, i.e.
the time between one incident of the sun and
another, as the measure of a month. In order to
delimit these stations, however, the astrologer did
not portion out the ecliptic in a fresh series of
constellations, but distinguished each of the 28
by a dominant star in the ecliptic. In contradis-
tinction to the older method of dividing the 30
days of the moon's synodical period in three, there
rose subsequently the plan of dividing its sidereal
period in four. Once in each of these quarters
each of the seven planets was recognized as the
lord of a lunar station, the order of sequence being
the same as that in which, in the horoscope of the
hours, the planets became lords of the ascending
at sunrise. Thus came about the division of the sidereal month of 28 days into four weeks of 7 days,
with Sun, Moon, Mars, Mercury, Jupiter, Venus,
and Saturn as successive lords of the lunar stations
in each week. This astrological scheme of naming
the days of the week after the rulers of the lunar
stations still survives throughout Christendom,
while, on the other hand, the canonical books of
the Old and New Testament wholly avoid the use of
such designations, distinguishing the days of
the week by ordinal numbers alone.

The various locations of the five smaller planets
were usually designated by the horological, signs
into which the sun's path is divided, as is especi-
ally shown in regard to Egypt by the Berlin
Demotic Papyrus, p. 8279.

3. Spherical astronomy and the astrological
houses.—Observations of the astral motions
within the scope of natural vision are design-
nated spherical, and when these have been duly
adjusted they are, by way of contrast, called cos-
mical, while the actual occurrences themselves are
spoken of as sidereal. Modern scientific astronomy
likewise must always take the direct spherical
observations as its starting-point, only then pro-
ced to elaborate its way towards the higher
levels of knowledge. The astrology and astronomy
of the ancient world never got beyond the spherical
stage. Hence it was necessary from the outset to
lay down fixed bearings for observational purposes,
such as would be furnished by two这些年, one run

1 If we take the planets, therefore, in the reverse order of their prescriptive order on the earth, viz. Saturn, Jupiter, Sun, Venus, Mercury, Moon, and suppose that each planet in turn
precedes over an hour of the sun, then, if, e.g., Saturn passes
over the first hour of the day, he will also precede over the
8th, 16th, and 22nd hours; the 22nd hour accordingly will fall
to Jupiter, the 3rd to Mars, and the 1st to the Sun; hence Saturday is followed by Sunday, and so on.
ning east and west, the other north and south, through the observer's own position.

In connexion with nearly all ancient systems of religion are found sacred edifices of great age whose longitudinal axes lie exactly east and west. The determination of this east and west line, i.e. the parallel of latitude, was thus one of the early triumphs of the human mind. The oldest known instrument employed for the purpose was the stile, which afterwards developed into the gnomon of the sundial, and indeed, the sun-dial itself. The stile was a vertical shaft fixed in the centre of a circle. In the morning, and again in the evening, the shadow of the pillar extended a considerable distance beyond the circle, while for an hour or two before, as also for an hour or two after, midday the extremity of the shadow lay within the circle. It was necessary, therefore, to mark the two points at which the shadow, forenoon and afternoon, terminated precisely upon the circle. The straight line joining these two points supplied an accurate east and west alignment, which could thus be secured on any sunny day at any season of the year. The use of the gnomon, in some form or another, seems to be common to primitive and the older civilized peoples.

Simple trial and observation showed that a stationary position was to be found in the north pole of the firmament and the star lying nearest to it. The direction of the meridian line through any given point of observation could then be ascertained by the following expedient. Two horoscopes stood face to face upon a line lying roughly north and south. The observer on the south, holding up before him the split rib of a palm leaf, moved it into such a position as enabled him through the figure to see the pole star directly above the crown of his companion's head. Then the observer on the north, looking through the slit, saw all the then culminating stars from the southern point of the horizon upwards, and in this way projected his meridian upon the celestial vault.

The east and west points of the horizon, and the meridian of the observer, having been ascertained, the earliest facts of observation regarding the paths of the planets could be brought into relation therewith. The fixed stars, indeed, never varying in their positions relative to one another, also rose and set at constant distances from the east and west points respectively. On the other hand, the sun, the moon, and the five smaller planets rose and set at points never twice the same successively, and sometimes north, sometimes south, of due east and due west respectively twice a year, viz. as he entered Aries and Libra. The extreme limits of his northward and southward movements in the ecliptic were called the tropical points, and the two constellations concerned came to be known in astrology and astronomy as the tropical constellations of the zodiac. Corresponding results were established with reference to the other planets.

But there is likewise an apparent daily revolution of fixed stars and planets alike around the position of the observer, each of them crossing his meridian once in every 24 hours, while if they lie in the equatorial circle the interval takes place exactly 6 hours after they rise in the east, and 6 hours before they set in the west. Hence the observer's celestial equator, too, is always laid out in 12 segments corresponding to the 12 constellations of the zodiac; and if we disregard the sun's daily eastward movement of one degree, we find that every two hours the zodiac changes its position relatively to the equator by one whole zodiacal sign of 30 degrees. Now the intermediate positions of the signs during these two hours being left out of account, the observer's celestial equator was once for all divided into 12 apparently stationary parts, each of these having its own meridian. The illustration below shows an equatorial section traversing the horizon and the celestial sphere. These parts were called 'houses,' and all the conditions found within them were treated as if stationed in their respective middle lines. Now, as the enumeration of the houses began in the east, and then proceeded downwards under the eastern horizon, i.e. according to the order in which the phenomena of each successive house arose would appear in the middle of the first house, the due west point in that of the seventh, the meridian in that of the tenth, and the opposite meridian in that of the fourth. All primitive astronomical and astrological study of the sky was occupied, and indeed necessarily occupied, with the rising, culmination, and setting of the heavenly bodies, with the passage of planets, normal stars, and constellations from one house to another, and with the mutual positions of the planets as measured by the houses they happened to occupy at any given time.

It would appear that these houses were sometimes divided in two, as, e.g., in Egypt in the time of King Seti; and this led quite naturally to the division of the day into 24 hours, and eventually to the arrangement of the dial-plate of our clocks. For more exact observations, however, each house was subdivided into three decanates, and each decanate into ten degrees, the advantage of this being that the sphere of the observer had the same number of parts as the ecliptic, while the boundary lines defining the parts of each coincided every four minutes.

This method of parceling out the sun's apparent daily course must have been instituted at a very remote period, in an age indeed when the astronomer had not yet grasped the idea of a circular orbit, but still thought of the solar path as a square. In the figure representing the horoscope this quadrative form was retained, and it has remained in use till modern times, and, in fact, till the present day. To this method of delineating the stellar paths in
the horoscope by means of the square we shall frequently have occasion to return, as a considerable number of symbols relating to God and the world were evolved therefrom. In interpreting the horoscope the various positions were so far as possible brought into relation with the first house, and with the latter as starting-point the astrologer, applying the principle of even and odd as in the case of the equinoxes of Jupiter, and Saturn, alternately assigned to the other houses an essential character of benefit or bane. Thus the twelfth house was unfavourable, the eleventh favourable, the tenth—apart from its special position—unfavourable, the ninth favourable, the eighth supremely unfavourable, and so with the rest. This mode of interpretation was also arrived at along another line of thought, and, being thus supported by two ostensible proofs, it was believed to be established beyond dispute. The second proof in question was that supplied by the 'aspects,' of which we shall treat presently.

The plan of indicating position by means of zodiacal signs and houses could at best give approximate results. For the sake of simplicity it was assumed that the boundary lines of the several signs always coincided with those of the square, and that the number of a Babylonian double-hour sign moved instantaneously into another house, whose number was one less than that of the house which it had vacated. For all further deductions within the limits of plane geometry, the entire contents of any particular zodiacal sign were regarded as concentrated in the middle point of the sign and the house then congruent therewith.

The enumeration of the astrological houses from the east downwards towards the west, then eastwards again above the horizon, so that account is first of all taken of the invisible regions of the celestial heavens, had its origin in the fact that the attention of the astrologer was primarily directed towards the rising of the stars, and accordingly the houses were numbered in the order in which the stars contained in them at any given time would reach the eastern horizon and become visible.

4. Aspects.—The term 'aspects' was used in astrology to denote the relative positions of the houses and zodiacal signs, or of the stars situated in the houses at any given time. Planets in the same sign and the same house were said to be in conjunction; planets in opposite signs and houses, in opposition. The other possible relations amongst the celestial phenomena are divided with references to regular inscribed polygons. Thus, if a planet were situated in the twelfth or the second house, then the line joining the middle point of either of these houses and that of the first house would form one side of a regular inscribed dodecagon; in

which case the planet in question was said to be in dodecagonal aspect to the east point, or 'horoscope' in the original sense. As in the same way planets in the eleventh and third houses furnished the side of a regular hexagon, their aspect towards the east or west house was that of sextile. Similarly planets in the tenth and fourth houses were in quartile or square, and those in the ninth and fifth were in trine. The line joining the middle point of the eighth or the sixth house with the east point was not a constituent part of any regular figure within the circle, and suggested at best a cross dodecagon, formed thus, which was regarded as the violation of all order. But as conjunction and opposition are rest positions at the twelveth aspect, the eighth was the only visible house having no aspect towards the horoscope. The principle of alternate numeration likewise pronounced this house unfavourable. In the astrological application of spherical astronomy it therefore signified the house of death.

Prior to the stage now reached, the exclusive concern of the astronomer had been to map out the heavens with such precision as would enable him to fix his observations by means of a verbal record. His conception of aspects, however, i.e. of the relations of the stellar positions to the horoscope, led him to assign values to the stellar positions themselves, and as soon as these came to be represented as anthropocentric or concentric, the initiative was given to the science of Judicial Astrology. Now we may emphasize the fact that the original scheme of the horoscope was depicted as a square, and that, before it became possible for astrology to speak of regular polygons, the conception of the sun's apparent diurnal motion as a circle must have been thought of as the ultimate. The very language of astrology shows it to have been a kind of exorcism, not inherently connected with astronomy at all. Even in the Middle Ages a distinction was still maintained between Natural Astrology and Positive Astrology. The former dealt with the actual, and especially the baneful, influence of the planets upon meteorological changes—wind, storm, hurricane, thunder, lightning, and earthquake. It was accordingly bound up with the naive and fantastic weather-lore of primitive man, and is to some extent still in evidence in scientific meteorology. In regard to the latter it is even yet frequently true that sub iudice sit.

Positive or Judicial Astrology, on the other hand, was concerned from the earliest times with the supposed influences of the planets upon the fortunes of men and nations. It is now regarded by all sober minds as an extravagance of the human intellect, as something that the race has finally left behind. In Judicial Astrology it was no longer merely the place of a star to the horizon which determined the east point, that was specified and appraised, but also the aspect of two planets with respect to each other. If one planet, for example, was situated in the eleventh house and the other in the eighth, the two were said to be mutually in quadrile. Here again, moreover, we find the alternate distribution of good and evil: conjunction was good; adjacent aspect or aspect in dodecagon was evil; sextile was good; quartile relatively evil; trine specially good; absence of regular aspect was specially evil, and opposition relatively good.

Since the line between the eighth or the sixth house and the east point did not form the side of a regular inscribed polygon, these two houses were deemed of inferior value. For the anthropocentric mind of the astrologer it was therefore a short step to regard them as houses of misfortune. The eighth house thus became the house of death, and the sixth the house of pains. We shall see later that in the reciprocal relations between the macrocosm and the microcosm the left arm became a synonym for the house of death and the left leg for the house of pains, and that in consequence these bodily parts themselves came to be regarded as evil ones.

As emphasis was laid likewise upon the mutual correspondence of east and west—an idea that was corroborated by the principle of alternate numberings—the twelfth and second houses were counted
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unfavourable. In primitive plane geometry the inscribed and circumscribed polygons are pre-eminently regular figures, and once the alternate enumeration gave the same result. Consequently the eleventh, fifth, fifth, and third houses were reckoned necessary, while the tenth and fourth again, were relatively evil. These symbolical interpretations, however, were sometimes set aside, sometimes even reversed, especially those connected with the invisible half of the sky. In the instance of our own world, in the stars culminated, was supposed, by a very natural symbolism, to preside over dignities and offices, while the fourth house, lying directly beneath us, came in similar fashion to be associated with parents and ancestors, as those who had passed into the under world, and inferentially with all the other ties of kinship. On the ground of a certain analogy with the eighth house, i.e., that of death, the twelfth became the house of enmity (καταδινησιν), and, by a further analogy, the second became the house of poverty. As the second house, however, was situated in the sky belonging to the under world and therefore opposite to ours, it became the house of fortune and riches, and for the same reason the sixth house, that of pains (or, according to another interpretation, that of service), became the mirror of the ancient house of death and the eleventh, adjacent to the house of enmity, became that of friendship (συμπαθεια). On the ground of similar considerations the third became the house of brothers, and the fifth the house of children. Finally, as the first house was specially associated with the quenct of the astrological oracle, the seventh belonged to the quenct’s companion, in the ordinary course of things, wife or husband.

The designations of the various houses were therefore as follows: (1) life, (2) riches, (3) brothers, (4) parents, (5) children, (6) health, (7) marriage, (8) death, (9) religion, (10) dignities, (11) friendship, and (12) enmity. But this arrangement gave only the general scheme of astrological prognostication, and in the course of thousands of years various changes were introduced. Our information regarding any particular era of astrological speculation is defective, and we speak only in a general sense when we say that from first to last the system detailed above remained essentially unchanged. It was all along recognized, moreover, that the scheme must be specially adjusted to special circumstances. Thus in the case of sickness the real querent was the invalid himself, and it was about him, therefore, that the first house supplied information. The counterpart was meanwhile not the wife, but the disease itself, upon which accordingly light was cast by the seventh house. The tenth house, in which the stars culminated over the patient, symbolized the physician, while the fourth, lying directly beneath in the under world, signified medicine. Account was also taken, of course, of the eighth house as the house of death, and of the sixth as the house of health. The houses of friendship, enmity, riches, brothers, and children were not supposed to yield any influence upon the course of the disease. Nor was much importance attached, in such cases, to the symbolism of the sun’s planetary family; and, in fact, according to Greek accounts of Egyptian astrology, neither Venus nor Mercury was taken into consideration at all.

5. The astrological conception of the world.

—The enormous advances that have been made with the aid of modern instruments and the practical application of the natural sciences, as well as the great contrast that obtains between the ancient and the modern scientific point of view, are matters of common knowledge. It is impossible to understand the theories of nature held by the ancients without a clear conception of the difference between their fundamental standpoint and our own. According to the older view of the world, which can be traced backwards for 5000 years before Christ, and which still held unquestioned sway for 1000 years after Christ, all natural objects issued in parallel lines from certain primary causes of universal operation. Modern science, on the other hand, assumes that the various groups of physical phenomena proceed by differentiation from certain primordial forms. While the ancients, therefore, looked upon the diversity of things as original, and their common elements as due to external influences, the moderns assume that the properties which objects have in common are inherited from a single primary form, and that their differences have been produced by external conditions, such as, e.g., the struggle for existence.

The two conceptions, however, are not held stringently apart, nor does history show a rigid line of demarcation between the two later than the earlier. Even in Genesis (10:16), for instance, we have a table of nations which stands in complete agreement with the modern point of view, more particularly in the circumstance that it traces back all nations to one universal race. More much in accordance with the ancient conception, on the other hand, is the Greek Deluge-story of Deucalion, according to which human beings were generated spontaneously from stones cast upon by the formative powers present in the air. The theory of parallel processes may be called the 'ancient astrological,' or, again, the Oriental astrological, or, as it is more technical, the 'starry heaven' theory. It had its birth amongst the early civilizations of the East, and its leading science was astrology; nor is it yet a spent force among certain Asiatic peoples of to-day. Now even our modern science, with its discovery of steam-power and its remarkable utilization of electricity, does not enter so profoundly into contemporary experience as did the ancient astrological conception into the life, thought, and feeling of the distant past.

Perhaps the most effective resistance to the more harmful issues of the astrological theory of the universe was made by the peoples living around the Mediterranean, but the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are likewise free from the evil outgrowths of that view. Nevertheless, we must remember that even the Biblical writers were children of their time, and could therefore hardly avoid expressing their thoughts in terms of the recognized philosophy of their age. Hence, just as we have come to recognize that the thoroughly going study of Biblical Hebrew cannot dispense with the philological investigation of Arabic, Ethiopic, Babylonian, Syriac, etc., so we are now beginning to realize the impossibility of understanding the tenor of Biblical modes of expression apart from a view of stages of the astrological conception of the world common to the Babylonian, the Egyptian, and other ancient civilizations.

We must again refer to the square form of the horoscope, as furnishing the ground-plan of this theory of the world. The figure shows us the link which the theory had with astrology, and also with other two occult sciences, viz. Alchemy and the Kabalah.

It is of interest to note that the symbols used in astrology for the four cardinal points were not corresponding to the points of the compass. Thus the points of the compass were determined by the observer on the north, the fixing of the cardinal points was effected by his own position in the world. The heavens were therefore seen by the latter from the opposite point of view, and the
four houses in question took a reverse form, so that △ came to mean north, ▽ south, ▶ east, and ◄ west. With this exception, however, all further inferences were drawn from the proper form of the horoscope, i.e. from the figure it presented to the observer on the north.

\[ \text{Diagram of houses} \]

The tenth house, as the sumnum colosum, and the fourth, as the innum calum, embraced everything in the world above and the world below respectively. The upper world as a whole, however, consists of the eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth houses. In the hieroglyphic script of Egypt, accordingly, heaven is represented by the exterior boundary of these five houses, thus:

\[ \text{Diagram of heavens} \]

which, of course, according to the Egyptian practice in such matters, is only a contour, and really stands for \[ \text{Diagram of heavens} \]. The same proportions and angles are likewise retained in the Egyptian representation of the goddess of heaven, who broods over the earth—God—a phenomenon which will meet us again when we treat of Egypt. The under world was represented, of course, by the same figure inverted. Now we find two different ideas attaching to each of the houses numbered ten and four. According to one conception the sumnum colosum contains the heavenly upper ocean, from which rain falls (כַּלֶּלֶת כַּלֶּלֶת in the Biblical narrative of the Deluge), while the innum calum embraces both the ocean of the under world and the subterranean water from which the fountains of the deep are fed (כַּלֶּלֶת כַּלֶּלֶת; also the sources of the Nile in Herodotus). According to the other conception there lies above us first of all air, then fire; and beneath us, first earth, then water. Now the latter theory furnished also the alchemistic symbols of the elements—symbols which are still written by doctors in old-fashioned mysterious recitals, and were in common use among physicians and apothecaries a hundred years ago. Thus, for example, ▽ sigill. signifies terra sigillata; lunabre. △ restr. = lunabre. terrestres; △ flor. -drast. = aqua florum auranti- orum; or something was to be boiled leni △, i.e.

\[ \text{Diagram of elements} \]

lenti colore. Distilled alcoholic liquors were known as 'burnt water,' and were denoted by a combination of the symbols for water and fire, thus: △. To this day the device △ displayed upon rustic insns indicates the licence to sell brandy. This combined symbol △ was used not only in alchemy but also in the Kabbala, where it represented the Star of David. It became, in fact, a symbol for God (just as the fire-eye, i.e. △, was employed in Christian symbolism to signify the Holy Spirit); for, by the rules of the Kabbala, the combination of the principal consonants of ח ("fire") and כ ("water") yielded the word מ"ח ("heaven"), which in its turn was the cabalistic equivalent of מ"ח ("God"). Thus the term God could be expressed by the secret sign △ as the synthesis of fire and water. In the synagogue all pictorial representation of God was forbidden, nor was it allowable to give utterance to the tetagram מ"ח unless absolutely necessary. In the same way, therefore, as the word מ"ח had to be resorted to as the oral designation of God, the symbol △ came to be used in the architecture of the synagogue as His graphic designation. This figure, moreover, not only contains within itself the symbols of the four elements, interfaced with one another, but, besides the upper and lower triangles signifying fire and water respectively, it also shows four extra-numerale triangles, which could thus be regarded on cabalistic principles as metaphysically symbolizing the four consonants of the tetragram. Hence, even in passages of ancient Christian works where we might expect some such phrase as 'with God,' we actually find the cabalistic device

\[ \text{Diagram of tetragram} \]

signifying מ"ח.

According to the astrological theory of the world, however, not only the perpendicular section through the universe, but the surface of the earth itself, was thought of as quadrate, since the cube, as the ideal geometrical figure, was the accepted symbol of the world as a whole. This idea finds frequent expression even in later cabalistic writings treating of the origin of salt, which, of course, also crystallizes in cubes. The scheme of the horizon, accordingly, became a comprehensive map of the world as well. As previously explained in
connexion with the points of the compass, the
horoscope was in this case the opposite point of view. In the centre
was the navel of the world, which every nation
sought to claim for its own territory, and as the
site of the national sanctuary. The figure also
supplied the four pillars, viz. N.E., N.W., S.W.,
and S.E., upon which the heavens are supported.
Of these the best known was the S.W. pillar, as
it was there that Athis had been relieved by
Hercules.

6. Anthropomorphic nomenclature of the
sphere.—The square horoscope was not the only
expedient resorted to in setting forth the relations
of the stars, as another method was also in use
among the Egyptians. From a time anterior to
Menes until the final period, the high priest
Helopolis was known as \( \text{\textino{\textomega}} \), i.e. 'chief
astrologer.' We may note in passing that this
office was held by Iotis-pheru (of whom name
the literal Greek translation was Heliodorus), the
father-in-law of Joseph (Gen 41:5). Tables of ob-
servations made in Egypt during the Twentieth
Dynasty are still extant, and in these are recorded
the times at which the fixed stars cross the middle
lines of the house, and also of the double-hours.
The astrologer on the north found the
meridian of the place of observation by look-
ing through the slit of the palm-leaf rib above
the bald crown of his companion. The middle
meridians of the first and seventh houses were
given by the horizontal line, while the observer
found those of the eleventh and ninth houses by
lines projected over his companion's right and left
eyes, and finally those of the twelfth and eighth houses by lines above
the right and left elbows. It is probable that
the sixth house was in like manner associated with
the left knee, and the second house with the
right.

From this point of view the left arm corre-
sponded with the house of death and the left leg
with the house of sorrows, and on this account
there eventually arose a superstitious aversion to
using the word 'left' at all. In particular, all
actions performed by the left hand came to be
regarded as unlucky. It may well be the case
that this additional handicap, more than left-
headed before astrology asserted its sway, but
the ban thus laid upon the left extremities of
the body undoubtedly supplied a further reason
for excluding the left side and especially the
left hand from all actions of great and critical
moment.

7. Applied astronomy and astrology.—Alike
in the greatest and in the smallest affairs of life un-
civilized man is affected by the changes incident to
the day and the season, by the phases of the moon
by night, and by the ebb and flow of the tides.
Hence the observation of sun and moon with a
view to a standard movement of the sun, or, in
other words, to the construction of a calendar, was
a vital condition of all progress in civilization.
But, as the periods of the earth's rotation about its
axis (i.e. the apparent diurnal movement of the
sun), of the moon's revolution, and of the sun's
apparent annual revolution, are incommensurable
with regard to each other, the early attempts to
frame a serviceable calendar were attended with
no small difficulty. As the lunar month made
more impression upon the primitive mind than the
actual solar year, endeavours were made in the
earliest calendars to base the latter upon an integral
number of the former; and all sorts of expedients
were tried in order to harmonize the two periods.
At a further stage in the growth of civilization
the determination of the true solar year became
the subject of inquiry, the length of the true lunar
month being then left out of consideration. Here
again, however, the residual fraction of days pro-
vided difficulties, and the difference between the
calendars of Western Europe and Eastern Europe
(Russia) shows that these difficulties have not yet
been overcome. In the pre-Christian era there was
a disparity between Babylon, with its cyclically
adjusted lunar year, and Egypt, with its solar year,
or, rather, its two unequal solar years. Other
civilizations employed other types of calendar. A
purely lunar calendar is still in use among Muham-
madans.

The outstanding periodic phenomena of the
apparent courses of sun and moon were registered
in these calendars, and were celebrated as occasions
of joy or sorrow according to their influence upon
human life. In such feasts and fasts the moon
and the sun were, first of all, personified, and they still
continued to be revered as divine or heroic beings
even after the particular days connected with their
movements by astrology and astronomy had been
duly set down in the ritual literature, the corre-

dated calendars of ancient and modern civilized
peoples.

8. Lunar, solar, and planetary. The
assumptions of the ancients vary as to the phases of the moon
and the sun as could be registered in the calendar
was undoubtedly a forward step in the mental
development of primitive man. But the notion
that the movements of moon, sun, and planets
were effected by powerful and conscious beings, more or
less endowed with free will, was an open door to all
illusion. The religion and mythology of the lowest
races are permeated with this idea. Amongst more
highly civilized peoples, again, we find a stock of
myths of like purport, which, partly indigenous and
partly exotic, forms a kind of illicit religion or
superstition, and which shows many points of con-
trast with the teachings of the recognized national
cult. In periods distinguished by a high state of
civilization this supplementary religion finds accept-
ance only amongst the lowest and least enlightened
ranks of the people, while at times, when culture is
at a low ebb, it extends its sway over the leading
classes as well.

In cases, however, where a relatively advanced
and purified form of religion found its way into a
region already civilized, the old representations
of moon and sun as personal beings, as also the
narratives that had grafted themselves upon their
festivals, degenerated into mere legends. As illus-
trations of this process we may name the Metamor-
phoses of Ovid in the Roman religion, the stories of the Thousand
and One Nights in Islam, and
Grimm's domestic and popular tales in Christianized
Germany.

But it was also possible that a fusion might take
place between the older and the newer narratives.
Thus, apart from the sphere of religious history as
such, there are many medieval kings and heroes
whose actual name, as we know, or, in
other words, to the construction of a calendar, was
a vital condition of all progress in civilization.
But, as the periods of the earth's rotation about its
axis (i.e. the apparent diurnal movement of the
sun), of the moon's revolution, and of the sun's
apparent annual revolution, are incommensurable
with regard to each other, the early attempts to
frame a serviceable calendar were attended with
no small difficulty. As the lunar month made
more impression upon the primitive mind than the
actual solar year, endeavours were made in the
earliest calendars to base the latter upon an integral
number of the former; and all sorts of expedients
were tried in order to harmonize the two periods.
At a further stage in the growth of civilization

SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Introductory)
The disengagement of this secondary astro-mythological element from the Christian system of thought has now become one of the prime tasks of the modern historical theologian. It is not possible for any earnest scholar to reject the fundamental idea of such analysis, and the extent to which the work of elimination shall be pursued depends entirely upon his individual theological leanings towards the more orthodox or the more liberal side. In regard to Conuncus, Buddha, Zarathushtra, and Muhammad, as also in regard to the Alexander romances, the Christian theologian concedes the rights of the method without hesitation. Further, the OT and the Life of Jesus have from ancient times been the nuclei of a mass of legendary stories (the Talitha, etc.; Gospels of the Infancy, etc.), which all theologians have for centuries regarded as apocryphal; and it cannot be disputed that the study of astro-mythology has rendered valuable service in throwing light upon the origin of these spurious additions to the lives of the leading personalities of our religion. Once more, there is a group of writings which, though reckoned apocryphal by evangelical Churches, are still included in the canon; and, as might be expected, the bearing of the astro-mythological theory upon these writings is estimated by the two great parties within Christianity in precisely opposite ways. And when at length the theory is applied to certain constitutive elements in the OT, and to the life of Jesus as given in the evangelical records, the theologians who concede its rights in these domains are fewer still in number. The explanation of this fact must be sought in the fact that such criticism seems to undermine the historicity of the Biblical narratives, and to leave nothing but a mass of mythical stories about the planets, which have crystallized around certain more or less unreal figures in the history of Israel. The logical result of the process appears to be the subversion of every constituent of Christianity save its ethics.

Taken in this sense, the comparative study of astrology and astro-mythology rests upon an impenetrable foundation. The implications of its results, as was said above, may quite well be looked upon as a chapter in that most rigid orthodoxy and the broadest liberalism. Hence it cannot be non-suited by either of the warring schools; it is reconcilable even with those of its critics. Just as comparative philology is an ideal and impartial science, so must the comparative study of myths assume a like impartiality; and the indispensable framework of this study is formed by the planetary deities of astrology.

PROPHECIAL ASTROLOGY. From the theological point of view, prophetic astrology must be regarded as by-way towards superstition, and, indeed, as one of the main sources of superstition. It was evolved by gentle gradations from what we may call 'calendar astronomy.' Primitive man discerned parallelism not only in the processes of nature, but also in the State and in human life; now, even in the forms and organs of animals he read analogies and homologies, and many other fields of observation presented similar correspondences. But by far the most obvious and unmistakable cases of parallelism were those which subsisted between the planet and its influences and the rising or setting of the sun, moon, on the one hand, and the periodic variation of the tides, of light and heat during the day, and of the seasons, on the other. Hence arose the notion of planetary causality—of course, in the form of a peculiar kind of animism, according to highly complicated laws, ordained either by themselves or by a superior power, and who sought to bring all events, great and small, in their sphere of influence. Where the trend of thought was polytheistic, the planets were regarded as gods; where it lay towards monotheism, they were but the messengers of a Divine will beyond them; or, as the case might be, an invisible state was supposed to hang over the gods themselves.

From the standpoint of the ancient astrologer, the supreme function of all learning was the observation of the phenomena of the sky and the drawing of inferences bearing upon a parallel series of facts otherwise veiled. The primary task of astrology was to ascertain the positions of the planets in relation to one another, to the zodiacal signs, and to the observer himself, and then to make deductions therefrom. This was astrology properly so called, and it required for every particular case a direct reading of the sky. A cloudy night, however, rendered such direct readings impossible. Now, the Konuyunj inscriptions, dating from the time of the Assyrian king Assurbanipal, yield evidence for a continuous series of actual observations. From these we learn that, notwithstanding the complexity of the planetary movements, the periodic repetition of essential phenomena had been calculated for each particular planet. Thus the astrologer could, by consulting his charts, discovering every particular sequence of planetary movement, and could substitute these for direct observation. It is true that, owing to trifling inaccuracies in the data thus supplied, this course was avoided for thousands of years; but at length the momentous step was taken. No doubt, it still remained necessary to bring certain recorded positions to the test of actual observation, but, with these exceptions, the processes of the practical astrologer were thenceforward pursued in the study. Our earliest evidences for this procedure date from the period of the Persian monarchy.

So far as astronomy itself is concerned, this was a progressive movement; but, from the standpoint of observational science, it was a backward step. It issued finally in the determination and mathematical calculation of the planetary orbits by Kepler. But, in our estimate of Kepler's discoveries, we must always bear in mind that he was still under the spell of the astrological conception of the universe. It was his firm belief that his discoveries were only the most rigid reflections of his own mind, and had exalted astrology to the level of a perfect and independent science of simple calculation, while in reality he had given the death-blow to its pretensions.

From the time of the earliest attempts to draw up a calendar—through the period of the Sumarians and Akkadians—to the days of Kepler astrology underwent no essential change, save that it gradually abandoned the method of direct observation of the heavens in favour of, first, a partial use of tables containing earlier observations, and, finally, a purely arithmetical determination of the positions occupied by the planets at any given time. Astrology, be it remembered, was a study of international importance. Wherever, therefore, in the history of any civilized country we can trace some slight advance in astronomical science, we find corresponding records, practically contemporaneous, in all the civilized countries of that epoch. Additions to men's knowledge of the stars were welcomed always as an auxiliary to the prediction of the planetary positions. As all the available evidence goes to show, however, astrology, throughout its entire career, had but one method of adapting this knowledge to the needs of the hour, and, of universal application, a more or less clearly realized principle of alternation. In the main, the positions of the planets were made
the basis of prognostications of the unborn, but they were also used as a means of filling up locana in the knowledge of the past and the present.

10. Astrology and medicine. — In the ancient Oriental view of the world, astrology, religion, and therapeutics went hand in hand. In the conviction that all things in the universe proceeded in parallel lines, men spoke of a macrocosm (primarily that of the heavens) (microcosm) and a microcosm (primarily the human body), and sought for far-reaching analogies between them. Thus — to take one of many examples found in Sanskrit literature — the Vedas and their allied texts exhibit attempts to establish an exact equivalence between the number of the bones in the human body and that of the days in a year. Simple as would have been the task of enumerating the bones accurately, they were purposely numbered wrongly, so that the desired numerical relations might be educe; the lower jaw, for instance, was said to be composed of eighteen single pieces, not including the teeth, just because the number of purely fictitious, could, as the twentieth part of 360, be used for purposes of speculation. The method was applied in every field, and things which did not harmonize in fact were arbitrarily made to do so.

In the ancient East the therapeutic art was based upon the two fundamental postulates of air in motion and liquid in motion, and it was supposed that in the human body the air passed along the arteries, while the liquid traversed the veins. The solid substance of the body (its earthy constituents) and its native heat (its igneous constituents) were regarded as forming a fixed and constant mass; earth and fire, in fact, were probably never considered in their physiological aspects until the Hellenistic period. The astrological references hitherto discovered in Babylonian and Egyptian texts show that air and liquid alone were taken into account. In the further development of these notions, special prominence was given to the air by the pneumatists, and to the blood (i.e., liquid, and a mixture of the four principal humors, viz., water, phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile) by the hematists. We cannot enter here into the particulars of the antagonism maintained between the two schools for several thousand years, but we may mention that of which we can trace in the period when the Pyramids were built, and which, again, moved the hematist Aristophanes to the mortal hatred wherewith in the Clouds he arraigned the pneumatism of Socrates before the Athenian populace. Suffice it to say that, in all references to the facts of nature found in the Pentateuch, the Jewishistic sections of Genesis, in particular represent the pneumatic, and the Elohist portions the hematistic point of view, whereas the Priestly Code exhibits no scientific tendency at all. The pneumatists regarded the nose as the most important organ of the body. We may recall the numerous phrases formed with ἐνο in the OT, and the large noses of the singers in the chorus of the Clouds. Even amongst the inscriptions from Nineveh, which must, on the whole, be reckoned to the first days and the prominent part in the OT and the Talmud. Among the Babyloniens and Etruscans, again, as also amongst the various peoples influenced by them, hematopathic and pneumatological forms of inspection of the liver. The coneiform texts which treat of this hepatoscopy are without number, and have been read and translated mainly by Jastrow.

In the ancient East, and even in Greece, the hematists were for the most part firm believers in astrology, omens, and all that we now brand with the name of superstition. To dreams, above all, they attached great importance, while the pneumatists, on the other hand, as is shown by the writings of Hippocrates, declared dreams to be unworthy of consideration. The pneumatists seem to have borne the reputation of being enlightened physicians, and the hematists of not infrequently falling into the case with the pneumatist Socrates as delineated by Aristophanes. From certain fragmentary indications we may perhaps gather that in the main the Christians of the early centuries were hematists in their knowledge of nature.

From the mental standpoint of the hematistic astrologer every actual group of relations amongst the planets mirrored itself in all synchronistic events and conditions, and thus the entire horoscope would be reproduced in the variations and peculiarities found in the liver — the central organ — of the newly-born sacrificial animal. An expert examination of the liver could therefore quite well take the place of a direct observation of the sky. The practice of hepatoscopy was extensively diffused, and diagrams illustrative of the art are still extant. The method adopted by the Babylonians was to dig out the breast, and let the liver be called oracular squares by means of a right-angled system of ordinates, a device reminding us of the square sections shown by the extant Egyptian projection of the heavens made in the time of King Seti, and likewise of the square figure used as the ground-plan of the normal horoscope. Among the Etruscans, however, hepatoscopy applied a polar projection in its construction of oracular fields, and to this arrangement corresponds the system of regular polygons designed to represent the relative positions of the planets in the circular horoscope.

Another way of dispensing with direct observation of the heavens was to watch the forms assumed by certain substances when suddenly placed under new conditions, as it was supposed that the forms thus produced were determined by the configuration of the planets at the time. Oil or melted tallow was dropped into water, or water into oil, and the diviner took note of the resultant forms. We read that when Darius established himself in the reign of King Hammurabi of Babylon for the express purpose of interpreting these formations. This mode of divination still survives in the superstitions practiced of dropping molten lead upon a cold surface.

A further variety of oracle was found in dreams, to which reference has already been made. Dreams also were believed to run parallel to the facts of astrology, and might, therefore, be substituted for the latter. But, as dreams were held to have their origin in the blood, their significance was concealed by the hematists only.

Finally, every unaccountable phenomenon of nature — from the movement of an animal to a monstrous birth — everything, in short, that touched human life at any point, came to be associated with planetary influence, and might become the basis of divination. The Library of Sardanapalus contains thousands of tablets in which such superstitions ideas and practices are expounded with the most precise casuistry. They seem to have been regarded as the supreme and final expression of wisdom, and might relate to matters a thousand years old. But these fallacious issues of man's search for knowledge, involving such a prodigious expenditure of energy in efforts of discovery and in the ultimate explanation in the fundamental misconception of astrology, viz. that the incidents of life, being dependent upon the contemporaneous con-
The dates given are themselves products of astrological speculation, and cannot be regarded as historically established, but they are nevertheless worthy of notice. On the 24th of June, B.C. 7 (or 6, according to a previous calculation), a vision of John the Baptist. On the 15th of April, B.C. 6, at 5 a.m., the annunciation to Mary (instead of the conception of Jesus), and, at the same time, the observation of this 'new star' by the Magi. Between the 24th of June, B.C. 6, and the 25th of November, B.C. 6, occurs the visit of the Magi to King Herod. After the 25th of November, B.C. 6, the Magi notice the re-appearance of the stellar configuration at the annunciation. On the 27th of December, B.C. 6, the stellar configuration becomes stationary (σαθρ αφρη), and the Magi worship the infant at Bethlehem.

Now the horoscope of the 15th of April, B.C. 6, can be re-constructed thus:

and supplies the following apotelesmata capable of interpretation:

1. The horoscope of the day appears (with sunrise). (2) Aries is in the ascendant. (3) Mars, as lord of the house of Aries, presides over the birth. (4) The sun is in the ascendant. (5) Saturn is in the descendant. (6) Jupiter is in the ascendant. (7) Mercury is in the ascendant. (8) Saturn is in the second house. (11) The moon enters the eighth house. (12) Venus is in the twelfth house. (13) Mercury, in the house of Mars, and likewise in immediate proximity to Mars. (14) Saturn is in his retrogradation, or "detraction." (15) Moon enters in his σωμαν, or 'exaltation.' (16) The moon in her νερονεια. (17) Venus in her νερονεια. (18) Venus is in sextile ('morning star'). (19) Jupiter is in proximity to his house Pisces. (20) Jupiter in trine (adiectus trigonum) with his house Sagittarius. (21) The sun in trine with his house Leo. (22) Moon's motion is direct. (23) Jupiter is direct. (24) Mars is direct. (25) Venus is retrograde. (26) Mercury is direct. (27) Mercury is combust. (28) Mercury in immediate proximity to the sun. (29) Mercury is invisible. (30) Mars is not combust. (31) Mars is nevertheless invisible, and is, in fact, entering upon its invisible period of three months. (32) Mars is separated from the sun by Mercury. (33) Saturn is separated from the sun by Jupiter, though the latter is combust. (34) Jupiter is combust. (35) Jupiter is separated from the sun by small planets. (36) All the morning stars are visible. (37) All the evening stars are invisible. (38) Mars is situated in his nocturnal triangle. (39) The terrestriai triangle contains Mars only, its nocturnal lord, situated in Taurus. (40) Mars is in opposition to his house Scorpio. (41) The moon in trine with her house Cancer. (42) The moon is in her domain. (43) The trigonum of fire contains its lord conjunct in Aries. (44) The trigonum of water contains its nocturnal ruler, the moon. (45) The moon and Venus are in trine. (46) The trigonum of air is empty. (47) Saturn and Jupiter are in conjunction. (48) This conjunction occurs in Aries, and is thus conjunction maximus, and dominates the entire horoscope. (49) This conjunction is preceded by a conjunction magnum, occurring in Pisces (indicating the astrological necessity for the forerunner, John the Baptist). (50) Saturn is in opposition with the ascendant et al. (51) Saturn is in conjunction with Mercury. (52) Mars and Mercury are in different houses, but close together. (53) This conjunction occurs in Aries, and is thus conjunction maximus, and dominates the entire horoscope. (54) Saturn is in conjunction with Mercury. (55) Mars and Mercury are in different houses, but close together. (56) This conjunction occurs in Aries, and is thus conjunction maximus, and dominates the entire horoscope. (57) Saturn is in conjunction with Mercury. (58) Mars and Mercury are in different houses, but close together. (59) This conjunction occurs in Aries, and is thus conjunction maximus, and dominates the entire horoscope.

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SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Introductory)

(62) Jupiter has no aspect with the moon. (63) Jupiter is in aspectus confinis with Venus, but intercepted by Saturn. (64) Jupiter is in aspectus confinis with Mars, but doubly intercepted. (65) Venus has no aspect with the moon. (66) The sun is in aspectus confinis with Venus, but doubly intercepted. (67) The sun is in aspectus confinis with Mars, but intercepted. (68) Mercury is in aspectus confinis with Venus, but tritly intercepted. (69) Mercury is in aspectus confinis with Mars, but quadruply intercepted. (70) Mercury has no aspect with the moon. (71) Mercury is in aspectus confinis with Venus, but in opposition to the moon. (72) Mars is in trine aspect with Venus. (73) Full moon is just past the equinox. (74) The sun is in opposition to the moon. (75) The tropical signs only Aries is occupied, but it contains four planets. (76) All the planets except the moon and Venus are under the influence of the sun. (77) The lord of the sun's house emerges from the sun's beams. (78) Hence the conjunctive maxima also emerges. (79) All the visible planets and the moon are situated in the diurnal sky. (80) All invisible planets are in the nocturnal sky. (81) The lord of Saturn's house is Mars. (82) The lord of Jupiter's house is Mars. (83) The lord of Jupiter's house is Mars. (84) The lord of the sun's house is Mars. (85) The lord of Mercury's house is Mars. (86) The lord of Venus's house is Jupiter. (87) The lord of the moon's house is Mars. (88) The lord of the house of Mars is Venus. (89) The horoscope, i.e., Aries, is masculine. (90) The other occupied houses are feminine.

Several points of detail may be left out of account. By making the horoscope more precise, and dividing it into decanates and houses, we might multiply indefinitely the ninety particulars given above. These data of the positions occupied by the planets were known as opodesminata. The manner of computing and interpreting these results can be interpreted only in part at the present day, as our information regarding ancient modes of astrological interpretation is at best fragmentary. According to the opinion of the ancients and such modern interpreters as are of this opinion, the planets, no doubt, have also been made in certain particulars. So far, however, as we can test the interpretations of this horoscope, it corresponds with the evangelical narratives of the life of Jesus even in the smallest details.

13. The development of astronomy and astrology among the various peoples.—The foregoing sketch makes it evident that primitive peoples constructed their calendars by direct observation of the heavens. Similarly, it is amongst these primitive peoples, as indeed we might expect, that we find the first steps of the transition from astronomy to astrology. Thus, in the interior of some of the larger South Sea Islands, as, e.g., Borneo, a primitive astronomy and astrology are found amongst the aborigines, while the inhabitants of the sea board, as also of the smaller islands, especially in the Caroline, Marshall, and Carolines, the science of the stars, partly because their nautical interests demanded a more thoroughgoing observation of the heavenly bodies, and partly because they were influenced by the higher standard of culture attained by the Asiatic races, as is shown, for example, by the fact that the Malay language contains words borrowed from Chinese, Sanskrit, Arabic, and Persian. Of the pictorial writing of ancient Mexico, part of the calendar is all that has hitherto been deciphered; but even this suffices to show striking correspondences between the civilizations of America anterior to its discovery by Columbus and those of the ancient Asiatic races, and not least in astronomy and astrology. The development of these sciences already attained in the Babylonian period or later in the time of Alexander the Great is practically the same as that which now prevails throughout China, in part of Japan, and, above all, in India.

In the West, likewise, the results of astronomical inquiry show the same signs of superstitious conceptions. The earliest successful attempts to eliminate these conceptions and their effects from astronomy were made about A.D. 1500. It is evident that the work of civilization the educated classes tried to throw the number of horoscope overboard. Certain of the Church Fathers wrought strenuously to oust it from its place. But, on the one hand, the vexed question regarding the date of Easter, which was simply a consequence of combining the lunar calendar of Babylon with the solar calendar of Egypt, and, on the other, the attempt to fix a year for the birth of Christ, gave astronomy since more a certain advantageous prestige in Christian life and theology. Fresh vantage ground was also won for it in the secular learning of the Middle Ages by the Western drift of Islam into the Jewish Kabbalah. As to the extent, the astronomy of the West, and, in particular, the coalescence of astronomy and astrology in the later culture of Western lands, is a development or an importation from the astronomy and astrology of the ancient East.

Until the time of Kepler, astronomy was always bound up with astrology, and its progress was for the most part of a meagre kind. This may seem incredible so long as we confine our investigation to a short period abounding in records, but it is always unsafe to argue from the silence of the earlier records that the apparently fresh facts set forth in the later constitute an intellectual advance. No candid observer in the field of astrology could fail to notice that, while this or that forecast might happen to be correct, yet in many cases the configuration of the planets, however skilfully interpreted, could not be reconciled with the facts of experience. Certain details of astrological procedure were, therefore, constantly being left behind, as in an ever-seething witches' caldron; and, on the other hand, long disused methods were once more resorted to. This was especially the case when, in periods of unrest, races and civilizations were shaken and mingled together. Detailed research in a newly circumcised period may thus produce the illusion of rapid development in a science which, in its leading features, really remained unchanged from age to age.

The fundamental tenets promulgated by astrology as inviolably true were manifold. From the fourth house, as it seemed, welled up the subsoil water and the springs which fed the rivers, while from the tenth house came the rain. Now when primitive man found the moon in either of those houses he anticipated a flood. But the moon was evidently connected also with the occurrence of menstruation, which was regarded as a periodic overflow of blood. The regular blood phenomena tended to corroborate another so fully that the sovereignty of the moon over the liquid element was deemed indisputable. An example of a different kind is furnished by the horoscope of disease, or rather of the évéraxev. Here the invalid was the quencher, and his remedy the quenched, and information regarding them was supplied by the first and seventh houses respectively. Now, in the regular horoscope the sixth house was significant of pain and the eighth of death, and thus the entire western section of the sky from 45° above the horizon to 45° below it was the region of disease. In this expanding, however, the great distinction among the planets as the source of heat, is situated between three and nine o'clock p.m., and this again is the time when the invalid shows symptoms of fever. An easy explanation was thus provided for the increase of febrile temperature, while on the other hand the validity of the science was demonstrated once more. Astrology simply abounded in specific applications, and the good.

Thus the leading principles and ideas of astrology were looked upon for centuries as incontrovertible. Its failures were attributed to points of secondary measurement, and it seemed most convenient to change the time of ebullition by a whole double-hour, and so to shift the entire horoscope by one house—an artifice...
which would in general quite invert the first interpretation. Corrections and alterations were thus made in matters of detail, while among the more progressive peoples the general tendency was towards over-refinement in interpretation and an ever-expanding casuistry.

Accordingly there was no real development in the astronomy and astrology of the ancient East within historic times. The explicit references of the inscriptions go as far back as the period of Sargani-sar-ali and Naram-Sin. From the reign of the former eight short texts are all that have as yet been preserved of the latter sixteen only, all of the same date. It is not to be expected, therefore, that we shall trace all the details of later astrology in such meagre records. It is surely sufficient for our purpose that the later period, the archives of which may quite well extend backwards to the monarchs just named, yields a mass of evidence to show that astronomy and astrology by this time reached the status of a closed and nomended system. Inscriptions from the age of Hammurabi make it clear that full instructions had already been drawn up for the practice of divination by caps in connection with the written horoscope. We have also from a period about a thousand years before Christ come the inscribed boundary-stones, the dates of which are indicated by their arrangement of the planetary symbols. Thereafter the richest vein of astrological records is found in the library of Sardanapalus. We learn from these that there was a system of observatories covering the whole kingdom, that there was an established scheme of relays for the professional astrologers and of serial reports regarding their work, and that a State library had been established for the purpose of supplying all needed information in astrology and the auxiliary arts of divination. It is to be regretted that as yet only the Reports of the astrologers and the instructions regarding horoscopes have been properly edited. The cuneiform texts of the period between Sardanapalus and the beginning of the Christian era are not so rich in relevant information. The astronomical texts of this epoch, however, have found a thoroughly capable editor in Kugler, whose labours were based on the preparatory studies of Strassmayer and Eppel, but who, unfortunately, engaged as he was with the productions of a relatively short period, has failed to grasp the subject in its entirety. A final resumé of Babylonian astronomy and knowledge of the science of the Chaldeans' current in the days of the Roman Empire. From the beginning of our era astrology and astronomy languished on in the various Asiatic countries, but they were borne westwards by the Arabs. Mesopotamia always remained more or less of a terra incognita for countries influenced by Greek-Roman civilization.

On the other hand, Egypt became permanently merged in the Roman Empire, and, at a later period, in the Byzantine Empire. It was Egypt, therefore, that brought Babylonian astronomy and astrology into contact with the West. Even in the most remote times, in a period, it may be, anterior to the First Dynasty, astrology, religion, and medicine were combined as one science at Heliopolis. The high price of Heliopolis, officially invested with the star-studded panther's skin, was all along the supreme State astrologer until the imperial age of Rome, and he bore the title of 'great in vision' already alluded to. A hierarch of this order, in a little book written in 418 as the father-in-law of Joseph—that of that Joseph who was himself an interpreter of dreams (40th, etc.), and practised the art of divination by birds (44th, 12), referred to in connexion with Hammurabi. On the wall of a tomb dating from the reign of Seti I. we find lists of stars, times of culmination, etc. Extensive tables of ephemerides and a fragment of planetary divination according to the different houses, together with corresponding collossal and horoscopic texts, have survived from the age of Augustus. We possess even horoscope-texts drawn up in the Imperial period. Our minor records of later Egyptian astrology are not generous.

Greek-Roman civilization throughout its entire geographical and historical range, until the establishment of the world-empire and its swift decline, has never produced such monuments as we find in the great empires of the East. Observatories of colossal proportions, attached to primeval temples containing archives by which the positions of the planets might be traced and tested for centuries and millenniums, were never the work of Greece and Rome. Among the Etruscans, therefore, and subsequently among the Romans, it was the surrogates of astrology that occupied the central place. Apuleius explicitly asserts that the Chaldeans were the founders of astrology and astronomy. But, so far as the Romans concerned themselves with the study, they appealed to the productions of the sages of Alexandria, of whom the most celebrated were Herophilus and his astrologer Ptolemy, called Hecateus and his astrologer Ptolemy of Alexandria. At a later period Claudius Ptolemaeus (A.D. 100-178) was regarded as the final authority in our twin sciences, and beside him we catch a glimpse of the somewhat legendary Horus Trismegistus. But, as has been already indicated, the claims of astrology were not left unchallenged in this period. About the year A.D. 200 the famous physician Serapion of Alexandria published six books προς μαθηταςαυτος, of which the fifth was directed προς ωσελαβλητως. Heprefaces his con- dition by a sketch of the entire system of know-ledge possessed by the Χαλδαιος, and in this he provides valuable materials for a thoroughgoing digest of the astrological texts in the library of Sardanapalus.

In this later period, however, astrology has maintained some degree of progress in the Far East. Among the Chinese and Japanese, occult art, in the modern 'fengshui,' seems rather to have taken the form of geomancy. Just as in the Near East, astrology grew up to its zenith in China and Japan and the interpretation of the planets in the celestial vault has been transformed into divination by the carapace of the tortoise. Similarly the Gypsies have developed a system of fortune-telling from the open constellation, the designation of the convexities of the palm as 'mounts' of the various planets shows us that this practice also is a surrogate of astrology.

LITERATURE.—The significance of astronomy and astrology for the interpretation of the religious conceptions of the ancient East, as also for the exegesis of the Bible, has only recently been recognized. There is as yet no comprehensive work dealing with the subject. Contributions to the study have come mainly from the hand of H. Winckler (especially in Josafat von den alten Orients, Leipzig, 1897), of whom A. Jeremias (Die Pan- balgionisten, der alte Orient und die egyptische Religion, Leipzig, 1907), and an able ally. Pugitive essays have appeared in considerable numbers, principally in publications of the Vorderasiatische Gesellschaft and the Orientalistischen Literaturzeitung; Hirsch (Leipzig) has also issued a number. At first the new exegetical theory encountered very strong opposition, but more and more it has been conceded to have value. More recently, however, the work of Winckler, already referred to and appealing as it gives it a partial reverse. K. SCHMIDT (Almabibliotik, vornemlich im 15. und 16. Jahrhundert, Berlin, 1902) and the present writer, writing in the light of medicine, have studied the ancient astronomy and astrology, and have arrived at the same results as Winckler, though by a very different method and with the present work, sixteen of the present writer's essays on the subject, and these have appeared in various periodicals, the theological, esp. Die Angaben der Berliner Pflanzenkunde, p. 8279, Berlin, 1903, Das Horoskop der Eryxangal Christi, do., 1903. These publications are based upon cuneiform texts, on epigra- phic (or denotic) texts which have only recently become accessible.

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SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Primitive).

Knowledge of the movements of the heavenly bodies is of varying degrees by most primitive peoples. In the earlier stages of civilization that continued observation which is necessary to arrive at a reasoned explanation, which is the foundation of a scientific study, is not possible through lack of proper means of recording its results, nor is it called for by the practical requirements of a population which lives chiefly by hunting. For an agricultural people, however, foreknowledge of the recurring seasons becomes essential, and it is necessary that some means should be found to mark the proper seasons for performing the operations to ensure the food supply. In the stars, their regular motions of rising and setting, primitive man has found the earliest and most convenient calendar. In default of a theory based upon a series of observations, the supposed motion of the sun, moon, and stars, the phases of the moon and the motion of the stars, the shape and character of the sky, have been explained by formulas composed of material drawn from the religio-philosophical traditions. The celestial bodies, equally with his fellows and material surroundings, he considers to be animated with a personality like his own, though more powerful. Departing from this fundamental assumption, primitive man has fashioned for himself, in his legends, a fairly complete explanation of the celestial phenomena which come under his observation.

1. Sun and moon.—It is almost universal among primitive races that both sun and moon should be regarded as alive and quasi-human in nature. Their sex differs among different races, but the moon is invariably female and the sun male. Relation between them, varying in character, is also recognized. Among the Dieri of Australia the sun is the daughter of a Dieri woman, who after her death went into the earth. The natives of Encounter Bay say that the sun is a woman who has a lover among the dead. Each night she descends among the dead. At her rising she appears in a red kangaroo skin, given her by her lover before he went into the earth. The sun is a woman who was digging yams and reached the West; after wandering round the earth she came back to the other side, and has done the same ever since. The Warunjerji say that the sun is the sister of every one. This may be compared with the story of the origin of the sun told by the Arunta. At Alice Springs there is a tradition that in the Alcheringa and the universe created, there was a spot now marked by a stone near the country of the Bandicoot people, in the form of a spirit woman, accompanied by two other Panunga women, who were sisters, the elder of whom carried a child. The spirit woman went up into the sky, and she does this every day, visiting the old spot at night and rising in the morning. A medicine-man could see her in the hole, but not a person with ordinary vision. The two women settled among the Bandicoot people, and originated a local sun totem. This totem may be compared with the sun totem of the Inecs. The sun has a definite relation to each individual member of the various divisions, belonging itself to the Panunga division, as did the two women. Among these people a ceremony connected with the woman and the child is performed, in which symbols of the sun are worn.

The Maori held that the sun married the moon, and they had a fight. Each damaged the other. The sun was so ashamed that he became bright, in order that people might not be unable to look at him. The moon was not damaged, and it is said that she sees that her mouth is damaged and that one eye is missing.

It is interesting to note that, while the sun is a man and the moon a woman, the Maori word for sun, eng-olrig, is feminine, and e-oapu, the moon, is masculine. The Bushman story goes that the sun was an old man, from whose armpit light radiated; some children threw him up in the sky, where he stuck. Occasionally both sun and moon are feminine. Among the Mantras the sun is a woman, who is continually being pulled by a string held by her lord. The moon is a woman, the wife of Muyang Bertang, who sits in the moon making nooses for men.

(a) Origin and movements of the sun.—The origin of the sun, as related in the Tembeli legend of Sam-mor and his battle with Naing, has advanced beyond the anthropomorphic stage. When Sammor had imprisoned Naing, he rolled the fire which he had fought into a ball, and this, as the sun, still required man to watch Naing. This conception of the sun as inanimate is probably due to external influence, but it has a parallel among the Gallinomeros of Central California, where the hawk and the coyote, after jostling one another painfully in the darkness which then prevailed, collected two masses of inflammable substance; the hawk then flew up into the sky with them, and lighted them with flint. They give light as the sun and the moon. The Wurmnerji believe that the sun was made by Puppu-imbul, one of the race inhabiting the earth while everything was dark. This personage, it is hardly necessary to point out, belongs to the race of demiurges of which Prometheus is the type.

The sun did not always cross the sky in the same leisurely manner as at present. The great feast of Mani, the Maori hero, was that he tamed the sun. According to one version, he beat him so unmercifully that he lamed him, and he has walked slowly ever since. In Samoa the sun had a child by a Samoan woman, who trapped the sun by a rope made of vines. Another Samoan legend has it that the Sun was trapped by ropes of the swallow, and made him promise to go slowly. The same or an analogous explanation is found in Aztec folklore and in North America. On the other hand, in Australia and in Mau-mau, it is the sun who is not set. In the myth of the aborigines of Victoria, Norralie decided that the sun should disappear at intervals, and addressed it in an incantation, 'Sun,
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sun, burn your wood, burn your internal substance, and go down.' The sun now burns his fuel in a day, consuming fourteen hours, as the fire does. Brough Smyth, Aborigines of Victoria, iv. 430. In Melanesia Qat (the Melanesian hero) went to Qong ('night') and begged assistance. The latter put him to work, and in twelve hours or so crept up from the horizon and sent the sun crawling to the West (Cordining, JAI, Feb., 1881). In a Brazilian myth, a man ('the great serpent') who owned night sent it in a gourd to his brothers; when he saw marriage; the messenger grounded the gourd and let it out. Various explanations are given of the sunset. The simplest is that the sun sinks into a hole, occasionally the hole from which he arose. The Dieri say it sinks into a hole near Lake Eyre, and in the night travels underground to the East, in the same manner as it was believed to do in ancient Egyptian belief. Not infrequently the sunset myth takes the form of a legend of a personal hero plunging into the body of a personal myth. Mani was caught in the mouth of Hine-nui-te-po, 'Great Daughter of Night,' and thus brought darkness and death into the world. Since then the sun descends into the under world, and repeats the battle with Hine-nui-te-po every night. An explanation of sunset is that Mani took fire, and when it burnt him he plunged into the sea. Among the Basutos, all men were transformed into great monsters. He also was swallowed, but cut his way out. The Zulu story of the rescue of Princess Utombele is of a similar character.

Origin and movements of the moon.—The moon occupies a prominent place in primitive folklore for which her periodical growth, diminution, and disappearance, phases more marked than those of the sun, are explained in a similar manner. Like the sun, the moon is regarded as a living person. Allusion has already been made to the variation in the attribution of sex to the moon among different peoples. One or two further instances which illustrate other points of lunar mythology may be added. Among the Arunta the moon is a big man (etwa olunruhu). They say that, when there was no moon in the sky, a man died and rose again as a boy. The people ran away. He said, 'Do not run away or you will die. I shall die, but will rise again in the sky.' He grew up and died, reappearing as the moon. Since he was not always visible, he goes away to his two wives who live in the west. A second legend of the origin of the moon, which is found among the same tribes, relates that the moon was carried by a black-fellow in the hollow of his shield, who hid it in a clink of the rocks during the day. Once it was stolen from his shield while lying on the ground. He pursued the robber but could not catch him, so he shouted that the moon should go up into the sky and give light to the people during the night. In South-East Victoria in one myth the moon is an old man who climbed a tree to pick grubs. His sons made the tree grow to the sky as he devoured the moon. The Dieri say that there was once no moon; the old men held a council, and a muara-muara gave them a moon in order that they might know when to hold their ceremonies. The same reason for the moon's existence is given among the Todas.

The marks on the face of the moon are explained in various ways. The Eskimos say that these marks are the ashes which were smeared on his face by his brother, when he was about to be embraced by a white stone at Temple Bar in the Macedon Range, leaving her charings behind. Every child
conceived at this stone belongs to the Evening Star totem, although it is in the lizard totem country, and any child conceived near the stone is a lizard. One of the beliefs that is closely associated with this is that the ancient men who danced around it and sang choruses as they walked around it were the Pleiads, with the leaders being the Great Bear (Ursus). The Pleiads are considered the most important group of stars for primitive peoples, who were known to the Indians of North America as the Great Bear. The stories of the Pleiades with women among different races is remarkable. It is clear that these legends which attribute an heroic and human origin to the Pleiades contain the germ of a conception which have been utilized by modern astronomers in mapping out the heavens.

3. Signs and omens. —The train of thought underlying primitive astronomical theory would seem peculiarly adapted to foster the magical conceptions and analogies upon which astrological reasoning is based. Omens and signs, favourable and unfavourable, are and have always been the object of constant observation in the past of savage and semi-civilized people. It is, therefore, not surprising that peculiar powers in controlling human events should be attributed to those heavenly bodies which are regarded as endowed with powers similar to but greater than those possessed by human beings. Even when a stage has been reached at which the magic powers of the witch no longer gain credence, belief in the power of the moon or the first star of the evening to grant a wish remains. The following story is an example of such beliefs told by the Hos of Chota Nagpur. In this story, however, the sun threw a hatchet at the moon and cut her in two.

For practical purposes among most primitive peoples the stars perform a more important function than the sun. By their rising and setting the times of the feasts and ceremonies are determined, and among agricultural peoples their movements serve as a calendar by which the various operations in cultivating the soil are regulated. In the Torres Straits, Tagai marks the time for new yams and the migrations of turtle; Seg, the time for another kind of yam. The Murray Islanders also use Tagai as a mark in navigation. The rising of the constellation Dorgai, which coincides with the North-West Monsoon, is the time to 'make dance.' The natives of Borneo, especially the Dayaks, watch for the Pleiades to determine when to prepare their ground for planting. When it is estimated that the wet season is approaching, men are sent out for the purpose of seeing the rising of the Pleiades. The Kenyaks and Kayans of Borneo measure the length of the sun's shadow by means of a marked stick with the same object (G. Hose, *JEA*).
falls for seven days in accordance with the number of stars in the group; three days' rain follows the rising of the group Atuel, while the star Toro is peculiarly troublesome. Well, all the time Lembergo, 'animal crop grass' (? F. P. Müller, 
Folkloristische Ewethete' (Ge-Dialekt), Globus, 
Jxix. Jan. 1901). These beliefs, however, may be regarded as generalizations from important as well as trivial data, and as resulting in a 
magic connexion. A less doubtful case of intimate relation between cephalic and terrestrial phenomena occurs in the widely distributed belief, still common in European folklore, that fertility of crops and success in an enterprise depend on an 
action undertaken while under a waning moon. The Lithuanians weed boys on a waxing, and girls on a waning moon, believing that in the one case it provides strength, in the other, slenderness and grace.

An instance of a belief which most nearly approaches astrology is quoted by Tylor (Prim. Cult. 4: 192) from Shortland. The Maoris when besieging a 'pa' believed that the result could be foretold by the relative position of Venus and the moon; if the planet were above the moon, the foe would conquer; if below, the home force would be victorious.

LITERATURE.—No comprehensive study of primitive astronomy on the American continent is as yet available. The best general work is Dr. E. B. Tyler, Prim. Cult. 2 vols., 1904, and A. Lang, Myth. Rel. and Beliefs, 1907, which is supplemented by a number of minor works. For ceremonies connected with the Pleiades see R. Andrews in Globus, 1891, p. 395; a chart of the Pleiades, contributed chiefly by W. W. Skelat, Meanig Magic, 1900; Skelat-Blagden, Fagan Races of the Malay Peninsula, 1902; A. W. Howitt, Nat. Nat. Fr. and Aust., 1881; Spenst, Nat. Rest. Fr. Dent. Aust., 1888; A. C. Haddon, Head Hunters, 1901; A. C. Hollis, The Mazat, 1908; Sir G. Grey, The Last of the Chibcha, 1853.

E. N. FALLAIZE.

SUN, MOON, AND STARS (American).—
1. Sources.—A large part of our knowledge of the astronomy and astrology of the American Indians is derived from their traditions as reported by early European and American missionaries and travellers who had the advantage of contact with the various tribes before European influence had extensively modified their modes of thought, but they paid little attention to astro- nomicall details. The few communications mentioned by them are seldom identified, and the identifications are frequently indefinite or incorrect. A number of works by native authors give tribal tradition in authentic form, but little astronomy.

In Mexico and Yucatan a few codices, which escaped destruction at the hands of the Spanish priests, contain many complex astronomical symbols of which little is definitely known as yet, but from which, undoubtedly, much will eventually be learned. They are supplemented by hieroglyphics on structures and monuments. In Guatemala there is the Popol Vuh, or 'Book of the People' (ed. and tr. E. Sisson de Bourbourg, Paris, 1863), and in Peru Samaymacas's Spanish account of Aymara Quichua antiquities (tr. Markham, Haskiit Society, 1873). These manuscripts either are of pre-Columbian origin or present pre-Colonial material with slight European modifications. They include some myths and legends having an astronomical basis (cf. also Brinon, Anales de la Ciencias, Philadelphia, 1885; and Tres relaciones de antiguas personas, ed. Ximenes, Madrid, 1888). Although even scientific travellers have often shown indifference towards astronomical traditions, but ethnologists now recognize the importance of this subject and are collecting material which, in spite of the long contact between Indians and Europeans, affords some evidence of native origin.

In North America these traditions are supplemented by a few comparatively reliable written accounts collected amongst the Osages, Pawnees, and Huchens (Dorsey, in 9 REVIE, p. 93; Field Columbian Museum Report, xi pl. 2; Louis Agassiz, Collected Researches on American Natural History, iii. 57 ff.). The two first are intimately associated with the biennial Algonquian ceremony of the wigwam, which represents the Hyades, Pleiades, morning and evening stars, sun and moon, and probably the Milky Way and part of Scorpius. The last chart shows the Winter Solstice, Great and Little Bear, Northern Crown, Orion, Hyades, Pleiades, Milky Way, and probably Capella; that of the Huchens depicts as stars or constellation the Southern Cross (Sagittarius and Antares), the Deer (Taurus), which is pursued by the Dog, a Woman bearing a child (Hydra), and the Bear (Ursa Major and other signs. The winter counts of the Western tribes represented each year by some important event, which is pictured upon an alternate Loga-Natural Signs, or Mysterious Signs, are names denoting the signs, and other. The winter counts of the Western tribes represented each year by some important event, which is pictured upon a picture, being. Naturally the names are given to the astronomical figures. That of Lone Dog, for example, presents the plummet toward the horizon, which is the Pole Star, and the circle the sun. The Tripods of Pueblo secret societies furnish numerous stellar names, as is shown by W. G. Beede and W. F. Fossey in REVIE, JAP, and Amer. Anthropologist. Tablets inscribed with astronomical characters have been found at Rock- ford, Illinois. With the little that is known of North Carolina and South Carolina. Excepting the rayed solar face, crescent moon, and morning and evening stars, the characters upon these tablets have not been satisfactorily deciphered.

The Mexican calendar stones present another and an elaborate source of astronomical symbolism, to which considerable study has been directed (see Calendar [Mexican]). Inscribed stones of astronomical significance have also been found in the Chincha region of Colombia. The symbols seem to correspond with those inscribed to the Chibcha calendar and constellations by Duquesne (cf. Bollati, Antiquarian Researches, London, 1860; also Humboldt, Recherches, and Lembourg, in Century Mag., x91, p. 385). A circular gold 'codice' from Cuzco presents a solar rayed face surrounded by twelve unknown symbols (Bollett. op. cit. p. 146; Markham, Cuzco and Lima, London, 1856, pp. 107-128; Wissler, Peruvian Codices, Jap. 1900). The Sun, the Moon, and the Star, Kingsborough, Narratives of the Discoveries at Tiahuanaco (London, 1821, iv) present Peruvian symbols of the sun and moon, Osiris, the Pleiades, and other constellations, but they are as scarce and fragmentary as symbols of European origin. The most valuable source of astronomical knowledge is the Peruvian star charts, such as the map of the quinity, of the ruling class, who wrote during the first quarter of the 17th century. With the exception of a prudential reference to the symbol of bulls and lions, this chart presents only the native concepts. It gives symbols of the sun and moon, morning and evening stars, the Milky Way, and all the zodiacal asterisms (cf. Hagar, in Congres Rendu de Congres International des Americains, Paris, 1900, p. 271 ff.).

2. Scientific knowledge.—The use of gnomons, natural and artificial, was widespread in America. Amongst many other tribes, the Chippewa and Ojibeway have that they will deliberate in determining the seasons and the time of day by the position and direction of the solar shadows. The Pueblos have measured and named the sunrise points on a great scale and to divide the year into two periods of six months, and the time of the equinox is determined with great care. The Zuñis used as a gnomon an erect, sandstone slab adored with a solar motif (Dellenbaugh, The Americans of Yesterday, New York, 1901, pp. 305-306; Fowkes, Annual Cerem-
onies at Walpi, Leyden, 1895).

At Chapulleepo, in 1775, a stone was found under which the crossbow arrows crossed, presumably to the equinocial and solstitial sunrise points (Bollett., in Memoirs of the Anthropological Society of London, i. 210 ff.). The main doorways of the chief temple of Cuzco fronted the north-east, and a large stone platform at Tiahuanaco probably served as a solar dial. The
sidestones of the pyramids of Mexico and Central America are often aligned to the cardinal points. In Mexico, Noble describes a perpendicular shaft in the pyramid of Xochicalco which permitted the rays of sun to fall upon an altar in an interior chamber. The shadows cast by the steps of the pyramid of Papantla were observed for calendar purposes (Humboldt, Researches, ii. 87), and tradition indicates a similar use of the steps and columns at Cuzco known as the Monkeys' Dance.' Mrs. Zelia Nutall, moreover (Boas Anniversary Volume, New York, 1906, pp. 290-299), points out various photographs in the Mexican codices which represent priests observing the stars to determine the time. The different divisions of time were marked by the sounding of drums or trumpets in the temples. The priests used various methods to fix the position of the asterisms. They observed them through the doorway of the temple, which was elevated above the surrounding country, sometimes placing forked or bifurcated sticks within the doorway to define the position more exactly, and sometimes using a peculiar figure representing the drawn-up limbs of a seated man for the same purpose. A possible use of rows of upright stones is also indicated. The Indians are said to have noted the solutions and equinoxes by means of the shadows cast by certain columns. Those on the equator were held most sacred, because at the equinox they cast no shadow (Garcilasso de la Vega, Commentarios reales de los Incas, vi. 22). These columns have never been found, but circular stone sun-dials, called intihuatanas, 'the sun tied up,' exist on the Carhu hills at Cuzco, where the 'columns' are said to have stood, and elsewhere. A shadow is cast thereon by a small erect stone, which, Squier suggests, may rightly have been known as the inti rucana, or 'sun-finger.'

The most advanced American nations, such as the Maya and Aztecs of Mexico, and the Aymaras and Chibchas of Peru, seem to have attained a astronomical knowledge nearly, if not fully, equal to that of any people prior to the invention of telescopes; they had learnt all that could be learnt by the unaided eye. Their principal practical incentive to stellar observation was the accurate determination of seed-time and harvest, this being elaborated into a calendar. They do not seem to have attained to the heliocentric system, but they knew the cause of the lunar phases, and distinguished the five brighter planets. The Mexicans estimated their synodic periods accurately, as some of the Peruvians observed sun-spots (Humboldt, Vues des Cordillères, ii. 92), Researches, ii. 173; Salamanca, op. cit. p. 131; du Gourec, op. cit. p. 835), large spots being sometimes visible to the naked eye through the mist or light cloud (garwa) which is of common occurrence in Peru. In some myths the sun and other celestial bodies, and even the earth, are represented as balls or globes. This does not necessarily imply either European influence or ignorance. It may be an analogy derived from the supposed hollow ball of the sky.

3. Astrolab.—A system of astrology was undoubtedly in vogue in America. The Tonalamallti, or book of lucky and unlucky days, included in the Mexican codices, indicates the propitious and unpropitious times for performing certain actions. In the Codex Vaticanus a human figure appears surrounded by stars on a day of good fortune and a cometary or zodiacal association. The commentator says that the influence of moon signs upon the moment of birth was an established belief.

'... The Mexicans,' says Salasung (Historia general de las costumbres y Españoles, iv. Intro.) 'take much care to know the day and hour of birth of each person in order to conjecture his destiny, life, and death, but they do not base their prognostications upon the positions of the stars.' Nevertheless, the stars warn a god that he must go away in five years (H. Phillips, jun., in Proc. of American Philosophical Soc. xxi. 617f. (Philadelphia)). In Guatemala diviners were called upon to determine the propitious date for each monthly festival. As soon as a child was born, it was brought before the diviner, who, observing the day of birth, told what the child would be and what disposition it would show. He examined these things after consulting a book which contained the month and day signs (Ximenez, Las Historias del origen de los Indios de Guatemala, Vienna, 1837, pp. 158-160). In his divination he would consult the stars for divination by observation of the stars, and the chief priest dwelt away from the Inca capital that he might observe them and meditate more freely. He, at the solstice of the mountain deserts lived priests who contemplated and adored the stars 'almost without ceasing.' People visited them to learn about lost articles, absent friends, and future events. Even the wild tribes of Ecuador and Peru regard some of the constellations as propitious to man, others as hostile (Lorente, Hist. del Peru, Lima, 1860, p. 229; Markham, Cuzco and Lima; von Tschudi, Travels in Peru, New York, 1854, p. 288; Relation anómima, in Tres relaciones de antiquiedades peruanas, pp. 157, 164, 178).

It is said that the coming of the Spaniards had been predicted many times by these observations. Atahualpa's general is quoted as saying to his ruler just before the arrival of the Spaniards became known: 'My lord, I watched the stars last night, and saw in them the preague of a great calamity.' Later, Atahualpa himself declared that the appearance of a comet in the heavens was the sign of a high rank, and that a similar sign had been seen in the skies a short time before the death of his father, Huayna Capac. He was murdered after. A divine order has been published according to the appearance of the moon, is said to have foretold to Huayna Capac the death of his son and heir Atahualpa, and the order of the Inca rule. Comets and a thunderbolt which fell upon that Inca's Cuzco palace occasioned analogous predictions. Similar prophecies were recorded but not so clearly. The middle of the stars (Garcilasso, Commentarios reales, te. Markham, Babshyt Society, v. 29, i. 14; Humboldt, Views of Nature, London, 1856, p. 429; Prescott, Conquest of Peru, bk. ii. ch. 6).

4. Ritual.—The ceremonies of the various tribes also include astronomical features; in fact many of their elements seem to have originated in the wish to imitate on earth the aspects and movements of the celestial world. The initiations of animals in the dances of the primitive tribes arise among those more advanced to elaborate figures, dances, and processions reflecting the ordering of the sun and stars across the sky, and the progress of time and of the seasons. The American Indians as a whole are a thoughtful and religious race, much given to ceremonial. Even their games and sports, even their ordinary duties of domestic life, are made part of the religious ritual to be ceremonially performed, and from the grandest to the most insignificant details of their ritual much is based upon astronomical symbolism.

In the various ball games found from one end of the continent to the other, the movement of the ball originally represented that of the sun (Brinton,
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Among the Chibchas, prior to the contest, the opposing teams were carefully instructed in the use of magic, and the players were supposed to depend upon the amount of magic power thereby developed (Mooney, in RRBW, p. 301 ff.). In Yucatan and Central America the ball court itself represented the celestial sphere. The game was won by the player who drove the ball through a stone ring upon which two interlaced serpents, symbols of the eternal years, were sculptured. The Pueblo Indians, however, associated the result of which determined the control of Xibbalba, or Shadow Land; and Mrs. Nuttall asserts that the ball courts were also used as astronomical observatories. The Araucanians saw the divine will in the result of the game, and used it to decide the fate of those accused of crime.

It is probable that the annual ceremonial hunts, once common in the South-western United States, formed a terrestrial imitation of the celestial Hunter, as in Peru, and foot-races also symbolized the solar journey. In the Mexican game of ‘those who fly’ the celestial revolution was symbolized by four migrant snakes about a pole at the end of four cords wound round it (Clavigero, Historia, ed. Mora, Mexico, 1844; Nuttall, op. cit. p. 24 ff.). Dice games, common in North America, reflect the celestial imagery on their boards. The Mexican game of Patolli uses a cruciform board representing the four celestial regions, through the divisions of which a stone marker progresses like one of the celestial bodies (Schaghen, op. cit. vi. 8; Cullin, American Indian Games’ in RRBW; Nuttall, op. cit. pp. 82, 87). A serpent-dance in which the dancers imitated the motion of the serpent existed until recently among the Miemacs and other Northern tribes, and in Peru. In the North the dance symbolized the movement of the Pleiades across the sky (Hagar, in Congrés international des Américains, New York, 1902, and JAPL xii. 92 ff.). The famous serpent-dance of the Hopis, figured on Mexican and Central American monuments, was a rain-making ceremonial performed in August under the sign of the Tiger Sun (Leo). The well-known mural paintings on the wall of the Tigers at Chichen Itza represent a similar ceremony also dedicated to the Tiger Sun. In the Mandan buffalo-dance, twelve dancers divided into groups of four painted black, and doubtless the Diamond Serpent, enacting the yearly course of the sun within the building. The importance of the star cult in Peru is indicated by the fact that the Peruvians made images of all their constellations.

5. Mythology and star lore.—The arch of the sky was generally regarded as a kind of transparent roof, over which the heavenly bodies walk. The Chinooks on the north-west coast and the Peruvians represented it by two oblique lines meeting in an acute angle. Possibly the ‘Maya arch’ possessed a similar symbolism. The Peruvian box the sky is seen as a woman’s breast. The sun above the sky, a huge god, is personified and cohabited with female deities, progenitors of the stars and of mankind, but seldom or never as the supreme celestial powers. They

1 Collection of A. F. Chamberlain; Hagar, Peruvian Astronomy, Salamayrus Chur.
were the objects of a celestial cult existing practi-
cally everywhere in America, in which, at different
times and places, the sun, moon, and stars con-
trolled all life and death—were symbolized by
heroes or by natural objects. The Maya pyramids, for
example, were considered to be the sun ob-
turned into stone, and the pyramids of the
Maya kings were sacred places where the gods
were said to have dwelled. The Aztecs, on the
other hand, were more focused on the sun and
moon, and their calendars were based on the
solar and lunar cycles.

The sun and moon were also central themes in
many indigenous American myths and legends.
The sun, for instance, was often seen as a
powerful and dangerous entity, capable of
burning everything in its path. The moon, on
the other hand, was often associated with
wisdom and knowledge.

Among the Peruvians, the sun was symbolized
by the god Inti, who was considered the
creator of the world. The moon was symbolized
by the goddess Llullaillaco, who was often
represented as a beautiful woman with a
full moon on her forehead.

Eclipses were a particularly significant event
in many cultures, as they were seen as
opportunities to communicate with the
gods and to observe the movements of the
suns and moons. In some cultures, such as
the Maya, eclipses were considered to be
portents of change and were used to
predict the future.

In the Americas, the sun and moon were also
seen as symbols of the seasons and the
cycles of nature. The summer solstice,
for example, was celebrated by many
cultures as a time of renewal and
growth, while the winter solstice was
seen as a time of rest and
reflection.

In summary, the sun and moon were
central figures in many indigenous American
myths and legends, and their
movements were considered to
have significant implications
for the lives of the peoples who
worshiped them. Whether
symbolized by gods or natural
objects, the sun and moon
were seen as powerful and
mysterious entities, capable of
ingravidating the lives of all
deeply connected to the
natural cycles of the
world.

The Peruvians represented the sun as a
carried in the prime of life, who impressed his
footprint on a rock to mark the height of his power.
This affords an explanation of a world-wide type of
solar legends. Throughout America the solar rays
become the conventionalized face of a man upon
which appear marks called tears by some, but
perhaps having a pathological meaning. The
Mexican hero Cihli shoots three arrows at the sun
and succeeds in wounding him. The enraged sun
returns one arrow, which pierces Cihli's forehead
(Mendieta, op. cit. p. 77). The sun is the
Spider woman of some western tribes, the Ojibwa Wig-

tum of the Great Spirit, and the Kauk the field of
the solar tortures, while the Katenai Coyote manufactures the sun out of grease made
into a ball (Chamberlain, in AAOJ xvii. 69). In
Peru an oval plate, the symbol of the All-pervading
Spirit, ultimately manifested in fire, earth, air,
and water, was called the image of the true
sun, of which the solar orb was only the reflection.

The sun, says the Quichua, Bnas Valera, was the
caller of the earth, and the light was that part
of his divinity which the Creator had imparted to
him. It was considered sacrilegious to look at
his face; but early writers give several accounts of
Inca rulers (particularly Huayna Capac) who
did so, and who declared their scepticism of the
supremacy of an object which never rested, but
ternally moved upon its track like a driven
animal, whose face the clouds obscured. From
the nature of their light, gold was sacred to the
sun and silver to the moon.

Eclipses were regarded as attacks made by some
insect or animal upon the object enshrouded. In
accordance with this, the noise was made to frighten
away the attacking monster, although the Tascalan believed that the
sun and moon were fighting. To induce them
to cease, red-skinned people were sacrificed to the sun
and aylmhos to the moon. The Peruvians thought
the sun was angry when his face became obscured,
while under like conditions the moon was believed
to be ill. If her light disappeared altogether, she
was dead and would fall from the sky upon earth,
killing everyone upon it. Dogs were beaten, as
the moon was thought to be fond of them because
they had rendered her a certain service, and it was
hoped that their cries would induce her to uncover
her face. A similar custom existed in Mexico
(Ixtlilxochitl, Hist. des Chichimeques, Paris, 1840,
vol. 6; Oviedo, Hist. gen. y nat. de las Indias,
Madrid, 1848, 1. viii. 6; Garcilasso, op. cit. xi. 1).

The altruisitic spirit of the Pueblo community
may be seen in the legend that the moon was once
a serpent, and that it was transformed by the
sacred Father Sun, who gave it a new form that
people might sleep at night. According to the
Sux, the diminishing of the moon is caused by
the nibbling of field mice, which thus prevent it
to allow the Indians to get sufficient sleep.

The profile face of the woman in the moon is figured on the Salamaclaua

— continued —
chart. The Osages and the Mexicans seem also to have observed her. As the sun, being a male, watches over the fortunes of men, so the female moon is the guardian of women, to whom appeals for protection and aid are made.

According to the Micmacs and Ojibwaw, the stars are the lights of camp-fires before the wigwams of the dwellers in the land of the sky. Here and there one sees the trees and huts, and the brightest represent the largest fires before the dwellings of the chiefs. By other North American tribes they are described as birds that fly to the sky at night, and are the sun and moon. Some Brazilian tribes regard them as rifts in the canopy of the eternally glowing sky-land (Seler, Codex Vaticanus, London, 1902, p. 44; Hagar, Micmac Star Lore, MSS; Nery, Land of the Amazons, London and N.Y., 1901, p. 47). These simple and primitive notions existed coincidently with the division of the sky into constellations bearing the names of animals, plants, and frequently of inanimate objects.

Among the American tribes we find single stars named after individual objects, and groups forming true constellations; but probably nowhere in America is this more clearly demonstrated than in the Aztec form, which has become conventionalized like our own to such a degree that the derivation of the name is not really apparent from the alignment or other features. The morning and evening stars were naturally the most important of the stellar host. In the legends of the Cherokees, Peruvians, and others, the morning star appears before the first rising of the sun. It is the great star, the warrior, or messenger who goes in advance to announce the coming of his solar master. Its advent was hailed with incense and dances. It was widely symbolized by an equal-armed red cross. An Ojibwa legend makes it an older sister, who at her own desire was borne by the winds into the eastern sky, whilst her brother ran up a high mountain to hunt. So, according to Diodorus Siculus, the divine youth Hesperus went to the summit of a mountain at night to study the stars and a great wind carried him into the sky, where he became the evening star (Schoolcraft, Hiawatha Legends, Philadelphia and London, 1836, p. 90 ff.).

Among the Chodos the morning star was the errant man selected by the moon to be his assistant chief and to call the people together. He used to get up early during war expeditions, long before dawn, in order that the people might see him so that the enemy would not find them. That is the reason why he gets up so early now. Morning Star has three brothers, Evening Star, North (Pole) Star, and South Star. Their father's name was Great Star, and he was the chief of the people (Dorsey, Traditions of the Caddo, pp. 7-8, 15).

In America the evening star was usually regarded as a woman, because it governed the time of family reunion at home, though among the Zunis it is the twin brother of the morning star. In Mexico it is the Lord who comes with his torch to light the dwellings on high, in Peru the female maize-grinder, the truth in the west, while among the Micmacs it is leader of the stellar tribe. Its symbol is frequently a white cross. It is the mother of all things to the Skidi Pawnee, who keeps a garden in the west in which the sun rests at night, where the corn is always ripening and much buffalo meat is stored (Schoolcraft, op. cit. p. 90 ff.; Cushing, Zuni Folk Tales, New York, 1901, p. 378; Dorsey, Traditions of the Skidi Pawnee, 354; Hagar, Peruvian Astron., ch. on 'Cult and Symbol,' pp. xv, 3). As the converse of the morning star, the Cadasso believe that the evening star would go back a long distance upon the trail and warn his people if the enemy approached (Dorsey, Traditions of the Cadasso, p. 15).

The identity of the planets, whether the morning or the evening star, was recognized in Peru, Mexico, California, and parts of South America. The Peruvians made Mercury the ruler of merchants, travellers, and messengers. The Amazon tribes call it 'Deprieved of Fish,' since it is believed by them to cause a scarcity of food. The Cherokees believed Venus in Peru governed the daughters of the rulers, and women generally, dawn, rains, and flowers; Mars, war and soldiers; Jupiter, public matters and food supplies, and the wind; Saturn, father of the Peruvians placed Venus alone of all the stars in the dominion of the sun, evidently because it alone is sometimes visible in the full solar light. Because of its brilliant rays they called it Chasca, 'Curling Hair.' Because of its beauty they said that the sun never permitted it to wander far from its presence—a poetical interpretation of the fact that Venus never departs as far from the sun as the major planets. They also called this planet Chasquei, 'the Messenger,' because its swift passage from star to star suggested the swift running messenger upon the highways (Hagar, Peruvian Astrons., ch. on 'Cult and Symbol'). In the codices it is represented by numerous symbols, in the temple of Mexico by a high column, and in the myths it is identified with Quetzacoatl. The Californian Indians say that the daughters, Mercury and Venus. Twenty men kill them, and after fifty days they return to life (Mendieta, op. cit. pp. 89, 83; Nuttall, op. cit. p. 53; Emerson, Indian Mythes, Legends, and Traditions, Boston, 1885, p. 481; Nery, op. cit. p. 251; Explication Codex Telleriano-Remensis in Kingsborough, Mexican Antiquities, 101).

The Milky Way in North America generally, and among the Guarani of Paraguay, was the path of spirits, over which the souls of the dead pass between this world and the sky-land of the hereafter. Those of the good follow the broader and easier path, those of the evil the narrow and difficult path. It is the Cherokee and Pueblo 'Way of Meal,' the Micmac 'Ancient Trail' and 'Way of Reeds,' the Californian 'Backbone of the Sky,' the Pawnee 'Dust raised by Buffalo Racing.' A Manx legend calls it the 'Great Song Drift of the Skies' (Stevenson, op. cit. p. 25; Cushing, op. cit. p. 581; Dorsey, Traditions of the Skidi Pawnee, p. 57; Hagar, Cherokee Star Lore [in Rosa Anna, op. cit.]). The Milky Way is a path for the gods, and at Zuñi, as among the ancient Sumerians, it is associated with a gigantic celestial serpent. On the Osage star chart it is figured as a river, and it appears as a celestial stream in the mythology of the Peruvian and Amazon Indians. In Peru, as in the legends of the Ojibwas and Cherokees, and as in the Euphrates region, China, and Japan, this river is associated with the passage of souls. The Cherokees and the Kutenai also call the Galaxy 'the Way of the Dog,' the tribes of Guiana 'the Way of the Tapir' and the 'Path of the Bearers of Whitish Clay' (Brett, Indian Tribes of British Guiana, New York, 1832, p. 107; Chamberlain, in AAQJ xvi. 69).

In the sand paintings of the Mission Indians of California the outer circle is called 'Our Spirit,' a name of the Milky Way. The whole represents the world resting on the Milky Way. A gate or door to the north permits the escape of the soul at death.

The Cherokees recognize two dog stars, Sirius and Antares. In spite of the identical name of the former in our tradition, this is probably a native name, for it is explained by a Cherokee legend which bears no resemblance to its Oriental analogue. In it the two dogs act as guardians of
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‘The Way of Souls,’ at the extremities of which they are stationed, as ‘the Double Sun’ or ‘the Corral,’ with food before they will permit the souls to pass.

The Winnebagoes, Ojibwas, and Huichols also recognize a dog star, and the Hindus and Zoroastrians likewise place two dogs upon the way of souls. The Chippewa say that a dog gifted with prophetic powers talked with its master, the pair becoming two bright stars in the south (Dorsey, Traditions of the Caddo, p. 25).

The ancient Mexicans recognized a conspicuous constellation in the star-jore and ritual of the American Indians, though in North America they share the leadership with Ursa Major. Throughout America they are known as the stars of harvest and of the propitious rains. Their Pervuan name ‘Granary’ is echoed by the Eskimo ‘Sharing-out of Food.’ In allusion to their alignment they were generally known as a group of various objects: in Peru ‘the Dogos,’ in Guatemala ‘the 400 Young Men,’ and in Mexico ‘the 400 Rabbits,’ patrons of feasting and of intoxication. They are also the Algonquian ‘Sweating-Stones,’ referring to the seven stones with which the sacred last of the medicine-man was heated. Their Maya name and Miamc symbol, the rattle of the rattle-snake, suggest an association with the group of stars. ‘The Way to the Dead’ and Teothuacan, for these mounds are traditionally dedicated to the stars, and from some of them have been exhumed large and erect rattle figures, which were evidently used as altars.

Another important aspect of the group is that of ‘the Dancers,’ suggested by the twinkling of the closely grouped stars. The whole stellar world follows the group, as they perform their cosmic dance across the sky; and while on earth, their rising was hailed by Brazilians, Cherokee, Micmacs, and probably many other tribes, with an initiatory song and dancing referring more or less directly to the eternal procession of the heavens. The Iroquois, Housatunnucks, and Cherokee have, or had, an explanatory legend which describes how a group of boys, while dancing, ascended to the sky and became the Pleiades. Among the Caddos there are seven brothers who played all day long. Being soled by their mother and refused food, they danced round the house, gradually rising from the ground until they reached the sky; they disappeared in spring, when work time begins (Dorsey, Traditions of the Cadde, p. 64). The Blackfeet believe that they ascended because their fathers gave to their sisters, instead of to them, the yellow skins of the buffalo calves they had slain. In revenge they determined to go away each year when the buffalo calf skins became yellow. This occurs in May, when the Pleiades are hidden in the sunlit. The Kiowas call the Pleiades ‘the Star Girls,’ and they are probably represented by the dancing stellar maidens who descend to earth in the poetic legend of Algon. The seventh Pleiad appears in the Cherokee and Iroquois legends, in the former as a boy who is knocked down with a pole before reaching the sky, in the latter as a star whose light is dimmed because of his desire to return to earth (James Mooney, letter to author; R. W. Wilson, AAOJ xv. 149; Emerson, op. cit. p. 72; Sergeant, Housa- tunnuck Indians, Boston, 1753; Domenech, Deserts of the North American Hemisphere, 1853; Heswather Legenda, p. 116 ff.; Mrs. Erminnie Smith, in 2 REEW, p. 80).

Almost invariably seven stars are attributed to the Pleiades, though in some, notably those of the sixth magnitude while their companions are of the third and fourth, may be seen by one with strong sight or in a clear atmosphere. The Cherokees also relate that the seventh Pleiad fell to earth at the time of an annual festival, the bearded man, who warned them of the coming flood. So in Peru the approach of the Pleiades to the meridian enabled the llamas of Ancamarca to warn their shepherd of the coming of the annual deluge or rainy season. The Mexicans have six ‘tonontemocue,’ or stars which fall at the deluge, seem to have been Taurid meteors (Mooney, in 7 REEW, p. 621; Explication Codex Telleriano Remensis, p. 1). In this connection look at these stars (the Pleiades), runs the Pawnee song, ‘they will be guided aright.’ Many tribes actually did use them as a guide by night (Morgan, League of the Iroquos, Rochester, N.Y., 1857, ii. 106). Everywhere the Pleiades are a peaceful, beneficent, and friendly constellation; and there are some indications in Peru and elsewhere that they were once regarded as being (or having special influence over) the home of souls.

The pole star of the Northern hemisphere seems to have been observed by all, or nearly all, the northern tribes. It is the Ojibwa ‘Man who walks behind the Leon,’ or homeward, who, metamorphosed into a firefly, flew to the sky; in another version a hunter of bears. The Kutenai call it a female grimly bear; and this small constellation is a part of what seems to have been a Pleiad that includes Ursa Minor and Ursa Major. The Sioux declare that ‘all stars walk around the pole star, which is the star that does not walk.’ The Michmaks describe it as a bear hidden in a den, about which a group of hunters (Ursa Minor) eternally circle in a vain attempt to discover it. The Pawnees call it ‘the star that does not move,’ and regard it as the chief of the stars. In the Southern hemisphere the pole is indicated on the Salcamaychans chart as the apex of two slanting lines, which form the sky roof of the world. To it point three stars of the Southern Cross, called the male group, and having pliable attributes. The Maya name of Vega is ‘Scrotum Star,’ but this star ceased to mark the north pole several thousand years ago. The Peruvians used the Southern Cross to indicate the divisions of the night, the Mayas to indicate the seasons (Emer- son, op. cit. p. 58; Le Fèbvre in AAOJ vii. 106; Chamberlain, ib. 1770; Copway, Traditional His- tory of the Iroquois Nation, London, 1850, p. 113 ff.; Dorsey, Traditions of the Cadde, p. 80).

The stars of Ursa Major seem to have been called ‘the Bear’ by the Indians of practically the whole of British America and the United States. An accompanying legend is found in almost identical form among the various Algonquian tribes, the Housatunnucks, Iroquois, and the Cherokee, but is given most fully by the Miemaks. The four stars of the body of Charles’s Wain, or the Dipper, as Americans call it, form the body of the bear. The three following stars, δ, ζ, η, with four trailing behind them in the form of a bow (γ, ε, η Bootis, and Arcturus), are seven hunters, who are put out all at once. The little star, Alcor, close to the second hunter, is the pot in which they intend to cook their meat. Corona Borealis and α, δ Bootis form the den from which she climbs down in the spring. In the summer she runs across the sky with the hunters in full pursuit; in the full she is overtaken and shot, and begins to fall over on her back. The blood from her wound overflows the northern horizon, the blood of the foremost hunter, the robin, and, dripping upon the trees of earth, it gives to the foliage its blood-red autumn hue. But the bear eternally returns to the spring, and, climbing down, though her den invisible (below the horizon), to issue forth again in spring, and thus eternally to renew the celestial drama. The seasonal features of the
legend correspond accurately with the actual positions of the stars in the early evening. There is good reason to believe that this is a native legend, or at least one of pre-Columbian origin, though the evidence is not conclusive. As far as the American Indian system — the Huron, the Micmac, the Iroquois, etc. — is concerned, there is no native Indian system of which the date is known.

In connection with the hunting concept, it is noteworthy that the Wichitas regard the Great Bear as the patron of all hunters. The Pimmans, known, as the French, as "the Fishers," and the Zuñis represented them by seven white pebbles in the rites of the "Priesthood of the Bow." The Pawnees described Corona Borealis as a circle of chiefs, in whose honour was founded the society of "Chief Dancers."

The Belt of Orion among the Point Barrow Eskimos becomes three men who were buried in the earth by the Miamis for their own amusement," the Zuñi "Hanging Lines," and the Patagonian "Tree Bolas," or round stones with which animals are slain by hunters. The Peruvians, like the Basques and the people of Deccan, call it "the Siexa." The whole constellation is the Zuñi "Celestial Hunter" pertaining to the sun. In Peru it is symbolized by crossed arrows, and relates to hunters and hunting. A myth makes it the Promethean figure of a criminal raised aloft for punishment by two condors. It may be connected with the Mexican Citi, "the Bowman." The names of a few other constellations and single stars have reached us, but present no features of special interest.

In view of the similar and wide-spread symbolism associated with some constellations in America, a more or less uniform system of celestial symbolism may have existed through a large part of the continent, similar to the primitive symbolism of the eastern continent in some elements, yet unique in others.

Unquestionably many of the symbolical concepts have been transmitted from tribe to tribe for long distances. Many of them are of pre-European, or at least of pre-Columbian, origin, and the analogies which they present with Oriental ideas are striking. These concepts have not a like effect of independent causes or by pre-Columbian intercommunication between the continents. The weakness of the former explanation lies in the complexity and conventionality of the concepts, and in the difficulty of tracing the symbolism to any natural basis. The American zodiacs, for example, reveal analogies with the ancient Oriental zodiacs in every sign, yet in few if any instances, either in the Orient or in the Occident, are we able to explain why these signs were so named or why their symbolical attributes are what they are. The zodiac is older than its seasonal associations; its origin remains unknown, yet we find it in similar form in America and in the Orient. The same argument applies, although perhaps less forcibly, to a large part of the astronomical symbolism of America.

LITERATURE.—The literature has been given throughout the article.

SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Buddhist).—The astronomical ideas found in Buddhism do not form an independent system, but have developed in close relation with Hindu theories. The problem is rather to determine what stages of development are to be found in the canonical and later books. Thibaut 1 divides Indian astronomy into three periods: (1) that of the Vedas and Brahmanas, (2) the middle period with a fully developed native Indian system, and (3) the later, or Buddhist influence. The Buddhist scriptures cover a long time, some of the later containing references to the Greeks, but it is to the middle period, and rather to the early stages of this astro-nomical notions of these works belong. They are in the main the same as those that we find in the Purânas. The Hindus had two important uses for astrology: the sacrifices and astrology, neither of which was countenanced by the Buddhists. The latter had no special motive for paying close attention to astronomical theory beyond that required for determining the periods of the lunar month with its fast-days, the period of Retreat in the rainy season, and the divisions of the day.

1. Position of sun and moon.—The heavenly bodies that we see are the vehicles of gods, who have been thus reborn through their merits, and who are associated with the thirty-three gods, but below them in rank. The moon, the sun, and the constellations come as gods in the retinue of Sakka and in that of the Buddha. The sun, moon, earth, and the asura Râhu occur along with the guardians of the ten quarters as world-protectors. When sun and moon occur together, the moon is always mentioned first.

In the scriptures there is no systematic description of the heavenly bodies, but the account given in the Sârasvatâyoga 2 corresponds to scattered notices in earlier works and probably underlies them. The earth, a flat disk, is 1,203,450 leagues (yojanas) in diameter and 3,610,350 in circumference. In the centre is Mt. Meru, rising 84,000 leagues above the surface of the earth, and round it the moon and stars, shining in the sky, range on the four continents round Mt. Meru. Night is caused by the sun passing to the other side of Mt. Meru. The diameter of the moon is 49 leagues and the circumference 147 of the sun 30 at 150 leagues. The moon shows us the visible part (vimñana) of the god is one league higher in position than the moon. It is of crystal outside, gold within, 3 and hot within and without. The moon is of silver outside, of jewel within, and cool within and without. The sun has three paths—gvoice, navavoice, and govithi—according to its apparent course in the ecliptic during the seasons along the equator, and above or below. 4 This fact appears to be referred to in the Sûliû, 5 where the sun and moon are spoken of as going along their paths or out of their paths. Whether there was any early theory

1 Astronomie, Astrologie, und Mathematik, Strassburg, 1590, p. 67.
3 Upanisad-parâksâmavâda, tr. J. F. R. Dickes, Venice, 1875, p. 15; 1st, Avising årheh, tr. The Buddhist Religion, tr. J. J. Taka-
4 kus, Oxford, 1890, p. 100.
5 Vaitaka, tr. 499, p. 48.
6 Dhûpa, tr. 299.
7 Cosmological passages are quoted in R. S. Hardy, Legends and Theories of the Buddhists, London, 1866, appendix.
8 Ixhandira.
9 "Abhupâda, 227.
10 The ratio of the diameter and circumference of a circle is thus 1 : 3, Sûrya, v. 271. This is the domi-
11 so, but more correctly, in the Vîra Purûsa, Skt. I., ch. 8.
12 Sûra Purûsa, Skt. I., ch. 8.
of the cause of revolution, apart from the choice of the god of the luminary, is not clear. The Chinese sources of A. Rémusat state that five vortices of wind support and move the vehicle of the sun in the required directions, and five other vortices similarly do for the moon.

2. Eclipses. — Eclipses are due to the asura Rahu, who is stationed at the moon's nodes, and periodically swallows the sun and the moon. The length of time that the moon stays in the crippled or sickly Rahu when he was drinking the ambrosia produced at the churning of the ocean, appears not to be early Buddhist, nor even ancient Hindu. It is absent from the account of the churning in the Vyuha Purâna.2 Buddhistha describes Rahu not as a head, but as having a complete body, of which he gives the dimensions.3 The Puranic notion of Ketu as the slowed body of Rahu at the descending node, although mentioned in Mahâyânaputtâ, 164, and implied in Abhidhânapadipika,4 61, among the "nine planets," is a late borrowing from Hinduism. Two ancient sutras describe the moon and sun as being afflicted by Rahu and appeasing to Buddha, who commands Rahu to let them go.6

3. Planets. — The stars also are said to move along and out of their paths.4 The term here used for star in Sanskrit is rÂjÂyâ, and probably refers to the planets, as Buddhaghosa understands it in this context.

The only planet distinctly mentioned in the Sutta is Osadhi-busk. This is what Venus may be inferred from its being described as the brightest of the luminaries next to the moon and as possessing the meaning of "sun." The Sanskrit recension of the Dipha passage in Mahâyânaputtâ, 71, definitely identifies it with Venus by substituting Uana, one of the Sanskrit names of this planet, for Osadhi. The name Osadhi-busk is unexplained. The phrase Osadhi-busk târâ, "like the star Osadhi," is clear as "it does not mean 'planets' (sain osadhi-patak),' lord of plants (or of the sun-plant), a title of the moon. The possibility that osadhi is a corruption of asvastä,7 although it is not certain, is supported in texts or commentaries to support it. The same is the case with the view of Kern that it is a corruption of asvastä Sakkavu, a derivative of usanà.8

4. The lunar zodiac. — The term naksâtrat is taken from late Vedic times applied especially to 27 or 28 constellations lying roughly along the ecliptic and forming a lunar zodiac; and from the Buddhist use of many of them as proper names it may be inferred that they were known to the early Buddhists. They are as follows:

 1. (Aṣaṣata, Arâla), (2) Bhargava (Arâla), (3) Katibha (Pleides), (4) Rohini (Hyades), (5) Magaśrâ (f, d, e, Orions), (6) Pusuta (Gemini), (7) Phasusa (Taurus), (8) Phusa or Tasia (f, y, Cancer), (9) Aśimëla (f, g, Hydra), (10) Magha (Regulus), (11) and (12) Pushta- and U tras-phagwâni (f, g, Regulus).7 (13) and (14) Sasta (Betel), (15) Sâi (Auriga), (16) Visakhâ (Libra), (17) Anuradha (f, x, 4th quadrant), (18) Jetthâ (Antares), (19) Rakshadala (f, Scorpii), (20) and (21) Naha- and U tras-assâli (f, e, 4, 5, Saggittarii), (22) Abhijâ (Vega), (23) Savâpa (Aquila), (24) Dhaniji or Savîjha (Orion), (25) Sasa-bhada and Pushta-phagwâni (the square of Dacus), (26) Revi (Pisces, etc.) 9

No. 22 in this list is not in the Abhidhânapadipika. It was omitted in Hindu astronomy, but the existence of Abhijjha (Skr. Abhijjha) in the Buddhist system may be inferred from the statement that the number of nakṣatra is 211 and from the existence of Abhijjha as a proper name.10 It also occurs in Mahâyânaputtâ, 165, and in the list of Rémusat.11

References to other fixed stars than nakṣatras are rare in all Indian literature. The descent of the Heavenly Ganges, a myth relating to the Milky Way, occurs only in the canon, but never in any astronomical connexion. In Jâtaka, vi. 97, seven sages are mentioned, but their names are not those which Hindu mythology gives to the seven rîṣis, but those of the stars of the constellation of Major. The name Sakata, 'the cart,' in Digha, ii. 234, is probably a name of Rohini, as suggested by S. Kono.12 It is so named by several Hindu astronomers.4

5. Months. — The moon in the course of a year may be full in any of the nakṣatras, and we find such expressions as Visakhapûramasam, full-moon when the moon is in Visakhâ;13 but there has been established earlier than Buddhism a system of twelve lunar months, with names derived from certain of the nakṣatras. These are:

 1. (Chitta (Mar.—Apr.), (2) Visakhâ (Apr.—May), (3) Jeththa (May—June), (4) Asvastä (June—July), (5) Pha.$ (July—Aug.), (6) Pushta-phagwâni (Aug.—Sept.), (7) Assaya (Sept.—Oct.), (8) Magaśrâ (Oct.—Nov.), (9) Suta- or Kaurava (Nov.—Dec.), (10) Pushta-phagwâni (Dec.—Jan.), (11) Macla (Jan.—Feb.), (12) Pusa (Feb.—Mar.).

These names were later applied in Hindu systems also to the twelve solar months, and the number of sun appears to be always lunar, as well as in the Ocenean chronicles.

The month is divided into two parts (pa$kha), the dark (kâla) from full to new moon, and the light (pa$kha, pujas) from new moon to full. Whether the month ended with full or new moon is not clear, but the fact that the dark half is mentioned first and that the months of Retreat began the day after a full-moon day and ended on a full-moon day, suggests that the full-moon day was the end. Both methods were in use by the Hindus in Vedic times, as they are at the present day.

6. The week. — The division of the half month at the eighth and fourteenth or fifteenth day easily led to the reckoning of seven days as a usual period (aottâha), but there is no trace in the Vedic writings of the system (no doubt non-Indian in origin) of naming the week-days from the names of the sun, moon, and planets. These names occur in the order of the days of the week as the first seven of the seven planets in Mahâyânaputtâ, 22 and 23.

7. The year. — In Aûgâstaca, i. 213, where the length of a year of the gods is given, it is said to be a year of twelve months, the month being made up of 30 days (and nights). This gives a year of 360 days, and is in use in India and China. The number 30 is probably 23 and sometimes 20, and sometimes 25 days, after the number of days of the year. The months may be named by adding together the 15 days of each half of the lunar month. In practice the number would sometimes be 29 and sometimes 30, as the number of days of the year. The months may be named by adding together the 20 days of each half of the lunar month. In practice the number would sometimes be 29 and sometimes 30, as the number of days of the year. The months may be named by adding together the 20 days of each half of the lunar month. In practice the number would sometimes be 29 and sometimes 30, as the number of days of the year.
the year: (1) with the full moon of Kattika, (2) with the month Chitta. 1 The former is implied in the usual Buddhist reckoning of the three seasons, in which the cold season is always mentioned first. This period was the end of the Retreat, in which the annual redistribution of robes took place. The second mode of beginning the year is implied in the *Dipavamsa* and in the list of vies months in the *Abhidhammapaddhati*, which begins with Chitta. 2

8. Seasons.—The ancient Hindu seasons are three: *hemanta*, the cold season from Magasira to Phagguna; *gimika*, the hot season from Chitta to Assaha; and *ocean*, the rainy season from Sava to Kattika. These dates, however, would vary from year to year through the irregularity caused by the lunar months and occasional intercalation. 3

*Dipavamsa* (Cey., xii. 44, calls Jetha the last of the hot months. *Vasa* in the sense of Retreat does not correspond with the eclipse of the moon and of the sun of that period. The Hindu subdivisions of the seasons into five or six 4 are not found in Pali works, but there are occasional references to autumn (varhati) as the early part of *hemanta* and to spring (casrata) as the early part of the hot season. 5 M. J. Thibaut, p. 308, states, given the list of six, and *taiti* 6 also describes other systems of division used in various localities. 7

9. Astrology.—Indian astrology, as the science of omens drawn from celestial phenomena, is known to have been developed in ancient India. It is still practiced in *Dipa* (Sansk.), i. 10, as a base science and false means of livelihood. In the *Sutta Nipata*, 927, the monk is forbidden to devote himself to magic (*slabha-bhuma*) to the interpretation of the dream, the sign, and the *nakata*.

That such a science is possible is generally taken for granted, but in the Jataka there is a tendency to ridicule the belief in lucky name, sign, andomen. 8 There is no reason to think that this sceptical attitude is primitive; it is rather the rationalizing of a single individual or of a school. The survival of the belief within orthodox Buddhism is shown in the collection of *suttas* drawn from the canonical books called the *Paritta*, which, among other formulas intended to ward off hostile powers or to win their favour, contains the two *suttas* on the eclipse of the moon and of the sun. 9

A fragment of a MS of an astrological work in corrupt Sanskrit has recently been discovered in East Turkestan at Khotan. It is called *Budhavatara-nasakalakramasastra* and appears to be a handbook on astrology, as well as by the reference to the *ra* *karaha*, who makes known to the congregation the known and unknown days, nights, months, years, 10 and the phases of the moon. 11 The latter is similar to that in Hindu astrological works, such as: the new moon, the full moon and the eclipses of the moon are causative of the gods, the planets, the signs, the houses, the evils of the time, and the day of the month. 12

There can be little doubt that it is borrowed from some Hindu work and, like later works of this kind, it shows the influence of Greek astronomy in the use of such terms as horos, and the names of the 12 signs of the zodiac (Pisces, Scorpio, etc.) along with those of the *nakatas*. 13

LITERATURE.—The sources and authorities are given throughout the article. 14

SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Celtic).—1. Very little is known about the astrology and astronomy of the Celts during the Druids, as we learn from Cesar (de Bell. Gall. vi. 14), discussed and transmitted to their disciples many questions regarding the stars and their motion. They had observed the passage of the moon by it if they regulated their calendar. Their months and years began with the sixth day of the moon (Pliny, xvi. 66, 250); they counted by nights (Cesar, vi. 18. 2), and their cycle was one of thirty years (Pliny, xvi. 95, 250).

The discovery of the calendar of Coligny has made it possible to determine these general ideas for the Gallo-Roman period. This calendar gives a year of 354 days, divided into twelve months of twenty-nine and thirty days alternately. To establish agreement between the lunar and the solar year a month of thirty days was intercalated every two or three years. At the beginning of every fifth year there was complete agreement between the two methods of calculation; and probably this was the occasion, as Julian remarks, on which were held the quinquennial sacrifices of which Didoros speaks (v. 32. 6).

Astrology, properly so called, does not seem to have been practised by the pagan Irish. But in the ‘Lives of Saints’ there are to be found some superstitions which are derived from popular interpretation of the stars. The foster-father of Columcille goes to ask a prophet when he should begin to teach the child to read. The prophet after having examined the heavens replies that he must begin immediately (Lives of Saints from the Book of Lismore, i. 812). Manannan mac Lir used to know by studying the sky when there would be fine weather and when bad (Conowm’s Glossary, P. 114).

The scientific observation of stars was also in use among the ancient Irish. Loeg observes the stars to ascertain when midnight comes (Meos Uladh, 13). Irish astronomy dating from the early Middle Ages have been preserved. They are founded on the system of Ptolemy, and seem to be translations of foreign works. The Irish word ‘day’ is borrowed from the Latin. Yet the Irish were particularly clever at calculating dates, and in the *Saithar na Rann* it is told that every intelligent person should know the day of the solar month, the age of the moon, the flow of the tide, the day of the week, and the chief saint’s festival days. Perhaps in the ancient Irish and Welsh texts there are traces of the name of the primitive Celtic calendar. The year was divided into two halves or into four periods of three months, the month being divided into two parts. The periods of time most in use were those of three nights and three days, or nine nights and nine days, while the most common cycles were those of three years and of seven years. In Armoricain Brittany and in Wales the names of the complementary days which served to convert the lunar year into a solar year (Brit. *gourdecs*, Welsh *dyddion dyddon*) have been preserved. Several popular superstitions are attached to them. Thus a medical manuscript from the Peninsula of *Cultry* contains a list of unlucky days, and in Irish literature there are numerous examples of births delayed in order that they may take place on a lucky day, and of disasters which might have been prevented if an undertaking had not been engaged in on an unlucky day.

1 Whitney, p. 270. 2 Vinaya, i. 137. 3 There is no reason to think that the year ever began with Sava. The recurring phrase *Kontha chakramata* does not mean the full moon of Kattika ‘in the fourth month,’ but ‘at the Chakrimaya festival.’ See T. W. Rhys Davids and H. Oldenberg, in *Buddh. Stud. xiii. (1888)* p. 354, n. 2; *Jataka* vi. 221; *Dipavamsa*, xv. 1. On the Chakrimaya, or ‘Four month’ celebration, see art. FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Hindu).

4 See the Commentary on *Sutta Nipata*, 233, p. 102, and *Vinaya Patthana*, vi. 5, 5.
5 Thibaut, p. 11.
6 Majjikas, i. 115; *Jataka*, i. 98; *Com. on Sutta Nipata*, 293.
8 See also art. CALENDAR (Buddhist).
9 69. 10 120, 110. 11 97.
10 See also art. MAGIC (Buddhistic and Dittavatrican) (Buddhist), where the later developments of Buddhist astrology are given. See also L. C. Maser, *Buddhistic Literature*, i, 2, 82; *The History and Doctrine of Buddhism popularly illustrated; with Notices of the Kapposmat, or Demon Worship, and of the Evil, or Spirit, Incantations, Rituals, &c.*, i, 259; *The Celestial Tablets*; E. Schlaglwein, *Buddhism in Tibet*, Leipzig and London, 1895; for Chinese, *Rumant*, *Monotheism posthumous*, p. 84 ff.
11 *Manuscript Remarks from Buddhist Literature found in Eastern Turkestan*, ed. A. F. Codell Hoernle and others, Oxford, 1916, i. 121.
12 Cf. *Dipa*, iii. 85.
The Gallic god Belenos had been assimilated to Apollo as a healer rather than as a sun-god. We have no evidence of worship of the stars among the Gauls except a few dedications to the sun and the moon in Gallo-Roman inscriptions (A. Holker, "Altkeltische Spruchschatze," 3 vols., Leipzig, 1896-1913), and the mention of the worship of an image of the sun (AS, 4 Sept. ii. 197 C). No conclusion can be drawn from the representation of stars on the shields of the Orsos-arch, found at Matenagus, near Toulouse (Orsos), and a sword from the wheel that is an attribute of a Gallo-Roman god assimilated to Jupiter; for the stars may be ornaments or armorial bearings, and the wheel may be a divination-wheel or a symbol of the thunder as well as a symbol of the sun. Some customs of the ancients may be connected with the beliefs relating to the stars—e.g. the gathering of the mistletoe and the beginning of the years and months on the sixth day of the moon (Pliny, xvi. 230), the dread of the Asiatic Galatians during an eclipse of the moon (Polyb. v. 78).

The evidences of the worship of the sun and the moon in ancient Ireland are not numerous. The most explicit text is in the Confessio (§ 60) of St. Patrick, in which he alludes to worshipers of the sun. G. Keating (History of Ireland, ed. D. Connolly, 2 vols., Dublin, 1853-1856, i. § 133) says that one of the Danann was named Mac Gréine, 'Son of the Sun,' because his god was the sun. A passage of Cormac's Glossary (p. 54) tells us that two methods were used to save some pictures—e.g. that of the sun—on the altars of their idols, and Keating (ii. 11) relates that in Colmcille's time a priest of Tirconnell who had set up images of the sun and the moon in the church was carried off by a devil. The king of Ulster, Loegaire, swore by the name of the elements—the earth, the sun, and the wind (W. St. Boroma, RCæl xii. [1892] 221 f.).


SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Chinese).—I. INTRODUCTION.—The Chinese view of the sun, moon, and stars taken as a whole may be likened to a well-developed system of three different sciences:—the thread of astrology, the thread of religion, and the thread of astronomy. Astronomy means here the observation of the heavenly bodies and the truths deduced therefrom, chiefly for the use of the people. It may therefore be called 'observational' astronomy, as distinguished from what is called 'physical' or 'descriptive' astronomy, founded by Galileo after his invention of the telescope, and it may also be called 'practical' astronomy, as distinguished from what is called 'theoretical' astronomy, founded by Newton on the hypothesis of the law of gravitation. The religious view of the Chinese concerning the heavenly bodies may be called astrological, and their astrological view may be called religious in the comprehensive sense of the term. But a clear line of distinction can be drawn between them. The idea of deity or God is always present and predominant in the religious view, whereas it may be vague and even absent in the astrological view. The latter is concerned chiefly with the influences of the heavenly body upon men, while the former is concerned chiefly with the relation of God to men as revealed in the heavenly bodies—i.e. God's messages and warnings derived by means of the observation of the heavenly body.

The Chinese term for the study of the heavens is tien shen, literally 'the system (or order) of heaven.' The term is not limited to purely astro-

nomical knowledge, but has been applied equally to astrological and religious beliefs or views concerning the heavens.

Chinese astronomy has been of much interest to many European scholars, its great antiquity being widely admired.

'The progress of Astronomy among the Chinese,' says John Williams, 'is a subject of highest interest whether it be considered as recording observations of the heavenly bodies made by one of the most ancient and primitive races of mankind, which appears in extremely remote time to have advanced to a high degree of perfection; or as peculiar, beautiful, and important which has preserved the manners and customs established by its early rulers more than two thousand years before the Christian era, in a great measure unaltered to the present day, or whether the fact that at a period long anterior to the commencement of civilisation among the Western nations, and when almost universal barbarism prevailed among them, astronomy had been carried to a great degree of perfection by the Chinese, as manifested by their still existing records, whose authenticity is not only strongly asserted by that people, but is acknowledged by some of the most eminent European scholars of the present day.'

It has been said by some of the authorities of our own century that the antiquity of Chinese astronomy is 'greater even than that of almost any other nation.' But the study of the heavens in China is not pursuit of knowledge, or astronomical knowledge, merely as such. Being a highly practical nation, the Chinese, who could to know anything, generally have some end or ideal in view to the attainment of which knowledge is merely a means. The present case is not an exception. It has been well to arrange all the various ceremonies, social and governmental affairs, and, most important of all, their agricultural work according to the seasons, the Chinese, even at the earliest period of their history, felt a great need of a proper calendar, the formation of which required astronomical knowledge. Apart from this, there were other motives—the religious and the astrological. The latter explains itself, and the former has a dual purpose. We then see, and the Chinese sought to know the laws of the heavens, which were for them, in some sense, divine, in order to apply them to their own conduct, social as well as individual. The doctrine of the imitation of, or the conformity of men's conduct with, the laws of the heavens has been much held by Confucians, and especially by Taoists, and even found in most of the Chinese classics. On the other hand, they believed the celestial phenomena to be God's revelations or warnings to men, they wanted to know them in order to re-adjust their conduct.

Both the astronomical and the religious views of the Chinese concerning the heavens are as old as their history, and it is difficult to tell which is earlier; their astronomy is a later development. The Chinese term for 'astronomer' is t'ieh shu or t'sing tsh, which may be translated 'the man of sun' or 'the man of stars.' According to the Chinese records, the former term did not occur until the 5th cent. B.C., and the latter is of still later date. Kepler says that astronomy is the wise mother and astrology the foolish daughter. If we may adopt this saying with a little modification, we can regard the astrology of the Chinese as the daughter of their astronomy, and the latter as the mother. They seem to have few different views for the thousands of years influenced the Chinese mind, and the astrological view, though the latest, has almost since its birth been the most powerful. Even at the present day among many of the Chinese astronomy has not divorced itself from religion, nor has it disowned or rid itself of astrology, as Western astronomy has since the 16th century.

II. THE ASTRONOMICAL ASPECTS. — The

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Chinese are great believers in their ancient classics, so that to deal with their ancient views and beliefs is to a great extent to deal with their modern ones as well. The great antiquity of Chinese astronomy has admitted of many of the best European scholars of both the last and the present century. According to tradition, a sort of calendar was invented by Fu Hsi (3528 B.C.) for the benefit of the observations of the phenomena of the heavens. The reformation of the calendar and the rectification of intercalation are attributed to Hwang Ti, or the Yellow Emperor (2695 B.C.). In the record called Shih Ki of Shih Ma Chien, China is said to have sprawled the region of Tsuan Hsu (beginning 2513 B.C.) a conjunction of the five planets was observed by the Chinese in the constellation called Yin Shih or Shih.1 It has been carefully examined by the French astronomer, Jean S. Bailly, that such a conjunction did take place on 29th Feb. 2449 B.C., which would be the 65th year of Tsuan Hsu's reign. In the time of the emperor Yao (2556 B.C.) the Chinese already knew the exact, or almost exact, number of days in a year, had a way of determining solstices and equinoxes, and had in use an intercalary system and some instruments of the eclipse of the sun. The 5th day of the 5th month of the year, the knowledge of the five planets and of the twelve zodiacal signs, and most probably of the 28 stellar divisions.

In the 'Canon of Yao,'1 the first book of the Shu King ('The Canon of History,' we read):

Thereupon Yuann commanded Ho and Ho 3 to have reverence to the great heavens, and to calculate and delineate the movements of the sun, moon, the stars, and the zodiacal spaces; and so to deliver respectfully to the people.

He separately commanded the second brother Ho to reside at Ye-ec, in what was called the Bright Valley, and there respectively guide the rivers and to adjust and arrange the labours of Spring. "The day," he said, "is of long and short, and the star is Ho 7; you may thus exactly determine mid-summer. The people begin to disperse; and the birds and beasts breed and copulate."

He separately commanded the third brother Ho to reside at Nan-sea, and arrange the transformations of the summer, and respectfully to observe the extreme limit of the shadow. "The day," he said, "is at its longest, and the star is Ho 7; you may thus exactly determine mid-summer. The people are more disturbed; and the birds and beasts have their feathers and hair thin, and change their coats."

1 See Williams, Observations of Comets, Introduction.
2 A large collection of ancient documents, discovered A.D. 279; see James Legge's tr. in Chinese Classics, Hongkong, 1861-72, vol. iii. p. 149.
3 One of the 58 stellar divisions determined by a, b, and other suffixes, extending north and south from the equator, and dividing part of the Milky Way.
5 Names of two families which had been hereditary officers of the Board of Astronomy since the times of Hwang Ti.
6 Neos in a space of heavens extending over 112° and embracing the seven constellations of the southern quarter. The star in Neos is, according to the view held by Chinese scholars and adopted by many Western scholars, such as James Legge, William Jones, and the Rev. John Swete, to correspond to Gamma, the southernmost star in the constellation of Cancer.
7 After an elaborate calculation Williams says (p. 31) that the date is the same as the one on the day mentioned in the Shu King. He then says: "Thus a strong presumptive proof is again afforded of the veracity of the Chinese history as recorded in the Shu King."
8 The central star of the seven constellations of the eastern quarter, corresponding to Alpha Scorpii.

He separately commanded the second brother Ho to reside in the west, in what was called the Dark Valley, and there respectfully to consider the phenomena of the completing labours of the autumn. "The night," he said, "is of the medium length, and the star is Hsi 3; you may thus exactly determine mid-autumn. The people begin to feel at ease; and birds and beasts have their coats in good condition."

He further commanded the third brother Ho, the star is Hsia 3; thus you may exactly determine mid-winter. The people keep their close corners; and the birds and beasts become thick."

The emperor said, "Ah! you, Ho and Ho, a round year consists of three hundred, sixty, and six days. By means of an intercalary month do you fix the four seasons, and complete the determination of the year. The number, in exact resonance with this, regulating the various officers, all the works of the year will be fully performed."

In the 'Canon of Hsun,' the second book of the Shu King, it is recorded that, having accepted the throne which had been often offered to him by the emperor Yaun, the emperor Hsun examined the gem-adorned sphere and the gem transverse tube in order to regulate the seven directors or planets.

Both the commandment of Yaun and the examination of Hsun are supposed to have taken place at the beginning of their reigns. The observations of the heavens in the history of the seven directors or planets is of great importance. According to another book of the Shu King, called the 'Punitive Expedition of the Princes Yin,' in the reign of King Tsang of Tsang (2556-2465 B.C.) this emperor failed to foretell an eclipse of the year 2555 B.C. (3), and it was considered such a great crime that the prince of Yin, who was then commander-in-chief of the imperial armies, received orders from the king to punish him with death on exact time.

The Chinese then commenced their observation of eclipses from a time not later than the 22nd cent. B.C., though some European scholars regard the Chinese as having observed the eclipse of the 5th day of the 5th month of the year 1236 B.C., in the Shi King ('Book of Odes'), as the earliest recorded eclipse in all history. In Ma T'wan Lin's Encyclopaedia more than 600 eclipses of the sun are recorded from 2168 B.C. to A.D. 1229. There are many other kinds of heavenly phenomena which have been keenly observed by the Chinese from a very early period as well. From 611 B.C. to A.D. 211 alone comets are recorded by the Chinese, with the title of William's Observations of Comets. The spots of the sun were observed and recorded by the Chinese not later than A.D. 301, i.e. 1508 years before the assumed first discovery of solar spots by Galileo in 1610. He further says, it was by the astronomers who had failed to foretell an eclipse of the year 2555 B.C., who were the first to record the observation of a solar eclipse. In A.D. 1061 the Chinese recorded 34 observations of solar spots, from A.D. 301 to 1906, are recorded in Ma T'wan Lin's Encyclopaedia, which was published in A.D. 1323, i.e. 258 years before Galileo's observation. In the same Encyclopaedia a great number of instances of the observation of moving or shooting stars are recorded from 1122 B.C. to A.D. 1290. Meteors have been observed, and recorded by the Chinese since, as early as 1578 B.C. The Bamboo Books record: 'In the tenth year [of the emperor Kwei of the Hia dynasty, i.e. 1579 B.C.] the five planets went outside of their courses. In the night stars fell like rain.' Comparing with the solar eclipse of A.D. 1562, remarks E. B. Knobel, when they had the great display of meteors, the interval gave 104 periods of 33-11 years. Now Leverrier's period for the November meteor is 33-23. This is the only possible place to direct that.

1 The central star of the seven constellations of the northern quarter, corresponding to Alpha Aquarii.
2 The culminating star of the seven constellations of the western quarter, corresponding to the Pleiades.
3 When it is said, it says the editor of Yang Ch'ing's Shu King (James Legge's) that the year consists of 365 days, we are to understand that Yaun was speaking in round numbers. The years mentioned in the book of Yaun were evaluated by the astronomer of successive dynasties.
4 In vol. 3; Legge's tr., London, 1856, p. 299 f.
we have here the earliest record of a shower of heavenly stars.

III. DIVISION OF THE STARS.—1. The 28 sius or shes.—In common with the Hindus, Arabs, Babylonians, Persians, and Copts, the Chinese have the division of the celestial system into 28 divisions, or the zodiac into 28 signs, or sius or shes. According to the interpretation of Sun Ma Kuang, a great scholar of the Sung dynasty (A.D. 960-1279), the term "shes has the meaning "to reside (or to stop) somewhere" and sius means "an abode," and both words mean the "houses of the sun, the moon, and the five planets in their revolution residing in turn in the divisions of the sphere indicated as the 28 abodes. This meaning is very similar to that of the Hindu nakatras ("stars" or "asterisms") and the Arabian manadil al-kamar ("lunar mansions"). There is, according to Knobel's calculation, a concordance of the determinants of the sius, the nakatras, and the mandzils in fifteen divisions, of the sius and the nakatras in four divisions, of the sius and the mandzils in five divisions, and of the nakatras and the mandzils in four divisions. This remarkable resemblance attracts the attention of many eastern scholars and seemed to them a sufficient reason for presuming that all these systems sprung from a single source. The conclusions arrived at are different. Some scholars hold that they are included in India and the Chinese borrowed it from there; others are of opinion that the Chinese borrowed from the Arabs; another opinion is that the Babylonians were the originators; while still others say that the origin is to be found in Central Asia or some part of Persia. Unfortunately none of these conclusions is supported by satisfactory evidence.

But there are differences as well as resemblances between these three systems, and the Chinese division has its own peculiarity. The Chinese divisions are very unequal in the angular intervals and therefore cannot present the daily stations of the moon, as the Hindu divisions do. They are measured on the equator rather than on the ecliptic. According to G. Schlegel, there is no connexion at all between the Chinese asterisms and the lunar zodiac. Some of the names of the 28 sius were known to the Chinese as early as the time of the emperor Yang (2356 B.C.), while the earliest Babylonian record concerning the lunar mansions is the earliest Hindu record of the nakatras named after the Vedic deities are much later than that. The nakatras, in their recent forms at least, are apparently assimilated to the Chinese sius, and the whole system of junction stars is undoubtedly an imitation of them. J. B. Biot and his son were the first to demonstrate the identity of the Chinese sius and the 28 lunar mansions of the Hindus and Arabs. They concluded that this arrangement of celestial divisions was invented by the Chinese and borrowed from them by the Hindus and Arabs for purely astrological purposes.

"To this day," says J. M. de Groot, "no considerations of importance have cancelled these views [of Biot], and though they have been more or less violently combated by Weissenhovell and other authorities of renown, yet it seems that most investigations of oriental astronomy silently subscribe to them." 3

4 According to Agnes M. Clerke's art. "Zodiac" in Encyc., the sius being invented and the nakatras or divisions of the zodiac being of Indian derivation. The nakatras in their recent organizations were, as far as possible, assimilated to the Chinese sius. The whole system of nakatras and the nakatras, as signs without an imitation of the sius; the choice of them by the Hindu astronomers of the century was to be the cause of a considerable change in the consideration of the Chinese, compiled with a widely different intention.

2. The twelve kungs.—Besides the division of the lunar cycle into 28 unequal parts, the Chinese, in common with the Hindus and Western nations, divide the zodiac into twelve equal parts as follows:


These names are found in Chinese books written several centuries B.C.—e.g., Tso Tsuan, Erih Ya, etc. The Hindu zodiac signs, which are probably of Greek origin, entered China at a much later date.

3. The four quarters and the five kungs.—The Chinese divide the heavens into four quarters. The eastern quarter is called Tsang Lung ("the Blue Dragon") and is associated for astrological purposes with the season of spring, the planet Jupiter, the element wood, the colour blue, the taste sour, and the virtue of benevolence. The southern quarter is called Chii Niu ("the Red Bird") and is associated with the season of summer, the planet Mars, the element fire, the colour red, the taste bitter, and the virtue of propriety. The western quarter is called Pe Hwun ("the White Tiger") and is associated with the season of autumn, the planet Venus, the element metal, the colour white, the taste sweet, and the virtue of righteousness. The northern quarter is called Hsian Wu ("the Black Warrior," or "the Black Tortoise," as it has also been interpreted) and is associated with the season of winter, the planet Mercury, the element water, the colour black, the taste salt, and the virtue of wisdom.

In Siih Ma Chien's Siit Ki the stars are divided into five kungs, or palaces—middle palace, eastern palace, southern palace, western palace, and northern palace. The middle palace consists of the northern circumpolar stars, and the other four are like the four quarters stated above. This system of division is followed by Pan Ku in his History of the Later Han Dynasty.

4. The three yuans and the two kuan.—The three yuans (palaces or stellar spaces) are (1) Tsu Vi Yuan (the Middle Palace), consisting of the northern circumpolar stars, (2) T'ai Vi Yuan (the Upper Palace), consisting of stars in the west and south, and (3) Tien Su Yuan (the Lower Palace), bounded by two chains comprising Hercules, the upper part of Ophiuchus, etc. The two kuan, or kinds of officers, are (1) luing kuan, the internal officers, consisting of groups of stars inside the equator, and (2) weng kuan, the external officers, consisting of groups of stars outside the equator.

This system of the division of the heavens is peculiarly Chinese and is very ancient. In the Tien Wun, consisting of eight chapters, written by Wu Hian, an astronomer of the Yin (or Shang) dynasty (1796-1122 B.C.), the astronomer assigned to the Middle Palace for four stars or officers, consisting of eight stars, to the Upper Palace one star, consisting of one star, to the Lower Palace four stars, consisting of eight stars, to the internal officers five stars, consisting of 24 stars, and to the external officers nineteen seats, consisting of 93 seats. In the Tien Wun Sing Chan, written by Kan Te, an astronomer of the state of Tsi, and the Tien Wun, written by Hseu Hien, an astronomer of the state of Wui (both astronomers lived about the 4th cent. B.C.), the method of division is identical with that of Wu Hian, but the numbers of officers and stars are greatly increased. If we add these estimates together, we get 283 officers, consisting of 1464 stars.

5. The three yuans and the 28 sius.—There is a
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popular book consisting of 31 songs by Tan Yuan Tau of the Sai dynasty (589-617), called Pu Tien Ko. It divides the stars into three yuana and 28 sius, consisting of 1069 stars, and, besides these, 11,520 stars. This system of division is followed by Ma Twan Lin and others.

IV. THE RELIGIOUS ASPECTS. —I. Animistic view. —The animistic view which the Chinese took of many things in nature is seen in their attitude to the sun, moon, and stars. Many of them regard the heavenly bodies not as merely inanimate bodies, but as dwelling-places of spiritual beings or as spiritual beings themselves; e.g., there is, it is said, a cock in the sun and a hare in the moon, the palace of angels; the hare is said to be sitting under a tree pounding medicine in a mortar. These spiritual beings have supernatural powers, though the supreme power is not attributed to any of them, but to Tien, Shang-ti, or God alone. Hence the movements and appearances of the heavenly bodies are interpreted by means of regular, lifeless, or inevitable, for omens or with them there is a will which causes them. This may well be the will of the heavenly bodies, of the spiritual beings who dwell in them, or of God, the Supreme Ruler.

2. Comparison of the heavens with the earth. —In the heavens there are the sun and the moon; correspondingly on the earth there are the yang and the yin, the two contrary conceptions applied to phenomena mental and moral as well as physical. Yang is the male principle, associated with heat, day, etc., and yin is the female principle, associated with cold, night, etc. The sun is called 'the great yang,' and the moon 'the great yin.' It is also said that the sun is the 'crystallization of the yang,' and the moon the 'crystallization of the yin.' The five planets are said to correspond to the five elements of the earth, and therefore Mars is called 'the planet of fire,' Mercury 'the planet of water,' Venus 'the planet of metal,' Jupiter 'the planet of wood,' and Saturn 'the planet of earth.' Similarly, the different stars and constellations are believed to correspond to the various portions of the surface of the earth. In the chapter called Tien Kwen ('The Heavenly Canon') in Chou Chih's Shih-Ki, in which all the beliefs mentioned above may be found, we read: 'The twenty-eight siu or constellations correspond to the twelve chows, or provinces. . . . The source of this (saying or belief) is of remote antiquity indeed.'

It is a popular saying in China that 'the stars of the heavens above and the configurations of the earth beneath correspond with each other.' A great number of stars—a.g., the twenty stars constituting the two chains of the Tien San Yuan, or the Lower Palace—are believed to correspond to certain countries in China and are given the names of those countries.

In some of the ancient books the heavens are said to be spherical and the earth square, the heavens dynamic and the earth static. There are also ancient stories or mythologies which represent the heavens as having a hollow place in the north-west round which all the stars revolve, and the earth as having a hollow place in the south-east towards which all the waters run.

3. Comparison of the heavenly bodies with men. —Heaven, earth, and men are believed to be the three great powers or genii in the universe. The heavenly bodies are regarded not merely as separate, but as having a society like that of men. As the Chinese state was an empire, so the heavenly society was believed to be an empire. This can be observed in the names of the stars. The coining of significant poetical or mythological names for the heavenly bodies was probably to render easier the task of discriminating and remembering them. Many stories grew round those names, which are regarded by some as fables and by others as truths (or even the names of the stars in the Tai Vi Yuan, that Upper Palace, the northern polar star (Polaris) is where the emperor is. The reason is quite plain, as Confucius said: 'He who exercises government by means of his virtue is like the northern polar star, which keeps its place, and all the other stars turn towards it.' The Great Bear, or the Spoon, as it is called in China, is said to be the imperial chariot, and its motion round the northern polar star is said to be the emperor viewing his empire in all directions. Names of some of the other stars are: the Empress's Palace, Crown Prince, Prince, Prince, King and Military Officers, Law-Court, Prison, Armoury, Storehouses, Kitchen, Bed, Canopy, etc.

4. relation between the heavenly and the earthly empires. —The empires are not separated from one another without intercommunication. Tien, or Shang-ti, the Supreme Ruler, governs both, but the heavenly one more directly. The ruler of the earthly empire used to be called Tien Ti, 'the son of Tien (or God.)' Entombment used to be regarded as the appointment of God, the rewarder of the good and the punisher of the bad. Therefore, when the Son of Heaven was good and his empire well governed, auspicious phenomena used to appear from God in the heavens, and, when he was bad and his empire in disorder, threats used to appear. There are many heavenly phenomena which are regarded as God's threats—notably eclipses. The Lunan of Odes refers to an eclipse of the sun of the date 29th Aug., 775 B.C., which was carefully verified by John Chalmers.

'The sun was eclipsed—
A thing of very evil omen,
First the moon looked small,
And then the sun looked small,
Henceforth the people
Will be PLAID and neglected.
The sun and moon present evil
By not keeping to their proper paths;
All through the kingdom there is no [good] government.
Because good men are not employed.
For the sun was eclipsed—
It is a small matter,
But now the sun is eclipsed,
How dreadful is that!

In the Confucian classic called Tsun Tsu ('Springs and Autumn') the eclipse of the sun which took place on 20th April 610 B.C. is recorded. The writer says: 'On the occasion of an eclipse of the sun, the Son of Heaven should not have his table spread as lavishly as usual, and should have drums beaten at the altar to the spirits of the land, while the feudal princes should present offerings of silk to the spirits of the land and have drums beaten at their courts, thus manifesting their own service of the spirits and so teaching the people to serve their rulers, according to the respective rights of each, as was customary in ancient days.'

The word 'eclipse' used here is the same as the word 'eat.' The eclipse of the sun or the moon is described, in some of the Chinese stories, as the sun or moon is being eaten by a certain animal, and the beating of drums is said to frighten the animal away.

The sun in the heavens is also said to correspond to the ruler on the earth; e.g., when the people wished the death of Kie, the tyrant (reigned 1818—
1753 B.C.), they said: 'O sun, why exprest thou not? Let us die together with thee.' Therefore the eclipse of the sun is generally regarded as a threat from God to, but as having a society like that of men.
numerous examples, and the edict of the emperor Ming Ti (A.D. 257–269) after the eclipse of the sun in 233 is most illuminating:

'We have heard,' says the emperor, 'that if a sovereign is regarded as elegant and humane, he will never be without a beneficent name because of his calamities and perils. These are divine reprimands sent to recall him to a sense of duty; and the sun and rain are among the worst warnings that the rod of empire is not wielded aright. Ever since we ascended the throne, our inability to continue the glorious traditions of our ancestors and carry on the great work of civilization has now culminated in a warning message from heaven. Accordingly, we harken to the demands for personal reform, in order to avert impending calamity. The relationship, however, between God and man is that of father and son; and a father, about to chastise his son, would not be deterred were the latter to present him with a dish of food. We do not therefore consider it a frill, of our duty to act in accordance with certain memorials advising that the Grand Astronomer be instructed to offer up sacrifices on this occasion. Do ye governors of districts, and other high officers of State, seek rather to rectify your own hearts; and if anyone can devise means to make up for our shortcomings, let him submit his proposals to the throne.'

Comets, even more than eclipses, are regarded as God's threats. When the comets appeared in 524 B.C., travelling eastward towards the Milky Way, an officer said: 'This is a broom to sweep away the old, and give us new. God often makes us feel the effect of his displeasure by giving us sacrificial calamities by fire.' The stars or the spiritual beings who dwell in them sometimes descend from the heavens, either by themselves or by the will of God, are born on earth, and go to their place of abode after their earthly life.

In The Annals of the Bamboo Books there are the following legends:

'He's mother (the mother of Wun Tung, 268 B.C.) was called Tu Pion. She witnessed a great flash of lightning, which surrounded the star Chu (or Dehie) of the Great Bear with a brightness that tallied all the country about her, and thenceforth became pregnant.'

His mother was called Niu Tel. She witnessed a star like a rainbow come floating down the stream to the islet of Hiva. Thereafter she dreamed and received it, and was moved in her mind. We must not therefore consider it a frill, of our duty to act in accordance with certain memorials advising that the Grand Astronomer be instructed to offer up sacrifices on this occasion, when it moved itself in the palace of Yio-pong, after which she brought forth Yung Hu (the emperor, 253 B.C.).'

His mother was called Si-Ki. She saw a falling star which went through the constellation Mao, and in her dream her thoughts were moved till she became pregnant, after which she swallowed a spirit's pearl, ... and gave birth to Yu (king 2236 B.C.) in Shih No.

There are 28 heroes in Chinese history who were believed to be the 28 sius, or constellations, descended. A great man on earth may become after death a spiritual being; in heaven and dwell in one of the twelve jiang (the ancient princes) and stars. There were 28 heroes. There are a great many stories, love stories, and mythologies based upon beliefs of this kind.

5. Sacrifices.—We read in the 22nd book called Ky Tong (The Foundation of Sacrifices) of the Li Ki (The Book of Rites), a collection of treatises on the rules of propriety or ceremonial usages, one of the five Confucian books or canons.

'Of all the methods for the good ordering of men, there is none more urgent than the use of ceremonies. Ceremonies are of the kind, and there is none of them more important than sacrifices.'

Among various sacrifices there are sacrifices to the sun, moon, and stars. We do not know when these rites began, but they have long been performed under each dynasty from the 23rd cent. B.C. down to the time of the present Republic of China. In the 29th book of Li Ki, called Ki Fu (The Laws of Sacrifices), it is said:

'With a blazing pile of wood on the Grand altar they [the Emperors, from Emperor Shun 2250 B.C. to King Wu 1125 B.C.] sacrificed to Heaven. The wood was fed with the wood of the Grand (or three) mound, they sacrificed to the Earth. (In both cases) they used a red victim.'

By burying a sheep and a pig at the altar of Great brightness, they sacrificed to the seasons. (With similar) victims they sacrificed to (the spirit of) cold and heat, at the pit and the altar, using the wood of cremation and the wood of the Grand mound, they sacrificed to the Earth. (In both cases) they used a red victim.'

In the 21st book of Li Ki, called Ki I (The Meaning of Sacrifices), it says:

'The sacrifice in the suburb of the capital was the great expression of gratitude to Heaven, and it was specially addressed to the sun, with which the moon was associated. The observance of the Sun (dynasty, 2259-1766 B.C.) is said to have continued to the dark,'Connor the Yin dynasty (1799-1122 B.C.) they did so at noon. Under the Kau dynasty (1122-656 B.C.), they sacrificed all day, especially at daybreak, and towards evening.

'They sacrificed to the sun on the altar, and to the moon in the hollow—to mark the distinction between the doors (of the one) and (the brightness of the other), and to show the difference between the high and the low. They sacrificed to the sun in the east, and to the moon in the west.—to mark the distinction between (the forgoing) of the former (and) the withdrawing (of the latter), and to show the correctness of their (relative) position. The sun comes forth from the east, and the moon appears at the west; the days are now long, now short; when the one ends, the other begins, in regular succession—thus producing the harmony of all under the sky.'

These are the sacrifices at the equinoxes; that to the sun at the vernal equinox in the eastern suburb, and that to the moon at the autumnal equinox in the western suburb. They were not performed under each dynasty, and can also be found in The Ritual of the Manchu Dynasty. The former is called Chou Zi, 'The Moon, Sun,' and the latter Sh E, 'The Evening Moon.'

In the dynasty of Chin (255-206 B.C.) they sacrificed to what they called the eight gods, i.e. the god of the heavens, the god of the earth, the god of war, the god of the sun, the god of the moon, the god of the sun, the god of the moon, and the god of the four seasons. In Hon Shu ('The Book [or History] of the early Han Dynasty') (206 B.C.—A.D. 25) it is said: 'There were such eight gods in the ancient times, but their origin is unknown.'

In the dynasties after the China dynasty different temples were built for their sacrifices. Even at the court sacrifices were performed under each dynasty, to the sun, moon, and stars can be found in different places. In Peking there is the world-famous Tien Tan ('Temple of Heaven'), and in it there are altars of the sun, of the moon, of the 28 constellations, and of some other stars and groups of stars. In the Manchu dynasty (1644-1911) sacrifices were offered in the Temple of Heaven once every spring and once every autumn. Even since the establishment of the Republic of China (1911), a grand sacrifice was offered in the Temple of Heaven by Yuan Shi Kai, the first Chinese President.

The 15th of the eighth lunar month is a Chinese holiday called Tsung Tsia Tze ('the mid-autumn holiday'). The moon is said to be always at its fullest and brightest on this evening if it is visible, whereas it is not so on the same date of other lunar months. A family festival used to be, and in some places still is, held in Chinese houses on that evening. The offerings to the moon should be the same as to the God of Heaven. The ceremony is similar to that of Chinese ancestor worship.

On this holiday schools, shops, etc., are closed, and farmers cease work for a few days. Relatives and friends exchange presents, chiefly

1 Red was the special colour of victims under the Chou dynasty.

2 SZE xxviii. 201 f.

3 Ib. p. 218 f.
SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Chinese)

There seem to be other reasons why the Chinese should be grateful to the sun, moon, and stars—especially to the sun for its great and various benefits—but the fact is that they attribute these benefits to Tien, God, rather than to the heavenly bodies themselves. Indeed their sacrifices to these bodies are sometimes an indirect way of expressing their gratitude to God.

7. Sun-worship, moon-worship, and star-worship.—Is there, or has there been, sun-worship, moon-worship or star-worship in China? The answer to this question does not seem to mean by the term ‘worship.’ If by worship we mean the ‘adoration, sacrifice, praise, prayer, thanksgiving, or other devotional acts performed in honour of the Supreme Being or God,’1 it is certain that there is no such worship in China, and perhaps also that such worship has never existed there. None of the heavenly bodies is conceived by the Chinese as the Supreme Being. The Supreme Being is, for them, Tien, God, and God only. Nor can we find such worship in China if we take the term ‘worship’ to mean (1) the ‘prostration which arises in presence of a superior being,’ or (2) ‘the reverence and whom we fear or reverence,’ or (2) ‘the feeling and act of worship’ which involves primarily submission and fealty, and ‘is the attitude of inferior beings to the supreme or intelligent beings which are absolutely dependent.’2 The Chinese do not regard themselves as absolutely dependent on any of the heavenly bodies or on the spirits dwelling in them, but they regard the heavenly bodies or their indwelling spirits as dependent on Tien, ‘God,’ as they themselves are. It is true that they believe these heavenly bodies to possess powers which do not belong to men, but they also believe that men have powers which these bodies do not possess. What more is, some of them believe that certain men have the power of subjugating the spirits of the heavenly bodies, as magicians have the power of controlling spirits.

There are certain passages which have been regarded as evidence of sun-worship in China. In the 9th book of Li Kí, called Kiao Teh Seng (‘The Single Victim at the Border Sacrifices’), a passage says:

‘At the (Great) border sacrifice be [the Son of Heaven] welcomed the arrival of the longest day. It was a great act of thanksgiving for Heaven, and the sun was the chief object considered in it.’

Legge, commenting on this, says:3

‘The sun becomes the object of the 60th tablet of Heaven. Fang Kieh says: ‘(The Son of Heaven) was welcoming the arrival of the longest day, and therefore he regarded the sun as the residence (for the time) of the spirit of Heaven. That spirit could not be seen; what could be looked up to and beheld were only the sun, moon, and stars.’

The present writer need not give his own translation here, but he must point out that the idea that the sun was regarded as the residence of the spirit of Heaven is not implied either in Fang Kieh’s commentary or in the text.

With reference to the passage in the book—on the meaning of sacrifices, namely:

‘The sacrifice in the suburb of the capital was the great expression of gratitude to Heaven. The sun and moon were addressed to the sun, with which the moon was associated.’

Khán Hào, a Chinese commentator, says, according to Legge:4

‘Heaven is the great source of the (the course of nature and duty), and of all the visible bodies which it brings out, there are none greater than the sun and moon. The spirit of the object of the suburban sacrifice was a grateful acknowledgment of Heaven, the sun was chosen as the resting-place for its spirit (or essence). The idea in the institution of the rite was deep and far-reaching.’

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2. JAP. H. BUXTON, Translations and Notes, London, 1863, p. 25.
3. SBE xxvii. 427, n. 1.
4. SBE xxvii. 218, n. 2.
The same remark may be made on the translation of this passage, viz. that there is neither in the text nor in the commentary the idea that the sun was chosen as the resting-place of the spirit (or spirits). The ultimate purpose in both these cases was to express gratitude by means of sacrifices to Heaven, but not to the sun or the spirit of the sun. Heaven is invisible, and they thought that for the object of sacrifice something visible was necessary. Therefore, the sun was chosen as a symbol. Neither of these two cases therefore can be regarded as an example of sun-worship. There does not seem to be any other case.

Legge says concerning the last example:

'It must be borne in mind that the rites described in the text are those of former dynasties, especially of that of K'ao. I cannot bring to mind any passages in which there is mention made of any sacrifice to the sun or sun-spirit in connexion with the great sacrifice to Heaven, or Shang Ti, at the service on the day of the winter solstice in the southern suburb.\(^1\)

Hence it is only by taking the term 'worship' in a very comprehensive sense, and by ignoring the purpose of the sacrifices, that we may say that the fact that the Chinese sacrificed to the sun or sun-god is that they worshipped it. It is the same with regard to their worship of the moon and the stars. In whatever sense we may be justified in saying that some of the ancient Chinese and other ancient savages worshipped the sun, moon, and stars, such worship occupies a very insignificant position in China compared with the worship of other natural phenomena or the spirits of them. If by sun-worship, moon-worship, etc., we mean one who regards the sun as the only or the supreme object of worship, we may say with conviction that the Chinese are not, as they have never been, sun-worshippers, moon-worshippers, or star-worshippers.

Literature.—See the works quoted in the footnotes.

SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Hebrew).—

The Hebrew conception of the universe, as we find it in the OT, is not scientific in the modern sense of the term. The cosmology of the Hebrews (see art. COSMOLOGY (Hebrew)) is characterized by the simplicity and savagery of primitive folk. The attitude of mind is one of awe and wonder, not of critical inquiry; and to pry closely into the secrets of the divine government is felt to indicate a want of reverence, and even to be dangerous. Moreover, we rarely find in a people which seems to have had an innate genius for religion to think, even after it had progressed beyond the stage of quite primitive ideas of the universe, that religion itself was an object of study or of knowledge.\(^2\) We need not expect, therefore, to find in the OT any inkling of the modern science of astronomy. The Hebrew shepherds without doubt, like the Phoenician mariners (cf. Pliny, H.N vii. 57), closely observed the sky, and learned from the scrutiny many lessons of practical value for their every-day life. It is equally likely that at an early date the Hebrews were wont to worship the stars and planets. There are later traces of this worship in the OT (cf. 2 K 17\(^3\))\(^4\) And, besides

\(^{1}\) STE xxvii. 218, n. 2.

\(^{2}\) On this point Lucian Magni's 'Religio Latinarum' (Judaism (1897) will be found suggestive. It has been argued elsewhere (W. Jay Hudson, Law of Psychic Phenomena 10, 1907) that ignorance of, or indifference to, what we term science might co-exist with a perfect knowledge of the laws of the moral and spiritual universes.

\(^{3}\) It is quite unnecessary to suppose that the idea of worshiping the stars and planets was borrowed, though, of course, the Hebrews would have been more and more into contact with people who were addicted to this worship. Whether and to what extent the Babylonian and later Jewish occultism is a disputed matter (see K. Marti, Religion of the OT, p. 36 f.). Cf. the proper names יָאָשָּׁים (Jg 12\(^3\)) and יָאָשָּׁים (Ezr 4\(^4\)) derived from יָאָשָׁ, and the Arabic يَاشِم, Serer.'

\(^{4}\) This is probably derived from סין, 'China,' and so also Beth-shenesh, a place sacred to the sun-god. Commentators have seen in Mal 3\(^8\) (4) the conception of a winged solar disk such as this, the figures suggested by various constellations no doubt gave rise to a number of curious fables and fancies. On the other hand, the OT, as we have it, a collection of much-edited writings, preserves few traces of the astronomical and astrological lore of the early Hebrews themselves. Since in the course of their national development the study of the stars and planets became more and more associated with the idolatrous practices of surrounding nations, it was easier to avoid, or even to remove, references to astronomy and astrology (cf. Dt 18\(^5\)) This would account for the fact that most of the references preserved in the OT are of a very general nature.

The chief planets are, of course, alluded to frequently. The sun (שֵׁמַש), is spoken of as ruling by day (Ps 136\(^6\)), and is often referred to as coming forth (from one chamber) in the morning and going in (to another chamber) in the evening. Its magnificence (Jg 5\(^7\)) and its powerful nature for good (Dt 33\(^8\)) or for evil (2 K 4\(^9\)); cf. Ps 121\(^10\)) impressed the Hebrews, as they have impressed all peoples ever since, as a manifestation of the hand of God. In the OT, the sun is called, metaphorically, 'month,' יִשָּׁר, a word which is common to all the Semitic languages, though not, in fact, in use in the OT. Another word, שֶׁבֶרְנָה, which occurs only three times (Ca 6\(^11\), Is 24\(^12\), 30\(^13\)), designates the moon as the 'white one' or the 'pale one.' Rarer still is a word וכש (perhaps connected with the Assyr. kuv'[u], 'headdress' or 'cap'), which denotes the full moon (perhaps the moon-god clothed in the splendor of his tiara), and is, as is most common word is בְּדֵת, which means 'new moon,' and also 'month.' Thus the new moon was regarded as marking a new period or month, and the use of יַשְׁרֹא, יֶשֶר, and בְּדֵת for both moon and month shows that among the Hebrews the month and year were lunar. The moon rules the night (Ps 136\(^6\)), and, like the sun, is a power for good (Dt 33\(^8\)) or for evil (Ps 121\(^10\)). Its pale brilliance made it the emblem of beauty (Ca 6\(^11\)). In a few passages reference seems to be made to eclipses (Am 8\(^14\), Is 35\(^15\), Job 9\(^16\) et al.). And we are once told that 'the sun stood still, and the moon rested,' after the battle of Armageddon (Re 16\(^17\)). Similarly the sun and moon are regarded as enemies (Jos 10\(^18\)). In late writings there are several allusions to the worship of the sun (Ezk 8\(^19\), Job 31\(^20\); cf. 2 K 22\(^21\)) and moon (Dt 4\(^22\)). Other planetary worship is recorded in the OT. Thus, in all probability, Venus\(^2\) as the Morning Star is referred to in Is 14\(^23\) under the name יְהָטָל, הָלוֹל, or יְהָטָל, הָלוֹל (lit. 'the glittering one'), though it should be mentioned that some expositors have been in the term an Arabic name for the moon (חלָל, הָלוֹל). W. Louts (PLP 5, 1, 'Sterna') indeed argues that the Arabic word means 'new moon,' which would be unsuitable; as we find among the ancient Egyptians, Babylonians, Assyrians, and Persians. But the present writer has pointed out (Journal of the Manchester, Jewish, and Oriental Society 4 (1899)) that the word that usually translated 'wings' will bear another meaning. The meaning may be 'skirts' rather than 'wings,' and the figure of the glorious robe that flows from the sun.\(^3\)

1 In Jg 14\(^19\), Job 9\(^20\) the word translated 'sin' is not שַׁנָּה, but לְכָה (cf. Is 35\(^13\)) are probably derived from סין, the name of the moon-god in Babylonian. In Ex 3\(^11\) Sina is described as 'the mountain of Ecbatana,' i.e., the sacred mountain. This passage suggests that it was in Ecbatana that the he-goat was kept, and that the he-goat in Babylon was Shamas, the moon-god.

2 The writer clearly intends a miracle to be understood (so C. Steuernagel, De la cosmologie dans le Talmud, 244). The terms used by the expositors (e.g. W. H. Bennett in 'Joshua,' SBOT, 1899) regard the passage as poetic and figurative (cf. Jg 5\(^7\)).

3 Another description of Venus is קַשָּׁר ha-shāhmayim בָּשָׁם יִשָּׁר, 'the queen of heaven,' mention being made of cakes which were baked for her (Jer 7\(^28\), 44\(^17\)).
SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Hebrew)

but, according to Zimmern and Buhl's edition of Gesenius's Lexicon (Handworterbuch, 1905) it can denote the old moon as crescent. Further, in Am 9:9 (see below) there is an allusion to Saturn (κλαίνω = kloan = Assy. klama'tu; and ἱερόν, kloyn = Assy. kaimun). The stars, again, are alluded to frequently in a general way, and the references to particular stars or constellations, and these require special attention. The earliest of them is found in Am 5:31. Since, however, the same terms occur, with others, in the context of Job which contain more precise references to astronomy, it is best to consider the Job passages first. In Job 9, in a description of God's almighty power as manifested in the marvels of the material world, Job is represented as pointing to God as one who shaketh the earth out of her place, and the pillars thereof tremble. Who commandeth the sun, and it riseth not; and sealeth up the stars. Who alone spreadeth out the heavens, and treadeth upon the waves of the sea. Who maketh the Ash, Kš'ël, and Kš'el, and the members of the south. The context indicates that the terms in the last two lines (ψω, 'ash; γαλακτος, kš'ël; γεως, kšemah; γεως, hadrel témâd) designate particular stars or constellations. We are helped, too, by the fact that three of their terms occur in Am 5:31, Job 38:3, Kš'el in Am 5:31, Is 13:1, Job 38:3; 'ash in Job 38:3; but there is considerable uncertainty as to the correct interpretation of some at least of the terms.

1. ψω, 'ash, or better ψω, 'ayish, as in Job 38:3, and better still ψω, 'ayish, as suggested by the Syriac (Pesh. smy). In Job 9:6 LXX has ἀστροφος, Vulg. 'Asper'; in Job 9:7 LXX has ἀστροφος, Vulg. 'Vesper.' Modern expositors have found in the word either the Great Bear, the Pleiades, Hyades, or the Northern and Southern Crown. 'Ash in Job 9:6 has to be taken in connexion with the other passage, 38:3, in which, according to the Messianic text, it is said: 'or dost thou guide 'ayish with her young?' (גֵּרֵס וְנֶפֶשׁ וְנֶפֶשׁ הָאֵשׁ). It is noteworthy, too, that what in Arabic corresponds to the Great Bear is called nash, 'the bear,' and that the three tail stars of Ursa Major are called bandat nash, 'children of the bier' (i.e., in this case, 'mourners'). It is true that no philological connexion can be established between the Arabic, nash, and the Arabic phrase 'children (or daughters) of the bier' is suggestive as regards 'ayish and her children. It might seem natural to expect to find a striking constellation like the Great Bear mentioned in Job 9:6, and it would be fitting that it should be assigned the first place, though it may be mentioned in passing that possibly the Hebrews thought of this constellation not as a Great Bear, but as a lioness with her young (cf. with Ewald, Arabic 'ayush, and see A. Dillmann's Commentary). But there is some force in the argument that 'ayish can hardly be Ursa Major, because the constellations in Job 38:31 are referred to an account of their meteorological importance. Some expositors, therefore (e.g., M. A. Stern, Nöldcke, Schrader), have thought that 'ayish represents the Pleiades. The great objection to this is that there is very good reason to think another Hebrew term (see below) designates that constellation. The 'children' of 'ayish would certainly suit the Pleiades, which are sometimes represented as a hen with its chckerens. But, on the other hand, the smaller stars surrounding or adjoining a star of the first magnitude might in several cases be described as its children. The Pleiades not being probable, some scholars agree with the Vulgate of Job 9:9 in thinking that 'ayish represents the Hyades (so, e.g., Hoffmann, Schiaparelli); and this view has the support of the Syriac (Pesh. smy). Moreover, the term 'ayish was among the names of certain stars of great meteorological importance. Elsewhere in Hebrew 'ash means 'moth.' Friedrich Delitzsch has suggested that it may have the same meaning here, since, a giant star (μαυ) seems to have been given to the star by the Assyrians (see T. G. Pinches, in Hastings' DB, s.v. 'Astronomy'). Now, the Hyades, a great red star of the first magnitude (Abelbaran) and five stars of the fourth magnitude, resemble our letter V or the Greek A. And Schiaparelli points out (p. 58) that 'in the butterfly stage, when the moth is at rest, its wings are not held detached from the body, as happens with most other butterflies, but spread themselves out in it such a way as to form a cloak, more or less similar (according to the several species into which the animal can be divided) to an isosceles triangle. The suggestion is that one of the authors of the passages in Job 'ash meant 'moth,' which was a name for the Hyades. In that case, assuming the identity of 'ash and 'ayish, the 'children' of 'ash or 'ayish would be the minor Hyades which surround Aldebaran. Against this it might be urged that it is easier to explain 'ash as short for 'ayish than to account for 'ash as the original form, and that 'moth' does not seem a likely name for a constellation (especially the Hyades, apart from its form). The question of identification cannot be decided definitely. But, as the Pleiades has to be excluded (see below), there are reasons for thinking that the other 'children' of the Hyades is intended. The Great Bear was no doubt as well known to the Hebrews as to other ancient peoples; but it would not be in the least surprising to find no mention of it in the OT, the references to astronomy being so few.

2. γαλακτος, κš'el, usually translated 'fool.' In Job 9:6 LXX has ἀστροφος, Vulg. 'Orion'; in 38:31 ἰδας, Vulg. 'Aretaurus'; in Am 5:31 LXX omits, Vulg. 'Orion.' In the LXX οἰασ, Vulg. 'splendor earum.' Some of the Rabbis of the Middle Ages (Saadya, Abulwaid, and others) identified the word with the Arabic Suhail and interpreted it as the term for a constellation. The prepondering view of the versions is in favour of Orion, a constellation which was popularly thought of as a giant who was bound in chains to the sky. Kš'el occurs elsewhere in Hebrew with the meaning 'dullard' or 'fool,' and modern expositors commonly think of the giant (Orion) as a fool in the sense of an impious person who had rebelled against God. But the Arabic equivalent of the root (κš'el, kandah) means 'to be thick, plump,' which suggests that kš'el itself need not mean anything more than 'thick.' In the big, bulky one); and the Cheyne says (art. 'Orion' in EB), kš'el ought not to be confounded with nābāl ('fool' in the sense of impious person). In Job 38:21 there seems to be a reference to some myth current among the giant being spoken of as bound with cords; but what exactly the myth was is quite uncertain. In Am 5:9 kšemah (see below) and kš'el are again mentioned together ('seek him that maketh kšemah and kš'el, and the black darkling, and the thick bounding,' etc.) as well as in Job 38:3 ("Dost thou bind the bands of kšemah, or loose the cords of kš'el?"). Further, in Is 13:2 we find the curious expression 'their kš'elîm' (often translated 'the stars of

1 It seems certain that the Syriac word does denote the Hyades or the chief star of the group (cf. Barthélemy).
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This seems to indicate that primarily *kimdah* was used to denote stars of the first magnitude, in distinction from lesser stars (*kobitam*). In any case it is pretty generally agreed that it has one of the most brilliant constellations, and it did not fail to arrest the attention of the ancients.

3. *kimdah*, literally 'a group, cluster,' cognate with Arabic *kima* (אכ*), 'to heap up.' In Job 9* LXX has *dialis*, Vulg. 'Arcturus,' Pesh. and Targ. *kpt*; in 38* the renderings of the Versions differ only to the extent that the Vulg. has 'Pleiades,' in Am 5* LXX omits, Vulg. has 'Arcturus,' Pesh. and Targ. *✘*. Most of the ancient authorities, in fact, understand the Pleiades by *kimdah.* Several modern expositors, however, prefer to think of Sirius (e.g., G. Hoffmann). But the word itself suggests we are to look for a compact cluster of stars, and, of course, we must seek for one that early attracted attention. The Pleiades, as Schiaparelli says, is the best known of such clusters, and also that only one which has in consequence of its conspicuous light awakened universal attention at every time and among all peoples' (p. 62). The expression of *kimdah* in 38* is not to be understood metaphorically.* The Arabic name for the Pleiades, *thargayya,* also means 'cluster,' and Bar Ali mentions it as an explanation of *kimdah.* The word *kimdah* itself has also been connected with the Arab *kimdara* 'house,' and the Assyri *kimtui* 'family.' In either case the name would suit the Pleiades.

It should be noted, further, that, according to some, the Pleiades are in the Talmud v. *Rosh ha-shanah,* 11b, God brought the flood by causing *kimdah* to set instead of rise in the morning, and by removing two stars from it. This is given as the explanation of Rabbi Joshua. According to R. Eliezer, the changes took place at a season of *kimdah* when it was wont to set in the morning, and what God did was to make *kimdah* rise in the morning on the day in question and lose two stars. This caused the flood. According to Stern, the dates mentioned are exactly the morning rising and setting of the Pleiades, and seem to prove that in the time of Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Eliezer the Pleiades were a well-known constellation. Many of the Jews identified the Pleiades with *kimdah.* It is further represented in the Talmud (ib.) that God afterwards sets things right by taking away two stars from it. It diminishes its rain-producing power. *kimdah* is a conspicuous constellation.

4. *kpt* (99*), *kimdah* témân, lit. 'chambers of the south.' The LXX renders *tapest Köln* Vulg. 'interior Assyria.' We seem to require mention of another definite constellation. This has given rise to the suggestion that the phrase designates the bright star Canopus or the constellation to which it belongs (so Stern). Other expositors regard the text as corrupt, and, emending *kpt* see in the Hebrew the uncertain constellation, and in the second (mpt) *Gemini,* 'the Twins.' But we are not obliged to find in *kimdah* témân a special constellation. 'Chambers (or store-houses) of the South' might, as K. Budde says ('Hbr., in W. Nolte's *Handwörterbuch,* 18*), denote a whole group of constellations in the southern sky. Dillmann (loc. cit.) thinks that the author of Job cannot have known anything of the stars of the southern hemisphere, but that it was known to him, as one who had travelled, that the farther one goes south the more stars and constellations become visible. To those who dwelt in the north these were, so to speak, enclosed in the innermost chambers of the vault of heaven, and were therefore invisible. This would explain the expression 'treasure-houses of the South' (cf. Pr 24*; Job 37*). The word *hder,* coming from a root meaning literally 'to possess,' in the plural would mean the term 'penetralia.' Schiaparelli gives reasons for thinking that the reference is to the imposing constellation found on the charts of the Ancients and extending beyond the Cross, and the Centaur; but whether this was visible to the author of Job depends upon the date of the book, which is uncertain.

In Job 38* we find another difficult astronomical term. The LXX renders it as follows: 5. *ŋΔ, mazzadírith* in his season, or dost thou lead in the *kimdah* of women who are young? We have already dealt with three of the terms which occur here. 'We have now to consider—

The Hebrew *ŋΔ, mazzadírith* is used in the LXX to denote something having to do with rain, and especially something which produces rain. It is used in the same sense in the Tanakh, in a number of passages throughout the Bible, as a sign of the approach of spring.

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It is not necessary, however, to regard *mazzārîth* and *mazzâlîth* as identical. We have found reason to think that another word denotes the Hyades as a constellation, and we would adduce from this supposition that *mazzārîth* may be a further description of some of the stars in this group.1 The word *mazzārîth* has also been identified with the Great Dog, whose chief star is Sirius. This, as the brightest, and most fixed, astronomical reasons as well, everywhere attracted the notice of the ancients.

6. It should be noted further that in Job 57* another constellation, *zâdîth,* or *mazzâlîth,* which bears some resemblance to *mazzārîth.* The passage runs: 'Out of its chamber cometh the whirlwind, and cold out of *mazzârîth.*' This word might also come from *zârîth,* 'to scatter.' On that assumption, it has been supposed to mean 'scattering' or north winds. Another suggestion, however, is that it is a corruption of the Babylonian *mishri,* 'the northern (star)' (so Edi, s.c. Mazaroth). A more recent conjecture is that of Schiaparelli (p. 60 ff.). He suggests that the correct punctuation of *zâdîth* is *mizrîth* or *mizzîrîth,* i.e. the plural or dual of a word *mizri,* *mîzrîth,* which is referred to in more than one room for *winnowing.* Schiaparelli points out that the arrangement of the stars of the Great Bear is such that they might be thought to resemble a *winnowing fan.* To the ancient Hebrews these stars actually suggested a ladle, which, with its cavity and handle, is very like a *winnowing fan.* The plural *mizrîth* would indicate more than one instrument. Schiaparelli, therefore thinks that the word might designate the Great Bear and the Lesser Bear; and in that case, of course, the dual *mizzîrîth* would be a still more suitable description. The fact that the Phoenicians used the Lesser Bear when at sea to find the direction of the north is noteworthy in this connexion. The suggestion is very ingenious. But unfortunately *miszrîth* is not the term which denotes a *winnowing instrument* of the shape required. The word for that is *raḥāth* (the other term mentioned in Is 30*). *Mizrîth* is apparently the *midhir* of modern Syria, a pitch-fork with six prongs, and the Great Bear can hardly be said to resemble that.

7. Some divines have found yet another reference to astronomy in the *zîrîth, nāyāṭh bôrîth,* of Job 26*. Meaning literally 'the seeing serpent,' the words have been supposed to refer to the *Lion of the north,* the *Lion of the Bear.* There is nothing in the context, however, to indicate that the author had any star or constellation in mind.

The OT contains very few definite references to astronomy, though the prohibition in Dt 18* shows that it was practised. We can hardly say that there was no astronomy amongst the ancient Hebrews, in spite of the fact that the present allusions are late and due to Assyro-Babylonian influence. In Is 47* (post-Exilic) we read: 'Yes let them deliver thee, the dividers (i.e. workers) of heaven (כְּזַת הָנָבָא), the gazers on stars (כְּנַצְת הָנָבָא), those who make known each new moon (כְּנֵשְׁת הָנָבָא), from the things that are coming upon thee.' The word translated 'dividers' occurs here only, and LXX has for the whole phrase of ἀστρολόγοι τό αἰωνὸς ἑπεξεργασμένος. It has been connected with an Arabic word 'to divide' (باحر، lit. 'to cut into large pieces'), a meaning which suits very well, since the Babylonians divided the sky for astronomical purposes into signs of the zodiac, and those who 'make known each new moon' (or the 'monthly prognosticators') would be persons, like the Assyrian and Babylonian astrologers, who noted lucky and unlucky days, preparing monthly

1 almanacs or calendars based on astrological calculations (see Cheyne, *Isaiah,* PB, 1888).

In Dt 8*, according to AV, Daniel became chief of the *astrologers* (בַּלְאֹת) in Babylon; but the correct translation of the word is 'conjurors' or 'enchancers.'


SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Hindu).—1. The sun.—Solar worship has been described as the real religion of India. Nor is it difficult to understand how in a country flooded with sunshine, where every phase and function of life is dependent upon the kindly warmth of the sun and his destructive energy and power are felt in the uttermost extremes of heat, it should have been a stern and early business to win his favour and placate his wrath. In the ancient verse of the *Gāyatrī* every Hindu begins his day with prayer and ascription of praise to the sun, the giver of light, heat, and fertility. In his mid-day devotion also he remembers him and renders homage to the same deity. It is apparently true that at no period in India was the worship of the sun to any great extent exclusive. There are no distinct sects at the present time who maintain the sun alone and bear his name. The essentials of his worship, however, are present everywhere and in all the sects, more or less avowedly, or in disguise, and amongst the lowest and most impious he has his practical and decisive influence on daily life is universally recognized.

In the Ṛgveda Śūrya, or the sun, is worshipped under many names and forms. The three chief aspects under which he presents himself to his worshipper are the rising, culminating, and setting sun. These are not separated or distinguished as three deities, but are varying forms of one and same god, each of which he displays himself with different attributes and as exercising different powers. Especially is he reverenced as Savitr, the giver and sustainer of life, who each morning wakes the world and at sunset is again carried by his most ancient chariots, perhaps the most ancient of all, is under the name Mitra, the Persian Mithras; whence some have conjectured that India derived her solar religion from the West. If borrowing took place on either side, it is probable that in those early days the indebtedness was Persian. As Mitra, the sun was associated as a member with an early triad, symbolized by the sacred syllable *Oṃ,* Agni or fire, Vayu the wind, and Mitra. This triune aspect also was manifested in the sun as the heavenly fire, and he bore corresponding epithets or titles, *astrīpāt,* 'three-footed'; *śvādratana, dhatavāyata, triyogāyata,* 'three stepping,' *avorshipped by the gods* (so Pinches), *sûryā,* 'sun,' *sūrya.* The last name was appropriated more particularly to Viṣṇu, the sun as the all-pervader, who in three strides traverses the three worlds, earth, heaven, and hell. He is invoked as *Pāṇār,* the guardian and preserver of the cattle, the companion of travellers, and guide of the soul on its perilous way to the lower world.

1 See the conjecture made above on p. 99, note 4.
and expels diseases and all the subtle and traded influences of darkness. The beneficent office of physician and healer of bodily ills, which later are ascribed to the Sūnas, are in the first instance that of Sūna himself.

There seems no reason to reject or doubt the statement of Sankara in the 10th cent. that in his time there existed distinct sects of sun-worshippers, Sauryas, or adherents of which the members were accustomed to carry branded on their forehead and breast the symbol of their deity. They have, however, all died out and been forgotten.1

Not many temples dedicated to the worship of the sun have survived, nor is it probable that at any period in Indian history they existed in any considerable number. That at Konarak in Orissa is the best known, and architecturally of the most interest. It is, however, neglected and ruinous, and attracts no worshippers. There is another at Gaya, and a small but much-frequented shrine at Benares, where the fire-sacrifice is offered in honour of the sun.

Among the non-Aryan peoples of India and the sub-tribes, who may be described as on the borders of Hinduism, sun-worship is much more open and confessed. The Sūnas (Sūnas), of whom the Sūna of whom the Sūnas, who sacrifices, is the best known, is the most interesting. As many of the sun-worshippers, perhaps because they are identified with the sun, it is possible that it was a totemistic rite.

The worship of the sun is also an important part of the daily life of the Hindu. It is observed in all the important religious ceremonies in India. It is observed at the time of the new moon, at the time of the full moon, and at the time of the partial or total eclipse of the sun. It is also observed at the time of the solstices and equinoxes.

The sun-worshipers of India are known as the Sūnas, and they are considered to be the most ancient of the sun-worshippers. They are known to have existed in India since the earliest times, and they are mentioned in the Rigveda, the oldest of the Hindu scriptures. They are described as being a race of people who worship the sun, and they are said to have lived in the north-eastern part of India.

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Rahm and Ketu, with Saturn, are deities of ill omens who presage sickness and all kinds of trouble, and to be born when one of these is in the ascendant is a grave misfortune. The remaining planets are propitious, especially Mercury, Venus, and Jupiter, in concert, and they give the gifts of wisdom and all knowledge and skill.

In the Rigveda nakṣatra is the name for a constellation in general. Universally, however, in later astral lore, the semblance of the nakṣatra are the lunar mansions, or stations, through which the moon passes, as the sun through the twelve signs of the zodiac. Originally these seem to have been 27 in number, but in the later literature and in astronomical tables 28. Mythologically they are the wives of the moon and daughters of Dakśa, one of the Adityas. Like the planets, the nakṣatras are important and influential deities, whose countenance is sought before undertaking a journey or making arrangements for marriage or other domestic rites. Every Hindu boy’s horoscope contains a reference to the nakṣatra under which he is born, and the best is the name of one other than that which is given him at the special name-giving ceremony (nānaddheya), which is written in the horoscope and is stated to contain always a secret word from the name of the nakṣatra through which the moon was passing at the hour of his birth.


A. S. Geden

SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Iranian).—Astronomy received much attention in ancient Persia, as is obviously implied by the current tradition that the Magi, the sacerdotal class of the Medes and Persians, were highly skilled in divination, an art which depended largely upon a knowledge of the heavenly bodies, astrology and astronomy being sister sciences in antiquity. The part which the veneration of the sun, moon, and stars played in the national religion of early Iran is well known (see art. ZOROASTRIANISM), and there is no need to stress it beyond the fact that much in the light of a professed astrologer and star-worshipper as in that of a wise man and prophet (cf. Diogenes Laërtius, Proem. i. 6, ἀστρονοµον ἂν εἰς ἀστερον αἰτίας, i. 122; Clementines Homilies, i. 3-6, Recognitores, iv. 27-29; Suidas, Lexicon, s. v. ἀστρονοµος, ἀστρονοµὸς—all collected in Jackson, Zoroaster, the Prophet of Ancient Iran, New York, 1899, pp. 250-273). The Asta and the Pahlavi books, especially the Bundahish and Dinâ-i Mainâq-i Kârat, contain frequent allusions of an astronomical nature; and Persian literature, after the Muhammadan conquest of Iran in the 7th cent., contains similar references. These three sets of sources furnish our chief supply of information, supplemented by comparisons drawn from Babylonian and Assyrian, as well as by other material.

1. Conception of the universe.—The ancient Iranians naturally based their astronomical system upon a geocentric conception of the universe. It is probable that in the earliest times the shape of the earth was regarded as round and smooth; although it is not altogether clear whether the Astavan word skaruna, ‘round’ (cognate with the Greek σφαῖρα), signified merely circular, or whether it actually meant spherical (Presệt, v. 36, xix, 19). It is almost certain, however, that in later times the globular form of the earth was recognized by the Persian astronomers, possibly influenced by Ptolemy, who was a great authority among the Arab-Persian scientists. The spherical shape may be inferred from two Pahlavi passages which apparently contain the idea of the cosmic egg—a wide-spread notion in antiquity. The first of these passages occurs in the Dâd-i Mâhâ, i. 11 (tr. in SBE xxiv. 85): ‘The sky is arranged above the earth, like an egg, by the handiwork of the creator Atharhâzand; and the earth, in the midst of the sky, is just like as it were the yolk amid the egg.’

The second Pahlavi passage is found in the Dinkart, ii. 74 (ed. Peshotan Sanjana, Bombay, 1876, ii. 72): ‘The world and the other creatures are placed together in the midst of the sky, like the bird in the midst of the egg; the sky surrounds all, as the egg does the bird’ (tr. Casartelli, Mazdâyanasman Philosophy, Bombay, 1889, p. 107). In the arrangement of the universe the earth was regarded as encompassed by the atmosphere (Av. vâyu, Phil. wâiz; or Av. vâsaka, Phil. spân), above which was the sky or firmament (Av. O.P. asman, Phil. Așmani, lit. ‘stone’). The earth; Plutarch again rose the sun, the moon, and the pyrean realm (Av. a mano yâsâ, lit. ‘endless lights!’), the abode of Ormazd and his angels. Through a misapprehension of the true facts, however, and not knowing the relative position of the sphere of the stars (cf. Phil. Atrâ-Visrâv, vii. 1-13; Bundahish, iv. 4; Zât-Spâram, vii. 6; Sâyast lâ-Sâyast, xii. 5; Gr. Iran. Bund., tr. Darmesteter, Le Zend-Avesta, ii. 310; Dâd-i Mâhâ, i. 11, xxiv. 2; Av. Vendidad, vii. 52; and consult Jackson, ‘Die iranische Religion,’ § 66, in Geiger and Kuhn, Grundriss der iranischen Philologie, ii. 671-672).

3. Sun and moon.—In the Zoroastrian ritual, as preserved in the Avesta, both the sun (hvora) and the moon (mâh) receive high veneration individually, and each has a special hymn of praise devoted to its glorification (Yâdst, vi. and vii.); besides, minor litanies and prayers are consecrated to their particular service (Sîrâzd, i. 11, ii. 11; Yâdst, vi. 1-7; Vindâk, i. 1-10; Nyûdâk, i. 1-10, ii. 1-11). A similar degree of reverence was accorded the moon among Parthian and Sassanian times, as is shown by the Pahlavi texts themselves and by allusions in the Greek and Latin classics (e.g., Phil. Sâyast lâ-Sâyast, vii. 1-3; Dinkart, i. 61, 6, the former translated by v. 297-298, and the latter by Peshotan Sanjana, Bombay, 1875, i. 47, and tr. p. 48: cf. also such classical writers as Strabo, xv. 3, 13, p. 732; Ammianus Marcellinus, Hist. xxxii. 3, 36; Pliny, Hist. nat., xxxvi. 11, 12; Strabo, Geogr., xxxvi. 11, 12; Apollodorus, Theog., xxxvii. 13; and Nicolaus Damascenus, frag. 66, p. 401, ed. Mührer). The supremacy of the sun among the heavenly bodies is naturally emphasized in the Avesta (e.g., Yâdst, vi.), and its various positions in the heavens are described in Bundahish, v. 1-7, and Sâyast lâ-Sâyast, xxi. 1-7. In the latter passage there are to be found special observations of the midday and afternoon shadows with respect to the sun’s altitude in the various zodiacal constellations. Solar observations were important in determining the various times of day for performing the sacrifice.

The moon, like the sun, is invoked because of its beneficent influence (Yâdst, vii. 1-7), and there are several specific allusions to its periodic phases (e.g., Yasna, xiv. 3; Yâdst, vii. 2-4; Fragment, ii. 13-14, 29; Dâd-i Mâhâ, ii. 6, xxvii. 5; tr. West, SBE xvii. 210-211, 215). The connexion between the moon and the tides was fully recognized in Sassanian times, and a crude attempt was made to explain it (see Bundahish, xii. 12, 13, 14-17; Zât-Spâram, vii. 14-17). Eclipses, both of the sun and of the moon, were regularly taken into account ‘in the calculations of the astronomers,’ at least under the Sassanians, as is shown by Dâd-i Mâhâ-i
Dinik, lxix. 1-7, and the cause of these observations was thought to be the intervention of two bodies that revolved around the sun in particular. Six to seven of these, are alluded to as guiding the quarters of the heavens into which the Zoroastrians divided the firmament. The chief star in the Avesta, as elsewhere, is called Tishtya (Av. *Tishtya*). Only its upper part, unconnected with Sirius, is alluded to. Tishtya is regent of the eastern division of the sky, an opponent of the meteorites, and the bringer of rain by overcoming Apascha, the demon of drought (*Yad)*, viii. 1 f. (*Bundakdih*, ii, 7, v. i., ix. 2). The fixed star Satavaha (Av. *satavaša*), Phl. satavā, `having a hundred servitors', which is possibly to be identified with Fomalhaut, is an ally of Tishtya, and lord of the southern heavens (*Yad*, viii, 9, 32, 43, 44; *Bundakdih*, ii, 7, v. 1, xiii. 12; *Sāyastā-l-Sāyastā*, xiv, 5, vi. 16). The guardianship of the west is entrusted to Yavant (Av. *yavant*, Phl. *sawand*, 'victorious'; cf. *Yad*, xxx, vii. 12, *Apidh*, ii, 8; *Bundakdih*, ii, 7, v. 1; *Maino-i Khorat*, xlix. 12; *Sīkand Gāmānī Vīyār*, iv, 28-38), while the keeping of the north is consigned to the constellation of Urha Manah (Av. *hāt-pō-trinīya, Phl. hāt-pō-trinīya*, 'with seven signs'; cf. *Yad*, viii. 12, xii. 28, xiii. 60; *Bundakdih*, ii, 7, v. 1, xiii. 12; *Maino-i Khorat*, xlix. 12; *Sīkand Gāmānī Vīyār*, iv, 28-38). The Pleiades (Av. *pāz-īz-īz*) are mentioned in the Avesta (*Yad*, vii. 12), and there are certain other allusions that may contain the names of special stars, though their interpretation is open to question (see Kari, in F. Miuller, in the Avesta in Zarathoést., ii, 7-29, Bombay, 1904). In giving an account of creation, the Pahlavi book *Bundakdih* (ii. 5) sets the number of stars at 6480 (or 64,800, according to another reading). This figure is not uninteresting when taken in connexion with the fact that astronomers generally allow that between 5000 and 8000 fixed stars are visible to the naked eye. Regarding the identification of certain of the major stars, though some are positively sure, reference may be made to a monograph by Muncherji P. Kharegert, 'Some Heavenly Bodies mentioned in Old Iranian Writings', Bombay, 1914, p. 372. The Pleiades are divided into two sub-divisions: *Tora* and *Madras*, in the Avesta, *Zarathoést.*, ii, 7-29, Bombay, 1904. In giving an account of creation, the Pahlavi book *Bundakdih* (ii. 5) sets the number of stars at 6480 (or 64,800, according to another reading). This figure is not uninteresting when taken in connexion with the fact that astronomers generally allow that between 5000 and 8000 fixed stars are visible to the naked eye. Regarding the identification of certain of the major stars, though some are positively sure, reference may be made to a monograph by Muncherji P. Kharegert, 'Some Heavenly Bodies mentioned in Old Iranian Writings', Bombay, 1914, p. 372. The Pleiades are divided into two sub-divisions: *Tora* and *Madras*, in the Avesta, *Zarathoést.*, ii, 7-29, Bombay, 1904. In giving an account of creation, the Pahlavi book *Bundakdih* (ii. 5) sets the number of stars at 6480 (or 64,800, according to another reading). This figure is not uninteresting when taken in connexion with the fact that astronomers generally allow that between 5000 and 8000 fixed stars are visible to the naked eye. Regarding the identification of certain of the major stars, though some are positively sure, reference may be made to a monograph by Muncherji P. Kharegert, 'Some Heavenly Bodies mentioned in Old Iranian Writings', Bombay, 1914, p. 372. The Pleiades are divided into two sub-divisions: *Tora* and *Madras*, in the Avesta, *Zarathoést.*, ii, 7-29, Bombay, 1904. In giving an account of creation, the Pahlavi book *Bundakdih* (ii. 5) sets the number of stars at 6480 (or 64,800, according to another reading). This figure is not uninteresting when taken in connexion with the fact that astronomers generally allow that between 5000 and 8000 fixed stars are visible to the naked eye. Regarding the identification of certain of the major stars, though some are positively sure, reference may be made to a monograph by Muncherji P. Kharegert, 'Some Heavenly Bodies mentioned in Old Iranian Writings', Bombay, 1914, p. 372. The Pleiades are divided into two sub-divisions: *Tora* and *Madras*, in the Avesta, *Zarathoést.*, ii, 7-29, Bombay, 1904.

4. Planets, meteorites, and comets.—In contrast to the fixed stars and regular constellations, the planets, meteorites, and comets were held by Zoroastrians to be disturbers of the established order of the universe, and consequently to be of Ahiranian origin and evil nature—a point of view directly opposed to that of Babylonians, where the planets were looked upon as distinctly beneficent in character (cf. Jastrow, *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, Boston, 1895, p. 379). Of course, the planets Mercury, Mars, Jupiter, Venus, and Saturn (the only five then known, but making seven with the sun and the moon, by the side of which they were usually mentioned) were held given, respectively, in Pahlavi the eponymous names *Tr*, *Vahrām*, *Akharmazd*, *Anāhīd*, and *Kēvān*, derived from divine names, including the name of the god Ahura Mazda himself, because these beneficent powers influenced the most intimate influences exercised by the planets (Bundakdih, i, 1-2; *Sīkand Gāmānī Vīyār*, iv, 1-5; *Zād-šaram*, i, 10, iv, 7-10, vi. 1-2; and consult the list in al-Āmmari, in *Sāhān*, Col. 172). The Persian treatise *Uṣūl-i Īslām* (tr. Vullers, *Fragmente über die Religion des Zorooster*, Bonn, 1831, p. 52) states that they originally bore the names of demons, but were afterwards given the designations of the planets. At the same time it is not impossible that we have in the Babylonian translation of the Babylonian names of the planets, *Nabu, Nergal, Marduk, Istar, Ninib*, as they appear from the equations, Marduk (lord of the gods) = *Aθārmazī = Jupiter; Nergal (god of war) = *Vahrām = Mars;* and *Istar = Anāhīd = Venus;* on the confusion between *Sīrīn* (Sūrīn) and *Sīkand* (*Zorooster*) 2) compare the note by Gray, *ERE* i, 798; and, for the Babylonian names of the planets, see *Jastrow, Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, pp. 370, 484-486. This parallel, in any case, is of interest because the Sanskrit names given by the Hindus to the planets show no likeness to the Babylonian (cf. Weber, *Vorlesungen über indische Literaturgeschichte*, Berlin, 1878, p. 268 f.). Shooting stars are alluded to in the Avesta (*Yad*, viii. 8) under the name of *karmān sādor*, a designation meaning, perhaps, 'worm stars'; and there are several passages in both Avesta and Pahlavi literature, which allude presumably to comets (*Yasna*, xvi. 8; *Bundakdih*, v. 2, xxviii. 44, xxx. 17; *Dādāstān-i Dinik*, xxviii. 55, lx. 2).

5. Signs of the zodiac.—The names of the twelve signs of the zodiac, at least in Persian times, correspond in concept with those familiar to us through the Greek and Latin designations, and are parallel likewise with the Babylonian, from which, like the Indo-Germanic zodiac in general, they are believed to be derived, and of which their names are translations—a phenomenon precisely paralleled in India and in most of the Asiatic countries (see Ginzel, *Handbuch der Chronologie*, Leipzig, 1906, pp. 78-88). Thus in Pahlavi we find *Parāk* ('Rām', *Aries*), *Tārā* ('Bull', *Taurus*), *Pē-pathur* ('Two-figures', *Gemini*), *Kalhak* ('Crab', *Cancer*), *Sēr* ('Lion', *Leo*), *KhuSak* ('Maiden', *Virgo*), *Tartādūk* ('Balance', *Libra*), *Gasdām* ('Scorpion', *Scorpio*), *Nēmosp* ('Half horse', *Sagittarius*), *Vahik* ('Goat', *Capricorn*), *Dīt* ('Water-up', *Aquarius*), *Mašīk* ('Fish', *Pisces*). The names of the twenty-eight lunar mansions, as recognized in the subdivisions of the astronomers (Av. *zūrāt-i hāmārdakān*), are given in the *Sāhān*, and it is probable that the various designations is by no means sure, and the individual identification of the names remains, therefore, uncertain, even when compared with those in the Sogdian and Khorasanian list, given about A.D. 1000 by al-Birūnī (*Chronology*, tr. Sachan, p. 227 l.).² Possibly some further light may be gained from a study of the terminology used for these asterisms by the Hindus, Chinese, and Arabs, if not by the Babylonians (see Ginzel, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-76). Such an attempt has already been made from the Sanskrit side, in comparison with Avestan and Pahlavi, by a Parsi scholar named Anjali, in a piece entitled 'Asterisms in Iranian Literature' in *Cmna Memorial Volume*, Bombay, 1900, pp. 216-227.

6. Prediction of events.—Like the reference in the preceding paragraph to the minor civilizing influences used by the astronomers (*Bundakdih*, i. 3), there are kindred allusions in Sasanian literature to the calculations of the astronomers or to the com-
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putations made by astrologers with regard to observing favourable or unfavourable conjunctions of the stars (e.g., Dātāstān-ī Dinik, lviii. 3; Sikand Īrānūnī Vījār, iv. 28; Epistles of Mānuśīkār, p. 256). These were known even though written in Pahlavi. Astronomers, however, disagreed with his ‘wise men and constellation-knover’ (dānavakn va axtar-mārān in the Pahlavi text Kārātūn-ē Ārtakshārī Pāpakān, ii. 4–5, ili. 5–6, or Pahlavi, p. 1808, pp. 10–11, 15–16), and their knowledge of the position of the stars at the moment enabled them to predict to him future events. In a Pahlavi work dated A.D. 881 and entitled Epistles of Mānuśīkār, ili. 9–11 (re-translated by West, SBE xxviii, Introd. p. xlvii), there is a specific allusion to a set of astronomical ‘tables’ (Pahl. zık, cf. Arab. zij, and the Byzantine Gr.ζῆς of Theodorus Meliteniotes, ed. Usener, Ad historiam Astronomicae Symbolae, Bonn, 1876, p. 14), which were constructed by ‘the great Shatru-ayār’. See, more fully, art. SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Muhammadān), p. 599 below.

The recurrence of such events, as well as those of Ptolemy and of the Hindus.

7. Astronomical works.—Some of the works from which citations have been drawn above, like the one last quoted, actually belong to the early Muhammadān period (i.e., the third century of the Hegira), but were composed in the Pahlavi. Astronomy, influenced by Arab science, continued to flourish in Iran under Muslim rule. The notable scientific achievements of the great savant and chronologist, al-Bīrūnī of Khiva (973–1049), are sufficient to prove that fact, and it is certain that computations of the positions of the heavenly bodies must have played an important part in the reform of the calendar and establishing the new Jaliālī era, in 1079, by the Seljūk sultan, Jalāl-al-dīn Malikshāh, under the direction of a commission of scholars headed by the well-known astronomer-poet, Omar Khayyām. Omar, in fact, had been summoned to Nīshāpūr by the sultan, four years previously, to make observations in the royal observatory, and there he constructed the Zīj-i Malikšāh, ‘Astronomical Tables of Malikšāh’, which were employed in the royal calendar reform. The names of two of his colleagues engaged upon the reform were Abū’l-Muẓaffar al-Iṣfahānī and Māmān ibn Najāb al-Wāṣīṭi (see Browne, Literary History of Persia, iv. 349, p. 163). A section of a large work composed in 1082–1083 by Kāi-Kān and entitled Qā绝缘-Nāmeh (ch. 34) was devoted to ‘astronomy and mathematics’ (ed. Teshrīhu, 1255; tr. A. Quatremère, Paris, 1897; cf. Browne, Lit. Hist. Pers. ii. 277). The Persian poet Anvari, of the 13th. century, was a great astrologer, and a conjunction of the planets in the sign of Libra, calculated to take place on September 16, 1188 (or in October of the preceding year, according to other accounts), led him to predict dire calamities for that day; but happily they did not occur (see Browne, Lit. Hist. Pers. ii. 368; Horn in Gīrāt, p. 362–365). In the 14th. century, the Mongol ruler Hulagu Khan, grandson of Chingiz Khan, established a celebrated observatory at Maragha, in Azerbaijan, Western Persia, the building of which was begun in 1256, and of its ruins are still to be seen (cf. Wilson, Persia: Life and Customs, New York, 1895, p. 77). Hulagū’s astronomer-royal was the learned Naṣīr-al-Dīn of Tūs (1201–1274), whose Zīj-i Hūrānī, or almansiya and astronomical tables, was a notable contribution to science (see Browne, Lit. Hist. Pers. ii. 484–486). The names of several other andover Medieval Persian astronomers, with a mention of their tables, are found in the Byzantine treatise of Theodorus Meliteniotes, referred to above (ed. Usener, pp. 13–14). Best known among the astronomical tables, however, are those of Ulugh Beg, grandson of Timur and founder of the observatory at Samarqand, in which the astronomers (albeit in 1231–1232), and eventually, written in Arabic, were translated into Persian and were made accessible in Europe through a Latin version by Greaves (Gravius, London, 1622), and in Latin and Persian and Latin (Oxford, 1665), and more recently by Bailly (London, 1843) in Memoirs of the Royal Astronomical Society, xiii. 79–125. With reference to the present state of astronomical studies in Persia itself, one of the largest meteorites in the world is preserved as a curiosity in the Shah’s palace at Tehran to-day; but there is no astronomer-royal to know its true value, and Persia must still wait a renaissance before independent work in studying the heavens is done by those of native birth.

3. Influence of the heavenly bodies.—The astrological aspects of Persia’s early studies of starlore and sun have already been indicated above. In fact, there is little reason to doubt that ‘judicial astrology’, or the attempt to determine scientifically the presumed influence of the heavenly bodies upon the world or upon the destiny of events, is taken more highly than natural astrology, or astronomy in our sense, which confines its investigations to determining the motions and positions of the stars, sun, and moon, in order to gain more strictly scientific results, as well as their influence on the welfare of mankind (e.g., Yat, vi. 1–5, v. 5; Bundahish, vii. 2–4, and elsewhere), while the stars also entered into the sphere of human activity by exercising a kindly sway over events, the most powerful of them being the star Tsītryā, aided by Satavānās in the Avesta (Yat, viii. 1–62; Strīzh, i. 13, 18), combats the demon of drought, when invoked by men, and confers blessings upon his faithful worshippers. The victorious star Vanan, (Yat, xx. 1) regulates the influence of evil; and Hapīr-īrānī (Ursā Major) is effective even in tempering the torment of the souls in hell, a region located in the North (Martano-dī, lxxvii. 12, 13; cf. Yat, vi. 15–21; Sikand Īrānūnī Vījār, iv. 31–33). The three fixed stars or constellations just named are regarded in the Pahlavi book Sīyatat la-Sīyatat (xiv. 5–6), which was written about the 7th. and 8th. century, but contains, in the section about the Tsītryā, exercising an influence upon the efficiency of the sacrifice during the time of their ascendancy. In another chapter of the same work (Sīyatat la-Sīyatat, xxii. 1–7) a specifically fortunate character is ascribed to the shadow of the noonday and afternoon sun when occupying certain positions in the zodiacal signs; and in Dātāstān-ī Dinik, vi. 9, the stars are synonymous with destiny. The malign influence ascribed to the planets has been sufficiently indicated above, and need not be referred to again in this section.

Sufficient reference has likewise been made to the part played by astrological astronomy and horoscopes both in Sassanian and in Muhammadān-Persian times. We need only recall the allusion to the last of the Parthian kings, Ardavan, and his astrologer Astūnūnī Īrānūnī (al-Bīrūnī, Gronoendy, tr. Sascha, p. 63). A good illustration, in the 17th. century, of ephemerid tables that were used also for horoscope purposes may be found in a work translated from the Arabic, Persian, and Turkish, with a Latin commentary,
SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Japanese).

In the ancient mythology of Japan the sun-goddess plays the most important role, while the moon-goddess, her brother, occupies an insignificant place, and almost nothing is told about stars. The commonly accepted story is that the sun-goddess (Aiorior panta, a blue hunch-backed deity) and the moon-goddess (‘Izuki-yemi, ‘the ruler of the moonlight night’) were born, together with the storm-god (Susa-no-wo, ‘the swift-impetuous’), of the couple who were the progenitors of all the deities and archipelago. In this story the creation of these deities is conceived evidently as a generative act, whereas another version makes the emergence of the two deities from the ‘white copper’ mirrors the work of the male progenitor alone. Perhaps a more interesting version of the story is that the sun and the moon were produced out of the eyes of the progenitor, when he was washing in order to purify himself from the stains with which he had been contaminated on his visit to the infernal world after the death of his consort. Though there are these different versions, the common trait and predominant factor in the story is that the sun-goddess is considered to be the supreme ruler of heaven and earth, and also the progenitrix of the ruling family, who claim to have handed down from the goddess herself the insignia of the throne (see below). Now the relation between the sun-goddess and the moon-goddess is based on the natural phenomenon that the two are visible alternately by day and by night. The story is as follows:

The sun-goddess once commissioned her brother, the moon, to go down from their heavenly abode to earth to see Ukemochi, a heavenly wine. When the moon obtained the moon with the food-stuffs taken out of her body, the moon became so enraged and threw them into the food. The sun-goddess was so disgusted with her brother’s wantonness that she said to him: ‘That is a wicked deed. I must not see your face again.’ Hence the sister and brother appear alternately in heaven.

The intention of the story is evident, but at the same time it shows a characteristic of the sun-goddess as the matron of agriculture, which played a great part in the myths and worship of the goddess.

Thus, in contrast to the prominent role played by the sun-goddess, the moon plays a very inferior part, a much smaller part is played by the stars. A star-god is mentioned in the ancient myth, but his rôle is quite ambiguous, while a festival in honour of certain stars (the stellar constellations called the Hordman and the Weavermaid) was derived from China. All other stories and worship of stars are much later and were introduced chiefly through Buddhist agency.

Though some of them may have been derived from other sources—Hindu, Persian, or Chinese. The most prominent star-worship is that of the Pole star, together with Ursus Major. These stars, conceived as a female deity, are worshipped by Buddhists as the protector of the country as well as of individual fortune, while the Shintōists identify them with the Ōkotsū, ‘palace of iridescent subtlety’ (Shi-hi-kyō in Sino-Japanese), where the highest deity, Shin-tō, is supposed to reside. It is believed that the sun and moon, stars and constellations (Minaka-nushi), are believed to reside. But this Shintō worship is of late origin; it was especially emphasized by a Shintō theorizer in the early part of the 19th century.

When Buddhism was introduced into Japan (6th cent.) questions came up as to the relationship between the indigenous deities and the Buddhist pantheon, the Buddhist teachers tried to discover analogies between them and to explain that the Buddhist deities were the original nomina and the native ones their later manifestations. The most striking analogy was found between the sun-goddess and the aspect of Buddha’s personality conceived in the sun-myth. The difference in gender concerned the syncretist but little, partly because the Japanese language had no genders at all, partly because the manifestations of the sun-goddess were not sex-specific. The result was an identification of the Japanese sun-goddess with Buddha Vairocana (‘the illuminator’), and this conception exercised a wide influence on doctrine and worship during the sway of the syncretic Shinshō from the 8th century onward. In the middle of the 19th century it was dissolved by force. Among the theorets of the Shinshō syncretism we may cite one, Kanera (1402–81), who explained sun, moon, and stars as corresponding to the three insignia of the throne, i.e., the sun to the mirror, the moon to the jewel, and the stars to the sword. This eclectic theory was backed by the popular conception of the ‘three-illuminating bodies’ (San-kō) and their worship. People even nowadays regard with simultaneous appearance of the three as an auspicious occasion for worship and as a sign of special blessing to the country—e.g., when on an autumn day the clear sky and the comparatively weak light of the sun cause the new moon and a certain star (Venus) to be visible to the eyes. Not only was various conceptions of the celestial bodies were used for methods of divination and predictions. In these methods Hindu, Persian, and Chinese elements may be detected, and their influence is still a living force among the mass of the people.

SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Muhammadan).

I. ASTROLOGY—1. Name. Among the Muslims the technical name of astrology is ʿilm (or ʿiniʿat) al-ḥabām an-nuṣyāmīn, 2 science (or art) of the decrees of the stars, ’ilm al-ḥabām, science of the decrees. Sometimes, though rarely, in place of al-ḥabām its synonym ʿiḥrād is found. Another name is an-nuṣyāmān (niḥrān) or ʿilm an-nuṣyāmān. On the other hand, the names ʿilm (ʿiniʿat) an-nuṣyām, science (or art) of the stars, ’ilm al-ṭarāqān, mean astronomy as we know it today, and they also mean both of these sciences taken together. The word ḥabām also signifies ‘judgments’, ‘judicial decisions’; accordingly the first of the above mentioned terms given above in the Middle Ages translated in the Latin versions of Arabic works by scientia judiciorum stell-
2. Divisions.—The Muhammadans usually arrange the science of astrology under five principal heads:

(a) The fundamental principles of astrology, viz. the different divisions of the ecliptic, the properties of the various celestial places and of individual planets, the methods of determining the ascendant and the 12 celestial houses (bay'at, 'domus'), the planetary conjunctions, etc.

(b) Prognostics of a universal character (al-akhbām 'ālā umūr al-'alam), viz. those which refer to the vicissitudes of kingdoms, dynasties, religions, and classes of men, events, winds, rains, the prices of goods, etc. This part of astrology, which Ptolemy calls ṣawtulmam and kalēdn, 'universal apotelesmatics,' is usually called by the Arabic term al-qa'āma al-qārī 'ulūm annur muni, since a great part of these prophecies is deduced from the planet which has the dignity of 'significator' (qārīn, dālī, ḥujjat) at the moment when the sun enters Aries, i.e. at the beginning of each tropic year. This universal part of astrology is subdivided into three sections: (i) predictions drawn from the various kinds of planetary conjunctions (qārīn, qārīn), (ii) predictions based on the 'revolution annur mundi,' (iii) predictions relating to the 'mutations aeris' (taghasyur al-hand), i.e. to meteorological phenomena, and which are deduced from the lunar stations, or from the heliocentric rising of Sirius, etc.

(c) Individual prognostics relating to the vicissitudes of individuals, derived from the planet or other celestial place which may happen to be the 'significator' at the moment of birth, and therefore of influence on the future of the individual for successive tropic years. This part of astrology Ptolemy calls ṣawtulmamīk and the Arabs al-mawālid, 'nativitates.'

(d) Mu'mid, 'interrogations' (fawqīj, fawqīj), or that part of astrology which is concerned with replies to questions, e.g., the circumstances of a distant relative, the author of a theft, the hiding-place of a runaway slave, etc. The 'interrogations' are always connected by the Muhammadan astrologers with the division of the heavens into 12 'domus.' From the astrologers who follow the pure tradition of Ptolemy do not admit the 'interrogations.'

(e) Ḩiyārāt, 'elections,' i.e. the choice of the propitious moment for doing any particular thing. The most common method is that of determining such a moment by seeking in which of the 12 celestial 'domus' the moon is found at that particular moment. This was also very probably the method employed by the Greeks; but along with this the Muhammadan astrologers use another method, of Indian origin (but also attributed to Dorotheus), which consists in deducing the fitting moment for action from the place which the moon then occupies in one of the 28 lunar stations or mansions (mānāt). The 'elections' also are not admitted by the astrologers who follow Ptolemy's teaching.

3. Place among the sciences.—The science of the stars, which is also known as the Tetrabiblos, or Quadrupartium, consists of two parts: the first studies the appearances of the heavenly bodies either with respect to each other or with respect to the earth; the second seeks the relations and significations of those appearances, the changes which take place in the sublunar world. The first part is a science which stands by itself, and can be studied independently of the second; this, on the contrary, cannot do without the first. This conception that astrology is but the sister of astronomy, a branch, that is to say, of the 'science of the stars,' which in its turn is a part of 'mathematics' ('ulum rlqdiyāyih, 'ulum al-lamīnayyih, ta'alum), is common to all the Muhammadan astrologers and astronomers, and is accepted also by some philosophers (al-Farābî in his De Scientiis, and the Ibyan ag-sa'af, or 'sincere companions' of the 10th cent. in their Epistles, by the author of the Mosafīt al-alum, or 'Encyclopedia of the Sciences' (10th cent.), and by the great historian philosopher Ibn Hālīkān (Proleg. lib. vi. cap. 13; M. G. de Salines' Fr. tr., Paris, 1862-68, iii. 122 f.).

Astrology, however, is classified in a different way by the majority of the philosophers. Muhammad writers are usually divided into four great categories: (a) sciences which relate to religious law ('ulum sharā'īyayih), that is to say, in addition to theology and canon law, the learning which serves as an introduction to them, namely, grammar, lexicography, rhetoric, poetry, history, etc.; (b) intellectual or philosophic sciences ('ulum ṣaqilayyih or hikmāyyayih), which the author of the Mosafīt al-alum, thinking of their origin, calls 'ulum al-saqā'af, 'foreign sciences.' The intellectual or philosophical sciences in their turn are for the most part divided into the three sections already fixed by the later Greek peripatetics and by the Neo-Platonic expounders of Aristotle (e.g., Ammonius, Simplicius, and Johannes Philoponus), namely: (a) metaphysic (al-hikmah al-'ajam, théōría, τα μετὰ τὰ φυσικά); (b) natural sciences (al-fikhnayyih al-'atbīyyayih, 'natural philosophy,' φυσικά); (c) mathematical sciences (al-fikhnayyih ar-riqādīyayih, μαθηματικά). These last correspond to the Quadrivium of Boethius, namely, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music; but the others are divided into two parts, the natural sciences are subdivided into eight fundamental parts, named for the most part after the titles of the corresponding Aristotelian works, namely: Ausculatioophysica, Generatioet corruptum, Cosmum et mundum, Meteoroe, Mineralia, Vegetalia, Animalia, de Anima. Avicenna (Fia allām al-alum al-ṣawtulmamīk, in Ti rul 11, Constantinepol, 1266 A.H. [=A.D. 1881], p. 71 ff.). Muhammad al-Akāfī an-Suhawī (Irshād al-qāṣīd, ed. A. Sprenger, Calcutta, 1849; the author died in 749 A.H. [=A.D. 1348]), Hājjī Hālīfān (in the introduction to his Lexicon bibliographicum et encyclopaedicum), and others consider astrology as one of the 7 (or 9) Puruṣ' 'secondary branches' of the natural sciences, placing it, that is to say, beside medicine, physiology, interpretation of dreams, alchemy, the science of talismans, etc. This same classification of the natural sciences is found in al-Ghazālī (fī 105 A.H. [= A.D. 1111]), who, in his Tahāfūt al-

1 Each of these two great categories afterwards gave place to the distinction between the 'mathematical' (al-ahdām) sciences—a distinction which has its origin in Aristotle (E. S. G. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Greecen, Tübingen, 1873-83, ii. B. 177).

2 Other divisions, indicated in the writings of the Ibyan ag-sa'af, in the Mosafīt al-alum, etc., are useless for our present purpose.

Avempace, in the Tahafut al-tahafut, Cairo, 1319 (1901), p. 121, admits, as corresponding to Arabian teaching, the eight fundamental parts of the natural sciences; but he denies that the so-called derived branches are sciences. Medicine, he says, is an art (sindah) and not a science; it has a practical and not a theoretical character; according to Avempace the same category with divination from the flight of birds and from the movement of quadrupeds (zijar) and divination in the form of vaticinations (khahānādā), with physiology and with the interpretation of dreams, all being arts which have as their aim the prediction of the future, but which are not sciences either theoretically or practically, however it may be supposed that one may sometimes derive some practical advantage from them.

A curious classification is found at the beginning of the untitled book De Interrogationibus (Pet-ma'sulid) of the astrologer Ya'qūb al-Kindī, who lived during the 3rd cent. A.D. (cf. H.B.). According to the catalogue of the Arabic MSS of Berlin (W. Ahlwardt, Verzeichnis der arab. Handschriften, Berlin, 1857-99; v. 275, no. 5871), he maintains the classification of astrology, medicine, science of the stars; the last, being based not on observation, but on deduction from analogy, occupies a place between the other two.

3. Sources.—(a) Greek.—These are represented by the classic (if we may call it so) astrology of the Tetrabiblos or Quadruplicatum of Ptolemy; by the writings of Dorotheus Sidonius (1st cent. A.D.), which go back to the Greek-Egyptian tradition; by the great treatises of Menelaus and Ptolemy on the division of the zodiac into signs, and of Vettius Valens (2nd cent. A.D.); by the book on the 'decani,' the 'interrogations,' and the natalies of Antiochus of Athens (2nd or 3rd cent. A.D.), which appears especially to follow the Babylonian tradition; by the Kapris, or Contilgoarium, falsely attributed to Ptolemy; by some works ascribed to the mythical Hermes; and by an author whose name (Etimos, Zimos?) is cited by Arabic writers in a form so corrupt as to be unrecognizable. Of another Greek writer, Teucer or Teuccur of Babylon, the Arabs had knowledge through Iranian sources.

(b) Islamic.—The Muslim writers mention seven or eight Indian astrologers, whose names, however, has not as yet been possible to identify with the corresponding Sanskrit. The most important is K.n.k, or K. lkh, who, according to some Arabic writers, appears to have come to Baghdad to the court of the khalif al-Mansūr, bringing thither astronomical books of India, and, according to others, making known Indian arithmetical astrology. Of the Arabs attribute to him writings on the mumāddar (that is, on the method of ascertaining a factitious ascendant of the nativity), on the nativities, and on the conjunctions of the planets; it is therefore plain that he had adopted the part of Indian astrology called in Sanskrit horā or jātaka, which arose through Greek influence. This confirms a conjecture of F. Boll (Sphaerae, Leipzig, 1903, p. 414 f.), who, from the citations contained in the Introductio of Abū Ma'shar (or Alhambour), infers that K.n.k. had before him various texts of distant Greek science. For his representation of the figures arising in the heavens together with the 'decani,' but in general, Muslimu astrologers cite simply 'the Indians' (al-Ihind), which points to the Alhindīs.

We must further add that the influence of Indian astrology made itself felt sometimes through Persian writings and oral teaching, as is apparent from some Indian words which have passed into the Arabic terminology in an Iranian form—e.g., darjān (Ind. drekāhvat).

(c) Persian.—These are in the Pahlavi language or Middle Age Persian. The writings of Teucer of Babylon (second half of the 1st cent. A.D.) on the figures arising in the heavens together with the 'decani' reached the Arabs through a Persian version, where the name of the author, on account of the ambiguity of the Pahlavi writing, was afterwards spelt by the Persians and Arabs Tinkalās (also Tankalīsh or Tankallāsh); so that in the Introductio of Abū Ma'shar his teachings were given as 'teachings of the Persians' (mardtibāk air. Pār.) and have become synonymous names of constellations (cf. Boll, p. 415 f.). Another source was Buzurjmihr's commentary on the astrological Abodaer of Vettius Valens; the Pahlavi translation of this treatise was 'selected,' which became in Arabic al-bīzīdah and was afterwards variously and strangely corrupted by Arabic writers. The Muslims also cited as a source of astrological teachings the mythical Zoroaster (Zaradust in Arabic writings, Zarust at in modern Persian writings), whose name indeed was already frequently found in Greek astrology of the 4th and following centuries. A fourth source is the book of the natalities of [al]-Andār- zahr, son of Zādānfarrah; but we lack information about this personage, whose name is corrupted into Alincedegol in the Latin version of Alcabitius (al-Qāhīs), and into Andrapgar in the Latin version of the book of the Jiw Ibn 'Eznat on the natalities which always draws on Arabic sources. These astrological writings are ascribed by the Arabs to Ardashir the Wise (the trusted counsellor of the successor of the khanqāh) seem to be late Muslimian falsifications.

We do not know exactly when all these works hitherto mentioned were first translated into Arabic, but it is certain that the compilation of them was known in the second half of the 8th cent. A.D., that is, when Musulmān culture began. If the indication placed at the end of the unedited 'Ard mūfīd al-nāma'ah of Hernes (MS in Bibliothek Ambrosiana in Milan) is true, this book would seem to have been translated in the month Dhū l-Qu'dāh, 125 A.H., namely, in September 743 A.D., while the Umayyad khalifs were still reigning. The first version of the Tetrabiblos is due to Abū Yaḥyā al-Baṭrīq, a translator of the time of al-Manṣūr, the second Aḥbābad khalīf (130-158 A.H. [A.D. 754-775]); Dorotheus and Antiochus are also mentioned in the writings of Mā 'shī (Messahala) in the second half of the 8th cent.; all the other Greek authors mentioned above are amply cited by the astrologers of the 9th century. As has already been said, the writings of the Indian K.n.k seem to have been known at Baghdad in the time of the khalif al-Manṣūr; and about the middle of the 9th century, we shall search among the astrologers, especially among the 'followers of al-Kūnī' (Alchabas) formed expressly on Indian models. It is almost certain that the Persian books were translated by members of the family...
Nawbhat, known by their translations from Pahlavi into Arabic (cf. Kitāb al-Fīrāt, pp. 244, 274), whose head was astrologer at the court of al-Manṣūr; and in any case the antiquity of Iranian astrology is supported by the fact that in the works of Māshā’ī Allāh, according to the Latin translation of John of Seville, technical terms of Iranian origin are freely used: e.g., *ahdleyg (ahludyg), alicohen (al-kududah), taliyak.*

Side by side with the written sources there was, without doubt, the oral tradition of the peoples converted to Islam. Among the Syrians Christianity had almost suffocated astrology, although Bardeanes (154–222) had reconciled Christian dogma with an attenuated form of predestination by means of the stars; all the same we know that at Harrān, the ancient Carhae, special astrological traditions flourished along with other pagan sciences.

It is further probable that Theophilus, son of Thomas, a Christian of Edessa who was astrologer of the khaliif al-Mahdi (A.D. 755–756), and who has been cited by several Muslim astrologers as an authority on the subject of 'elections,' again took up with Syrian oral tradition. In the same manner it is natural that there were absorbed into Muslim astrological doctrines and practices of the Aramaic centres (tending to paganism) of Mesopotamia and Babylonia, of the Egyptians, etc. Finally, we must not forget the Judaic element which had a notable part in the first ages of Musulmān astrology; in fact, among the principal writers on astrological matters in Arabic in the 2nd and 3rd centuries of the Hijra are the Jews Māshā’ī ‘Allāh, ibn Bishr, Rabban al-Talāri, and Sanad ibn Allī. 5.

5. Special character.—The civilized peoples over whom the Arabic domination of the 7th, 8th, and 9th centuries extended, viz. Greeks, Copts, Syrians, Persians, and Indians, had already imagined all the possible fundamental combinations concerning the influence of the stars over mundane events; consequently it was impossible for the Musulmān astrologer to find out anything substantially new. On the other hand, the principal justification of astrology consisted precisely in presenting itself as the jealous preserver of that which an age-long respect and veneration had taught, the wise of preceding generations. The office of the Musulmān astrologers consequently was reduced to a choosing of what seemed suitable among the many principles and methods of their predecessors, and an arrangement and combination of elements of very diverse origin, amplifying and completing particular points on which it was easy to give free rein to fancy. All this, as we have said, was done with the widest eclecticism. But, though nothing really original is met with in the field of astrologers properly so called, there is, all the same, a point on which Arabo-Musulmān astrology is far superior to other astrologers, including the Greek, and represents a real progress. This consists of a wide and continued application of spherical astronomy and of exact mathematical processes to the methods of astrological research. Among the Greek astrologers the calculations are very rough; area of the ecliptic are substituted for area of the equator, right ascensions for oblique ascensions; rough tables, useful for a determined terrestrial latitude, are also employed for different latitudes; the latitudes of the planets are neglected in the calculation of the radiations (projectiones radiorum, *māfirīsh ash-šulw*). Among the Greeks, however, we see a clear disposition of an ordered method of determining mathematically the 12 heavenly ‘domés,’ which, however, form one of the hinges of the astrological system. Ptolemy himself, teaching minutely in the *Tetrabiblos* how the ‘directio’ (*epórion*) is calculated, completely neglects the latitude of the planets. Characteristic is the fact that Ptolemy, in the *Almagest*, occupies himself with three problems useful only to astrologers (identification of the shadow of the planet in the solar disk with respect to the ecliptic and to the horizon, position of the stars with respect to the sun in consequence of the daily motion of the sphere, appearance of the solar eclipses calculated with respect to the sun), and which even in astrology are of very small importance; and, on the other hand, he does not make the slightest allusion to other problems of spherical astronomy which would be of capital importance for apotelmatics. Musulmān astronomers, on the contrary, teach exact calculations, and often even prepare tables for all the mathematical problems required by astrology: determination of the 12 eccentrics; *domes* of heavens, ‘directio,’ ‘revolutiones annorum,’ ‘profectio,’ ‘projectio radiorum.’ Thus astrology, among the Musulmāns, becomes an art which demands a mathematical preparation, and which tends to give an ever greater mathematical complication and exactness to its methods of research among celestial phenomena. E.g., the *manarr* in astrology (‘passage [of the planet] through the houses’ or ‘supereminentia,’ of our astrologers) corresponds exactly from an apotelmatic point of view to the *kávmpopóros* of the Greeks; but whilst for the Greeks this takes place when a planet is situated to the west of another, viz. has a lesser longitude, for the Arabs the *manarr* takes place when a planet in its own epicycle is distant from the apogee of the epicycle less than another planet is distant from the apogee of its own epicycle. Consequently, its calculation in Musulmān astrology is not a light matter, and requires the employment of complete planetary tables. We can understand, therefore, why the theory of the *manarr* of the planets is not only expounded in several treatises of spherical astronomy, but has also given rise to special monographs. The importance of all this is plain; in the Hellenistic world astrology flourishes while astronomy decays; in the Musulmān world of the Middle Ages astrology becomes a potent ally of mathematical and observational astronomy.

6. Polemic concerning astrology.—From Islam astrology must have had a much better and more respectable reception than from Christianity. The latter had to combat in the teachings of astrology an entire world of pagan ideas and cults; it had to contend against the polyhymnian and dualistic wish of the Christian free will. In the 7th and 8th centuries A.D., however, the pagan elements of astrology were completely modified; they were so entirely hidden under a verbal formalism as to be no longer recognizable; and, on the other hand, orthodox Islam, with its doctrine of predestination, which excluded the freedom of human actions, was, at bottom, very far removed from the *clausura* of the Stoics and of many astrologers of antiquity. When we consider that the first Musulmān theologians took no heed whatever of the sciences which did not appear to have any relation to the religious combat of Islam, we easily understand how astrology had been able to advance unimpeded through its first stages almost up to the end of the 2nd cent. of the Hijra. It is not, therefore, astonishing that Abū Ma’shar, writing his *Introductorium* in 845 A.D., among the ten categories of persons hostile to astrological teaching, makes no mention whatever of opponents of astrology, and that he makes his defence of astrology to consist (Introduction, 1. 5, fol. b 2 v., b 3 v.) only in an amplification of the arguments with which Ptolemy (*Tetrab.*, 1. 3)
had already manifested the material and moral advantages of foreseeing the future, and there was no reason to be adverse to the work. The 'philosopher of the Arabs,' al-Kindi, who died a little after 870 A.D., regards astrology as an integral part of philosophy (Islam, falsafah); he seeks its confirmation not only in the four mathematical, but also in the physical and metaphysical doctrines; 1 and he opposes it to many popular prejudices. Al-Kindi was perhaps the only one who endeavoured to refute astrology. But it is a question whether the arguments and preconceived notions form the principles and the methods of astrology.

But matters soon underwent a change. Towards the end of the 2nd cent. of the Hijra the knowledge of Aristotle 2 became more diffused and profound, and in this there was no place for astrology; hence the philosophers commenced to make war against it. On the other hand, the theologians were not slow to see in the influence attributed to the stars over human actions a menace to the severely monothestic conception of Islam, more especially when later on there filtered into Musalman theology an opinion of the idea of predestination (dalil, karama), which, we believe, in the case of certain of continued creative acts became more prevalent. Moreover, the daring predictions concerning the duration of Islam 3 became an evident danger to dogma. Thus the pelagic against astrology became prevalent.

The most ancient confusion which we possess is that of Abu'l-Qasim Is'a ibn Ait, 4 drawn up in the first half of the 10th cent., and preserved in the third part of the famous Mathematical treatise Ibn Qayyim al-Jauziyah, Mi'tah dar as-altahad. 5

After an exordium in which he admits that the stars may have some influence on such natural phenomena as earthquakes and storms, 6 but confines the practice of foretelling the future by their means, he divides his dissertation into three distinct parts. The first has reference to the discordance among astronomers as to their fundamental principles concerning the nature of the causality of the stars, and an exposition follows of several fundamental principles for astrological calculations on which the various writers disagree—e.g., the method of determining the planetary 'termini,' the 'significator' (da'd, sherm), the 'pars fortuna,' the male and female nodical signs. The second part consists of the examination of many principles which are affirmed by the astrologers, but which are repugnant to good sense (mutazabat). In the third part Is'a ibn Ait cites some of the arguments adopted by the astrologers in favour of their science, and refutes them.

Contemporary with 'Isa ibn 'Ali is the famous philosopher-al-Farabi (q.v.; † A.D. 950), who, as a profound student of Aristotle, used to write against, but he was not opposed to astrology. We have a work of his on that subject, 7 which, however, is not so vigorous a conflagration as we should have expected from such a philosopher, and from such childish reasonings. This is explained by the fact that the work is merely a series of notes, published by a disciple who was to be found.

The philosophers contemporary with al-Farabi did not all share his hostility to astrology; in fact the schools which had been less subject to Aristotelian influence favoured it, as was already the case with al-Kindi. 8

With reference to this a special place is held by the Iywan as-Safa', 'Sincere Companions,' who flourished in al-Bayzah towards A.D. 900 and whose writings have provided astrologers with the mystical doctrines of the heretical Bani'is, a branch of whom was the Carmalists, which are mystical, and which, in the climate of the 3rd cent. A.D. (9th cent. A.D.) caused political disorders in the 'Iraq, and who founded an independent kingdom in N. E. Africa. The Carmalists hadraped great advantage from astrological predictions based on the theory of the great planetary conjunctions. 9 One can therefore understand that the Iywan as-Safa' did not only admitted, with Aristotle and other Arabic philosophers, that the changes (generation and corruption) of the sublunar world were consequent upon celestial movements, but also that the planets foreshadow the future and have a direct influence upon the will and the moral character. The great encyclopaedic work of the Iywan is based with these astrological ideas, among which the theory of planetary conjunctions occupies the principal place.

Favourable to astrology also are those other philosophers who lead up to Abu Sulaiman Muhammad ibn Tahir ibn Bahram as-Sijistani al-Mantaghi, who died in the 10th cent., and whose written works on astrology, a considerable number of which in the sublunar world are concerned upon celestial movements, but also that the planets foreshadow the future and have a direct influence upon the will and the moral character. The great encyclopaedic work of the Iywan is based with these astrological ideas, among which the theory of planetary conjunctions occupies the principal place.

Averroes (q.v.; † 1198) undertakes to compare astrology, not only in his great encyclopaedia, as-Sa'di, 'The Recovery of the Health of the Soul,' and in the as-Najdi, but also in a special work of which a full remuneration was made by Mehrem. 10 He demonstrates that astrology has no foundation, and proceeds to show that, even admitting its theoretical truth, it would be impossible for men to acquire a knowledge of it.

Averroes (q.v.), or Ibn Rushd († 505 A.H. [A.D. 1118]), is also a decided adversary of astrology, as appears from the severe judgment referred to above (§ 3) and from the passages in which he inveighs against astrology on Aristotle. But it would be useless to continue the review of the philosophers, who after the 10th cent. A.D. are all in agreement on this question. It is more interesting to consider the position taken up by the theologians, who—owing to the motives indicated at the beginning of this section —engaged, towards the end of the 9th cent. A.D., in a relentless war against astrological theory. 11

We have already seen the attitude of al-Jubbi. We may add here that Ibn Hazm († 486 A.H. [A.D. 1064]), who fiercely opposed the scholastic or speculative theology of al-As‘arî in Spain, gives his ideas on astrology in al-Fiqh fi l-mitali 'a-rahbi wa 'm-nilal. 12 He divides those who believe that the future can be foretold by means of the stars into two classes: (1) misbelievers and polytheists, against whom he will fight, and (2) those who first are those who maintain that the stars and the

1 Cf. the quotations in M. Steinheinscher, ZDMG xvii. [1864] 134; and chs. x. and xl of the anonymous Latin pamphlet De erroribus philosophorum (written in the second half of the 13th cent.), ed. F. Mutsonnet, Siger de Brabant, Louvain, 1868-11, pp. 18-32.

2 Ed. Théophile, son of Thomas, the astronomer of the third 'Abbasid khaliif (see above § 3), maintained that the reign of Islam would last only 600 years ( Ibn al-Maltak, Proph., ib. ib., ch. liv., tr. de Blanc, ii. 522). The philosopher al-Kindi calculated that the duration of the kingdom of the Arabs would be 605 years (see O. Lottin, 'Al-Malik al-Ali'ad,' in Monatsh. f. Klassische Forschungen, Festschrift an H. L. Fleischer, Leipzig, 1875, pp. 323-390).

3 Men like al-Jalib († 555 A.H., 969 A.D.) and the famous theologian al-Ash'ari († 503 A.H., 1116 A.D.) and al-As‘arî († 394 A.H., 1005 A.D.) were against astrology.

4 According to Ibn al-Qafi, ed. Lippert, p. 241, he died in Paris at the age of 30. He wrote in Arabic, C. 955 A.H., c. 956 A.D. (see H. R. H., also Fris, p. 120).

5 A work, included in the praesto of the Libellus copiosissimum ad magisterium juiterorum astronomorum, which al-Qahabi had written for Saif ad-dawlah, prince of Armenia, who resided from 553 to 556 A.D. (see H. R. H. p. 244-247).

6 Cairo, 1533-35 A.H. [A.D. 1905-07], ii. 158-196.

7 See A. Dhahabî, al-Makhtûbât fi 'l-Mathbûtât, p. 213.

8 See also a brief account by I. Goldziher, 'S nationalisten of the 19th century. (A.B.W, 1913, pp. 20-25.

heavenly spheres are intelligent beings, agents, of eternal duration, and disposing of earthly things either with or without God. The second are those who hold that the stars and the celestial spheres, whilst without intelligence, have been created and established by God as indicators of things which are to be followed.

The preserver of Ash'arite dogmatic theology, al-Ghazālī [† 505 A.H. [A.D. 1111]], opposes astrology in his Ḩußā'-ulām-ad-dīn, 'The Revival of Religious Sciences'.1 And the same attitude we find in the famous Ḥanbalite, Ibn Ṭamīyīyah [† 723 A.H. [A.D. 1325]].3

But the most vigorous and complete condemnation of astrology is contained in the Miftāḥ dar as-salāḥ of Ibn Qayyim al-Jauziyyah [† 751 A.H. [A.D. 1350]],5 one of the most noted theologians of the Ḥanbalite school. Only the famous work of Fico della Mirandola, Adversus astrologiam, can be compared to the 110 closely printed quarto pages of the condemnation written by this Muhammadan theologian, whose impassioned polemics press upon the adversary with an infinity of subtle distinctions which prove the force of his dialectic.

In the theological world perhaps the sole defender of astrology is Faḥr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī [† 606 A.H. [A.D. 1210]], cited above. Famous especially for his great commentary on the Qurʾān, he composed many metaphysical and astrological works, and studied medicine and mathematics. Without doubt his confidence in astrology is due to his cultivation of the sciences, and this confidence already appears in his commentary on the Qurʾān.

No theologian seems to have followed Faḥr ad-dīn ar-Rāzī in his bold interpretations of Qurʾānic passages and of religious traditions. Besides, after the writings of Ibn Qayyim al-Jauziyyah and his predecessors, polemics about astrology could no longer reckon on any novelty of argument. The considerations developed by the great philosopher of history, Ibn Ḥaldūn [† 805 A.H. [A.D. 1400]], in his historical Prolegomena,6 are alone deserving of notice.

7. Astrology in common life.—The four orthodox schools of jurisprudence and the Shi'ite school were already in existence when the war of the philosophers and theologians against astrology became fierce; accordingly, the anathema launched against it in the name of religion did not occupy much space, and the mere fact that this had its chief foundation in religious doctrine. Among some jurists of a rather later age, however, we meet with open hostility to astrology. In Muhammadan law the buying and selling of useless things is forbidden; therefore some jurists7 teach that one may not sell or buy books of astrology. Another legal prescript does not admit the testimony of misbelievers; therefore some jurists, regarding the astrologer as a misbeliever, deny him the right of acting as a witness.8 But, before theological anathema smote it, astrology was deeply rooted among all the classes of society. The courts of the Ḥāfdhīs kTAILS at Baghdad and of the numerous small dynasties which arose in the Muhammadan world after the 3rd cent. of the Hijrā received astrologers with great favour and consulted them on all sorts of questions, not only on questions of destiny, but also on striving matters of daily life. At the

1 Ibn, 1302-03 A.H. [A.D. 1886-90], i, 275 t. All this passage is copied without indication of its source in ad-Damirī, Ṣawā'ī al-bayyina, Cairo, 1903, i, 341 t. and ah.
2 Majmū'ut al-tawāṣel, Cairo, 1293-94 A.H. [A.D. 1876-77], i, 352-53.
3 Eld. ch. 23, 226-227 A.H. [A.D. 945-946], ii, 190-196.

foundation of Baghdad in A.D. 762, and at that of al-Mahdiyyah (in Tunis) in 916, the astrologers, either by their acts or by their quarrels, indicate the propitious moment for beginning the work. Many writings on apotropaeisms are dedicated to khilāfs, sultans, and princes. In Turkey, even at the beginning of the 19th cent., one of the chief posts at court was that of muṣaf-al-hakīmah, or chief of the astronomers. The case was similar in Persia, in India, and in Muhammadan central Asia.1 In the Thousand and One Nights not only is the astrologer with his astrolabe mentioned several times but (pp. 79 and 80 of the Egyptian ed.), but there is also a complete dissertation on the elements of astrology (Nights 254-257, in the story of the slave girl Tawaddud). Further, the considerable number of old Arabic astrologies still existing in the East and in South Europe would alone suffice to prove the great diffusion of astrology throughout the Muhammadan world; and it found strong support among the students of astronomy. Cases of persecution of astrologers by the State are extremely rare. Al-Jāḥi, Fatīmīd khalīf of Egypt, who in 404 A.H. [A.D. 1013-1014] prohibited the study of astrology, was himself of the Muslim persuasion and cultivated it, was an astrologer himself, and that decree of his is one of many acts of madness committed in the last years of his life.

In the Middle Ages, the most important writings into which European civilization has penetrated (which with the Copernican system has destroyed the bases of astrology) astrology has lost its importance and renounced the monopoly of the popular classes, among whom it has degenerated into a form of prediction without any serious mathematical and astronomical basis. On the other hand, in countries where there is little or no European influence (e.g., in many parts of Morocco) apotropaeisms still flourish, but accompanied by only rudimentary astronomical knowledge. To-day in S. Arabia the function of the astrologer is exercised especially by the gāṭī,3 i.e., by those whose duty it is to see that canon law is observed.1

8. Influence of European astrology.—The astrology of the Latin Middle Ages from the beginning of the 12th to the end of the 15th cent. is really Arabic astrology. Its sole sources are Arabic (Albohali, Albohazan, Alumasar, Alcabītius, Alchindus, Almansor, Alphadol, Aomar, Gergis, Hal, Haly, Helen Rodan, Messahala, Zahed, etc.), and this is not surprising, and not only on account of the standard Arabic translations from Arabic (e.g., the Tetribulos or Quadrupartitum of Ptolemy, and the Apocryphon or Centiloquium); the technical terminology is literal translation or mere corruption of Arabic words. In the 10th cent. the humanists rescued from oblivion the poem of Manilius and the crude compilation of Firmicus Maternus; but this was a mere literary exercise of no importance for the astrology of the 17th century.

In the Byzantine world also Muhammadan astrology leaves deep traces in many versions from the Arabic and Persian, and even in the Latin; 4 so that side by side with the works derived from the classic Greek authors appear those of 'Abū maʿṣar, 'Aḥṣaf (Ahmad ibn Yūsuf ibn ad-Dāyāh), Masūdā (Māšā Allah), Ẓābl (Saḥīl ibn Ḍisr), and other Arabic writers. Thus it is natural that in Byzantine astrological writings Arabic and Persian names of planets or technical terms which no longer correspond to those of classical Greek.

3 The Arabs and the Persians are called indiscriminately Persians.
Finally, the Jewish astrological literature of Europe, in which a conspicuous place is occupied by the works of Abraham ibn Ezra († 1167), is based exclusively on Arabic sources.

Jewish astronomers have left us no work setting out the content and history of Muslim astrology. For biographical and bibliographical notices of individual astrologers reference may be made to master copies of the Mafraj al-'aqliyyah and the Nihaya al-'aqliyyah. The mathematical side of Muslim astrology and the history of several technical terms are set forth in the present writer's annotations on al-Battani, Opus astronomi- num, Leipzig, 1899-1900, volume 2, beyond two or three small pre-sepulchral writings of no importance, printed or lithographed in Cairo, and the dissertation of D. Renier published by D. Loth (see above, p. 290, n. 2), there are no add. of complete astrological works in the original text; there are, on the other hand, a number of Middle Age Latin versions (16th-17th cent.), several of which have been cited in the course of the article.

II. ASTRONOMY.-1. Name.-The names 'ilm or sindat al-an-nújum, 'science (or art) of the stars,' has for its subject the study of the celestial bodies and astrology and astronomy. For the former science Avverroes 1 adopts the expression sindat an-nújum al-ta'dilimiyah, 'mathematical art of the stars,' which is the title of the original, the de Scientiis al-Farabi, where Gerard of Cremona translated it by 'astronomia doctrinalis,' misled by the double signification of the adjective ta'dilimiyah. The astronomic art of observation and calculation is denoted by Avverroes' sindat an-nújum al-tajribiyah, 'experimental art of the stars.' Special names of astronomy are 'ilm al-harâb, 'science of the form of the universe,' and 'ilm al-fizîk, 'science of the celestial spheres.' The branch of astronomy which deals with the construction and use of instruments for determining the time, especially for the purpose of regulating the times of the religious ceremonies, is in Arabic named 'ilm al-magât, 'the science of the time appointed for the canon prayers,' and he who cultivates it is called muwwaqit.

2. Greek and Muhammadan conception of astronomy does not exactly correspond to the modern conception. Al-Farabi says in his treatise de Scientiis 2 that astronomy is that science which frees the various motions of the celestial bodies and the earth from these three points of view: (a) number, figure, order, and respective positions of the spheres and of the celestial bodies; their magnitudes and distances from the earth; immobility of the earth; (b) celestial motions and their consequences with regard to phenomena (sunrise and sunset, eclipses and oppositions, eclipses, etc.); (c) magnitude of the inhabited part of the earth, that is, the land in zones or circles of influence of geographical co-ordinates; effects of the rotation of the celestial sphere in regard to parts having different latitudes (varying lengths of day and night, differences in the positions of the points of the ecliptic, etc.). This scheme of the content of astronomy is found also in later writers, with the sole difference that the study of the magnitudes and distances of the celestial bodies and spheres comes to be considered under a category (d) separate from (a).

According to Avicenna, the astronomer studies 'the parts of the universe as far as regards their figure, their respective positions, their magnitudes, and their distances from each other: he further studies the motions of the spheres and of the celestial bodies, the estimate (kifârî) of the spheres, of the axes (k. qâbîb) and of the circles (kifârî) on which those motions take place. All this is contained in the Almagest.' 3

The limits of astronomy are well defined by Ibn Haldun († A.D. 1406):

Astronomy consists of the study of the celestial bodies and motions as they appear to us; 'it is a most noble science, but it does not give, as is often supposed, the form of the heavens and the disposition of the spheres and of the stars, but only their motions as they are seen in reality. It only indicates that from those motions there result for the spheres those forms and those dispositions. Now, it is known, it is not strange that from one and the same thing there should result necessarily two different things; therefore, when the celestial motions are observed, those motions give us information concerning the nature of the stars, and of the sphere we are peeping into, but the sphere is by no means determined, the feeding which does not at all guarantee the truth. Nevertheless, astronomy is an important science, indeed one of the fundamental parts of natural knowledge.'

The diversity of criteria and of purposes by and for which the physicist ('naturalis') studies celestial phenomena, in contrast to the astronomer ('astro- nomus'), is in the best and most automatic fashion treated on Muhammadan astronomy, viz. the unedited al-Qânin al-mas'âdî, composed in Arabic by al-Biruni († A.D. 1058):

(a) General notions and fundamental hypotheses for the geometrical representation of celestial phenomena; (b) mathematical chronology, conversion of one era into another, festivals of various peoples; (c) spherical trigonometry, construction of the celestial sphere and systems of co-ordinates; phenomena of the diurnal motion of the stars, with reference to celestial latitudes, magnitudes, solar altitudes, right and oblique ascensions of the points of the ecliptic, etc.; (d) form, dimensions, etc., of the earth; problems relating to terrestrial latitudes and longitudes; the direction of Mecca with regard to other places on the earth; (e) geometrical astronomy on a spherical-geographical and astronomical basis; (f) the sun; (g) theory of the moon; solar and lunar parallaxes; (h) synodical, eclipses, appearance of the new moon; (i) fixed stars and lunar phases; (j) the rotation of the five planets; geometric distances and magnitudes of the celestial bodies and spheres; (k) problems in the passage of a spherical astrologist (calculation of the twelve celestial 'domus' of the 'applicaciones,' of the 'projections radium,' of the 'directiones' and 'protractions,' of the 'revolution sacrarium,' of the 'mansiones,' of the planetary conjunctions, of the millenary periods).

Muhammadan astronomical writings, almost always in Arabic, can be classified under four groups:

(a) General elementary introductions which represent a perfected form of the passage of Geomich, Geonomics, the introduction of Potenly, were for the Greeks; belonging to this category—to cite only a few— are: the Almagest. The most important and best known are: 1. de Imaginiens Spheres of Athelai (or Thabit) Ibn Qurra (A.D. 901), the compendium of Alfragucus or Al-Farghuni (A.D. 1042), of the consolidated and re-edited edition of (1344-45); (b) systematic treatises corresponding in type to the Almagest, Alhacen, 1115), the commentator Alhazen; 2. the empiricist Alhacen, the treatise Almagest of Geber (or Jabir) Ibn Asaf, printed at Nurnberg, 1584, would belong to this category if it had not omitted all the mathematical and astronomical tables; (c) treatises of spherical astronomy for the use of calculator and observers; there are called ziy (plur. ziyd, ziyd, ziyâd); they presuppose a knowledge of the general principles of comography and consist essentially of tables for calculation, illustrations of the use of the tables, and indications as to the manner of solving problems of spherical astronomy (for the most part without demonstration); the only treatise of this kind published and translated is that of Al-Bukhârî; 3. of the Persian treatise of Ulugh Beg only the polemical fragments, the use of the tables, and the polemical or theological character of the tables have been edited and translated; (d) writings on special subjects—e.g., stellar catalogues, treatises on instruments, etc.

1 Prolegomena, bk. vi. ch. xvi. (tr. de Slane, Ill. 145.).
3 E.g., Muhammad al-Akhrî-ibn Sa'bînî, Irzhd al-qâbil, Calcutta, 1843, p. 84. 4 Râsîlâ al-fâqîm al-ulâm al-qâbilî, in the Târîh al-Khâshî, Constantinople, 1588 A.D. (1661). The same definition is found in al-Majrîtâ, al-Arabî, Almagest. ar-rasîl, for al-Majrîtâ, the definition of the tables of al-Hawârizmî, ed. with an excellent German commentary by H. Butler, 1914.
3. Relation to Islam.—Muhammadan religious ritual bases some of its prescriptions on elements of an astronomical character. The hours within which prayers and all other religious exercises are considered valid depend on the latitude of the place and on the epoch of the solar year; further, the legal time for the night prayer is between the end of the evening and the beginning of the twilight. Both these times are valid unless the face is turned in the direction of Mecca; hence the necessity of solving the astronomical-geographical problem of the azimuth of Mecca. The beginning and the end of the day is given by the hour when the sun sets, which is determined not by the civil calendar, but by the actual appearance of the new moon; and the beginning of the day is given by the morning twilight. Finally, the five daily prayers are determined by the appearance of the new moon, which is to be prepared in time. All this presupposes a certain degree of astronomical knowledge; and, although the Shari'a lawyers, when they were brought in contact with pure calculation for the appearance of the new moon, but require the actual sight of the phenomenon, it is evident that the religious precept must be a real stimulus to scientific study. The astronomers of the early centuries have undertaken so much research into the complex phenomena of the twilight and of the conditions of visibility of the new moon—phenomena which were well known to the astrologers of the Graeco-Roman astronomers. On the other hand, many passages of the Qur'an set forth the benefits which God has vouchsafed to men by means of celestial bodies and motions; and they invite reliance on the goodness and providence of God. Astronomy thus becomes an ally of religion.

4. Sources.—(a) Arabian.—A first element of an eschatological interest is due to God, and finds expression in the New Testament. Like all other peoples who dwell in hot countries and are compelled to prefer night to day for travelling, the Bedouin made use of the stars for guiding their wanderings and for calculating (approximately) the hours of the night; they were thus familiar with the principal appearances of Venus and of Mercury, the phases of the rising and setting of the more brilliant stars, and above all the annual course of the moon determined by noting its position in relation to 22 successive groups of stars called for this reason manzil al-qamar, 'lunar stations.' Further, among the essential agricultural tribes, the seasons and many meteorological predictions (especially those for rain) were strictly connected with the annual rising of certain fixed stars or with the waxing and waning of the lunar stations. Hence, even in the 16th and 17th centuries, Arabic astronomical treatises are full of references to the lunar mansions and their amsat, or cosmic settings.

(b) Hebrew.—The first scientific element of astronomy in Islam is to be found in the 14th B.C. (A.D. 771), which came to Baghdad with a second embassy in 148 B.C. (A.D. 772-773). It is generally accepted that Sphæria by Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Mārghānī, written about A.D. 698 (the year A.D. 773) by Bedæus. From this work (which the Arabs called al-Sind Hind) Ibrahim ibn Ḥabib al-Fazari drew the elements and the methods of calculation for his astronomical tables (ṣij) adapted to the Muhammadan lunar calendar. Almost contemporaneously Yahyā ibn Bāzīr composed his Tarikh al-ʾafāj, 'The Composition of the Celestial Spheres,' which was based on the elements and methods of the Brāhmagupta-siddhantin and on other data furnished by another Indian scientist (name unknown), who came to Baghdad with a second embassy in 148 B.C. (A.D. 772-773). It seems that almost at the same time there was translated into Arabic under the name of al-ʾArkan fī ṣināʿat al-ʾarz by Yahyā ibn Bāzīr, probably drawing on oral teachings of learned Indians, into his Al-ʾarz al-ʾarz, written about A.D. 750 by the Indian astronomer Sūkṛavara (name unknown in Arabic). This work has never been translated into A.D. 750, while the last version of the 15th century by the same author. Some of the data of this work are not yet translated into Chinese, probably because they are too complex for the Chinese, who have always preferred to translate the works of the Greeks, viz. by means of combinations (sometimes very complicated) of eccentrics and epicycles; or

1 For details see Našimi, Ḥasan, pp. 140-146, 213-233 (Arabic) 123-143, 213-233 (Greek).
2 Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Mārghānī, written about A.D. 698 (the year A.D. 773). This work has never been translated into Chinese, probably because they are too complex for the Chinese, who have always preferred to translate the works of the Greeks, viz. by means of combinations (sometimes very complicated) of eccentrics and epicycles; or

3 This Indian idea occurs also in some Arabic works which are not astronomical, e.g. Ibn Qutbah, Libri poetà et pastoral., p. 498f.

4 So al-Birūnī. On the other hand, Ibn al-Qiftī (a source of less authority) has 156-718.

5 Some astronomical teachings.—We may here refer to some special points, which have an importance for the history of the general ideas of celestial phenomena. The only system received by the Muhammadan peoples was the geocentric. Aristotelian philosophy, the authority of Ptolemy, and the requirements of astrology of the Graeco-Roman astronomers, imposed obstacles to the conception of a heliocentric system, which, in any case, could not have been demonstrated by irrefutable reasons or, in the absence of telescopes, have procured any real advantage to practical astronomy. The lack of telescopes kept Muhammadan astronomers from becoming acquainted with other planets that were already known to the Greeks. The use of representing their motions is altogether that of the Greeks, viz. by means of combinations (sometimes very complicated) of eccentrics and epicycles; or
impressing on the other spheres diurnal motion. This ninth sphere, accepted by all the later astronomers, was called ‘the universal sphere,’ ‘the greatest sphere,’ ‘the sphere of the spheres,’ ‘the smooth sphere’ (al-falak al-‘alâs), ‘the sphere of the zodiac,’ and ‘the sphere par excellence,’ a name which indicates the precession of the fixed stars. The sphere of the astrologers—e.g., Avicenna and Ibn ‘Tufail—accept these nine spheres; Averroës, however, under the influence of Aristotle, cannot bring himself to accord the number of eight. In the theological camp the nine spheres did not find many opponents, in spite of ‘the seven heavens’ mentioned in Qur. ii. 27; it was held that the specification of the number seven did not imply the rejection of a superstitious number. In fact, several theologians saw in the eighth and ninth spheres respectively the ‘seat’ (kurus) and the ‘throne’ (harsh) of God mentioned in the Qur’ân.

Doubts were not wanting, however, concerning the unity of the sphere of the fixed stars. Faqr ad-din ar-Râzî informs us that Avicenna, in his book as-Shifâ’, declared: ‘Up till now it has been maintained by some that the sphere of the stars be a single sphere or be several spheres, placed one above the other.’ Ar-Râzî, in his discussion, had no practical importance. Still the number of eight, combined with the Aristotelian theory of solid spheres in which the heavenly bodies are infixed without being able to move themselves, did not easily accord with the other conceptions of the Ptolemaic system. Aristotle, who was ignorant of the motion of the precession of the equinoxes, and who consequently held that the fixed stars are really immovable, assigned to the eighth sphere the apparent diurnal motion of the celestial vault from east to west, a motion which the eighth sphere impressed also on all the others. But Ptolemy, on the contrary, attributes the precession of the equinoxes on account of which the fixed stars have a slow and continued increase of longitude, came implicitly to attribute to the sphere of the fixed stars two motions in opposite directions—one diurnal from east to west, and the other from west to east. Ptolemy had no occasion to notice and correct this contradiction, which was soon perceived by the Arabic writers. The contradiction would have been easily eliminated by supposing that the fixed stars moved by the precessional motion within their own sphere, supposed accordingly to be fluid and not solid; and Avicenna in the Jâbîrisi (1039) introduced into pure astronomical teaching the doctrine of the solid spheres of Aristotle, it was necessary for the physical reasons set forth above to add a ninth sphere without stars,

1 Cf. below, p. 62.
2 Cf. Latarre del saber de astronomia, ill. 280. In any case, the earth there occupies the centre of the ellipse and not one of the foci.
3 Ed. Nalini, l. 124.
4 Cf. Nâgin ad-din al-Hâsan an-Nâsibî, Ta’fsîr (in marg. to the Tafsîr al-'Izhînî, l. 290, comm. on Qur. ii. 27); Faqr ad-din ar-Râzî, Ma‘âtifî al-ghabi, Cairo, 1308-10 A.H., l. 60 (comm. on Qur. ii. 150).

(b) Order of the planets.—The order of the planets followed by almost all the Muhammadan astronomers is identical with that of Ptolemy, although they recognize, together with the Greek astronomers, the ecliptic as the limit of the planets. Two main writers, al-Hasan ibn ‘Allâh (c. 1140) held it more probable that Mercury and Venus were above the sun on account of their analogy to the superior planets in having epicycles and apsidal seats, and retradial and retrogradations. Al-Bîtrjî (1200), moved by physical reasons connected with his special system of planetary motions, placed the sun between Mercury and Venus.

(c) Obliquity of the ecliptic.—The obliquity of the ecliptic with regard to the celestial equator is one of the fundamental elements of astronomical calculation. The Greeks, from Eratothenes (230 B.C.), had assumed that the constant value of 46° 51' 20"; i.e., they held it to be invariant. The astonishment of the Arabic astronomers must have been great when they found by their observations an obliquity sensibly less; at first they could not decide whether the discrepancy was due to a real diminution of the obliquity or to a defect in the ancient observations. Al-Battânî leaves the ques-

2 Nâgin ad-din al-Hâsan an-Nâsibî, loc. cit.; Faqr ad-din ar-Râzî, l. 290.
3 See al-Qawânî, Cosmographie, ed. F. Wüstenfeld, Göttlingen, 1848, l. 64; the glosses on Ma‘âtifî of ‘Allâh ad-din al-Jîl; E. W. Lane, Astronomical Lexicon, 3 vols., London, 1833-34, s.v. ‘Asr,‘Ashr, etc.
5 Bonapl., De ascensionibus, ed. W. Mädler, 1858, l. 59 and l. 599f.
6 See § 7 below.
UNION undecided and declares that he chooses the excellent value found by himself (23° 35'), 'since this was observed by us with our own eyes; the other, on the contrary, was received through the medium of the ancients.' It will be observed that this did not lead to a difference, but to an agreement, since both the centuries following the proposed revolution, and even before, observed that the obliquity of the ecliptic was subject to a very slow regular diminution, which therefore came to be admitted by all the astronomers; in Europe, on the other hand, we must refer to Tycho Brahe (1546-1601) to see it affirmed in the midst of opposition which lasted through the greater part of the 17th century. The Muhammadan astronomers had no means of determining whether this diminution was continuous or periodical and within what limits it was contained.\(^1\) Abū 'Ali al-Hasan (c. 1260), who had accepted the hypothesis of az-Zarālī as to libration, believed that the obliquity oscillated between a maximum of 23° 53' and a minimum of 23° 33'; Fārūq ad-dīn ar-Rāzf\(^2\) admitted a continuous diminution on account of which the ecliptic would coincide one day with the equator. It appears from it again, so that the Tropic of Cancer will pass to the south and that of Capricorn to the north. Nasir ad-dīn al-Tūsī († 1274 A.D.) confined himself to setting forth the eight possible hypotheses as to the continuity or the periodicity of the diminution, without giving preference to any.

(d) Precession of the equinoxes.—The precession of the equinoxes, an effect of which the equinoctial points retreat from east to west along the equator and cause a continuous increase in the longitude of the fixed stars (calculated precisely from the point of the vernal equinox or the first point of Aries), is one of the greatest discoveries of Hipparchus, accepted by Ptolemy. It was accepted by all the Muhammadan astronomers, who, from the first half of the 9th cent., assigned it a value much more exact than that of Ptolemy (39 years), viz. 34° 32'; later, a continuous series of observations indicated other values still more approximate to the true one. There remained a question which celestial mechanics alone has been able to solve: Is this precession to be regarded as continuous, so that in many thousands of years the retreating equinoctial points will accomplish the entire circuit of the ecliptic, or is it a finite period, such as in Hipparchus's writings so as to be reduced to one oscillation, more or less great, of the equinoctial points? The first hypothesis, which is the true one, is accepted by Ptolemy; the second was followed by some Greek astronomers after the Christian era, who held that the equinoctial points, after having advanced 8° in 640 years, retreated 8° in a similar lapse of time, returning thus to the primitive point. According to them, the precession was 45' a year. Finally, it is necessary to observe that, while some Indian writers are quite ignorant of the precession, others admit it in an oscillatory form with axes of 54° or 48° (namely, 27° or 24° from the one part and from the other of the equator, P. Picusim), which they imagined by gross mistakes and not for scientific reasons.

(e) Hypothesis of libration or precession.—The great majority of Muhammadan astronomers held that there was a continuous precession, rigidly attributing the discrepancies concerning its value to the imperfection of the observations of the Greeks. We know only three writers of the second half of the 9th cent. who, through Indian influence, accepted the hypothesis of the variable, which, in the form of the empirical law of the Greek astronomers mentioned above and of the Indians. On the other hand, Thabit ibn Qurra († 901) suggested that the discrepancies in the precessions previously accomplished were due to an apparent irregularity of that motion, and that they were connected with the discrepancies relative to the obliquity of the ecliptic. In an epistle which is preserved by Ibn Yuhayya ibn Sayyid, he says that he had risen till then kept his own calculations private, because he regarded them as uncertain and only provisional. It seems that these secret papers formed the treatises which have come down to us only in two unedited Latin translations under the title De motu octave sphere or De motu accessus et recessus.\(^4\) In this tractate Thabit notes that, if all the known observations were exact, there would be a slackening and an acceleration in the motion of precession and in the increase and diminution of the obliquity of the ecliptic. In order to explain these apparently irregular variations, he proposed the following hypothesis:

The eighth sphere, viz. that which contains the fixed stars, has a movable ecliptic, the extremities of whose axis rotate about the equatorial points of an ideally fixed sphere 33° 33' in respect of the equator; the complete rotation on these two small circles, having 1° 15' 47" of radius, is accomplished in 4717\(\frac{3}{4}\) years. In this period the equinoctial points would seem to accomplish, with a motion not uniform, an oscillation of 4° 6' 20" forwards and 4° 6' 20" backwards; in a similar time there will take place an unequal variation of the obliquity of the ecliptic.

The hypothesis of Thabit was received in its entirety by Ptolemaeus (1275-1308) and by his commentators Reimond and Nūr ad-dīn. The oscillation of the equinoctial points is called by the Arabs ḥarakat al-thālīya waʿl-‘alā, 'motion of advance and of regression of the Latin motion.' The Arab designation was also used in Europe trespassatio equantur. This does not seem to have had supporters among the Muhammadans of the East after the 11th century. It had greater fortune among the Muhammadans of the extreme West (Syria and Morocco). Towards 1060-70, at Toledo, al-Zarālī, in order to make his observations consistent with those of his predecessors, suggested that the poles of the ecliptic circulate about the equatorial poles, so that the equinoxes advanced one by one unequal amounts to a fixed point. This hypothesis was treated irregularly by 2°, accomplishing, i.e., an oscillation of 2° forwards and 2° backwards with reference to the fixed point ideally fixed. Every arc of 16° would have been passed over in 759 years, so that the complete cycle of the libration would be accomplished in 3837 years, the motion of az-Zarālī, explicitly denied by Averroès,\(^2\) was accepted by al-Ṣajījī (c. 1050), at Cordoba, and by Abū 'Ali al-Tūsī (c. 1030). In Morocco; it also found great favour among the Jews and Spanish Christians and had an influence on the Hebrews, who, on a basis of Arabic sources, compiled about 1570 the Tabulat Alphonsin.\(^3\)

(f) Motion of the solar apogee.—Ptolemy (followed by all the later Greeks) says that he found the longitude of the solar apogee to be equal to that observed by Hipparchus, and consequently believes that it is immovable at 65° 30', while the apogee of the five planets move with the motion of the precession. It is a merit of the Arab astronomers of the Khalif al-Ma'mūn (813-833) that they recognized that the solar apogee is subject to the

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\(^1\) A suspicion arises, however, that this tractate may rather be by a grandson of Thabit, viz. Ibrahim ibn Sinan ibn Thabit, who wrote concerning libration (as al-Biruni and Ghazinur al-Dīn also).

\(^2\) Metaph., p. 60 (Quirks, bk. IV, § 15).

\(^3\) It must be noticed that those Hebrews combined the hypothesis of Az-Zarālī with the most fantastic elements in it viz. the admitted a continuous precession accomplishing the circuit of 360° in 40000 years (4° 6' 20") and a 2° 6' 30" approach of 23° 33' to the fixed point. This law was to be always corrected on the basis of an inequality accomplishing its own period in 5000 years. They evidently wished to introduce this hypothesis of precession with the same precision of a thousand jubilee periods of 49 years and a thousand sub-historical periods of 7 years!

\(^4\) Tīrībī, XLI, 12.
motion of the fixed stars and of the planetary apogees, i.e. to the displacement of longitude due to the precession of the equinoxes. But the solar apogee has also another very small proper motion in longitude which, according to Leverrier, is only 11.6 arc minutes yearly. This motion must have escaped the Muhammadan astronomers. The determination of the longitude of the apogee is not easy and, in times when telescopes and pendulum-clocks were not yet invented, it was fortunate that we have Precession in the minutes of a sign; on the other hand, there was no term of comparison with ancient observations. One understands, therefore, why the majority of Muhammadan astronomers did not give to the solar apogee any other motion than that of the precession, attributing the small discrepancies to the imperfection of instruments and observations. It seems that Thabit bin Qurrah, however, dared to affirm the existence of a proper motion. Al-Biruni² informs us that Thabit, author of a tractate on the inequality of the solar year, had determined 365 days, 6 hours, 9 minutes, 9 seconds, as being the length of that interval which we call anomalistic, i.e. the time which the sun takes to return to its own apogee. If, then, the same Thabit (if we may rely upon a piece of information which Regiomontanus and Copernicus seem to have kept to himself) is right (for the sphere cited above) determined the length of the sidereal year as 365 d., 6 h., 9 m., 12 s., it is plain that he must have attributed to the solar apogee a proper motion added to that of the precession.³ Certainly the values found by Thabit are excellent, since, according to the moderns, the anomalistic solar year is 365 d., 6 h., 15 m., 54 s., and the sidereal year 365 d., 6 h., 9 m., 10 s. It is beyond doubt that az-Zarqali determined with great exactness (1251⁻²) every Julian year) the proper motion of the apogee, as distinguished from that due to the precession; and he is therefore supposed that the centre of the eccentric of the sun moved over a very small circle, and by this was also settled the variation of the eccentricity of the solar orbit. Among us the proper motion of the apogee was discovered only in the 16th cent. by Kepler and Longomontanus.

(g) Third lunar inequality.—We need not notice other modifications of special points of Ptolemaic doctrine through which we must at least make a reference to a controversy carried on from 1586 to 1571 in the Academy of Sciences of Paris without any definite conclusion being arrived at, viz.: Is the diminution in the variation or downward inclination to be ascribed to Abo ‘l-Wafa’ (†988), or to A. Sedillot maintained, rather than to Tycho Brahe? There would have been no reason for this dispute if that part of the Almagest relative to the movements of the moon had been better studied, and if the analogous discussions in the works of other Arabic astronomers had been examined with care. Carra de Vaux⁴ has demonstrated that the hypothetical theory of the variation was nothing else than the ρηδοςέννης of Ptolemy, i.e. the difference between the ρηδοςέννης of Ptolemy, i.e. the difference between the ρηδοςέννης of Ptolemy, i.e. the difference between the ρηδοςέννης of Ptolemy, i.e. the difference between the ρηδοςέννης of Ptolemy, i.e. the difference between the ρηδοςέννης of Ptolemy, i.e. the difference between the ρηδοςέννης of Ptolemy, i.e. the difference between the ρηδοςέννης of Ptolemy, i.e. the difference between the ρηδοςέννης of Ptolemy, i.e. the difference between the ρηδοςέννης of Ptolemy, i.e. the difference between the ρηδοςέννης of Ptolemy, i.e. the difference between the ρηδοςέννης of Ptolemy, i.e. the difference between the ρηδοςέννης of Ptolemy, i.e. the difference between the ρηδοςέννης of Ptolemy, i.e. the difference between the ρηδοςέννης of Ptolemy, i.e. the difference between the ρηδοςέννης of Ptolemy, i.e. the difference between the ρηδοςέννης of Ptolemy, i.e. the difference between the ρηδοςέννης of Ptolemy, i.e. the difference between the ρηδοςέννης of Ptolemy, i.e. the difference between the ρηδοςέννης of Ptolemy, i.e. the difference between the ρηδοςέννης of Ptolemy, i.e. the difference between the ρηδοςέννης of Ptolemy, i.e. the difference between the ρηδοςέννης of Ptolemy, i.e. the difference between the ρηδοςέννης of Ptolemy, i.e. the difference between the ρηδοςέννης of Ptolemy, i.e. the difference between the ρηδοςέννης of Ptolemy, i.e. the difference between the ρηδοςέννης of Ptolemy, i.e. the difference between the ρηδοςέννης of Ptolemy, i.e. the difference between the ρηδοςέννης of Ptolemy, i.e. the difference between the ρηδοςέννης of Ptolemy, i.e. the difference between the ρηδοςέννης of Ptolemy, i.e. the difference between the ρηδοςέννης of Ptolemy, i.e. the difference between the ρηδοςέ

2. The fact that Thabit wrote a tractate to maintain that the solar apogee does move is of no importance, since it is probably incorrect.
3. Cf. also L. Gauthier, ‘Une Réforme du système astronomique de Ptolémée tentée par les Arabes du dixième siècle’, Temps et Saisons, Paris, 1902, xiv. 438-420; but this article is insufficient from a mathematical-astronomical point of view.
5. Omas, De Cartes, op. cit. (Aristotelis Opera omnia quae Averroes Compendium continebat, Venice, 1635, v. fol. 118v.-119r.)
7. Thus the Latin translator in the commentary on the Metaphysic renders the Arabic adjective λανθάλινos, spiral, in the form of a spirale, or of a spiral, if you prefer.
8. And, in fact, this was the hypothesis of Eudoxus.
9. I.e. the mere recognition of the circulation of the sphere in the hypothesis of the Spaniard az-Zarqali (see above, § 5 (A)).
be a lemmatice described on a spherical superificies instead of on a plane. There naturally occur in the hypothesis of Eudoxus so-called special axioms, of which Aristarchus, as not seem to have thought; one does not understand, then, how the Arabian philosopher thought to save himself from the greatest objection with respect to the rotation of all the superificies, viz.
that by making the distance of the celestial bodies from the earth annual to the Sun, is not permitted the explanation of the variation of the diameters of the sun and moon.

Another friend and disciple of Ibn Tufal, al-Birjī, (a native of the Punic city of Carthage, Africa) made a complete system as a substitute for the geometrical hypothesis of Ptolemy. He accepted the nine superificies of the Aristotelian scheme in agreement with the peripatetic philosopher. He says that, moved by discourses of Ibn Tufal to meditate on this question, he began to apply the new theory for a kind of divine revelation. He admits with Ptolemy the nine spheres concentric with the earth; of these below the mind should have a motion of their own in an opposite direction. In order to remove this contradiction, he conceives a whimsical theory which betrays the inexperience of the author in the field of practical astronomy.

According to him, the movements of the planets and of the fixed stars in longitude take place in reality from east to west, like the diurnal motion of the rotation of the heaves; these movements which astronomers have judged to be from west to east are simply illusory consequences of the progressive diminution of the angular velocity of the spheres, according as a gradual approach is made from the sphere below to the earth. The same thing he explains by the famous 27° of difference in 24 hours and communicates this motion to the spheres below; but then, of course, the planets would also be in motion. Thus, he justifies the admissibility of the nine superificies, which is immediately under the tenth, in accordance with the hypothesis of Ptolemy. The ninth superfcie is the sphere of the fixed stars, which is situated in the space of about 30°; this little retardation brings it after 5,000 years; it has accomplished a whole circuit less than the ninth sphere and appears to be moving more eastwards than the other planets. Under the sphere of the fixed stars comes that of Saturn, considerably slower; it accomplishes in the space of about 30 years a whole circuit less than the ninth sphere. The next sphere makes a whole circuit in 12 years; Mars in two; Venus, the sun, and Mercury in the same time. This, then, is the reason why all the spheres under the ninth appear to move in a direction contrary to it.

For these reasons, therefore, al-Birjī believes that the sphere of Venus is to be placed above the sun and that of the other planets retains the same relative positions of the motions of the sun, moon, and planets. He says that he drew inspiration for this from conceptions analogous to that by which az-Zarqalī had imagined the motion of the libration of the fixed stars. While az-Zarqalī made the poles of the ecliptic to rotate with the planet of the equator, al-Birjī, in the case of the planets, made the poles of the planetary spheres move on inclined planes round the poles of the equator or of the ecliptic; from this it results that the planets describe lines latitudinal, i.e. spiral, on a spherical superfcie. Thus, he succeeded, in the sense of the ancients, in the reproduction and regraduals of the planets. For this part, therefore, we have the partial restoration of the hypothesis of Eudoxus. The ideas of al-Birjī were accepted by a few Arab astronomers, and Jews in Spain and Provence; and they had also an echo in Italy from the 10th to the 13th century.

7. Celestial physics. — As is said above, celestial physics, according to Muhammadan and Greek writers, lies outside the field of astronomy; its problems are discussed in books of metaphysics, of physics in an Aristotelian sense, and of theology, or at least in special works, of which the greater part are now either lost or untranslated.

Like Ptolemy, the most ancient Arabic astronomers neglected to define the idea of the celestial spheres and limit themselves to considering them in the mathematical aspect of ideal circles representing the movements of the heavenly bodies.

1 Alpernus of our medieval writers.
2 Al-Birjī there had been published only an obscure Latin tr. (Venice, 1531) made from a Hebrew version.
3 The same ideas are found also in the hypothesis of Ibn al-Haytham.
4 For the text, see C. and E. (the first number of the 11th cent., see their (Isidore L. (London, 1605-6. a. xii. 22-29) and by Fajr al-dīn ar-Rāsi, Marifat al-ahdab, 1612 (15th cent., see the Arab tr. of this work) and Vi. 1171 (on Qur. xxi. 54). But they admit Ptolemy's eccentricities and epicycles.
5 The period of the time in which, according to Ptolemy the fixed stars accomplish the circumference, proceeding to the north of the east.
6 The duration of the heliocentric sidereal rotation of Saturn is a little less than 29 years; it is in the Ptolemaic hypothesis, the rotation of the centre of the epicycle of Saturn in the zodiac.

The Aristotelian conception of solid spheres was introduced for the first time into a purely astronomical treatise by Ibn al-Haytham; and he, in his unedited compendium of astronomy, gives a definition which was accepted afterwards by all the other Arabian treatises. A celestial sphere (fīdak, plur. athfāk) is a body completely spherical, bounded by two parallel spherical superificies having the same centre. In this, as in the Greek hypothesis, in which he himself made use of the Aristarchian conception, the celestial sphere (fīdak, plur. athfāk) is a body completely spherical, bounded by two parallel spherical superificies having the same centre.

1 For the text, see C. and E. (the first number of the 11th cent., see their (Isidore L. (London, 1605-6. a. xii. 22-29) and by Fajr al-dīn ar-Rāsi, Marifat al-ahdab, 1612 (15th cent., see the Arab tr. of this work) and Vi. 1171 (on Qur. xxi. 54). But they admit Ptolemy's eccentricities and epicycles.
2 The period of the time in which, according to Ptolemy the fixed stars accomplish the circumference, proceeding to the north of the east.
3 The duration of the heliocentric sidereal rotation of Saturn is a little less than 29 years; it is in the Ptolemaic hypothesis, the rotation of the centre of the epicycle of Saturn in the zodiac.

The Aristotelian conception of solid spheres was introduced for the first time into a purely astronomical treatise by Ibn al-Haytham; and he, in his unedited compendium of astronomy, gives a definition which was accepted afterwards by all the other Arabian treatises. A celestial sphere (fīdak, plur. athfāk) is a body completely spherical, bounded by two parallel spherical superificies having the same centre. In this, as in the Greek hypothesis, in which he himself made use of the Aristarchian conception, the celestial sphere (fīdak, plur. athfāk) is a body completely spherical, bounded by two parallel spherical superificies having the same centre.

1 For the text, see C. and E. (the first number of the 11th cent., see their (Isidore L. (London, 1605-6. a. xii. 22-29) and by Fajr al-dīn ar-Rāsi, Marifat al-ahdab, 1612 (15th cent., see the Arab tr. of this work) and Vi. 1171 (on Qur. xxi. 54). But they admit Ptolemy's eccentricities and epicycles.
2 The period of the time in which, according to Ptolemy the fixed stars accomplish the circumference, proceeding to the north of the east.
3 The duration of the heliocentric sidereal rotation of Saturn is a little less than 29 years; it is in the Ptolemaic hypothesis, the rotation of the centre of the epicycle of Saturn in the zodiac.
al-Jauziyyah († 1330), and many others absolutely deny life and intelligence to the heavenly bodies. The Platonists, however, held that the movers of the celestial souls and consequently of the spheres are pure intelligences. Concerning their origin, Poria, Avicenna, and their followers maintain a Neo-Platonic enunciatory theory: from the first principle emanates the first intelligence, and from this are derived all the nine spheres by means of successive triads always composed of intelligence, soul, and body; until one arrives at the final or active intelligence from which is derived all the material of the sublunar world. This theory is vigorously opposed by al-Ghazalli and the other theologians.

The question of the marks on the moon is either neglected or only hinted at in the works hitherto published. The idea that the moon had valleys and mountains like the earth—an idea set forth by several Syriac writers—did not harmonize with the Aristotelian conception of the nature of the heavenly bodies and so could not be accepted by Muhammadan writers. Observation of the solar spots is almost impossible to the naked eye; Fahr ad-din ar-Razi, however, explicitly affirms: 'There are those who believe that there exist on the surface of the sun spots, but in the normal phases there are marks on the surface of the moon.' These spots were actually seen on some occasions, but were erroneously believed to be transits of Mercury and Venus across the sun.

The comets and the other meteors (in an Aristotelian sense) were the subjects of observations and of numerous monographs. But, judging from the little that we know of their treatment by Muhammadan writers, it seems evident that the matter is set forth by Aristotle in his books on meteorology.

8. Conclusion. The importance of Muhammadan astronomy in the history of science has been variously judged; sometimes Muhammadan astronomers have received excessive praise, sometimes unjust criticism, as if they had done nothing but preserve and transmit to Europe Greek science, improving it only in minor details. This harsh verdict is due not only to very imperfect knowledge of the Arabic writings on astronomy (of which the greater part is still unedited), but also to the fact that none of the medieval astronomical works has been translated into any modern tongue. But the special conditions of astronomy in the glorious period of Muhammadan culture. The system invented by the Greek geometricians, and completed by Ptolemy, for representing all the celestial movements had mathematically all the precision that could be desired or attained by the use of the best instruments; it produced no sensible discrepancy between theory and the result of observation. The elliptic orbits of Kepler would not have given the theory greater perfection than it received from the complicated system of eccentrics and epicycles; the latter indeed had the advantage of preserving the Pythagorean and Aristotelian principle, which denied any but circular movement in the heavens. One must not forget that even in the heliocentric system of Copernicus the motions of the planets were still explained by means of combinations of epicycles—combinations which were in several cases less perfect than those employed by the Ptolemaic astronomers. To change the method of geometrical explanation would therefore have been whimsical—a mathematical trick, which no datum of observation would have justified; and, in fact, those Arabs who wished to eliminate the eccentrics and the epicycles 1 were philosophers rather than astronomers, and their proposals were based only on Aristotelian physics.

It is thus easy to understand how it was that, e.g., the astronomers of the khalif al-Maʾmun and his successors saw no necessity for drawing from their observations of the movement of Venus 2 the final conclusion that Venus revolved round the sun. From the point of view of such phenomena as could be observed with the telescopes, this new hypothesis had no higher value than that which made Venus revolve round the earth. In a word, celestial appearances gave no cause to shake the foundations of the geocentric system, which agreed very well with every religious notion, and which was supported by the authority of both Aristotle and Ptolemy, reinforced by a very potent element in Hellenistic and medieval culture, viz. astrology. Giovanni Schiaparelli, in one of his monographs on Greek astronomy, 3 has set forth clearly the decisive influence which astrology, brought into Greece by the Chaldean Berosus (3rd cent. B.C.) and consequently received with great favour by the Stoics and Neo-Platonists, had in the abandonment of the heliocentric system of Aristarchus.

Astrophysical doctrine, based on the immobility of the earth in the centre of the world, was reconcilable with any system which made the earth revolve round the sun or round any other body; astrology was thus a very powerful additional obstacle to the abandonment of the geocentric idea. Further, we must not forget that it was only in the 17th cent. that European physics reached clear proofs of the diurnal rotation of the earth and justified elliptic orbits and the heliocentric system, and that the whole question was really irrelevan for the revolution of the earth round the sun was furnished only in 1728 by the discovery of the aberration of the fixed stars.

An essential condition of all astronomical progress is to have at disposal a long series of methodical observations; and in this matter Muhammadan astronomers were obliged to begin, so to say, from the foundation. Ptolemy was the last Greek observer; but not even all the observations which he says he made are true. In several cases of capital importance—e.g., regarding the obliquity of the ecliptic and the longitude of the solar apogee—he gave such reasoning with his own observations and with the few data found about 270 years before his time by Hipparchus, thus causing certain elements to be believed constant which are really variable. In other cases—e.g., regarding the precession of the equinoxes—his observations are very rough.

Thom of Alexandria (4th cent. A.D.) and Proclos (6th cent.) do no more than accept Ptolemy's elements, in some ways aggravating his errors; accordingly, during the seven centuries from Ptolemy to the first flourishing of Arabo-Muhammadan astronomy, we have not even one observation which is of use to the science. The first task, therefore, of the Arabo-Muhammadan astronomers was to revise all the Ptolemaic elements of the celestial motions; it was a time not to form new theories but to collect the indispensable elements of fact by means of continuous observations more accurate than those of the Greeks. This task was accomplished by the Muhammadan astronomers in a marvellous manner;

1 See above, § 6.

2 They found (contrary to Ptolemy) that Venus has the same longitude of centre as the sun, and the same latitude of centre; and so the true longitude of the centre of the epicycle of Venus is always equal to the true longitude of the sun. This was the same as to suppose that the orbit of Venus is an epicycle whose centre is always the true place of the sun, and whose radius is always the mean radius; it was equivalent to making Venus a satellite of the sun.

3 Origine del sistema planetario eliocentrico presso i Greco, Milan, 1839, § 55.
indeed, we must come down to the time of Tycho Brahe (1546-1601) to find observers and observers comparable to those of the Muhammadan Mohammed and Ptolemy. Furthermore, by founding trigonometry in a modern sense and doing it with thorough degree and precision, they furnished astronomical science with an excellent instrument for its work.

The influence of Muhammadan astronomy in Europe is shown in the treatises that are afraid of it. The length would be to give the history of some centuries of European astronomy. From the 12th. cent. to the end of the 15th the treatises used in the mediaeval universities were transmitted from Arabic or were based on Arabic writings; the astronomical tables and the processes of calculation were derived from Arabic works, among which must be classed (from the point of view not of their language but of their contents) the celebrated tables of Alwaro which were still used by many in the 16th century. Spherical trigonometry in Europe started from Arabic treatises; the famous Regiomontanus himself (1436-70) borrowed heavily from the surface from al-Battani. Through the influence of these Arabic sources the ancient Latin technical terminology was greatly modified, and not only Arabic but also Greek and Persian languages, the Latin words acquire new significations by imitation of corresponding Arabic words. The words 'degree', 'minute', 'equation' (in celestial mechanics), 'object', 'figure', 'argument' (of a table), and some others, owe their technical significance to ridiculously literal translations of Arabic writings. We cannot enumerate all that European astronomy owes to Muhammadan observers; it will be enough to recall that they rendered inestimable services even to writers of the 17th cent. — e.g., Halley—precisely because they offered the only certain means of checking elements determinable only by a comparison with observations separated by long intervals of time. The books of Regiomontanus, Purbachius, Copernicus, Tycho Brahe, Riccioli, etc., cite the observations which were known to them of their Oriental predecessors. The theory and practice of instruments in Europe has also Arabic sources. Finally, we must not forget the influence exercised by the Arabs in the way of example. They infused into the Christian and Jewish Jews of Spain that spirit which is still for continued observations and an idea of the perfectibility of astronomical science; from Spain this passion and idea spread through the rest of Europe, preparing the way for modern astronomy.

The conditions of the Byzantine medieval world were not favourable to the development of the sciences. Nevertheless, Muhammadan culture, which left many traces in Byzantine astrology, had also its part in astronomical studies. In 1258 an anonymous Greek introduced the Persian astronomical tables of Shams al-din al-Buthari (2464 Meevasqes), which were at once widely used; in 1312 George Chrysococces made a new reduction of them, preserving at the same time many Arabic-Persian technical terms; and finally, about 1361, Theodore Molloniotes reproduced these methods and the main tables in the third and last book of his Άστρωνομιχ Εκδήλωσ, after having set forth in the first and second books the methods and the tables according to Ptolemy and Theon of Alexandria. Thus there was created in Byzantium also a new astronomical terminology different from that of the classic Greek; and sometimes even Greek proper names appeared transformed by their passage through Arabic-Persian sources, as Ἡεοσάρ in place of Ὠρα.

LITERATURE.—There is no satisfactory exposition of the astronomy of the Muhammadan peoples in the Middle Ages; the general account of astronomy, e.g., those of Schiaparelli, J. H. von Mädler, R. Wolf (the best of all), and Arthur Berry are inadequate, antiquated, and often erroneous. J. B. J.

SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Teutonic and Balto-Slavic) 101

Delambre, Histoire de l'astronomie du moyen âge, Paris, 1819, pp. 1-511, and 512-530, is not a history but an analysis (of very unequal value) of the works of Muhammadan astronomers. The part devoted to the unedited book of Ibn Yûnis (pp. 70-156) is especially noteworthy, but it has the usual defect of Delambre—instead of their logical order the works are arranged in chronological order. The book contains a series of formulas found by Delambre himself. Useful, but to be used with caution, is L. A. Sédillot, Instruments pour servir à l'état, comparaison des sciences mathématiques chez les Océans et les Orientaux, 5 vols., Paris, 1845-48; see also le Ménor in Les instruments d'astronomie des antiquités et de l'Europe, 1822-29 (MAIBL, Stettinsch. Arch., 1). The present writer's Arabic book quoted above, p. 509, n. 1, concerns only the earliest period (summary of H. Suter, Die Mathematiker und Astronomen der Araber und ihrer Werke, Leipzig, 1890, and Nachträge und Berichtigungen zu Die Math. und Astron., in Abh. d. Gesch. der mathem. Wissenschaften, xiv. 1902 157-185. For edd. and tr. of original see above, n. 5.
SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Teutonic and Balto-Slavic)

Hrosvitha lies in front of her, and he will catch the moon, and so it seems to me—a wolf, who pursues the gleaming goddess to I wrought. Another called Hla, son of Hrosvitha goes before the fair bride of heaven.

Sun and moon will be involved in the final world- catastrophe.

Then said Ganelor: “Of what race are these wolves [i.e. Nicol and Halli?]” He said: “...The old glances rays the son of many Jottas and all in the form of wolves, and it is said that of the son of these wolves, there shall come one nightier than all, called Moon-Swallowar and Sun-Swallowar’s form shall seize the moon... He shall slay himself with the bodies of hunter, he shall slay himself with the ghost’s shade with red blood; the sunshine shall be black, and all the weather treacherous during the following summer.”

Whose comes sun, in the smooth sky,
When Fenir [i.e. a monstrous wolf] has overtaken this one,
One daughter alone, shall the Bl-rain [i.e. the sun] fear,
Before Fenrir overtakes her.

The maiden shall ride on the mother’s path
After the Fowers have perished.

3. Sun-worship.—Our knowledge of the religious practices of the Teutons is very meagre, and it is difficult to say how far the stories told in the two Eddas formed part of a living religion, even among the Scandinavians. We have, however, various references to the sun-cult from other sources. Preconia describes how in the island of Thule (i.e. Scandoia) the sun does not appear for 40 days at the winter solstice. At the end of this period messengers are sent up into the mountains to watch for the rising sun. They send word to the people below that the sun will shine upon them in five days: thenceon begins the greatest feast of the inhabitants of Thule.

The positive side of Cesar’s well-known description of Teutonic religion is probably true. The Teutons may well have acknowledged their sun as gods, such things as arc “objects of sight and by whose power they are apparently benefited, the sun, moon, fire,” although these were not their only deities. Observances in connexion with the sun and moon are forbidden in Christian sermons and penitentials. St. Eligius (588-659) tells his hearers that no Christian person “calls sun or moon lord.” In the 11th. the Decree of Barchurms of Worms mention pagan traditions: “Id est ut elementa coloris, id est human aut solis, aut solis erat existenta cum, aut detecta luna, ut sit cunctans et nihil superius Juni et superius valere.”

From Clunie’s Anglo-Saxon Laws we learn that “heathenism is to honour heathen gods, and sun or moon...” We have perhaps a trace of sun-worship in vendar: “Thorcliff Moon, the law speaker, was of the best conversation of any heathen man in England. He had himself carried out into the land of the sun to his mother and commended himself to that god which had made the sun.”

We know little of Anglo-Saxon paganism. Bede, however, mentions a goddess Eostur, in whose honour April was called “Eosturnonath.” The word “Eostur” is identical with the Latin, Greek, Sanskrit, and Lithuanian names for the goddess of the dawn, or Marzorōbōc, probably the same being who is referred to in the Lithuanian and Teutish folk-songs as the daughter of the sun.

Throughout Teutonic territory the first and second days of the week are named after the sun and moon. Sunna is mentioned with Wotan and Trna in the Merseburg charm. Sol is counted as one of the asagyni.

It is noteworthy that Snorri (see above) distinguishes between the physical sun and moon and the beings who rule over them and guide their movements. This distinction has been partly preserved in the Old Norse language, where the word “sol” is used for U.S. “sung,” and “man” is a star.”

Iaf. xii. 15. 2 Gr. xiv. 88.

11. Lettish, Lithuanian, and Old Prussian. — i. Mythology.—Our chief knowledge of the solar mythology of the Baltic peoples is derived from Lettish and Lithuanian folk-songs, the most significant of which have been translated and analyzed by W. Mannhardt. In these poems the changes with the course of the sky, especially at dawn and sunset, are viewed as a drama, the chief actors being sun, moon, the daughter of the sun, the son of God, Purlkin, the thunder deity, “God” and “dear Maria”—the last two being as frankly pagan as the rest. Often, of course, the poems are confused and inconsistent, and it must be remembered that the terms “sun,” “moon,” etc., sometimes stand for the presiding deity, sometimes for the actual sun, etc., personified:

“The Sun, in the apple garden,
Worshiped bitterly.
The golden apple hath fallen
From the apple tree.”

(Here there is a clear distinction between the deity and the physical sun.)

“The Sun dances over the silver mountain,
Silver footsteps she hath on her feet.
(In this case sun and goddess appear to be one and the same.)

God,” who was at war with the sun for three nights and three days, is evidently a sky-deity. The sky itself is described as a “great water” or a mountain:

“The Sun with two gold horses
Rides up the rocky mountain.
Never gotten, never weary,
Never resting on the way.”

(In this and in other songs we get the widespread myth of the horses of the sun.)

2. The Sun.—The sun is called in many of the songs “daughter of God,” in Lettish sources “valenstar,” mother of the sun. She is married to the moon, who is, however, an unfaithful husband.

“It happened in the spring-time
That sun and moon did wed.
But the sun rose early
And from her the moon fled.
The morning star was loved then
By the lone wandering moon.
Who with a sword was smitten
In deep wrath by Purlkin.”

The children of the sun and moon are the stars, who are called orphans, because they appear only at night after their mother, the sun, has abandoned them.

3. The sons of God.—The morning and the evening stars play an important part in the folk-songs, sometimes as a single being, sometimes in dual form. In Lithuanian sources they are called Ausrinė and Wakarėi and are described as the handmaids of the sun.

“Dear son, daughter of God.
Who kindles your fire in the morning?
Who spreads your bed in the evening?”

“Ausrinė kindles the fire.
Wakarėi spreads the bed.”

In Lettish songs the morning and the evening stars are called the “sons of God”—an epithet exactly equivalent to the Greek Dioskouroi. Like the Dioskouroi and the Apšinas of Indian mythology, the Lettish sons of God are connected with horses:

“Neither ride the dear sons of God
With steeds dripping with sweat.”

“Folk says the moon has no steeds of his own.
The morning star and the evening star
They are the steeds of the moon.”
4. The daughter of the sun.—A favourite theme of the Letheh folk-songs is the wooing of the daughter of the sun by the son of God, the sun providing the dowry, often most unwillingly.

Why are grey steeds standing
Near the deity of the sun?
They are the grey steeds of the sun
Who weds the daughter of the sun.
The son of God stretches out his hand
Over the great water.
To the 6rst steed: the sun.
The sun cries bitterly
Standing on the mountain.
Why should she not weep?
She sorrow for the little maiden,
She sorrow for the dowry.
For the chest which is laden
With gold and silver gifts.

This is a good example of a sunrise or sunset myth. The daughter of the sun is the red glow which is in the sky when the planet Venus appears, but soon afterwards melts into darkness or the full light of day. The 'dowry' seems to be the rays of the sun which light up the edges of the clouds and the tops of trees and mountains.

The sun prepar'd the dowry herself, gilding the edge of the forest of planets.

The daughter of the sun is almost certainly identical with the goddess mentioned by Lasciuius.

According to Preistorz, the Naedzrians worshipped a star-god, Sveigisuluktta, who is evidently the Suasitx worshipped by the Sudavians in Samiland and equated with Sol in the Constit. Synod. Evangel. of 1350. Lucas David calls Sveigisuluktta, a god of light and mentions him as one of the four deities who were invoked at agricultural festivals. This deity seems to have been worshipped in both male and female form: 'They more commonly called this goddess Sveigisulukta, a star-goddess, whom they consider the bride of the sky and through whose power the morning and evening stars are guided.' It is perhaps 'the maiden who weaves star-coverings,' mentioned in one of the folk-songs, and also the goddess whose place has been taken by dear Maria, and who was also known as the aunt of the thunder-god? The underlying idea may be that she is a goddess of fire, light, and heat.

5. Dear Maria.—Manhauldt considers that the name Maria has been substituted for that of various pagan deities, but it is also possible that she stands for a particular goddess, perhaps the Perkuna tete (i.e. the aunt of Perkun) mentioned by Lasciuius: 'Perkuna tete is the mother of thunder and lightning; who receives into a bath the weary, dusty sun, and sends her out again next day washed and shining.' Maria also presides over a bath-chamber:

'Behind the mountains smoke is rising.
Who is it that kindles fire?'

Dear Maria heats the bathroom
Where baleful little orphans dwell (i.e. stars).

'1 ran down into the valley, into the bath-chamber of dear Maria.'

According to Preistorz, the Naedzrians worshipped a star-god Sveigisulukta, who is evidently the Suasitx worshipped by the Sudavians in Samiland and equated with Sol in the Constit. Synod. Evangel. of 1350. Lucas David calls Sveigisuluktta, a god of light and mentions him as one of the four deities who were invoked at agricultural festivals. This deity seems to have been worshipped in both male and female form: 'They more commonly called this goddess Sveigisulukta, a star-goddess, whom they consider the bride of the sky and through whose power the morning and evening stars are guided.' It is perhaps 'the maiden who weaves star-coverings,' mentioned in one of the folk-songs, and also the goddess whose place has been taken by dear Maria, and who was also known as the aunt of the thunder-god? The underlying idea may be that she is a goddess of fire, light, and heat.

6. Cult.—We know little of the sun-cult of the Baltic peoples, although we know from Peter von Dusburg and Erasmus Stella that sun, moon, and stars were worshipped as important deities.


5. Preistorz.


7. For the colour of the goddesses, see Preistorz.


11. For art. Xaver (Letheh, Lithuanians, and Old Prussians).

12. Sorpgnyce Xaver Prunificus, Leipzig, 1691-74, i. 53.

13. Preistorz, p. 29.


15. Preistorz.

16. Schultze, in Dilo.

17. Theodoricus, Dilo, 293.

18. Theodoricus, Dilo, 293.

19. Theodoricus, Dilo, 293.

20. Theodoricus, Dilo, 293.

21. Schultze, in Dilo.

22. Theodoricus, Dilo, 293.

23. Theodoricus, Dilo, 293.

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52. Theodoricus, Dilo, 293.

53. Theodoricus, Dilo, 293.

54. Theodoricus, Dilo, 293.
recent times. The ancient Greeks, at any rate, knew nothing of the sooner Sunday, which was observed not only among all other peoples but even among the Romans, who already regarded it as more or less a national tradition.

In the middle of the 2nd cent. Justin Martyr, writing for heathen readers, speaks of Saturday and Sunday (τον Κυριακον, την Κυριακη) as if they were familiar names to all. Near the end of the 1st cent. Josephus boasts:

‘Nor is there any city of the Greeks, nor any barbarian city, nor any nation, where our custom of resting on the seventh day has not reached.’

That, no doubt, is an exaggeration; but it would have been meaningless unless division of time into weeks had been so general that any one might know which day was a Saturday. The belief that such was the case in the 1st cent. is supported by a picture which was found at Herculaneum, and therefore painted before A.D. 79. It contains the heads of the seven planetary deities in the order of their days—Saturn, Apollo, Diana, Mars, Mercury, Jupiter, Venus. Numerous references in Latin literature assure us that the Jewish Sabbath was well known as early as the Christian era. But only those are to our purpose which imply familiarity with the week. Such are the passages in Tibullus, 4, Ovid, 5, and Martial, 6 which mention the observance of Sunday by the Romans. But more remarkable is the fact that Horace, writing about 35 B.C., could represent an ordinary superstitious mother as making a vow for the next Thursday (Iovis dies) and could describe how he himself attempted to escape from a bore by pleading that it was a special Saturday. 8 Neither the vow nor the plea would be intelligible without the week as a familiar background.

Sabbath in the primitive Church.—It was therefore not only the Jewish proselytes among St. Paul's converts, but all his Greek and Roman disciples, who reckoned their time by weeks and therefore found a weekly day of worship natural. To such, again, as were Jews by race it seemed actually part of the order of nature. That is why, we may well suppose, St. Paul's protests against the observance of the Sabbath or of any fixed days 9 were but partially successful. The Sabbath, indeed, was given up by the churches which he founded. But, as a concession to his converts' habit of mind, another day of the week was chosen for worship, where there could be no question what the choice should be, for the Lord's resurrection had given the first day of the week an unquestionable pre-eminence.

The name of this day which was current in the Roman Empire was 'the day of the sun' (την Ηλιωτην, dies solis). The Jews, who avoided all use of heathen terms for either days or months, called it the first day of the week (μνα Σαββατου), and the earliest Christians followed their example. But a mere number was felt to lack distinction, and very soon an appropriate name was found, which contrasted alike with Sabbath and Sunday. The first day of the month, at least in Asia Minor, was usually called 'the Emperor's Day' (Σαββατης). 10 Now the early Christians, partly by way of challenge, applied to their Lord many of the official terms which were consecrated to the emperor, the lord of the earth. So it was probably not without reference to the term Σαββατης that they entitled the first day of the week Κυριακη, 'the Lord's Day.' So apt a name was rapidly established. The author of the Apocalypse, writing about A.D. 90, uses it without explanation. To Ignatius 11 (c. A.D. 110) it was a matter of course and a basis for argument. When the empire became Christian it was entirely displaced 'the day of the sun' for all who spoke Greek or Latin. Κυριακη remains to this day in Greek; and in the Romance languages we find derivatives of the same name—Domingo, Domenica, and so on. But the Northern peoples, who in accepting the week from the heathen Romans had named the days after the corresponding Northern divinities, were more conservative. In England Sunday (A.S. Sundayegige), in Germany Sonntag, in Sweden Sondag, have resisted all attempts to substitute either Lord's Day or Sabbath.

3. Observance in the Church before A.D. 321.—

The records tell us very little about the manner in which Sunday was observed during the first three centuries, except that it was the day on which Christians assembled for worship. After St. Paul, who is quoted above, our first witness is the younger Pliny. His famous letter, written to the emperor Trajan in A.D. 104, tells how the Christians in his province of Bithynia held a service early in the morning on a fixed day, perhaps long a Jewish common meal late in the evening. 12 Ignatius (A.D. 110) insists upon the contrast between the Lord's Day and the Sabbath. 13 A little later the Teaching of the Apostles 14 remarks:

Κατα κυριακαν ιη κυριακων συνανθηνες ελαστα ορνοι και εχαροτημοντες προπαλαγηθηκαν τα παραπομπα υμιν, δεπε τινα και ου ρητω τον ουρανον.

A simple service, before or after the day's work, was the only observance possible for a community most of whose members occupied very humble stations, while many were slaves. As the Christians advanced in number and in wealth, they were able to command the time for a long service. Justin Martyr, writing about A.D. 170, describes one which must have occupied at least two hours; for it includes readings from the Bible, sermon, prayers, and Eucharist. 14 And, since Melito, bishop of Sardis, just about the same time published a treatise On the Lord's Day, we may conclude that the services were being systematized.

How important they were considered is partly shown by Tertullian's attack upon cowardly bishops, who excused themselves for fleeing from persecution on the ground that in such times they could not assemble the Church.
years more. The Apostolic Constitutions, 1 e.g., recognized a parallel observance of the Sabbath and Sunday. And the Councils of Laodicea, which permitted observance of the Sabbath, marked it as a festival and a day of worship. Different as was the East from the West, in spirit and in name; and the maintenance of the Sabbath in the East was a reason for keeping Sunday clear of Sabbatarianism, as the primitive Jews of Egypt, Interna, who distinguished between East and West, was Western in its observance of Sunday. Accordingly Clement of Alexandria (c. 160), \( \text{\textit{which makes use of the} \text{\textit{Doxologia}}} \) as a festival day is celebrated by putting away evil thoughts and acquiring true knowledge; and Origen (c. 240) apologizes for the common observance of the Sabbath and Sunday on the ground of the weaker brethren. They, 'being either unable or unwilling to keep even one day of rest in some memory, in order to prevent spiritual things from passing altogether away from their minds.' 2

A hundred years later Athanasius wrote to much the same effect: 'We keep no Sabbath day but we keep the Lord's Day as a memorial of the beginning of the second new creation.' 3 St. Jerome follows in the same line. He tells how his party of recluses at Bethlehem attended Church services on Sunday, but otherwise pursued their usual occupations. 4 St. Augustine, while insisting upon the festal character of Sunday—'Dies tamen Dominicus non Judaeus sed Christianus restoratione Domini declaratur est, et ex illo habere coepit festivitatem sanum'—praises that the Fourth Commandment is in no literal sense binding upon Christians. His words seem framed to exclude the idea of any transference of obligation from the Sabbath to Sunday. 5

4. Movement in favour of a day of rest.—While the leaders of the Church gave no sanction to the idea that Sunday was the heir of the Sabbath, that idea was all the time gaining power among the laity of the various peoples of the empire. Several causes combined to favour its growth. As the passage quoted above from Tertullian indicates, the numerous heathen festivals constantly suggested that a holy day should be a day of rest. Familiarity with the OT, whose authority was unchallenged, insensibly turned men's thoughts in the direction of Sabbatarianism. Increasing leisure and power enabled many Christians to command a day of rest. Greater stress was laid, as time went on, upon the duty of attendance at the Church services, which in many cases involved the abandonment of regular work. How steadily popular opinion was moving in the direction of a Sunday holiday may be inferred from a resolution passed in 305 by the Council of Iliiberis in Spain, making the observance of the Lord's Day compulsory and ordaining that failure to attend the services shall be punished with excommunication. The Sabbatarian movement, therefore, like that for the worship of the saints, came from below. Theologians long resisted it, but at last yielded, and sought to harmonize the two issues which the people had adopted. Among these we do not usually find either the duty of observing the Fourth Commandment in the spirit or the social need (recognized in Deuteronomy) of a day for rest and recreation. The reasons alleged are of a mystical and symbolical character, such as would naturally suggest themselves to theologians in difficulties. And yet the very contrasts which they draw between the Sabbath and the Lord's Day show the influence of the popular pressure, and prepare the way for the identification of the two which was to come in the 4th century.

S. Ambrose, e.g., describes how the first day has succeeded to the dignity which formerly belonged to the seventh: 'Ut colui Dominus sit feste perpetrae, et primum festum resurreci; Sabbatum, quod primum erat, secundum habuere coepit a primo. Prima enim regula casavit, secunda sucessit.' 6 St. Chrysostom, who was bishop of Constantinople in 347—'1 Cor 16'- he says that the first day of the week was well chosen for acts of charity, especially to the poor, and that the Sunday then thus actually carries back the Sunday rest into the year 67. And when he writes about Ro 14, he asserts that 'sustentare every day alike' has reference only to fasting. The attempt to strain a misapprehension is doubtless that he regards the observance of Sunday as not altogether a duty, although it be generally contrasted Sunday and Sabbath in the manner of his time, it is not surprising to find him once coming very near to the later Sabbatarian view. In the 10th Hymn on Gn 1 he writes: 'God from the first teaches us symbolically to set apart one whole day in the week for his worship.' The following day of worship was therefore now established, and the influence of popular opinion which was steadily moving towards it.

5. Constantine's decree of A.D. 321.—Parallel to the Christian movement in favour of a Sunday rest there seems to have been another, which was quite independent. The matter is obscure, and we must rely in part upon conjecture. As the social and industrial organization of the empire advanced under the Pax Romana, the spurious festivals of the ancient calendar became more and more inconvenient. The efficiency of labour depends largely upon recreation; but holidays at irregular intervals are not effeclual for recreation, and interfere sadly with organization. We can imagine that the heathen often reflected upon the contrast, to which Tertullian points, between the regular weekly festival of the Christians and their own uncertain celebrations; and that they wished that they could exchange their inconvenient holidays for a regular rest on 'the day of the sun.' Some such movement towards the popular mind is required to explain the readiness with which the whole world, heathen as well as Christian, accepted Constantine's famous decree. Though he was doubtless influenced mainly by the wishes of his Christian supporters, it was not as 'the Lord's Day' but as 'the venerable day of the sun' that he described the new public holiday: \( \text{"Omnis judices urbanusque plebes et eum sanctum dixit, day solemnizes the day of Redemption."} \)

There has been much speculation about Constantine's motives. Eusebius would persuade us that they were wholly religious, 6 others that social and political considerations determined his action; but we have not sufficient evidence to decide the question. One thing is certain. The edict of A.D. 321 marks an epoch in the history of Sunday. It was the parent of a double series of legal enactments and conciliar decrees which exercised a profound influence both for the increasing efficiency of the Empire, and for the life of all Europe during many centuries.

6. Later imperial decrees.—With regard to the imperial decrees, it is important to remember that they affected an ever-decreasing area. The laws of Theodosius the Great, which forbade all litigation and the spectacles of the theatre and the circus on the 'dies Solis quem Dominum rite dixere majores' (350), affected mankind from Spain to Mesopotamia. But its reiteration by Leo and Anthemius (400) was addressed only to Turkey, Greece, Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt. The chief importance of those later decrees is that, enshrined in Justinian's Code, they set up a standard for the new nations which gradually rose out of the flood of barbarian invasion.

7. Decrees of Church Councils (300-600).—On the other hand, the decrees of Church Councils had an immediate influence not only in the areas which they represented but also to some extent throughout the former Roman Empire, for the Church maintained a large degree of unity. It is not always possible to say how the Council of Laodicea (363), ordering men to work on the Sabbath, bade them \( \text{\text{"Thecra puserotere}\), e\text{\text{\text{" της θεοσιας, χρπδεωτικών ή χριστιανων, but also how the Council of Orleans (558), while prohibiting}

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1 S. Ambrose, De S. Dominico, cap. 1. 2 Ep. 22. 3 Tertullian, De Mor. 35. 4 Ep. 22. 5 S. Ambrose, De S. Dominico, cap. 1. 6 S. Ambrose, De S. Dominico, cap. 1.
against an excessive Sabbatarianism, forbode all for the upbuilding of religion: and the Council of Maccon (580) laid down that the Lord's Day 'is the day of perpetual rest, which is suggested to us by the type of the seventh day in the law and the prophets,' and ordains a complete cessation of all kind of business. How far the fourth commandment has been gone by the end of the 6th cent. is shown by a letter of Gregory the Great, 1 (poppo 590-604) protesting against the prohibition of baths on Sunday. 2

And on Saturday 3 (Sabbatum septimum) it was a right instinct which led the people to demand, and emperors and councils to grant, that Sunday should be a day of rest as well as of worship. Up to the end of the 7th and 8th centuries, the changes in law and custom, in spite of some extravagances, were on the whole beneficial. But in the darkness of the next two centuries other influences came into play, causing wars, plagues and disorders which lowered the standard of civilization both in the Eastern Empire and in Western Europe threw all initiative into the hands of military or ecclesiastic rules. Changes were no longer made in response to the people's demands, but were imposed upon them by rulers who were guided not by a sense of practical need but by monkish theory. Thus an edict of Colotar (c. 600) forbid work on Sunday.

"Quod lex hanc prohibet et sacra scriptura in omnibus contra,

3.
The Christian Sabbath from 800 to 950.— (a) Decrees of rulers and councils.—Though the decrees of the 7th and 8th centuries were obviously of a Sabbatarian movement, the term 'Sabbath' was not applied to Sunday until Alcuin had written:

"Cujus observatione nos Christianos ad diem dominicum competetim transustatit."

Under his inspiration the new feeling, long fluid in society, was crystallized in Charlemagne's decree of 816 (387) forbidding ordination on Sunday for a breach of the Fourth Commandment. In particular it forbade agricultural labour, which Constantine had expressly permitted, and the opening of markets, which Constantine had appointed on market-days to encourage country people to attend the church services: 'Proviso pietatis suae munda die sanci perpetui anno constisvit.'

From that time onwards the identification of Sunday with the Sabbath was taken for granted, and from this that principle deductions of increasing severity were drawn by princes and ecclesiastics.

Among the decrees which were issued by princes for the benefit of their own dominions we may mention that of the emperor Leo (c. 830) which forbade agricultural work in the Eastern Empire, and that of Egbert the Peaceable (A.D. 903) which extended the Lord's Day from 3 p.m. on Saturday to Monday's dawn. More interesting, because of wider influence, are the pronouncements of leading churchmen. In the 12th cent. Bernard of Clairvaux maintained that the Fourth Commandment required the Sabbath to be observed on any Sunday as well as on holy days. In the 13th cent. Thomas Aquinas lent his immense authority to the same principle: 'Sabbatum est, quia in die dominico ... Similiter ait solennitates veteris et lege novae solennitates succuntur.' In the 14th cent. Tostatus, bishop of Avila, a learned learned prelate, laid down by the Council his Christian Sabbath with a fullness of detail which rivals that of the

Pharisees. And the precepts of the learned were enforced and illustrated for the multitude by a host of miraculous judgments—ranging from toothache to sudden death—which had fallen upon those who profaned Sunday or St. Day's by labour. 1

For five hundred years after Charlemagne Church Councils were much occupied with questions of Sunday observance. The following examples may perhaps be sufficient for the purpose of illustration:

1 A.D. 829.—The Council of Paris re-enacts the prohibition of ploughing, marketing, and law business on Sunday.

2 833.—A Synod at Rome forbids markets and field labour.

3 1000.—A Council at Hexham (Kingetham) forbids markets, fairs, burning, and ordinary labour.

4 1063.—The Council of Bourges forbids travelling, except in cases of necessity or charity.

5 1069.—The Council of Covent (in Spain) forbids all 'service work' and all travelling.

6 1212.—The Council of Pamiers condemns all parishioners to hear Mass on the same day and preaching.

7 1244.—The Synod of Lyons found it necessary to limit the number of holy days, whose increase was causing various abuses.

8 1228.—The Synod of Valladolid ordained 'quod nullus in diebus Dominicus et Festivis alio loco adthe, an manusin articulis exercere pracentum, nil urgenti necessitatis, vel evidenti pietatis causa.'

The Council of Mafum (1573) decrees that:

'Nemo labiit et coehor det operam. Vendissent quorum semper notum, et tenuisse quae ad divinam cultum et victum necessarium pertinent, nunntiis publicis, superbus et vultibus, quos non ducti festas. Ludos etiam theatricos, id est paste, praecipue constatantem, praeterea profanat.'

The Council of Narbonne (1690) protests against the prohibition of Sunday by dancing, singing:

1 Council PARISIENS, c. 59; H. Spelman, Concilia, London, 1729-84; L. 125c, 1525. See also: Churchill, Synodologia (747), which is sometimes quoted, applies only to monasteries.

2 Epp. XIII. 1.

3 Heylin, Hist. of the Sabbath, ii. 137.

4 Heylin, Hist. of the Sabbath, ii. 137.

5 W. Haubach and W. Mathius, 'Church Councils and Ecclesiastical Documents relating to Great Britain and Ireland. Oxford, 1836-45; iv. 249-300; vii. 422-23. See also: Churchill, Synodologia (747), which is sometimes quoted, applies only to monasteries.

6 How. 15. sect. Pentec.

7 Loud. In. 1. ext. 4. art. 3.
Sunday

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lusting, hawkling, markets, public feasts, and romping, and allows none but travellers to be served in the inns.

These quotations prove that the Counter-Reformation led the authorities of the countries which remained Roman Catholic to recognize a duty with regard not only to Sunday labour but also to Sunday recreations. They seriously endeavoured to check the licence which had been allowed for many ages and had doubtless increased with the advances of the commercial prosperity in the 14th and 15th centuries. It is difficult to estimate how far they succeeded in reforming the manners of the people. Peter Heylin, sub-dean of Westminster, whose History of the Sabbath is the most valuable book on the subject, is an important witness, for he travelled on the Continent very soon after the close of the 16th century. He sums up his impressions in these words:

"Nor is their discipline so severe as their Canons neither, so that the Lord's Day there, for ought I could observe, when I was there, was observed in so strait a manner as we in England: repairing to the Church, both at Mass and Vespers, riding abroad or walking forth to take the air, or otherwise to refresh themselves, and following their honest pleasures, at such leisure times as are notdestinated to the Church, there were no returning from the Church by travelling of their lawful business, as occasion is, so they reserve sometime for their devotions in the publick."

But Heylin was an advocate, obviously on the fair side; and undoubtedly (as the decrees of the Councils imply) there were many regions in which Sunday was spoiled both by needless labours and by the most ostentatious amusement.

11. The Protestant Sunday in the 16th century.

The Reformers of the 16th century were in a difficult position, for, although they regarded both Gn 2 and Ex 20 as historical, they could not reject the institution of Sunday on either of the traditional grounds. They could not identify it with the Jewish Sabbath; nor could they admit that an ecclesiastical rule of observance, however venerable, was of unchangeable validity. Yet both feeling and reason urged them to maintain its obligation. Luther, Calvin, and the various catechisms and confessions put forward much the same view—save this effect:

The Fourth Commandment was abrogated by the New Testament; and ideally there should be no distinction between days. But human nature requires a day of rest from labour: the soul demands leisure for joint worship: therefore a day must be fixed for all. We cannot do better than follow the tradition which has been preserved from the first day of the creation.

Sound as that argument was, it had an unfortunate effect upon the minds of a generation who had been trained to rest upon absolute law and were not ready to accept reason in its place. To a vast number of Protestants Sunday appeared to have lost its authority; and there was a decided slackening of its observance. Heylin thus describes the state of things in the latter part of the century:

"There was no restraint on Sundays in the afternoon, from any kind of servile work, or daylabours; but that men might and did apply themselves to several businesses, as on other days. As for the greater towns, there is scarce any of them, wherein there are not Fairs and Markets (Stirk Masses, as they used to call them) upon the Sunday; and those as much frequented in the afternoon as were the Churches in the morning. So that in general every day is no otherwise observed with them... then so half holiday is with them, even of all those questions to be made, but that where working is permitted, and most kind of business, a man may lawfully enjoy himself and his housewife, as if he were the Emperor of Rome."

This is true, he says, of Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, France, and Germany, and part of Poland.

In England, where religious changes were far more violent, the observance of Sunday in the reigns of Henry VIII. and Elizabeth was considerably stricter.

Both The Institution of a Christian Man (1557) and the queen's Injunctions suppressed the Sunday walk, as recorded by Heylin, and yet one of the Homilies, published in 1563, sorrowfully confesued, "The Lord was more dishonourable and the Devil better served on Sunday; we were afterwards upon all the days of the week, as by a token and sign forebode." King James's proclamation of 5th May 1562 is a significant proof of this complaint. In his complaint of 5th May 1562 he thereon forth 

Q. 68. How is the Sabbath to be sanctified? — A. The Sabbath is to be sanctified by a holy resting all that day from such worldly employments and recreations as are lawful on other days; and spending the whole time in the public and private exercises of God's worship, except so much as is to be taken up in the works of necessity and mercy.

By successive enactments (1644, 1650, 1656) the same Parliament inquired every kind of Sunday recreation, even "vainly and profanely" walking for pleasure. At the Restoration the pendulum swung the other way. The court, the cavaliers, and the House of Lords all thought that the clergy led a life of idleness and profaneness; and the return of the Prayer-book service on Sunday morning was accompanied by trading, open theatres, and ostentatious frivolity.

The full title of this work is The Solemn Declaration to His Majesty Against Laws to Be Used, London, 1618.
in the afternoon and evening. To what lengths the court went may be learned from Macaulay's description of the day. It's last night.

There were many protests; and the battle of the books continued, Bishop Pearson, John Owen, and Richard Baxter being among the combatants. In 1677 a celebrated Act of Parliament was passed. The Sunday Observance Act regulated trade, labour, and travelling in a reasonable way, making ample allowance for ' works of necessity.' At the same time the Act of 1652 was revived and came to be recognized as the standard by which amusements were to be regulated. Both acts were observed with varying degrees of strictness at different times and in different places. But it is no little tribute to their reasonableness that both remained in force until the year 1871, though they were modified in some details; e.g., in 1099 forty watermen were allowed to ply on the Thames, in 1710 coaches and chairs received permission to stand for hire, and in 1794 bakers to sell bread at certain hours. From the Revolution to the death of Queen Anne a higher standard prevailed, and there was a marked and of obedience to the law. Under the Georges, though no change was made in the law, and though the same literary controversy continued, there was a steady decline in both respects. About 1780 the Evangelical churches, which were used by the Wesleys, produced a considerable change in opinion and observance. How much need there was for improvement may be inferred from three actions of Bishop Potton, who was a leader of the new school. He supported the institution of Sunday Schools, which began in 1780 and soon spread over the country. He persuaded the Prince of Wales to transfer his rowdy 'Sunday Club' to a week day. And he drew up the Sunday Observance Act of 1781, which enacts that any place of public entertainment or debate where a charge is made for admission may be deemed a disorderly house. Passed in order to check bear-baiting and infidel propaganda, this act has been used of late to impede Sunday concerts and lectures to working-men. For many years it was undoubtedly of great value, helping to restore the credit of Sunday in the public eye. But, when the rapid growth of large towns, due to the industrial revolution, presented new problems, this law with its restrictions of travelling to cause mischief. The increase of the industrial population, crowded up in towns which were almost destitute of churches, had no meeting place but the street or the public-house. This evil became serious in the latter part of the 18th cent., but its full development was not seen till the 19th.

(b) Scotland-The early history of the 'Christian Sabbath' and applied it to social life with the ruthless logic which is characteristic of Calvinism. The Westminster Confession was adopted by the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland in 1647, before Parliament had passed it; and it has remained the formal standard of faith to the present day. So long as it was enforced by public opinion—i.e. till about 1770—the Scottish Sunday was observed with amazing rigour. Not only were ordinary recreations disallowed; a ban was put even on books and music, except such as were recognized as religious in the narrow sense. No recreation was permitted, even to the kings of the drunkenness which is still common in Scotland may be traced to an unwise Sabbatarianism. In parts of the Highlands and the Islands the old rigour remains; but in the greater part of the country, as will be explained below, the last fifty years have witnessed a great change.

(c) America-The American night. The New England States, founded by Puritans, was based on the Scottish standard; but their coast towns were influenced by English practice, and their Western border by the practical necessities imposed by the frontier. There was danger from Indian raids, and the freedom of the Yankee and the Scotch-Irish was more absolute.

(d) Protestant Europe.—Nicholas Bownd's book was translated into several Continental languages and exercised a considerable influence. In Holland and Switzerland a strong Sabbatarian party grew up; and in Protestant Germany his doctrine found rigorous advocates. But on the whole the Sabbatarians failed; and the observance of Sunday, especially in Germany, fell much below the standard in England. Sunday labour was very common, and Sunday amusements were very coarse.

(e) Roman Catholic Europe.—In Roman Catholic countries, during the same period, as much as was practicable was done to keep the country from the Sunday. Sunday observance was not made a law in any of these countries, but there was a very strong movement for Sunday rest. In France, especially, there was a great struggle to win for Sunday the same freedom that was allowed to Sunday in England. In Spain Sunday was a day of rest only by law, and this was because it was the set day apart for bull-fights.

13. From the French Revolution to 1848.—The French Revolution marks an epoch in the history of Sunday observance. Its new calendar, with a week of ten days, though ephemeral and rather absurd, was a practical challenge to tradition, whose effects were permanent. The questions which it raised frightened some men into reaction, but excited others to free speculation. And it gave prominence to one fact, which no Government could afford to ignore for long. In every country there was an increasing number of citizens who did not acknowledge the Christian sanctions for Sunday, for whom, therefore, any rules for Sunday observance must rest on social rather than religious grounds. The recognition of this fact gradually altered the attitude of the Government towards Sunday laws; and perhaps it may account for the complete absence of legislation between 1789 and 1850. In England the repulsion caused by the Revolution combined with the Evangelical Revival to render Sunday observance much stricter. The laws of 1677 and 1781 were rather rigidly enforced, and public opinion (among the minority who had no votes for Parliament) was on the whole Sabbatarian. For the middle class and for all the people in country districts the movement was largely beneficial. The churches were filled; the sense of duty was strengthened; and habits of relection were induced. On the other hand, for the growing multitudes in the great towns the restrictions imposed by law became ever more cruel. Neglected by the Church, they had few places of worship and little will to enter them. They wanted means of getting into the country and opportunities of reasonable recreation in the town; but these were denied them, and nothing was left but the public-house. It was not until that change was recognized. The active controversy which was carried on about Sunday concerned only the reasons for observing it. Several distinguished writers took part in the discussion, but they did little more than repeat the well-worn arguments of the 17th cent. on either side.
In France, though Napoleon re-established the Church, the hold of Sunday upon the public mind could not be restored. It remained to a large extent a day of trade and of labour, as well as of social and religious enjoyment. In Spain it had been more striking. In Germany, which had been penetrated with Protestant influence, there was a marked decrease of Sunday observance. As a judge by the books which were published there between 1750 and 1845, public opinion was avowed to be strikingly based on religious propriety and Sunday was not yet safe to the social reason in favour of a day of rest. Sunday observance therefore, resting mainly upon tradition, naturally failed to maintain its hold.

The United States continued the division of opinion which had been characteristic of the years of the Great Revolution. New England and the Western States, which were gradually peopled by emigrants from New England, remained Sabbatarian, while the Southern States, occupied by the Quakers of Pennsylvania, generally adopted the more liberal view. Between 1830 and 1850 many books were published on both sides, but no legislation resulted.

14. From 1848 to 1914.—From 1848, the ‘year of revolution,’ we may date a new phase of the Sunday controversy. Suddenly the masses of the people, especially in manufacturing towns, acquired a new consciousness and began to be regarded with a new interest. The consequences were not long in making themselves felt. Hitherto it may be said that the churches and the legislatures had, on the whole, worked in harmony. Since 1848 there has been a gradual divergence. For, while the churches were slow to admit the possibility of change, the legislatures, more and more, as if in anticipation of the growing demand, sought to define regulations which were supposed to be required by new social conditions. At the same time an agitation began in some countries in favour of limiting the Sunday labour which vast numbers of people found so oppressive. These two elements were mixed in very different proportions in different countries.

(a) England.—In England, where Sunday labour was already several centuries old, the main question was that of relaxation. In 1851 a lively controversy arose about two points. Should railway travelling be allowed on Sunday? And should the new Crystal Palace be open to the public on Sunday afternoon? The instances could not have been better chosen, for their discussion involved all the main principles which were at stake. Twenty years passed before any legislative result came of the debate. In 1871 an Act was passed requiring the consent in writing of the chief officer of a police district, or of two magistrates, before a prosecution for Sunday trading could be instituted under the Act. In 1875 the Sunday Opening Act has been a dead letter. And an Act of 1875 has very much limited the application of the Act of 1781. That did not end the debate. In 1875 the Sunday Tramway was almost abandoned, and the opening of museums and picture galleries and other means of rational recreation on Sundays. In spite of several societies started in opposition, the Sunday League has gradually effected a great and beneficial change.

But the real crux of the situation is connected with travelling. Nothing has done so much to alter the habits of the people as the rapid increase in means of communication. The railway, the steamer, the tramcar, and the motor-car have successively helped to empty the towns on Sunday. They have answered a real need; for the strain of modern life has created a new craving for fresh air and change of scene, which finds satisfaction in the week-end habit of the rich folk and in the excursion train for the poor. The desire for such recreation is natural and wholesome. At the same time, it is in itself a cause of evils. (1) Those who spend Sunday away from home rarely derive any part of it to worship, and those who remain at home feel themselves thereby excused from attending at church. Consequently the number of those who enter any place of worship on Sunday forms an increasingly small percentage of the population. (2) Every added facility for travel on Sunday involves additional labour on the part of a large class of workers. The railways, the tramways, the restaurants, the bands, and the news agencies are so heavily tasked on Sunday that few of their employees enjoy anything like a day of rest.

Intent upon claiming what they considered their right to recreation and convenience, the mass of the people did not see what was involved in its satisfaction. The railways and the Continental trains ran in ever-increasing numbers, and a large number of subsidiary industries were obliged to join the movement. Then contractors who were in a hurry to do Sunday work; and there was a real danger that the industrial population might lose their day of rest. About the beginning of the 20th cent the trade unions and other bodies began to realize the danger; shop-assistants began to protest; and so a check was imposed upon the movement.

In the first year (1914-15) of the Great War it seemed as if the national necessity might obliterate Sunday rest. Munition factories and many others were opened on Sunday, and double pay was offered for work on that day. But the result was uniformly a diminished output. Many of those who worked on Sunday for double pay spent the extra money on Monday and Tuesday; and such as conscientiously toiled all seven days did so with rapidly falling energy. After two years Sunday work was generally abandoned; and it may be hoped that the nation has taken the lesson to heart.

(b) The Continent.—On the Continent during the latter half of the 19th cent. the same causes produced even more marked effects. In the eighties and nineties there was a struggle mainly along the aspect of the towns whether the day was Sunday or not. But at last even the ‘anti-clerical’ Governments, which had looked on complacently at a change which would increase the religious observance, became aware that it was causing immense social mischief; and while on behalf of the overstrained workers urgent claims were made for a legal day of rest. Between the years 1880 and 1910 laws were passed, in almost every country of Europe, which were intended to secure a weekly holiday for every working-man.1 Even in France, where the secularist influences were strongest, it was found impossible to judge necessarily one side of the case. The Act of 1781 had been a dead letter. An Act of 1875 has very much limited the application of the Act of 1781. That did not end the debate. In 1875 the Sunday Tramway was almost abandoned, and the opening of museums and picture galleries and other means of rational recreation on Sundays. In spite of several societies started in opposition, the Sunday League has gradually effected a great and beneficial change.

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1 See the return made to the House of Lords on the subject in 1911.
OTT has removed a difficulty which the church
never need have feared. Speaking as the story of the
creation in Gen 1 and 2 and the account of the
giving of the Law on Mt. Sinai were regarded as
historical, the question had to be faced: How can a
divine prescription, directly given, be abro-
gated? The answer for us is plain: No such
commands were ever given, and the stories which
record them are legends. The Sabbath was made for
man; and, under the guidance of Providence, it
was made by man. Sunday, in its turn, was made
by man and for man. Man, therefore, is
lord both of the Sabbath and of Sunday. It is
from the experience of men, both as individuals
and in societies, that the reasons must be drawn
which determine the manner in which Sunday is
to be observed.

(a) The new reasons for observing Sunday.—
These reasons are evidently of two kinds, answer-
ing to the conditions required for bodily vigour and
spiritual health. While the former may be re-
spected as especially the concern of the State and
the latter of the Church, the mutual influences of both
and mind are so considerable as to make it
impossible that in practice it is hard to draw a line
between the sphere of politics and that of religion. It is
all the harder because to ancient thought the dis-
tinction was not so clear. It was even in Turn times
is largely artificial. For the Church cannot ignore
the body, nor can the State disregard the interests
of the spirit. But happily no sharp division is
necessary. The reasons given by the Reformers are
of general application and may satisfy both
the Churchman and the statesman. Since three
hundred years of controversy have added nothing
substantially to them, we may be content with re-
statement of them and their detailed form.

The need of bodily rest at short intervals is a
fact of human nature which all civilized nations
have recognized by instituting public holidays.
The more complex the social and industrial
organization, the more important it becomes that
such holidays should recur at regular intervals.
The sporadic festivals of the ancient Roman
calendar and the Saints' Day system of modern Italy
could not be tolerated in an industrial
country; for production depends upon regularity
of labour and the efficiency of labour upon regu-
larity of recreation. Constantine's decree of A.D.
321 was, in fact, only confirmed in 1883 upon the
individual and satisfied a requirement of the
Church, but also solved economic and social
problems which were growing very difficult. Its
wisdom is proved by the fact that, in spite of
occasional protests and experiments, the Sunday
holiday has remained the rule of civilized countries
ever since.

The well-being of the people, which is the proper
object of government, demands more than mere
cessation of work at sufficient intervals. The life
of the citizen is incomplete, and his value to the
State is small, unless he cultivates his mind,
develops family affection, and enjoys social in-
tercourse. All these functions require leisure—not
merely the tired hours after a day's work, but
whole days when the time can be disposed of at
will. It is in days of leisure, also, that person-
nality and development develop. The State, there-
fore, has a responsibility, not only for appointing
holidays, but also for preventing such misuse of them as may diminish their value to
the citizen. The organization of recreation, on the other
hand, experience proves such responsibility to be
of a negative rather than a positive character.
The State can remove obstacles to a right course of acting
and prevent the individual from being physically
for the weekly holiday, they must issue from a
religious authority, where the moral sanctions, and affects only those who acknowledge
its right. The Christian Church is such an
authority, and has strong reasons, besides those
just mentioned, for requiring its members to
observe Sunday. Pitti says the mistaken
claims for Sunday, which originated in the dark
ages and were so hotly urged in the 17th cent.,
there remain some which are undeniable. The
spiritual life of the individual requires leisure
time, in which he may read or meditate, may
do acts of charity, and commune with his
friends, with nature, or art. It requires, also,
regular opportunities of joining in common wor-
ship, without which his membership of a Church
becomes unreal. The former demand might be
satisfied by times of leisure peculiar to himself.
But the latter involves regular holidays which are
common to all. Nor can it be a matter of indul-
gence whether these holidays fall on Sundays. The
power of association and tradition is enormous: no
man can escape from it, and no Church can ignore
it. To substitute another day would be to waste the
accumulated associations and traditions of nearly
2000 years which are concentrated on Sunday.
For on the Lord's Day Jesus rose from the dead;
and, on that day and times, the whole of
worship and mutual comfort; on that day they
have joined in the feast of His love. Luther did
not state the whole case when he wrote: 'Because
Sunday has been appointed from the earliest
times, we ought to keep to this arrangement, that
all things may be done in harmony and order,
and no confusion be caused by unnecessary novel-
ties'; 1 for he ignored one of the strongest impulses
in human nature, the desire for change.

(b) The mode of observance. — Assuming the
above reasons for the observance of Sunday, we
have to consider, from the point of view of Church
and State, what ought to be the manner of its
observance. The action of the State in such
matters, as we have indicated already, is mainly
negative. It has to protect the worker against
the oppression of unbroken labour, to secure for
him a regular period of recreation, and to prevent
other persons from interfering, whether by force
or by bribery, with his reasonable use of his leisure
time. That task is not so simple as might appear.
To enforce it, in every right, means to interfere
with some one else. The right to food involves the
Sunday labour of the milkman; the right of
the public to enjoy works of art encroaches upon
the leisure of the custodians; the right to fresh air
and green fields compels the toil of the railway-
man. These classes also have their rights, which
must somehow be safeguarded. To adjust conflicting
claims in the interest of the people as a whole
is a work of much insight and patience; nor can it
be accomplished once for all, since every enlarge-
ment in the tastes and interests of the many
involves a fresh tax upon the ministrations of a
few. In Britain, happily, men seem to be approach-
ing a general agreement about the main principles
of such accommodations. No man should be
required or encouraged to work on Sunday except
for the benefit of a large number. For the day-
man, the engineer of a picture gallery, or the
musician who plays in a band, is engaged in a
work of charity, if he is not adding a seventh
working day to his week for the sake of profit.
No such plea can be made on behalf of the man
who makes profit by the performances of others, or
of a tradesman who opens his shops on Sunday.
A partial exception is rightly made in the case of
those who supply the public with necessary refresh-
ments. But even that requires careful watching;

1 See above, § 11.
2 Larger Catholicism.
SUNDAY SCHOOLS.

and the Government has long recognized the duty of limiting the sale of intoxicants to certain hours of the day.

The action of the Church, on the other hand, is to protect the interests and the community, and must use compulsion. Every breach of positive law can be measured and punished by fine or imprisonment. Yet the main influence is really that of public opinion; for the magistrates and police, who administer the law, will not always be strict or lax according to the general feeling of public opinion. The best means therefore of securing a proper observance of Sunday is to educate public opinion.

In Robert Cox, The Literature of the Sabbath Question, 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1865. A few of them are historical, but the mass are arguments set out against the obligation of the State in which the same ideas (very few) recur over and over again. The following short list gives specimens of the writings of different countries and religions to which reference will be made. England has produced far more books than all the other countries put together.

(ii.) 19th century.—Martin Luther, Larger Catechism and other books; John Calvin, Institutes, bk. II., ch. vii.; Philip Melanchthon, On the True Obscurity of the Christian Conception; A Confutation of Unwritten Versions; Richard Hooker, Polycarpiano Institutionis. London, 1558, 1560;


Hendin and his followers. The question historically and with much ability. Parts of the history are well treated in articles and special chapters: Smith’s Histoire; D. Lord’s Day; Biddle, s.v. ‘Sabbath’ (ed. chiefly with legislation); D.F.S., s.v. ‘Sunday’ (ed. chiefly with legislation); D.F.S., s.v. ‘Sunday’ (ed. chiefly with legislation); D.F.S., s.v. ‘Sunday’ (ed. chiefly with legislation); D.F.S., s.v. ‘Sunday’ (ed. chiefly with legislation); D.F.S., s.v. ‘Sunday’ (ed. chiefly with legislation).


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SUNDAY SCHOOLS.—1. Origin.—The history of the Sunday school is not the history of religious education. The Sunday school is the latter; the former is a modern institution. The Sunday school is a voluntary lay organization conducting religious instruction in classes on Sunday, generally attended by children, who are included but not always as part of a church organization. The informal instruction that was probably given by teachers in the early Christian communities was somewhat akin to the activity of the Sunday school teacher. But the catechetical schools which flourished in the post-apostolic Church were entirely different. Moreover, the regular catechizing of children, which was always the duty of the minister, albeit a duty very much neglected for many centuries, was not a precursor of the Sunday school. Indeed, if it had been thoroughly effective and well developed, there might never have been a Sunday school. The failure of the church through the centuries to systematize and to develop the religious education of the children made the Sunday school necessary. Thus the Scottish clergy, who were more successful in the catechizing of children, regarded the new institution at first as altogether superfluous. The origin of the Sunday school is to be sought in the sporadic efforts of earnest men and women to supply some elementary instruction to children who were neglected by the Church. The most notable instance of such effort was that of Robert Raitkes at Gloucester; the name ‘Sunday school’ seems first to have been attached to his name.

LITERATURE.—Many hundreds of volumes have been written on this subject. A very good account of some 200 will be found

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institution; and there was genetic connexion between Raikes's enterprise and the whole Sunday school movement, which was necessarily to be approved.

2. The period of beginnings.—(a) Robert Raikes and the first Sunday schools.—The national duty of universal education was not fully recognized in England until the 19th century. In the 18th century, education was the privilege of the well-to-do. Even the many benefactions which had been provided from time to time for the education of the poor had been more or less restricted to the children of the middle classes. Moreover, with the development of the factory system, the children had been forced into labour at a very early age, with the result that they grew up in hopeless illiteracy. Among a number of efforts to remedy this intolerable condition the most significant was that of Robert Raikes, editor of the Gloucester Journal. He was a man of generous sympathies, interested in various efforts to ameliorate the lot of the unfortunate. His attention was attracted to the vicious conduct of the 'young pagans' who were employed in the factories during the week, but who were at large on Sunday, and who naturally employed their single Sunday afternoon in the recreation which they understood. Believing that their ignorance was responsible for their depravity, he gathered a number of them into a school and set himself to training them to make them understand in 'reading and the Church Catechism.' The date of this simple enterprise, which was soon copied in numerous towns, is usually set at 1780. Sunday schools became so popular that attention was soon addressed to them in the Gentleman's Magazine, and the various letters in that once influential periodical still remain our most important source of information regarding the beginning of the movement. Wesley, in his Itinerary, soon came upon Sunday schools in various places, and with live insight immediately saw their possibilities.

(b) The Sunday schools in America.—The American churches were accustomed to hold services in the morning and afternoon. There was an 'intermission' of an hour or more, during which a simple lunch was eaten. Naturally this period was often used for the catechetical instruction of the children, for whom the somewhat solemn services provided little that was appropriate. There is no evidence that any such practice was at all common previous to the Revolution. The catechizing of children was usually left to the faculty, and in connexion with the pastoral visits of the minister. A large proportion of the children were of course altogether neglected. The period of the Revolutionary War was not favourable to religious education, and the strong influence of France tended decidedly away from religion. In the general desire of the churches to meet this condition, they turned with interest to the new institution of the Sunday school, which had been introduced into the United States from England. It was not in America primarily (though it was to some extent) a school held on Sunday for illiterate children who could not be instructed on week-days, but rather a school conducted by the Church for religious instruction on the day set apart for that purpose. Thus from the beginning the Sunday school in America was more closely related to the Church than it was for a long time in England. This is not to say that there was not considerable opposition in the one country as in the other from clerical quarters, nor did the danger of the intrusion of inexpert laymen.

(c) Sunday school organizations.—Within a few years of the establishment of the Raikes schools organizations for propagating the institution came into existence.

William Fox, a London merchant, had had in contemplation a large plan for the gratuitous instruction of the poor. When he learned of the Philadelphia enterprise, it seemed to him more educational than his own more ambitious project; and he took the lead in forming, in 1787, the Society for the Establishment and Support of Sunday Schools. In 1796 it organized the Edinburgh Gratitude Sabbath School Society. Others were formed in other Scottish cities. In 1810 the Hilberry or Stockport School Society was organized. These societies collected funds for the establishment of new schools, and the payment of teachers, for the purchase of Bibles, spelling-books, etc. The practice of paying teachers, although continued in a few places for many years, did not pave the way to the organization of the new institutions, with the spread of the new institution. A number of young men who were ministering their services in the English districts of London felt the necessity of mutual help and conference, and organized in 1808 the Sunday School Society for this purpose. This organization became the most significant means of developing the Sunday school in Great Britain.

Organization began in America with the First-Day or Sunday School Society at Philadelphia, in 1791. It was denominational in character and philanthropic in purpose. The visit of Albert May of London in 1811 greatly stimulated interest in Sunday school organizations. Many of them were formed in American cities. After a number of federations of these had been made, the desire for a national denominational union resulted in the organization in 1834 of the American Sunday School Union, which has continued to do effective work to the present time.

(d) Lessons and methods of teaching.—The earliest Sunday school teaching was of the most primitive sort. There were no books, and they consisted of the Bible, and simply listening to the recitation. Soon some simple plans of lessons were prepared, with some practical appreciation of child religion. Helps to the teacher were the Sunday School Society's Teachers' Magazine, which began in London in 1818, and the American Sunday School Magazine, started in 1824.

3. Development of the Sunday school in America.—(a) Denominational organizations.—The definite adoption of the Sunday school by the Church in America is seen in the steps taken by almost all the denominations subsequent to the organization of the American Sunday School Union to supervise and extend the work within their own churches. For example, in 1827 the Sunday School Union of the Methodist Episcopal Church was organized in New York City; Baptist and Congregational denominations, which had been organized in 1825, developed into the American Baptist Publication Society in 1846, and into the Congregational Sabbath School and Publishing Society in 1858. The supervision which has been more especially undertaken by the denominations.

(b) The Sunday School as a pioneer religious agency.—It is easy in the light of our modern educational science to criticize the poor endeavours of early religious education, but no history of the wonderful development of the Mississippi valley would be adequate which failed to recognize the social significance of the little Sunday schools that went far ahead of the organized Church into the pioneer communities.

In 1829 the American Sunday School Union established its first western headquarters at Cincinnati, and in the following year resolved at its annual convention to undertake the organization of a Sunday school in every destitute place in the Mississippi valley. Funds were raised, lay and clerical missionaries were appointed, and a notable advance was made. A single missionary in the 'midst of the wilds' was able to work with the quickest of success. By 1829 he was able to report the organization of 1300 new schools. As it was said of old that where ten Hebrews lived there should be a synagogue, so it came to be the expectation in America that, wherever three or four Christian families were neighbours, a Sunday school should be started. That was the practice, and that was the result. At first, in the country districts, the schools were held in the church or in the court-house. Very many churches of the West had their origin in the activities of a few of the faithful who had begun religious work by the organization of a little Sunday school.

(c) The International Sunday School Association.—The conversion-system has been characteristic of the American movement. Neighborhood conversions were held before the annual meeting of the American
SUNDAY SCHOOLS

Sunday School Union, a national convention of Sunday school workers was called in 1822. After a long series of meetings it was continued to meet the following year. Numerous state and county conventions met in the succeeding years, until in 1859 a third annual convention was called. The first of these denominational conventions for the Civil War, was in 1869, and by that time the noted Illinois leaders, B. F. Jacobs, Edward Eggleston, J. H. Vincent, and D. L. Moody were prominent. While this convention ended definitely Chicago, there were delegates from Canada and from the British Isles. The same was true of the fifth convention of 1872, at which the uniform lessons were adopted. The movement then became definitely organized as international, with delegates from all the states and provinces of North America. An official body was gradually developed, which supervised the extension of the system to state, county, and township conventions, meeting annually and leading up to the great triennial gathering. At the eleventh convention in 1905 it was resolved to incorporate under the name ‘International Sunday School Association.’ This was done in 1907, headquarters being established at Chicago. A completely articulated organization exists under an executive committee, with a general secretary and a corps of superintendents over the various divisions and departments.

(d) The development of the lesson system.—As an improvement on mere memorizing, the ‘limited lesson’ system came into vogue about 1825. Two years later Albert Judson published a question-book, which supplied some notes and explanations of the selected lessons. In the same year the American Sunday School Union issued the Union Quarterly, which was followed annually by others covering a considerable portion of the Bible. Various schemes followed, the result partly of private enterprise, partly of denominational zeal. There was no adequate division of subjects, and Sunday school leaders felt the need of some unity of effort. After much discussion the convention of 1872 voted to issue a uniform system of lessons for all Sunday school pupils. A lesson committee was appointed, and great enthusiasm was developed in the scheme. The co-operation of the British Sunday School Union was secured, and the lessons became practically universal. Noted writers prepared text-books and commentaries. Great teachers’ meetings were held for the exposition of the lesson of the forthcoming Sunday, and the public press frequently devoted a column on Saturday to this purpose.

After twenty years of great external success the educational value of the uniform lesson was seriously called in question. The subject was warmly debated in conventions. At last, in 1908, the convention decided, while continuing the uniform lesson, to authorize its lesson committee to prepare a thoroughly graded course, to be used by such schools as desired it. This has since been done, and a series of text-books has been prepared by the various denominations upon the lessons thus outlined.

(e) Teacher training.—It has been recognized that most Sunday school teaching has been very unsatisfactory. Efforts have been made almost from the beginning to effect improvement. The institutes held since 1837 for public school teachers were a challenge to the Sunday school, which was answered by the development of conferences and institutes. The normal class of J. H. Vincent in Illinois in 1837 was a model which many followed. Courses for normal training of increasing scope have been established, and they are attended by the various denominational societies and prepared by educational experts are of very high grade. A summer school has been established at Lake Geneva, Wisconsin, where instruction for professional and lay workers is carried on during the vacation season.

(f) The Sunday School Council of Evangelical Denominations.—The activity of the various Sunday school boards of the Evangelical denominations has been very markedly developed during the last thirty years, until there has grown up a professional body of editors and secretaries representing the more important denominations. These leaders, feeling the need of a common expression of the denominational responsibility for religious education, organized in 1910 the Sunday School Council of Evangelical Denominations. Annual meetings are held, at which important problems of educational policy and administration are discussed. The existence of such a representative body naturally raised the question of future responsibility for the making of the lessons for the Sunday school world. The lesson committee has therefore been reconstituted, and now consists of eight members selected from the international association, eight members selected by the council, and one member selected by each denomination having a lesson committee.

(g) The emphasis on religious education.—The last quarter of the century has been marked by a growing emphasis upon the more serious educational responsibility of the Church. This was seen in the demand for the graded curriculum. In addition to the international lesson, several very significant commentaries and schemes have been produced, notably the Constructive Studies of the University of Chicago Press, the Completey Graded Series of Schulmer, and several series of various denominations. In 1898 the International Sunday School Association was organized by the Religious Education Association to promote the educational ideal in religion and the religious ideal in education. The Association holds annual conventions or conferences, conducts studies and surveys, publishes a magazine, gathers in its offices in Chicago all significant material on religious education, and conducts an extensive correspondence of advice and stimulus on problems in this field. Several denominations have established Boards of Religious Education, which are undertaking the supervision of the entire educational work of the Church.

Leaders of great ability are being selected as church secretaries. In some cases these boards are preparing new and specialized grades curricula.

The numerous agencies of religious education are being co-ordinated in the more progressive churches under a professional director of religious education. He is becoming the educational minister of the Church. Some colleges and universities and most theological seminaries have established chairs of religious education, by means of which a trained professional force is being developed and scientific work in religious education is being undertaken. An extensive literature has already been produced, both technical and popular.

4. British developments.—(a) The Sunday School Union.—The parent society in London developed into a nation-wide enterprise. In 1821 there were four metropolitan auxiliaries and sixty provincial unions, besides the Sunday School Society of Ireland and the Sabbath School Union of Scotland. The reports of that year show 4000 schools with 36,000 teachers, and 500,000 scholars. In 1823 infant schools were added for children below the ordinary school age, as in 1811 Thomas Charles of Bala, the Welsh Methodist leader, had already established infant schools. The latter subsequently became known as senior classes, and in the north infant and senior branches became part of a completely organized school. The Union celebrated its jubilee in 1853 by inaugurating a fund for the erection of
a permanent building. In 1862, at the time of the International Exhibition in London, a general Sunday school convention was held, attended by delegates over the British Isles, as well as from the Continent, the United States, and the Colonies. British Sunday schools were accustomed to meet in the morning and in the afternoon, and the Union had a very wide series of lessons. Beginning with 1874, the British Lessons Committee co-operated with the American Committee in the production of the international series of lessons.

In 1880 was celebrated the centenary of Sunday schools throughout the United Kingdom, and a great convention was held in London to which delegates came from all over the world. As a result of this enlarged interest, the Union modified its constitution so as to become thoroughly national in character, representation to the counties being extended in 1890.

During the last thirty years the Union has developed a very significant philanthropic work, including country homes for poor scholars, a home of rest for lady teachers, a children's convalescent home.

5. Educational progress.—In the second quarter of the 19th century, a forward movement in the science and art of pedagogy began in Scotland. David Stow organized the Glasgow Normal School for the training of teachers. Believing that the same principles could be applied to religious education, he published in 1826 a training system. The Union published in 1837 Popular Education, or a Normal School Manual. In 1836 a training class was organized at Pilimico. An attempt was made in 1861 to establish a college for Sunday school teachers, but it was found more feasible to develop a system of standardizing examinations. The college was finally established in 1899, and the examination system adapted to this organization. In addition to the publication of lessons and the encouragement of teacher training, the Union has developed a considerable literature for teachers and scholars, a separate building being required for this phase of its work.

6. World Sunday school work.—The Sunday schools spread naturally through the English-speaking world. Various efforts were made, beginning as early as 1815, to establish it on the Continent, but with slight success. The convention in London in 1862, at the earnest solicitation of Albert Woolf, raised the whole question of Sunday schools. Sunday schools were established in all European countries. This movement was promoted by the world's conventions which met in London in 1889, in St. Louis in 1893, in London in 1898, in Jerusalem in 1904, in Rome in 1907, in Washington in 1910, in Zürich in 1913. At Rome the World Sunday School Association was organized, with American and British sections. Missionary work in China, India, S. Africa, and Europe was assigned to the British section; in Japan, Korea, the Philippines, S. America, and in the Muslim fields to the American section. The Association reported at Zürich the world Sunday school membership as 20,015,057, with 310,057 schools, and 2,669,630 officers and teachers.

6. Non-Protestant Sundayschools.—The Roman Catholic Church has adapted the Sunday school to its system, though without relinquishing the control to lay leadership. In the Hebrew Reformed Synagogue the Sunday school, generally under parochial control, is of longer standing. Among others the Latter-Day Saints an excellent system of religious education has been developed, including the Sunday school. The Christian Science churches have established Sunday schools especially for children.

SUNNITES


THEODORE GERALD SOARES.

SUNNITES.—I. Distribution.—Islam is at present divided into two great unevenly divided sections. The Shi'ahs (q.v.) are found in Persia and among the many people in India; they are also to be found in the Turkish empire as it was prior to the Great War, in N. Africa, Egypt, other parts of Africa, Central Asia, Afghanistan, India, China, and the East Indies. In India, the ruling class is of Sunnite faith; in the Turkish empire there are numbers of Shi'ahs of the better class who make a point of concealing their religious convictions. The Muhammadan population of the world is estimated to be about 221,000,000, and of this total it is reckoned that about 15,000,000 are Shi'ahs; the rest are Sunnite. The Indo-Persian (q.v.) of E. Arabia and N. and E. Africa are not relatively numerous and are neither Shi'ah nor Sunnite inasmuch as they claim descent from the Khurjite schism of the early Umayyad period. The Zaidites (q.v.) of Yemen, though of Shi'ah origin, are on terms of fellowship with the Sunnites of Arabia.

2. The term 'Sunnite' and the early attitude towards the sunnah.—The Sunnite is the follower of the sunnah ("form," "outline," "mode," "usage"). To the view and usage of the Prophet. The issue implied in the use of the term is as to how new demands of thought are to be satisfied and new situations are to be met. The party of the sunnah contendcd that, where the Qur'an did not fully define and clearly outline details, the sunnah was to seek trustworthy information as to what Muhammad had said on the subject, what his action had been with relation to it, or what he had approved in others. The sunnah of the Prophet would be found embodied in a tradition (hadith), and it was of the highest importance that the trustworthiness of traditions should be certified. They were tested, not by their intrinsic probability or by their consistency with other reports, but solely by the reputed reliability of the succession of persons through whom they had been handed down. If the 'hadith, or chain of guarantee, had no un-
even greater degree was probably the notoriously untrustworthy manner in which traditions were produced. He preferred to resort directly to the Qur'an and, where it was not explicit, to decide according to its spirit, not by what he felt to be fairly be inferred from its teaching as bearing on the question in hand. This method of obtaining direction involved two principles which the party of the sunnah employed for a long time, viz., the trust, or qiyas, or independent personal judgment, and qiyas, argument from the analogy of known cases to secure direction for new cases. Both of these were thought to imply disrespect for, or even independence of authority. Aba Hanifah went farther than this in the readiness which he showed to depart from the written authority of the Qur'an and the direction given by the sunnah. Even when these gave a clear decision, or where the principle of qiyas gave a definite instruction, the situation might suggest a better view or a wiser course of action. To follow such a suggestion was a duty. The principle here implied is termed istislah, preference or asking for the better thing. It involves personal independent judgment (ra'y) to a greater degree than the employment of qiyas does and is still more inconsistent with the established law of the party of the sunnah (Aba-Sunni). Malik ibn Anas († 179 A.H.) lived in the atmosphere of tradition at Medina, and his work had more weight with him than with Aba Hanifah. Still, where traditions were being forged at the rate he knew and for the purposes of which he was aware, there was room for a principle of decision in legal and doctrinal questions which would protect Islam against in- volution through capricious or irrational judgments. Malik, therefore, admitted the rule of istislah, the seeking of the public welfare, which might over- ride the dictation of the Sacred Book and the sunnah. The strict party of the sunnah opposed this rule, as it had the liberal practice of Aba Hanifah; both allowed too much room to ra'y. To men accustomed to earlier conditions, when the absence of a sunnah which might cover all cases left room for decision on other grounds, the mere multiplying of traditions did not afford a sufficient reason for surrendering methods of obtaining guidance which had been followed when traditions were not available. Meanwhile the uninformed masses of Islam were strongly inclined to the simpler method of appeal to external authority. Qiyas, istislahan, istislah, and ra'y were too human, and hence to feel that there might be circumstances in which it was proper to decide on free scholarship (ra'y) or authority (sunnah) became the ruling factor in the community, whether the need of the Muslims was to be conceived according to the view of intelligent leaders or to that of the great body of the people with its clinging to old-established ways.

3. The Mu'tazilite rection.—The traditional and rationalistic tendencies both went on developing, and the mutual antagonism between them was intensified. The rationalistic party became recognized as a party which favoured ra'y, that is, the interpretation of Islam by free and philosophical and Christian reason, and regularly employed the Aristotelian method of arriving at truth. The earlier khilafahs of the Abbasi dynasty had been interested in these things, but they became so absorbed in the official approval under the khilafahs al-Ma'mun († 218 A.H.) that the last year of his reign he instituted an inquisition against the traditionalists. This inquisition (al-Mihnah) went on for sixteen years, in which He debate was allowed, and only officially approved under the khilafah al-Ma'mun. The sunnah party with its argument from the analogy of known cases to secure direction for new cases. Both of these were thought to imply disrespect for, or even independence of authority. Aba Hanifah went farther than this in the readiness which he showed to depart from the written authority of the Qur'an and the direction given by the sunnah. Even when these gave a clear decision, or where the principle of qiyas gave a definite instruction, the situation might suggest a better view or a wiser course of action. To follow such a suggestion was a duty. The principle here implied is termed istislah, preference or asking for the better thing. It involves personal independent judgment (ra'y) to a greater degree than the employment of qiyas does and is still more inconsistent with the established law of the party of the sunnah (Aba-Sunni). Malik ibn Anas († 179 A.H.) lived in the atmosphere of tradition at Medina, and his work had more weight with him than with Aba Hanifah. Still, where traditions were being forged at the rate he knew and for the purposes of which he was aware, there was room for a principle of decision in legal and doctrinal questions which would protect Islam against in- volution through capricious or irrational judgments. Malik, therefore, admitted the rule of istislah, the seeking of the public welfare, which might over- ride the dictation of the Sacred Book and the sunnah. The strict party of the sunnah opposed this rule, as it had the liberal practice of Aba Hanifah; both allowed too much room to ra'y. To men accustomed to earlier conditions, when the absence of a sunnah which might cover all cases left room for decision on other grounds, the mere multiplying of traditions did not afford a sufficient reason for surrendering methods of obtaining guidance which had been followed when traditions were not available. Meanwhile the uninformed masses of Islam were strongly inclined to the simpler method of appeal to external authority. Qiyas, istislahan, istislah, and ra'y were too human, and hence to feel that there might be circumstances in which it was proper to decide on free scholarship (ra'y) or authority (sunnah) became the ruling factor in the community, whether the need of the Muslims was to be conceived according to the view of intelligent leaders or to that of the great body of the people with its clinging to old-established ways.

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One more element in the Mu'tazilite controversy
remains to be noticed. The party of the sunnah held the characteristic Arab view that the will of Allah is revealed in the Qur'an and should not be changed or altered. The 'party of agile' allowed no capacity to initiate action and to accept responsibility for it. Because of that, the Mu'tazilah, for this reason, the Mu'tazilah are classed as Qararites (believers in free will). Their arguments attacked the orthodox, particularly the ground that they held man responsible for his acts and, notwithstanding the Qur'an and Sunnah, it was said to be forced upon them. Their arguments were not, but it was only illusory; in reality his acts were created by God, without whom nothing happened. This orthodox contentions the Mu'tazilah repudiated as involving injustice to man and also as implying an insulting impeachment of God's justice.

4. Re-establishment of orthodoxy.—The Mu'tazilite controversy was summarily terminated by the kalifah al-Mutawakkil in 324 A.H. He reversed the liberal policy of his predecessors, declared the doctrines that they had championed to be offences against the State, and proclaimed the orthodox views to represent the official opinions which alone would be tolerated in Islam. This official endorsement of the 'Ahlu-'s-Sunnah has been maintained in Islam down to the present. That the orthodox and of the orthodox were held by both Sunnites and Shi'ahs, and the Sunni khalifate has regularly stood for them. There is no doubt that the Mu'tazilite kalifah of the Ilmān period represented a relatively small minority in the Muslim world of their time and that al-Mutawakkil was wise not to continue his support of their views in the face of an adverse tide. Tradition and Qur'an retained their hold upon the masses, to whom their directness and their clear mandatory accent appealed as more reflective opinion could hardly hope to do. The great body of Islam ranged itself behind the orthodox kalifahs, and the Mu'tazilah tend to disappear little by little. The free-thinking teachers notwithstanding give the traditional theologians a great deal of trouble, in spite of the smallness of their numbers. It was easy to make a system based on literal interpretations appear ridiculous when attacked by means of keen dialectic, and the orthodox tenacity and inflexibility would probably prevent them from feeling an awkward comfort when they were forced to evade rather than answer the attacks made upon them. It will be readily understood that the man who enabled them to inflict genuine defeat upon their opponents, Abū'l-'Iṣṣān al-'Ash'ārī (q.v.), would seem to the orthodox to be almost a prophet when he arrived.

5. Abūl-'Iṣṣān al-'Ash'ārī.—Al-'Ash'ārī had been long trained in the views and arguments of the Mutakallims, and there is some plausibility in the legend which represents him as using their method against his own teacher al-Jub'ālī to the discredit of the latter. He had apparently come to see that the Aristotelian logic was valuable, not for the discovery of truth, but for making explicit the significance of propositions which were taken for granted and for the confutation of false arguments. It became clear to him that religion could not be built securely upon kalām, a formal science. The foundation must be in revelation through inspired men and media, through prophets and the Qur'an and Sunnah. The teaching of their predecessor's poor logic, the party of the sunnah had founded Islam upon the true basis, that tradition was a genuinely trustworthy means of communicating religious truth, that the consensus of the Muslim community (ijāda) expressed through its leaders was more reliable than the judgment of the individual Mutakallim, al-'Ash'ārī returned to the orthodox faith which he seems to have inherited from his forbears in the first instance. He came back converted through his own employment of kalām against itself, and naturally he made use of the weapon from that. He is remembered as the first of the Mu'tazilah and to develop into a system the orthodox doctrine.

6. The principle of consensus.—The principle of consensus operated more largely from the days of al-'Ash'ārī onwards. He was the first person who first made extensive use of it in his teaching and was prepared to accept it as a guide where the Qur'an and sunnah failed to afford direction. His preference for ijāda was approved only with reserve by the rigid Hanbalite orthodoxy of the 3rd century. Al-Bukhārī's strictness in the criticism of hadiths and his refusal to give an opinion on his authority made his system of ijāda very closely akin based upon an employment of the ijāda. The principle has a bearing upon the division of Islam into Sunnites and Shi'ahs. In the days of the early Ash'arite school this division, which is based, not upon a religious character, but upon a divergent view of the kalifate, had not yet taken place, and the ijāda embraced the whole Muslim community. When the division came, it is possible that the 'Ahlu-'s-Sunnah lay beyond the boundaries of the Persian empire as organized under the Safawids (A.D. 1502), and that ijāda had a sense and a binding force in the Sunnite parts of the Muslim world, but not in Persia. The Persian Muslims readily accord the name Sunnis to their rivals and accept Shi'ah as a proper term by which to describe themselves. Ijāda is especially a Sunnite principle and has guided the leading movements and changes of Sunnite Islam during many centuries. There is no need of its use among the Shi'ahs, where appeal is made to the inspired authority of the imāms as it is voiced through their mujtahids.

In spite of the fact that the Hanbali school, so powerful in the 3rd cent. of Islam, is now almost a negligible quantity, al-'Ash'ārī, the founder of the Sunnite theological system, was an ardent Hanbali after his conversion and died in that faith (329 A.H.). It is necessary to say, however, that the views which are now held by all the Sunnite schools are the founder's views as somewhat liberalized by the Ash'arite school after his death. There is no reason to suppose that the boundaries of the kalifate, into which the great teacher came back at the time of his conversion from Mu'tazilism was modified through the very kalām influences which he had combatted with his own. al-'Ash'ārī's thought to employ kalām for purely apologetic purposes, but that this did not give much substance to the principle of the consensus than he seems to have thought of. The 'Six Correct Books' of traditions (Kutub al-Sittah), of which the two most respected of all the Hanbalites and Sunnites are the most essential authorities, contain the only generally accepted evidence as to the sunnah, but in the application of the sunnah the principle the ijāda, used in accordance with the scholastic method introduced by al-'Ash'ārī, has made it possible to leave far behind the strict views of law held by the triumphant Hanbalite school of the 3rd Muslim century. That kind of unchanging orthodoxy would not have preserved the unity of Islam as it has been preserved among the Sunnites. Modern Hanbalites are the consistent successors of the early Hanbali school before al-'Ash'ārī, but they exert little influence. Sunnite Islam is an Islam to which the liberal views of the Hanbalites and the moderate views of the Mālikīs and Shāfi'is have less and less difficulty in adjusting themselves as time has passed, so that in opinion, at least in unity and even in use of uniformity have come to prevail. The Hanbalite domination of the Sunn sect became at once impossible with the admission of the kalām method and the broader understanding of the ijāda. The schools differ, as they have always differed, in the extent to which they accept the certain liberal and rational attitudes of mind. Analogia (ijāda) and judgment according to personal opinion (wāy) and, in special relations, talaqin, or preference for a view as a matter of choice, have undermined the conception of Hanbali law, a less important part among the N. African Mālikis, and even smaller part in the Shi'ite community of Islam, but the difference is within the region of wāy and not within that of dogmatic opinion.

7. Triumph of Ash'arī theology.—The process of liberalizing the orthodox system of al-'Ash'ārī must have been somewhat rapid in the century
following his death. Towards the end of the 4th century A.H. the Sunnites have the disposition to allow kālām to run riot in Baghdad, where we read of theologians who were willing to argue questions without reference to the traditional authorities of Islam. Even in the West the great thinkers, excluding Ibn Hazm (g.v.) as almost a sole exception, gave themselves more and more to a philosophical account of religion and at the same time realized painfully that they had parted company with the rest of the world. Men like Ibn Tufail and Avemero (g.v.) in the late 6th C. A.H. have one system for the masses and another teaching for the instructed few. Nevertheless one may say that, in spite of all excesses, the Ash'arite school had definitely imposed its views and method upon the Muslim world before the end of the 11th C. of our Christian era. The liberty of thought which al-Ash'ari had secured for Islam had developed by that time a controversial intellectualism which left no place for intuition or mysticism in religion, and orthodoxy was in serious danger of losing the sympathy of the masses. A new emphasis was called for in order to supply a corrective to the general rationalism which prevailed.

Al-Ghazālī—Al-Ghazālī (505-556 A.H.) was by nature a religious mystic, an interest which to whom the truth was the greatest of all possessions. It was for him life's supreme concern to solve the problem of Ultimate Reality in such a way as to be satisfied that he enjoyed contact, response, and fellowship with it. He was convinced that what he sought could not be given by an acceptance of truth on mere external authority, a point to which, in spite of his inmost conviction, al-Kalām al-Ash'ari still held. He saw that the Mutakallims could proceed to their conclusions only as they took for granted certain propositions which they did not prove, and that, when they had said all, the seeker had in possession only a system of logical inferences and not at all an experience of the ultimately real. Not because it was a last resort or because he was in despair of finding anything better, al-Ghazālī turned to Sufism. He made a full and sympathetic trial of the Sūfī discipline, after having tried other ways, and was convinced that the Sūfis (g.v.) had solved the problem of the soul's quest. Man created in the image and likeness of God to enjoy fellowship with God; he received both through faithful conformity to the Sūfī ideal and persistent openness to receive higher communications. Al-Ghazālī was a moderate Sūfī who was ready to give due weight to reason within its own limits, and who recognized the ethical and religious duties of the common life. His pre-eminent gifts and virtues—for he was one of the finest characters as well as one of the greatest minds which Islam has produced—have made his solution of the religious problem exceedingly influenceful down to our own day. Sūfism became a power far beyond the borders of the derish organizations; the extreme dependence upon rationalism was checked; the emotional factors in human nature were provided for with due regard to ethical and religious con-
duct. Probably no teacher since the days of the Prophet has afforded to Muslims a better illustration of the possibilities of their own faith.

Sunnites and Shi'as.—The distinction be-

tween Shi'as and Sunnīs has its roots in the dispute between the 'Aliids and the Sunnīs in the year 465 A.H. (the year of the Muharram in which Muḥam-mad ibn al-‘Abbas ibn al-‘Abbas, who will recall the assassination (33 A.H.). In its origin it has nothing to do with the religion founded by Muhammad,

but rather is occupied with the political succession to the leadership of the Muslim community. At first the 'Aliids on their side claimed that they were the legitimate khālidfsih because they were descended from the Prophet's daughter Fatimah and his closest companion, 'Ali. The Unayyids on their part claimed a nomination by the choice of the Muslims themselves and as a further title claimed kinship with the Prophet as being of the Hashimite family. Later the 'Aliids founded another claim, the establishment of a judge.sm against all claims of right to office because of the popular choice. This difference still marks off the Shi'ah political theory from that held among the Sunnīs.

(a) Theory of the khālidfsih.—There is, moreover, an old standing difference between the Sunnīs and Shi'as as to the functions of the khālidfsih. Among the Sunnīs the khālidfsih is a political ruler essentially, while from the first the 'Aliid party regarded the Prophet's successor as a religious guide and therefore preferred to designate him as the iimām. Since the iimām was assumed to have physical descent from the Prophet secured to him not merely divine rights, but also a divine endowment of grace and wisdom. No such assumption was held by the Sunnīs with relation to their khālidfsih. They were chosen from among the believers and could claim no supernatural qualifications. Their authority was conferred by the Muslim community and carried with it no implication of pre-eminent sanctity or infallibility. The Sunnī attitude towards the khālidfsih differs greatly from that of the Shi'as towards the iimām. The personal qualities and public influence of the khālidfsih have been largely deterministic of the respect shown to them. Among the Shi'as the office hallows the occupant, and the iimāms are regarded with the deepest religious veneration. The Sunnīs khālidfsih by law are required to be the Prophet's tribe, the Quraysh; the iimāms were chosen from the still more narrow circle of the Prophet's immediate family.

Since the twelfth iimām, Muhammad ibn al-Iṣḥāq, disappeared in the year 929 A.H., they have not had a title Fraimām has been suspended, but there has never been a legal reason why the Sunni khālidfsih should be interrupted, as it has always been possible for the legal descendants to forward a candidate and to nominate him, provided circumstances did not interfere with his fulfillment of his role of khālidfsih. The iimāms have been assumed to have been the khālidfsih of the Prophet and have taken to themselves the exclusive title pertaining to this honor. In the past, the Shi'as of the Ummah, the descendants of the Prophet, have been the custodians of the Faithful; since the time of the Ottoman conquest of Egypt in A.H. 1052. As they are not of Arab race, but always of Turco-European lineages, there is to be no basis for the Ottoman claim. The first sufiijin (Sulaymān) to assume the title justified his act on the ground of a surrender of his rights on the part of the last Abū'īhadīdīkhālidfsih, al-Mutawakkil II, who at the time of the conquest of Egypt was attached to the court of the Mamluk sultān and was recognized by them as the spiritual head of Islam. The Ottoman sultānis have returned in their persons the dual authority temporal and spiritual which the Mamluks had divided, and the principle of the consensus seems to have permitted the 'ilah to legalize the departure from the law of the khālidfsih as settled by the sultān. They have accepted the transfer of the 'Abī'īhadīdī's rights to Sulaymān Sulaymān, giving a title, and have regarded it as authenticated by other considerations, viz. the Ottoman conquest of Muslim domain, the control of the sacred cities, and the possession of relics of the Prophet. The sultānis have felt an exaction to traditional sentiment in constituting the chief mujtahid as shāhīd al-İlah, or highest spiritual authority over all believers. This functioning, nevertheless, derives his power from the sultān who appoints him, though it is to be admitted that the choice of the 'ilah politically settles the appointment. All questions affecting Islam are considered by the sultān, and are authenticated by his title as promulgated by a future issuing from him. The other condi-
tions required to possess a recognition of authority as mujtahid or representative of a claim of a khalifah are that he shall be of adult years, of sane mind, of free condition, a man versed in the learning of Islam, and a capable of administration, with considerable influence over the 'ilahs, the Sunni doctors have always recognized Abī-'Ibn Umar, 'Umar, as the first successes of the sultānis, as genuine khālidfsih (al-Khālidfsih ar-rāshidun) together with the fourth khālidfsih 'Ali, who of course is allowed to be a legiti-
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The intense hatred between Sunnis and Shi'ahs as distinct sects dates from the time when the Shi'ahs were constituted a separate political organization by the erection of the caliphate of Persia in A.D. 1502. The fault in this mutual bitter feeling is greater on the Shi'ah side than on that of the Sunnis, but the treatment of Persian pilgrims to Mecca has been an enduring irritation, and in earlier times the military aggression of the Turkish sultans gave occasion for resentment in Persia. As has been pointed out above, there are many individual Muslims of Shi'ah connexion in the Turkish empire, and, either because of an acquired indifference or oftener because of their practice of taqiyyah (concealment of faith), they suffer no personal inconvenience at the hands of their Sunnite fellow subjects. The proposal of Nadir Shah in the 18th cent., that a reunion of Islam be brought about by admitting the Shi'ahs to fellowship with the Sunnis as a fifth orthodox school, was promptly by the world-ambition of that ruler and was met by the refusal of the Shi'ahs in the case in the old Persian mullahs and mujtahids.

(c) Position as to the sunnah.—The difference between the Sunnis and the Shi'ahs does not consist in the acknowledgment of the sunnah of the Prophet by the former and its denial by the latter. The title of the Sunnis to have the oldest and the most thoroughly tested body of traditions is not questioned, but the Shi'ahs also have their sunnah, whose authorities are the acknowledged hadith collections of the sect. Resting upon these recognized standards, the Shi'ah teachers claim that they alone maintain the true sunnah, while the Sunnite version, they allege, has been perverted so as to furnish arguments against the claims of 'Ali and his sons to the succession of the Prophet. The corruption of the sunnah for any such purpose by the Sunnis is exceedingly unlikely, while the evidence of the manipulation of traditions by the Shi'ahs to support their own side is considered to be fairly clear. In the interpretation and adaptation of the sunnah to new relations the Sunnis are guided by the consensus (ijma') and analogy (qiya'), while the Shi'ahs claim to be alone rightly guided in their following of the sunnah, inasmuch as they have enjoyed the infallibility of the imams either in person or since the line has been suspended by the inerrant communication of their word and will through the mujtahids. According to the sunnah view, there can be no mujtahids in Islam since the death of the last great orthodox founder in the 3rd cent. A.D. The term as employed in Sunni circles is limited to the great imams of the earlier centuries who founded the four orthodox schools and laid on indisputable foundations the theology and law of Islam. Since their day no teacher's opinions have justified themselves as a permanent basis for faith and life.

10. Changes in Sunni Islam.—In the theory Sunni Islam is tied up to the Ash'arite system, and because of that it is thought to be fated to intellectual stagnation. The facts show that from the days of the Prophet there was some modification of the founder's positions, and with the contribution made by al-Qazzaz one may say that the modification amounts to a materially altered view-point and the introduction of a new and revolutionary emphasis which takes up the intuitive and emotional factors in religious experience. The necessities of the historical situation have repeatedly rendered nugatory the theoretical requirements of Sunnite orthodoxy. Where Muslims live under Christian governments, as in India, the law of the khilafate has to yield place to the obligations of political loyalty, the duty imposed by the jildal is in most cases unfulfilled, and the zakah and the prayer times have become meaningless to the authority to whom it is to be turned over and the mode and purpose of its distribution. With the universal recognition of saint-worship and the cult of relics, the apostolic or dogmatic of the latter days, the law against idolatry (shirk) is violated, and the sufficiency of the canonical authorities, the Qur'an and sunnah, is called in question. It may be recalled that one fruit of the modern liberal movement in Iran is the rise of the Qadisiyya school, which, its founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (†1908), recognized the logic of facts in the position of the Indian Muslims and declared that the duty of the jildal was to admit of the Sunnite majority until such time as the effect of the Shi'i teaching when fully developed is a pantheism which is in contradiction with the hard, clear-cut monotheism of the Ash'arite theology. It is a pantheism, sworn strongly to a hobnail of the positive bonds of conduct which the orthodoxy touching imposes. The righteousness of the Shi'i may become extravagantly mechanical and violently anti-social, so much so that public regulation may be called for to prevent wrong in the one in the case in the old Persian mullahs and mujtahids.

11. Detailed differences between Sunnis and Shi'ahs.—A fair point of detail the Sunnis and Shi'ahs differ require to be mentioned. (a) The Sunnis do not accord to 'Ali and his sons the degree of veneration which the feast of Muhammad implies. This holds true even if the Sunnis be the Shi'ahs in the sense of those who actually participate in the ceremonies of the feast along with their Shi'ah neighbours. (b) There is some confusion of the orthodox feast of the 'Ashura, which falls on the tenth day of Muharram, with the Shi'ah feast, which extends from the first to the tenth day of that month. The motive of the respective feasts is, however, entirely different. The 'Ashura commemorates the completion of creation by the creating of Adam and Eve on the tenth day of Muharram, while the tenth day of the Shi'ah ceremonies is simply the crowning day of the whole Muharram feast, pointing in particular to the killing of Husain without the permission of time has taken place on that day. (c) Generally speaking, the ritual of ordinary worship differs only in the non-essential points. The mode of purification is the same both in the Shi'ah and Sunnite, the washing of the arm upwards to the elbow, while with the Shi'ahs the process is reversed. In the washing of the Sunnite ritual literally washes, the Shi'ah merely rubs or wets the feet. (d) To perform the hajj by proxy is not permitted by the Sunnites, while it is in common among their Shi'ah neighbours. This permission, if granted, would violate the cardinal Sunni requirement that a Muslim must perform the hajj at least once during his lifetime. (e) More far-reaching in its social effects is the permission given by the Shi'ah law to contract mahr marriages. These temporary unions, for a price agreed upon and under conditions of legal contract, are forbidden by the Sunni codes. (f) The Sunni recognition of the principle of taqiyyah is limited to times of extreme personal danger when it is at most permitted to disguise one's religious convictions in order to preserve one's life. The Shi'ahs do not view taqiyyah as limited to situations of personal risk, and, where it applies, they do not merely permit a resort to deceit but depend strongly upon the employment of it. Especially where the interests of religion may be supposed to be in jeopardy, the Muhallal of Shi'ah faith will feel the use of taqiyyah to be a moral obligation.

In all that has been said in the foregoing description of the Sunni position and practices regard has been had to only those matters which fall within the scope of the present work. It must be kept in mind that in all Muslim countries, whether Sunni or Shi'ite, there is another authority which has its constituted rights and its organized administration, viz., the customary law ('urf or wa'ad). This differs according to the degree of its development in the various provinces of different places. It is not a distinctive feature of the Sunnites and need not be more fully treated in this article.

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very great, though as a class they are not viewed with the superstitious veneration or even fear which the Persian Shí'shá shows to many of the mundhí, to all the muthakás, and to the large class of ayáda who are to be found in Shí'í regions.4 The influence of the 'ulámid has been conserved by their learning, which, though narrowly restricted to Muslim theology and law, is often comprehensive within its limits. This learning is constantly on call in the service of the Muslim community. Their influence, moreover, has been greater since it might have been owing to a certain measure of accommodation which has made large room for such a phenomenon as the Saíd movement—a movement whose elements of wonder and esotericism have proved to the satisfaction of the naaœs that Ilám was still a medium of supernatural power and divine life. Along with this they have admitted to the curriculum of theological studies in all the leading schools the works of the great mystics, particularly those of the master, al-Ghazãlí. The fact or explication of the cult of saints, endowed as it is by public funds, may be an anomaly, but for the orthodox leaders it also is an instrument of power. More potent than the personal factor is the fact that the consensus ('ijmá) is realized only around the 'ulámid and that no cause has been so effective in bringing about change of policy and the initiation of new lines of action as the voice of the 'ulámid declaring the will of the Creator to be the universal Muslim community. The 'ijmá is being prepared by the training which the candidates for the learned calling receive, whether be in the Azhar University at Cairo, in the schools of the West African, or in the ancient seats of learning like Ekkára. It is a long mechanical process aiming at fixing rigidly the positions of traditional orthodoxy in the thoughts and sympathies of the masses and cultivating in him a fanatical devotion to the authority of the past, especially of the primitive age of the faith. It is natural that, when his opportunity to lead comes, he should adjust himself as an obedient part of the whole traditional system.


W. M. PATTON.

SUPERNATURALISM.—Supernaturalism is the mental attitude that has the supernatural for its object. The term is used by anthropologists to express the fact that primitive magic and primitive religion alike rest on a belief in supernatural power. Of course, in this learning it is convenient to have a word such as 'supernatural' that may be equated now with 'magical' and now with 'divine.' For the savage respects the human magician 'on account of his supernatural interests, his capacity to shape the supernatural world,' and, on the other hand, must be allowed to possess a rudimentary notion of certain supernatural beings who may be fittingly called gods, though not in the full sense in which we use the word.1 Frazer, indeed, assumes a general tendency among savages to claim 'powers which we should not himself believe, as opposed to that of a savage who 'will say that 'a savage hardly conceives the distinction commonly drawn by more advanced peoples between the natural and the supernatural.'2 F. B. Jevons, on the other hand, warns us against the error of imagining that there was a time when man did not distinguish between the natural and the supernatural.3 This error may take the form of saying either that to primitive man nothing was supernatural or that everything was supernatural.4 He goes on to say:

1 Primitive man took to himself the credit of his successful attempts to work the mechan of nature for his advantage, but when the machinery did not work he ascribed the fault to some overriding supernatural power.

The objection of E. Durkheim, that to recognize breaches in a habitual order does not amount to the recognition of breaches in an order conceived as necessary after the manner of modern science, is surely something hypercritical in such a context. An objection of another kind, since it does not dispute the facts, but merely regards convenience of terminology, is that of J. H. Leuba,5 who in naming the belief in supernatural power would call attention to the power rather than to the supernatural quality attaching to it, and hence would substitute for 'supernaturalism' the term 'dynamism,' originally used by A. van Gennep,6 to describe the term 'primalist' theory of society contrasted with the 'personalist' theory of animism. Now there is much to be said for the view that the positive content of supernaturalism receives its fullest conciseness of expression in terms of the monas type.7 But the mental attitude in question has its negative side as well as the positive side connoted by monas, since it is called forth by the frustration of reasonable expectation; so that, as Jevons says, 'where the natural ended, the supernatural began.'8 Again, this mental attitude is not so predominantly intellectual that it can be suitably designated by means of any more concept that it generates. For the rest, anthropological terminology is, happily, in a somewhat fluid condition, and may be varied without impropriety in response to the needs of different theoretical purposes. It will suffice here, however, to give a brief account of the chief aspects of the mental attitude under consideration.

1. Emotional aspect.—The emotional constituents of the magico-religious sentiment have been subjected to psychological analysis with results that show how it is, even in its simplest forms, exceedingly complex. Ave 'is perhaps the word in our language that expresses its many-sided nature most fully, and awe is defined by W. McDougall as a 'tactilely compounded fear of wonder, and negative self-feeling.'9 Round the object provided by the supernatural, fear, admiration, and submission in varying degrees are organized into a mood, whether, in addition, that object be on the whole hated or loved, and consequently take rank as a manifestation of evil or of good supernatural power. Thus the sentiment is excited equally by lore and religion, the one the more, the other the less, according to the god, being 'surrounded by a cloud of mystery and an atmosphere of awe.'10 To appreciate the

2 Id., p. 206. 
3 Id., p. 51.
5 Les Formes elementaires de la vie religieuse, Paris, 1917, p. 36.
6 A Psychological Study of Religion, New York, 1912, p. 84.
8 See ART, MAM.
9 Id., to the Hist. of Belief, p. 19.
11 Id., p. 270, p. 266; p. 256.
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emotional attitude of primitive man towards a universe which, beyond the narrow circle of the daily routine, is almost wholly unknown, yet felt to be pregnant with immeasurable possibilities of weal or woe. Such one should take stock of by one of the more baffling and startling elements in his experience, as is done, e.g., by W. D. Wallis in his paper 'The Element of Fear [better 'Awe'] in Religion.' Confined by his ignorance to the immediate here and now, he is unable, therefore, to see or apperceive events alike to the stranger at a distance and to those of his own race that are dead and gone. Nor does the familiar present remain unvisited by portents. The sky above him is disturbed by thunderstorm, eclipse, shooting stars, the aurora; earth and sea about him have their haunted pools, their fantastic rocks. Then living nature teems with wonders—trees and herbs, reptiles and fishes, birds and quadrupeds, that look strange or behave unaccountably. Moreover, man is mysterious to himself, with his visions, his seizures, the power of his eye and gesture, his sheer impressiveness, ranging from the majesty of kings to the gruesomeness of witches. For the rest, life is full of accidents and coincidences. Altogether, the savage world provides plenty of scope for that interplay of primary emotions of which a wise outcome is the result. But, however, that the essence of supernaturalism does not consist in bare feeling, but attains to expression through every aspect of the mental life at once.  

2. Intellectual aspect. — Since supernaturalism has a negative as well as a positive side, embodying a cautious doubt of the unknown combined with an effort to read a meaning into it, primitive thought divides its attention between two sets of concepts. Negatively the supernatural is tabu, positively it is mana. Among savages, of course, such notions have not been built up into any systematic theory; nor is it possible to say at what stage of mental evolution they first came into use, though perhaps it would be hard to point to any primitive people that lacks them entirely. Moreover, since the supernatural implies evil power as well as good, ministering to the purposes of the sorcerer no less than to those of the priest, it is to be expected that mana will sometimes split up into two notions that stand antithetically for the good and evil kind of supernatural power. Finally, it cannot be said that rudimentary thought is altogether without an idea corresponding to that of the natural or normal. It seems highly doubtful whether we can credit the savage with a belief in one and all the uniformity of nature, as some have sought to do; 4 indeed, historically, the modern concept of nature would seem to have descended from mana, its wonder-working quality having been shed by the way. 5 But in the Polynesian nora, the non-sacred, common, or permitted, 6 we have the counterpart, as in the Latin profanus, of nature so far as it stands not for mechanism but for routine. We must not, however, look for definiteness in primitive categories, since they are never subjected abstractly and as ideas to reflective examination, but merely embody such more or less arbitrary associations as custom suggests and sanctions.  

3. Practical aspect. — Seeing then, that the savage may be said to live out his ideas rather than to think them out, it is in the sphere of his actual practice as regulated by social use and wont that we are likely to meet with the clearest indications of his mental tendencies. Primitive supernaturalism will declare itself primarily in a group of traditional activities through which human emotions, feelings and thoughts find their satisfaction. The question, then, is how far there is a distinctive province of behaviour corresponding to the interest in supernatural things. Nowhowever, there can be little doubt that among some peoples of low culture the cleavage between the secular and the magico-religious sides of the social life is made 'as with a hatchet.' Thus we are no longer of the Central Australian during initiation, or a woman at child-birth, enters a condition of tabu and passes out again into ordinary life — need not be pressed too hard, seeing that sacredness is not to the same extent relative, so that, e.g., a nun may be tabu to strangers without being so to his friends. 8 All that need be assumed here is that certain activities tend to be organized about the interest in the supernatural as embodied in a specific tissue of feelings and beliefs. The magico-religious life is unhinged in its claim on human endeavour, and in its ulterior effects on human welfare may be well-nigh all-pervasive. But the mental attitude which demands continuous maintenance. Whenever the tension is relaxed, 'nature,' in the shape of the effortless rule of habit, is busy making good the strain.  

REFERENCES. — See the works cited in the footnotes. 9

R. K. MARETT.

SUPERSTITION. — 1. Signification and use of the term. — The word 'superstition' is used both in a concrete and in an abstract sense. We group together as superstitions a number of beliefs, habits, and fancies, tribal and individual, which we regard as not being founded on reasonable conceptions of the world and of human life, necessities, and obligations. The magico-religious term 'superstition' signifies the disposition to attribute occurrences to preternatural or occult influences, and to direct conduct with a view to avoiding misbelief or obtaining advantage from such influences are supposed to produce. The precise connexion between the etymology of the word and its ordinary signification is not easy to trace. The term 'superstition' seems to imply some excess, and this excess may generally be regarded as an exaggeration of a reasonable belief in some supernatural agents or agencies, with a readiness...
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to accept unverified statements as to spiritual or magical interference in the material world. The origin of the most potent and widely diffused of superstitious beliefs has already been discussed under various headings. 1 It seems therefore more suitable here to consider superstition as an abstract quality, and to regard it in its psychological and historical aspects.

Two points may be noted for the purpose of clearing the ground: (1) the intensely subjective way in which the word is used in popular language. No man is ready to define himself as superstitious, but almost every one is ready to recognize superstition in the beliefs and acts of others. Thus superstition, like natural phenomena, is the less the more its causes are obscure, and there is nothing the cause, the reason, and the explanation of which are obscure; (2) superstition need not be in any way connected with mysticism (q.v.). True, the mystic who regards all things and persons as owing what reality they have to a divine and supernatural life or nature, may pass from a desire to find traces of the spiritual and eternal manifested in or through the form of the material and temporal. But the reasonable mystic, by properly recognizing the belief in the spiritual nature of ultimate reality, is the less liable to give credence to fanciful and grotesque utterances from a supposed source. For the true mystic, and especially the greatest of mystics, was eminently sane and reasonable. If the same cannot be said of all the Neo-Platonists, the reason must be that they did not have so many less mystical causes of material than he. 2 Some confusion, however, may arise from the circumscription of the term in popular minds (especially in those who employ it in an official or of a poetic order) attach a symbolic meaning to certain material phenomena or ceremonial acts without any real or supposed connection with their material and temporal causes. Hence we have the interesting fact that, in the higher religions of an advanced race, we may have what seems to be a mystical connection with the material, but with far-reaching differences in fundamental religious conceptions. Hence the warnings of religious teachers, on the one hand, against the abuse and demotion of 'superstitions' which have, for the uneducated, been valuable in association with religions thoughts and feelings, and on the other, against the confusion of symbol and reality, which tends to materialize and crystallize popular religion.

The superstition, then, is one that is not educated to discern the character of evidence, or that has not patience to suspend judgment in the presence of unfamiliar phenomena. If it is objected that some powerful, and (in some directions) well trained intellects have coincided with a superstitious bias, these exceptions would seem due to a want of mental balance.

2. Historical aspects. — Turning from the individual to society and to historical progress, we may say that, roughly speaking, superstition declines as the view of the universe becomes more scientific. True, the basic element of many of the more elaborate forms of all early natural religions, and of crude hypotheses which lend themselves to strange vagaries of thought. This is specially evident in the pseudoscientific basis of theology, whence emerged the science of chemistry, was the subject of the art of Eutyches of Ionia, thought were not without such vagaries, yet the Greek philosophers had in them the root of the matter — a whole-hearted desire after truth. Therefore they progressed, and their progress belonged to the Western world.

When, in May, 553 A.D., in the midst of a battle between Lydians and Medes, there occurred 'the first eclipse of which European records witness when it should be rated,' the date to which this passage refers as to the eclipse of 407 B.C., ascribed to the Lydians and Medes, the eclipse of 242 B.C., ascribed to the Persians, and the eclipse of 159 B.C., ascribed to a comet, was not, or even could not tell the day or the hour — the sun would be darkened. 1

This does not, of course, imply that the Greeks had altogether lost the desire ever to become, what we should call a scientific people. But to bring so uncanny an occurrence as a darkening of the sun within the range of calculable events was to cast the Shadow of Morius into the pale of superstition. It was indeed a sufficient reason for supposing that the gods were now affected with disease, and that they might be induced to withdraw their beneficent influence. 2

1 See esp. astro. Magic, charms and amulets, dreams and sleep, evil eye, etymology, propitiators and propitiations.


Greeks religion and Greek life abounded with superstitions. The religion of the Olympians was bound up with the superstitions which Plato would have excluded from his ideal city, and the old-world ritual which survived in popular ceremonies was yet more favourable to unreasonable fancies and stories. The Athenians, less the most intellectual of the Greeks, yet their prosecutions for impiety showed both a low standard of religious liberty and a high standard (if the expression may be used) of respect for ancestral religion. Auxagoras, a man of honest and useful character, suffered at the hands of his countrymen. True, their cause prevailed in so far that in the next century speculation was more free and scepticism had scope; and, after all, the moderation centred in the maxim μηδε ζησαν seems to have checked any tendency to persecution like that of the Middle Ages and later. Nicias was, in spite of his popularity, blinded by posterity for delaying the retreat of the Athenians before Syracuse on account of an eclipse of the moon. But the point against him, most probably, was that he was too ill-educated to know the cause of such an eclipse (though he and the advance of Iano meant, to many individuals in many places, a remarkable development and enlightenment of the religious consciousness; but it also meant a recreation of Oriental and barbarous superstition. This was found even among the late philosophical sects, notably the Neo-Platonist.

As might naturally be expected, in societies comprising men of culture considerably above the rank and file of their contemporaries, we have, from the ancient pagan world, unanswerable protests against superstitions as a form of worship. Thus among those is the great poem of Lucan, which holds in superstition, or in popular religion, the most potent and most neglected source of human ill. The same view is taken by the Roman reformers of Plutarch and Justinian, in which he holds up to contempt the figure of those who, under the guise of their religious superstitious, commit such acts of corruption of the soul. And such examples are not uncommon in the religious literature of all ages. The same point is illustrated by the case of the Empress Julia, who was so much taken with the theory of the sun's having four moons, and of her own figure resembling one of these moons, that she caused a coin to be struck with a figure of herself, on which a moon was engraved, and thus was made part of the sun's heavenly train.

Yet, by a kind of paradox, scepticism seems to have overshot the mark, and, by denying the possibility of all certainty, to have opened the way for popular superstitions, to which they applied in all manner of superstitions and practices.

The interchange of religious ideas, the foundation and migration of religious societies, and the general disintegration which followed the fall of the most advanced and the advance of Rome, meant, to many individuals in many places, a remarkable development and enlightenment of the religious consciousness; but it also meant a recreation of Oriental and barbarous superstition. This was found even among the late philosophical sects, notably the Neo-Platonist.

1 This 'overshooting of the mark' by the sceptics is suggested by E. Fries, Neo-Platonism, London, 1912.

2 See art. Neo-Platonism.
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conspicuously from its original form, and on the other hand may bring it within the reach of minds unaccustomed to deal with abstract ideas. These accretions are sometimes, in order to avoid the unpleasant connotation of 'superstition,' called by the German name of Ängstlichee. They consist both of ritual and of dogma, and are hardly ever entirely to be distinguished from the necessary appurtenances of the religion with which they are associated.

The Middle Ages are generally regarded as pre-eminently a time of superstition. The judgment is probably justifiable, though there were as many hard-headed and constructive thinkers at most epochs of the Middle Ages as there have been earlier or later. But apart from the mixture of races and consequent multiplication of superstitions in the declining Empire, with the deficiency of mental culture in the leaders of the barbarian races, there was a great force arising to control speculation—that of ecclesiastical authority. This, however, must be considered on two sides. The worst kinds of superstitions, or at least the most conspicuous kinds, especially in Eastern Europe, were distinctly discouraged by the Church—soothsaying, necromancy, charms, and the like. And there can be little doubt that many of the most pressing, and at times, Church were accompanied by superstitions vagues.

Still, the fact is patent that the suppression of free thought, especially as directed to Church doctrine and ritual, must have tended to the growth of superstitious in Plutarch's sense. Of course, when we speak of the suppression of free thought, we do not necessarily mean that a very large number of persons suffered from not being allowed to think freely. Probably the number who thus suffered was comparatively very small. But many more must have lived in perpetual fear of the unce.

The terrors of the Judgment Day and of the world to come are very familiar objects of medieval art, and it is difficult for us to see how far they were practically mitigated by the harmonious setting forth of the more comforting and spiritual elements in Christianity, with which they were, perhaps, not quite consistently, associated.

The Renaissance and the Reformation are common regarded as having given the death-blow to superstition in at least, and in much extended. It is certain, however, that the indiscriminate cult of antiquity, which in some sections of society accompanied the Renaissance, contained or encouraged superstitions fancies and observances of a novel kind. And as to the Reformation even in Protestant countries, practically a good deal of Aberghlaubia formed part of the newly established doctrines and usages, and the sway of spiritual authority was by no means removed. The great movement towards mental and spiritual emancipation is generally taken as beginning in the 18th century. It is to be noted that the battle waged on behalf of human reason was not confined to the world of thought and opinion. Political institutions, social divisions, industrial methods, and moral conventions were to be submitted to the test of right reason, and, if they failed, to be extirpated forthwith. The bitterness with which the contest was carried on, and which reached its culminating point in the excesses of the French Revolution, was partly due to the belief that superstitions gave rise to revolutions like those carried on by those who profited by them—from the medicine-men of a savage tribe to the officers of an established church or a hereditary monarchy. Although there is, of course, a great deal of evil for such oppositions, as a partial explanation of the evil in question, its whole acceptance shows a very delicate con-

prehension of human nature. Without intelligible reasons, man is always desirous of knowing more than he can know about the spiritual world, and he will more readily submit to authority which has a traditional, if not actually a divine, sanction.

And the exact nature of the government and institutions which right reason would condemn, of course, been very differently conceived by socialists or revolutionists of various types. Still, the general recognition that all belief not from some rational justification was a great point gradually gained. It does not, of course, imply that nothing should be believed without strict logical proof, or that no institution should be maintained that does not evidently serve some useful object. But it does embody the Stoic principle that life should be according to nature and according to reason, and thus it tends to eliminate most of what is injurious either in superstitions with regard to religion or in tame acquiescence in existing governments.

4. Influence of education.—The great agency looking for the reduction of superstition during this century and the last is popular education. True, our elementary education can hardly as yet be called scientific, and what passes for scientific education may, after all, be superficial and narrow. But all sound thinking—good thinking, and even wise thought—must be said to product something like a scientific view of man and his environment—a view perfectly compatible with belief in the spiritual significance of life and even in a possible communion with non-material beings, but inconsistent with fanciful and trivial interpretations of natural phenomena as determined by preternatural agency.

If there should ever be a remission of superstition in this generation or the next, it would probably be due, not to a defect in the scientific faculty, but to the expectations lately raised within the bounds of scientific investigation. Experts in psychology, especially those who have devoted themselves to what is technically called psychological research (q.v.), have, to many sane and scientific minds, proved the possibility of telepathy, thought-transference, and other processes which, fifty years ago, would certainly have been set down as superstitions. More than this, some persons of scientific mind and education believe that they have actually, at least, a means of communication between living and dead. When the persons engaged in these investigations are careful and scientific, we are inclined to accept their evidence, as we should on any other point of expert investigation. But in this field the 'media' used are of such uncertain character, the conditions and possibilities of communication so deeply veiled in obscurity, the desire to attain to fellowship with the departed so intense, that it is as well to approach all such problems with the most suspicious caution. There may be, as has often been said, a 'superstitions fear of superstition.' But, while suspending judgment on the result of the inquiries of experts, the non-expert may be in danger of falling into a superstitions habit of mind such as tends to upset entirely the mental balance.

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SUPRALAPSIANISM—SVETAMBARAS

SUPRALAPSIANISM.—The term supralapsarianism is used in Calvinistic theology, in contrast with sub- or infralapsarianism, to denote a view of the divine decrees in which, for the manifestation of His glory, God is held to destine a certain portion of mankind to eternal life, and another portion to destruction, regarding both simply as creatures, and antecedently to any consideration of the Fall and sin. It is not meant that this purpose is actually carried out without regard to a tidation of the order of decrees, it is first determined who are to be embraced in the one class, and who in the other; then the means are appointed—including creation, the Fall, and redemption—by which each case is to be attained. So harsh a view of the divine procedure has always been in the highest degree repellent to Christian minds; accordingly, the great majority of Calvinists have shrank from it, and contended themselves with the milder sublapsarian view, which affirms an election of God from the mass of mankind, regarded as already fallen.

On the historical side, the question is raised whether Calvin himself is to be classed as a supralapsarian or a sublapsarian. Some scholars hold that the former, and supralapsarian, view was the one intended by Calvin, when he wrote, the question had not distinctly emerged, and the emphasis which he continually lays on election as a ground assigned from a sin-dominant representation as grounded on the sinner's own evil, fairly warrants the more usual opinion that his doctrine inclined more to sublapsarianism.4

On the other hand, even Calvin's successor, Gomar, the colleague and opponent of Arminius in Holland, Trisse, the professor of the Westminster Assembly, and a few others were conspicuous for their advocacy of sublapsarianism; and the Remonstrants, in the Arminian controversy, naturally sought to fasten this view on all Calvinists. It is really, however, an extreme opinion, and the bulk of Calvinists, as already said, have reasoned for themselves along different lines, generally states and defends the sublapsarian position in his Institutio.5 The Synod of Dort, in its decision, traced its causes on sublapsarian lines.6 The Westminster Confession teams, in certain of its clauses, to the stronger view of Archbishop Ussher, of the Irish Academy, and of a few members of the Assembly, but the tone of the debates in that body sufficiently shows that the prevailing opinion was sublapsarian, and the Confessional statement, taken as a whole, is of this character. The stronger view has, indeed, no symbolical sanction.

Cunningham, in his discussion of the subject,7 claims that the controversy is one of 'no great intrinsic importance,' but this can hardly be allowed.

'A doctrine of this kind, which bids as think of beings not yet actually existing, to that which is even created (therefore pointless)—not to say as sinful—separated from eternal blessedness or misery, and by means of which means for effecting that purpose, is one which no plea of logical consistency will ever get the human mind to accept, and which is bound to provoke revolt against the whole system with which it is associated.'

It cannot even be conceded, though it has often been conceded, that this is the most logical form of the presbyterian doctrine. The end, it is argued, comes necessarily first in order of thought: then the means are devised which are to accomplish it. In the case of moral destiny, we are disposed to say, this is the precise inversion of the fact. There can be no legitimate consigning of a moral being to wrath, save as he is in some way viewed as deserving of that wrath: even in order of thought, therefore, the consideration of moral state must precede the sentence of rejection. If the reply is made that the sin itself is viewed in Calvinism as foreordained, this is doubtless true, but it is not the consideration of moral state which in life is foreordained, viz., by God's decreeing to admit it into His providential plan and to overrule it for the ends of His wisdom. It is a totally different

3 Loc. cit., p. 1x.
4 Cf. Schaff, Hist. of the Creeds, l. 455.
7 See also, Cunningham, The Reformers and the Theology of the Reformation, p. 366f.
8 See also, Cunningham, The Reformers and the Theology of the Reformation, p. 366f.
the following legend to account for the actual cleavage: 

A monk named Śivabhūti had been given a most beautiful blanket by the king in whose service he had been at the time of his initiation. He died in the universal spiritual perception and gave it to a friend; this friend disposed of it by offering it in public to Śivabhūti, who was a devoted following of Mahāvīra. 

His successor, who realized the extreme strength of the sect, obtained it through the advice of Śivabhūti, when he discovered what had happened, was so angry that he destroyed the great blanket and threw it among the devotees, which went beyond his value, he would keep nothing at all, but would wander in entire nakedness like the Lord Mahāvīra himself; and he then and there started a new sect, that of the naked Digambaras.

This very human legend which the Śvetāmbara, the ‘White-clothed’) tell of their unclothed rivals not only accounts for their nakedness, but also goes on to explain the whole difference between the two sects; for, when Śivabhūti’s sister wanted to join his order, seeing that it was impracticable for a woman to go about nude, he roundly told her that it was impossible for a woman to become a nun, or to obtain mokṣa (q.v.) without rebirth as a man, and thus laid down for all time a distinctive tenet of the Digambara. Important as these legends are, it must be remembered that the stories are quoted only as illustrative of the Jain point of view, for their confirmation is sadly to seek, and the legends connecting Chandragupta with the faith are essentially open to suspicion.

**Diand practices.**—We are on firmer ground when we notice the main differences between the two sects at the present day. We are already prepared for the fact that the Śvetāmbara list of sacred books is not accepted by the Digambara, and that, since they hold that no woman can attain mokṣa, the Digambara will not admit the Śvetāmbara tradition that Mahīśāśana (the ninth century) was a woman. But the two sects differ very considerably on the life-story of Mahāvīra.

The Śvetāmbara say that their great saint married and enjoyed the bliss of the full before entering the ascetic life and that, even when he at last decided to do so, he waited till his parents died, and until he had gained his brother’s consent, lest he should grieve any one before receiving initiation, which he obtained in his thirtieth year. The more austere Digambara tradition, however, is that their founder never married; and, having no hesitation about hurting any one’s feelings, pronounced the world at the noetic age of eight. Even the prevalent stories differ, for the Śvetāmbara believe that Mahāvīra’s mother had fourteen wonderful dreams; the Digambara say that she had only seven; while the later removal of the embryo of Mahāvīra from Devanandā to Trishālā is a Śvetāmbara only.

The lists of the heads of the community since Śivabhūti of course differ also. The Śvetāmbara generally arrange their philosophy in nine categories; the Digambara arrange very much the same philosophy under seven heads. One point of divergence on which they lay great stress is that, according to the Śvetāmbara, a tirthāṅkara needs food to support him until he dies; while the Digambara believe that, once a tirthāṅkara has attained omniscience, he has no further need of meals.

There are also differences in actual practice. A Śvetāmbara ascetic may keep a loin-cloth, a shoulder-cloth, and a blanket, but he wears nothing else. Indeed, including these and his brush, mouth-cloth, and wooden vessels, he is allowed to retain fourteen possessions in this world, whereas a Digambara is absolutely naked, though he is provided with a brush and peacock’s feathers, to live entirely in the jungle. The Śvetāmbara laymen complain that their ascetics interpose too much in their conferences; this complaint is, of course, never heard from the Digambara, but the latter are, on the other hand, famed for their skill in the art of clothing themselves for life in the wilderness.

There are also different rules about bodying for the ascetics of the two orders, and the Digambara ascetics have no upāsikās. Again, the Śvetāmbara idols have glass eyes inserted in the marble, wear a loin-cloth, and are bedecked with jewels, whereas the austere Digambara idols are simply represented as having been dead to the world, with eyes cast down. There is naturally therefore a difference in the installation ceremonies of their idols.

The ordinary worship differs also. The Śvetāmbara, when performing the eightfold worship, offer flowers and fresh fruit to their idols, and so on great festivals do the Visāpani Digambara; but the Terapani Digambara never offer flowers or fresh fruit, but instead they use cloves, dry coco-cot-nut, sugar, and rice.

There is another very interesting difference. A Digambara Jain has no private idol in his own house, but, if a Śvetāmbara is a wealthy man and lives far from a temple, he may have his own private chapel. This chapel is separate from the house and can be entered only by persons in a state of ceremonial purity. In the chapel, if he can afford it, he may have a pratimā (an image of any one of the twenty-four tirthāṅkaras that an astrologer selects for him), or he may have a siddha chakra (a tray on which are depicted the leading points of the Jain faith).

The householder offers the eightfold worship to the pratimā, but only washes and wipes the siddha chakra and marks it with sandal-wood paste. An instructed Śvetāmbara would never ask a guest of the idol in the chapel to be only sit himself up to future efforts by meditating on it. But, if, as often happens, an uninstructed Śvetāmbara does ask a guest, he would be answered not by the tirthāṅkara (who as a matter of fact does not even bear it) but by the yakṣa in attendance on the tirthāṅkara.

**Śvetāmbara sects.**—The main division of Śvetāmbara Jains is into Śāstānakavāsi and Deraṅgī. The Śāstānakavāsi are the idol-worshiping sect, which arose about A.D. 1472. Excepting on the crucial point of idol-worship, they do not differ much from other Śvetāmbara Jains.

At the present time the chief sects among idol-worshiping Digambara Śvetāmbara are the Tapagachchha (whose ascetics use red alms-bowls, and whose laymen in their devotions first confess their sins of walking and later their sins of trading), the Kharatragachchha (whose ascetics use black alms-bowls, and whose laymen first confess their sins of trading and later their sins of walking), and the Acheśagachchha and the Phayagachchha, whose divergences are very slight.

It must be remembered that these are only spiritual distinctions and do not interfere with the freedom of marriage between different sects. The chief castes among the Jains are Osavāla, Poravāla, Srimati and Srimālā, which are each divided into two sections, Dāsā and Vīsā. It is impossible for members of different castes to intermarry: thus an Osavāla Kharatara could marry an Osavāla Śāhānakavāsi, for, though the sect differs, the caste is the same, but a Dāsā Osavāla could never marry a Vīsā Osavāla, and still less could any Poravāla marry any Osavāla.

It is interesting to notice, however, that any Jain could dine with any other Jain, Śvetāmbara or Digambara, whether Osavāla or Srimālā; but they would not interdine with any Brahman convert to Jainism.

**Later critics.**—Through the kindness of Jain friends the writer was given an opportunity of translating this text, the leading Tapagachchha Śvetāmbara Sahā in Patna, in his upāsikas, who, perhaps with but little knowledge of English, freely consented to the task.

1. Cf. art. Worship (Jain).  
SWAN-MAIDENS.—See ZANZIBAR.

SWAN-MAIDENS.—The beautiful and poetical myth of swan-maidens is of early origin and, in varying forms, of very wide diffusion. The central idea of the myths is that certain beings, half-mortal, half-supernatural, have the power of metamorphosis into bird-form; connected with this are two secondary ideas: (1) that this power is dependent on the possession of a magic attribute, which was generally a bodily covering, such as a feather coat, robe, or veil; but sometimes merely a ring or chain; (2) that either this being, when in human form, or her captor is subject to a tabu of some kind. There are so many variations on these themes that it is impossible to do more than refer briefly to some of the most significant versions.

1. Oriental folk-lore.—Oriental folk-lore furnishes many instances of bird-maiden stories. In Indian tradition we find the very early myth of Urvasi embedded like a jewel in the durl ritual of the Samavedhikarana.

The apsara, or nymph, Urvasi loves one of the lunar race of kings, Pururavas; in wedding him she stipulates that she must never be shorn or unclad, and that her naked body is to be protected by a shield. To this Parvati played by the pandita-aras, supernatural beings who desire the return of their former playmate, the promise is broken, and Urvasi vanishes. Pururavas seeks her in every direction, finds her and her body in a lullaby on a lotus-lake in the shape of water-birds. They appear to him as birds, as a swan-maiden, but in reality he is pleasing Urvasi replies: 'I have passed away like the first of dawns... I am like the wind, difficult to catch.' Finally, however, she rejects him, and the couple are reunited.

In the Vikranuvasai of the poet Kâlidâsa, a drama based upon this story, the bird-myth has almost disappeared, except for Urvasi's power of flying and for the rejection of Pururavas by Urvasi in its present form. The subject of the play is the Lila of the very ancient dâng of the Aryan race, and theotton act iv. Her change into human form depends merely upon the laying aside of a veil, in itself probably a stage convention for invisibility; the marital tabu, which Lang characterizes as a relic of 'a traditional Aryan law of nuptial etiquette,' assumes a quite different form.

The myth re-appears in one of the finest tales of the Thousand and One Nights, that of Hassan of Bassorah.

Hassan is enjoying the hospitality of a family of princes, when obliged to leave them, they enjoin him not to expose a certain door. He disobeys, and finds a fair pavilion and a bathing-pool, to which come flying from the desert ten birds, one of which is the pre-eminent for beauty. Each bird, as it alighted, rent open its neck-skin with its claws, and issued out of it a feather, and at a later year, a golden ring. After their departure Hassan, who has become deeply enamoured of the fairest bird-maiden, confesses his adherence to his hostess, and in her power is at last made to marry the maiden. She was a swan-maiden.*

The story of Jishafi is a slighter tale that begins similarly; but the bird-maidens are only three in number, and are 'as doves, eagle-sized.' The husband's device to secure the feather coat is to place it in a chest, laden-bound, which is built into the foundations of the palace; but in vain, for the lady traces it by scent and digs it out.

2. Greek folk-lore.—The names of the bird-forms of the latter story have been identified with various Melanesian islands; it is not surprising, therefore, to find the tale of Hassan re-appearing in the Colchis in a modern form, which Tylor quotes in connexion with the heaven-born maidens.

1 This formula, 'difficult to catch,' recurs in the Welsh tale of the Van Pool, quoted by Hartland, Science of Fairy Tales, p. 52, note c.
2 Late 13th century.
4 Cf. F. Burton, A Plain and Literal Translation of the Arabian Nights, Benares, 1885, vili. 7-143.
5 Ibid. 1887.
6 Cf. With this Hartland's idea (p. 309) that the swan-maiden must always employ an intermediary to obtain her reply.

plant myth. 1 Tatar versions of the myth are said to equalize as being the only ones to represent the bird-maiden as a malignant being, half-vampire, half-fairy; 2 in the Tatar poem quoted by C. Preuss, Gandìz, tr. O. Franzer, 1885, the external being, the hero wrestles with the evil swan-woman for 'moons and years.'

2. In classical tradition.—Classical tradition does not seem to have preserved any swan-maiden tale in a complete form, but that the main idea was a familiar one is evident from the Cynic myths, the bird-transformation of the comoruses of Diomedes, the story of Oenomaus, and the symbolic connexion of swans with Apollo, with the Muses, and with Aphrodite. Modern Greek folk-lore represents the Nereids as flying maidens, similar in many points to swan-maidens.

3. Slavic.—Slav folk-lore bears frequent testimony to the myth. The South Slavs were naturally more influenced by late Greek and by Oriental tradition, and the Bulgarian armoures, and the Serbian vila, like the Greek Nereids, resemble the swan-maidens; e.g., the vila are associated with water and have the power of flying.

The Polish fairy-tale of the prince and the twelve gesso-princesses shows that the myth in its simplest form was known to the Western Slavs. The most important Russian example is the tale of 'Sveta Lot' by I. I. Ivkivich that describes the passion of a young hero for the white swan; this begins in fairly conventional style, although without the feather dress, but later it diverges considerably, for the hero is magically re-animated, and finally forsakes her husband for another love.

4. Celtic.—Old Celtic tradition has two beautiful and elaborate swan-maiden tales, as well as an episode in the story of Edain, wife of Eochaidh, who is carried off by the hero-god Midir in the form of a swan.*

The story of the 'Children of Lir,' one of the three most sorrowful tales in Ireland, is an example, with Christian over-lay, of that variant of the myth in which the swan shape is enforced by malignant magic. The four royal children, metamorphosed for 900 years, retain their powers of human reasoning and speech, and have the gift of singing 'plaintive music at which the men and women would sleep, and there shall be no music of the world its equal. 10

This power of song is turned to account in the Christian-tale which concludes the tale. 'The Dream of Oengus' conveys more closely to the regular swan-maiden type, so much so that J. A. MacCulloch 12 dismisses it as of no mythological or religious value; its artistic value, however, is very great.

The god Oengus is smitten with love for a dream-maiden, the original of whom proves to be Caer, a princess who spends every night flying to her lover in the form of a swan. After some time, however, she comes to the decision to become mortal, and, in the form of a swan, she woos and wins the hero. Finally the hero, with his swan lovers, is turned into a golden cup arranged as the actual sovereign of the Jans. He has an army of women, smithers with swords, and his power is that of a lull, and the planned skins wherever they fly are the handiwork of enchanters. Hassan is advised to steal the feather dress and never again to let it into the owner's hands; he does so, but after three years the wife by a rare securing the dress, bastes it on, and flies away. Hassan tracks his wife to the islands of Wai-Wak, inhabited by the warrior women, and rescues her.

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both of the world and of individuals; thus the two swans, the progenitors of all the swan-kind, that float on the Urtharbrunnr of the old Norse cosmogony, may be contrasted with the swan that lived, according to Finnish myth, on the river of Tuoni or the dead. In the later folk-tales we find a swan living on a hidden lake, which maintains the world in equipoise by carrying a ring in its beak; when it drops it, the end of the world will come.\footnote{Snorr. Edda, ed. C. Wilken, Paderborn, 1877, p. 24.} Popular saying expresses the birth of the daughter of the woman and augury;\footnote{Latenius, rune 14.} in Rügen, swans, not storks, are the bringers of new-born children,\footnote{F. Gottschalk, Sagen und Volkswihrer der Deutschen, Halbe, 1831, p. 227.} while, on the other hand, the sight of a swan in flight may betoken death.\footnote{Cf. Grimm, i. 437, note 1.} and swans are often leaders of the spirit-host.\footnote{K. E. M. Arndt, Schriften für und an seine lieben Deutschen, Leipzig, 1845, II. 547; cf. in Lenz's account of the frog's journey into the world above. Cf. F. J. Furnivall, The Book of Celtic Ballads, London, 1893, p. 385 f.}
The ideas of animal shape-changing and of the external soul favoured the development of the swan-maiden myth in folk-lore. The Scandinavian North, as one of the chief haunts in the world of the bird-people, the birds of sleep, and dreams, was the home of the swan-knight, was the home of the swans, and is thus possessed of the swan-knight, who is subject to mysterious prohibitions and who in the end is almost always lost to her captor, and the swan-knight, who must not reveal his name of origin, as denizens of the world of the dead or of that world of the dead.

7. Interpretations.—The interpretations of the swan-myths have been various; the earlier class of mythologists saw in them nature-myths, the swan-maiden being the white cloud, her captor the storm-spirit.\footnote{F. J. Furnivall, The Book of Celtic Ballads, London, 1893, p. 385 f.} Others have explained the swan-maiden, who is subject to mysterious prohibitions and who in the end is almost always lost to her captor, and the swan-knight, who must not reveal his name of origin, as denizens of the world of the dead or of that world of the dead of the dead.

A more prosaic view takes into account merely the totemistic aspect which the myth shows in common with all animal shape-changing tales, points to the swan-maidens and swan-knights as founders of clans, and compares them with such figures as Mélusine of Lusignan. The most modern theory brings the tabu into prominence, to the overshadowing of other aspects, and advances the wide evidence now forthcoming of marital tabus among primitive peoples;\footnote{F. J. Furnivall, The Book of Celtic Ballads, London, 1893, p. 385 f.} but a curious piece of corroborative evidence on the symbolic connexion between swans and women has been found in the forehead of an early American Indian tribe.\footnote{W. Müller, Die Sage vom Schwarmritter, in Germania, ed. F. Pieper, i. (1866) 410–449.} Fortunately for the appeal of the myth, none of these theories has power to detract from, but all serve only to enhance, its charm and its popularity.

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SWAT OR UDYANA. This is a famous principality in Independent Eastern Afghanistan, between the latter country and Kashmir, to the south of Chitral and Baluchistan. It derives its name of Swat from the river of that name (the Swat, in Sanskrit), which joins the Kabul branch of the Indus above Peshawar. Its literary name of Udhina (Udyana) is supposed to be derived from the Sanskrit meaning 'garden' or 'park-like' appearance; for it is an exceptionally richly cultivated and well-watered beautiful Alpine valley. Through this Indo-Skythian country Alexander descended for his invasion of India, crossing, it is generally supposed, the Malakand Pass, which is on the main route to the Indian plains; but Swat is best known for its fame as an ancient centre of Buddhism. It is still thickly covered with the ruins of Buddhist monuments and temples, richly decorated with some of the finest sculptures of the Greco-Buddhist or so-called Gandhāra (g.e.) type of art. These sculptured friezes and terra-cottas are particularly numerous between the 2nd and 5th centuries A.D. and a collection of several hundreds was made by the present writer during the Chitral expedition of 1895 and is now preserved in the Calcutta and Peshawar museums. The Chinese Buddhist pilgrim Fa Hian, who visited the country, ed. A.D.

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\footnote{i. 305–370.}
SWEAT, SWEAT-HOUSE

400, says: 'The religion of Buddha is very flourishing... in all there are 500 monasteries, they belong to the Little Vehicle (Hinayana) without exception.' But, when Huen Tsang visited the lands of A.D. 639, he found that nearly all the convents, some 1400 in number with formerly 15,000 priests, were 'waste and desolate.' It is a striking commentary on Fa Hian's reference to the ten thousand prevalence of the 'Little Vehicle' form of Buddhism—of course the sculptural remains of are the 'Great Vehicle' (Mahayana). It was regarded by Fa Hian as the most northerly province of India, and the food and clothing of the people were the same as in India, and this is still the case—the people dress in white. The dimensions of the Swat country, as described by Huen Tsang at 5000 li (about 833 miles) in circuit, show that in those days evidently included, in addition to the valley of Swat, also the Chitral and Darji adjoining countries and the mountains on the right bank of the Indus, even beyond the great bend of the river to the south. It was the native country of Padma-sambhava (q.v.), the founder of Lamain in Tibet; and the notorious prevalence of Savitri magical rites in the mountains that surround the Tibetans is somewhat in keeping with the old reputation of this country for sorcery. Huen Tsang, in his visit to this land about a century before Padmasambhava's period, writes: 'The science of magical formulas becomes a regular professional business with them (the men of Swat or Udyan's). The belief in serpent-dragons of rivers and springs was especially prevalent here. It was at the source of the Swat river that was located the legendary water-dragon or serpent Apalâśa, whose conversion by Buddha is a favourite motive in Buddhist art, both north and south. Huen Tsang refers especially to the 'white water' issuing from this spring, as also does al-Biruni about the 11th cent. A.D., which would doubtless be snow-water rather than glacial, yet it suggests that the river-name Svasini may have originally been derived from Svatas or Swat-s, 'white,' which approximates the modern name of that river, 'Swat.' Confirmation of this ancient water-serpent worship was found by the present writer in a Kharoṣṭh inscription upon a great boulder at a spring of which the record reads from a rubbing taken by the present writer: 'By the son of Dat, the Thera (Buddhist monk) Norn, a tank was placed to be north of the Worship of All Serpents (in) the year 113.' This date, from the palaeographic details, is placed about 65 B.C.

literature.—References are cited in the article.

L. A. WADDELL.

SWAZIS.—See Bantu and S. Africa.

SWERING.—See OATH, PROFANITY.

SWEAT, SWEAT-HOUSE.—Sweat, a colourless fluid containing about 2 per cent of solid matter, is a secretion of the sudoriferous glands. Its chief function is to regulate the heat discharge of the human body. It is connected like some curious and interesting religious and magical customs in various parts of the world.

1. Sweat in magic.—Primitive man regards sweat, like blood, saliva, hair, and nail-parings, as a medium both for setting sorcery in motion against an enemy and for working the more harmless forms of magic. Codrington says that among the Melanesians the belief prevails that a leaf with which a man has wiped the perspiration from his face may be employed to work mischief against his enemy. A like belief is found among the Natives of N. America. Some of the natives of N.E. New Guinea take elaborate precautions to prevent a drop of their sweat from being made use of by a sorcerer; on leaving a camping-place, they stab the ground with their spears, and all the persons of the most curious uses to which this exudation of the human body has been put are illustrated by a group of customs connected with love magic.

2. A cake, an apple, or a sweetmeat impregnated with the sweat of the giver is a powerful philtre throughout the greater part of northern Europe, from Cæn Garm to the Carpathians. A Hungarian girl steals meal and honey at Christmas-time, takes a cake, takes it to bed with her for one night, and then bestows it on a youth whom she wishes to fall in love with her. W. R. Paton says that in three Native races (confessor, proverbial, which means, they believe, less than three centuries old, 'women are accused of rubbing dough on their bodies, and giving it to eat to men in whom they wish there was love.' The victim of such love magic can, however, have recourse to a counter-charm of the same character. It was narrated that if a man who, under the influence of a philtre was forced to love against his will, would put on a new pair of shoes, and wear them only for a month, breaking in them, and then throw them out of the right shoe, where it could mingle with the perspiration already there, his character would promptly be cured of his love, and hate take its place. A similar idea underlies the superstition prevalent among the Negroes and Indians of N. America, and they in Belgium. The owner of a dog wishes to make the animal faithful to him, he should give it some bread which has been soaked in his sweat. In the island of Tuta, in the Torres Straits, a man could not wear the sweat of renowned warriors to acquire courage.

3. The mythology of ancient Egypt seems to have ascribed a sacramental virtue to the sweat of Osiris. In the pyramid inscriptions—the life-formulae the life-formulae appear to be his sweat; and in the ritual of Anion the incense appears to be crystalized drops of it. A song quoted by A. Erman speaks of the Nile as the sweat of Osiris' hands.

4. The Negroes of what is now the Congo have a man's luck with the perspiration of his hands, and believe that, if the latter were wiped away, the former would disappear.

2. The sweat-house.—The ceremonial use of vapour baths is a custom of great antiquity and wide geographical distribution, being found both in N. America and in N. Europe. In the former continent it was probably known to every tribe of Indians and is likely, along the north-west coast it has been superseded by sea-bathing. 'The type of the ordinary sweat-house seems to have been everywhere the same. Willow rods or other plant stems were stuck into the ground and bent or fastened with wires into a hemispherical or oblong frame-work, which generally was large enough to accommodate several persons. A hole was dug conveniently near the door into which stones, usually heated outside, were dropped by means of forked sticks. These were sprinkled with water to generate steam. A temporary cover of blankets or skins made the enclosure tight. In each tribe there were certain prescribed rules for the construction of the sweat-house. In some cases, however, the communal ceremonial chamber was used for this purpose. Sometimes it was used as a kind of men's club with a pool or bath, as for

1 Ch. vii.
2 N. of A. Beal, London, 1884, p. 129.
4 Alberni's In India, ed. C. G. Schafar, London, 1910, ii, p. 182.
8 J. P. II. 123.
9 J. P. II. 123.
11 A. Blackman, Z.A.I. (1911) 124.
13 J. P. II. 123.
14 J. P. II. 123.
15 J. P. II. 123.
16 J. P. II. 123.
women being permitted to enter it for certain ceremonial purposes, but not for sweating. Among these, the chief ceremonial uses were not even permitted to gather wood for the holy fire to be kindled in the sweat-house. In California, where sweating always had a religious significance, some tribes used the sweat-house as a sleeping-place for adult males. Half-an-hour was usually spent in the sweat-house, and then the bather plunged into a stream, if there was one at hand.

Among the Eskimos, hot air was used in place of steam and in Zuni, and probably in the Pueblos generally, hot stones near the body of the bather were used. Some tribes lit the fire in the sweat-house in autumn and kept it alive till spring. Bancroft says of the Northern Californians:

"A fire is kept burning in every one of these sweat-houses in the year, and even during the rainy season, as the dry air is never very humid and the people are, as a rule, fond of taking refreshments in a warm room."

Sweating in N. America was practised for three purposes: (1) religious—such as purification and the propitiation of spirits, preparation for war, and on arrival at puberty, when it was usually attended by secrification and mutilation; (2) therapeutically—usually prescribed by a shaman, who stood outside and invoked the spirits believed to cause the disease (among the Plains Indians shamans who officiated at these ceremonies had usually to pass through the sweat-houses themselves for purposes of purification); (3) social and hygienic — a number of persons would enter a sweat-house for the purpose of enjoying the luxury of a bath (among some tribes this became an almost daily practice, and was perhaps a degeneration).

The sweat-bath is also used by the Eskimos of Bering Strait, among whom the men and boys indulge in it about once a week, or once in every two or three weeks, but with this people it does not appear to possess a religious significance. Among many tribes the sweat-house had its own guardian spirit or manitu (q.v.). A Fox Indian, relating his experiences during a sweat-bath, once said:

"Often one will eat one's self only through the skin. It is done to get away from the places of the manitu to pass into the body. The manitu comes from the place of its abode in the north and the north by the heat of the fire, and proceeds out of the stone when the water is sprinkled on it. It comes out in the steam, and in the steam it penetrates the body wherever it finds entrance. It moves up and down, and all over and inside the body, driving out everything that inflicts pain. Before the manitu returns to the stone, it imparts some of its nature to the body. That is why one feels so well after having been in the sweat-lodge." 1

Among the Thompson Indians of British Columbia, when a boy reached the age of puberty, he went through certain ceremonies to obtain a guardian spirit.

In the sweat-bath 'be prayed to the spirit of sweat-bathing under the title of 'Sweat-bathing Grandfather Chief,' begging that he might be strong, brave and agile, lucky, rich, a good hunter, a skillful fisherman, and so forth.' 2

The Ojibwa (q.v.), an Algonquin tribe, had a secret society called the 'Midwi wiwin,' or society of the four days, into which a candidate would purify himself in the sweat-bath.

1 In all ceremonies, prophetic or medico-magical, great reliance is placed on the sweat-bath. It is entered with sacred feelings, and is deemed a great means of purification. Secret arts are here often disclosed betweenekab (shaman) of high power, which could not be imparted in other places; positions, however, are to be lost subject to the influence of sanctifying power.

2 When we turn to the Old World, we find a striking resemblance to the American customs in Herodotus's account of the sweat-bath among the Scythians as a means of purification, after mourning. The construction of the sweat-house was, however, simpler than in America. Three sticks were stuck in the ground, leaning towards each other, and around them pieces of felt were tightly stretched. A dish containing red-hot stones was placed inside. Hemp seed was then thrown on to the stones. A close parallel to this custom was found among the Delaware Indians, and is described by Tytler:

"At their festival in honour of the Fire-god with his twelve attendant manitises, inside of the house a small open-bath was set up, consisting of twelve poles tied together at the top and covered with blankets, high enough for a man to stand neatly upright within it. After the feast this oven was heated with twelve red-hot stones, and twelve men crept inside. An old man threw twelve handfuls of tobacco on these stones, and when the patients had borne to the utmost the heat and suffocating smoke, they were taken out, generally falling in a sweat to the floor." 3

The sweat-bath, as used among the peasantry of Great Russia, possesses the nature of a ceremonial purification even at the present day. It is taken weekly on Saturday evenings, and all kinds of pollution must be avoided till after the service on Sunday morning. 4

Among the northern Finns, for the sauna, or sweat-bath, a log-lut is used. The bath is frequently taken en famille. With this people, however, and also with the Lapps, who make use of the sweat-bath on Saturdays before putting on their clean clothes, it appears to be an entirely secular institution. 5

Vapour baths were in use among the Celtic tribes, and the sweat-house was in general use in Europe, down to the 13th, and even survived into the 19th century. It was of beeche shape and was covered with clay. It was especially resorted to as a cure for rheumatism. 6

Vapour baths were used by the Greeks and Romans; details for their construction are given by Vitruvius. 7

The sweat-bath, which in England has been named the 'Turkish bath,' being an imitation of the Ottoman baths, is of Russian origin, and was introduced into this country by David Urquhart, M.P. (1805-77).

3. Origin and distribution. The presence of the sweat-bath both in N. Europe and in N. America at once raised the question of its origin. It has been attributed independently in each of these continents, or whether it has reached them from a common centre of distribution. It is essentially a northern institution, and one belonging to the Mongoloid branch of the human family. M. A. Czaplicka suggests that the Slavs of Great Russia probably borrowed it from the Finns of the Middle Volga.

There are many unsolved problems connected with the ethnology of the Scythians, but there appears to have existed among them a Finn-Ugric element from which most likely the sweat-hut was derived. It should naturally be looked for in the sweat-hut in N. Asia, where its habitants form an ethnological bridge uniting the Mongoloid peoples of Europe and N. America. We are, 8

2 3 PoE, 471 f.
7 See also, DE Kaye and Medicine (Celtic), vol. iv, p. 749.
8 De Architeutica, v. 10, 11.
however, disappointed in this expectation, since among the aborigines of N. Siberia it is not in- digenous, but is in use only among those tribes which, like the Yakuts, have derived many customs and ideas from the Russians. We seem, then, to be led to the conclusion that the sweat-bath originated independently in both Europe and America, or else that it originated in a more southerly latitude than N. Siberia. The names by which those institutions were originally called in for hygienic purposes, but afterwards, owing to their beneficial results, came to be connected in the mind of primitive man with mysterious unseen powers, and hence were used in connexion with religious rites. Now, however, the sweat-bath seems to be regaining its former secular character.

LITERATURE.—See Footnotes.

H. J. T. JOHNSON.

SWEATING.—See ECONOMICS.

SWEDENBORG.—I. Life and works.

Emanuel Swedenborg was born in Stockholm on 29th Jan. 1688. He was the second son of Jesper Swedenborg, Bishop of Skara and previously professor in Hebrew and Latin. Swedenborg's father was, apparently, the first to be en- tailed by Queen Ulrica Eleonora in 1719, when the patronymic of Swedenborg was changed into the name of Swedenborg.

Little is known of Swedenborg's childhood. After completing his studies at the University of Upsal, he went on a celebrated foreign tour, and he was in England in 1711, 'studying Newton and dabbling in alchemy,' he seems to have been particularly drawn to alchemy. He took a ship south to see and hear the great man, and, so far from one of his letters to his brother-in-law, Dr. Erius Benzolin, that he could have been a member of the Royal Academy of Sciences, Stockholm, and that he repub- lished some of its publications, and was also a member of the Royal Society of Edinburgh. Swedenborg, however, turned his attention to the study of science, and the work of the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, and the British Museum, Swedenborg's scientific work was published in 1745, London, and in 1764, London, and in 1764, London.

Another of his inventions was a machine air-gun to discharge 00 or 70 shots in succession without reloading. He also devised a flying machine, but the great Swedish engineer, Christopher Polhem, expressed the opinion that, with respect to flying by artificial means, it was about the same thing as trying to make a perpetuum mobile or to make gold!

In 1716 Swedenborg was appointed by King Charles XII, extraordinary preacher, at the Royal Board of Mines, an appointment which caused him to decline the offer of a professorship of astronomy at the University of Upsal. He was also a son of his family, Swedenborg had a seat in the House of Nobles of the Swedish Parliament, but his interest in science, always greater than his in politics, led him to continue his studies in the mines and manufactures of other lands. It was during this journey that he published a treatise on physics and chemistry, at Amsterdam, a second edition of his New Method of finding the Longitude, at Leipzig, and Miscellaneous Observations on Geology and Mining. But the work which won for Swedenborg a European reputation was his Opera Philosophica et Mineralia in 3 vols., with numerous copperplates, published at Dresden and Leipzig in 1734 at the expense of his patron, the Duke of Brunswick. In the first volume of that work, the Principia, Swedenborg gives an elaborate theory of the origin of the visible universe and propounds his nebular hypothesis. This theory has been often attributed to Kant and Laplace as the original authors, but Swedenborg's theory appeared in the Principia of 1724, while Kant's Natural History of the Heavens was published in 1755, and Laplace's Systeme du Monde in 1796, as has been shown by Arhenius in his Introduction to the Latin republication of Swedenborg's work, which appeared the Economy of the Animal Kingdom (1740-41) and The Animal Kingdom (1748), the latter of which are given in English by Sweden-

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borg's extensive labours in anatomy and physiology. In 1745, his Worship and Love of God was published. This work marks the step from the mind, which is the foundation of all scientific and philosophical reasoning to what is generally considered a form of mysticism, but a form of mysticism, but in which the author himself would have described as spiritual perception. A great change had come over him. His mind, as he himself says, had been opened to the contemplation of the mind of God, and the things of the Spirit.

Swedenborg gives the year 1743 as the date of the opening of his spiritual sight, but it was in April 1746, according to his own statement, that he was fully admitted to intercourse with angels and spirits, not by any process analogous to what is usually termed spiritualism (p.r.), but by speaking with them directly, while assuming normally conscious of everything about him on earth. He was quite aware of the scepticism with which such a man would be received, when known to the world, and he anticipated it in his first theological work in these words: 'I am well aware that many persons will insist that it is impossible for any one to converse with angels and spirits during his life-time in the body; many will say that such intercourse must be a forgery; some will pretend such relations in order to gain credit; whilst others will make other objections according to their sense of things, but I care not, since I have seen, heard and felt.'1

1 In 1747 Swedenborg resigned his position on the Royal Board of Mines and devoted himself to the new study. But he believed himself to have been divinely called. His last work, the Arcana Coelestia, was completed in a volume in 1736. Then followed, among others, The Earths in the Universe (1755), The New Jerusalem and its Heavenly Doctrine (1758), Heaven and Hell (1758), perhaps the best known of all his books, On the Intercourse between the Soul and the Body (1760), Divine Love and Wisdom (1770), Divine Providence (1780). The Apo-

type Revealed (1760), Conjectural Love (1760), the first theological work to which Swedenborg's name is attached, and lastly The True Christian Religion (1773).

It is interesting, and in a sense very significant, to find that, while Swedenborg was fully occupied with the publication of so many theological works, he yet found time and freedom of mind to attend to mundane affairs. In 1703 he wrote several papers on scientific subjects in the Transactions of the Royal Academy of Sciences of Stockholm, and in 1706 he republi- cated some of its publications, and was also a member of the Royal Society of Edinburgh. Swedenborg, however, turned his attention to the study of science, and the work of the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, and the British Museum, Swedenborg's new Method of finding the Longitude, at Leipzig, and Miscellaneous Observations on Geology and Mining. But the work which won for Swedenborg a European reputation was his Opera Philosophica et Mineralia in 3 vols., with numerous copperplates, published at Dresden and Leipzig in 1734 at the expense of his patron, the Duke of Brunswick. In the first volume of that work, the Principia, Swedenborg gives an elaborate theory of the origin of the visible universe and propounds his nebular hypothesis. This theory has been often attributed to Kant and Laplace as the original authors, but Swedenborg's theory appeared in the Principia of 1724, while Kant's Natural History of the Heavens was published in 1755, and Laplace's Systeme du Monde in 1796, as has been shown by Arhenius in his Introduction to the Latin republication of Swedenborg's work, which appeared the Economy of the Animal Kingdom (1740-41) and The Animal Kingdom (1748), the latter of which are given in English by Sweden-
mean that God is a man in a physical sense. His real meaning is simply that, if we think at all abstractly of God, by means of symbols derived from our highest human experience. But, if these symbols do not correspond, in an infinite Reality, to what they represent, as finite symbols, to us, then they are not merely imperfect and inadequate, but actually false. We are then obliged to conclude that there is a fundamental antinomy in the constitution of the human mind, so that the Power from whom it proceeds has not made it possible that it should think about that Power, and think about it falsely. Surely, Swedenborg considers, that the human mind must think should be, at least, an approximate symbol or representation of a fact. If we doubt this, the grounds upon which we believe any philosophical, ethical, or spiritual truth are undermined.

Thus, to think of God as a divine man would simply mean, for Swedenborg, to think of Him as being infinite love and wisdom, as He is apprehended by us by means of symbols derived from the highest of human faculties, the intellect and the will—those faculties by which we are made "in his image." But Swedenborg seems also to have discerned some profound connexion between this conception of God as a divine man in His essential nature and the rational interpretation of a possibility discerned in reading Swedenborg it must always be remembered that there is an idealism, quite his own, at the basis of his philosophical views and consequently of his theology. This enables one to understand much that lies hidden behind his realistic language when he deals with spiritual matters for which our human vocabularies have only weak and inadequate expressions.

(b) The world.—This should be particularly remembered in his treatment of the creation of the world. Swedenborg has attempted to correlate two apparently irreconcilable ideas—the idea of a personal God distinct from the universe, and the idea of an immanent Creator. He has done it by means of his doctrine of 'discrete degrees.' He holds that there are substances of many orders composing the universe. The primary, self-existent substance is the infinite God from whom all finite substances originate. But those substances are related to each other in an order constituted by degrees of human 'discrete degrees' in distinction from continuous degrees because there is no possibility of existence entirely separate from each other and incapable of being resolved one into another. A continuous degree is merely a variation of being or quality on its own plane, as from heavier to lighter, or from denser to rarer. It is only a question of more or less. Discrete degrees, on the other hand, are never of the same forms or qualities of being, and, moreover, they involve the relation of cause and effect. Hence Swedenborg says: 'Nothing, so far as I am aware, has hitherto been known of discrete degrees but only of continuous degrees; yet without a knowledge of both kinds of degrees nothing of cause can be truly known.' For 'seeing from effects alone is seeing from fallacies.' He means that fallacies arise, not from a failure to distinguish between cause and effect, as, e.g., between matter and spirit, but from the fact of regarding them as differing by continuous degrees only and not by discrete degrees. For thus cause is never lifted above the plane of effect, nor spirit above the plane of matter.

It is maintained therefore that in everything of which anything can be predicated there are what are called end, cause, and effect, and these three are to each other according to discrete degrees. In creation the natural or material world is the effect, of which the spiritual world is the cause, and God is the end. The first act of creation, not in time but prior to time, was the Divine of a finite emanation of love and wisdom from Himself. This is conceived as a spiritual sun of incomparable splendour, a manifestation so intense that it could not be contained by any mind or heart, were it not tempered by intermediate stages. Thus, successive discrete degrees, separated not in space but in the quality of their spiritual constitution, produce the higher and the lower heavens; other discrete degrees exist in angelic forms according to their receptability of love and wisdom.

Similarly, the affections and thoughts which constitute the life of men are not, as it seems to us, self-generated, but pass into their minds out of the spiritual world, in a clearer or more obscure manner, always according to discrete degrees and in the order of cause and effect. In the world of matter a different law operates. Matter is derived not directly from spirit, but from the natural sun, which, according to Swedenborg, is not only the centre and support of our solar system, but also the proximate source of the material activity of this prismatic sun are ultimately produced, by discrete degrees, the atmospheres and matter itself out of which the physical world is formed.

The materials themselves, as inert and as potential, are nevertheless capable of being acted upon by spiritual forces. But there is nothing of God in them as the ultimate of creation, since their life has ended in no-life, and love and wisdom have ended in forms of motion. Of course, this does not mean that God is not present in this ultimate of creation.

This doctrine is intended to exclude the incomprehensible idea of a creation ex nihilo, whilst it is meant also to provide against a pantheistic interpretation of the universe. It inevitably presents the difficulties which are inseparable from any theory of emanation.

(c) Man.—The theology of Swedenborg, as it deals with man, his nature, and his destiny, cannot be understood apart from his view (or, as he would insist, apart from the doctrine that he was divinely commissioned to make known to the modern world) of the real meaning of God's Word as we have it in the letter of Holy Scripture. More than 150 years ago Swedenborg had foreseen the difficulties which would arise in the future in interpreting the revealed word, and he was bringing forward as an argument against a belief in a divine revelation, 'It is in the month of all,' he says, 'that the Word is from God, is divinely inspired and therefore holy. But yet it has been unknown hitherto where within it its Divinity resides. The man who worships Nature instead of God may easily fall into error concerning the Word, and say within himself when he is reading it: "What is this? Is this divine? Can God who has infinite wisdom speak thus?" Yet Swedenborg never lost his faith in a divine revelation, and one of the principal objects of his theology is to show that the difficulties which create so serious a stumbling-block in many minds are due to the fact that they are looking in the Bible for what its letter does not and cannot explicitly manifest. He affirms that the Word contains throughout a spiritual meaning which alone gives the true and full sense of God's revelation to man. Philo, Origen, Clement of Alexandria, and others have attempted to discover this spiritual meaning in the Bible, but Swedenborg's conception proceeds on entirely different lines. For him the Word is the divine truth itself as it exists in God. It is the very form of God, and the medium of communication and conjunction with Him for.
angels in the heavens and for men upon earth. But truth in this divine form is utterly incomprehensible to any but the few. To render it at least partly intelligible, it must descend through the discrete degrees already described, and assume successively lower and lower forms of expression adapted to the comprehension of the various grades of finite minds. Thus, to us as the letter of our Bible, or rather as the original texts from which that letter has come to us.

Now then are these texts written? They are written in pure 'correspondences,' i.e. in symbols derived from nature. Every natural object is conceived to be the effect, and therefore the expression, of spiritual causes. Those effects 'correspond' to those causes; hence their capacity, when properly understood, to reveal the spiritual meaning contained in them.

The first result of this principle is that man is thus enabled to know the true canon of the sacred Scriptures. Those books which are so written as to present a correspondent spiritual meaning are really 'the Word.' The other books possess devotional, and not a spiritual, value; they are not 'the Word.' Guided by this fact, Swedenborg declares that the only books of the Word in the Bible are, in the OT, the Pentateuch, Joshua, Judges, 1 and 2 Samuel, the Psalms, 1 and 2 Kings, the Proverbs, Job, and the Psalms to Isaiah to Malachi; in the NT, the four Gospels and Revelation. The Epistles form therefore no part of what Swedenborg strictly calls 'the Word.' But he valued them highly, and he frequently quotes them.

In the letter, as we have it, Swedenborg recognizes a human element manifested in the language and feelings of the writers of the various books of the Bible; it is only the spiritual sense that is entirely and solely divine. Hence many of the difficulties raised by the higher criticism would be no difficulties for him; e.g. instead of a creation in six days in the book of Genesis, he reads there the earliest condition of man and the gradual development of his psychological constitution; his growth in a knowledge of good and truth, of love and faith, and of divine things; and finally his introduction to a celestial perception of divine truth itself. It is a conception of the regeneration of man, called to reach his spiritual destiny through knowledge, trial, faith, and love, and Swedenborg assigns a sublime meaning to it which he could not have had for the men who lived when the letter was written. It would have been an unintelligible revelation for most of them. Therefore the full meaning of the letter as contained in the spiritual sense was not given to them. There is, according to Swedenborg, a grave spiritual danger in the premature disclosure to any mind of divine Truth.

But what is man? He is, says Swedenborg, made to be at the same time in the spiritual world and in the natural world. He is not life, but a recipient of life from God. And God grants man a sense that the life which he feels within himself is his own, in order that he may live as of himself. In every man's soul there is an utmost or supreme degree into which the divine of the Lord proportionately flows; hence it is that man can receive intelligence and wisdom and speak from reason, and from this also comes the fact that his soul is capable of voluntary and intelligent action.

The will rather than the understanding constitutes the man. Swedenborg rejects the idea of angels having been created as such to people the heavens. All spirits, he believes, whether in heaven or in hell, are from the human race. He also holds that there is no personal Devil or Satan, but that that name signifies the whole society of evil spirits.

The life of man cannot be changed after death, for the spirit of man is such as his love is, and inferior love cannot be changed into heavenly love, 'because they are opposite.'

The problem of evil, as interpreted by Swedenborg, is explained by the freedom with which God has endowed man, and it is because God 'who changeth not' will not withdraw that gift that man's love remains what it was even after death. If he has deliberately made evil his good and good his evil, then he is his own hell, and does not desire heaven. He could find no ease there, and would long for his congenial surroundings and associates. He is not sent to hell; he goes there of himself, and would be happy there, if an evil soul could find permanent happiness anywhere. But he inevitably meets with sufferings and punishments, inflicted not by God or His agents, but chiefly by the evil spirits his associates. What happens under our eyes here upon earth continues in hell. For evil breeds evil always and everywhere. The conception is sad, but certainly drawn from life.

Are then those sufferings eternal? It is difficult to interpret definitely the teaching of Swedenborg on that point; he says so much that he must be mitigated,' says Howard Spalding, 'we are not told, but a careful study of all that Swedenborg has said on the subject suggests that they may be so greatly modified as to cease to be heinous.'

It is remarkable that, according to Swedenborg, there is no absolute destruction of evil even in heaven, for nothing has formed part of the spiritual nature of man can ever be annihilated. Spirits therefore—yes, angelic spirits—carry with them into heaven the perverted organic forms in which their evils resided. They are even permitted to experience from time to time a sense of their evils, but not uselessly, for by those alternations of state spirits are kept in continual spiritual progress. Thus the regeneration of man, begun on earth, continues to eternity.

Of heaven we are told that God Himself is heaven, and that His presence to each human spirit brings heaven into him, but always in a degree which depends on a certain faculty of reception acquired on earth by man's conscientious endeavour to make what he truly believes the rule of his life.

There has been a tendency, more or less defined, to class Swedenborg among the mystics, but this seems to be due to an imperfect understanding of his system. His conception of life in heaven should suffice to show how little he has in common with mysticism past or present.

The fulfillment of God's purpose in creating the world is a fundamental doctrine in Swedenborg's theology. That purpose, we are told, was, by making man in His own image and endowing him with the faculties of freedom and rationality, to prepare him for that conjunction with God which constitutes the angelic heaven. In this sense, the creation means infinite love seeking by love to cause love to arise freely between the Creator and His rational creature. But the misuse of rationality and freedom has led to evil being chosen and loved instead of good; hence sin, whose effect is the weakening of true freedom, and the obscuring of that inner light within us which is the possibility of heavenly life. Then it is that the love which had created man has also come to save him. By His incarnation the Lord did not come to reconcile His Father

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1 See Arc. Cæd. no. 523.
2 The Kingdom of Heaven as seen by Swedenborg, p. 41.
3 For full details see especially Swedenborg's Heaven and Hell.
to man, for God in Christ, as Swedenborg says, is the one only God who is love itself and does not need to be reconciled. His Man, or who needs to be reconciled to God. The Lord came and, as to His human nature, was born, lived, suffered, and died ‘for us,’ not ‘instead of us.’ He came to enable man to do that which, through the fall, man had almost lost all power of doing, namely, to shun evil and to do the Lord’s will in a life of righteousness and true holiness. Moreover, God ‘became flesh,’ not only to effect this work of redemption, but also to show thereby that He is capable of manifesting His infinite love for man, and thereby give to Him for ever a definite object of intelligent faith, worship, and love. Man is said to be saved by the blood of Christ, in this sense, that His blood is the symbol of divine truth, and the shedding of His blood is the symbol of the imparting of His spirit of truth, the Holy Spirit. The Atonement, for Swedenborg, is thus really an at-one-ment, the reconciliation of man to God by love and power of God. It was accomplished by the Lord taking upon Himself man’s nature, enslaved by sin, from the blessed Virgin Mary, sustaining in His own body and soul the assaults of the powers of darkness, and gradually subduing them. For this work the Lord laid down His life, i.e. the life in Him of all that was not in perfect agreement with the infinite perfection of His in divine dwelling. When this was done, ‘consummated,’ the Lord Jesus Christ was no longer, even as to His human nature, the Son of Mary. He was the ‘only begotten Son of God,’ the perfect manifestation of the infinite, invisible Father. This process, called glorification, was completed after His resurrection, when the Lord ‘put off’ from the infirm human nature all its hereditary tendencies to evil and sin, and ‘put on’ from the Father the divine humanity subsisting in the essential divinity within Him. This is the supreme type of man’s own regeneration by which, having put off hereditary tendencies to evil and its actual sins, he puts on from the Lord, in the degree that he has thus put off evil, a new regenerated and spiritual humanity, a spiritual mind. No real regeneration can be attained except in accordance with the principle that the ‘saving faith’ is ‘a faith which worketh by love.’ Salvation by ‘faith alone’ is rejected and condemned by Swedenborg in innumerable passages in his works.

It is important in connexion with this subject to understand his idea of ‘the Church.’ The essential Church for him is constituted by a genuine love of goodness and truth and by the spiritual relation established with the Lord in the minds of men. The true Church is therefore invisible, but, so far as it is a true Church, it can never pass away. This, however, does not exclude the possibility of the disclosure by the Lord of further truths called for by new conditions in the world of human thought and experience, and needed to establish a higher level of spiritual life. Nor does it exclude the possibility of the loss or the corruption of truths previously held, rendering necessary the institution of a specific ‘New Church’ in order to restore what has been lost, and to incorporate new truths which the Church in the past was not ready to receive. The new Church, therefore, made by the disciples of Swedenborg that a ‘New Church’ has been instituted, involves, as they would insist, no disparagement of the former Christian Church ‘so far as was possible,’ but only the addition of the members of the ‘New Church’ at the present time consider it an entire misconception to imagine that Swedenborg is the founder of a ‘New Church.’ He himself always regarded the Holy Swedenborgian. He considered himself merely an instrument through whom new truths needed in the Church were communicated to the world. His chief point always was, however, that the Church and religion is another. The Church is called a Church from doctrine; religion is called religion from a life according to doctrine. Hence his well-known saying: ‘All religion is related to life, and the life of religion is to do Good.’


SWINE.—The swine plays a prominent part in many ancient and modern religions. The word ‘pig’ is unlucky to the Scottish fisherman, and when bearing it he will feel ill for the mists in his boots and mutter ‘Caubir iron.’ The inhabitants of certain villages on the north-east coast of Scotland consider the words ‘sow,’ ‘pig,’ and ‘swine’ very unlucky; should one be so unwise as to utter these words while the line is being baited, the line will surely be lost. The Galatærens, having noticed that, whilst men suffer from it, caused by troubles, in the fallen fruit of the fruit palm-tree, the wild boar, which is fed of the fruit and runs freely among it, is not liable to such a disease, argue that the fruit treats the pig as a real friend, and, if one by granting can impress the fruit that he is a pig, he must obtain that treat him in a certain way. The pig was offered by the Romans and Greeks as an expiatory sacrifice. Cato advises that, before thinning a grove, the Roman farmer should offer a pig to the god or goddess of the place. The grain distributed as præxis in the Eleusinian games in Greece was grown on the Rarian plain near Eleusis; this plain was so sacred that no dead body was allowed to touch it, and, whenever a death occurred, a pig was offered as a sacrifice. The Caribs abstained from pig’s flesh because, like most primitive races, they believed that the physical and mental qualities of the human being depend largely upon what he eats, which he eats. If they were to eat the flesh of pigs, they would have small eyes like those of a pig. Similarly Zulu girls abstain from eating pig’s flesh because they fear that by eating it they might gradually come to resemble the ugly pig in appearance. But there are other reasons why primitive man abstained from pork. The Kai of N.E. New Guinea find that pigs are the worst enemies of the crops; therefore, if a field-labourer were to eat pork, the dead pig in his stomach would attract the living pig into the field. Swine’s flesh was forbidden to all the Semites except the Babylonians, but it is an abomination whether this was because the animal was holy or because it was unclean. As early as the time of Hammurabi pork was a highly valued food among the Babylonians and frequently used to settle differences. By

6. A. Brinkman, Frieslandsc Comitesg Sterren, Groningen, 1895-97, ill. 60."
the inspection of pigs various omens were derived, and in the official lists special provision is even made for the temple pigs. The heathen Harranians sacrificed swine's flesh once a year and ate the flesh of pigs that had been regarded as sacred, and it was especially sacred to Aphrodite. To the Greeks the attitude of the Jews towards swine was difficult to understand. In 627 B.C., when Nebuchadnezzar was about to meet secretly to eat swine's flesh, it has been suggested therefore that the swine was revered rather than abhorred by the Israelites, and that it was not eaten because it was divine. To the Egyptians the pig was very loathsome. Swine-hens were forbidden to enter a temple and even had to marry among themselves. If a man even touched a pig, he immediately stepped into a river to wash off the taint. Pig's milk caused leprosy. These prohibitions prove that the Egyptians originally regarded the pig as sacred, for the belief that the eating of a sacred animal produces leprosy and that the effect caused by touching a sacred object is removed by washing was current among many ancient tribes and religions. Later, however, the pig began to be looked upon with horror and was regarded as the Egyptian devil and the embodiment of all evil. Typhon and Serapis are often mentioned as the boar-god. Typhon, in the form of a pig, injured the eye of Horus, who burned him and ordained that a pig was to be sacrificed, seeing that Ra, the sun-god, had declared the pig to be an abominable beast. We find in various religions that the animal sacrificed to a god because he is the god's enemy was originally the god himself. Now, we read that Typhon was hunting a boar when he discovered and mangled the body of Osiris, and that for this reason pigs were sacrificed once a year. It has therefore been suggested that originally the pig was a god, and that he was no other than Osiris. 

We have already seen that the pig of New Guinea abstain from pork because they regard the pig as the enemy of the crops, so that we can understand why the Egyptians should have identified their corn-god Osiris or his enemy Typhon with a wild boar. It might also be noted that pigs were sacrificed to Osiris on the very day on which he is recorded by tradition to have been killed. Further, the pig was sacred to the corn-godess Demeter and was often associated with her. In art she is represented as accompanied by a pig. At the Thesmophoria it was customary to throw pigs into some sacred vaults, which are looked upon as the 'caves of the Athenians' and the 'caves of Persephone.' It seems that the pigs were intended to represent Persephone and her descent into the lower world. An ancient legend tells that, when Pluto carried off Persephone, Eubulus, a swineherd, was herding his swine near the spot, and his herd were engulfed in the cave into which Pluto and Persephone had vanished. The Thesmophoria has analogies in the folklore of the Corland of the pig, the cosmic power of which  

1 En-Nedim in D. Chevrolat, Die Schaukel und der Schaukelspiel, St. Petersburg, 1856, ii. 42.  
2 Servius s. l. Apotheosis a L. Athoni. iii. 49 and in Pamphylia (Stebel, ix. 5. 17.).  
3 Plut. de Is. et Osiris, i. 1.  
5 Plat. de Is. et Osiris, 5.; Herodotus, i. 47, etc.  
8 J. J. Sanderson, Griechische Kunsthauptschriften, Leipzig, 1873-78, pl. ii.  
9 F. C. Movers, Die Phönizier, Berlin, 1841-66, i. 220.  

10 The inspection of pigs various omens were derived, and in the official lists special provision is even made for the temple pigs. The heathen Harranians sacrificed swine's flesh once a year and ate the flesh of pigs that had been regarded as sacred, and it was especially sacred to Aphrodite. To the Greeks the attitude of the Jews towards swine was difficult to understand. In 627 B.C., when Nebuchadnezzar was about to meet secretly to eat swine's flesh, it has been suggested therefore that the swine was revered rather than abhorred by the Israelites, and that it was not eaten because it was divine. To the Egyptians the pig was very loathsome. Swine-hens were forbidden to enter a temple and even had to marry among themselves. If a man even touched a pig, he immediately stepped into a river to wash off the taint. Pig's milk caused leprosy. 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In this connexion it is of interest to note that Ball finds a philological connexion between Tamuss, the Assyrian god of the under world and of vegetation, and the Chinese and Turkish words for pig. He also cites the evidence of classical writers that the Jews did not use swine's flesh because it was sacred inasmuch as by turning up the earth with its snout it taught men the art of ploughing. In some parts of White Russia it is believed that the bones of a pig preserve the corn from hail, whilst in other parts they are turned into the seed-bag among the flax-seed because they cause the flax to grow well and tall. The Alfoors of Minahassa in N. Celebes believe that a pig's blood causes inflammation of the body; in Minangkabau there is a sacrifice to the pig through which the priest drinks a pig's blood and thereupon is able to prophesy as to how the rice-crop will turn out. The inhabitants of Car Nicobar rub themselves over with pig's blood in order to cleanse themselves of any devil of which they were accused. In the same way the Greeks cleansed a homicide by sprinkling him with pig's blood and beating him with a laurel bough. The Karens of Burma believe that a bad harvest is caused by adultery, and, in order to atone for this, those detected in adultery must buy a pig, scrape out furrows in the ground with each foot, and then fill them with the pig's blood. Some Yabims believe that after death their souls will be turned into swine, and they therefore abstain from swine-flesh lest they should be eating the souls of their relatives. The people of Tamara (off the coast of New Guinea) also abstain from pork because the souls of the dead transmigrate into the bodies of pigs. The worshippers of Adonis did not eat pork because their god had been killed by a boar. It has been suggested that the cry 'Hyia Attis!', raised by the worshippers of Attis, meant 'pig Attis!' In Fiji a huge pig is presented to those who are initiated into manhood. At Mauwo, in Aurora, one of the New Hebrides, pigs are killed for the death of a wealthy man pigs are killed, and the point of the liver of each pig is cut off. The brother of the deceased goes to the forest and calls out the dead man's name, saying, 'This is for thee to eat,' the idea being that, if pigs are not killed for the benefit of the dead man, his ghost has not proper existence. It should be noted also that the pig is very often represented by a cowry-shell. Malinowski, in an
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SYMBOLISM (Christian).—It is proposed in this article to indicate the more important of the emblems and personifications in which Christian belief has found spontaneous expression. The literary images which deserve to be called symbolical, but which have not embodied themselves in pictorial or material shapes, remain invisible from view. An attempt will be made, however, to connect the emblems which call for notice with the language of the New Testament.

When the subject is thus defined, the field to be surveyed is at once seen to admit of a clear division. The first four or five Christian centuries separate themselves for our purpose markedly from the centuries which follow. For the symbolism of the earlier period we have the definite and varied testimony offered by the sepulchral paintings and inscriptions of the Roman catacombs. With the light thus obtainable we are able to see the hopes with which the Christians of Rome during this formative period followed their dead into the unseen world and connected the life that now is with that to which they believed it to be the portal.

Burial in the catacombs and the symbolism to which it gave rise practically ceased before the middle of the 5th century. From that time onwards new images and ideas crowd in upon us, created by the popular imagination in response to the Church's teaching and worship, to legends of the saints, animal fables, and spiritual plays and morbidities. Many of these images do not succeed in finding an emblematic expression, but those which do create a symbolism far exceeding that of the previous period in amplitude. We shall give our chief attention to the earlier period, and briefly indicate the later emblems which, either from their permanence or from their inherent significance, seem especially to claim notice.

A review of the entire field brings one decisive feature of the symbolism into prominence. The emblems will all be found to point onwards to a life beyond the tomb. The symbolism is created by a hope or, it may be, a fear whose fulfilment is not expected within the limits of our present existence. The justification of this 'other-worldliness' may readily be found in our records of the life of Christ. His ministry began with the announcement, 'The kingdom of God is at hand,' and was throughout a prophecy of good things to come (Mt 1). Some of His disciples may at first have believed that they would see these good things before they 'tasted' death (9). The mere lapse of time was enough to stamp such expectation with the mark of illusion. Every year it became more clear that the realization of the promised kingdom must needs be a slow and gradual process. In another respect also the de-irred consummation underwent a change. The earth ceased to be regarded, as perhaps it had at first been, as the

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account of the natives of Malu Island, off the coast of New Guinea, 1 says that at one of their feasts the natives erect a gallows and ornament it with a white shell called moto (the so-called white cowry, *Ovisula ovata*). This shows that they are about to sacrifice a dog, and that the number of pigs to be sacrificed is always the same as the number of shells. The association of this shell with pigs is important when it is remembered that cowries are widely known as pig-shells. This fact, and also the passionate tendencies of swine, would be the most plausible explanation of the abhorrence with which they have always been, and still are, regarded in certain circles. 

LITERATURE.—The literature is contained in the article. 

MAURICE H. FARRIDGE.

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Greek and Roman (P. GARDNER), p. 133.


Jewish (I. ABRAMS), p. 113.

Muslim (M. S. MAQBOOLIYAH), p. 145.

Semitic (M. H. FARRIDGE), p. 146.

The scene of fruition. The liveliest hope cannot resist the accumulating contradictions of continuous experience. Year by year it became less likely that the kingdom could ever be localized or assume any material shape. The Crucifixion and its sequel had lifted the thoughts of the disciples from the earth and carried them into that heaven which had now become the Master's home. To this heaven they transferred their 'treasure' (Mt 6*), less perhaps from deliberate apostasy than from the reluctant acceptance of undeniable experience, and to it their hearts ascended. Death thus resumed its normal character, and what lay beyond it became an object of anxious thought or fervent longing. These thoughts and longings form the central motives of Christian symbolism. The blessedness hoped for after death, the means by which it may be reached, and the character of Him who procured and guarantees it—these will be found to be the subjects round which the Christian emblems of all periods gather. From the beginning hope has been the dominant Christian characteristic. The scene of fulfilment and the mode of realization may have shifted. Hope itself has remained.

The symbolism of the catacombs embodies the hopes of future blessedness entertained by those who used these burying-places up to the time when such subterranean burial ceased. Thus the roses, or flowery meadows and shrubs, which appear on so many tombs represent paradise. Its entrance is sometimes indicated by a curtain which is in process of being drawn aside. For instance, a figure who appears on tomb after tomb may with greatest probability be here regarded as the Lord and Protector of the dead. It is they whom He gathers together round Him in the beginning of the future world. One of their number is the sheep He carries on His shoulders. The fish, one of the two articles of food with which the thousands were fed (Jn 6*), represents the mystical union with Christ, and its fruit incorruptibility (αὐθανάσιος). The vine points to the heavenly feast, or to its earthly pledge—the Eucharist. The dove, sipping water from the basin or jar, is the soul refreshing itself from the water of life (Rev 22*). The palms symbolize either the palms borne by the blessed (7) or the wreaths or crowns of those who have been victorious in the race of life (1 Co 9*; 2 Ti 4*). The anchor indicates the hope of Hb 6* which enters 'within the veil.' The ship and lighthouse typify the dangerous voyage across the ocean of life to the haven of safety. The stag is that of Ps 42*, and represents the soul's thirst for God.

The paintings of the catacombs have been fully described by two recent writers. Wippern, in his *Moderne der Katakomben*, has classified the paintings, reproducing all that are important and giving his interpretations of their symbolism. Von Sybel, in his *Christliches Antike*, has reviewed the subject on the ground provided by his predecessor's labours. He also reproduces many of the paintings and states his own conclusions in a lucid style and with much wealth of learning.

The symbolism of the later centuries has the
His ministry has been heralded by many previous displays of God's saving power. He has actually shown Himself to be the raiser of the dead, the restorer of the blind, and the healer of the sick. He waits in the church of his disciples and leads them into the heavenly pastures. Such are the subjects and implications of the symbolism.

(a) OT types.—Scenes from the OT which were especially held to typify this divine man often occur with great frequency on the tombs. These are the salvation of Isaac, when he was about to be slain in sacrifice by Abraham; the salvation of Noah in the Ark, the restoration of Job to his former prosperity (Job 42:12), the rescue of damsel from the jaws of the sea-monster, and the preservation of the three Hebrew youths in the flaming furnace. Some features in the symbolism of these paintings deserve particularly to be noted. In the representations of Abraham's contemplated sacrifice it is the rescue of Isaac from death that the painter desires to symbolize. This is plain from the attitude in which Isaac is represented when the design of the picture permits. He appears with extended arms—a posture of prayer or adoration of which more is said below. This is also the attitude of Noah as he stands in the Ark, and of the three children in the furnace. There is an observation in the paintings of the theological meanings afterwards found in Abraham's projected sacrifice. It may also be observed that the Deity is represented here, as generally or often in the earliest Christian art, by an outstretched hand. No attempt is made to delineate His features. There are no representations of the Trinity such as we find afterwards. Of all Biblical types Joseph has been the most frequently chosen by those painters. He forms the subject of 129 separate pictures which have come to light. It is to be observed that he does not here appear as a type of the resurrection of Christ, as he does in Mt 27:5. Nor is it the repentance of the Ninives at his preaching (Mt 11:29) that the painters wish to symbolize. He is represented as an example of God's saving power. Sometimes he forms the subject of three or four connected pictures. We first see him standing on the deck of the vessel and about to be cast into the sea. We then see the monster vomiting him out towards the land. The next panel shows him on the shore, which takes the form of an arbour like those in paradise. There may be a fourth picture where he reclines in an attitude of dejection, his head resting on his hand.

(b) The sacred infancy.—The divine childhood is depicted on a number of tombs. One of the most beautiful paintings in the catacombs3 is the picture in the Priscilla cemetery of the Christ-child on His mother's breast. The mother bends slightly forward as if to suckle the child. The child's hand is spread out over the mother's breast, but the face, with wonderful eyes, is half turned towards the spectator. Above the heads of mother and child two stars are indicated in an oblique direction. To the left stands a man in mantle and sandals who has in his left hand a written roll and with his right points to the stars, and next appears resting under a canopy, presents, not Joseph (who, as far as is known, does not appear in early Christian art), but a prophet, either Isaiah, who pointed to the light of the Messianic age (60:1), or Elkam (Nu 24:17, Rev 22:16), who told of the start to arise out of Jacob. If this identification be correct, it is, as von Sybel says,4 one more evidence that at least the earlier Catacomb painting was in no sense historical, but entirely symbolic. The picture belongs to the beginning of the 2nd century.

3 See art. 'Mary,' in HDB. Schulze art. 'Synthetiker,' in PREP xviii. 392.

4 Von Sybel, p. 216 fl. 2 Th. p. 247.
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depicted is the visit of the Magi. They are generally represented as three in number, although the painters often depict these by four, or even five, to increase them to four or reduce them to two. The definite determination of their number as three, their designation as the Magi, and the ascription to the proper names (Kaspar, Melchior, Balthazar), the differentiation of their ages to this legendary web antiquity only. It is connected the first designation was the work of the Middle Ages. 1

The Annunciation (Lk 1:26) forms the subject of two paintings, one belonging to the end of the 2nd and the other of the 3rd century. It is seated. The angel, in the form of a man, makes the announcement standing, as a visitor who has just entered the house. The relative postures of the two figures can be explained without the supposition of an intention to claim for Mary a higher dignity than for the angel. The two paintings may presuppose, but cannot be held to go beyond, the Gospel narratives.

On the other hand, Mary's perpetual virginity finds constant expression in medieval art. The OT provides many images of inviolability which are applied to Mary. She is the 'fons signatorum,' the 'house of consecration' and a 'curse' of the Song of Solomon (4:12 4:14). The christianized Physiologus—a medieval bestiary or book of animals, real and fabulous, with allegorical explanations—supplied the legend of the unicorn, a fabulous animal which is said to have been caught in the lap of a pure virgin. Ezek 17 provided the symbol of the barred door, Jg 6:17 that of Gideon's fleece wadded from the dew from heaven. The number and variety of these symbols show the value assigned to the doctrine of Mary's perpetual virginity by the medieval Church. 2

c) The Divine Healer.—The Gospel miracles, of which there are numerous representations in the catacombs, are evidences of God's desire to release humanity from its plagues. In the heavenly city of the Apocalypse there was to be neither sorrow nor death (Rev 21:4). To this divine purpose the healings of Christ bore emphatic witness. His ministry was a short-lived anticipation of the Messianic Age (Mt 11:5). The beneficent power, then displayed in a few instances, would hereafter be seen in the fullness of its strength. It is an evidence of the authority rapidly acquired by the Fourth Gospel that the miracle most frequently represented in the catacombs is the raising of Lazarus (50 examples have been discovered). 3 We remember how Jesus greeted the Saviour with the words, 'If thou hadst been here, my brother had not died' (Jn 11:21-25). We are intended to regard the presence of Christ as incompatible with death, or at least with its bearnessing power. Other healings which may with certainty be identified are that of the paralytic (Mk 2:3-11), in which the man appears walking with his bed on his shoulder, and that of the blind man, where we see Christ touching with His linger the man's closed eyes. Another unmistakable scene is the cure of the issue of blood (Mk 5:21 and 25). The woman comes behind the Saviour as He walks with two disciples, and kneels that she might touch Him with her handkerchief. Other paintings have no distinctive features which would justify certain identification.

d) The Cross.—The absence from the earlier catacombs of what has now become the distinctive Christian emblem is full of significance. The use of the cross as a separate symbol appears to date from the campaign of Constantine against Maxentius in the year 312, when Constantine put the cross upon the shields of his soldiers. Previous to this date we find the cross mentioned in one inscription

in the catacombs, and appearing doubtfully in two ceiling-paintings. Both inscription and paintings belong to the 3rd-4th centuries. The monogram of Christ 

appears in inscriptions of which some may possibly be anterior to Constantine, but its general use dates from the reign of this emperor. It has accordingly become customary to regard both the cross and the monogram as institutions not formed before the 4th century. It should also be observed that the only known reference to the Passion in the catacombs previous to the 4th cent. is what is believed to be a representation of the crowning of thorns in the Praetextatus cemetery. 4 The absence of any symbol of the Passion from the earlier tombs may readily be accounted for by the fact that their paintings were intended to display, not death, but the victory over death. Even when the cross does begin to appear, it seems to be introduced, not for its own sake, but as a support for the rose-leaves which gather round it. It thus becomes a beauteous or symbolic cross. We are reminded of the symbolism of the Passion-narrative in the Fourth Gospel, where we see Christ reigning with sovereign authority from the Cross, and the majesty of the Divine Sufferer shining through the insignities of His Passion. It is not possible to say whether the foliage-crosses of the catacombs—concealed or 'dissimulated' crosses—have indeed been traced to the supposed desire of the Christians to avoid observation. Apart, however, from the fact that such crosses do not begin to appear until the 4th cent., it is difficult to believe that the other emblems which do appear would not have clearly indicated these various Christian burials, if more natural to suppose that the transfiguration of the Cross effected by St. Paul's theology required much reflexion before it could find emblematic expression. The Cross was at first a stumbling-block (Gal 5:11) and only slowly became a symbol of glory (6:14).

It will thus have been observed that the earliest representations of the Passion were avowed symbols, suggesting, but not depicting, the sacrifice of the God-man. Realism becomes more pronounced as we travel down the centuries. The crucifix—an inevitable development of the cross—does not appear in churches till after the 14th century. 5 The implements of the Passion (hammer, claws, etc.) become independent emblems towards the end of the Middle Ages, when indulgences began to be attached to their veneration. The lamb with blood streaming from its breast, and carrying the cross or a banner upon which the cross was depicted, became a favourite symbol on the portals of Latin churches. The pelican (taken from the Physiologus), who teats open its breast to feed its young, was used to represent the sacrificial death of Christ. 6

e) The Good Shepherd.—The favourite symbol of Christ among those who constructed and used the catacombs is that of the Good Shepherd. This image takes here the place of the crucifix in later art. It appears in two different forms in the catacombs. In Lk 15:2-10 the shepherd is seen bringing home on his shoulders, 'reducing,' a sheep that has been lost. In Jn 10:17 the shepherd leads his sheep to and from the pastures and protects them

1 Wilpert, p. 293; von Sybel, p. 322.
2 For the three forms of the cross in later symbolism—

2 See DCA, s.v. 'Crucifix.'
3 Schulze, PEFQ, xviii. 592.
5 Scholle, FPK xviii. 322.
6 See DCA, s.v. 'Crucifix.'
8 Schulze, PEFQ, xviii. 592.
from the wolf, even at the price of his own life. It is added by Christ in a subsequent verse (v. 257): 'My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me; and I give unto them eternal life; and they shall never perish, and no one shall snatch them out of my hand.' Both representations are of frequent occurrence on the tombs. We see the shepherd pasturing his flock, and carrying upon his shoulders a sheep, whose legs he holds. Two, three, or even more are seen thus sometimes with both hands. There seems to be little doubt that this favourite symbol, like the others in the catacombs, is intended to transport the mind beyond death. The painters wished to indicate the power of Christ: it is seen as a natural instinct, of those who lived, were under His protection, 'the shepherd of his pasture.' Thus, where a landscape is indicated in the paintings it is invariably that of the garden or park which typifies paradise. The image, so understood, would appear to have passed into the early burial prayers of both the Greek and the Latin liturgies.1 Thus, when A. P. Stanley2 points to the frequent image of the Good Shepherd as an evidence of the joyousness of early Christian feeling, we must remember that the sheep in these pictures are in all probability those who have passed from the vicissitudes of the world into the safe and restful presence of eternal rest.

A brief reference may here be made to the emblems which early Christian art adopted from Greek and Roman mythology. We cannot measure, however, the precise significance which these emblems possessed for the Christians who used or looked at them. There is a remarkable contrast between the current decorations of the period; or they may have had a distinct didactic purpose, and been intended to suggest that Christ was the reality to which the heathen mythologies pointed in unconsolating and hesitating prophecy. So Eros and Psyche appear in many of the catacomb pictures; or we may be reminded of five different pictures where we should have expected the Good Shepherd we find Orpheus with his lyre.

(f) The Judge of the dead.—In some paintings Christ is seen seated upon a raised platform, plainly in the character of Judge. In one of these we see a male figure in the posture of an orans between two taller forms, who point to him as if they were his introducers or sponsors. In the background upon a raised pedestal is Christ, who stretches His open right hand over the head of the middle figure, while in his left He holds a roll. In Wilpert’s topographical figures representing one of the deities who has already stood before the judgment-seat of Christ, while the two other figures represent his advocates. These representations of judgment convey some important impressions. The face of Christ in the picture described above is grave without being stern. It must be remembered that no authentic likeness of Christ appears to have been preserved by His disciples. The varieties given to His face and figure from the earliest times put this beyond reasonable doubt. Irenæus4 shows that no trusty trustworthy portrait existed in his day. To the same effect are the words of Augustine.5 The disciples were thus left to their own insight and skill to depict His likeness. The painters of the catacombs seem to have given Him the typical male head of their time. This type was during the first two centuries continually bearded. He had the long hair, coloured locks. If the painters were guided by the prevalent fashions of wearing the hair and beard, it is obvious that we cannot infer much from the apparently increasing seriousness of the countenance.6 The growth of asceticism in subsequent ages had a marked influence upon art. The representation of the Christ after beauty was abandoned. Manly beauty was associated in the mind of the monastic Church only with barbarian soldiers. The words of 1557, 'There is no beauty that we would desire him,' shaped the artist’s conceptions. The figure of Christ in the Church of Gallus Placidia in Ravenna (c. A.D. 450), when compared with the portrait to be seen in the Church of Apollinaris in the same city, painted about a century later, shows the transition from the earlier ideal, shaped by the love of beauty, to the ascetic or melancholy conceptions of later art.

These representations seem also to make it plain that the judgment symbolized was individual and thought of as taking place immediately after death. The departed appears at once before the judgment-seat of Christ (2 Co 5:10). The appropriate sentence of the Judge is the signal for his immediate entrance into paradise. Thus in one painting7 we see two figures, one on either side, drawing back a curtain to admit into paradise one of the departed, who stands in the centre in the posture of an orans. In another painting two of the blessed move eagerly forward to welcome a new arrival, who advances in the same attitude of devotion. We find no representation in the catacombs of a general judgment of mankind. Nor do the paintings, as archaeologists of all schools agree, give any indication of belief in an ‘intermediate state’ or a period between death and judgment. All those who die in Christ are conceived as passing at once from their death-beds into heaven.8

When we pass into the subsequent centuries, death and judgment assume terrifying shapes. The destructive power of death is symbolized by a man who weeds the garden of life or fells its trees, or (after Rev 6) as a rider with drawn bow, above all as an emaciated old man who finally reaches the form of a skeleton with scythe and hour-glass. ‘The dance of death’ appears to have originated in the plague known as ‘the Black Death.’ It quickly gained a wide popularity, which it retained far beyond the close of the Middle Ages. Of course, the body, was regularly represented as a little human figure, naked and sexless, emerging from the mouth. In pictures of the Last Judgment popular imaginations often took the place of the earlier representations of paradise. Hell was symbolized by the open throat of a monster (after the levitans of Job 41), into which men and women, masters and servants, priests and people, were thrust. Devils in every shape did their work of derision and torture under the supervision of the prince of hell. To him the popular imagination transferred everything it knew of monsters, and thus arose the being of many shapes and names with goat’s horns, cloven hoof, bat’s wings, and a tail. He even took the form of a blackbird, and, as such, flew into the mouth of Judas at the Last Supper, and whispered into the ear of Pilate as he sat in judgment. Popular humour may well have had its share in shaping these fancies.9

2. The heavenly state. — St. Paul represents Christ as the second Adam, who unites the consecutiveness of man. For Adam’s transgression (Ro 5). By the early Christians heaven was pictured as a restored Eden. The word ‘paradise’ appears to

1 Von Sybel, p. 242; ap. Muratori, Liturgia Romana Petrus, Naples, 1760, l. 751: 'We pray God faithfully that He may grant [to the departed] that, redeemed from death, released from his sins and linked to the Father, be together, on the shoulders of the good Shepherd, he may enjoy the society of the blessed.
3 Wilpert, p. 304; von Sybel, p. 271.
4 Contra Hier. i. 25, 6.
5 In Trin. vi. 4.
7 See art. 'Jesus Christ, Representations of,' in DCA.
8 Wilpert, p. 367.
9 Wilpert, p. 343; von Sybel, p. 573.
10 Schultze, PR 38 viii. 393.
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have been originally Persian and have been introduced to the Greek East during the 4th century by Eusebius. The Greek Fathers seem to have passed it on to the Hebrews. It appears in the OT only in writings subsequent to the Greek period (Ec 2:2, Ca 4:2, Neh 2:19) and the meaning of a park with trees, shrubs, and vines was later extended by wild animals, such as surrounded the residences of eastern potentates. Such parks were commonly enclosed by a wall or trellis-shaped fence. Trees, shrubs, flowers, and the trellis building in the catacomb paintings are invariably symbols of paradise.2

On the threshold we meet with the figures known as orantes. These are females, male or female - the latter are much more numerous than the former. Stands with arms either fully extended or bent at the elbows, and with opened hands. The orantes give rise to questions which are still in debate. Where, in the first place, are these figures intended to represent? Against the assumption that they are either lilies of the valley or intended to represent their souls3 we have to place the fact that a female orans often appears painted on the tomb of a nun, and also to remember that the paintings appear to have been sometimes executed before the tombs were filled. It seems, therefore, most natural to regard these as ideal figures, poetic representations of the blessed dead. Again, what is the meaning of the outstretched arms and open hands? Are we to understand by the attitude of prayer that it is one of adoration? And, if it be prayer that is symbolized, for what end? The Church Fathers or the scribes do not give a clear answer. Unquestionably, the attitude has remained in some cases where it unquestionably symbolizes adoration, or at least the prayer in which essentially exists itself in submission. Thus far, the deliverance from the prison of the resurrected Christ and His orantes, appear often in the attitude of orantes. So Noah stands in the ark, and David among the lions, and the three children appear in the furnace. Yet in each of these cases the deliverance has already been granted. If anything is asked for, it can only be to divine grace and so the deliverance of the inmates of paradise seem to stand in an attitude of wondering reverence.4 On the other hand, the三百th Psalm signifies a song of fortitude, as the three children in the furnace. The lifting up of the hands was a Jewish as well as a Christian practice (Ps 119, 143, 149).

3. The heavenly feast. - The Christians who buried their dead in the catacombs had two sacraments, both of which are frequently symbolized in the paintings. In baptism the believer was admitted among the number of the elect. He became a 'saint' in the original sense of that word. On the tombs we find representations both of the baptism and His foreordination in the Church's baptism. There are also three pictures of a fisherman, seated on the bank and drawing a fish out of the water with his hook. The figure may point to baptism and to the fish of Jesus, and to the words: 'Come ye after me, and I will make you fishers of men' (Mt 4:19). If this be so, it would supply an additional reason for the adoption of the fish as a Christian symbol. In the Eucharist the believer partakes of the bread which came down from heaven, and of which he ate and would not die (Jn 6:50). In it he has partaken of the heavenly feast. When Jesus took leave of His disciples, He told them of the new wine which He would drink with them in the Kingdom of God (Lk 22:19). The Christians cherished for a brief interval the hope raised by the prophetic words. Despondency gave way to renewed confidence when it became apparent that God had seen 'allowed His Holy One to see corruption.' So 'day by day, continuing stedfastly with one accord in the temple, and breaking bread, and singing psalms, and prayer, adoring the Lord, and showing miracle among them' (Acts 2:46). It is no longer possible to make the step of faith, which is breaking of bread, pass into the Church's Eucharist. It is enough to recognize that what afterwards became the ecclesiastical rite on the part of the community of the Christian East is still preserved by the West. If the presence of the heavenly Christ was, as we can well believe, most literally realized during certain occasions than as an inward reality, the disciples would naturally associate themselves with the peace and joy which awaited them hereafter. The formation of the Church would tend to confirm the people in their anticipations of future happiness. They might recall the

Biblical assurance: 'Blessed is he that shall eat bread in the kingdom of God' (Lk 14:15), 'Blessed are those who are bidden to the marriage supper of the Lamb' (Rev 19), 'To him that overcometh, I will grant to sit with me upon my throne, even as I also overcame, and am set down with my Father in his throne' (Rev 3:21). It is profuse to dwell upon the inconsistency of such a heavenly banquet, which allows only men of bodily appetites. For in 'the new world' which, whether it be peopled by corporeal or incorporeal beings, is in any case to be the seat of truth and love, the most attenuated equally with the most material, becomes obsolete. An instance intended for a recompense of a body by an atmosphere is useless when the atmosphere is transcended. Thus the most spiritually-minded Christians, restricted by limitations from the material world, cannot exercise them as they do, to associate heaven with the 'abode of them that their souls.'5 In the catacomb paintings heavenly happiness is represented by the image of a floral joy. The scene of the feast is marked by the customary paraphernalia of paradise. The guests are to be seen, generally if not always, behind the roll which is the recognized symbol for the curtains used at feasts. Often attendants appear carrying a dish or holding a flagon or wine-cup. In one series of pictures these attendants take the form of two female figures who are designated by inscriptions as 'Irene' and 'Agape.' They are appealed to by the guests to supply warm water or to mix the wine ('Irene, da cauda'; 'Agape, mine noble'). One of the figures seems thus to symbolize the peace of heaven, and the other the avenue which the Christian love-feast derived its name, and which was one of St. Paul's three almsgiving things.6 The food indicated in these pictures consists in bread and fish. Sometimes, in catacomb paintings, small round leaves, appear either in front of the cushion-roll or on either side of the food. These additional emblems were plainly intended to model in the painter's mind. This miracle, connected by St. John (20) with the 'bread of life,' was an anticipation of the heavenly Eucharist, which, in the Catacomb, is the Church's Eucharist, which in some of the paintings seems to be expressly depicted and made a symbol of its heavenly antecedents. This is only added that the fish, from its presence in the miracle, as well perhaps for the reason given above, appears to have established itself as one of the most popular symbols. The common acrostic was discovered: ἑκάστης ἑκατέρου ἡμέρας δόθη σώζεται.7

It will appear from the foregoing summary that, while Christian symbolism points persistently on- wards towards the spiritual world, conceived as lying beyond death, the hope thus expressed is sustained by experiences which are prized for their own sake, and also as earnest of things yet to come. Eternal life, the ultimate object of the consummating of life and death, is there represented as both present and future. So the Messianic kingdom of the earlier evangelists was yet to come, while it was also 'within' or 'among' the disciples who walked with Jesus and saw God in Him. The Church which continued His ministry in the ages that followed was likewise a prophet of what was yet to be, and also a teacher of mysteries by His foreordination of the Church's baptism. Thus in the Middle Ages, while the three theological virtues (faith, hope, charity) appear repeatedly on church porches, pulpits, and monuments, the cardinal virtues (prudence, fortitude, temperance) also naturally took their symbolic shapes. The Church is a teacher of common-place morality, while at the same time she must bear witness to truths whose validity cannot be demonstrated by everyday experience. The Christians who built the catacombs tell us in many inscriptions of the central hope with which they consigned their dead to the tomb. Their desire was that 'the departed might see God' (Vivat in Dom, 'Vives in internunium, 1 Deum videre cujusvis vitis!). Such is the hope, vague and yet real, changing but steadfast, which has created the Christian symbols of the past, and may perhaps the most universal symbol becomes more proficient in the interpretation of its own language.


JOHN GAMILE

1 Wilpert, p. 470; von Sybel, p. 207; de Rossi, Bull. Christ., 1892.
2 See a learned note in von Sybel, p. 161.
3 Von Sybel, p. 167.
5 de Rossi, in soterranea cristiana, ii, 311, Bull. Christ., 1892.
6 Wilpert, p. 231; von Sybel, p. 204.
SYMBOLISM (Greek and Roman).—A symbol is a visible or audible sign or emblem of some thought, emotion, or experience, interpreting what can be really grasped only by the mind and imagination by something which enters into the field of observation. So far as Greek and Roman religion are concerned, we need speak only of two kinds of symbolization: by the means of actions or words and symbolic representation in art.

Religion, taking its rise in experience and belief, tends, as it becomes less literal and less consistent, to give rise to symbolism; and this is true also of that lower kind of religion which is called magic. When primitive men thought that by certain actions and words they could compel spiritual powers to do their bidding, or when they thought that the painting of animal forms on the walls of their caves gave them power over the animals depicted, they had not yet reached the stage of symbolism, but had taken the first steps towards it; when they poured water on the ground to produce rain, they thought that there was an actual causal connexion between the ritual act and the desired result, when religious belief decays, the feelings which gave rise to it often find scope in the field of poetry, so, when actual belief in the power of sympathetic magic grows less, the actions and ceremonies to which it led are often continued in symbolism.

I. GREEK.—1. In local cults.—The local cults of Greece, which went on at a lower level, and in a more conservative key, than the religion of poetry and of philosophy, preserved a great deal of symbolism. Even in Athens the great festivals embodied such traces of primitive religion. At the Brauronian festival young girls, impersonating bears, danced a bear-dance in honour of Artemis. At the Diania the priest who struck down the sacrificial ox was accused of murder and in turn accused his instrument, the axe, which was condemned and solemnly cast into the sea. In the worship of the dead flowers and fruits gradually took the place of the more serious offerings of an earlier time. With the dead were buried, not, as in primitive times, real armour and ornaments, but only symbolic offerings, such as gold-leaved axes, deer or gold-leaved animals of terra-cotta, and the like. Sometimes these objects were only depicted in relief on the tombstone. The terrible human sacrifices once brought to the inner deities were conned into such images of animals as sometimes symbolized the dead, or were mere images of human beings. Naturally it was in the mysteries, where the survivals of primitive religion were most rife, that symbolism was most prominent. Mere ceremonial ablutions took the place of actual immersions as a ceremony of purification. The sacred meal which the deity shared with his votaries became a mere ceremonial tasting of some special food. At Eleusis, in the great mysteries, the votaries emptied two vessels filled with water, turning to east and west and repeating the sacred formula οὐκ αἰτεῖται ('Sky pour rain, earth yield grain'), which was directed to earth and sky, and was evidently a survival of an ancient magical formula for the production of rain.

The suppliant who visited the cave and oracle of Trophonius at Lebedia, before he went into the presence of the hero, drank from two springs, that of oblivion and that of memory, to signify that he was to forget the past and to remember the revelations to him. Finally, in all probability, the water of those springs was supposed to have some actual effect on the votary, as had the spring in the cave of the clariss Apollo at Colophon on the priest who drank of it before soilswaying. But in the time of Pausanias the action had become merely ritual and symbolical.

The sacred marriage was common to several cults in Greece. When the motion of the deity was somewhat indecisive, women went into the temple, to stand in the same sexual relation to him in which, according to tradition, Cassandra stood to Apollo. But, as time went on, such designation became only symbolical, the piece of the victim being sometimes taken by the wife of the priest.

As the mystery religions spread and their outlines hardened, a new element came in, which was destined to take further development in Christianity—the element of authority. Symbolic rites were practiced, not on the ground of mere tradition, but by ordination of the recognized hierophants of each cult, who claimed a divine communication. This element, however, scarcely belonged to the earlier religions view of either Greeks or Romans, among whom authority in religion was scarcely recognized apart from tradition. Cults had an open field and freely competed one with another, except those with which the safety of the State was supposed to be connected.

It seems that almost the whole which does not appeal to the intelligence is in character symbolic. And the notable feature in symbolic ritual is that, since it appeals mainly to the emotions, it may be interpreted or understood in a great variety of ways. At the mysteries of Eleusis, e.g., some of the votaries might regard the whole proceedings as a sort of spell to cause fertility; some might be genuine worshippers of the great goddesses of earth and vegetation, as Demeter and Persephone; some might, like Cecrops, find in the ritual a promise and pledge of a life beyond the grave. Everything depended on the religious outlook, the exalted or materialist beliefs of the votary himself.

' Aristotle,' says Syme (2) is of opinion 'that the initiate learned nothing precisely; but that they received impressions, were put into a suitable frame of mind.' Thus symbolic ritual has a great attraction for persons of emotional temperament, while it is distasteful to those of strongly developed intelligence, who like definite views. Compared with clear doctrine, it is like music compared with reading: it can be enjoyed by many means well suited to the minds of the more cultivated Greeks.

2. In art.—In early Greek art symbolism appears in two forms: in representing by some simple figure an idea such as a quality or attribute of one of the deities and in choosing images or symbols of anything by depicting some characteristic part of it.

A few symbols of the deities seem to have been taken over by the Greeks from the prehistoric peoples whom they displaced in Crete and Hellas. Such is the double-edged axe, which is found in the palace of Chossas in Crete in the third millennium B.C. in scenes of cultus, and which belongs to a male or female deity of the people. This axe became among the Greeks a symbol of Dionysos. The snake also appears as an attribute of a goddess or of the squamated hero, and later was identified by the Greek Brineyes. But most of the symbols of the gods of the Greek pantheon seem to be more immediately derived from the art of the nations of Syria and Mesopotamia. Most of these symbols were displaced by growing anthropomorphism. This statement requires some explanation. On early bronze and terra-cottas found on Greek sites, dating from the 7th or 6th centuries B.C., we find lions, horses, bulls, or winged figures, as winged and holding in her two hands lions, panthers, or swans. On the chest of Cypselus, a
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7th cent. work preserved at Olympia, Pausanias¹ saw such a figure, which surprised him by its strikingly artistic feeling; its wings were not for flight, but only to typify swiftness, the lions were added to show the power of the goddess over animals, whose mistresses (τοίχωμα) she rules. We may trace this transformation step by step through Greek art and see how in mature times the swiftness of the deity was indicated by her stature and slimness of build, her power over animals by the stag or dog who accompanied her. A similar transformation takes place in the case of Zeus. On early coins of Elis an eagle appears as a substitute for the god; later he bears the eagle in his hand. Later still, as in the great statue of Phoebus, a golden eagle was an adornment of the sceptre of Zeus. Thus, as time went on, merely outward symbols tended to disappear or at all events to become unimportant; and the meaning which they had conveyed was expressed in the type of the deity. Certain symbols, however, held their ground. The thunderbolt of Zeus, indicating him as the lord of storms (Zeus bēros), is usual in the 5th century. The meaning of the thunderbolt in this type of the deity could not be easy. The bow, as symbol of the rays of the sun-god,² is usual in the hand of Apollo in archaic representations; later the lyre is far more usual. Even when the transformation takes place they mostly lose their merely symbolic character and are used for flight, as in the case of Victory and Eros, an innovation ascribed to the sculptor Archermus of Cnidos (c. 570 B.C.). The god Hercules, even in later art, carries wings on his cap or his heels—a survival of archaic symbolism.

Coins furnish us with many examples of symbols belonging to the deities. In the 7th and 6th centuries we have the reverse of electrum silver coins usually presents some very simple symbolical device—a griffin at Teos and Abdera, a thunderbolt at Olympia, a wolf at Argos, an owl at Athens; and then, after the archaic period, this type is usually banished to the reverse of the coin, and in its place we have the head of the deity to whom the type belongs. It must, however, be observed that, when numismatists speak of a symbol on a coin, they use the word in a technical sense, to indicate not a symbolical type, but one of those small and subsidiary devices often placed in the field of a coin by magistrates who, when they attempted to trace the life of all kinds of animals—lion, bull, jackal, hawk, and so on. And Indian figures of deities represent them with several heads, many arms (each holding some attribute), necklaces of skulls, and the like. Oriental art and sculpture to represent in this way qualities and attributes which sculpture or painting could not otherwise portray—elements of mysticism, mythological tales, or sometimes the ideas of pantheistic religion. Greek art avoids monstrous forms as a rule, though it inherits a few specially suitable for artistic development, such as the Centaur. And it does not attempt to portray, in sculpture or in painting, anything which lies outside the scope of those arts. Exquisite in form and clear in meaning, its creations do not carry us beyond sense and intellect, do not appeal to the mystical tendencies of men. Thus Greek symbolism has no wild elements.

II. ROMAN.—I. In cult and law.—In Roman religious ceremonies the symbol held a large place. This was natural, as in quite the early times of the republic there was an invasion of Greek and Greek deities, which caused the old rustic religion of the Roman people to survive only in the form of ritual, the meaning of which was in a large degree lost. The city of Rome was divorced alike from belief and from morality, and, so long as the magistrates performed

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2. JHS, vi. 196.
exactly the ceremonies handed down by their ancestors, it matterless what meaning they attached to those ceremonies or what beliefs they held in religion. The emperor, whether he were Trajan or a Nero, was always pontifex maximus and represented to the gods the State in its religious capacity. Hence the Romans were extremely careful as to the way in which they wore the toga or the cap called aegos, as to their exact position in relation to the points of the compass, and as to the attitude in which they stood when they were sacrificing. All these details had no doubt some meaning in their origin; but not only are we unable usually to discover what it was, but even the Romans did not know: they blindly followed the tradition, with an uneasy feeling that, unless they did so, some great calamity would overtake the State. Most of these ritual customs were probably derived from the Etruscans, a people at a low level of culture, but exact in all matters of a religion which seems scarcely to have risen above the level of magic.

When an official conducted a sacrifice, he sprinkled the victim with wine and threw over it salt meal; then he made a ritual motion symbolical of the wiping off of physical blemishes was done by attendants.1 Like the Greeks, the Romans contrived to put in the place of human sacrifices the mere offering of substitutes and symbols.2 In the ancient cults, they took with them their recognized symbols; and the native gods, who were largely identified with the immigrants, also adopted these outward signs of inward powers. Thus in art Greek customs went on, as in fact the artists were usually Greek. So we have on Roman monuments the symbolism of Ephesus and Alexandria. Allegorical and symbolical figures, such as Pudicitia, Ubertas, Armona, appear abundantly on the Roman coins; but they can have had but little serious worship. In short, while symbolism is of importance in relation to Roman cultus, it is unimportant in earlier Roman art, reflecting perhaps a concrete poetical imagination of which the Romans were destitute.

There was a good deal of symbolism or symbolic ritual in the customs of Roman law; e.g., if a man purchased a slave, he laid hands on him (manus patris) in the presence of witnesses, and weighed out at the same time to the seller a piece of money which was accepted as a symbol of the price, quasi pretio loco, as Gaius says.3 We need not be surprised that so much symbolism made its way into Christianity in Rome, since it had become a recognized part of the routine of daily life.

2. In art.—In the time of the Roman dominion, as the religion of Mithras and other mystery cults spread from east to west through Europe, the range and power of symbolism increased. We may especially trace on tombs of the period of the empire, alike in Italy, Gaul, and other regions, a growth of religious symbols mainly having reference to the life beyond the tomb, which was taking an ever larger place in men's thoughts and hopes. Some of the mythological scenes which the Greeks had depicted on tombs, from the stories and decorative motives, seem to have been re-interpreted in a more mythic fashion. Such were the rapes of women and the combats of men; and more especially seen from the lives of Heracles and Orpheus and other heroic persons who had won immortality by great deeds, or had descended into Hades and returned. Some ordinary figures of earlier art—the griffin, the lion, the cock, and the eagle—became connected with the hope of immortality.4

The Mithraic shrines of northern Europe contain

2 Cf. 112.

SYMBOLISM (Hindu).—Of all religions of the East, the home of type and imagery, Hinduism makes the most use of symbols. It has formally declared the ultimate truth to be unknowable and indescribable. In all its schemes of mythology and teaching it seeks to make definite approach to the reality by suggestive type or symbol—an approach that can never find its goal, but can only draw nearer and more nearly, as it points and moves on, like the ancient Greek philosophers, to the symbol or likeness which most fully and faithfully reflects the true, and embodies the largest part of a reality which in its entirety is inconceivable by the human mind and inexpressible in the language of men. The symbol is the necessary and helpful intermediary between the inadequate capacity of the mind of the would-be worshipper and the incomunicable nature and fulness of the Unknown whom he adores. A complete and adequate description therefore of the Hindu use of type and symbol would require an almost complete exposition of Hindu belief in its many varieties and ramifications. Whether in creed or in practice, the symbolic in Hinduism is not far from being co-extensive with the religion itself. Of the literature of Hinduism and its systems of doctrine and ramifications, whether in creed or in practice, the symbolic in Hinduism is not far from being co-extensive with the religion itself. Of the literature of Hinduism and its systems of doctrine and ramifications, whether in creed or in practice, the symbolic in Hinduism is not far from being co-extensive with the religion itself. Of the literature of Hinduism and its systems of doctrine and ramifications, whether in creed or in practice, the symbolic in Hinduism is not far from being co-extensive with the religion itself. Of the literature of Hinduism and its systems of doctrine and ramifications, whether in creed or in practice, the symbolic in Hinduism is not far from being co-extensive with the religion itself. Of the literature of Hinduism and its systems of doctrine and ramifications, whether in creed or in practice, the symbolic in Hinduism is.
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manner its historical relations in the religious scheme and cult, to define its necessary limits, and to select for illustration and comment a few of the more important types which have occupied a considerable place in the belief and profession of the adherents of the full range of the conception of the symbols employed would be a large and probably impossible task.

1. Use and purpose of symbols.—The use and purpose of the symbol is twofold: (1) to set forth in visible or audible likeness whatever cannot be really or fully expressed to the physical eye or ear, or even clearly conceived by the limited faculties of the human mind. All language is in the last resort symbolic, and religious language in an especial degree, for it endeavours to present a mystery, a reality too deep for words. The Hindu faith had at its service a language of the utmost delicacy and flexibility, with a vigorous and fertile growth and an almost unlimited vocabulary, and found itself in a world of tropical luxuriance, with a tropical wealth of beauty and suggestiveness. It was not to be wondered at that it became profuse in symbolic and legendary illustration of all the facts and phenomena of nature to serve its religious and priestly ends. All the great gods had their resemblances, animal or material, to which they might represent themselves as embodied to human sight, which served to recall to the worshipper the deity, whose mind and character they more or less inadequately reflected. Other more rare and refined symbols were representative of qualities or attributes, as the lotus, the emblem of spotless purity preserved under the most unfriendly conditions. All idols, totems, fetishes are symbols. The wise man does not worship the symbol, since it has no form to which his reverence and fear may attach themselves, will wander in a maze of doubt, disquiet, and unbelief. It is better that they should worship erroneously, worshiping them because they symbolize the worship that the gods do, and not at all. There is much that might be urged in favour of the Hindu view that regards the worship of the external symbol as a stepping-stone to higher, clearer forms of belief; it is a view unacknowledged perhaps but not unknown to other faiths. And in Hinduism, whatever may be said of or claimed by the wise and instructed thinker, the pujâ of the multitude to the image of the god is reverent and sincere. In some respects also and within definite limits the Indian contention has justified itself that the symbol has proved a sign-post and a guide to better, higher thoughts and to a better worship of Him whom no form can express or language describe.

2. The most important types.—(a) The most important symbols are those of the Brahman, the undelineable and unknowable origin and source of all. Of the Brahman only signs and types can be employed, for the primordial source and sustainer of the universe is beyond and above thought or word. His names or titles are symbolic: Āghora, the godless man; Āgni, the beginning; svayambhû, the self-existent one; vīva-karman, the artificer of all things; and many others. The authors of the Upanisads especially attempt to set forth the highest and the most mysterious character of the which in the last resort they are obliged to confess is beyond knowledge. Prâya, the breath, or āyî, the wind, is a frequently recurring symbol; and it seems to have been felt that by its mystical and elusive character the prâya was peculiarly fitted to represent that which in its essence eludes comprehension. The breath, prâya, is Brahman, and it is significant of the all-pervading and all-surrounding, omni-present and unchanging in the heart. 2 Manus also, the mind or will, is with the ākâsha a symbolic form or type under which the Brahman is to be meditated on or worshipped. 3 The mystical syllable Om, the most widely venerated syllable in the world, is the highest Brahman, and its utterance with understanding of its significance secures the accomplishment of every wish. 4 Om is also a symbol of the Hindu triad, Brahmâ, Visû, and Siva, and each of the three sounds of which the word is composed represents one of these deities. To the Buddhists also the word is a symbol of much significance, forming part of the sacred six-syllabled formula which every Buddhist cherishes in his memory and makes a constant part of his invocation and prayer.

A more comprehensive and suggestive symbol of the Brahman is given in the compound sâvâkhi-dvânda, a kind of triple representation in three several modes or aspects, as sat, being, chit, thought, dharma, right conduct, and in the heavens (aditya), 5 the material/adhisthâna, the golden puruṣa in the eye, 6 or even more than manus, or the significant name dhum itself. In its further course, moreover, speculative thought denied that even in sâvâkhi-dvânda any positive implication concerning the Brahman did or could reside. The Brahman transcended all symbols and assertions, comprehended both being and non-being (sat, asat), thought and non-thought (chit, achit), bliss and its contrary (ananda, anānanda), or rather he was above and beyond all, the unsearchable and unknown.

(b) Each of the great gods has an animal or material form or object which represents him to the eyes of men, by which he is symbolically known. The more popular gods have many symbols. The 'vehicles' of the gods are practically all the symbols of the pantheon. There are Brahmâ: Garûda, the monstrous eagle of Visû; the bull (Nandi) of Siva; the fabulous sea-monster (makara) of Varuna, who is then depicted as a white man and is described as makaradwaj, i.e. whose steed is the makaraw, 7 riding, with the head and fore-legs of an antelope and the body and tail of a fish; the peacock of Kârttikeya, the god of war; the monkey of Hanumâna; the deer of Vârû; the elephant AYâvâta of Indra, produced with other sacred and marvellous objects at the churning of the ocean; the buffalo and dogs of Yama; and many others. Of the well-known Hindu triad Brahmâ himself possesses any emblem or type, except his sacred goose—an indication of how little the first member of the triad attracted to himself the thought and worship of the Hindu. Of the popular Vishnu there were many symbols, some of which are always represented on the images or pictures of the god. The most frequent and characteristic is perhaps the chakra, or discus; 1

1 E. Wash. ii. 11.
2 Chând. vi. xi. 7-9 (Bipl. 64); Bipl. vi. vii. 12, 16, lv. 1, 3.
3 Chând. vii. xviii. 1 (SBE i. 53); Bipl. vi. i. 6.
4 Bipl. v. i. 1; Kâthâ, i. 10; cf. Manu, ii. 83.
5 Chând. vi. ii. i. vii. xii. 4; Tâltt. ii. li. 4-6; Bipl. vi. i. 9, ii. 6. This symbol is found only in the Upânîsâds: cf. Donovan, U. p. 126ff.
6 Chând. vii. vi. 5 (Bipl. 64).
7 Tâltt. v. viii. 5; Chând. vi. v.
SYMBOLISM (Jewish)—The club and conch-shell also which he carries are indicative of his authority and power. The auspicious mark (āraṇēvar) usually represented on the breast of the god, in form like a curl of hair, and the trident-like mark made with white or coloured earths on the foreheads of his worshippers are symbolic, the latter of devotion to the service of the deity. The sacred tulasi plant in the courtyard of a temple is the mark of the deity's presence and protection, and in it connotes the worship especially of the women of the household. The ilāyāvai amī also, the sacred annamite-stone, is similarly used. The moon also is a well-known symbol.

The symbolic types or presentations of the rival deity, Siva, who in almost equal degree with Viṣṇu holds the affection and regard of the Indian peasantry, were equally numerous. The most important are the bull Nandi, on which he rides, and the śhūna or phallus. Every Śāivite temple has its sacred bull, which roams the courts and streets un molested and receives practically divine honours. The śhūna is the commonest emblem of the god, and the stones, great or small, which represent him have this form or are roughly shaped to it. Two of these stones are said to bear a pre-eminent holy character; that at Bénarças is Siva in the shape of Śivēvar, the lord of all; and the idol in the temple at Somnath, destroyed by Mahāmut of Ghūzni in his iconoclastic rage. The śhūna is borne by Śiva, a type of government and authority; and the crescent moon depicted on his forehead has a special significance, recalling the sovereignty which was assigned to him when the moon was recovered from the depths of the ocean.

Similarly the wives of the great gods have each their symbols—the trident and skull of Kāli, the lotus of Sarvēṣvati, wife of Brahmā, and also of Laks̄mi, wife of Viṣṇu.

In a late writing the Gāyatrī is said to represent the trident of gods, Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Siva, and also the three Vedas.

(c) Under sacred trees in the vicinity of Indian villages often will be found the images or symbols of the grānawedōṭā, the village deities who watch over its interests and care for the inhabitants; and in the village fields the clay or pottery steds of Ayār (q.v.), the sacred deity of the fields, on which he rides by night to pursue and rout the demoniac powers.

(d) There are symbols also of a more general import, which are not always so easy to classify. The piyōt, or bull of cooked rice, used at the commemorative services for deceased relatives and offered to the pāřs, represents symbolically the share which the departed still have in the family life. The most important and widely recognized symbol of this character is probably the sacred footprint, which typifies both the presence and the authority of the god. In the courtyard or vicinity of many, perhaps most, Hindu temples there is the print of a foot on the ground, often of large size, with sacred symbols engraved on the sole, which differ according to the deity commemorated. To these there are sometimes a legend attached, which gives its supposed history and describes the occasion on which it was impressed. The well-known footprint on Adam's Peak in Ceylon is believed by Siyūtis to be that of Nūr. By Buddhists also the numerous footprints of the Buddha are regarded with reverence.

(e) In many parts of India the symbols of the sun and moon and the planets may be seen. The two former are represented by a crescent, respectively, made of metal. The signs of the planets in their order are as follows: of Ḫuda, or Mercury, a bow; of Soṣna, or Venus, a square; of Manūla, or Mars, a triangle; of Vīṇaspatī, or Jupiter, a lotus; of Soṣna, or Saturn, an iron seimitar or sword; of Ḫavana, a makhara; and of Kētna, a snake. The last two symbols are usually of iron; the sphere of Soṣna is silver or silvered, and the bow of Ḫavana a crescent made with white or coloured earths on the foreheads of his worshippers are symbolic, the latter of devotion to the service of the deity. The sacred tulasi plant in the courtyard of a temple is the mark of the deity's presence and protection, and in it connotes the worship especially of the women of the household. The ilāyāvai amī also, the sacred annamite-stone, is similarly used. The moon also is a well-known symbol.

SYMBOLISM (Jewish).—Symbolic actions as well as symbolic ideas occur in the later Jewish and Christian literature. The propensities often made use of symbolic ideas—e.g., the basket of fruit in Am 8:5; the vineyard in Is 5:1-5; the almond-trees in Jer 14:5; the dry bones in Ezck 37:1-14, and the sticks in Zechariah 6; the lotus indicated in the former, and the闪电 in the latter, are the outstanding examples in Zechariah. Equally frequent are symbolic actions—e.g., the rending of mantles (1 S 15:27, 1 K 11:12), the discharge of arrows from a bow (2 K 13:20), the casting of shoes (Ps 60:9, Jos 5:4, Rx 4:8). The crescent moon is a type easily understood to the parallel, the latter into charms; possibly we should say that they emerge from these literary and magical arts. Symbols, in any case, have frequent historical connotations which with primitive cultures, though they tend to transcend their origin under the transforming influence of higher conceptions. Most important, therefore, for the present article is the association of symbolic ideas with religious ceremonials. Prominently the Sabbath is described as a symbol, 6th, similarly with the rite of circumcision (Gen 17), the phylacteries (Dt 6), the Passover (Ex 12), natural phenomena such as the rainbow (Gen 9; cf. Gen 39 in the Rabbinical commentary).

It was accordingly easy for later Judaism to apply symbolic meanings to many of the Biblical institutions. Thus, throughout his writings Philo illustrates such interpretations, but the method is much older. Thus in the Letter of Aristōc (which can scarcely be later than the 2nd cent. B.C. and may well belong to a century earlier) the enactment as to the animals lawful for food are explained symbolically. But by Philo's age symbolical interpretation had so fully developed that the Alexandrian allegorist felt impelled to rebuke those of his brethren who neglected the ceremonial acts because they regarded them merely as symbols of ideal things. Though this is a real danger to a ceremonial religion, on the other side it can gain appreciably by idealizing institutions the original significance of which is outworn or unknown. Ancient rites may have been derived from primitive tabus, and yet they have retained permanent reverence on the ground of symbolic significance. Thus a remarkable letter Maimonides (11th) dealt with certain acts of worship, such as prostration (practised by Muhammadans in the 12th century). Probably such notes were derived from certain customs of exposing parts of the body, but, contends Maimonides, they no longer mean anything but
SYMBOLISM (Jewish)

of the kind and have become symbols of humility. Present values do not entirely depend on past origins. A similar principle might undoubtedly be very widely applied to the history of religious conventions, and this is reflected by the newer ideas read into it by progressive ages. And, conversely, when an institution is lost (as with the Biblical sacrifices), the whole system may be retrospectively and symbolically reinterpreted.

When, after the destruction of the Temple, prayer and charity and fasting perfere displaced sacrifice, the latter shared in the moralizing process. But the allusions were deeper. Fasting seas sacrificed: the loss of bodily tissue (in the Rabbinic conception) to the offering of a sacrificial animal on the altar. The table at which the ordinary meals were eaten became a sacrilegious altar; and the partaking of food was in the Jewish home associated with a variety of customs, derived in large part from the same range of symbolism. It has often been claimed, moreover, that the dietary laws, besides being included in the law of holiness, or rather because of that inclusion, were a training in control of the appetites and restraint of desires. Maimonides also offers a utilitarian viewpoint, so picturesque a feature of a Jewish wedding, was originally the marriage chamber. Then the Scriptural application of the marital state to the relation of God to Israel led to symbolic results, among them the appointment of a bridegroom of the Law on the Feast of Rejoicing at the end of Tabernacles.

It is not quite clear why a glass is broken at Jewish weddings; it is probably a memento mori. Funeral customs are also marked by symbolic survivals. Some of these are Kabbalistic in origin, and it is not always easy to discriminate the symbolic from the superstitious.

So, too, with such ceremonies as tashlikh. Many symbolic customs arose in memory of the destruction of the Temple. Historical associations are also responsible for many a symbolic rite. Drapping the synagogues in black on the fast of the 9th of Ab is an instance in point. The shofar, or the ram's horn, is associated with its early use and anticipations, with Sinai in the past and the Messianic age in the future. According to Seidali, the shofar symbolized ten ideas: (1) creation, (2) remembrance, (3) revelation, (4) prophecy, (5) destruction of the Temple, (6) the binding of Isaac, (7) immunity from danger, (8) day of judgment, (9) restoration of Israel, and (10) resurrection. In this manner many rites were saved from becoming obsolete. The phylacteries worn on the head typify service of the mind; on the hand, service of the body. The former represents the

1 Yoma, Erubin, 13.
2 T.B. Ber. 56a.
4 J.B. ii, 48.
5 Cf. this point M. Friedländer, The Jewish Religion, p. 456; M. Joseph, Judaism as Creed and Life, p. 104. In modern times there has been a strong tendency (often unhistorical) to explain away the symbolic on utilitarian grounds.
6 On greeting the Sabbath bride see Annotated Ed. of Avot, Demuth, Leipzig, 1911 (this work may be consulted throughout for liturgical symbolism).
7 E. L. Abrahams, Jewish Life in the Middle Ages, London, 1890, i, 87.
8 The best collection of the customs connected with illness and disease is found in M. Moses, Mo‘adim Ye‘ledot, Mantua, 1676 (often reprinted).
9 J.E., s.v.
10 The recognition of the Godhead, the latter restraint of lust.
11 Jewish symbolism is also illustrated in ecclesiastical art, and in colours. Thus the blue thread on the fringes of the Nazim, a sign of piety, became the sky, the divine throne of glory. The symbolism of art was more thoroughgoing. The Crown of the Law is a frequent ornament on mantles of the scrolls, and of the Talmud. Of the Jewish coins, too, symbols were employed; so also with tombs.

The prevalent custom now is to avoid sepulchral emblems. But the custom is in accordance with the symbolism of the yggyn of the Talmud was only a mark warning wayfarers against incurring ritual impurity by contact with the tomb. Yet the action of Simon, who carved panoplies and (possibly) ships on the pyramidal tombs at Modin (1 Mac 15:32), can scarcely have been isolated. Outside Palestine the Jews of the first centuries of the Christian era certainly adopted the Greek habit of inscriptions and introduced symbols, such as an oil vessel, the seven-branched candlestick (symbolical of the soul [Pr 20:28]), the ram's horn (Messianic), and an ear of corn (type of the resurrection). These emblems are parallel to those on the Maccabean coins and to those favoured by Jews in the late medieval period. At that late date symbols appear descriptive of the dead, as out-stretched palms as in act of benediction (for priest), ever as in act of blessing (Levite), a harp for a musician, a crown for a goldsmith, and so forth. In the 18th century, Jews, like their Christian neighbours, used symbolic signs for houses and businesses. Thus the Rothschild family still exemplifies the custom in its name ("Red Shield"). Ornamental coats-of-arms are found on tombs in the oldest Jewish burial-ground of the Sephardic Jews in London. Such customs are no longer in vogue. There has been a growth, however, of symbolism in synagogue decoration in the form of glass windows mostly without human or animal figures.

In the Talmud a good deal of legal symbolism was taken over from ancient Biblical as well as from Roman law. Some of this is still retained.

Returning to the more religious aspect of the subject, we may say in general that in the Mishnah symbolism is the soul of Jewish ceremonial. Many particulars of the sacrificial system, the ritual of the Temple, synagogue, and home, are treated in this manner. Take, e.g., the rites of Tabernacles—the hearse, the palm branches, citron, citron, and willows of the ban (Lv 23:40). The palm is the spine, the citron the heart, the myrtle the eye, the willow the mouth, so that, in the synagogue liturgy, the citron atones for heart sins, the palm for stiff-necked pride, the willow for foul speech, the myrtle for lust of the eye. In another version the old homilists explain the 'four kinds' as symbolizing four types of character. The citron has both scent and taste, so there are men who study and perform; the palm-date has taste but no scent, so there are men who study but do not perform; the myrtle has scent but no taste, so there are men who perform but not on the basis of study; the willow has neither scent nor taste, so there are men who neither study the law nor perform good deeds. The Holy One did not destroy these, but bade all be united into one bundle, the better elements stoning for the base.

2 Cf. Sife on the text.
3 On this see J. H. M. 1951, and Jewish Opinion, London, Jan. 1919. The Tree of Life (on the basis of Pr 39) was also a symbol of the life-giving power of the Law, and the Tree accordingly appears in rabbinic and non-rabbinic decoration.

5 P. Friedmann, Der Meister, Vienna, 1850, p. 178.
good. In this manner symbolism is turned to the cause of humanism.


I. ABRAMHS.

SYMBOLISM (Muslim).—The Islamic languages appear to have no exact equivalent for "symbol." When it signifies a badge indicative of office, party, or community, the nearest would be šabk, or in certain cases ghīrāt; where what is meant by it is a veiled expression for an idea, the Arabic rendering would be kinyāyah. Islam as a religious system has nothing corresponding to the Christian cross. Muhammad seems to have adopted the Roman eagle as the standard for his armies, but the flag of the later (Abasid) khalifahs was "like any other, only black in colour with the legend in white, "Muhammad is the Apostle of God," 23 24. Those borne by various factions and regiments differed in colour and at times in the wording of the legend; thus the Abasid colour was black, the 'Alawid green, the Ummayyid white; the latter was 3 feet to the year 255 A.H. was a strip of silk with a Qur'anic legend in red and green; 25 in the processions of the sultans of Tunis white, red, yellow, and green flags were carried; these of the Ottoman tribes differed in legend; 26 the flags of the different divisions of the Ottoman army were red, yellow, green, white, red and white, green and white. The Mamluk symbols vary in India and are 27 which by an ordinance of the Mamluk Sultan Shahān of 773 A.H. on the turban indicates descent from the Prophet.

There is no more common error than the supposition that the crescent (or rather crescent and star) is an Islamic symbol, and even approved writers on Oriental subjects are apt to fall into it. 28 It was certainly in pre-Turkish times sometimes used as an ornament on the minarets of mosques 29 and on flags—e.g., that of the Fātimids of Egypt, accompanied by a lion of red and yellow satin, 30 and that of the Almohads (A.D. 1150) 31 —and on the standard of a Zanjid princes 32 such the crescent had been employed on the Roman senatorial shoe—a practice for which Plutarch 33 offers a variety of reasons. The current view of its adoption by the Turks is well presented by F. T. Elworthy: 34

"...Hera, under her old moon-name, 16, had a celebrated temple on the site of Byzantium, said to have been founded by her daughter Keroceus, "the horned." The crescent, which was in all antiquity and throughout the Middle Ages symbol of Byzantium, and which is now the symbol of the Turkish Empire, is a direct inheritance from Byzantium's mythical

1 A. von Kremer, Culturgechse, des Oriental, Vienna, 1875-77, I. S1.
2 Mukawthi, tr. D. S. Margoliouth, I. 198.
4 D'Ohsson, Subh al-Asb, Cairo, 1915, v. 143.
5 J. W. Zinkensted, Gesch. d. osmanischen Reiches in Europa, Göttingen, 1878-85, ii. 33.
7 On the Levy, History of Egypt, Cairo, 1321, I. 227.
8 Kaye and Malleson, iii. 961 : 'From the time when Mahommed of Medina had prevailed with the aid of war and the use of a crescent in the form of a cross upon the field of the battlefield in the country of the Hindus.' Al-Biruni, Chronology of Ancient Nations, tr. H. Sachau, London, 1870, p. 290, compares this with the 1901 symbol of the cymbals and makes the comparison of the name Muhammad with the human figure.
9 See also the "mendi" (star) in the mosque of 330 by Yemen (Kharjas). The Pearl-Strings, tr. J. W. Rodhouse, Leyden, 1896-98, I. 140.
10 See Elworthy, op. cit., iii. 474.
11 E. Reclus, Hist. de l'Afrique septentrionale (Berlin), Paris, 1878-80, II. 190.
13 Quell. Rom. p. 251.}

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fondress Keroceus, the daughter of the moon goddess In-I-era." 1

Keroceus, supposed to have been not the foundress, but the mother of the founder, of Byzantium, seems to have been an inference from the Golden Horn and no place to place in this history. Further, it seems correct to say that the crescent and star figure, though rarely, on coins of Byzantium, but as one of numerous ornaments, 2 and that no ancient author mentions any connexion between this emblem and the city. The sigla Constantinopoleos, according to A. Geofreas, 3 who asserts that the Turks' 'neque insignis utuntur neque corones,' were quite different. The earliest mention of it in English literature is said to be in the Arte of English Poesie by G. Puttenham (1589), 4 who ascribes its introduction to the sultan Selim I. (1512-20), with the notion of increased brightness, though it has been observed 5 that the crescent is not that of the new but that of the waning moon, while rising in its wake is the morning star of hope; from Puttenham's time the antithesis between it and the cross has been common in English and French literature. F. Sanovino, 6 however, supposes it to have been the ancient emblem of Bosnia, adopted by Muhammad when that country was conquered by the Turks in 1403. This is declared to be an error by Zinkeisen, 7 who speaks of a golden crescent inherited from the Seljuk, and displayed on all the flags and standards of viziers and sultan's horse, appearing on the earliest flags of the Janissaries. With von Hammer Purgstall 8 it is a silver crescent which, with the two-pointed sword of 'Umar, gleamed on the blood-red flag of the earliest Janissaries; in the authority to which he refers 9 the hands' flag displays the sword without the crescent; what appears on the flag of the cavalry is evidently a horseshoe rather than a crescent, with no star.

It is worth noticing that the Seljuk chronicler Ibn Bibi 10 compares the shoe of the sultan 'Ala-addin's horse to a crescent and its nails to stars; whence the symbol may originally belong to cavalry regiments. Its occurrence, however, on certain Byzantine coins is remarkable, and seems to have some connexion with its later employment by the Turks, who have not often introduced it on coins.

The symbols of royalty used by the Moslem Empire were courts were certainly not those found elsewhere. In Unmayad times the kalifah on accession received a rod, a signet, and a scroll. 11 The rod was doubtless the Prophet's; in 'Abasid times a new kalifah received not only the rod but a crescent, which was a silver ring with a bezel of Chinese iron with the legend 'Muhammad is the Prophet of God,' but that of his predecessor, with a ruby inscribed with the kalifah's name. 12 The 'Abasid kalifah also wore a crown, 13 against Arab usage; 14 and indeed the etiquette of their court was closely modelled on that of the Sassanians, as appears from the recently published handbook of it by Jahiz of Basrah. 15 A crown was worn by the Fatimids of

3 Anna Pavlova Descrip., Basel, 1977, p. 3.
6 Hist. universale de Porechi, Venice, 1868, i. 67.
7 Ih. 273.
8 Gesch. d. osmanischen Reiches, Post, 1857-59, i. 32, ii. 152.
9 Plate xvi. in N. C. Zinkensted, Gesch. d. d'Empire ottomans. The Hague, 1782, ii. 59.
11 Asghar, Cairo, 1293, vi. 100.
12 Miskawaihi, i. 325. He also inherited the Prophet's cloak (Omar), turban, sword, or the papal ring or pulpit.
13 Diction. of Buljuri, Constantinople, 1300, i. 70, ii. 135, etc.
15 Lierre de la Conronie, ed. Ahmed Bek, Cairo, 1874.
SYMBOLISM (Semitic)

Egypt also. In their processions there were borne a rod, a special sword (said to have been made of meteorite), an inkpot, a lance, a target (said to have belonged to the prophet Solomon), a cushion, a horse, the shoe-shaped ruby, and a canopy or umbrella. The last of these was a common emblem of royalty, and figures, e.g., at Indian courts, where the sovereign is traditionally attired in a white gaza, made like a shirt tied with strings on the one side, and a little cloth on his head coloured oftentimes with red or yellow. The gaza appears in the attire of the Daulah (10th century), and, with a black robe, a belt, and a sword, it formed the distinguishing dress of a vizier. Apparently the belt symbolized some sort of subordination, as an Indian prince to whom Yamin ad-Daulah gave a robe of honour had to be compelled to put on this portion of it.7

Homage to a newly-appointed sovereign was (at any rate in early times) indicated by a shake of the hand, the meaning of which is shown by the term employed to be agreement over a bargain. In later times homage was indicated by kissing the ground before the ruler; this practice, originally alien to Islamic ideas, has been familial, or rather, the end of the 4th Islamic century. To a newly-appointed vizier (or emir) food was sent in the 4th cent. from the khilafah's table, probably signifying that he had become a member of the royal household. The practice of offering such a person fragrant herbs is said to have been a purely Persian or Dailenite rite, the sense of which is not clear.

Owing to Islamic objection to the linnen's art, symbolism is very scanty in its architecture, and where found appears to be borrowed. The great mosque of Cordova exhibited in the carvings of its lattices the peculiar form of the Indian cross, the meaning of which is unknown, whereas the creating of the walls, originally painted scarlet, is typical of flame, and, brought from Persia, symbolized the faith of the Ghebers, worshippilers of fire.71 Probably in such cases the Muslim worshippers and spectators were quite ignorant of the significance. The same is likely to be true of the ornaments to be found on other works of art, such as pottery and textiles. Christian emblems are indeed habitually associated with particular ideas, chiefly on etymological grounds—e.g., the raven with parting—but there is little scope for their employment in art. The symbolism of manuscript illuminations into some communities (e.g., the figures representing; either a double hand or the spath of the male palm, indicative of fertility, painted in Tunis on the walls of the house where there is to be a wedding)12 is probably not Islamic.

The practices of Islamic ritual are tralititious, though taken from many different communities; their symbolic interpretation is therefore conjected, and is the subject of considerable speculation. Several pages are devoted by the mystic Ibn 'Arabi to the meaning of the postures of prayer (qisla): 'The raising of the hands implies that whatever was therein has fallen away; it is as though the Almighty, when He commanded this, said, "When thou standest before Me, stand as a poor mendicant, who owns nothing; fling away everything that lines possess, and empty-handed lift up thy hands and put thy head behind thee; for I am in front of thee."' Moreover since the hands are the seat of power, by raising his hands the warrior shows that the power is God's alone; when the brave man, with the sword held to the chest, is bidding that God is in front of him: he who raises them to his ears is thinking that God is above him, with the attitude of the slave before his master, an attitude which he may not adopt without the master's leave, etc.72

Similar speculations on the results of the ceremonies of the pilgrimages are to be found in the work of Ghaziil; the special garments worn by the pilgrim, e.g., are to remind him of the grave-clothes wherein he placed the body of His Maker.

Besides explaining much of the Qur'an as elaborate symbolism the Sufis (q.e.v.) developed a system of their own, or rather a number of systems; and there are numerous collections of odes in Arabic and Persian which, ostensibly dealing with love and wine, are traditionally interpreted as dealing with the doctrines of pantheism. Illustrations of the style will be found in the commentary of H. Wilberforce Clarke on his translation of the Diwán of Hâfiz, where we are told that 'breece' signifies the means whereby union with the Desired One is attained, 'bell' signifies the angel of death, 'dark night' the three, eternal and divine knowledge, etc., whereas in some cases the same term is variously explained; thus 'narcissus' may signify the growth of the world, the pure existence of God, the vision of God, or inward results of joy in respect of deities. These interpretations are not always very convincing; but in some works of the kind the symbolism is either interpreted by the author himself or is sufficiently clear or conventional to leave no doubt of the meaning; an example is to be found in the Masnavi of Jalâl ad-Din Rûmî.5

The employment of symbolic acts, either to emphasize language or in lieu of it, is common with Oriental peoples, but not specially Islamic. The same parable has a tendency to be duty through many centuries. Ibn ad-Thir records (A.H. 442) how, when an Arab tribe proposed to take Kairawan, they selected as their commander a man who offered to pursue the following plan: taking a carpet, he unfolded it, and then said to the others, 'Which of you can get to the middle of this carpet without treading upon it?' They declared it to be impossible. He showed them that the carpet had to be rolled up from the edge, meaning that the land had gradually to be conquered and secured. According to W. G. Palgrave, Ibrahim Pasha obtained the command of an expedition against Nejil eight centuries after by solving the problem of the carpet.6

LITERATURE.—See the works quoted in the footnotes.

SYMBOLISM (Semitic).—The extent to which symbolism exists in OT literature is very doubtful. In the case of the Babylonians and Assyrians, however, our knowledge is much more definite and it is obtained chiefly from a study of cylinder-seals, the Babylonian boundary-stones, and the monoliths of Assyrian kings. On the Babylonian kalârrus, or boundary-stones, the emblems of the gods are grouped together, and in one case the name of the god with whom the emblem is associated is inscribed by the side, thus giving us definite data on which to base our investigations.

The Hebrew word for symbol, šem, is most probably connected with the root šám, to describe with a mark, and with Assyr. šimtu. Some scholars have suggested a connection between Assyr. šim and Heb. šém.
SYMBOLISM (Somitic)

1. The symbolism of religious life. — The Temple as the centre of the religious life of ancient Israel symbolized the ark, which was the symbol of the deity. The Temple was specifically built in order that it might contain the ark, the symbol of the presence of the deity. In the second Temple, the adytum being empty, the presence of the deity was symbolized by the continuous burning of the sacred fire, the Delphic movement ritual, and the shewbread. Among the Semites the god was symbolically represented as a nobleman dwelling in his palace, and W. M. Flinders Petrie has pointed out that the mode of life of large households, the routine of Egyptian temples were similar to those of large households. First came the small chamber symbolizing the mysterious dwelling of the deity himself. The larger hall in front of this could be compared to the audience-chamber where human kings receive their subjects, whilst the larger space in front of the building was probably a meeting-place for the people. The division of the Temple into a Holy Place and Holy of Holies was also symbolic and corresponded to the heavens and the highest heaven (םֵי and פָּרָשׁ [I K 6:2]), whilst the entrance may have symbolized the earth, heaven, boats (I. 66). Why was the Temple built on a mountain? This really brings us to another question. Was there any connexion between the idea which represented Jahweh's home on earth and the mountain to which he ascended? Is this a historical question? From the standpoint of the Dendermonistic historian, the high places were legitimate places of worship until the building of the Temple at Jerusalem. It is to be noted also that the high places are said to have been built on hills, and it has therefore been suggested that they were artificial mounds taking the place of natural high places such as the summits of hills and mountains. This must be learned from Babylon. One of the most noticeable characteristics of the Babylonian temples was their enormous size. In Genesis 11 we read that the people met together in the land of Shinar and decide to build a city and a tower that shall reach up to heaven. To the Babylonians a temple was above all a 'high place,' and there is a symbolic reason to account for this conception. Jensen has shown that the Babylonians regarded a mountain or hill as a huge mountain. In fact the earth was actually called K Kur, 'mountain house.' Later they began to identify one particular part of the earth — the temple — with the dwelling of the god, so that the temples which were built later were known as 'mountain houses.' The height of the temple thus symbolized the mountain which had formed the original home of the deity. The same idea can be seen by sketching the history of Mt. Zion. The sanctuary on the mountain existed before the settlement of the Hebrews. Just as His people dispossesses the early settlers of Canaan, so Jahweh dispossesses the god of Zion. Mt. Zion is now regarded as His home and He therefore reveals Himself to His people from the mountain (Ex 19). We can thus see the symbolic idea which suggested the zigurats in Babylonia, the high places in Canaan, and the sacred temple mount in Israel. The very name 'ark of Jahweh,' 'ark of God,' suggests that the ark contained an object which in some manner symbolized the God of Israel. In the Assyrian temples a statue of the god took the place of the ark in the Holy of Holies, and

1 Presidential address before the Egyptian Section of the Third International Congress for the History of Religions (Oxford, 1884, l. 1901).
3 Die Kosmologie der Babylonier, pp. 135-195.
4 Cf. the minarets attached to the Muhammedan mosques, and see N. Herford's monograph, Somanas, Berlin, 1897.

it has therefore been suggested that the ark with the cherubim over it was a symbol of Jahweh. The custom of carrying about an ark as a symbol of the deity has its parallels in other Semitic religions. In Babylonia the gods were carried about in ships in solemn procession, and in Egypt the arks with their images were placed in boats. Remember the actual design of the Hebrew ark from the Egyptian ark-bont, but there is not sufficient evidence to warrant such a suggestion.

Cheyne suggests that the symbolic meaning of the brazen serpent was derived from the brazen image of Moloch in Babylonia. He thinks that the brazen oxen in 1 K 7 were copies of the oxen which stood in Babylonian temples as symbols of Marduk. Benzinger has suggested that there was a serpent-clan among the Israelite tribes and that Nehelems may have been its sacred symbol (Gn 49). The two pillars Jachin and Boaz which stood in front of the porch of the Temple were probably symbolical. The temple of Melkarth at Tyre and also the temple at Hierapolis had two similar pillars in front of them, and, as these were symbols of the deity and Solomon's temple was constructed on the same plan, it is probable that Jachin and Boaz were symbols of Jahweh. It is possible that the brazen lavers and the sea of the Temple symbolized the clouds. To the sea and oxen, as the oxen were the symbol of the Babylonian myth of the struggle of Marduk and Tiamat — the sea representing Tiamat and the oxen Marduk. Seeing that the Babylonian creation-myth determined the form of the Israelite cosmogony, this view has received general support, although there is no direct reference to it in the OT. H. P. Smith suggests that the twelve oxen were symbols of the twelve constellations and that the sea was symbolical of the celestial reservoir from which the earth is watered. The ornamental figures on the smaller lavers he also regards as symbolic. The bull was sacred to Jahweh, the lion was sacred to Ashtar, whilst the palm-tree is represented with a symbolic meaning in Phoenician art. The ornamentation therefore suggested a syncretistic purpose in building the Temple.

Although there is not the slightest reference in the OT to the symbolic meaning of the temple scholars, both ancient and modern, have suggested that both in its structure and in its appurtenances it symbolized various religious truths. The Hebrews, as early as 1895, 'developed a symbolic dwelling of the god, so that the temples which were built later were known as 'mountain houses.' The height of the temple thus symbolized the mountain which had formed the original home of the deity. The same idea can be seen by sketching the history of Mt. Zion. The sanctuary on the mountain existed before the settlement of the Hebrews. Just as His people dispossesses the early settlers of Canaan, so Jahweh dispossesses the god of Zion. Mt. Zion is now regarded as His home and He therefore reveals Himself to His people from the mountain (Ex 19). We can thus see the symbolic idea which suggested the zigurats in Babylonia, the high places in Canaan, and the sacred temple mount in Israel. The very name 'ark of Jahweh,' 'ark of God,' suggests that the ark contained an object which in some manner symbolized the God of Israel. In the Assyrian temples a statue of the god took the place of the ark in the Holy of Holies, and

1 Hist. of the People of Israel, Eng. ed., London, 1885, l. 123.
2 EIK, col. 8, 11, l. 66.
3 Hebrewische Archäologie, Tübingen, 1897, p. 392.
4 Theologisch Tijdschrift, u. (1879) 455 f.
5 OT Hist., Edinburgh, 1888, p. 135.
SYMBOLISM (Semitic)

only brass. The covering for the Holy of Holies was made of costly materials with figured chro-
nib; the curtain at the door of the Holy Place was woven of wool, and that of the court was
simply made of white linen. We can thus see
how the costliness of the adornments of the dif-
ferent apartments symbolized their sacredness; the
more sacred chamber was, the more sumptuously
it was adorned.

Together the curtains are designed to form the earthly, and,
with the aid of the attendant chasubles, to symbolize the heav-
eness and holiness of the God of the Tabernacle.

The sacrificial system of the Hebrews symbolized
self-surrender and devotion to the will of God,
the need of forgiveness, and the blessing of divine
fellowship. The peace-offering with its com-
munion-feast showed the idea of fellowship between
God and man; the ‘tomid, or continual offering,
symbolized Israel’s pledge of unbroken service to
Jehovah; whilst the sin-offering with its sprinkling of
blood, loved the sins of the children of Israel, or
of cleansing oneself from sin was to place oneself
submissively before God. The care taken in
the preparation of the aromatic compounds of the
incense suggests a symbolic meaning. From I’s
141* it is actually described how the sheen of
the golden altar, and the altar of incense, the
symbol of prayer. Bahr regards the
shewbread as a symbol of the fact that Jehovah was
ever present with His people and was the
giver of their daily bread. Circumcision was a
tribal badge and showed that the patient had been
admitted a member of the tribe, whilst the Sabbath
symbolized the completion of the work of creation.
In Ex 21* it is actually described how the
breathing symbol (nu) between Jehovah and Israel.
The long hair worn by the Nazirite symbolized his con-
secration for some special service. In ancient
religions the offering of one’s hair, like the offer-
ing of one’s blood, symbolized the making of
a covenant between the worshipper and his god.
The frontlets, or têqêqêth (Ex 13*), were badges
worn upon the forehead and arm to show that the
worshipper belonged to a certain religious com-
nunity, and as a worshipper of the national deity
was subject to His help and protection. Fire
occurs as a symbol of the divine presence (Ex 20*>
23* etc.). It was also regarded as a purifying
agent (Is 48*), and to pass through fire was there-
fore a symbol of purification. Would not this
explain why sacrifices were burnt before they
might be accepted by God? Water was another
symbol of purification and was so common among the Hebrews that it is difficult
to distinguish washings performed for the sake of
the body and those with a symbolical significance.
Anointing* denoted the consecration of a person
or even of an inanimate object (such as the taber-
nacle and its appurtenances or the stone at Bethel).
In Ps 23* it is referred to as a symbol of prosper-
ity and joy, and the cessation of the practice was therefore a symbol of mourning of (Ps 8* 129*).
The word anêkhâr, which appears very often as a name
for Astarite (1 K 18* 2 K 21* etc.), came to be
used as a name for the symbol of the goddess
(DT* 31* 34* etc.). Ex has shown that the horns were
most probably symbols of the sun-god, who is called
in Punic inscriptions zn 754 whilst the mesqêkên
breasts were expressing gratitude for a
divine revelation (Gn 28* 31* etc.). As to bull
symbolism, it most probably originated among the
Hebrews themselves (and was not borrowed from the Phoenicians like the cow), for when the
Hebrews being an agricultural race, it was natural
that they should look upon the bull as a symbol of
strength and power. The bulls on the lavers of
Solomon’s temple may have been due to the influ-
cence of Phoenician workmen, for among the
Phoenicians Baal was represented as a bull.
The horns of the altar are regarded by some scholars
as symbols of ancient bull-worship. The ‘sigqêrets,
or temple towers, of Babylonia consisted usually
of three, four, or seven stones, no doubt on account
of the symbolic sacredness attached to these
numbers. The quadrilateral shape of the sig-
quêrets, with the four corners towards the four
cardinal points, symbolized the four quarters over
which the Babylonian kings held dominion. The
lions (symbols of Nergal) and the bulls (symbols of
En-lil) which adorned the entrance of Assyrian
temples probably symbolized the means which the
gods had at their disposal for punishing man.
The names of the temples symbolized the character
of the gods by whom they were dedicated. Nabu’s
temple was called ‘the house of joy,’ and that of Shamash
was known as ‘the house of the universal judge.’
The basin of the temple known as apawu represented
the domain of Ea, the water-god. The ‘sigqêrets
and the basin thus symbolizing symbols of
current cosmological conceptions.

We may now turn to the symbols of the gods themselves. A symbol of Hamman, the storm-
and thunder-god, was a lightning fork, whilst an
axe represented the destruction which storm and
thunder bring in their wake. His nature as a
solar deity was also symbolized by a bull. Sin
had a crescent, either by itself or with a disk. Since the moon at certain phases suggested the
appearance of a horn, he was represented as an
old man with a flowing beard, and wearing a cap
on which were the horns of the moon. The horn
was thus regarded as his crown and came to symbolize his power. This explains why the
Assyrian kings adorned themselves with a foamed
crown as a symbol of divinity. Aunu symbolized
the abstract principle of which heaven and earth
are emanations. Thunder and lightning were
to them as the voice of heaven and earth, by which Ninib was known, symbolized his beneficent character as a solar
deity. But the fiery rays of the sun might also
de destructive, and he was therefore symbolized also under the form of a lion. Ea’s symbol con-
sisted of a ram’s head which projected from a
frame. This symbol occurs on the Bavian relief
and the Esarhaddon stele. But on boundary-
stones his symbol is usually an animal with the
head of an antelope and the lower part of a fish.
As the water-god of Babylonia, fountains were
called to him, and he was regarded as the giver
of fertility. Thus is explained why the
name of Bar last as a fish. Niban, ascribe of the
gods, was symbolically represented as carrying the tablets of fate and recording the
decisions of the gods upon them.
SYMBOLISM (Semitic)

The staff by which he is represented symbolizes either the stylus of a writer or a ruler's sceptre. The solar god Marduk symbolized the sun of spring which brings about the growth of vegetation and therefore the sowing season. His warrior-god, his symbol is a spear, and as a storm-god he is represented by a horned dragon. Sometimes he is represented by the symbol of a dog, and in a later Mesopotamian tablet there is a reference to four dogs of Marduk. His symbol of love and the symbol of creation ishtar was represented by a female figure with her breasts exposed and a child on her left arm sucking her breast. She symbolized every feminine phenomenon of the Babylonian pantheon. She was the mother of the gods and the mother-goddess, and was therefore prayed to in hymns as 'helper and heavenly midwife.' As goddess of the passions she was represented on seal-cylinders as nude, with the distinctively feminine parts particularly emphasized. In the astrological system she was identified with Venus and regarded as a symbol of light. Sometimes her symbol is a star of various shapes.

Nergal, who symbolized the hot sun of midsummer, was represented by a lion; Nusku, the fire-god, by a lamp; and Nergina by an eagle. He is sometimes personified as a naked man with ending of Gn 1, and suggests that the goddess was a symbol of the watery depths of the universe. On one of the inscriptions of Nabon-al-lihim Shamash is represented as seated in his shrine; before him is a table resting on a wheel, and attached to the wheel are cords held by two male figures which direct its course. These figures represent the messengers of Shamash, Malik and Eannes, who occupy the position of chariot-drivers. The sun's movement across the heavens, which is here symbolized by the wheel, was thought of as a drive (cf. Ps 19). On seal-cylinders his beneficent character is symbolized by the manner in which he pours forth streams of water from jars placed on his shoulders. But the most common symbol of Shamash is a sun-disk.

The chief symbol of Ashur was a standard which consisted of a pole surrounded by a disk enclosed within two wings. Above the disk was the figure of a warrior shooting an arrow. The term-cotta images of Bel found at Nimrud represent him as an old man with a flowing beard, a real 'father' of the gods. He personified the various forces of nature whose seat and sphere of action is the inhabited world. Together with Assu and Ez, therefore, he symbolized the eternal laws of the universe.

2. The symbolism of common life.—A Hebrew slave who refused to take advantage of the liberty open to him after seven years' service had one of his ears bored with an awl and pinned to the door to show that he was in future to be devoted to the service of that house (Ex 21:6). Elevation to a position of superiority was symbolized by placing a crown on the head (2 S 19:2, 2 K 11:25 etc.). The worshipper spread out his hands in prayer to show that he desired to obtain divine mercy and help (Ex 32:1, 1 K 8:6 etc.). Wishing the hands was a symbol of the wish that one's prayers be acceptable (Ps 104:16). The neck was broken to show that the murderer deserved the punishment, whilst the elders of the city by washing their hands showed that they were free from the guilt. Hostility towards a person is shown by gapping with the mouth (Ps 25:8, Job 16:5 etc.); ill-feeling by clapping the hands (Ezk 6:11, 21:17, 22:2), by sitting in the face (Nah 1:1, 25); and anger by gruscling the teeth (Ps 35:16, Job 16, La 2:6 etc.). The key of the door was probably looked upon as a symbol of authority, and to place it upon a man's shoulder showed that he was appointed as a steward. A woman with one's mantle signified the intention of acting as her protector (Ezk 16). The father of a new-born child acknowledged it as his offspring by placing it upon his knees (Job 39). In a Babylonian poem describing the wickedness wrought by the evil spirits they are said to snatch the child from the knees of a man. The use of salt as a condiment and the pignincy which it gives to insipid articles of diet caused it to be regarded as a symbol of life. An abundance of salt has the effect of preventing the growth of vegetation, and therefore the plunging of a city with salt denoted that it was condemned to eternal destruction (Jg 9:26). It was a mark of reverence to cast off the shoes on approaching a sacred person or place (Ex 3:8, Jos 5:13). To appear bare-footed was a sign of great humility (2 S 15:20, Is 65:20 etc.), and to draw off the shoes meant to give up a legal right (Ru 4:3). The taking of an oath was symbolized by placing the hand under the thigh of the adjurer (Gn 24:27, 47:7), or by lifting up the hand towards heaven (Gn 14:23). As kissing was a means by which parts of the body of different persons came into contact, it was naturally a symbol of attraction and commerce (Gn 27:25, Ex 18, Ru 1:7 etc.). Various symbolisms were used in mourning. A sackcloth was worn to show that the mourner's grief for the departed was so great that he was ready to give up all the pleasures and conveniences of life (Gn 50:7, 2 S 8:9). The tearing of one's garment denoted that the mourner's dearest friend had been torn from him (Gn 57:4, 49:3 etc.). The mourner went about barefoot and bareheaded (2 S 15:24, Ec 24:3), sat in ashes and sprinkled ashes upon his head (Jer 6:26, La 3:23), and practised various mutilations of the body (Jer 16:6 etc.). Shaving the head (as among the Arabs at a battle) presented a sign of mourning. The making of a covenant was symbolized by the person who gave the pledge passing between the parts of an animal cut into pieces, and thus showing that he was ready to be similarly treated if he failed to keep his promise (Gn 17:10, etc.).

Light represented to the Orientals the highest human good. The most joyful emotions and pleasing sensations are described under imagery derived from light (1 K 11:16, Ps 97:11 etc.). It was only natural that there should follow a transition from corporeal to spiritual things, so that light came to typify true religion and the happiness which it brings. Sin, wickedness, chaos, were represented by darkness. The lion was a symbol of strength (Jl 1:5). Kneading was a mark of homage to a superior, and is therefore transferred to an attitude of worship (2 Ch 6:4, 1 K 5:4).

In Babylonia it was customary for the eunuch to present the gifts to the girls' parents. According to some scholars, this symbolized the purchase of the bride—a practice which existed in our times. Various symbolisms were connected with the marriage ceremony, but their meaning is obscure. The officiating ministers bound sandals on the feet of the newly married pair, and then put them on the right foot of each of the male guests. A new wedding dress was provided for each girl, and the bride was given a garland of flowers. The marriage ceremony is described in detail by the famous scholar, "Jesus is born," JASO 9:139-140.

2 T. G. Furness, Notes on some Recent Discoveries in the Realm of Assyriology, London, 1892-93.
SYMBOLISM (Semitic)

girdle, and fastened it to a pouch of silver and gold. The first of these ceremonies has already been symbolized by the marriage-contract between them.

We are told in the Code that, if a maid behaves insolently towards her mistress, the latter may put an abbatu on her and reduce her to slavery. The same custom appear to have been observed in Babylonia, and the ancient writers have preserved an example of a woman's execution for this crime, and the form of mutilation was symbolical of the offence itself. For striking a father the hand was cut off; for ingratitude expressed by speech the tongue was cut out; as a punishment for unlawful curiosity the eye was torn out; and as a mark of disobedience the ear was often cut off. The cutting short of the hair was a mark of degradation. The city walls were regarded as a symbol of shelter. Swearing by the gods and the king was a means of sanctioning an agreement. When a contract was made, both parties and witnesses added their names to it. And this was authenticated by impressing their seals or making a nail mark. Thaddeus of Babylon states explicitly that a woman was not a wife without bonds. This was a marriage-contract which symbolized an official acknowledgment of the union. An artisan symbolized his adoption of a child by tattooing a man's trade. The penalty of breaking a contract was the payment of two or more white horses to the god. The exact meaning of this symbolism is unknown, but it was suggested purification and innocence. In Babylonian magic there was a symbolical tying and loosening of knots according as the sorcerer wished to strangle his victim or to release him from any demon by which he was possessed. If a magician wished to rid himself of an object, he would burn or torture an image of it, believing that the victim would meet with the same fate as his image. By 'seizing the hands of Bel,' the Assyrian kings legitimized their claim to the Babylonian throne.

3. THE SYMBOLISM OF NUMBERS AND COLOURS.—It is doubtful whether the Hebrews used numerical symbolism. muster by the Twelve Stones and the Siloam inscription the numbers given are invariably in words. But this does not exclude the possibility that numerical symbols, which were employed by the Babylonians and Egyptians, were also used by the Israelites. In S. Arabian and Phoenician inscriptions also the numbers are partly written and partly indicated by figures. The numbers most commonly used with a symbolical meaning are three, four, and seven. This symbolism of purity and innocence. It represented light, which impressed the Hebrew mind not only by its brilliance and beauty, but by its divine symbolism and profound moral connotation (Lv 16:16-22, Dn 7:2, Ps 104:2). As black absorbs all colours and thus buries the light, it symbolized death, humiliation, mourning (Mal 3:4, La 4 etc.). Blue, representing the colour of an unclouded sky, symbolized revelation (Ex 24:14). It was the first of the colours used for the curtains of the sanctuary, and the Israelites were commanded to have a ribbon of blue fringe on the edge of their garments (Ex 28:34). The tunic of David was of blue wool (Nu 15:38). Red, as the colour of blood, represented bloodshed, war, guilt (Zec 6:11). Purple was the distinguishing hue of royalty, representing dignity and honour (Est 8:8, Jg 5:5), whilst green, as the colour of plants—growth—to which people look forward in winter—symbolized hope and resurrection. 1 It was also the symbolical colour of the moon. 2

4. SPECIAL SYMBOLICS IN OT.—Ahiah tore his garments into twelve pieces in order to show that the kingdom of Israel would be similarly divided (1 K 11:25-30). One of the sons of the prophets asked his comrade to smite him, and by his wound thus showed the punishment that Ahab had deserved (2 K 8). Ezekiel, a false prophet, put on horns in order to show that Ahaz would push the Syrians as with horns of iron (22:12). In considering the special symbolical actions of the prophetic books, we are confronted with very great difficulty. For scholars are divided in their views as to whether these actions were actually performed in their literal sense or were merely conceived as symbolic visions in the minds of the prophets. It seems almost certain that there are a number of such actions which could not have been performed literally. It is impossible, however, for the present writer to discuss in this brief article the category to which each of these many prophetic symbolisms belongs. But a brief mention of some of these from the books of Jeremiah and Ezekiel may give some indication as to the difficulties in arriving at a definite decision. In Jer 13:10-11 Jahweh tells the prophet to go to the Euphrates and hide his linen girdle in a rock. After a while he is told to remove the girdle, and he then finds it to be marred. The lesson is that, just as a girdle from its nature clings to a person, so Israel is closely united to Jahweh. Now, on the one hand, it may seem unlikely that Jeremiah should have undertaken a journey from Jerusalem to Babylon—a distance of about 200 miles—in order to bring out this point to the people. But it is possible that the journey was actually performed. (1) We know that the prophet was absent from Jerusalem during part of Jehoiakim's reign, and, as we have no account of his whereabouts during this period, it is possible that he made the journey to Babylon then. (2) In Jer 25:18 we are told that Nebuchadrezzar behaved in a most friendly way towards him on the capture of Jerusalem. This suggests that king and prophet had met previously, and that it was on the occasion of the prophet's visit to Babylon. In Ezk 4:7 we are told that the prophet lay upon his side for 390 days. How can this be taken literally? Did any person actually count the number of days? In 4:12 we are told that Ezekiel used human excrement for fuel in baking some barley cakes. Surely it cannot reasonably be suggested that the prophet would have inconvenienced himself by going to such extremes merely in order to bring home to the people some divine message which he could very well have preached in a much more ordinary manner. There are some scholars, chief of whom is A. Klostermann, who argue that these symbolical actions were performed. The dummy of Ezekiel (3:22), they suggest, was due to discipline of speech, and the repetition of metaphorical language in Ezekiel, the fact that the prophet had to remain at home, in order to carry out the divine command, suggests 1 Hammurabi says that he 'bedecked the grave of Malikat with green,' the colour of resurrection (introduction to his Code of Laws).

2 Jeremiah, 1:11. 1
that it was not loss of speech but an injunction to refrain from reprouving his co-religionists any more. The present writer is therefore inclined to agree with W. S. Kuechler and E. Hübner in regarding many of the symbolisms of Ezekiel as being merely symbolical visions in the mind of the prophet and as not having been performed externally.


SYMBOLO-FIDEISME. — Symbolo-fideism 1 is the name given to the theology taught in the second half of the 19th cent. at the Protestant Faculty of Paris by Professors Auguste Sabatier and Charles Weiss at the École Évangélique. It is based since by a large number of their pupils and disciples. It has also been called the theology of the Paris school.

As its name indicates, this theology has two aspects: (a) symbolism, which deals with religious forms more particularly from the point of view of its form, and (b) fideism, which deals with it from the point of view of its content. Sabatier devoted himself specially to the former and Ménagoz to the latter aspect. But the two conceptions are inseparable and interdependent. Together they form a theology with a distinct character of its own.

The basis of symbolism is the psychological observation that the essence of things escapes us, and that we know only their manifestations in the form of images, figures, and symbols. We cannot, e.g., know what God is in Himself. We know Him only by the more or less anthropomorphized representation which we form of Him in our thought. This we express by the terms 'Father,' 'Lord,' 'Master,' 'Captain,' 'Sovereign,' 'King,' or by emblems bringing our attention on man, heaven, the world — earth, Rock, Banner, Fire. These symbols are without doubt the expression of a living reality, but the conformation of our brain is such that it cannot grasp that reality naked; our mind can apprehend it only when it presents itself in the garment of a more or less sensuous representation. This observation holds good in regard to all religious data, and is borne out in the most subtle dogmatic systems. The task of the theologian is to lay bare the eternal truth from under its contingent manifestations and its historical formulé; moreover, these formulé are subject to the laws of historical evolution.

As regards the Deity, it is the name 'Father,' habitually used by Jesus Christ, that best suits the religions man's conception of the Supreme Being—perfect, just, merciful, eternal, all-embracing. This name then is in regard to the Deity, and who man feels himself absolutely dependent, while at the same time conscious of liberty and responsibility before Him. On the ideas of liberty and forgiveness and those of atonement and penalty, which in turn suggest those of pardon and salvation. A lively conviction that we are created for life and not for death, for happiness and not for suffering, consues us as aspirations after salvation. We desire life, happy life, eternal life. The whole idea of salvation is summed up in these words.

How are we to attain this? Conscience replies: By the pardon of our sins. But how is pardon to be obtained? It is with this vital question that fideism is concerned. The term 'fideism' (Latin, 'faith') was coined by the religious society for the first time by Ménagoz in his Réflexions sur l'Évangile du salut. 1 Its meaning is most concisely indicated in the phrase: 'We are saved by faith, independently of belief.' The distinction between faith and belief is one of the fundamental premises of fideism. By faith is meant the movement of the self towards God—a movement which implies forsaking sin, repentance. The man who repents and gives his heart to God is saved, whatever his beliefs may be. This statement is opposed to the old orthodox, which made adherence to certain official dogmas a condition of salvation. Fideism declares that a man is saved by faith alone ('sola fide'). At the same time, it recognizes the value of doctrines. Doctrines are dynamic ideas which make for good when true, and for evil when false. Fideists regard them therefore as pedagogic instruments of the first order. It is for this reason that they attach so much importance to the pursuit of truth and oppose so resolutely doctrines which they consider erroneous. It is only through a great and regrettable misunderstanding that their opponents reproach them with indifference to doctrine; and it is also false to assert, as has been done, that fideists fail to appreciate the intellectual factor in religious faith. Faith, according to their teaching, is an activity of the self in its unity, and therefore must comprise all the elements of the soul's faculties—thought, will, and emotion.

But the essential factor in salvation is the inward movement towards God, not intellectual adherence to some doctrinal tenet. Fideists reject the doctrine of salvation by beliefs without thereby denying the spiritual influence of beliefs, as the Reformers rejected the doctrine of salvation by works, while maintaining that good works are obligatory on Christians.

In a general way, and as a result of historical, critical, exegetical, and philosophical studies fideists have departed from orthodox theology and returned to the simple doctrine of salvation as taught by Jesus Christ, according to their interpretation, the multiplication of the gospel; hence their emphasis on repentance and on consecration of the soul to God as conditions of salvation.

As regards the idea of salvation, they find it in the symbolic interpretation of the primitive Christian conception of the Kingdom of God. This idea has for them two aspects: (1) the entrance of believers at death into celestial happiness, and (2) the gradual establishment of the Kingdom of Justice and Peace on the earth. These two ideas combined constitute in their eyes the Kingship of Heaven.

The name 'Symbolo-fideism,' which expresses the union of symbolism and fideism, gained currency from two articles by Eugène Ménagoz, signed T. V. ('Théologien protestant') in the Église Libre (1894, nos. 31 and 32). Auguste Sabatier accepted this title (Exégèse, p. 556). It passed into Holland with the thesis by J. Riemens entitled Het Symbolo-fideisme: Beschrijving en kritische Beschouwing (Rotterdam, 1900), and into Germany with Gustav Lasch's Die symbolo-fideistische Pariser Schule: Charakteristik und Kritik des Symbolo-Fideismus (Berlin, 1901).

Symbolo-fideism has given rise to numerous controversies, an example of which is found in current

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1 In recent years the word 'fideism' has frequently been used alone.

2 Paris, 1879, p. 44.
SYMPATHY

religious journals and theological reviews. Its adversaries have also published a number of polemical pamphlets. These are referred to in the writings mentioned below.


EUGÈNE MÉNÉGOZ.

SYMPATHY.—Sympathy, as the etymology denotes, is 'feeling with others.' Two persons feeling alike do not, however, make a true sympathetic couple unless the feeling of one has partly caused or is reinforcing the feeling of the other. The phenomenon may appear when similar feelings originate spontaneously in the two and reinforce each other. Any relation, however, in which there is a mutual reinforcement of feeling, however originated, is one of mutual sympathy.

1. Emotional contagion.—The primary fact in sympathy is that the feeling of one person can, on occasion, produce a similar feeling in another. In its primitive manifestations this occurs without reflective consciousness of the feeling, and certainly without distinction of persons in respect of its origin. This is shown in the contagion of popular excitement, or 'public spirit,' the unreasoned enthusiasm of public meetings, the wild joy, the furious hatred, the boundless affection, that mark the excited crowd. The emotion, or its manifestation in some, excited similar emotions latent in the others, and, with the sympathetie reinforcement of the emotional disturbance in each is abnormally increased. Probably it is only those who, from the beginning, have some sort against the prevalent emotion that maintain a normal level throughout. Such sympathetic outbursts must be themselves short-lived and, as the cause of excitement is withdrawn, the persons affected are no longer in need of the fresh return to their ordinary emotional level. This may even be one of indifference to the popular frenzy in which they took part. It may, indeed, be one of revulsion if they have been drawn, as sometimes happens, into a condition of which in their normal moods they disapprove. Such revulsion would happen, e.g., if an advocate of peace found that he had been drawn by fellow-feeling into a demonstration of war enthusiasm.

The hot fit is followed by a cold fit. Hence the instability of popular acclamation, the apparent superficiality of feeling which appears when people liable to sympathy of this primitive unreflective kind are mingled together. The most suitable material for the typical 'fickle mob' is a town population sympathetically sensitive and intellectually immature.

The not-lived character of the feeling thus contiguously aroused follows in the nature of the case, because there is no settled identification of self-conscious personality with it. I feel in a sense, but do not feel as if feeling myself as if feeling. I do not take the feeling into myself as mine. It is on me and moves me, but it does not enter into any relation to that total of ideas, impulses, feelings, and desires which is me. It may be a mere motive excitement, moving me blindly to action, or it may take possession of me completely with fixed idea and over-mastering mood, acting instead of me and overpowering me. In either case I come out of it, and in the latter case as one recovered from a madness. Something like this, no doubt, befell Parisians in the brief violence of the Terror.

2. Self-conscious sympathy.—When self is identified with the feeling which is developing, as is ascribed to another person as origin, we have sympathy proper. The development of self-consciousness goes hand in hand indeed with the exercise of sympathy. We learn to know ourselves, and to become all that we are capable of becoming as self-conscious persons, by our dealings with our fellows, and *puri passu* with our consciousness of them as other selves. In so far, however, as we are clearly conscious of self, we are prepared to set bounds to the operation of primitive sympathy. A new condition of feeling, discontinuous with my previous state so as to preclude its origin, happens, is roused in me by sympathetic contagion. It is to self an invasion from without. As a feeling, moving me but not mine, it must be referred to a neighbouring conscious self, who is manifesting it independently. Perfect isolation, however, the isolation of the self which is invaded. Feelings that harmonize with the total state of this self enter into it as elements in its development: the sympathy of children with parents and other elders plays a large part in the building up of their personality. Confidence in the elders who give the lead to sympathy predisposes to acceptance of their guidance. The emotional behaviour of the child is educated in this way. If of average docility, it takes the form suggested to it by its society. On the other hand, the suggested feeling may be out of harmony with the character as already formed: thus the brave man may feel the horror communicated to him by the panic-stricken multitude, but he overcomes it as no possible part of himself. When the feeling thus communicated to us takes strong hold, the repulse by a strong character is correspondingly emphatic.

In sensitive natures this gives rise to a peculiar sense of revulsion, as towards something put into us against our will; and the transference of this revulsion to the source of contagion is probably the chief cause of violent personal antipathy. Between this attitude of abhorrence towards the induced emotion and willing receptiveness of it, as extremes, lie all degrees of repulsion by a feeling from which, as outside the disposition of our own personality, we nevertheless withhold ourselves. Whether we admit the feeling to influence over us, or harden our will against it in a sort of self-defence, it appears to us essentially, and throughout its action, as the feeling of another person with which in a measure we feel. This definite ascription of the feeling to another is the second characteristic feature in sympathy, and gains prominence with the developing consciousness of self and of other selves.

3. Control of sympathy.—In passing it may be noted how large a part in life is played by the partial hardening of the heart against the contagion of social feeling. This control of sympathetic distraction in general belongs to the preservation of self as maintenance of character. It is not only that undesirable emotions—e.g., of hatred, fear, envy—should be suppressed, as they are by the self-possessed though sensitive members of the excited crowd. Experience soon reveals that the preservation of self, even in the ordinary physical

1 Common self-possession, as in the man who is not liable to the contagion of fear, is to be distinguished from the excellence of sympathy under control. Probably this is one of the qualities of the born leader.
sense, requires much systematic control of emotion, whether initiated sympathetically or otherwise. An emotional nature loosely controlled is morally unstable and makes for a nervous break-down in course of time. The habit is of the hypochondriac type, so far as it depends as it needs on moral character. It is a main principle of moral health that the emotional life as it increases should be kept more and more strictly in subordination to the higher ends which it subserves. The precise definition of those ends belongs to the subject of ethics: the average man conceives them simply as the happiness of personal health for himself and his associates, together with some service in furtherance of the common weal. It may be that the rank and file of modern humanity suffer from lack of vitality and variety in the emotional life, but for the moment we are not concerned with them. Persons of the sympathetic cast are,—under modern conditions more especially,—liable to so much emotional invasion as must result in nervous exhaustion if not systematically kept in check. It is interesting to note how the habit of control over sympathy develops with experience from youth to maturity: the first great sympathetic grief overwhelms us as if it were our own; but we learn to throw ourselves outside of the emotion into the action required to assuage the sufferings of our friend; later still, to those who are overtired, callousness may come, with the exhaustion of other physical or moral. But this applies to all feelings however initiated. Sympathetic feeling differs from other feeling as being specially liable to increase of control by development of the element of otherness in it. This is a piece with another useful psychological truth, namely that the tension of any violent feeling may be relieved by treating it as an object of imagination or thought. Tennyson's lines bear on this point:

"Like wise the imaginative woos, That loved to handle spiritual strife, Diffused the shock thro' all my life, But in the present broke the blow."

In constructing a story, an essay, or a poem which depicts the emotion as affecting imaginary persons, the sense of its personal attachment is obscured: it is projected more or less, i.e. thrown out of self-consciousness into the non ego. Similarly, but as of course and instinctively, we project our sympathetic feelings back into the other self and, although still feeling them, are as a rule much relieved. This relief is no doubt partly due to the stop that is placed on the disturbance of the emotional personality in general by the sharp dissociation of the new feeling from those immediately pertaining to the self; it is the other person's feeling, and, though it disturbs me, I limit that disturbance by knowing it as something which has not its origin, and is therefore not necessarily permanent, in me. This control of the sympathetic disturbance furthers and is furthered by practical activity in relief of the other's distress.

4. Identification with the 'other.'—The exceptions indeed in this case explain the rule. When the sympathetic feeling is real, as to an object much beloved, it may affect us more than if it were of our own originati. This, no doubt, is what is meant when it is said that another person is dearer to us than ourselves. The consciousness of the beloved person's consciousness is in this case so established as part of our own that the projection of the feeling into it does not in the least dissociate the self from the feeling. So far as we know what the beloved person feels, we go on feeling it and being further disturbed by it all the time. Indeed there appear to be, in cases of intense affection when the self identifies itself passionately with the other, two ways in which the sympathetic feeling may become more disturbing than the equivalent primary feeling would be. (1) In projecting it on the beloved other, imagination, moved by the habit of affection, may greatly exaggerate its force and significance: the finger-prick which, in spite of instinctive tears, is a trifle to the baby may bulk large in the distressed imagination of the heartily anxious mother. This kind of thing happens in a thousand hidden ways when love prevails, and it happens for pleasure as well as for pain. (2) Each person has an intimate sense of the powers and resources within himself by means of which he bears his troubles and controls his emotional being generally. About the beloved other, however intimately known, he is never quite so sure, and thus, no matter how equal things may otherwise be, the sense of mystery breeds, as it were, a germ of fear that heights pain and, by release from it, also heightens joy. This goes, moreover, with the essential fact that love at its strongest exceeds self-love in desiring the welfare of its object. The heightening in this way of feeling sympathetically experienced may perhaps be discriminated introspectively as an additional element of anxious concern about subjective consequences. Such concern is a great deal to their own emotions by none but mobbed people. And indeed even in the lover-like relation to which this tender anxiety naturally belongs it may be so exaggerated as to be morbid concern of self for the other. For this reason it is often well that persons who get too much on one another's mind—as we say—should be sometimes separated.

5. Absence of this intimate affection in the case of ordinary associates makes it possible to limit the sympathetic disturbance by instinctively projecting it back into the other mind, consciousness of which is only now and then associated with the consciousness of self. There are, of course, all degrees of dependence on one another in this respect. A man may go through life without one associate in whose welfare he has any genuine lasting interest, capable of sympathy but never in danger of being shaken by it. Most persons, however, have friends sympathy with whom does penetrate into them, as well as move them out of themselves. Some men are, in the absence of contrary cause, friendly to all their associates: these are universally sympathetic also, in proportion to their primary sympathetic sensiveness. Friendliness, however, as the title implies, to identify oneself with another, must be carefully distinguished from the primary capacity to feel as others feel.1 When they are combined, we have the sympathetic nature as popularly understood. But an unfriended man may be sensitive to another's feelings, in which case he not only projects on the other but sharply dissociates himself from all interest in him. It is as if he said, "I know what you feel; I feel you feeling it; but it is nothing to me."

1. Friendship is in its degree the affectionate interest in another's consciousness of which the extreme has been described, and friendliness is the disposition to so interested.
tions and imaginings into which all sorts of error may creep. If he abounds in self-confidence, he is a dangerous guide: but, if he treats his gift humbly as a useful auxiliary, it will serve him in good stead and improve with such exercise.

A sympathetic bent may have experiences of cool insight, but with this difference that, since in such case he does not identify himself with the other, he is moved to change the state of the other into identification with himself. Thus theorist, orator feels that his audience is puzzled or hostile: they do not convert him, but he is not indifferent, so he puts out his strength to express himself and make them feel his feeling. The mere lecturer, on the other hand, only tries to show and make them see his meaning. The orator is the speaker whom the Americans call 'magnetic': he makes his hearers feel as he does, at least for the time. But the beginning which he makes is at the other end of the coil, by insight into the feeling which is theirs but not his. This is the getting into sympathetic touch. By showing this sympathy on neutral ground or even in respectful dissent, he fixes the attention of his hearers. His interest in them interests them in him: then the position is reversed, the mind of the speaker shown, and the original attitude of the audience merged in the new effort to identify with him. This kind of thing happens every day on a small scale in the experience of sympathetic people. To understand, to be interested though in disagreement to persuade—these are the means, and in this order, by which one person transforms the mental attitude of another. The more instinctive the process is, the better, sympathy operating in the pair by its natural impulse to mutual identification of mental content.

6. Affinity of character.—In so far as the sympathetic bent in the full sense turns upon friendliness of disposition, persons may be characterized as sympathetic generally, i.e. in relation to all sorts of other persons. In so far, however, as it depends on primary contagiousness of feeling, affinities of character must profoundly affect the relation between any pair. Racial type, e.g., is a basis of such affinity, and the mutual intelligibility of two compatriots, while partly arising from like habits of expression and community of associations, turns also on functional capacity to feel alike. In what ever way we explain the prime fact of emotional contagion, it is evident that no one can communicate to another a feeling of which the latter is constitutionally incapable. The fearless man cannot feel like the coward, nor the liberal man like the mean. Each can only see that the other acts in a manner directly opposite to himself and recognize the corresponding state of mind as a mystery. To sympathize with another, we must be able to feel like him. Some would say, further, that we must have felt on our own originations as he now feels; but that is not so certain, though perhaps it generally happens so. Our capacity to sympathize, therefore, is at least limited by the possibilities of our character. How far these are limited, or how far they may be extended beyond our present experience of them, we never know. Certain it is that in human society we run up now and then against mysteries, persons with whom after much acquaintance we never get in touch, who always seem to us as if they were feeling things the same way with us, though we feel that they are of another kind. Rubbish! and the other side of a high wall over which we cannot see, through which we cannot hear, them. At the same time, we meet others with whom, in trifling things and large affairs, an agreement in taste in time that diversities of aim and opinion, though standing out the more clearly, do not mar the general harmony. But mental conditions are so complex that likeness of condition between two minds must generally be of a very partial kind.

7. Similarity and association.—Another influence to the same effect which enters into these cases is natural similarity in habit of expression. A common stock of experiences, habits, and even feelings is formed by association in life, and the result is similar to that of congenital affinity, though lacking the charm of its ever-recurring unexpectedness. Congenital affinity, it should be noted, is not a matter of this type. It is a happy accident of human development which may be encountered at any turn.

8. Sympathy in education.—The value of sympathy as an element in the development of moral life is too large a subject to be treated here. A few words, however, may be devoted to (1) the teacher's use of sympathy in education, and (2) the training of sympathy in the child.

(1) The teacher's use of sympathy, like that of the orator described above, begins in his own sympathy with the learner's state of mind and ends in the achievement of the learner's sympathy with his. The teacher's sympathy requires as a starting-point, therefore, some demonstration on the child's part, and to evoke this in as good a form as possible for his purpose—but in any form rather than none—must be his first care. By entering into the child's mind thus shown to him he establishes the contact of sympathy, and by maintaining this contact he leads where he will, provided he can, in the child's case. This method is a small matter compared with an error in the procedure of moral discipline. It is quite possible to keep in touch with the child's sympathies, even when punishment seems to estrange him for a time.

(2) In the training of sympathy the first requisite is to encourage its manifestations when they occur spontaneously, and to suggest conduct which is the natural expression of interest in others. The tendency to sympathize with joy as well as with sorrow—M. Freud as well as Nietzsche—should be called out. All this belongs to the development of the sympathetic nature, which, as we have shown, also stands in need of disciplinary training. This, for the most part, life supplies, and the educator should be wary lest he interfere unwisely and too much. The delicate process of control and moderation by which certain effects of the opposite kind are had better be left to itself; and, as a rule, it is dangerous to train the young to repress, otherwise than by more fully expressing, their nature. Wise both the teacher and the parent. It is a part of one function for the sake of fulfilling another more perfectly. Thus, emotion is in general controlled by using it to subserve the voluntary and intellectual life.
SYNCRETISM

Thought and conduct are the antitheses to hysteria and emotional riot. As regards sympathy in particular, we should be chiefly concerned to develop first its voluntary and, second to that, its interior side. "The true syncretist, who contended with suffering, e.g., which does not go on to some comforting act is morbid because it ends in useless emotional disturbance. Doing in accordance with the occasion is the habit to which sympathy should be most carefully trained. Its other requisite is that it should be intelligent, and this is often a much-needed lesson. A useful sympathy with others requires imagination and reflexion sufficient to construct a true idea of what they want. This intelligent apprehension of another's case is of inestimable value in making the fellow-feeling, as well as the friendly action, fit.

Persons who are 'too sympathetic to be of any use in trouble' are persons who, by neglecting to help their fellows as need arise, have let themselves get into a habit of being overwhelmed by painful fellow-feeling. The remedy is to do something for the prime sufferer. This is the natural course in the case of an unsolved pit.

SYNAGOGUE.—See Worship (Hebrew) and (Jewish).


SYNCRETISM.—1. Untechnical use of term. The term 'syncretism' has a very extensive record. It is as old as Plutarch, who seems to have coined it, or at any rate to have made it current. In his essay on brotherly love he observes that even brothers and friends who have quarrelled prefer to associate with one another, in face of a common danger, rather than to commune with the foe; which is a Cretan precedent and principle, 'for, although the Cretans were frequently at faction and feud, yet when their city was in common danger, they became reconciled and united whenever a foreign foe attacked them. They called this syncretism ('synkretismoi').

By 'syncretism' in this political sense, therefore, we are to understand the instinct of self-defence which sinks private differences before a threatening peril on the outside. The 'syncretists' close their ranks; they like quarrelling among themselves, but they would rather exist than indulge in fatal internecine strife at home.

After Plutarch the term became submerged. Fourteen centuries later it re-appears in the pages of Erasmus, who was in his own way, especially when the way ran through the Adagia, a 'syncretist' of the reconciling order, averse to feuds. Erasmus sets down the reference to Plutarch and his work to reconcile and unify. Thus we find him writing from Louvain (22nd April and 23rd May 1529) to Melanchthon, hoping that scholars of all parties will close their ranks and bring a close the quarrels occasioned by the different standards of true and false heretics. Acquiesce not, quoique synkretismoi. Ingrates praiseworthy are concordia. 2

During the next century and a half the term is forgotten. It is recovered by means of the Reformed and of the Roman Church, sometimes as an appeal, more often as a taunt; theologians who endeavoured to reconcile extremists were dubbed 'syncretists,' and their system was indifferently and meretriciously applied to all irreligious proposals, whether these were the product of a Laodicean indifference or of a genuine love for moderation. In passing from the humanists to the theologians, the term upon the whole acquired disparaging associations, which continued to follow syncretism until it came almost a synonym for 'hybrid.' It was derived from συνκρήτημα, and the supposed etymology corroborated the connexion of the term with all that was insincere and heterogeneous.

This is the predominant meaning of the term in ordinary French. In untechnical English it also denotes 'fusion' of a more or less illogical or artificial kind. Thus Hallam 3 says of Giordano Bruno: 'What seems most his own... is the syncretization of the tenets of a pervading spirit, an Animism Mystical, which in itself is an imperfect thing, with the more pernicious hypothesis of an universal Mundus.'

2. Philosophical and ecclesiastical applications.

—in the history of philosophy 'syncretistic' has been applied to the harmonizing efforts of those who, like Cardinal Bessarion in the 15th century, refused to allow their love of Plato to be identified with any depreciation of Aristotle. The controversy between the Aristotelians and the Platonists had been sharpened by the impetus given to Platonic studies after the fall of Constantinople. Partisanship ran strong, and the more moderate men failed to draw the rival schools together.

Throughout all the tangents of this complicated controversy, a thread of gold is interwoven by the serene and imperturbable temper of Plutarch. What happened in 15th century, philosophy was repeated on a larger scale in the theology of the 17th century. The 'syncretistic controversy' of that age rose out of the efforts made by G. Calixtus (1586-1656), a distinguished scholar at Helmsdale, to draw the Lutheran and the Reformed Churches together. 'A plague? What a plague! His will, he cried, like Mercutio's dying cry of indignant protest. Calixtus lived and worked to check the plague. He was acutely sensible of the harm and danger to Christianity which the sharp internal divisions within the Church produced. But his broad, catholic temper met with little response among his contemporaries. The controversy lasted even after his death, assuming political as well as theological forms. The 'syncretistic' party in the Church failed, however, to carry its principles into effect. Even well-meaning and wise attempts to emphasize the fundamental Christian principles held by various Reformed, especially, and the Catholic Churches in common with the Roman Church, were suspect in that age of hardening division and widening cleavage. Men were told that in view of the Roman Church they would have to subordinate their private idiosyncrasies in the Reformed Church; or Christians in both Churches were reminded that the menace of outside heathenism should make them close their ranks. But 'syncretism' of this kind was generally branded as a betrayal of principles or as an attempt to secure unity at the expense of truth. The 'syncretistic controversy' was quelled over and over, and such quarrels are not the least bitter upon earth. What the 'syncretists,' in Plutarch's sense of the term, called a 'harmony,' their opponents called a 'hybrid.'

The Roman Church had a 'syncretistic' controversy of its own, an oddity in the turbulent dispute over the relations between grace and free will, which pressed from the last quarter of the 16th century. 'Syncretistic' is the term applied to the system of belief which endeavours to harmonize the conflicting views of the 'two universes' of the Nominalists, to the two sorts of efficacious grace, which are held together by prayer.

3. In comparative religion.—'Syncretism,' as men like Hume and Zwingli and Erasmus and Luther came to be called nothing of the practical sense which

1 De Pratento amore, 10.
3 Ibid., 2nd. ed., 1898, ii. 175.
4 Cf. CH. R. 2011, vi. 714.
Plutarch had originally attached to the expression. But this is lost in the technical, modern application of the term to a phenomenon in the history of religion, i.e. to the fusion of various religions in doctrine or in cult. Here 'syncretism' denotes generally an unconscious, wide-spread tendency, due to or fostered by some re-arrangement of political relationships or by some clash of civilizations. There is a blending of religious ideas and practices, which by either itself or external impetus are more or less thoroughly the principles of another or both are amalgamated in a more cosmopolitan and less polytheistic shape. Such movements in the religions world are often preceded and accelerated by a new philosophical synthesis as well as by a political re-arrangement, but the outcome invariably is a unification of deities, which, as J. Tounias has pointed out, proceeds on one or other of two lines: either two deities of different religions are assimilated by comparison or several deities are grouped together in a fresh synthesis. The motives for this re-statement are drawn from the dawnling consciousness that any particular form of religion is no longer adequate by itself, that others possess like features, possibly of superior efficacy and appeal, and that such features can be incorporated without detriment to the essential points of the religion.

The study of comparative religion exhibits this phenomenon in a variety of shapes and stages, but it is specially prominent during the first four centuries of the Christian era. The tendency to this syncretism or amalgamation of deities and cults had been in operation long before the rise of Christianity. When one tribe conquered another, or when two tribes or nations formed a political alliance, there was a strong movement towards fusing their gods. The foreign power, especially if it were dominant, fascinated many of its subject or weaker neighbours. An exchange of deities might be made, out of courtesy. Similarities in ritual were developed, and stress was laid on what was common to the two religions. Now and then the gods were identified, and this was specially easy in the primitive days when certain gods were still nameless powers; men were invited to recognize their own gods under the names of foreign deities or to welcome the latter as allies. The connexion between Israel and Canaan is a manifestation in point. The equally familiar one is the influence of Assyrian rites upon the religion of Israel under kings like Manasseh and Amon, when syncretistic influences were specially powerful in consequence of the political situation. The phenomenon is by no means confined to the history of Israel's religion in the ancient world. For different reasons syncretism, or, as some prefer to term it, 'theocracy' (κοιναλία), was rife at one period in Greek religion owing to Oriental influences, and as late as the 8th


5 Cf. ERE vi. 411 f., 522.

6 B. Stasiowski, Theologie des AT, Tübingen, 1906-11, i. 235 f.

7 F. J. de recently F. Legge, Forerunners and Rivals of Christianity, Cambridge, 1915, ii. 32 ('the theoreis which was wielding all the gods of the mysteries into one great god of nation').

8 Cf. HEB vi. 150 L., and HEB vi. 421 f.

cent. of our era a similar blending took place in Japan. But it is in the history of Judaism, particularly during the two centuries preceding the Christian era, that the elements and issues of syncretism are most clearly marked.

1 The main impetus to this rise of syncretism came from the political re-adjustment after Alexander the Great. The Seleucid period witnessed a contact between the East and the West, round the Mediterranean basin, which led not only to a fusion of Babylonian with Greek and Syrian deities and to a ferment of Oriental religions feeling throughout the Greco-Roman world, but also to movements which, in spite of the vigorous resistance of the Maccabees and their supporters, affected some circles in Judaism itself. The Hellenizing tendency was fostered by Jewish writers like Eupolemus and Aratus. It went hand in hand with the allegorizing of Homer and of the OT and with the Stoic philosophy of the Logos. As the tendency to syncretism was innate in Egyptian religion—the spread of the Serapis-cult is only a later instance of it—and as Alexander formed the centre of activity for the amalgamation of Egyptian and Greek or Syrian cults but also for speculative Judaism under the spell of the new ideas of cosmopolitanism, it is not surprising to see a movement set in the direction of a syncretistic Judaism, which should assimilate and employ current Greek ideas of a cosmopolitan, cosmic character. The exponent of this syncretism is Philo.

1 Un syncretisme dans lequel sont admis tous les éléments, en particulier persépiacites et platoniciens, qui s'accordent avec l'idéologie fondamentale de la sympathie des parties du monde, telle que la définition la plus exacte des vues cosmologiques de Platon.'

2 Philo's aim was not to blend Judaism with Hellenism. He adhered to his religious inheritance. But he was flavoured to experimentalise to regard it by re-stating it in terms of the current religions philosophies of his day.

As Judaism on the whole resisted this Philonic speculative tendency, so did Christianity in the main resist the later Gnostic movement with its syncretistic impetus during the 2nd and 3rd centuries. Syncretism was partly an evidence of strength and partly an indication of weakness at that period. So far as it meant a readiness to set the new faith in a positive relation to the elements of truth in contemporary cults and mysteries, so far as it breathed a spirit strong enough to assimilate vital data from its new soil and conserve its distinctive characteristics, it was healthy. In this respect it carried on the work of the best apologists, linking the Christian tradition to the new situation and proving that the faith was too vital to remain a Semitic cult. But there was another side to syncretism, and to this the Church was keenly, if not always wisely, alert. The fascination of the movement lay in its cosmopolitan appeal—an appeal which was the more seductive that already, within paganism itself, the movement had made headway, as we see from the tone of men like Plutarch, Maximus of Tyre, and Numenius, and from the specific phenomenon like the transformation which had come over a deity such as Isis in the popular pieties of the age. The
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passion of the time was for a vague monotheism, which should be direct and unmediated by the authority of the Church. A cosmopolitan syncretism, in the 3rd cent., began to overlay the earlier national religions and to embrace the Syro-Hellenic and the Western cults in a synthesis which regarded all deities as so many varied expressions of the One, and all rites as more or less acceptable forms of approach to this central, all-pervasive Deity. The individual features of the separate gods and goddesses became less and less distinct and were obliterated, and stress was laid, from the religious as well as from the philosophical and the political points of view, upon the all-embracing unity—generally conceived as a solar pantheon. A man like Macrobius voices this in the 4th cent. It underlay the pagan reaction of Julian, which was its last serious challenge to a recalcitrant Christianity. For, although the Church admitted elements which were of semi-polytheistic character, in the worship of the saints, the adoration of miracles, and even the adoration of the emperor, nevertheless formally the sense of Christianity decided against syncretism of the Gnostic and later of the Neo-Platonic type. This is the paradox of the situation. Christianity proved by its exclusiveness that it was not, and was not to be, a merely 'syncretistic' faith, in the sense of so-called eclectic or derivative conceptions. At the same time, it not only assimilated bravely and wisely many elements organic to its growth, but also admitted, as we see, e.g., in its later Egyptian popular developments, some pagan features which were a handicap ultimately to its successful advance.

The syncretistic situation was at once an opportunity and a risk for Christianity. The opportunity was often seized, and the risk was sometimes too much for the faith. Still, the environment did not mould Christianity as it moulded movements like Mithraism and Neo-Platonism. The catholicism of that age suffered from the desire to conciliate the natural man, but it had more in it than an indiscriminate selection or an anxious imitation, such as syncretism usually exhibited.

The tendency of syncretism, when broadly viewed, was to henotheism or pantheism rather than to monotheism. It is true that syncretistic movements made a break away from polytheism.

The first corollary of a truly pantheistic religion is not so much toleration of all forms of worship, as a tendency to conciliate even the gods of other religions. The one god is the same for all. What, then, does the name give him matter?

Such is the theme of a book like the Saturnalia of Macrobius, and it is the principle of the religions synthesis underlaying Plutarch's philosophies of things. But, as the arguments of a Neo-Platonist like Iamblichus show, this severe indifference was not incompatible with ideas which were henotheistic rather than monotheistic, and the popular cravings proved too much for even a monotheistic principle in Christianity. Pope's opening lines in 'The Universal Prayer':

'The expansion of the imperial organization, the mixture of nationalities in the capital, and the flooding of them by Oriental elements, the heightened intercourse, the prolonged residence of the legates, and of legates and their provinces and their dependents and by foreigners, finally, since the 3rd cent., the advent of emperors who were converted and unfamiliar with the national spirit of Rome—all these produced the syncretism of religions' (P. Wendland, Die hellen.-rom. Kultur in ihren Beziehungen zu Judaistik und Christentum, Berlin, 1895, p. 152.)

See G. Wissowa, Religion und Kultur der Römer, Munich, 1892, p. 301.

The recorded East and West met in Rome to exchange compliments and gods (J. Martineau, Essays, Recites, and Addresses, London, 1850-91, B. 315).

2 Grimm, p. 29.


'Father of All in ev'ry Age,' In ev'ry Clime adored,
By Saint, by Savage, and by Sago,
In every clime, in every land,
From Zoroaster to Death's domain.

ancient echo the syncretistic aspiration in its exalted and abstract form. But syncretism, like Catholicism, appealed to lower as well as higher cravings. The adoration of the Deity like this left the heavens strangely bare for those who had been accustomed to a richer variety of worship, and thus the syncretistic tendency was welcomed as it allowed those heavens to be inhabited by many of the saints and deities. Syncretism, in practice, almost invariably fostered mythology. Sages and saints, no less than savages, yielded to its spell in this direction. It was found quite compatible, in pagan syncretism, to unite a reverence for the One with some special adoration of one or more favourite, traditional deities. And it is a question how far even the Christian Church of the 4th cent., e.g., which had rejected in earlier days the hospital syncretism of a monarch like Alexander Severus, tolerated, for the sake of their associations and popular appeal, forms of adoration which were, strictly speaking, out of line of Christian essential monotheism.

The first example is in Jerome:

'Quartusque ponunt quae super hanc et extra haec tris est, quam Graeci vocant syncretos, quae sectilata conscientiae in Cain queque verborum... non extergeter, et quae... non pecore sentinent.'

Bonaventura couples syncretism with intelligenz, as intellectus with ratio. Elsewhere he connects syncretism with conscientia.

'Beinquisissimus Deus quadruplex consulti ad doctiorum, selectus duplum naturae et duplum gratiae. Duplices enim indixt rectitudinis principia, et deus naturum, videlicet ad recta indixtum, et haec est rectitudinis conscientiae, idiam ad recta voluntatem, et haec est conscientia, cujus est remuneration contra malum et stimulatio ad bonum.'

In the Inleernerium he defines syncretism as 'apex mentis seu sectillae,' Herrmann of Fritzlar speaks of it as a power or faculty in the soul, wherein God works immediately, without means and without intermission. Iuysbrecb speaks it defines it as the natural will towards good implanted in us all, though weakened by sin. Giseler uses similar language, saying that the spark (so Eckhart speaks of a Flankein in the soul which cannot be extinguished) was created with the soul in all men, and is a clear light in them, striving in every way against sin and impelling steadily to virtue, and pressing back towards the source from which it came. In Thomas Aquinas syncretism is the highest activity of the moral sense. Gerson says that the cognitive faculty in man has three faculties—the simple intelligible or natural light, which comes from God himself; the understanding, which is the frontier between the two worlds; and the sense-consciousness. Syncretism is the effective

1 W. Pacht in Marcus Aurelius ad Lucilium to his pious recognition of that one orderly spirit, which, according to the doctrine of the Stoics, diffuses itself throughout the world... he had added personal, fervent and personal devotion to a multitude of the old national gods, and a great many new foreign ones. The Edicts of the Emperor Justinian, 529 A.D., 2 In Ezek., i. 1. 3 In Martianus ad Decim., i.

1 Breveolopvum., n. 11.
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faculty answering to the first of these, and contemplation to its corresponding activity. The word also occurs in Albertus Magnus and Alexander of Hales. Eckhart sometimes seems to identify syncretism with the Finkelstein or Guinter, and with the intellectus agens or die ubeiste Vormahn; but the tendency of his philosophy is to move in the direction of the earlier mystics. He even says: 'Dies Finkelstein, das ist Gott.' In the earlier writers syncretism is usually thought of as a reassertion of the senseless state of man before the fall, whereas in the later mystics it is a state of grace, for which Eckhart becomes the seat or organ of divine illumination and of the highest personal inspiration. The notion of an impecunious 'soul-centre' may be traced back to the Neo-Platonists.

SYNDICALISM.—See Socialism.

SYNERGISM.—1. General meaning of the term and its Scriptural support. The term 'synergism' (συνέργεια, συνεργός, 'to co-operate, fellow-worker') became definitely fixed as a technical term in theology in the sixteenth century. It was applied to the later views of Philip Melanchthon and his followers on the question as to the relation between the Holy Spirit (or God's grace) and man's will in regeneration. This view, broadly stated, is that the human will can and does co-operate with the grace of God as a vera causa regenerationis. It opposes the position expressed in the sentence 'Homou convertitur nomen.' The human will was, it is true, considered as the primary cause (hence synergism differs from Pelagianism or even Semi-Pelagianism); that was unreservedly assigned to God's Spirit and to the preaching of the Word, but the energy of the human will was given a place, and its assent an essential place, in the act of regeneration. The enunciation of this view caused unusual heat among theologians, because its truth or falseness affected the whole realm of theological truth—the effects of the fall on human nature, the nature and working of God's decrees, the responsibility of the sinner, in fact all Christian anthropology and soteriology generally.

The term 'synergism' owes its origin to Scripture, but the Scriptural usage of the word operates in a different universe of discourse from the theological. In the NT συνεργέομαι (συνεργα) is never applied to the psychological relation, whatever that may be, whether creative or co-operative, between God's Spirit and man's will in regeneration or conversion. Its general usage is to describe the objective co-operation of the brethren in the furthance of God's kingdom on earth.

In 1 Co 3:5 (οις γὰρ ἐφέσασθε συνεργοί) the co-operation referred to is that between men in their outward labours for God, not a co-operation between them individually or unitedly with God, however true that may be in itself; and at any rate it refers to post-conversion experience, not to pre- or sin-conversion relationships. In 1 Th 2:9 the reference is to men already reconciled to God by faith, who are to work together in the cause of the gospel. Here the word συνεργεῖον (συνεργαμαι) is applied to the proper relationship of what is the true text—God works in all things for good with those who love God. It does not directly refer to what takes place in conversion, nor does it state the active elements involved therein and their relationships. Again, in Mk 10:9 the co-operation of the ascended Lord and the ascended Church is spoken of in regard to miracles. But the word in Scripture is never used of man's natural faculties or capacities (before conversion) working together to produce work (or fruit). This, of course, is a later doctrine, which employed the term to describe the specific and proper theological application of the term. If these things is to be understood or rejected or endorsed from Scripture, it must be by reference to the truth of Scripture, and not to its letter.

2. The origin and development of synergism in Melanchthon's doctrine.—The earlier writings of Melanchthon betray no synergistic tendencies. On the contrary, they are in some respects more rigidly determinate than ever. The religious mind is profoundly conscious of his dependence on God's grace. He does not dream of co-ordinating or equating his own freedom with the grace of God as causal in his salvation. This is true even of those whose views are termed synergistic. 'Arminians usually pray like Calvinists,' said Charles Hodge, adding, what is equally true, that 'Calvinists frequently pray like Arminians.' They appeal to man as responsible voluntary agents. The difficulty arises when one or other of these aspects of experience is made the determining factor in the elaboration of a theological system. Truth is largely a matter of proportion and balance. To begin with, Melanchthon, whose mind was eminently of a systematic cast, worked out his system under the dominating influence of the experience of divine dependence. The Holy Spirit teaches us, he says, that all things happen necessarily by predestination, and therefore there is no such thing as freedom of our will. To maintain free will was to dethrone God's grace in the view of human freedom and supremacy. This was his position in the first edition of his Loci Communes Rerum Theologicae, and it was even more rigidly expressed in his Commentary on Romans and Corinthians. Free will will be regarded as a scholastic figment emanating from carnal wisdom and obscuring the blessings brought to us by Christ. It made men arbiters of their own salvation and consequently undermined the immediacy of Christian assurance and froze the stream of personal devotion to the Redeemer. Melanchthon absolutely applied this conception of predestination to all events, physical and moral, outward and inward.

'Si ad praedestinationem referam humana voluntatem nec in externa, nec in internis operibus illa est liberta.' Since man is born a child of wrath, it follows that he is born without the Spirit of God, and therefore 'nihil nisi carnalia sapit, anath, et guanaria.'

Man has no power over his inward affections, and, though Melanchthon admits that in outward things he has some freedom, even here the power of will will seem to vanish. Thus Melanchthon, applying a transcendental conception, predestination, to the facts of human life, as he read them or understood them from Scripture, came to assert that no real causality existed anywhere but in God's will, and so the betrayal of Judas is as true and as immediately an act of God as the crucifixion of Paul. The reproach of the damned is as proper and in the same sense the effect of God's will as the salvation of the elect. We are not to think of certain events as determined while others are allowed. All things immediately flow out of God's will necessarily. All questions as to the rightness of God's procedure he silences by regarding these questionings as issuing from man's carnal insensitiveness.

It follows from this position that man could contribute nothing to his own conversion. He could not repent of himself, and so-called morality (pre-conversion) has no special place. "Homo parvis praebet, malis potest, nihil pecore.

Carolus est quidquid naturae virum fit, Scorsalis constantia, Xenodochus moderationis, nihil nisi carnalia afflicere maius est."

At this stage we see Melanchthon planted firmly on the experience of God's free grace which gave its strength to the new outlook of the Reformation, combating strongly the popular Roman Catholic view of predestination (a view which was later aided by certain ecclesiastical rites contributed

1 C. A. Salmon, Protestantism, Edinburgh, 1888, p. 177.
2 Originally published at Wittenberg and Basel in 1521, and ed. T. Kohli, Nuremberg, 1930.
3 Nuremberg, 1522.
4 Loci, 1521, p. 97.
5 Th. pp. 90-115.
Synergism, however, is to be understood not from the extreme censure of its opponents, not even from the extreme statements of its advocates, but rather when we look on it as an ethical protest against positions that threatened to submerge the conscience and heart and to disarm the Church in her fight against licence and anarchy. It is therefore necessary to state Melanchthon’s position more fully.

3. Melanchthon’s synergism and its effect on his theological outlook.—Melanchthon’s interest, we have said, was mainly practical, not theoretic. Accordingly his interest latterly in predestination was that of the custodian of morality. He desired to safeguard God’s moral purity from any shadow that might be cast upon it by this dogma and at the same time to free man’s moral nature from the paralyzing effect of a synergistic synergism. His early statements were extravagant. Now he emphatically declared that God could in no sense be regarded as the author of sin. Evil was permitted by Him, but it was abhorrent to His nature. He therefore felt obliged to give up the dogma of an eternal decree of predestination. The cause of man’s sin was in man himself, and the hardening of his heart was due to willful disobedience and perseverance in wickedness. The possibility for his spiritual state was emphasized. The offer of God’s grace was universal. Original sin was a fact, yet man’s will, though it could not initiate a grace, could yet adapt an attitude of welcome or of repugnance to God’s grace offered in His Word. Accordingly we find Melanchthon editing the original Augsburg Confession in this interest.

Art. 18, which originally read, “justitia spiritualis is effected by the Holy Spirit which is received into the heart through the Word,” he altered to read, “justitia spiritualis is effected in us when we are enlightened by the Holy Spirit by the same alteration, adjuration, is made in art. 20. He prepared the Liturgia Interionis in the same spirit; “Although God does not justify men through their merits, nevertheless the merciful God does not act on man as on a block but draws him to his will co-operatively, provided he has come to years of discretion.”

Melanchthon’s position is clearly stated in the revised edition of his Loci (published in 1533) in a sentence that became famous and stereotyped in after controversy:

“In how extreme videntes coniungi ha causas, verbum, Spiritum sanctum, et coniunctionem conversionis repugnantes infinitae mente; or, as he expressed it in later editions; “his concurrents, the two causes both cause and effect, the Divine, Spiritus sancti, et humana voluntas assentient ne repugnantes verbo Dei. Posset enim excutire ut exeat Saul et dominus in autem, sed cur in iussione, sed ne in extremis, sed adjuvante etiis Spiritu sancto conuator assentii in hoc certamen, voluntas separat.”

There is little doubt that Melanchthon applies this to the act of conversion, and his view was that the positive assent of the will was essential, although, as Herrlinger points out, he maintained at times that the help of the Holy Spirit was necessary to enable the will to accept the gospel. While he does not make it at all times quite clear whether this assent was itself the result of the working of God’s Spirit or due to the natural energy of the will, yet he seems to maintain that something must be granted to the will itself, and here is the point on which the synergistic controversy hinges. This ambiguity is noticeable also in some of his earlier statements. Pelagius, interpreting his master as teaching that the will was a causa subordinata, after the Holy Spirit in the Word had roused up the soul.

Latterly he defined the will after Erasmus as facultas applicandi ad se gratiam, and therefore the difference between the saved and the lost is
ultimately due not to election—for even God fore-
saw something in the elect which conditioned His
election—not or repubration, but to man himself.
The difficulty which confronted Melanchthon was
just to determine what constitutes responsibility,
and, even if his solution is defective and open to
verbal criticism, as it certainly is, it is a merit
that he recognized the problem in its seriousness
and that he tried to solve it on moral grounds.

Melanchthon's synergism also affected his
practical outlook. To those who defended civil
and social outrage because they were sinners, and
would remain sinners unless changed by a divine
divine

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consideration, he sternly said that man in spite of original sin had
liberty in outward actions, the reason could control
the will, and the will the bodily movements. No
man could say, like the servant of Zen, that he
was compelled to sin by fate. It is clear that his
soul loathed this Manichasism, as he called it, and
his safeguarding of predestination from those who
so understood it was elanently demanded by the
circumstances of the age and of many ages since.

It is surely as immediate a datum of Christian
experience that the sinner is responsible for his
sin as that he ascribes his salvation to God's grace.

Melanchthon did not take a prominent part in the califical
controversy. He did not altogether deplore over General
statements that 'good works are necessary for holiness,' but by various utter-
sances, when he said that, whilst something is to be said
in justification that is of grace alone, he was anxious to
show that a holy life was the inevitable consequence and the
test of the reality of a justified life. Anderson's statement
that 'good works are harmful to holiness' he characterized as a
leviathanistic hyperbole.1

4. The synergistic controversy—Melanchthon's
statements concerning free will were ambivalent and so
hesitating that men, accustomed to the brevy statements of Luther, and who subject
felt as if he attributed to the will more than he actually expressed, and his acceptance of Erasmus's
formula gave this feeling a colour of truth.

Luther on this point was delinete:

'Ve gethein aund gethein Sachen war der Seelen Hall
betrift da ist der Muench wie die Salenstein, wie Loth's Welt, ja
wie ein Ketze und Stein, wie ein teilt Bild, das weder Augen
noch Mund weder Sin no赫r Herz brauchen.'2

What Luther advocated with zeal Melanchthon
admitted with reserve. It was therefore inevitable, and it broke out violently, occasioned by
two publications of Pfeffinger—a Leipzig pro-
essor and disciple of Melanchthon.

He tried to answer the question why one man under
the preaching of the Word became converted and another did not, and he maintained that one willingly
assented and the other did not. The difference cannot be attributed to a difference in the activity in the divine with
therefore the difference lies in man himself. We must there-
fore attribute a certain synergy to our will. Man even now in
his fallen state is not as a statue or a stone, nor is he purely
passive, for, if that were the case, there would be no difference
between the pious and the impious, the elect and the damned,
Saul and David. God would become a respecter of persons and
the author of continuance in the impious and the damned. On
the other hand, the human will has not the power to effect
spiritual motions without the help of the Holy Spirit, but the
Holy Spirit moving through the Word of God, and the mind
thinking, and the will not resisting but complying under the
Spirit's influence—these are the causes which constantly
produce conversion.

Pfeffinger's defence and explanation of Melanchthon's
views called forth violent opposition especially from Amsdorf and Flacius. The former
(see above) said that, according to Pfeffinger, man could prepare and equip himself for
conversion by the natural powers of his free will without the aid of the Holy Spirit. Verbally
this was a point he held, but essentially it was an element of truth in it. Flacius appealed to Luther's
words and declared that man was worse than a stock or

1 Corp. Reform. IX. 407.
2 Hainry, in. v. 40, etc.
3 Propositiones de libero arbitrio et Questiones quibique de libertate voluntate humanae, Leipzig, 1556.

stone because he offered resistance to God's Spirit.
The will therefore does not co-operate; it opposes
and resists. Every one knows that this criticism,
though infelicitously expressed, is in touch with reality and spoken out of personal experience. As
regards religious matters, men absolutely agree—
he is spiritually dead; the image of God is not
only wholly obliterated, but is transformed into
the image of Satan. Man thus contributes nothing
positive to his own conversion; any
contribution of his is negative and resisting.

Pfeffinger replied to Amsdorf and incidentally
mentioned Flacius. He declared himself more
explicitly as holding that the unconverted will had the
power of either obeying or resisting God's offer in His Word. Thus the controversy raged,
the new university of Jena contending for the old
position of Luther and, violently opposing the
synergistic movement, which was stoutly advocated
by the faculties of Leipzig and Wittenberg.

At last, at the instigation of Flacius, an attempt
was made to silence opposition by authority. John
Frederick III., Elector of Saxony, was appealed to;
and by his command a Book of Confutation and
Condemnation of all prevalent heresies was
published at Jena in 1559. Of its nine divisions
the sixth was devoted to the abolition of
synergism. Those who took that man had
power in his will to co-operate with the grace of
God in conversion were stigmatized as over-
throwers of the grace of God. It was false to
maintain that he can do anything by his free will in
accepting or rejecting grace. Human nature
is wholly adverse from God and hostile to God and
is subjected to the tyranny of sin and Satan.

In a similar strain the oratorians—
Amsdorf, Wigand, Tilman Hessenhusen, etc.—spoke
and wrote against synergism and deduced this
anthropology from their predominant views,
the last-named saying that, in one respect,
2 God did not wish that all men should be saved, for He did
elect all. God's will acts in one uniform way on men just
as on stocks of animals.1

Melanchthon raised his voice against this deter-
ministic delirium and declared that it is absurd
to talk of conversion until the will consents, that
to reject God's grace is an act of will and not an act
of God, and that human nature has no power of
outward actions. An attempt was made to make
the book binding on teachers and preachers,
but without success. Even in Jena, the citadel
of orthodoxy, Pastor Hugel refused to read the
document; and the deacon Strigel raised his
voice on the synergistic side. Both Strigel and
Hugel were imprisoned, and it looked as if
synergism were doomed in Jena, for the university
was strengthened in the orthodox interest by the
appointments of Wigand and Judex to professorial
chairs and by the recall of Musaeus, all of whom
were strong champions of orthodoxy. However,
the prisoners were set free after an imprisonment
of less than six months, and a further attempt
was made to settle the dispute by public dis-
cussion. This disputation lasted from 2nd until
8th Aug. 1559, and occupied thirteen sittings.
The interest for us in these centres in the positions
defended and refuted regarding free will and God's
grace.

To begin with, Strigel maintained that the
substance and qualities of human nature were
not obliterated by the fall nor altered, but only
hindered in their activity. His position he made
clear by a curious physical illustration.
A magnet, he said, cannot attract iron when smeared
with olive-juice, and the rejection of its magnetic power
and it can

1 See Lutherli, p. 241.
case and not in the other. So by the fall man's nature is not destroyed, but only weakened. He is like him who fell among thorns, of whom Jerusalem and Jericho, he is dead, or like one weakened by disease but not dead as a corpse.

Strigel is here aiming at a distinction which satisfies many theologians—that between formal freedom and material freedom or that between natural ability and moral ability, a distinction largely used by Jonathan Edwards but in currency before his day. According to this distinction, man is able to will what he pleases. That is the very meaning of will—it is not compelled from without; but, though man has this natural ability, as a matter of fact he does not will the good spiritually simply because he does not want to—he lacks moral ability.

Seeberg contends that Strigel was groping after this distinction, but did not adequately express it. That is certainly true of him at this Weimar disputation. He did not make his meaning clear, but afterwards he distinguished very clearly between efficacia (δυναμία) or facultas, on the one hand, and capacitas or aptitude, on the other. Man has lost the first through the fall, and this Holy Spirit restores to the will the δυναμία or efficacy or faculty of believing, which was lost by the fall. At this disputation, however, Strigel did not go so far as to say that Flacius if the human will will co-operated with the Holy Spirit before conversion or only after, he hesitated and said that to him conversion was not a point but a line, not the beginning of the Christian life but the whole of it.

It is evident from reading the disputation that Strigel really wished to attribute power to the will, but at the same time to ascribe the chief place to the Holy Spirit. This seems to be an unfortunate term to use of factors that cannot be equated. He repeated the Melanchthonian formula: 'Concurrunt in conversione hac tria: Spiritus sanctus movens coram, vox Dei, voluntas hominis quae voc divinae assemnatur,' a sentence which is ambiguous; and on this point no decision could be reached. On the other hand, Flacius went so far as to say that the very substance of the soul was altered by the fall and by sin, and that therefore man was purely passive, or active only in hostility to God. Peace could not be restored by public controversy. In a few months the majority of all the clergy from the country, and Flacius, a man of undoubted erudition, died in his fifty-fifth year at Frankfort-on-Main. Strigel also left and died in Heidelberg at the early age of forty-five.

5. The Formula of Concord.—After various unsuccessful attempts at a solution of this and other disputes the Formula of Concord appeared, and, as it became an authoritative standard of the Lutheran Church, its position on this topic must be stated here.

The problem is dealt with in artt. 1 and 2 of the Formula, and, while no personal names are mentioned, the views of contending parties are very clearly kept in mind. In the 1st art., dealing with original sin, a clear distinction is drawn between actual transgressions (actualia delicta) and the hereditary sickness of the soul. Man's nature is in all its parts poisoned by inherited sin, and for this condition man is guilty and condemned by God's law, so that by nature men are the children of wrath, and from this state they can be saved only by the benefits of Christ's merit. How this corruption is transmitted is described. God creates every soul afresh, but because of physical generation from corrupted seed the hereditary disease of

...
SYNERGISM

In the Reformed Church the same problem arose, though it was approached somewhat differently. The distinctive feature of the Calvinistic system is its logical consistency; every doctrine is discussed not only by itself but in the light of the whole. The reason, regulatory principle in Calvinism is the sovereignty of God; and, when man's regeneration was viewed in the light of this principle, it was recognized that God's grace acted directly, and not, as it were, reflected and only on those who are not. That is obvious, but whence the difference? It was due to the determination of God. God, who had elected some, did not so as a bare matter of decree or quiescent foreknowledge or fortuitously waiting on their faith, but energetically through a series of efficient means—the redemptive mission of His Son, the preaching of the Word, the irresistible working of the Holy Spirit; and these were effective all along the line in the case of the elect, leading them from spiritual death to grace and glory. Now, in the case of the unregenerated it was a sufficient proof that this divine, all-prevailing efficacy, also existed, that it failed in this link of regeneration. It was non-existent here; therefore it was wholly non-existent. God did not elect them; the redemption of His Son was not purposively undertaken or efficaciously applied in their case. The question of the will is so embedded in the logical coherence of the system that to moot it is to raise the question of the validity of the system as a whole, and that is what happened in the case of Arminius, and especially—for Arminius himself did not attribute regenerating power to the will—in the case of his followers Simon Bishops (Episcopius), Philippus van Limborch, and others. The objections to Calvinism, as far as the subject of this article is concerned, were directed mainly against what was called irresistible grace and the extent of the Atonement.

The Arminians—for we may leave the Socinians out of account; W. Robertson Smith has aptly described them as 'Pelagians of the intellect'—held that grace worked similarly on all, the difference from which conversion arose being due not to God's grace but to man's own will. To them irresistible grace (or, more properly, efficacious grace) meant necessity, and so the responsibility for the final damnation of the lost fell on God. Again, the very fact that by the Atonement the possibility of salvation was opened to all, and they vehemently rejected the doctrine of the eternal reprobation of some, as Wesley so strenuously did afterwards, the Synod of Dort attempted to settle the problem, but in the Reformed Church as in the Lutheran it keeps constantly emerging. Here even more than in the Lutheran Church, which diffeently refrained from applying predestination theories to its anthropological and eschatological views, the problem is an acute one, for the question of God's moral character is raised, and it is from this quarter, rather than from the sphere of religious psychology, that the opposition emerges, and here its strength lies. Hence we find that Calvinistic apologetic has largely been a defense against what is regarded as misunderstandings, perjuries, and unwarrantable inferences. In regard to efficacious grace the Calvinist did not mean that God's grace did violence to the human will by outward or inward compulsion, or that it is all of the will as such, which always has worked and does work voluntarily, but that grace affected the disposition of man in such a way that the resistance of the will was changed into obedience. It was not the observation of the principle of the free will of man, that was most obstacles, but much more the efficacy of grace that

made the will not only in act but in disposition obedient.

Some Calvinists, notably the school of Samur, agreed with the Arminians that the Atonement was intended for all mankind; but the Arminians contended further, that it profited to the free will of man either to concur with or to reject this intention. The Calvinists felt that, while this opened a possibility of salvation to all, it made salvation certain for none, saving a contingency rather than a reality, and they could not understand a purpose of God which could thus be frustrated. To leave the future of mankind hanging on the slender thread of the free will—even if that thread was not itself an illusion—seemed too precarious to be consistent with a purposive God, and rendered the salvation of the regenerate itself problematic, a denial of the perseverance of the saints. Hence the position that the Atonement was meant for those that are saved or to be saved, and that grace is efficacious in the case of the elect; and so the empirical fact that some are not saved inwardly a proof that God's purpose in the Atonement was not meant for them.

Here also, as in the Lutheran Church, and as in the internal disputes on this question between the Jesuits and the Jansenists in the Church of Rome, as well as in the disputes of the Reformers on this point, we see the question at issue in spite of many current currents in the discussion itself. The Calvinistic and Arminian problem is even more illuminating than the Lutheran because it is more conscious of the persuasive nature of the issue. It is a matter not of anthropological simply, but of theology in all its bearings. A survey of the discussion, in spite of the changing outlook of our own day, reveals the palpable dangers on either side and at least teaches us where we are not to search for an adequate solution.

The problem is not an accident of history, but a fundamental problem of thought, perhaps the problem which goes deepest of all—the relation between God and man. It goes deeper and higher than the question of man's place in nature or man's place in history; it is the question of man's place in relation to God.

7. Conclusion.—What, then, is the significance of the synergistic controversy for modern Christi-anity? It would be rather difficult many of the presupposi- tions accepted by both parties alike, whether we look at the discussion as handled by Augustine and Pelagius, by Ficarius and Melanchthon, by Calvin and Arminius, or by Jansenists and Jesuit, are antiquated. The march of natural science has raised afresh the whole question of the nature of man, and the problem is now whether man's nature can be explained from below as a development of life in general. Alongside of the activity of science has gone a prodigious wealth of philosophical speculation dealing with the nature of man, his place in the universe, and the value of his experience and his self-consciousness. If the changes also in the structure of society, the emergence of democratic ideas, and the consequent application of new categories in the explanation of the significance of human life have changed the outlook consider-ably. The more direct activities of Christiani- ity itself, its vast missionary ideals and efforts, the investigations into the psychology of the Chris- tian life, the insight into what is the nature of Christian experience as distinct from what is accident- al or subsidiary—in short, the main currents of modern thought and life—have poured through Christian theology till the old landmarks are submerged, and many are left to wonder whether and what certainty that the unity of experience is a reality and that the problems of the spirit change not,
however much the outlook may change. It is on this changed background and in the light of these tendencies that the problem of synergism can alone be approached.

c. Modern Christianity in all its schools has had a naturalistic conception of man. From this point of view we can appreciate the emphasis laid by the early Greek theologians on man's freedom. Whatever may be thought of these views they are not inconsistent with the point of view as against fatalism Christianity asserts that freedom has a real meaning as applied to man. So all Christian schools to-day, whether they be historically affiliated with Augustinian or Reformed, emphasize freedom as against physical necessity or direct determinism. Freedom has a meaning in regard to man that it has not in regard to matter. It is necessary to be clear on this point because naturalistic necessitarians too often claim the Augustinian and the Calvinist as on their side, whereas they are working on a different level of experience altogether. This is brought out clearly by the following considerations:

1. According to Calvinism and Arminianism alike, man was originally created in the image of God, and his final end is to glorify God and to enjoy Him for ever. That is, man is by nature qualified by any changes brought about by sin and subsists as an inalienable characteristic of human nature.

'A lady once said to me, "The more I see of myself, I see nothing but sin, and mine as my sin."' It is true, but, 'Well, you do not see deep enough. There is something far more proper yours than your sin; and your sin is improper yours. It is a blot in your being, which, if you do not get rid of it, will never cease to be unsuiter to you. No; the image of God is more properly yours, though you had no share in the production of it.'

2. (It has always been held that man is responsible for his sin. He has formal freedom, nor can he ever become a non-moral being in the sense that he can become non-voluntary in his actions or place himself beyond the claims of the moral law on his character. Whatever his actual condition due to sin, these things hold true. His reason, conscience, and will always act rationally, morally, and volitionally. Again, the question here is not whether we agree with the content of this nature as explained by different schools of Christian thought. We may consider that the Arminian view gives too much, and the Calvinistic view too little, real freedom; but the important point is that from the general Christian standpoint man is not defined in terms of conditions, but, however subtle or refined in form. The synergistic controversy has no meaning either for opponent or for defender if the naturalistic view of man is true. The theory of T. H. Green as to the relation of the character to volitions is simply Calvinistic psychology in a philosophical dress, but its whole motive is to overthrow the naturalistic conception of man.

b. Synergism becomes a real problem when man's freedom is viewed in the light of God's activity. We are so accustomed to defending liberty against material necessity in our age that we do not as yet realize that the real problem of freedom emerges on the religious plane. What meaning and content are we to give to man's freedom, not now as against nature, but as against God Himself? The two main streams of thought emerge in history on this question.

(1) The Pelagian, looking almost exclusively at man's free power of initiative, became jealous even of God's influence. Man on this view is a bare individual and largely, if not wholly, his own creator. His sin is a bare act of will, undetermined by what went before and unaffected by what comes after. His will is his unconditionally, for the character is the result of acts of will; but an act of will can alter it easily. His merit is his own, and his salvation is his own. God never gets inside the azygion of man's free spirit, and free will is primarily the power of choosing between alternatives.

(2) To the Augustinian the problem was far more complicated. He recognized that man was organically related to the past. The influences of the past affect his will and disposition and character. He does not begin as a moral neutral or moral unit. Sin is more than a bare act of will. When a man becomes self-conscious, it is there not simply as the result of a wrong choice, but as the fruit of a vitiated disposition and itself a source of vitiation. The characteristic of moral awakening is the discovery of our bondage. We become conscious of our need of freedom more than of the fact that we are free. The interposition of God is not regarded as a violation of freedom, but welcomed as the restorer and succourer of true freedom itself, which is to be found under all the circumstances, in accordance with the highest. This deeper view of man led Augustine to the certainty of pre-individual iniquity—racial evil—as it led Kant to posit it as a supra-temporal fall. Of course there are phrases like original sin, the guilt of Adam's transgression, the fall of Adam, supra-temporal fall, and it is right to aim at verbal accuracy if possible, but it is essential that the repudiation of inadequate phraseology should not be met with by the rejection of the realities bodied forth by inaccurate phrases.

We have the same tendencies in philosophy in our day represented by naturalism in its many forms and by absolute idealism. The former is so alive to the importance of the individual that in its extreme and logical forms it makes the individual eternal a parte ante, and, if God is represented as it is, as a priva inter partes; the latter is so conscious of the claims of God that it tends to annihilate the personal life of the individual a parte post. The problem as to how a man can act against God's will is insoluble intellectually, and the Calvinist has great difficulty, in spite of his insistence on man's accountability and God's holiness, in saving himself from the pitfall of pantheism where sin is glorified into something divine, differing from what it is to the conscience. Yet, however sinful man's state may be, however the sinner may be alive to the deep-seated nature and wide extent of this diseased self-subsistence responsible to him, he cannot devolve the responsibility on God or on circumstances. That is the moral attitude. The intellect may attempt to explain sin either scientifically as a residuum from our animal origin or philosophically as due to finitude or as a necessary stage in our development; but every explanation that explains away the moral attitude is itself unsatisfactory. Pantheism, material, philosophical, or theological, sinks shipwreck on the conscience. But, on the other hand, though we are compelled to recognize centres of activity acting contrary to God's will, it is impossible to give them the self-subsistence that we give to God. Even in sinning they depend on Him and are within the scope of His control. The Christian doctrine of creation—creation in time, for creation has no other meaning than to designate dependent beings derives from anthropology and pluralism alike. While all subsist in God, personalities have a limited power of self-antagonism to God, but they do not compel God to disown His character as a free and responsible sustainer of all. He creates personalities with the capacity to create themselves. Their endowments and faculties, which vary so much as regards both individuals
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and races, which are also so clearly dependent on their historical setting, are of God. It is this interaction of God with His world, which accounts for the presence of high ideals among men however sinful, for the unrest and lack of harmony in the life of man of which Pascal speaks so eloquently, and it is this that makes salvation possible and essential. The Augustinian tended to view man's original constitutive nature as made in God's image as an affix of an ideal human ancestor, and to leave man's will, he argued, in a fruitful organic relation. A logical distinction was made an absolute distinction in rerum natura. The divine image in man was practically regarded as a fulgur appearing once in Adam for a brief space, but now no more; but sin has meaning only when the alienable immanence of God in man is fully recognized. The Church has never agreed to the Fincian view of human nature as itself sin; but its language has often been perilously near it, and, when it has, protests have been raised, as in New England, where the amiable qualities of man have been emphasized until the need of salvation has been minimized or evaporated. On the ground, then, that man's original creation we must say that man has freedom which, alas, has been exercised against God Himself, though given by God and intended by Him to coincide joyfully with His own.

How to reconcile God's holy omnipotence and foreknowledge with this human fact seems an insoluble problem. We must give content to God's predestinating activity; it is not enough to posit a quiescent, non-interfering divine knowledge; otherwise there is no guarantee of the ultimate success of God's purposes. But, on the other hand, we must not look on God's grace to increase the moral cause of sin or as acting mechanically in man, and certainly not as an insurmountable barrier to the recovery of his true freedom, and that in a moral way.

The syncretist fought against a view of God which made Him in the case of some men the obstacle to salvation, withholding His grace from some, and making remedial provision only for some; and in this the syncretist was right. Here again the Christian doctrine of the new creation is the safeguard. God is not only inalienably immanent in man by virtue of the first creation; He is also redemptively active in man through Christ. The syncretist is mainly right in his psychology of conversion.

God's grace is efficiently active, and the consent of the will is the result of that activity; yet He is active in harmony with man's true being, and man's consent is voluntary. Man does not simply accept the offer of grace by the power of his unaided will and so convey it into the soul. His will is never unaided; grace comes into the soul as a power of God moulding the will itself. The acceptance itself is not the cause of its presence. The supremacy of grace and its efficiency is maintained by the religious consciousness on self-examination, but the acceptance itself is an act of will.

The miracle here also is not that a man's will should be effectually moved to harmonize with God's redemptive activity; the miracle is that some men should resist even this. It is not to be thought that their resistance is due to the fact that God withholds or withdraws His gracious activity, for He uses it for the other. The gospel offer is to all, even the Calvinist says, and it is a bona fide offer; it is more, for the cost to God—what we mean by the Atonement—is so real and so great that the activity of God is an energy penitent. God does not deal with the sinner simply in the way of punishing him; He deals with him in a redemptive way. How can this fact of man's resistance, again, be reconciled with God's omnipotence? Many, like Schleiermacher, find refuge in final universal salvation, in a probation extending beyond this life. But God's omnipotence is a reality which recognizes man's possible and essential freedom, it values man's freedom. This resistance does not annihilate the divine omnipotence, nor does it rob God of His character as Creator and Redeemer, He is the One which were the Father in the Old Testament.

The value of synergism is in its denials. It is wrong to regard God's activity as doing violence to this initiative of man. The weakness of synergism is that it tends to regard this activity of man as separate from God with beginning and as not co-operating with God. The relation between them is more intimate. God Himself is present from the outset in this freedom; and when, as in Christian experience, the soul awakens to the presence of God, then it is felt that God has done so much in Christ, and is doing so much, that it is joyfully acknowledged that the will's power is His, and the renewal of it is His work. Salvation is not an acquisition of a new freedom, but the welcome deliverance and liberation of the whole personality. Religion in its strength emphasizes God, and in so doing frees man into the liberty of joyful service.


C. E. Luthardt, Die Lehre vom freiem Willen, Leipzig, 1893, gives a detailed history of the controversy in its origin and development, with the Arbeiten Melanchthons zur Lehre der Notgeltung, Leipzig, 1884; Florow, De synergismo Melanchthoni, Tübingen, 1887, is a special handling of the subject referred to by G. Kauerau, who has written much on the various antagonisms in the synergistic controversy; see Schmied, Kautzsch, cit. 239 f., also PFRK xiv. 225 ff., E. F. Fischer has a trenchant Melanchthon's teaching on conversion (Melanchthon's Lehre von der Entbundenheit, Tübingen, 1905; and Paul Tschackert, Die Entstehung der lutherischen und der reformierten Kirchenlehre, Göttingen, 1920, pp. 320-321, is an excellent summary.


SYNODS.—See COUNCILS AND SYNODS.

SYRIANS (or Arameans).—I. General introduction.—The Hebrew 'Aram' is rendered in the LXX by Συρία, 'Syria.' We may therefore take it for granted that originally the words 'Arameans' and 'Syr' were synonymous. At a later time 'Syrian' and 'Assyrian' were used indiscriminately: 'Aσσυριανος = Συριανος = Συριας.' According to Gn 16., Aram was one of the five sons of Shem, and, according to Gn 10., Aram was the father of Uz, Harran, and Sha 'al. The Arameans, or Syrians, are therefore Semites.

A complete study of the Arameans would include that of all the races whose languages, manners, and religion are to be found within the Syrian scope; but our purpose here is to consider only the pagan Arameans. We shall not touch upon Western (i.e. Biblical) Aramean, represented by several quotations preserved in the OT and PSE in the form of the Egyptian papyri and ostraka, particularly those of Elephantine, nor the Jewish dialects.

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represented by the Targums, the Megilloths, and the Jerusalem Talmud, nor Samaritan, nor the fragments of Christo-Palestinian literature. All those are of the greatest importance from the general Aramean point of view, religious as well as philological, but are outside the scope of this article. The same remark applies to the different branches of Eastern Aramean, which includes the Babylonian Talmud, the literature, language, and religion of the Mandaeans, Mandarins, and Harranrians (q.v.). We shall also leave untouched the study of Syriac (language and literature) and the chief Neo-Aramean (Christian) dialects.

The principal names of the Syriacs are the Palmarenes (q.v.), the Nabataeans (q.v.), and the Syriacs of Damascus and of the region north of Syria. We get our information on these races from the OT, ancient inscriptions, and Latin and Greek coins and documents.

The ethnic arami, ἀραμικ, 'Aramaean,' is found in 2 Kgs 23:20, Gn 25:29, Dt 26:5. Its fem. is aramitaa, ἀραμιτά, in 1 Ch 7:44. The plur. is aramim, ἀραμιμ, in 2 Kgs 8:10, 32. The corresponding Greek of the LXX is respectively ἀραμικον, ἀραμίκον, τοῦ ἀραμίους ἐπισκόπου, ἀραμικός, ἀραμικαί. The most famous of the Syrian kings was Zedekiah (Gn 34:31), etc.; cf. Ἰωάς (1 Ch 27:4); cf. § 261 (5 § 261). The adverb ἀρανθ in 'Aramaean,' is translated by the LXX ἀραμαίω, εἰς την ἀραμαίω, § 1536, § 1536, § 24, § 24.

The OT gives the following information on the pagan Arameans.

Aram Zobah (Zoba). דָּעַר זֹבָּה (LXX τὸν Ζωβάν Σωπα), in 1 S 14:17, 2 S 8:28, 10:5, 1 K 11:35 etc. This expression means an Aramean state in the north of Canaan or its capital. The town of Zobah was situated in Lebanon, according to 1 Ch 18:12. Aram Mu'akka (Moab), מֹעָכָא (LXX τὸν Μωβαπαίον, ἐν Μεσοποταμίᾳ, ἀλάβα τὸν Ζωβαίον (Gn 14:7), etc.; cf. Ζωβαίον (1 Ch 27:4); cf. § 261 (5 § 261). The nebrev 'mac, 'Moab, is' is translated by the LXX Μωσαμβά, in 28:7, § 258, § 258.

Aram Beth Rebah (Beth Rehob). בְּתֵה רֹב (LXX Ροῦ), in 1 S 15:5, 1 S 15:36, or of the name of the sons of Aram when fighting against Joab, David's general. They took to flight before Joab, who re-entered Jerusalem in triumph. Rehob is said to be in the north of Palestine, in the region of Laish, or Dan (Gn 15:9).²

Aram Naharaim (Nahor, נַחוֹר, LXX τὸν Μεσοποταμίαν), is identified by the LXX with Mesopotamia (Gn 20:18, Dt 26:2, Jg 3:1, 1 Ch 16:9); 'Syria of the two rivers.' This is a mistake. Naharaim means 'country of the river,' and corresponds to the Nahrims of the Tel el-Amanus letters and to Nahalim in the Egyptian royal inscriptions. It extended over two banks of the middle Euphrates.³ At the time of the Khai the name Naharaim was given to the country lying between the Balikh and the Orontes.⁴

Paddan Aram (Pudon-aram). פַּדְדַן אֲרָם (LXX τὸν Μεσο- ποταμίαν), in Gn 25:22, 28:2, Jg 3:1, 1 Ch 17:16, 'Syria of the two rivers.' This is a mistake. Aram (q.v.) perhaps refers to northern Mesopotamia.⁵

2. DAMASCUS. —Aram Damasqūs, δαμασκός (LXX Ζωπά Ναξακοος), in 2 S 5:14; 1 Ch 18:14, is Syria of Damascus, which came to the help of Hadadezer, king of Zobah; David slew 22,000 Syrians and put garrisons in Syria of Damascus (Syria-Damasus).

In the course of time Syria (Aram) comprised numerous divisions, the chief of which, besides those mentioned above from the Bible, were: Batania, or country of Bashan, Connagene with its capital Samosata, Cyrhhestic-with Cyrihus as capital, and to the south is this region, together with its capital Chalybon (Haloπ=Alip), Cilene-Syria with Heliopolis (Baalbek) as capital, Seleucia, or Tetrapolis, with Seleucus, Antioch, Laodicea, and Apamea as principal towns. Chalced in with its capital Chalceia (Kimnesean), etc. In many cases we have not enough information about these divisions to treat them separately. The best plan will be to give a résumé of the details supplied by history, inscriptions, and other documents, grouping them round Damascus and the Damascene.

The god who received most worship was Hadad, whose consort was the Syrian goddess, or Atargatis. This god was also called Ramman or Ramman. These two names appear as early as 3000 B.C. in the cuneiforms. This deity does not appear in Phenician texts. Hadad is represented in Syria and Mesopotamia. He is the god of lightning and thunder; he shakes the mountains; he is beneficent when he sends the rain which fertilizes the earth; he is the destroyer when he sends floods and inundations. According to the inscriptions of Senjirli, Hadad was the first of the gods of northern Syria in the 8th cent. B.C. His chief sanctuary was at Hierapolis (Mabbeg, Manbij), near the Euphrates.

He was specially worshipped by the agricultural populations of Syria as the protector-god of the harvests. In time his cult became confused with that of the sun; his head was then ornamented with rays; this identification is particularly noticeable in Heliopolis (Baalbek), where the cult of Hadad and that of the sun are one and the same. In Roman times Hadad became Jupiter Optimus Maximus; he was associated with various local deities (Dolichenus, Hadaranes, Heliopolitanus), but he can always be recognized by the fact that he is represented with the bull or that he is mentioned along with his consort, the Syrian goddess Atargatis. A third personage is usually connected with these great gods, regarded as their son or their daughter. These three together form the triad known as the dii syrii. They have sanctuaries in a great many Syrian towns—Rhosus, Raphanae on the Lebanon (in Graeco-Roman times). But the principal sanctuary of the Syrian gods, after Hierapolis, was Damascus, and the Bible mentions kings of Syria in the 9th cent. B.C. with theophorous names, such as Ben-Hadad, Tabrimmon. It is even possible that this cult of Hadad exercised a certain influence on some Israelite centres, which would explain the representation of Jahweh by a young bull. In Roman times Hadad became Jupiter Damascus. In all probability Jupiter Heliopolitanus, the god of Heliopolis (Baalbek), should be identified with Hadad.

The consort of Hadad is Atargatis, the great Syrian goddess—also under the names Alit and Venus—who must not be confused with Astarte, the Phenician goddess. Coins of Hierapolis call her 'Ate or Atargatis.' She was represented with her head surrounded with rays. The symbol of Atargatis was composed of the crescent moon in conjunction with the solar disc.

Besides the divine couple, Hadad and Atargatis, the Syrian pantheon included other deities, of secondary rank, several of whom had a purely local character.

Reshef, or Rashaf, was the incarnation of thunder and lightning. He was often represented as a soldier armed with spear, mace, bow, and shield; he carried on his helmet a gazelle's head surmounted by two sharp horns. Reshef is also met with in Phenicia and in Cyprus. He was in later times identified with Apollo. Some scholars regard him as a Phenician rather than a Syrian deity.

The inscriptions also mention Rekub-el, 'the charioteer of El,' who is probably an importation into Syria of the charioteer of the sun-god of the Assyrians. El was an important god, but did not occupy the first rank in the Syrian pantheon. Bel was worshipped in Syria, as in Assyria, and among the other Semitic races.

Alongside of sun-worship the Syrians devoted a very special cult to the moon-god. Of two
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Niebrg inscriptions (6th cent. B.C.) one mentions Sahar, Shammas, Nikkal, and Nusk, the other omits Shammas, Sahar, and Nusk. In addition, only Sahar, Nikkal, and Nusk, the moon-god, was the chief deity of Harran. His wife, Nikkal, corresponds to Nin gol, 'the great lady,' wife of Sin, the Assyrian moon-god. Their son, Nusk (Nusku or Nushka, in Syrian), represents fire, according to some scholars, and, according to others, he personifies the crescent moon.

The stele of Teima (an oasis in the north of Arabia) mentions the ancient gods Teima, Singalla, and Ashira, gods of Teima. La Grange proposes to identify Salm with Salmu, the 'dark,' the dark planet, i.e. Saturn. According to other writers, the word salm, 'image,' 'statue,' means the idol of the local god (ba'al) of Teima; Singalla is of Assyrian importation and denotes the great Sin; Ashira corresponds to the Asherah of the Canaanites.

An inscription recently discovered by Pogon in the region of Aleppo, but probably the oldest Syrian inscription, mentions not only Zakir, king of Hamath, and Laash, but also a new deity, the god Kekub-El. He is the son of a local god, the genius bust of Hazak, for in the continuation of the text the important part is ascribed not to Altur but to Bar' alf Shamain.

Of the three Sejnirli inscriptions that of Hadad, the older, mentions the gods Hadad, El, Reshef, Rekbuk El, Shamash, who, according to Panammu what he asked of them. Lagrange calls attention to the fact that no goddess figures in this list. The same is also true of Anu declared that of Panammu dates from the reign of Tiglath-Pileser III. (754-727 B.C.) and mentions the gods Hadad, El, Rekbuk El, Shamash, and all the gods of Jadi. The third one, called that of Barrekeb, dates from the same period, but does not mention any deity, except that Barrekeb declares that, on account of his loyalty, his lord Rekbuk El and his lord Tiglath-Pileser have placed him on his father's throne.

When Zenobia was taken captive to Rome, the cult of the Syrian gods penetrated to the great city with her (or before her). This fact is now duly established by the discovery of a sanctuary to the gods of Harran in the Nasser villa.

We read inscriptions dedicated to the Syrian god Adad (Hadad) of Lebanon on a small white marble altar. There is also an inscription dedicated 'diis syris' at Spalato.


1. Clermont-Ganneau, Études d'archéologie orientale, 1892-1894.
2. Pq., 490-503.
3. IV, 1895.

To the north they became masters of Trans-Jordan as far as Damascas. The oldest Nabataean inscriptions, discovered on the south of Damascus, date from the 2nd century A.D., but inscriptions at Petra and ed-Druz, a little later. At the beginning of the 1st cent. of our era, Arab influence makes itself clearly felt, especially in the regions of Hegrâ and Medain Sakh.

The Nabataean sources now in our possession are inscriptions, which are published in the second part of C1Z, and coins, which have been studied most recently by H. Dussaud and have revealed an almost uninterrupted series of kings, of whom the eldest is Malicthus I. (90 B.C.) to Malicthus III. (A.D. 106). But before these dates a Nabataean race was known which in 312 B.C. was powerful enough to gain the victory against Antigonus. After this victory the Nabataeans, an essentially trading people, occupied the north of Arabia, the country of Edon, and the Damascene. F. H. Vincent has gathered together all that is known concerning the Nabataeans.

The Nabataean inscriptions are also of chief importance for the history of the Nabataeans, who were a tribe, with the exception of some nomads; they honoured the sun, to whom they built an altar on their houses, and to whom they offered libations and burned incense. The following are the principal deities. Dushara (Dusares) seemed to occupy the first place in Nabataean religion, and his name was perhaps the same as that of the oldest god of the Edomites. The names of the goddesses Vagrada and Tâda are from a doubtful reading as well as those of Naushu and Elge. The Syrian god Bar'alf Shamin was also adopted by the Nabataeans. The Nabataeans erected temples to their gods. The temple comprised a small building to contain the statue of the god, a sacred enclosure (barrak), votive stelae, and niches for the images.

Whether the Nabataean inscriptions in the Nabataeanised Arabs or real Arameans, they gave a very large place in their pantheon to the deities and cult-objects of Aramean or Syrian origin. See, further, NABATAEANS.


1. Clermont-Ganneau, Études d'archéologie orientale, i. (1892), 80; Lagrange, Études sur les religions syriques, pp. 492-503.

4. The Palmyrenees.—See art. PALMYRENE.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the literature appended to art. PALMYRENE, see also:—M. de Chambry, Les Clefs de Palmyre, Paris, 1877; L. G. Deville, Palmyre: souvenirs de voyage et d'histoire, Paris, 1894; H. Dussaud, Notes de mythologie syrienne, pp. 80, 81; DE. E. E. Dusseaud, Les Langues d'Araméens, d'Araméens, et d'Amazéens, Paris, 1910, pp. 12-51; Répertoire d'épigraphie syrienne (published by the commission of the C1Z), do. 1900 ff.
5. Syrian cult.—In their pantheon, as in their religious practices, the Arameans had naturally very close relations with the Assyro-Babylonian cults on the one hand and with those of Phœnicia and Canaan on the other. They preserved the local gods in cults, in conjunction with the worship of sun, moon, and stars, preferably on high mountains or sharp mountain-peaks, regarded as the abode of the gods. They worshipped sacred trees or groves, placed in the fields. They also rendered worship to sacred springs, and Palmyra possessed a specially consecrated river, whose Tyche was venerated. Certain sacred rivers had miraculous powers; if the offering sank to the bottom of the water, it was approved by the deity; if it floated, it was not approved.

As among the rest of the Semites, sacred enclosures have been found among the Arameans, known as ḥaram, and much used among the Arabs. The boundaries of the ḥaram were fixed by steles, several of which have been recovered during the course of excavation.

We have little information concerning the after life among the Semites in general, and the Arameans in particular. Like the ancient Hebrews, they probably had Sheol, the kingdom of the dead. From the Semjšrī, a Jewish and Neœraic inscription, which contains a few funerary texts, we learn that the Arameans believed that a part of the dead person survived, called Ṉepēha, 'soul.' It was a material principle, to which they had to offer food and drink.

Among the most venerated objects of worship we must mention the sacred stones, or betyla, which assumed various aspects. The presence of the god was materialized by a stone placed in the sacred enclosure. The inscription of Hadad shows that the Arameans worshipped the nasib, a hewn stone or statue. A Palmyrenian inscription shows among the Arameans the use of the wasebih (q.v.), in the sense of 'stele.' And they distinguished between the funerary stele, naphah, 'soul,' of pyramidal form, and the votive stele, napāζa (whence our word 'mosque,' through Arabic), which meant the place in which the deity was worshipped.

As regards the personnel of the cult, we hear of the priest, ṇomēr, attached to the service of such-and-such a god. It was he who offered the holocaust. Barbers played an important part, both in performing the ritual incisions and in shaving the heads of those who dedicated their hair to the deity in consequence of a vow. There are also scribes, charged more especially with keeping the accounts of the temple. Sacred prostitutes were not lacking in the Aramean cults; and lastly we must mention the familiars of the temple, who rendered services to the faithful who came to worship or make vows, and who lived in the surroundings of the temple, finding their food in the remains of the meals offered to the gods.

6. Calendar.—The Aramean calendar is fairly well known; the Nabateans and Palmyrenians employed the Seleucid era, and for a very long time the Syrians made their year begin in autumn. The names of the months of the Palmyrenians are all known: Tibrī, Kanūn, Kalūl, Tḥl, Shḥb, Adar, Nīn, Ir, Šion, Qīnān Ab, Etul. Those of the Nabateans are the same, except the second and tenth, which are not known. This information refers to the Roman times. The ancient names of the months have not yet been brought to light by the oldest inscriptions (Semjšrī and Neœraic).


FRÉDÉRIC MACKLER.

SYRIAN CHRISTIANS.—1. Scope of this article.—Much confusion has arisen from the fact that several different bodies of Christians—Jacobite, Maronite, Nestorian, Malabarese, and others—habitually call themselves "Syrians," as well as from the fact that the word 'Syria' itself has meant different things at different times. It will therefore be well at the outset to define the scope of this article.

The East Syrians or Nestorians call themselves 'Sirəyâ,' said to be a corrupt form of 'Sirâyâ.' The Syrian Jacobites are in the Syrian variety of 'Sirayâ'; by way of distinction (or by confusion) 'Sirayâ' and or 'Syriac' and or 'Syrians.' The name 'Syria' (Syr. Sir̄yā, Gr. Συρία or Ζύπφ, 'a locis Palestine martiniis') has been derived from Tȳrr̄, Tyr, 'Tyre,' and it was used with a different sense, &c. It varied in meaning from time to time. In Roman days, at the beginning of our era, it denoted the country west of the Euphrates and north of the Arabian desert, including Palestine and Palmyra, and extending north to the Taurus; though the Roman procurators or the Herods ruled all or part of Palestine, being more or less independent of the governors of the Roman province of Syria. It has also been called 'Inner Syria' meant Palestine (and the coast lands to the north thereof), and 'Outer Syria' meant Mesopotamia. The modern Turkish vilâyet of Syria is only a fraction of the old Roman province, and lies east of the Lebanon, extending from Hama on the Orontes in the north to the Hedjaz in the south, Damascus being the capital, while the vilâyet of Beirut is west of the Lebanon, and the old Judaea is an independent sanjak under a muqādir. Thus the term 'Syrian Christians' has little relation to the term 'inhabitants of Syria.' The most comprehensive definition of the former is 'The Christians who worshiped the Syrian language in their liturgical services or as a vernacular.' It thus includes the Jacobites of Mesopotamia, the Nestorians, the Maronites of the Lebanon, the Syrian and Chaldaic Unions, and the Christians of St. Thomas in Malabar.

The history of many of these Christians has usually been considered in Europe only as far as it affects their relations with certain heresies, i.e. only from one episode word the Bible of the Aramean of the OT, or 'Chaldee,' as it is used to be called), perhaps not more distant

1 R. Payne Smith, Thesaurus Syriacum, ii. 2558.
2 Th. ii. 2558.
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than some dialects of 'English' now current in the British Isles are from one another. The Edessa Syriac was the medium of commerce in the valley of the Euphrates, and was used far and wide for literary purposes. But, though this was, and is, a written language, oral dialects of Syriac were spoken vernacularly throughout a very wide district, from the Mediterranean to the eastern limits of Mosopotamia, Assyria, and Adiabene (east of the Tigris), and southwards to the borders of Egypt and Arabia. There were many Syriac-speaking monks in Egypt in the 4th cent. and, later,4 Even the Armenian Christians used Syriac till the 4th century.5 Thus there were many Syriac dialects. They were not the lineal descendants of classical Syriac, but were rather in the position of sisters or nieces of that language.

Syriac gradually gave way, vernacularly and to some extent liturgically, to Arabic after the Muhammadan conquest, though it has had locally a considerable influence on the vocabulary, pronunciation, and even the grammatical forms of the 'Arabic' which succeeded it.6 The Christians who now speak it habitually are the East Syriacs (Nestorian and Uniat Chaldeans), among whom it is practically the only language used (though the spoken Arabic), the Jacobites of Jebel Tar, and the people of Ma'lu' near Damascus. The other Jacobites and the Maronites now ordinarily use Arabic for their vernacular. The Malabarese have probably never used Syriac vernacularly—unless the immigrants from Persia used it for a while (see below, § 9)—but have always spoken an Indian dialect. It may be noted that many Jews in E. Turkey and Persia have a vernacular closely akin to the spoken Syriac of the Nestorians; and the language of the Ma'laezeans (q.v.), or so-called 'Christians of St. John,' if they still exist, is another branch of Aramaic. In the early ages of Christianity the literary language of Syriac proper was Greek (see below, § 3), but Syriac was the popular language there till after a.d. 500. It should be remembered that Antioch itself was a Greek, not a Syriac, centre. The Syriac was predominantly Greek, though Syriac was the language of numerous monks in it and its neighbourhood, and of the country people.

The above-mentioned Christians use classical Syriac as their liturgical language; and many of them use it still as their literary language, as all did till the Middle Ages. It will thus be seen that the prayers in the Church services are only imperfectly, if at all, understood by the majority of the worshippers. In Syria proper, however, many of the prayers are said in an Arabic translation, so as to be intelligible to the people; they are then written in Syriac characters, and this combination of Syriac and Arabic is called Carshuni (Syr. garshāni).7 But those services which are the bishop's own—e.g., ordination—are in Syriac only, as are all the prayers which are said inaudibly by the priest.

The vernaculars differ from classical Syriac in different degrees. The East Syrian vernacular dialects, which vary a good deal among themselves, differ from it perhaps as much as Italian from Latin, while the Ma'lu' dialect has retained more of the older grammar and is less analytically developed.8 This last vernacular is particularly noticeable as being preserved by those who are so far isolated from other Syriac-speaking Christians. Ma'lu' (called Seleucia by the Turzi) is a village of some 1000 inhabitants, situated about 5000 ft. above sea-level, north-east of Damascus; while two neighbouring villages, though most of their inhabitants have become Muslims within the last 250 years, also speak Syriac vernacularly. Ma'lu consists ecclesiastically of two divisions; half are of the Uniat Rite (see below, § 6), half of the Greek Orthodox rite. Each division has an ancient monastery.9 This distinction is that it is spoken by the immigrants from the east, from the district of Singar or Sinjar (west of Mosul), and by those largely inhabited by Yazidis, or so-called 'devil-worshippers'; but this tradition is very doubtful value.10

Of all the Syrian Christians, whether they have lost their own vernacular or have retained it, it may be noted that their clergy are supposed all to be able to read and write and understand classical Syriac; and most of them can do so, and can even, with some difficulty, speak it. But this is now only as a foreign language.

There are some differences of pronunciation. The East Syriacs (Nestorian and Uniat Chaldean) say ă when the West Syriacs (Jacobite) and the Maronites say ē (e.g., modēk, modēk, 'a king'), the former being the older sound, preserved to us in translations (cf. "Sylloge," p. 57); but in other cases (e.g., Syc, Māran ethth or possibly Mārkān thā). The East Syriacs hardly ever aspirate p (except when it is used to form a diphthong); many of them pronounce r or ṣ; almost all of them pronounce the vowels Rīśās (Rīśās) and Rīśākh alike as B, the sound being produced by the tongue placed above the upper teeth (e.g., Zaşāp, Zašāp) with or without aspirated ṣ or p. One point with regard to transliteration of Syriac words into Roman characters must be mentioned: whereas the Asiatics retained a medial consonant in certain verbal formations and in words derived from them, the Syriacs is said to be retained (e.g., 'Adās for 'Adā). The Syriacs themselves, however, dislike doubled letters, and in their vernacular admit them only in a few (so-called foreign) words, and in that case they pronounce each letter distinctly, like the d's in 'mid-day.' On the other hand, the contemporary Aramaic of the Akkadian and Assyrian type is very similar to this, the medial consonant by converting a preceding short ı into a long one. Most of them pronounce aspirated ṭūkh (ṣāk) and  withd (lāk) alike.

3. Syrian Christianity in early times.—In considering the spread of Christianity in these regions before the theological controversies of the 5th century, caused the divisions which exist to this day, we are faced with the difficulty that legends are the traditional groundwork of the religious history. It is not easy to estimate the amount of truth or falsehood that underlies the legends; but there is no doubt that all these regions were largely Christianized at an early period.

(a) The Roman province of Syria.—Here we are not troubled with legend. In the 1st cent. of our era the province extended to the Euphrates, but was conjoined with Cilicia.2 Antioch was the civil metropolis, and was likewise the headquarters of Syrian Christianity; there the disciples were first called 'Christians' (Ac 1119). The Greeks and Syrians were both represented at Antioch (see above, § 2). There is no evidence as to the extent to which the Church services were conducted in the Aramaic vernacular rather than in Greek; but probably, at a time when the worship was in the main extemporaneous, both languages were used. Though most of the people, perhaps, understood Greek, even if it was not their mother tongue, yet experience shows that the last place in which a vernacular gives way to the language of commerce and public life is that of religion. It is therefore probable that Syrian Christians in the Roman province to a large extent worshipped in their vernacular from apostolic times onward. But Greek was the literary language. Ignatius, bishop of Antioch at the beginning of the 2nd cent., wrote in Greek (he calls himself 'bishop of Syria');4 Lucian and Dorotheus of Dorothea11 (cf. 1 Cor. 11, 10), and Theodore, bishop of Mopsuestia (both these of Antioch), Chrysostom, Theodore, bishop of Cyrrhus—all of the 4th and 5th centuries—did

1 Parison, pp. 250-261.
2 T. Noldeke, Grammatik der neusyrischen Sprache, p. xxvii.
3 Parison, pp. 240, 249.
4 Burkitt, Early Eastern Christianity, p. 45.
5 For examples of the 'church in Syria,' and God as its shepherd in his stead).
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...The Antiochene school of theology was...to dismiss Addai as mythical. A trace of the mixture of the Greek and Syriac elements may be seen in the Pilgrimage of Silvia ("Etherea"), a work probably of the 4th ec., which describes the bishop of Jerusalem as knowing Syriac ("sivide"), but believes in Greek ("greekos"); b) having his sermons and the lections interpreted into Syriac by a presbyter who stood by.

In the 4th ec., when the provincial organization of the Church was grounded, Antioch was one of the great centres, and its bishop was called a 'metropolitan'; the corresponding verb is found in can. 19 of the Council of Antioch in ex ecrs. (A.D. 341), and the name itself in can. 6 of Nicaea (A.D. 325), which says that the rights formerly possessed by Antioch must be preserved to it. Thus Antioch had long exercised some sort of jurisdiction over neighbouring sees. Yet the Apostolic Constitutions, a Greek work written in Syria c. A.D. 375, does not mention metropolitans, any more than the other 'Church Orders' do. This is important in connexion with the supposed dependence of Seleucia-Ctesiphon on Antioch, for which see below (c).

(b) Edessa.—This famous city of Mesopotamia, called in Syriac Ur-hâ (now Urfa), was the capital of the kingdom of Osroene (a Greek name derived from Ur): Ur-hâ'. 'Edessa' was the Greek name for the city. The kingdom was independent till A.D. 216, when it was incorporated in the Roman empire. According to the well-known legend of Abgar and Addai, Edessa was Christianized in the middle of the 1st cent.; the legend is given in full in the Doctrine of Adadai (see below, § 4), and in a shorter, and perhaps more original, form by Eusebius, who says that his account was translated from the Syriac. Edessa is mentioned as a heathen city, which worshipped (the Doctrine tells us) Bel and Nebû, though Burkitt suggests that these names come from a perusal of the OT and not from any real historical reminiscence. Abgar, the heathen king or toparch of Edessa, sends messengers to our Lord, and a correspondence ensues; after the Ascension the apostle 'Judas Thomas' sends Addai (called by Eusebius Taddeus, and said to be one of the Seventy) to Abgar to teach him the faith. Addai does many mighty deeds; one of his converts was Aiggai, who 'made the silks and headbands of the king,' and he was made bishop. If Addai's successor was not a natural death at Edessa, Aiggai was afterwards martyred by the son of Abgar; and, as he could not consecrate his successor Paûlût by reason of his sudden death, the latter was sent to Antioch and was ordained by Serapion the bishop. Narsai, king of Assyria, sent messengers to King Abgar to learn about all these matters. Such is the legend. As we have it, it is of the 4ec., though clearly based on one that is a good deal older.

For the Acts of Addai and that of Theophilus see below, § 9.

(c) Antioch.—The most independent of the kings of Edessa were called either Abgar or Maûkå.

In a Syriac Præsbyteriæ Judææ Thaddæi in Syria Thaddæus is associated with St. Peter, not with St. Thomas.


16 The title of the Myth, I.g. 466. Burkitt has pointed out to the present writer that the pronunciation with short e is not found in the mythical form of the name, 'Mattïa.'

17 Eusebius, HE iii. 16. 18 112 DB. ii. 188 n.

For Epiphanius see also Theodore, H. 28, and Jerome, de Vir. Illust. 113; for a very unfavourable view of his intellectual works see Burkitt, Early Eastern Christianity, p. 94 ff.
after he attained to manhood; and he became a great ascetic, and the friend of Cyril of Alexandria. At the end of his life he strenuously opposed Nestorianism. The other fathers of the 5th century were his contemporaries. Ibas (who lived from 435 to 457), who was inclined to favour Nestorius (see below, § 8).

During all this period the Church seems to have made rapid progress. Enaesius, a third-century bishop of Edessa, living in the eastern desert of Syria and Mesopotamia, attended the dedication of Constantine’s great church at Jerusalem in 335.

(c) The Persian empire.—A great deal of light has been thrown on early Syrian Christianity in Persia by the recent publication of the works of Nestorian writers. Formerly we had to rely mainly on the accounts of Jacobite authors like Bar Hebræus.

This is another myth and disprove more than one myth; and Neale’s narrative in his History of the Holy Eastern Church needs much correction in this respect.

One legend is a continuation of that regarding Addai and Adlai already mentioned. Addai, travelled from Edessa and evangelized ‘Persia’ (i.e. what became later the eastern part of Asiatic Turkey, as well as the modern Persians, penetrating as far as the province of Pars. Mari is not mentioned in the Doctrine of Addai, which, it is true, was a hideous gospel, but is very real to Syria. Nor is Mari mentioned in the later published and very valuable work of Chabot, lit. ‘Christ has not died and risen in the flesh, and is not the Apostle of Adiabene and Assyria (this apparently contradicts the doctrine of Addai, which makes him see the great Church of the Persians). And he that ordained Pudhā as first bishop there. The Nestorian Simhāda, or Book of Canon Law, names the ‘converters’ of that region Thomas ‘of the Indians and Chinese’ (Nendēr). Bartholomew, that is Nathansel, of the Aramaan, Addai of the Seventy, the Teacher of Aggai, and Mari of Mesopotamia and of all Persians. To the latter are ascribed mythical, but is there any truth underlying the legend? Some consider that there was no Christianity, or at least no organization of Christianity, east of the Tigris before the Sassanian empire was established by a revolution, a.d. 226. This is perhaps going rather far. It may be that there was nothing before the third decade of the 3rd. to build upon, it is unlikely that so early a writer as Mohilla Zka could have given us such details; he could not have invented Pudhā out of nothing. It is quite probable that there were Christians in Assyria in the 2nd cent., for Tantor, the disciple of Justin Martyr, tells us that he was born ‘in the land of the Assyrians.’ This must be discounted by the fact that he probably wrote only in Greek, though many think that his Didascasia (for which see below, § 4) was written in Syriac; and that he may therefore have been Greek; and parents, and have been brought up to Christianity were not uncommon. We learn from Ephraem that he laboured in Syria and Mesopotamia, and we see that there was a Nestorian Syriac Church in Persia, the twin-capital of the Persian empire, situated on the Tigris below Bagdad, till the end of the 3rd century. Papa is there ascribed to him, the bishop of that city, c. 280.

Another legend is much later, and professes to account for the existence of a patriarchate at Seleucia-Ctesiphon. It is given by Bar Hebræus and other writers, and in the Simhāda; and in the manuscript of that date from Antioch in Pisidia, the bishops of Antioch and Seleucia-Ctesiphon received the episcopal see in 150. According to the first writer, one of them was crucified as a Persian spy, as was Silbus (proa. Silvan, lit. ‘cross’), still a common name, the bishop of Antioch, while the other escaped to Jerusalem and was consecrated there, returning with a letter professing to accept the patriarchate on the Church in Persia. The Simhāda does not name Silbus, but says that two patriarchs, ‘one of the East and one of the West,’ 199 were crucified on the doors of the church of Antioch, and it gives the pretended letter of the ‘Western patriarchs’ to the ‘Easterns,’ besowing on the latter a patriarchate, and abiding them from the duty of sending their patriarchs to Antioch to be canonized. The first patriarch, it says, was the bishop of Papia or Shababū—it does not profess to be certain. 20 This Shababū was probably the bishop of Adiabene, east of the Tigris and between the two Tigris, who was a contemporary of Papa. The letter of the ‘Westerners’ is a late forgery. The earlier writers, like the other contemporary of the few that there was, that historian who wrote the life of Aēl Bishib, the bishop who is said to have escaped. The whole is a double fiction, and it is improbable that the Persian Christians ever depended for their bishops on Antioch, though they doubtless received

their Christianity from Edessa, and Edessa possibly received it from Antioch. The title of patriarchs in the Middle Ages belongs to a much later time than these pretended events. The East Syrian patriarchs, however, have been acknowledged as bishops of Antioch, a.d. 410. There is no early evidence of Antioch exercising jurisdiction over the Church in Persia. When Papa was confirmed by his bishop to be appealed, successfully, to Edessa, and perhaps to Nisibis. 1

An important event for the Church occurred in a.d. 207, when five Persian provinces were ceded to the Roman emperor. This strengthened the ecclesiastical ties between East and ‘West.’ The cession made Nisibis a Roman city. Its most famous bishop at that time was James of Nisibis, who was born there towards the end of the 3rd century. Ephraim was his disciple, and was baptized by him. James himself was a great author of Syriac works.

It is remarkable that, though James was present at Nicea in a.d. 325, the East Syrians knew nothing officially of that council till the Synod of Seleucia-Ctesiphon in a.d. 410, when they freely accepted the Nicene decrees and creed. To this day they use the other version of the creed, the so-called ‘Constantinople’ creed, which came into general use (see below, § 4). The Arian controversy did not touch them; and an illustration of this may be seen in the first part of the Church of Edessa, to whose Homilies (see below, § 4) are a continuous exposition of the Christian faith, does not mention Arianism at all, though he lived at a time when heresy was prevalent in the ‘West.’

The principal East Syrian bishops of Seleucia-Ctesiphon after Papa and before the Nestorian period were Simeon Bar Saba’ē (martyred under Sapor ii.), Yahh-ahāha i. (pron. Yaw-ahāha), and Dādīshā, i.e. the bishop of Maipharqat or Martyropolis, north of Nisibis, author of the Book of Martyrs (see below, § 4). Mārathā often acted as advisor to the Persian king and as ambassador to the Roman emperor. The Simhāda 2 mentions an earlier Mārathā, who was (it says) present at Nicea, but it is probable that he did not exist, and that the statement is due to a confusion.

The period was marked by many personal quarrels, a feature of later history also, and by the great persecution under King Sapor ii. (a.d. 379), which lasted some 40 years and resulted in many martydoms. The Persian kings at one time favoured the Church and at another persecuted it. It is important to note that in the early days the political conditions tended, quite apart from theological considerations, to separate the East Syrians from the rest of Christendom. It was the policy of the Persian authorities when they tolerated Christianity to separate it as much as possible from that in the rival Roman empire. Another persecution, at the instigation of the Magians, whose religion was that of the State, broke out under King Bahram (Varananes) v., a.d. 423. Theodoret 7 makes it arise under his predecessor Yazdegird, though continued under Bahram, but Sozocrates 8 says more accurately that it arose after Yazdegird’s death.

The title of the bishops of Seleucia-Ctesiphon, a.d. 400, was, the Catholicoi of the East, and this is still preserved by their successors. The title of ‘Patriarch’ was also thought to be a little later. At the Council of Dadiush, held a.d. 424 at *Markabata of the

1 For his Biblical work see below, § 4.
3 This is here quoted in the MS form used by the Nestorians themselves. It is also incorporated in a larger collection given by Chabot, Syriac Oracles (vol. 2).
4 1 M. i, 5. 5 To the Greeks, 42.
5 6 I. xvi. 1. (‘Hear, Att蘭. 1’)
6 The ‘West’ means what we should call the ‘Near East.’
7 For Paps see above page 171.
Arabs.' This connell firmly established the independence of the 'Eastern' patriarchate.

4. The MSS of the Greek Bible. In the 5th cent. there was a considerable activity in Syriac literature, all written in what we call 'classical Syriac.' (c) The MSS were divided in Syriac literature in five forms. (a) The four 'Gospels separate' (Syri. Evangelyjon da-Mpharrhes), now generally called the 'Old Syriac,' are known to us by two MSS: the Curetonian, discovered in Persia in 1842, and edited by C. F. Rhinen in 1858; and the Sinaitic Syriac, a palimpsest discovered by Mrs. Gibson in the monas
tery of Mount Sinai in 1893. Both of these have the above Syriac title, which distinguishes them from the Diatessaron (see below). Both are perhaps of the 4th century. The Curetonian has the same type of text as the Sinaitic, but differs from it in many details.1

(b) The Diatessaron of Tatian (2nd cent.), sometimes called by the Syrians the 'Mixed [Gospels].'

2 is a harmony of the four Gospels, and is known to us through a commentary on it by Ephraim handed down in an Armenian translation, by quotations in the Syriac Psalter, and by a translation of the Harmony itself made in the 11th cent. by the Nestorian monk Ibn at-Tayyib. The Diates-
saron is mentioned in the Doctrine of Addai.

It does not distinguish it from the complicated recension of Thomas of Harqal (see below), is the version still used by Syriac Christians. The name is first found in the 9th or 10th century. This version, which is now often called 'the Syriac Valgate,' contains the whole Bible, OT and NT (including the OT Apocrypha), less 2 Peter, 2 and 3 John, Jude, and Revelation. Because of its universal acceptance, it may safely be assigned to a date before the divisions of the 6th century. The Gospels in this version have been critically edited by G. H. Gwilliam. It appears that Tatian's Harmony was at one time in popular use among the Syrian Christians, but early in the 5th cent. Rabbbil, bishop of Edessa (see above, § 3), and Theodoret, bishop of Cyprus, were instrumental in its being abolished and destroyed in favor of the 'separate Gospels.' Theological reasons have been very generally accepted, viz. that the Peshitta Gospels are a revision of the 'separate Gospels,' made early in the 5th cent. under the direction of Rabbbil; that the Diatessaron was written in Greek as early as above, § 3, perhaps in Rome, by Tatian, and translated into Syriac in his lifetime, c. A.D. 170; and that the 'separate Gospels' date from c. A.D. 260, the translator being familiar with the Diatessaron. These views are combated by Gwilliam, who is inclined to assign a much earlier date to the Peshitta Gospels; he objects that Burkitt's theory is not adequately attested, does not explain the disappearance of the 'Old Syriac,' and does not account for the acceptance of the Peshitta in the 5th cent. by Nestorians and Jacobites alike. The fact that the East Syrians were not definitely Nestorian in Rabbbil's time, or indeed for a long time after him (see below, § 8), appears to the present writer adequately to account for their being ready enough to accept such a version of the Gospels in place of the Diatessaron.

(1) Recensions of the Peshitta were made by Philoxenus, bishop of Mabang (Hierapolis, near the Hellespont) (not now extant), and by Thomas of Harqal (\textquoteleft Harklean\textquoteright version), A.D. 616. Both of these writers were Monophysites, and it appears that the only dissatisfaction with the Peshitta in the 5th cent. was among the Jacobites, and not among the Nestorians. But even among the Jacobites that version remained supreme.

Some characteristics of the Peshitta may here be mentioned. The MSS, which are in the Greek Bible in the 5th cent. all show practically the same text. Some of them are as old as the 6th cent., the oldest c. A.D. 450. One rather noticeable difference between the 'Old Syriac' and the Peshitta Gospels occurs in the Lord's Prayer, where the former has 'our con-
templial' bread, the latter 'our Spirit.' The noun 'spirit' being feminine in Syriac, the older writers make 'Holy Spirit' feminine also, and Aphraates speaks of the Holy Ghost as 'our mother,' just as the Gospel according to the Hebrews speaks of Him as the OT Messiah. But from the writer onwards 'Holy Spirit' is made masculine by a grammatical revolution, though in Lk 4:2 and Jn 7:38 Peter there is survival of the older usage, the feminine being retained.

Ilthibato we have considered only the Gospels. There is no extant text of Acts, or of the Epistles older than the Peshitta, but quotations in Aphraates and in Ephraim's Commentary on the Pauline Epistles, and in Menander's Manual of Apocryphal Literature, are of some slight help.1 In Aphraates and in the genuine works of Ephraim there is no clear reference to any of the Catholic Epistles. Certain texts of Addai explain the Scriptural canon to the Law and the Prophets, the Gospel, St. Paul's letters by Ephraem, and a version of the Epistles by the principal Catholic Epistles, shows an advance on the way to a fuller canon. The Peshitta OT was not revised by Rabbbil, and is undoubtedly much older than his time, perhaps dating from the end of the 5th cent. The translator had a good knowledge of Hebrew, though he was not sufficiently influenced by the Septuagint. Burkitt thinks that he must have been a Jew, and that he made his translation for the Jews, who had probably settled at Edessa before it became a Christian centre. The OT quotations of the Acts of Judas Thomas, the Doctrine of Addai, and the Eusebian Canons, the Peshitta, Syriac, and the genuine works of Ephraim (for all these see below) agree largely within the Peshitta, but there are some points where the Peshitta diverges so, rather resembling the 'Old Syriac' and the Diatessaron. After Rabbbil all the quotations but two agree with the Peshitta, the 'Old Syriac' having thus already disappeared. The 'Old Syriac' Gospels appear to be later than the Peshitta OT, as the translation of the former, direct from the Greek, uses Hebrew proper names correctly transliterated from the Hebrew, as does the Peshitta translator of the OT. The Peshitta Gospels are, however, similar to the Syriac Gospel translation, as if he had corrected the forms of the proper names before him.

Of other early Syriac works, in addition to liturgies, some of which seem in their main features to have been written before the middle of the 5th cent., and in addition also to early Syriac translations of Greek books, the following may be mentioned. The Disputation with Marcion by Archselau, bishop of Kashkar in Mesopotamia (3rd cent.), is now extant only in Greek fragments and in a Latin translation, but was originally written in Syriac. (2) The Doctrine of Addai already mentioned, is a work of the latter part, or, according to R. A. Lipsius, of the beginning of the 4th cent., giving the legend of Abgar (see above, § 3). (3) The voluminous works of Ephraim consist of commentaries, homilies, letters, and hymns. At least one of his works, On the Holy Spirit, was translated into Greek before Jerome's time. (4) Aphraates, the Parthian rabbi, and ascetic, wrote his Homilies A.D. 337–345. Their theological attitude calls for some remark in view of their aloofness from Hellenistic influence. There is no special difference between him and 'Western' writers in the presentation of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit in the works of Ephraem, and in Aphraates, as elsewhere, baptism is 'in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy

1 Burkitt, Early Eastern Christianity, p. 48.
2 Jb. p. 125.
3 Jb. p. 70.
4 ib. pp. 64-65.
6 DCCtl. 31.
7 vard. illustr. p. 115.
8 Jb. p. 78.
9 Jb. p. 23.
10 DCCtl. 31.
11 Burkitt, Evang. ii. 116.
12 ib. ii. 4.
5. West Syriacs or Jacobites.—We now proceed to consider the divisions of Syrian Christianity which resulted from the Christological controversies of the 5th century. It is not necessary here to repeat the accounts of those controversies which have already been given in this Encyclopaedia; but we may discuss the general history and the customs of the different Syrian bodies which separated from one another and from the 'Western' Church of Constantinople and Rome.

The Syrian Monophysites may be considered first. In Syria proper there was a constant opposition between them and the Orthodox for more than a hundred years after the Council of Chalcedon (A.D. 451), and the patriarchs of Antioch were sometimes Orthodox and sometimes Monophysite. The most famous of the latter was Severus, who maintained possession of Antioch itself from A.D. 513 to 518; he was an author, and wrote in Greek. He was a great admirer and quoter of Ignatius’s Epistles. He was the leader of his party till his death c. A.D. 540, after which a double succession to the patriarchate was continuous; and it has been preserved to the present day. The final breach between Orthodox and Monophysites may be said to have occurred in the reign of Justin II., the successor of Justinian. He persecuted the Monophysites, and an account of these troubles may be read in the third book (the only part extant) of John of Ephesus, a companion of the Bishop of Ephesus in the 6th cent., but he wrote in Syriac, and was the first Syriac historian. He was a native of Amida (Diarbekr). For James of Sarug (A.D. 521 or 522), who has been thought to have been a Monophysite (but this is very doubtful), and for other early Syriac poets, see art. HYMNS (Syrian Christian), § 1.

The Syrian Monophysites are called Jacobites from Jacob Baradai (Baradaires, or Zambalus, a monk of a monastery near Edessa, who came to Constantinople c. A.D. 540 to plead the cause of Monophysitism. After remaining there fifteen

1. Burkitt, Early Christianity outside the Roman Empire, pp. 76-79.
2. Edited with translation by A. Mingana, Some Early Judeo-Christian Documents, Manchester, 1907.
3. For most of the following, see W. Wright’s Short Hist. of Syriac Literature; many of them appear in English in the ‘Anti-Nicene Christian Library’ (Edinburgh, 1871), though they cannot all claim to be anti-Nicene.
4. DCB ii. 257.
5. Ib. p. 326.
9. For a summary of these histories of Baramy and Sharbil see Lightfoot (Greek-speaking works), ii. (1900-01) 428, iii. (1901-02) 94, and Ewig, ii. 101.
10. For these Acts see further below, § 9.
years, he was consecrated bishop by the imprisoned Monophysite bishops in the capital, and sent to Syria to organize his sect. He consecrated Sergius to succeed Severus at Antioch, and appointed Paul the Black to succeed Sergius. He is said to have ordained two patriarchs, 39 bishops, and an enormous number of clergy. He is often called bishop of Edessa, but Bar Hebraeus says that he was a bishop with no fixed see. John of Ephesus was his panegyrist. He died, and after his death, the Monophysites were driven from Antioch. The term ‘Jacobites’ was a nickname, given by the Orthodox; but the Jacobites themselves readily accepted it, tracing it, however erroneously, to the apostle James, to whom also they ascribe their principal liturgy. Their controversy with the Greeks, like the controversy of the East Syrians, with the Greeks, was not only theological; it was largely tinged with national differences. Indeed both were to a considerable extent contests between Syria thought and Hellenistic culture.

In the 7th century, the Mohammadans conquered Palestine, Syria, and the East; and at first the new rulers feared the Jacobites as the rivals of the Greeks. The principal writer of this period was James (Jacob) of Edessa (†708), who was a poet, commentator, and letter-writer, and a notable figure of Greek work in Syria. To him, e.g., we owe the knowledge of the ‘Church Order’ called the Testament of our Lord, a Greek work of c. AD 350, now extant only in Syriac.

The Jacobite patriarchs have continued to this day (at any rate from the 13th cent., and, according to Neale, from the end of the 16th cent.) to style themselves ‘of Antioch,’ though they transferred their residence from this place to Mardin, where it has been ever since.

Perhaps the most eminent Jacobite of all history was Gregory Bar Hebraeus, or Abulfaraj (†1286), a man of Jewish parentage, who became a convert to Christianity and afterwards was ordained, and was, in the eyes of Bar Hebraeus, the greatest of Eastern authors.

He wrote many works, and his Chronicle (which may be read in Assemani) is a valuable history. He seems to have been greatly esteemed even by his Nestorian opponents who abhorred his teachings.

He died at Maraga (south of Tabriz), but was buried in the monastery of Mar Mattai on Jebel Maqlub (Syr. Elpeph), a day’s ride north-east of Mosul, and his grave is still shown there. His Chronicle is, for his age, fairly trustworthy, but when he deals with Nestorian matters it should be compared with the writings of that body.

A less known Jacobite writer was Dionysius Bar-salibi (Syr. Elihi, pron. Elii), also called James, metropolitan of Amid, a theologian and commentator, probably of the 11th century.

We know less of Jacobite organization and customs, ecclesiastical and liturgical, than we do of those of the Nestorians, of which we have been fully informed in the last quarter of the century. For the modern Jacobites the best short account is to be found in O. H. Parry’s Six Months in a Syrian Monastery, which has been largely drawn upon in the description which follows. The ecclesiastical hierarchy consists of the patriarch; the metropolitan or see of the 12th century, at Mar Mattai (see above) or in Mosul itself; and bishops of Jerusalem, Damascus or Homs (Emessa), Edessa, Amid, Mardin, Nisibis, Malpaqrak (now Farquhar, in Pp. 372), Antioch, and Jerash (on the Tigris), and Tur ‘Abdallah (Jebel 1 Assemani, Bibl. Or. ii. 327. 2 Gen. Introit. i. 102. 3 Assemani, B. 341 ff. 4 Renaudot, Lit. Or. ii. 453. Tur). There are also some bishops without sees, as at Mar Mattai, where, when the present writer visited the monastery in 1887, the establishment consisted of one bishop and one monk. The patriarch is elected by the people, and the election is confirmed by the bishops resident near Mardin; it is common for the patriarch to be promoted to the chief position. The patriarch, or more rarely the metropolitan, consecrates all the bishops, who must be either married or of the rank of a monk; those chosen from the monks are called maphrian, or ‘metropolitan,’ while those chosen from the widowed priests are called asqof (érixoroun), and are of slightly lower rank, not being eligible (for any patriarchate or maphrianate). Each bishop has the prefix ‘Mar’ (‘my lord’) before his name.1 The patriarch and the other bishops are recognized by the State as judges for their own people, especially in questions of marriage and divorce. The canonical age for the ordination of bishops is 35, of deacons 20; but this has never been kept as a fixed rule. Bar Hebraeus was ordained as a deacon, and was called asqof (i.e., ordained as little boys, but they must be able to read the Psalms in classical Syriac. The parish priests, who are elected by the parish councils of deacons and laymen, and may be married, or widowers.2 When they die, they enter a monastery or else become asqof.

The second marriage is not allowed to them. The priests must let their beards grow, but they shave their heads completely. The leading priest in a large town is often made a chorepiscopus, but he is not a bishop, and cannot ordain. There are many deacons in each village—they are engaged in secular work during the week—as they are indispensable for the celebration of the eucharist. Minor orders are practically obsolete.

Several ground-plans of churches may be seen in Parry.3 The altar, at least in most cases, stands in the middle, and there are seats for bishops and clergy behind. This is also the usual Greek custom. The whole sanctuary in Syrian churches, Eastern and Western, is called ‘the altar’ (Syr., nadd/k/), though this name is sometimes also given to the holy table itself. The latter is usually of stone, though in some of the Jacobite churches it is of wood.4 There are side chapels with ‘altars,’ north and south of the sanctuary—the churches face east—and in some cases, as at Mar Mattai, there is another chapel at the north side for the burial of priests, called leithy gaddish (‘house of the dead’). Between this and the main nave there is a stone wall or screen, sometimes with folding doors, and always with a veil. The nave has no further columns or piers, except at the great entrance placed under a baldacchino. The Jacobites, like the Nestorians, do not allow images in their churches, but have a great reverence for the consecrated vessels.

Monasteries are common; the monks are often laymen, though they are sometimes in holy orders. The monastery is a bishop except where they contain the tomb of a patriarch or a maphrian; in that case they are directly under the patriarch. Nunneries seem to be obsolete. The technical Syriac term for the consecration of both the Jacobites and the Nestorians, is ‘saddness, ‘mourning.’

The eucharistic liturgy ordinarily used is that of ‘St. James,’ a translation of which, in the Ritual form, is given in § 20; dunh/k/’s Ordination (Christian), i. 26. The Jacobite’s liturgy is very similar, and is used in all cases except among the Jacobites of the Eastern and Western, i. 69 ff. The Syrian Jacobites, Moronites, Unionists, and Malabar Jacobites all use the same liturgy with some variations.

Leavened bread is used, but the ‘bread of the deceased’ (in Communion) which the Jews used with the meal is no longer prepared. The levitation is said to have been handed down from remote ages, as among the Nestorians. The eucharist is reserved for the sick, but only for communion on the same day; it is repeated at the Mass of the dead (immediately after baptism) are communicated.1 For the forms of admission to holy orders see art. ORDINATION (Christian), i. 26. 2 See Leclercq, Dict. Cat., ii. 225 ff. 3 Syr. abshul/k/up/l (see the Nestorian Shukuh/l), vi. 2, 3, etc. 4 See a list of other Jacobite Hymns in Brightman, L. p. 1117 ff.
The antidoron or eucharistic bread not consecrated (Syr. ἀγριστός-εὐήμαρ) is distributed after the service. The celebrant wears albe, amice, un- divided stole, yellow shoes, a manipel over each arm, and a chasuble split down the front and buttoned with five or seven buttons. The vesting takes place in the side chapel, where also the elements are prepared. There are in some churches daily eucharists. There are no special vestments (except girdles, and often, for the deacons, stoles) at the daily offices. These vestments have not been published, and exist in manuscript only. One of the great features of Jacobite worship is the peculiar addition of 'who wast crucified for us' to the Trisagion (Holy God, Holy Mighty, Holy Immortal, have mercy upon us'), which is used at many of the services. The addition was first made by Peter the Pulier († A.D. 477), and was eagerly adopted and retained as a test of Monophysitism.  

Baptism is not allowed to be administered in private houses. The child at baptism is signed with moron, or ungunt (which is consecrated once a year by the patriarch), anointed all over the body with oil (which is blessed in the church), and washed in water thrice up to the neck, clothed, and confirmed.  

Confession before communion is recommended by the canons, but is now almost obsolete. Some of the more strict cannot consent to confession before communion on Maundy Thursday, Christmas, and Pentecost.  

The fasts are somewhat severe. Besides Lent and Advent, both of which are strict fasts, there are (a) the Fast of the Ninevites, three days in spring, said to have been instituted owing to a plague in the 6th cent., and strenuously maintained also by the East Syrians; (b) the Fast of the Apostles, after Pentecost; and (c) the Fast of the Twelfth, i.e., the 5th Wednesday and Friday are fasts in each week, from sunset to sunset.

The Jacobites are to be found chiefly in Mesopotamia and northwards to Harput and Diarbekr, but there are also a good many of them near Damascus and a certain number around Mosul. The largest numbers are perhaps to be found in the hilly region of Jebel TUR (Arab. also TUR Ablûn; Syr. TUR Allûn), N. of the line Marûn—Nisibis—Jezerîn. In this district Syriac is still spoken vernacularly. Here some of their oldest and most interesting churches are situated.  

It is always dangerous to reckon numbers; but Gibbon's estimate of from fifty to eighty thousand is certainly too low. We may perhaps put the total in Turkey at rather less than 200,000. Certain communities of Jacobites have become Uniat (see below, § 6). Jesuit missionaries first came to Mesopotamia in 1540. In 1646 the Uniat patriarchate was fixed at Aleppo, and the patriarch took his title from that place. The Syrian Christians in that neighbourhood mostly belong to that jurisdiction.

6. Melkites and Uniates.—The former name, which is derived from Syr. murkâz ('king'), a word used also, like Jacobus, for an emperor, was invented 1

1 But the ancient and authoritative Jacobite statement of faith (the 'Credal of our Sainted Fathers'), published by the Syrian Patriarchal Committee for the Information Committee in The Ancient Syrian Church in Mesopotamia, London, 1905, emphatically states that the Trisagion with this addition is addressed to 'the Olympic panegyrist and not to the Three Persons' (p. 102). This 'Statement of faith' is quite free from Monophysitism. It does not define the divine nature of our Lord as confused with the human nature, or that the two natures became conformed and changed so as to give rise to a third nature, and asserts that the two natures remain distinct without confusion, mixture, or transmutation, and that they remained throughout in an unalike only.

2 For early Syrian baptisms see below, § 2.  

3 Several collections of these may be read in H. Denzelinger, Rituals Orientalis Sacrorum, Lips. 1853.  

4 P. 467.  

5 Wigmund, p. 214.  

6 The Jacobites in India see below, § 9.

in the 10th cent. by the Jacobites for those Christians who adhered to the Council of Chalcedon. It was a nickname, meaning 'royalists,' and implying that they could stand only by the support of the Roman emperor. It may be compared with the nickname 'Ecclesia maritata' used in this country at the present day; both have a somewhat similar shade of meaning. But the name 'Melkites' was quite readily accepted by those to whom it had been given in derision, 1 and was applied to all those who were in communion with Constantinople, whether Syrian, Egyptian, or Greek. In comparatively recent times the name has been given, and given exclusively, to the Christians of Syria and Egypt who have been drawn from the Orthodox Eastern Church and have been united to Rome. Such, e.g., are the 'Syrian Melkites,' whose liturgical language is, or was, Syriac.

The name 'Uniat' is applied to those Eastern Christians who have been united to Rome, but are allowed to keep their own liturgies, liturgical language, and ecclesiastical customs, especially as to the marriage of their clergy—though in all these respects considerable, but not considerable, have been introduced. The earliest of these 'Unias' are the Maronites (see below, § 7); but there are also four Uniat Churches of the East Greek-Slavonic, the Jacobite, the Melkite (formed of Arabic-speaking Orthodox after the Synod of Bethlehîm, in 1672), Rumaic or Roumanian, and Ruthenian; there are also the Armenian Uniat; the Syrian Uniat, drawn from the Jacobites in 1646 (see above, § 5); the Chaldaean Unias, drawn from the Nestorians (see below, § 8); and the Malabar Unias (see below, § 9). The Unias have nine Eastern patriarchs. Those of Constantinopolis, Alexandria, and Antioch live in Rome. In addition there are Uniat patriarchs of Jerusalem (Greek), Antioch (Maronite), Antioch (Greek), Antioch (Syrian), Cilicia (Armenian), Babylon (Chaldaean). European readers are often confused by the fact that there are no fewer than six patriarchs who take their title from Antioch—one Greek Orthodox, four Unias, and one Jacobite.

The Syrian Unias use the liturgy of 'St. James'; the rubrics are often in Carshuni (Arabic in Syrian characters), the audible prayers both in Syriac and in Carshuni, the inaudible in Syrian only. 2 The Chaldaean Unias use that of the Chaldean, and Mari 3 with some amendments; their daily services are considerably abbreviated compared with those of the Nestorians, and in the case of the long festal Night Service about six-sevenths are omitted. 4

7. Maronites.—These Syrian Christians of the Lebanon derive their name from their teacher John Maro, or Maron, a learned monk, who was named patriarch of Antioch, perhaps early in the 4th century. He has often been confused with an earlier Maron, called by Gibbon 5 a 'saint or savage of the fifth century,' whose relics were greatly venerated. In the time of John Maron the Monothelite controversy was still going on, and these Lebanon Christians espoused that cause. 6 They were thus in opposition to their Christian neighbours, and later, as Christians, to the Muhammadan authorities; and they received the nickname 'Mardaites' or 'Rebels' (Syr. murkâzî). In 1182 they renounced Monothelesitism under the influence of their patriarch Atmeric, and were united with Rome, then numbering about 45,000 souls. 7 At this time the connexion with the West

1 Gibbon, vi. 44, note 109.  


3 Brightman, Liturgy of the Slavonic and Western, i. p. i.  

4 Conybeare-Macleane, Rituals Armenianum, p. 336.  

5 p. 55.  

6 See art. MONOTHELETISM.  

7 Neale, Gen. Intro. i. 154.
was through the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem. After the destruction of that kingdom in the 14th cent., relations with Rome were at times broken off, but they were resumed, and still continue. Pious Gregory XIII. in 1503 founded a college in Rome for training their clergy, and this institution has the honour of having in the 18th cent. educated the learned brothers A. S. and J. A. Assemani, to whose literary labours scholars are so much indebted for their knowledge of Syriac Christianity. The Maronites subscribed the decrees of the Council of Trent in 1738.

They are allowed to retain their own liturgical customs, and use the Syriac 'St. James' and some other anaphoras. The rubrics in the printed books are in Carshuni; some of the formularies are in Carshuni and Syriac.

The Maronite clergy may marry. They also elect their own patriarch, who still takes his title from Antioch. He lives at the monastery of Qinzibn in the Lebanon, and has under his jurisdiction bishops at Aleppo, Tripoli (in Syria), Byblus and Botra, Baalbek or Heliopolis, Damascus, Berytus, Tyre and Sidon, and in Cyprus. Their numbers are difficult to estimate. Gibson gives 150,000 for the Maronites and 50,000 for the Chaldeans, but they probably number about a quarter of a million.

They have suffered much from their feuds with their neighbours, the Druzes, and in the year 1860, after great massacres of the Maronites, the British and French governments intervened for their protection.

8. East Syrians, or Nestorians. We may now take up the history of the Church in the Persian empire from the middle of the 5th cent. The first great event for the East Syrians after the Council of Ephesus, A.D. 431, was their final expulsion by the emperor Zeno from the school of Edessa and the consequent founding of the school of Nisibis, A.D. 489. Ibas (Syr. Ichhab, pron. ihhwa, lit. 'given'), bishop of Edessa, who was strongly Dyophysite, had been condemned by the Latrocinium, or 'Robber Synod,' of Ephesus in 449, but was acquitted and restored to his see by the Council of Chalcedon two years later, after having anathematized both Nestorius and Eutyches. During his lifetime the Monophysites made no way at Edessa, but after his death in 457 they became predominant there, and after a long struggle expelled their opponents. This was a decisive event in the Persian Church. Although up to that time it had had no direct connexion with Nestorianism, its tendency was mainly Dyophysite, and the influx of Nestorians from the Roman empire greatly strengthened that tendency. Nevertheless it is a mistake to suppose that the Persian Church at some definite date in the 5th cent. espoused Nestorianism and was therefore cut off from the Catholic Church. The process was a gradual one. The principal influence in the latter half of the 5th cent. was that of Bar Sohm (Baramass, lit. 'son of the fast'), bishop of Nisibis, who had taught at Edessa, and now, in the vacancy of the catholicate, organized the East Syrian Church in a Nestorian sense; he must not be confused with his namesake of the Latrocinium, who was a Monophysite. There was some opposition to 'Nestorian' doctrine, especially from the monks of Mar Mattai (see above, § 5), who to this day are Jacobites. The catholicos Acacius (Syr. Aqaq), who was bishop of Scelucia-Ctesiphon from 485 to 496, went to Constantinople on a mission from the Persian king, and there declared that his Church knew nothing of Nestorius; he was admitted to communion by the Orthodox, having anathematised the so-called Bar Sohm. But we may perhaps discount his statement as an Oriental exaggeration; but the incident shows that the separation was not yet complete. Still later, good relations with Constantinople took place in the time of Mar Abba (pron. Awa) the Great, a contemporary of contemporary of the so-called Bar Sohm (see above, § 5). This prelate, a convert from Manichæism, was catholicized from 540 to 552, having been a teacher at Nisibis, and having visited Jerusalem, Egypt, Greece, and Constantinople in the time of Justinian. In his Catholicate, as it would seem, the Council of Chalcedon was accepted by the East Syrian Church. The Sühoddhos quotes with approval one of its canons, and dates the council as '25th October, 763 of Alexander,' i.e. A.D. 462 (sic); the session of that day was particularly solemn, and was attended by the emperor and empress; it ended the principal work of the council.

One of the first matters discussed in this period was the marriage of bishops and clergy. A council was held in 494 at Beth Lahma, which decided that monasticism, practised in the modern Syria, was in its monastic forms of various sects (i.e. Sinai), it allowed them to marry, and even permitted a second marriage to widowers. This was confirmed by the Council of Ephesus held by Anacletus in the following year. Several patriarchs were married: Rabban (pron. Biswaal), catholicized from 466 to 468, his successor Simeon, Paul, and Ezekiel, all of the 6th cent. But Mar Abba set his face against episcopal marriage, himself declaring it 'a sin,' and the latter he crucified. The present rule is that a bishop must be a rabban ('monk'), but see below), and may not marry, or have married, and must never have eaten flesh meat; nor must his mother have eaten meat during her pregnancy. There is evidence that the rule against eating meat did not hold in the 7th cent. It is noteworthy that Ebedjesus (see below) in his Sühoddhos passes over the question of episcopal marriage in silence, and does not refer to the regulations which permitted it.

The definite official adoption of Nestorianism, or of what was taken for such, must be dated at the beginning of the 7th cent., when the East Syrians formally repudiated the term 'Theotokos' and adopted the phrase of 'gnanum,' on karpous or karpagous (μεταφυσικός), two natures' with reference to our Lord. The opposition to the 'Nestorians' of the Monophysite minority in Persia was greatly strengthened by the influence of a large number of captives of the latter persuasion from Syria, in 540 and 573, under Chosroes I; the influence of Shirin, the Christian queen of Chosroes II (560-628), was latterly in their favour.

Monasticism was at one time a most flourishing institution among the East Syrians. Thomas of Marga (see below) gives us a graphic description of his own monastery, and we have other sources of information in Socratem, in P. Beda's Acta Martyrum et Sanctorum, and elsewhere. It seems to have been introduced into the East from Egypt by Mar Awgin (pron. Ogin; ≈ Eugenius, Βαγγέλης, who founded the famous monasteries of Mount Ida (near Nisibis) and Deir-el-Zafaran (near Mardin; see above, § 5). He is said to have been the teacher of James of Nisibis. His Life is included in

1 Wigram, p. 170.  
2 Th. p. 158.  
3 Hist. of the Councils of the Church, Eng. tr., iii. 283 ff.  
4 Wigram, pp. 175, 176, 212; Budge, Book of Governors, i. p. xxiv.  
6 Wigram, p. 246. Eusebius (HE II 22) says that James the Just 'was holy from his mother's womb, . . . he did not eat flesh (μαρμαραῖος); i.e. he was a Nazarete, though abstention from flesh was not part of a Nazarete's rule.'  
7 The Sühoddhos (vii. preface) says that bishops were usually chosen from the community of monks.

8 Wigram, p. 265. But the latest investigations show that 'gnanum' (= hypostasia) is used in the expression of 'substance,' not of 'person.' This makes the phrase, if redundant, at least quite orthodox.

9 Th. pp. 158, 247.  
10 Hist. of the Councils, vi. 247.  
11 Hist. vi. 31, very short.  
12 For an account of the institution see Budge, Book of Governors, i. p. xxv.  
13 For a list of these see Brightman, Liturgies Eastern and Western, l. p. 171.  
14 Neale, Gen. Introd. l. 154. For their forms of admission to holy orders see art. ORDAINMENT (Christian), § 14.  
15 Cf. 2 Tim. 2.  
16 For the doctrinal controversy which occupied the Council of Ephesus see art. NESTORIANISM.
Canon Law, now in constant use by the Nestorians, though many of its provisions have been obsolete.

The missions of the East Syrians have been far extended. Their work in India is attested in the 6th cent. by Cosmas Indicopleustes (see below, §9). Gibbon remarks [1] their churches, from the Gulf of Persia to the Caspian Sea, were almost infinite. The missionaries extended their labours to Sogdua, Ceylon, Turkistan, and even to China, where the Church of the monk of Sin-gan-fu, dated A.D. 781 (‘1092 of the Greeks’), attests their activity, which also gave rise to the legend of Prester John (q.v.), a supposed priest-king in Tartary. Wherever they carried their teaching, they used Syriac as their liturgical language, even though it was not that of the people. Thus the Malabarese have always used Syriac liturgies. This great activity swelling the numbers of Syrian Christians exceedingly, and the Nestorians and Jacobites together are said to have been more numerous than the Greeks and Latins together. Under Muhammadan rule East Syrian Christianity was for a time especially favoured and persecuted. Under Tamerlane (‘Timur the Lame’), whose death in 1447 must be almost annihilated. But a remnant survived and is still to be found in the mountains of Kurdistan in E. Turkey, in the upland plains of Azerbaijan, and in the mountainous part of the Persian kingdom, especially in that of Urmi or Urumi (often called in Europe Urmina), and in the low-lying plain of Moṣul (Niniveh). The patriarch, who after the foundation of Baghād (A.D. 762) had established his residence at Ctesiphon for that city, later removed to the north. But disputes as to the succession divided the patriarchate. The Nestorians themselves are now under the rule of Mar Shimūn (these two words are pronounced with one and are accepted on the Syriac and last syllables), who lives at Qāchān in the almost inaccessible mountains which surround the Great Zab, a beautiful retreat near the small town of Dūlāmēr. Each successive patriarch takes the name ‘Shimūn’ (Simon), whatever his baptismal name. The East Syrians of the Moṣul plain, now called Chaldœans, have been united with Rome since 1660, when they were received by Pope Innocent XI. Their head (‘patriarch of Babylon’) bears the name Mār Eliyā (Elijah). He has several bishops, each styled metropolitan, under him. He maintains the title (‘of Babylon’) which the Nestorian patriarchs of old bore when their see was at Ctesiphon, and it is also found in the Sānḫādā. There were at one time patriarchs at Amīd (Dīnbek), who also were united with Rome; these bore the name Mar Joseph.

All the East Syrians speak Syriac vernacularly, though many of those in the Moṣul plain speak Arabic also. It is common to hear the sailors on the Tigris steamers talking vernacular Syriac, these being Chaldœan Uniates. The total number of Nestorians and Uniates combined is, or was till lately, perhaps about 300,000.

A detailed account of the ecclesiastical hierarchy of the Nestorians is given by Maclean-Browne, The Catholics of the East, ch. ix. The patriarch, or cardinal, has under him a metropolitan, or metropolitan, who holds the dynamic name of Nun-iḥāṣ (‘mercy of Jesus’), and several bishops, the number varying considerably from time to time. The present method of filling bishoprics (including the patriarchate) is for each bishop to bring up one or two boys or young men, his nephews or near relatives, as possible successors. Such a youth is taught the vernacular nāṣūr kūrāt (‘keeper of the seat’), and is not allowed to eat meat or marry; the bishop ordinarily nominates the one who is so trained and educated.

1 For a list of the works of Ebedjeus see Ammoni, Bibl. Or. i. 230 f. More will be said in the text below of Ebedjeus and his works.

2 For a list of the works of Ebedjeus see Ammoni, Bibl. Or. i. 230 f. More will be said in the text below of Ebedjeus and his works.

3 Cf. Budge, i. p. lv.

4 Cf. Budge, i. p. lvi.

5 Maclean-Browne, Catholics of the East, p. 19. The Sānḫādā is the seat of the rest of the clerks and laity and to eat meat in their monasteries and to that end cocoa beans and breadcloth. The monasteries of the Nestorians and Uniates are chieflay East Syrian. For East Syrian writers see art. Hašša (Syriac Christian).

6 This is the Office of Baptism and Confirmation, Cambridge, 1914, p. 31. See also art. CoNFRIMATION, §6, 7.

7 This is a book see Connolly, Liturgical Hymnals of Naṣanz, p. 75 f. See also R. Payne Smith, Theos. Syr. ii. 357.

8 Book of Governors, I. p. cxxiv. v.[ii. 3.]

9 Ebedjeus, Catholicos of the East, p. 19. The Sānḫādā is the seat of the rest of the clerks and laymen and to eat meat in their monasteries and to that end cocoa beans and breadcloth. The monasteries of the Nestorians and Uniates are chieflay East Syrian. For East Syrian writers see art. Hašša (Syriac Christian).

10 In Budge, i. p. lv.

11 In Budge, i. p. lvi.

12 This is the Office of Baptism and Confirmation, Cambridge, 1914, p. 31. See also art. CONFIRMATION, §6, 7.

13 For a list of the works of Ebedjeus see Ammoni, Bibl. Or. i. 230 f. More will be said in the text below of Ebedjeus and his works.
whom he wishes to succeed, but in theory the people elect from among the ‘keepers of the seat.’ In the 5th cent. the catholicons made a law restricting the catholicon to members of his own family. It is, on the contrary, an innovation, though not a very recent one. The catholicons consecrate the bishops; but the metropolitan consecrates the catholicons. In most villages there is at least one priest, in some several; and deacons are very numerous, as the eucharist cannot be celebrated without a deacon. Occasionally a priest is made an archdeacon (orbas), but this is now only an honour, not involving special duties. Formerly there were choriepiscopi and perioteisi (‘visitors’); these were presbyters, not bishops. The office of perioteisi was abolished in Syrian Christianity (by a 6th cent.), as he mentions it in his canons. 3 The East Syrian Rook of Heavenly Intelligences describes a church as having nine orders in three divisions; (1) the episcopate: patriarch (or catholicon), metropolitan, bishop; (2) the presbytery: choriopiscopi, perioteisi (or archdeacon), prezbiter; (3) the diaconate: deacon, sub-deacon, reader. These are said to correspond to the angelic hierarchy (as given by pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita and others) of (1) cherubim, seraphim, thrones; (2) dominions, virtues, powers; (3) principalities, archangels, angels. Minor orders are now obsolete. There are no longer any deacons.

Many of the ecclesiastical customs of the Nestorians are those also of the Jacobites (see above, § 5). But there are some differences. The Nestorian priests and deacons may marry, and if their wives die they may marry again; but the parish priests are not obliged to be married, though as a matter of fact they are hardly ever single men. The Nestorian church, especially in the mountains (of Kurdistan) have exceedingly narrow and low doors, sometimes only accessible by a ladder, and which are often built for security in a cleft of a rock or on a stone in an inaccessible place, are nearly all of the same pattern. Outwardly they show no sign of Christianity save a small cross beside the church door. They have no towers or spires, such as the Armenian churches have. Internally they have a stone wall reaching to the roof and dividing the nave from the sanctuary; a doorway in this wall is covered with a veil which is drawn back at certain parts of the service. On the nave-side of this wall is a raised peace called bema (a name which in other Eastern communions means the sanctuary), and this again is bounded by a dwarf wall with apertures in the middle and at the side, where the clergy stand to communicate the people. This raised peace somewhat corresponds to the Greek στόλος. 4 Against the dwarf wall, towards the nave, are projections (said to contain relics) for the cross and for books. The altar is attached to the east wall, and built into a stone niche. Now the altar is oblong, not square as among the Greeks. The people stand in the nave to worship, the men in front, and the women behind; there are no seats, and large portions of the congregation, such as that of the sermon, the people sit on the matted floor. Two other features of the churches may be noticed; a baptistery (also used as a vestry, and usually for baking the eucharistic bread), at the south-east corner of the church next the sanctuary; and a court (often open to the air) on the south side of the nave, where the daily prayers are said in summer. This is the usual arrangement, and is that of the church of Mart Marian (St. Mary) at Urmia in Persia, which claims to be the oldest church in the world, and to contain the tomb of one of the Wise Men of Bethlehem, built (as the most ancient links into the wall of the church)—in this case at the south-east corner of the nave. 5 The people are called to worship by a wooden board (Styr. ηδρηστης) hit by a mallet; this is the Greek στόλος. 6 Bells and cymbals used to summon to prayer, and there are often strings of small bells hung inside the church.

1 For the forms of admission to holy orders see art. ORTHO-
TION (Christian), I. 13.
2 See Aris in Dikt., Early eastern Christianity, p. 144.
3 Maclean-Brown, p. 154.
5 Maclean-Brown, p. 301; for plans of two other famous churches see pp. 297, 306.

The vestments worn at the eucharist differ somewhat from those of the Jacobites. For a chasuble the Nestorians wear a kind of cope (μυστήριον), which has no fastening at the neck, and is very difficult to keep in position. The priests‘ robes are similar to those of the Western Church, but are of different shape from those of the deacons; maniples and amices are not worn. Private confession, though often referred to in the service-books, is now obsolete. The officiers are the same as those of the Jacobites, but the fasts of the Apostles and of Mary are almost if not quite obsolete, as are some others mentioned in the East Syrian books. The Wednesday and Friday fasts do not in practice begin on (what we) call the evening before, but they end at sunset; all Eastern Christians reckon the day as beginning and ending at sunset, and our ‘Sunday evening’ is their ‘Monday evening.’

The chief liturgy used by the Nestorians is that of the ‘apostles Addai and Mari.’ This liturgy has many early features, especially a form of eucharistic invocation of the Holy Spirit which is not as full and complete as that in most of the Great Liturgies. It prays that the Holy Ghost may come and rest on the oblation, and bless and sanctify it, that it may become (or be) for us the remission of sins, a church of God, and expilicitly mention the change in the elements. But the most curious feature is the absence of the words of our Lord spoken at the Last Supper, when after ‘blessing’ or ‘giving thanks’ He gave the sacrament to the disciples (‘This is my body, etc.’).

Neale 1 argues on a priori grounds that ‘Addai and Mari’ must have originally had these words. But this is a precarious statement; there are other instances of at least the partial omission of the words. 2 This liturgy in no way refers to the Nestorian controversy. On certain days of the year the anaphora of ‘Addai and Mari’ is not used, but that of ‘Theodore the Interpreter’ (of Mopsuestia) or that of ‘Nestorius’ is substituted, the first part of the liturgy, and the ending, being common to all three. All these anaphoras date, in common, from very early times; the first probably, in its earliest shape, was compiled before A.D. 431; the other two are certainly not the work of the bishops after whom they are named, but are the work of East Syrian authors, in the 6th cent., and perhaps later. The liturgy had a Byzantine liturgy before him, as many traces of that rite are found in it. But all three anaphoras are quite distinctly of the East Syrian, and not of the Western, family. All three seem to have been composed before Narsai (end of 5th cent.), though doubtless many more modern additions have been made to them.

Eucharists do not occur very often among the Nestorians—some five or six times a year as a rule, though in a few churches weekly eucharists are the custom. The people communicate, as they pray, standing, the mothers holding up the very little children in their arms to receive. All receive in both kinds separately (the species of bread in their hands), except the very little ones, for whom the celebrant dips a small portion of the consecrated bread in the chalice and then puts it in their mouth. Reservation for the sick is not allowed. The eucharistic bread is leavened. 3 All services, without exception, are sung; but no instrumental music is allowed.

The baptismal customs do not differ greatly from those of the Jacobites. 4 The service is closely modelled on the eucharistic liturgies, than which

1 Gen. Introd., I. 498.
3 For a complete discussion as to the handing down of the leaven see Maclean-Brown, p. 247.
4 For a description see Maclean-Brown, p. 267 ff.
Syrian Christians

It is certain later, there is however, no kiss of peace. The triple immersion is absolutely total. As with all Easterns, the presbyter confirms and lays his right hand on or over the neophyte; the use of the consecrated oil at this point is not expressly mentioned in the service-book, but it is customary for the priest, when signing the neophyte with the sign of the cross, to do so with his thumb which he has dipped in the oil. There are now no interrogations or recitations, though they are prescribed to be in the 6th cent. by Narsai, where the renunciations have special reference to heresy. Private baptism is not, in practice, allowed; if a village has no church, a child must be carried to another village which has one. Thus some children die unbaptized, though it is not likely that a person would grow up without baptism. Sponsors are considered as being akin to their godchildren, and the relationship is a bar to marriage.

The non-liturgical services are of great interest, and are extremely long, at least in theory. They consist mainly of hymns and anthems. The great number of services in the Syriac Church is reflected in the frequent mention of them by name in these anthems. The calendar is remarkable, and in some respects unique. Most of the saints' days are commemorated at fixed periods with the arrangement of the ecclesiastical year, which is divided into periods of about seven weeks each, more or less—Advent, Epiphany, Lent, Easter, 'The Apostles' (after Pentecost), 'Summer,' 'Eliaji,' 'Moses,' and the 'Hallowing of the Church.' A few of the holy days however, fall on fixed days of the month, as Christmas (Dec. 25), Epiphany (Jan. 6), St. George (April 24), etc., St. St. Thomas (July 30), St. Mary, St. John Baptist, St. Peter and St. Paul (July 29), St. Mary (Aug. 15), Holy Cross Day (Sept. 13, not 14 as elsewhere). The twelve apostles are commemorated together on a Friday before Lent, the four evangelists on another, the 'Greek doctors' (Diodoros, Theodore, Nestorius) on a third, the 'Syrian doctors' (especially Ephram, Narsai, Abraham [of Kashtar, see above]) on a fourth. On other Fridays are commemorated St. James the Lord's brother, St. Mary, St. John Baptist, St. Peter and St. Paul (a second commemoration), Mar Abba or else the patron saint of the church, St. Stephen, the forty martyrs of Sebaste, all the departed, the Seventy, and some others.

The choirs are divided into two parts, and according to the first or the second choir begins the anthems each week is called 'Before,' or 'After,' 'Before and After' (Syr. Qdham a-Wathar) being thus taken for the name of the ordinary book of daily services. The properia for Sundays, fasts, and festivals are of very great length, and are contained in the books called ficult ("cycle") and Gazza ("treasure"). two enormous MS volumes, and some others. These two are not published; but the complete East Syrian service for the Epiphany is given in English by Conybeare-Maclean, Ritual Armamentorum, p. 288 ff. (from a MS in the Library of the Propaganda Fide in Rome), with the cues all filled in, and a part of these two books is published in Syria in the Breviarium Chaldæorum. The Psalms are said (at least in theory) all through twice a week, and the whole Psalter is recited on festivals of our Lord. In the litanies, which are numerous, and often still fuller, the service, the ruling patriarch, metropolitan, and bishop of the diocese are commemorated by name. The marriage-service and the burial-service for laymen (apudic) have been published in Syria.1 The burial-service for the nuns (brudt) is longer and more elaborate than that for laymen. These burial-services are most dramatic, and consist partly of dialogues between the departed and the mourners, or between the departed and those already in Sheol. After the funeral the kiss of peace is given, at least in the case of priests and bishops. All pass in line and kiss the hand of the departed, or a cross laid on his breast, and so take leave of him.2 Badger gives an English translation of the baptismal, marriage, and ordination-services, and of the burial-service for priests.

9. Christians of Malabar, or of St. Thomas. — Ancient tradition, in which, however, we can have little confidence, makes St. Thomas the apostle the first teacher of Christianity in India. The legend is told in the Syriac Acts of Judas Thomas (see above, § 4), which, curiously enough, makes Thomas (lit. 'twin') the twin-brother of our Lord. J. H. Harris sees here traces of the influence of the Heavenly Twins on Christian legend. The Ethiopic legend of Thomas is still fuller. Our Lord divides the world into twelve portions, and Thomas's lot is to go to India. Very unwillingly, but encouraged by our Lord, he goes, and is seen with Christ in India. Jesus appears in the form of a rich man, who sells Thomas as a slave, the price to be given to the poor and needy. Peter and Matthias return. Thomas is set to work as a stonemason, carpenter, and physician; but he afterwards explains that the buildings which he undertook to build were the souls which he won to Christ. He appoints a bishop, priests, and deacons, and departs in a cloud, having given his last sermon. After Thomas, there is no record of a Christian community in the land where, it says, the apostle Bartholomew had already preached.3 Panteenus is said by these writers to have found there a copy, in the Hebrew language, of St. Matthew's Gospel, and to have left it behind him. The first certain historical testimony to the existence of Christians in India is that of the Alexandrian merchant who afterwards became a monk, and whom we know from his Indian travels as Cosmas Indicopleustes. He travelled far, and his Christian Topography of the Whole World in twelve books, still extant, is a valuable historical piece of evidence, though it is marred by the erroneous geographical conceptions of the day. The first six books may be dated c. A.D. 547, the rest c. 560. Cosmas's other works are not now extant. He travelled in India and Ceylon, and describes 'Mali' (identified with Malabar) on the Indian coast, the centre of the pepper trade.

1 See under Literature at end of this article.
2 Maclean-Brown, p. 237.
3 See Ecclesiastes and their Rituals, p. 156 ff.
6 See art. Ecclesiastes.
7 Howard, The Christians of St. Thomas and their Liturgies, P. 121.
8 Eusebius, H.E. v. 10; Jerome, De Vir. Illust. 36.
testifies to a large number of Christian churches on the coast of Malabar and Socotra, whose clergy, he says, were ordained by the Persian archbishop of Seleucia, and were subject to his jurisdiction; the Church there had had many martyrs and a large number of monks. These, he says, were the Christians of St. Thomas' are the fruits of the missionary activities of the Church of the Persian empire (see above, § 8), and that their Christianity had begun long before this, probably in the 5th century.

The subsequent history is somehow obscure. Immigrations of Christians to Malabar from Baghdad and elsewhere occurred twice in the 8th and 9th centuries, and the immigrants intermarried with the native Christians. The latter of these movements was under two Nestorian priests (bishops!), Mar Sapor and Mar Peruz. The fame of the Malabar Christianity spread to the West, and from Malabar and Syria the bishops and ambassadors to that country. The converts were protected by the king of Cochin. They had their bishop at Angamala, and he was styled 'Metropolitan of India,' having in his jurisdiction 1400 churches and 200,000 souls in the whole district.

A theory has lately been put forward by P. T. Geeverges, a native of the Malabar coast, in a tract entitled the Syrian Christians Nestorianos, to the effect that the Malabarese were Jacobites till the 15th century, when they became Nestorians for a hundred years. He is agreed that Cosmas I, who was originally founded from Seleucia-Ctesiphon, and that they were under the consecration of the Syrian patriarch before that period; but this writer maintains that thereafter they depended on the Jacobites, not on the Nestorians. The only argument of any strength in support of his hypothesis is the existence of two inscriptions at Kottayam, a town of Travancore, in Pallak, the official language of the Syrian Church during the Sanadian dynasty; they are said to be of the 7th or 8th century. One of the inscriptions has a line also in Syriac, in Estrangela, confirming that the language, for the 10th century, the two run thus: (a) 'In punishment by the law (was) the suffering of this One; He who is the true Christ, and God above, and Guide ever pure'; (b) 'Let me not glory save in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ who is the true Messiah and God above and Holy Ghost.' The words in square brackets are in Syriac. Geeverges amends 'Holy Ghost' to 'Guide ever pure' as in the former inscription. These are said to be anti-Nestorian. But is this the case? The 'Nestorians' of the Persian empire never failed to assert that He who died upon the cross was God. The existence in Malabar of Jacobite Jacobite Bishop of the 13th century, or earlier proves nothing in the absence of evidence as to when it was received into the Nestorian Church. The suggestion that the Portuguese inquirers found some liturgical practices existing which showed traces of Jacobite rather than Nestorian influence, though early, does not disprove that the latter had been dominant for over a hundred years, would hardly bear examination. Thus the indication of some Nestorian influence is a probability, not a probability being in use. There is such a known Nestorian liturgy. Therefore, it is maintained, the liturgy in use was non-Nestorian, i.e. Jacobite. It is evident the inscriptions have been reinterpreted. Jacobites had named one of their archbishops the 'Nestorian Father of Nestorianism.' The Nestorians have been accused of changing the liturgy of the Syrian Church for many centuries, and perhaps some of the changes of the 10th century. Yet, as the Synod of Diamper mentions both Diodore and Theodore, this is very unlikely. Geeverges agree that the Nestorians of the Tigris valley at the end of the 15th century and the beginning of the 16th sent bishops to Malabar, on the request of deputies who had come thence, and he maintains that these converted Malabar from Jacobitism to Nestorianism. It does not appear to the present writer that Geeverges disproved his theory; but there is possible this amount of truth in it, that certain of the Malabar Tamil Christians, who have unfortunately always been conspicuous for questionable familiarity (like their spiritual ancestors), may have had dealings with the dissident Jacobites of the Tigris valley, or with the Western Jacobites, before the 15th century. Thus a deception is said to have gone to the Monophysites of Alexandria to ask for a bishop (theologically) 'Malabarese.'

An ecclesiastical revolution was effected by the Portuguese in the 16th century. They established the Inquisition at Goa in 1560. The Synod of Diamper was held in the south of Cochin in 1599 under Alexius de Menezes, archbishop of Goa, united the Malabarese, then estimated at about 200,000 souls, to Rome, and rooted out all traces of Nestorianism. Celibacy of the clergy was introduced, the Mass was made retrospective. All old books and liturgies were destroyed, or radically altered, so that putting together, with an attempt to get as complete a copy of the liturgies as used before the synod. Renaudot remarks that the Portuguese censors intimidated the monks, which they did not do with Nestorianism. The liturgy which they substituted, has been principally used, so that it is closely related to, or practically the same as, the Nestorian 'Addai and Mari' (see above, § 8). An English translation of this is published by J. M. Neale, who states that it is given as revised by Menezes and the Synod of Diamper. Yet this cannot be altogether the case, as it contains the names of Nestorius, Diodore, and Theodore, as well as of Ephraim, Abraham, and Narsai (see above, § 8), and the phrase 'Mother of Christ' for 'Mother of God' (see below). Neale gives some of the prayers in which the Nestorian word 'Katheryn' was anything original, but in a number of numbers the order in the form approved at Diamper is kept.

The change from ancient customs was effected only after great opposition on the part of the Malabarese themselves, who rallied under their bishop, Mar Abraham (+ 1607). It was his death which made the Synod of Diamper and the real union with Rome possible.

It is interesting to notice the changes of custom and of language produced at Diamper. To this time the Malabar Christians had had but a single bishop at a time; hence, perhaps, arose the custom for the chrisma at confirmation to be consecrated by a priest (of any rank) rather than, as elsewhere, by the East, by a bishop; indeed, the Malabarese were accused of not having had confirmation at all, though this is clearly a mistake. The chief changes in the eucharistic liturgy made at Diamper were the following. The Portuguese substituted for that of the patriarch of Babylon. For the names of Nestorius, Diodore, Theodore, and other 'Nestorian' fathers, those of Cyril (of Alexandria) and others were substituted. The phrase 'Mother of God' replaced 'Mother of Christ.' Where, before the consecration, the words the 'body,' the 'blood,' occurred (as in Eastern liturgies by anticipation), the words 'bread,' 'wine,' were substituted. In the Nicene creed the phrases 'God of God, Light of light, very God of very God,' which were said to have been wanting in the Malabar form, were inserted; probably in order that the first two of these phrases were wanting in Malabar, as they do not occur in the Nestorian creed (see above, § 2). The phrase 'constubstantial with the Father' was substituted for 'Son of the essence of the Father;' the usual equivalent in Syriac (Neale unfortunately does not give the text of the creed in his Malabar liturgy). The host was ordered to be elevated at the consecration. But the chief change was a reversal of prevalent Oriental conceptions of liturgy. The epiclesis, or invocation of the Holy Ghost, was moved from its place after the narrative of the Last Supper and placed before it; the wording of the epiclesis was altered so as to make the epiclesis refer only to a good reception of the sacrament. For these changes see Howard, p. 40; but two of his statements appear to be doubtful. The Portuguese censors probably found no narrative of our Lord's words at all, as they were working on 'Addai and Mari' (see above, § 8); they probably therefore inserted them from one of the other anaphoras, though not in the place where

2. Gibbon, vi. 51.
3. Hill, 500.
5. P. Patriarchate of Alexandria, ii. 32.
they are found in those anaphoras, but in the place which they thought most suitable. The other justification of the Portuguese altered the wording of the epiclesis, is also doubtful, for, as Neale gives it; it agrees exactly with the epiclesis of 'Addal and Mari,' which, as we have seen, is of a very different character from that in the East, and most of them. The emphasis on the effects and purpose of the consecration, for the benefit of the communicants, rather than on the change effected in the bread and wine. The history of the changes at Dhamar fully justifies Rendall's statement above, and shows that the Portuguese sensors were quite ignorant of liturgical science.

The Portuguese changed the episcopal see from Angamala to Cranganor on the coast, so that it might be more accessible to them, and that they might have a greater hold on the native Church. But during the whole time of their rule in India they aroused constant opposition from the Malabarese, whom the terrors of the Inquisition were never able entirely to subdue. In 1663, after more than 60 years of Portuguese rule, the Malabarese were enabled by the Dutch conquests of the Dutch, and the independence of Theodore, a bishop sent from 'Babylon.' The Dutch expelled the Jesuits from Malabar soon after 1663, but these were not united among themselves, and about half remained in obedience to the Roman see, while the rest became independent of it. These last gladly accepted Gregory, Monophysite Bishop of Jerusalem, who came from the Jacobite patriarch at Mardin in 1665. Gregory consecrated Thomas as metropolitan, and since then the Malabarese have been in the main Jacobite. This change of front appears remarkable at first sight. Yet we must remember that in their origin neither the Malabar Church nor her mother, the East Syrian Church, was Nestorian, for they both existed before Nestorianism was propounded. And, though many East Syrians were genuinely Nestorian, it is very doubtful if their Church was consistently and officially so; still less certain is it that the Malabarese were strongly imbued with that doctrine. Hence we can understand why they grasped at the first hand that was stretched out to help them in getting rid of the Western authority which was imposed on them, but under which they could not content.

In the year 1700 and afterwards Nestorian bishops were sent, but they only secured the allegiance of a minority. In the 19th cent. the history is one of constant litigation between rival parties. The Nestorians of Malabar, after many lawsuits, won recognition in the courts and part of the endowments. In the year 1850 they obtained a bishop from Mar Shimun, the Nestorian archbishop (see above, § 6). Later, another was sent, but he was murdered by robbers on the journey. In 1907 Mar Shimun consecrated Mar Timotheus (Achinelech), who now holds office.

There are now perhaps 500,000 Syrian Christians, all told, in India; the majority are Jacobites, and have since the 17th cent. adopted the Jacobite liturgies and customs. The metropolitans usually consecrates his own successor, from the family in which the archdiocesanate has been hereditary. The archdeacon is called ramban. The archbishop is only rarely celebrated; the laity must communicate at least three times in the year, but there are church communities without lay communicants. The churches are plain, consisting of nave and chancel without transcepts. There is one altar, the so-called 'side altar' being used only, as in the Nestorian churches, for the celebration of the eucharist. There are no bookshelves, or books, or the like. The altar itself is 4 ft. high by 6 ft. long and 3½ (or 4) ft. wide, sometimes of stone and sometimes of wood. It stands out from the wall, and in the east wall almost of the chancel, is a bema, a lectern of Mesopotamia, in contrast to the Nestorian altar. At the eucharist the altar is covered with a white cloth, and has a frontal. On it are placed a wooden cross (often with the figure of our Lord painted on it), two candles, a bookstand, a slab of wood or marble for the chalice and paten to rest upon, a 'sponge' of silk for wiping the priest's fingers and for cleansing the chalice after the service, and three veils for the chalice and paten. The bread is leavened, and must be prepared on the day when it is used; each bread is round, and stamped with a cross. It is called variously Qorbdn (Oblation), 'first-bogited', 'the Seal', 'the Body,' 'the Coal' (See 6). These are common Syriac names elsewhere for the eucharistic bread. The naves of the churches have earthen floors; they have no furniture except cross, the two bells in the portico, and the bookstand. At the west side of the nave, on the nave-side of the chancel arch, there is a space railed off, not unlike the Nestorian bema (see above, § 5), and it is wide or 18 ft., as compared with a 10½ ft. width of the bema. The churches sometimes have pictures; this is probably a relic of Portuguese influence. There is always a veil at the chancel arch, which is drawn back at certain parts of the service. Externally the churches have little adornment; the west front has three storeys, and is whitewashed. The roof is high-pitched, that of the chancel being always higher than that of the nave. The vestments worn seem to be much the same as those of the Jacobites of Mesopotamia (see §5), and are more elaborate than those of the Nestorians. At the eucharist the celebrant wears special shoes, whereas the Nestorians take their shoes off; also a black serge or coarse cotton robe (perhaps a sort of casack), a white linen alb, a stole in one piece with an opening for the head, girdle, mantles, chasuble (or cope) of silk damask, and cowl. At ordination the clergy receive the tonsure, as do the Nestorians, the latter, however, only cutting off some of the ordaind's hair in the form of a cross. As in the worship of all Syrian Christians, incense is used at the eucharist and other services.

In some externals, especially in the matter of vestments, the Nestorian Malabarese seem to have assimilated their customs to those of their Jacobite neighbours.

10. Modern missions. — Besides the Jesuit, Dominican, and Lazarist missions to the Unit bodies mentioned in § 6, there have been during the last 30 years various missions to the Jacobites and Nestorians. The American Presbyterian and Congregational Board of Missions have long had missionaries among them; the Archbishop of Canterbury's educational 'Assyrian Mission' has worked among the East Syrians since 1886; and later the Russian Church sent a mission to them. Similarly missionary work from the West have laboured among the Malabarese in India. To all these missions we are largely indebted for a knowledge of the people, and for the publication of the Bible in classical and vernacular Syriac, of patristic texts, and of other liturgical and educational works.

3 Ib. p. 152. 
found walking about, they would be knocked down with clubs, nay, masked, that is, killed. 1

Property—(carrying who carries on the story after Cook's death) is perplexed to decide how far the 'implicit and scrupulous obedience' of the natives in regard to the prohibitions laid upon them as then when Bering was tampered, at the request of the navigators, while the remains of Captain Cook were being committed to the deep —was due to some 'religious principle' and how far to the 'legal authority of the Tabus'. 2

The whole account, however, makes it clear that kings, chief, priests, and the gods themselves, formed one undivided theocracy, whereof tabu constituted the chief instrument, at once spiritual and temporal in its nature and effects. More especially, it ensured a complete control of the economic situation.

Thus at Tonga the special officer who 'presided over the tabo' was a veritable food-controller:

He had his deputies inspected all the produce of the island; taking care that every man should cultivate and plant his quota; and ordering what should be eaten, and what not. By this wise regulation, they effectually guarded against a famine.

A sufficient quantity of ground is employed in raising provisions; and every article, thus raised, is secured from unnecessary waste. 3

For the rest, tabu was the corner-stone of the class-system, ensuring the subjection of women to men, of the lower classes to the chief, and of all other beings whose very name was taboo on penalty of death. 4

(6) Primary connexion of Oceanic tabu with a theocratic system.—Here, then, in this alliance of the religious with the civil forms of authority, we have the distinctive mark of tabu as understood in its local sense. R. Taylor's definition of it, as 'a religious observance established for political purposes', 5 hits off what is at any rate its leading aspect in Oceania. In the Polynesian islands a class of chief with social influence proportionate to their mana, or supernatural power, was everywhere recognized; and in the Eastern groups at any rate there were supreme potentates who might fairly be termed kings, though sometimes, as at Tonga in Mariner's day, the religious head of the community might be said to reign while the war-chief, his liege, in the hierarchy, actually governed. 6

On the other hand, the different rates of proper to be found in Melanesia. Here, however, the secret societies exercise a tumultuous, but none the less forcible, control over affairs by means of a system of tabus.s 7

(h) The English word taboo is employed there is always in Melanesia human sanction and prohibition. 8

Thus there is every reason to suppose that throughout the Pacific we have to do with customs belonging to a single type. This view is supported by the remarkable fact that, despite the diversity of tongues obtaining in this wide area, the word tabu in one of its dialectical forms, as well as the supplementary term mana, is in general use. But, if the nature and name of the institution are uniform, so presumably will be its origin. On the strength of this argument, W. H. R. Rivers has recently tried to show that tabu in its Oceanic distribution stands everywhere alike for the prestige acquired and the authority exercised by an immigrant folk—his so-called ' savage people' —in its dealings with an indigenous population of markedly inferior culture. 9

It is interesting to speculate how a system of tabus may have developed on the spot under stress of such

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1 A Voyage to the Pacific Ocean, 1774-80, i. 388.
5 Cook, King, iii. 10, 56.
6 Cf. Taylor, pp. 78, 91.
7 W. H. R. Rivers, The Men of the South Sea Islands, ed. 1877, ii. 317.
or mystic aspect of the penalties in store for the tabu-breaker. In this way it is possible to bring together under one head a large variety of avoidance characteristics of the less advanced peoples. This is because it is said that they have no king but custom. Just as their response to traditional rules is largely automatic, so, correspondingly, the rule itself has imputed to it an independent automatic power of self-maintenance and self-vindication. Indeed, theoretically, it is for general purposes to lay stress on the immanence of the sanction normally attributed to a tabu that it is safer to deny the name altogether to prohibitions deriving their force mediatly from a god or his earthly representative and to distinguish these as religious interdicts or bans. Tabu, in short, is to be understood as meaning "unlucky to meddle with" rather than forbidden by edict human or divine. It belongs to what may be termed the perceptual (Lévy-Bruhl would say "prelogical") stage of religion, when values are massively apprehended without analysis of their grounds. At this stage emotion of the collective or mobbish order is paramount as regards both the excitatory and the inhibitive processes that govern the social life. Now of all the emotions feared least, have the deepest haunting quality a special power of sustained control. A primary source of fear is the unfamiliar or strange as such; and this kind of fear in varying degree is always present as an element in that complex emotion of awe or reverence which is the root of religion. Tabu, then, stands for the whole mass of such fear-inspired inhibitions in so far as they proceed directly from the religious emotion, as it regulates the social tradition in the relative abeyance of reasoned direction. Here we have at any rate the psychological clue to a vast variety of customary abstinences—"negative rites," as they may be called—of which the particular conditions are a matter for historical treatment in detail.

(b) Tabu and the notion of contagion.—It may next be noted that emotions are infections. It is, indeed, the leading principle of mob-psychology that emotions are propagated more readily than ideas, their external manifestations lending themselves to unintelligent imitation. Moreover, fear is, perhaps, the most infectious of emotions. Hence the fear-inhibition embodied in tabu always implies an infections unluckiness—a transferable curse on meddlers. As A. van Gennep in his analysis of the fady (= taboo) of Madagascar shows, the inhibitory instincts, of which being that of tokina, 'contagion.'

'Everything,' says Jevons, 'which comes in contact with a tabooed person or thing becomes itself as dangerous as the original object, becomes a fresh centre of infection, a fresh source of danger to the community.'

Jevons goes on to discriminate between 'things taboo,' the primary sources of such contagion, and 'things tabooed,' in which the tabu-infection is not inherent but derivative. A single thing taboo might infect the whole universe, as he says with pardoxal exaggeration; but in practice the transmissible fear is strictly limited in its possible effects, being confined to certain channels prescribed by convention. Meanwhile it is not always easy to draw the line between the two classes. The clearest cases of 'things tabooed' are those in which, as in Oceania, a divine chief tabus something hitherto common, or noa—say, a hunting-ground—and then after a time restores it to ordinary use. But, when Jevons accepts at its face-value the Polynesian explanation that the tabu on the sick is due to the fact that they are possessed by an atua, or spirit, and therefore pronounces them 'tabooed but ... not taboo,' it is at least arguable that a 'pre-animistic' basis remains in certain cases perceptibly contiguous than certain (and those precisely the stranger and more alarming) forms of disease? It is surely no mere superstition to suppose that sickness—say, as it were, death itself—is to some extent in itself—in the local sense at least—is hardly profitable, in deference to the theory that the emotions of man afford the best criterion of his instincts, to regard 'things taboo' as so many danger-signals to which mankind has an innate predisposition to attend. Tabus need rather to be studied in relation to their proximate conditions, which are not biological but historical. In other words, tabus are primarily matters of custom, forming part of the social inheritance, not of the individual heredity.

(c) Tabu and the notion of supernatural power.—The other notion to which the tabu of Madagascar rests, according to van Gennep, is that of heomana = mana, or supernatural power. The person or thing is not to be trifled with, because liable to react with a force of unknown range and degree. There is no fear there, but an intimated and intimated lest it blast the unwary. Now, if religion were all fear, such mana would rank as wholly bad, since fear is a shrinking from evil. But other primary constituents of the religious mood make rather for interest, receptivity, approach, communion. For reckless self-assurance, indeed—for what the Greeks knew as ἑλεός—there is always the fear of the devil to pay. But fear tempered with wonder and submissiveness, and thus transmuted into reverence, is the forerunner of love. So mana has its good side as well, though from the standpoint of tabu this helpfulness remains, so to say, in reserve, being a consummation that lies beyond the purview of the fear-inhibition as such. Meanwhile to an advanced theology that has clarified its concepts by the method of antithesis the savage apprehension of mana by way of tabu seems blurred and equivocal, an experience of something monstrous, half-devil and half-god. And that there is some such ambiguity in the value perceived cannot be denied. The sacred and the abominable, the hallowed and the accursed pivot within the same perturbed awareness of the object. Nevertheless, rudimentary religion has gone a long way towards defining in practice, if not in theory, the sacred and the accursed in the ambit of the hidden power. Thus the novice at initiation or the warrior on a campaign is tabu that he may seek and find grace in the self-concentration that ensues after spiritual crisis overcome. On the other hand, the criminal is tabu because his very soul is attainted; wherefore, as the words of his doom, 'Sacer esto,' imply, he cannot touch water and fire lest he sully their purity with his foulness.

(d) Tabu as a source of personal religion.—At this point it may be observed that the institution of tabu is not only the main organ of social discipline at the lower levels of culture, but likewise the sacred-bed of personal religion. The latter function hinges on the fact that to be tabu with respect to society is at the same time to be tabu in relation to oneself. The external signs of this self-regarding attitude of precaution are often ludicrous enough, as when a man cannot feed himself, or must scratch his head with a stick, or needs to snuff up the holiness that exudes from his fingers. But an inner inwardly felt view revealing itself even in such practices. The mana to be conserved is just that part of a man that he feels to be most...
worth the saving—the will for power. Such power may be coveted for temporal ends. Savage shepherds of the people are not more disinterested than the rest of their kind. But at least it is proximately envisaged as a spiritual power. At least it is the sort of only that comes with and after self-abnegation and the exercise of humility. There is good evidence, too, that a sense of unworthiness consequent on the violation of his self-imposed tabus is the distinctive 'row'—is enough to cause voluntary resignation of office on the part of the primitive wonder-worker. There can be no doubt, then, that the experience both of the access of inspiration and of its withdrawal is often perfectly genuine; and, again, that the due safeguarding of such a gift is a lesson first acquired in the school of tabu. Further, not to lay exclusive stress on the ecstatic experience peculiar to the religious genius, the whole development of personality, so far as this comes about by way of reverence and reflection, arises largely out of the tabu condition. No other such opportunity is afforded, in the gregarious life, the savage, and for this self-communing whereby man eventually becomes master instead of slave of the sense-world. Self-respect, again, is nourished on privacy; the king or priest must keep his distance from the profane. The tabu must be respected only in their eyes but also in his own.1 For the rest, tabu stands for the etiquette of savage life, and by encouraging mutual consideration enables man to ripen into morals, the end of which is freedom.

(c) Danger of the over-development of tabu.—Hitherto the fruitfulness, the educative value, of tabu as a factor in religion of the perceptual or rudimentary type has been chiefly signalized. After all, the inhibition of impulse, as far as the measure of human advance. But such inhibition may be overdone, with paralysis of the will to live as a consequence. Tabu as such represents negation, and a religion made up mostly of negations is necessarily sterile. Denial, even self-denial, cannot but be soul-destroying, if taken as an end in itself. Hence a meticulous scrupulosity is a mark of degraded religion. Nothing, e.g., is so characteristic of the dairy-cult of the Todas as the web of tabus in which every action of the priest-dairymen is emmeshed, and Rivers not without good reason comments: 'The Todas seem to show us how a state of the highest and deepest sort of religion may lead to stooply of the ideas and beliefs through which the religion has been built up.'

Even a positive rite such as prayer may degenerate into formalism. Much more is this likely to happen with the negative rite or tabu, wherein the nature of the spiritual activity subserved is less immediately manifest. In the last stage of such decay—and in this also the case of the Todas is instructive—the scrupulosity itself tends to become a sham, an organized hypocrisy of evasions. The function of ritual in religion is to relieve attention in regard to things ancillary, and of negative ritual to do so in regard to things actually disturbing—all this in order to set attention free for active converse with the divine. It is true that there is in many forms of religious experience—and they are perhaps especially to the fore in rudimentary religion—a characteristic prelude of apparent inaction, a spell of listening, as it were; and, so far as the tabu condition corresponds to this, it is itself apart from the apparent barren of results when it is not. To judge fairly in each case, we must watch the ritual drama as a whole.

1 C. Krapkoff, 'To put on airs of distance or separation from others,' in J. A. F. de la Mare, Polynesia, (London, 1905, pp. 323, 473.
2 The Todas, London, 1905, p. 455. 3 ib.
itself felt, there is of late manifested a deeper interest in the external life, not especially as it relates to the conviction. All in social psychology with its study of the crowd and in individual psychology with its doctrine of the subconscious the conviction is growing that society and mind alike are controlled from below, as it were, as well as from above—that reason is at best a constitutional ruler whose authority rests not on force but on consent. It may be, then, that examined from this point of view, a systematic investigation of the Taboo will be found to embody elementary principles of order that to-day are as active as ever beneath the surface of a changed custom. Experience, which is experiment, has demonstrated (p. 126) to reject any scientific usage dear to the old order; but this experience, which in its most critical form is science, bids us seek beneath the accidents of history for those essential laws whereby our rational sense of direction is continuously maintained.

LITERATURE.—(1) For tabu in Oceania see the works cited above, early authorities such as Cook and Martin being especially enlightening, since the original social system has long been gone, at any rate in Polynesia; compare also Th. Wallis and G. Simson, Anthropologische Notizen über die Weltinsel Lepopo, London 1861, vii; W. Ellis, Polynesian Researches, London, 1833, iv.; G. Tournefort, Tabou, ou les negotiations avec les Sauvages, Paris 1844; Old New Zealand, by a Pakeha Maori, 1854; since the same cultural influences presumably extend to Indonesia and the Polynesian races, see also W. Y. Skeat, Malay Magic, 1890. A. van Gennep, Tabou et Totémisme, Paris, 1909, brings the local into relation with a general interpretation.


TAHITIANS.—See POLYNESIA.

TALISMAN.—See CHARM AND AMULETS.

TALMUD.—Two great works are known under the title, 'Talmud'—a word (7679) which denotes primacy, priority, and hence 'learning.' The two works are the Palestinian and Babylonian recensions, both of which are, in form, commentaries on the text of the Mishnah (7572). The Mishnah ('repetition,' hence oral teaching by repeated recitation) was completed about A.D. 200. The Talmud consists of the Mishnah with the Gemara (797). It represents the scholastic activities of the Jewish Rabbis from the beginning of the 3rd to the close of the 5th century A.D.

The history of the compilation of the Talmud has been dealt with in many treatises and essays.1 It is not the design of the present article to add to those discussions on the criteria and problems involved. Two practical questions will occupy us: (1) the attitude of the outside world to the Talmud,2 and (2) the causes and nature of the permanent value of the Talmud within Judaism.

1. The Talmud in history.—The century which saw the completion of the Talmud also witnessed the beginning of interference with the normal course of the Rabbinic movement. In the year 553 the Emperor Justinian was called upon to arbitrate on a difference which arose between two sections of Jewry in the Byzantine realm. Whereas some were desirous of publicly reading the scriptures both in Greek and in Hebrew, others wished to have the latter done only. The Emperor ordered the prefect Areobindus to promulgate the imperial decision in favour of the use of Greek (the Synagogue might use Aquila if it preferred it to the Septuagint), or of other vernacular tongues such as the Latin, in the Italian province. The emperor, moreover, forbade any attempt on the part of the heads of the schools or elders to prevent the use of the vernacular by devices or prohibitory communications. Most significant of all was Justinian's interdiction of the practice of giving the Haggadiad exposition (sermon) after the reading of the Scripture. The opening words of the rescript explain Justinian's intention. The Jews, he suggested, should read their Scriptures with an eye to the hidden meaning and see in them a prophetic announcement of Christianity. Hence the emperor would literally desire to curb the popularity of the Rabbinic exegesis, which of course would confirm the Jews in their refusal to admit Christological interpretations. Thus Justinian, who introduced drastic legislative enactments against the Jews, was also among the first to attempt interference with the free use and spread of their literature.2

We must here confine our attention to that phase of the strife between Judaism and the Talmud. It was not till the 13th cent. that the attack assumed practical shape. Paris, in the year 1241, was the scene of the first public burning of copies of the Talmud. Before that date the Rabbinic doctrines had been assailed in the de Insolentia Judaeorum of Agobard; but from the Paris incident onwards these assaults became far more frequent and dangerous. Nicholas Donin of La Rochelle had, in 1222, attacked the word Rabban in the name of the Rabbis. This occurred in 1225; he subsequently joined the Franciscans, and in 1230 he formally laid an accusation against the Talmud before Pope Gregory IX., who addressed bulls to many lands (including England) ordering the seizure of copies of the Talmud pending a public inquiry. In France the matter was seriously taken up. Charges of blasphemy, impiety, particularism, and absurdity were formulated; a public dispute between Donin and four Rabbis was ordered. The humours and retaliations of such debates have been satirized in Heine's poem 'Disputation.' But the consequences were deplorable. The Talmud was condemned; many copies of it were burnt; and popular outbreaks against the Jews resulted. Within a few years similar scenes were enacted in Barcelona. Here again the attack originated with a Jewish convert to Christianity, Pablo Christiani. He instigated a public debate between himself and Nahmanides in 1263, as to the attributes and coming of the Messiah, and the Rabbi was sentenced to exile because his defence of Judaism was pronounced blasphemous. In 1264 Christiani induced Pope Clement iv. to appoint a Commission of censors, who expunged all those passages which appeared derogatory to Christianity. In particular, as time went on, Talmudic references to ancient paganism were misinterpreted as being attacks on the Church. This charge was brought forward by yet another erstwhile Jew, Geronimo de Santa Fé, who engineered a public dispute in 1310. In 1410, and also in 1421, the Talmud was submitted to the verdict of the crowd the most intricate problems of Biblical exegesis in relation to Messianic belief. The practical outcome again

1 Neville Goodinson, 146.

2 The view of Justinian's rescript given in the text is the one usually adopted. It is by no means the only possible explanation. See 'Literature' below.
was not a settlement as to the significance of Is 53, but the confiscation of copies of the Talmud. Of much greater interest was the controversy which arose in the decade of the Talmud's beginning of the 16th century. Owing to the part taken by Renschlin (q.v.) in this incident, the Talmud became the battle-ground between the old and the new, between the obscurantists and the humanists. Again the protagonist in the attack on the Talmud was one who had left the Synagogue for the Church. It must not, however, be thought that the proverbial zeal of converts has invariably assumed the guise of the recent assaults made on the Talmud by representatives of modern anti-Semitism (q.v.), powerful among the defenders of the fair fame of the Rabbinic system were such famous Judeo-Christian scholars as Daniel Chwolsohn and Paulus Cassel. The opponent of Renschlin was of a different type. We know very little as to the antecedents of Johann Pfefferkorn, of whom Erasimus said that from a bad Jew he became an execrable Christian ("ex scelestatus Judeo scelestatissimus Christianus"), for no reliance can be placed on the insinuations made by satirists that in his earlier days Pfefferkorn had adopted the tilting spear of the dread unpopular career of a burglar. All that we know is that Pfefferkorn was animated by a strong animosity towards his former co-religionists, that his fanaticism far exceeded his learning, and that he found support for his campaign among the Dominicans of Cologne. Though the Jews had been excluded from that city in 1426 and only regained rights of free domicile there with the coming of the French in 1799, Cologne remained during the 15th and 16th centuries the headquarters of the campaign against Jewish books. It would be unprofitable to repeat the details of the oft-told tale of Pfefferkorn's pamphlets and Renschlin's rejoinders; of the seizure of Hebrew books in Frankfort-on-the-Main in 1509, their restoration, and the long-drawn-out struggle that ensued in Rome. Nor is it of any importance to us now whether or not Pfefferkorn wrote the works that bear his name. The whole incident would have been forgotten but for certain facts. In the first place, this battle of the books gave rise to a famous satire, the Epistola Obscurorum Virorum, the first part of which appeared at Tübingen towards the end of 1514. The effect of this rather savage satire was instantaneous and permanent. As an assault designed to assail this was one of the most masterly efforts ever put forward on behalf of the importance of the Talmud. The struggle between Renschlin and Pfefferkorn became, in short, elevated to a higher plane. Renschlin, once for all, struck the trump-note when he protested against the destruction of a literature because elements of it were distasteful to certain of its critics. "If the Talmud contains errors," he said, "let us render them innocuous by studying to sift the chaff from the grain. Do not burn the Talmud, but read it." It is to Renschlin that we owe the foundation of Hebrew chairs in the universities; the first Hebrew text printed in Germany was the edition of seven Psalms used by Renschlin in 1512. The study of Hebrew in Christian Europe commenced with him, was taken up by his immediate successors, and has never since been relinquished. Renschlin died full of the vindication of his interest in the Kabába. But Hebrew was the passion of his life. And there is no doubt that to him we owe that interest in the Talmud which would, if it was realisable, make a clear and printed edition of all its tomes. There were, as we shall see, printed editions of parts of the Talmud available in 1510, when he wrote that "he would like to pay the price for a copy of the Talmud twice over but he had not yet been able to obtain one." He was referring to MS copies. Within about a hundred years in which the censorship of the law of the land it was easy to procure the Bomberg edition printed in Venice. It was fortunate for scholarship that Daniel Bomberg began to print the Talmud in 1520, before the censorship intruded its hand. Yet the censorship has this value. In 1550 the Talmud was placed on the Index. But the Tridentine Synod in 1564 provided that the Talmud might be circulated, if the passages obnoxious to Christian orthodoxy were expurgated. This was done, and between 1579 and 1581 there was completed the censored Basel edition which formed the model for many subsequent editions. In this form, the Basel edition, the Talmud may be read by Christians not only without reproach but even with profit ("Etiam cum fructu a nostris legi potest"). The Inquisitor Marco Marino went through the Venice edition of 1546-50, censored it, and affixed his name to the expurgated version page by page. The expurgated passages have often been edited and commented on separately. Attacks on the Talmud, nevertheless, continued. As late as 1816 copies of the Talmud were burnt in Poland as a result of the Kamenetz-Podolsk disputation. Literary onslaughts have naturally continued, and modern anti-Semitism has displayed much energy in seeking in the pages of the Talmud grounds for attacks on the Jews. Those pages contain enough and to spare of superstition, narrowness, folly, and intolerance. But the faults are superficial, the merits fundamental; and if anything the latter is that the Talmud retains its permanent worth.

2. Permanent value.—In the first instance the Talmud represents more fully than any other Jewish work the final development of the religion of the OT. In several important particulars, the Talmud, indeed, represents an advance on the OT. The view (adopted by the school of R. H. Charles) that Judaism was a degeneration, while Apocalypse was an advance. On the contrary, all the noble elements of the OT teaching were absorbed into and developed by Rabbinism, which was essentially a prophetic system. The moral life was at once the basis of religion and its ultimate outcome. The Talmud concerned itself with life. It therefore drew little or no distinction between the secular and the religious. This is not the place to discuss the Pharisaic life which developed in the Gospels; for, however we may explain the discrepancy, the Pharisaism of the Gospels is not identical with the Pharisaism of the Talmud.

Hence, though the Talmud, because it combines secular and religious into one whole, is often inclined to attach undue importance to ritual or customary trivialities, it cannot be said that it does so at the expense of the great principles. And, when all has been said, the fact remains that, difficult though it be to harmonize the daily round with the higher calls of spiritual moments, the Talmud did effect this harmonization with a considerable measure of success. To penetrate into the most of God in human life, and worship was not merely confined to the hours spent in congregational prayers. The home was sanctified as well as the synagogue. This fact constituted a glutification and development of the relation to the Judaism of all ages. The liberals who have rejected the authority of the Talmud have not rejected its spirit and its outlook. They, like the conservatives of 1790, confess that the accomplishment of life is the purpose of life. And, among the many attempts to effect this hollowing of life—in relation primarily to God, but also in intercourse...
TAMMUZ

with man—the Talmud must be conceded a high place.

In the main, then, the Talmud retains its worth because it has so thoroughly absorbed the prophetic conception of the close interconnection of religion and life. But life is not altogether expressible in terms of conduct. There is the intellectual side. Now, for long intervals, the Talmud was the main means by which the Jew cultivated his mind. Sometimes Talmudic Talmudists of the Middle Ages were indeed also devoted to science and philosophy, in the technical sense of those terms. But there were masses of Jews who knew no other intellectual interest than the Talmud and the allied literature. The nature of the Talmud saved them from stagnation. For the Talmud is a work of most manifold interest. It concerns itself with every phase of human activity. To read it intelligently—and it was assuredly so read—was a liberal education in the arts and sciences and philosophies. So wide is its range that a student of the Talmud is perforce acquainted with very many subjects which nowadays are regarded as distinct disciplines. The mind of the student was kept alert; his attitude never became scholastic; at every point he was in contact with actualities. It is not the Talmud, but the Talmudist, to maintain this alertness, so that to con over its pages was not identical with losing oneself in an obsolete past. The Talmud breathes with vital freshness.

This enables us to understand why the Talmud has never been superseded by the codes founded upon it even by authorities so competent and able as Moses Maimonides and Joseph Qaro. The codes omit the very element which makes the Talmud so important, so unique. The codes reduce ritual and religious conduct to rule; the decisions are stated in precise paragraphs; they are anonymous. But the Talmud presents processes as well as results; there is little of rule in it, less of precision; and the dicta are largely associated with the names of their authors. We see the religious evolution in action. And, just as it is in action in the older book, it remained in action in the modern life. The claim often put forward by recent Talmudists that their beloved tomes represent a progressive Judaism is well founded. Codes have an air of finality, while the key-note of the Talmud is continuance.

For the Talmud, after all, comes into line with the newer theory of the evolution of religion. The effect of it has been not only to obscure the difference between Scripture and Tradition. This may be true, but modern criticism tends (on quite other grounds) to obliterate the distinction. The Scripture is itself a traditional evolution—so the newer theories hold. The Talmud in essence anticipated this theory, not in the direction of belittling the divine character of the written text, but in the direction of magnifying the human part in the authorization of the message. Man has his part to play in bringing the Law into operation—in interpreting it, which is often another term for expanding it.

We can here merely mention the beauties of the Talmud, its felicities of thought, its sights of fancy, its parables, its poetry. The Jew did not merely feed his mind on the wit of the Talmud or his spirit on its idealism. His heart and imagination, too, were fed. It found there an inexhaustible literature. The liturgy derived some of its choicest prayers. In germ, the Talmud already contains the mysticism which in later ages grew up so luxuriantly. That this mysticism is rare and nearly became antinomian was due almost entirely to the Talmud, which more than permitted—for it encouraged—individualism as well as communism in the religious life. Our present point, however, is that volumes could be compiled (volumes have been compiled) out of the fine gems presented in a literary form which is unlike that of any other work—unlike in grotesqueness as well as in efficiency.

In the presence of these merits the attacks on the Talmud failed. Partly they were theological, partly moral, partly social. Ridicule was cast on its triviality; fault was found with its religious conceptions; objection was taken to its attitude to Gentiles. These unfavourable criticisms were not all unfounded, for the Talmud contains much of inferior value, and bears the marks of the different ages an intruder of thought in Judaism grew up. Nevertheless, some of the attacks on the Talmud were absolutely false; in others the assailants confused the attitude towards the Rome which destroyed the Temple with the attitude to the Rome which became the seat of the papacy.

Often, too, overmuch importance was attached to the obiter dicta of isolated Rabbinas. When, however, it was protested by Donin in 1359, and by Romano in 1553, that it was the Talmud that confirmed the Jews in their obstinate fidelity to the Synagogue, the charge was largely just. But that does not lead to the conclusion that the Talmud was not a work. At all events it explains, perhaps in the most effective manner, how it came about that a work, so curiously alien from the modern canons of excellence in literature, has maintained its position not only with those Jews who more or less order their lives in accordance with it, but also with those who, rebels against its authority, retain an affectionate regard for its spirit. Written in style far removed from modernity, the Talmud is one of the most modern of books.


TAMIL-SPEAKING PEOPLES.—See Dravidians.

TAMMUZ. Tammuz was the West Semitic, or North Babylonian inscriptions the legend of Tammuz was regarded as being exclusively West Semitic, owing, apparently, to the scene of the god's activities being located, in the then extant records, in Syria. The word is, however, in finding an acceptable root by which the name of the god might be explained.

2. its most familiar versions.—According to the classic legend of Tammuz, his mother had an unnatural intercourse with her own father, urged thereto by Aphrodite, whom she had offended. Pursued by her father, who sought to kill her for this crime, she prayed to the gods, who changed her into a tree, the trunk Adams (the Greek-Syriac name of Tammuz) was in due time born. So charmed was Aphrodite with the beauty of the infant that, placing him in a chest, she
handed him to Persephoné to take care of. The
goddess of the under world, however, when she
found what a treasure she had in her keeping,
refused to part with him again. Zeus was there-
fore appealed to, and he decided that for four
months in the year Adonis should be left to him-
self, for four months it was supposed he was
gnashing their teeth, and the remaining four with Persephone. A variant
account, however, agrees with the Babylonian
legend in making him pass six months with Erêš-
ki-gal (Persephoné) and six with Istar, or
Aphrodite.1 This representation Adonis,
or Tammuz, as being passionately fond of hunting,
and undeterred therefore by the fiercest quarry.
His end was tragic, as he was slain through the
task of a wild boar piercing his groin (see § 14).

3. The Syrian versions.—The centre of
the Syrian worship of Tammuz was probably Gebal;
in any case, Balthi ('the [divine] Lady,' as
Aphrodite seems to have been called in the ex-
treme west of Asia) was believed to have migrated
thither from her realm of Cyprus for love of Tammuz (Tammuz). But before Tammuz she
had loved Ares (Mars) and thereby aroused the
jealousy of her husband Hephaestus. In this
version Tummuz is described as the son of Cuthar,
king of the Phoenicians, to whom, when she fled
from Cyprus, Balthi made all the villages around sub-
mission. It is said of a wild boar, however, that
called the death of Tummuz, but the jealousy of either Aphrodite's husband Hephaestus or her lover Ares, who came and slew Tammuz on Lebanon whilst he was hunting wild
boars.
The Syrian lexicographer Bar Bahlu also gives the legend as he had heard it: 'Tommuwas, as they say, a hunter shepherder and chaser of those beasts; who when he married his bride took her away from her husband. And when her husband went forth to seek his Tommuwas, he was, but himself slain later on by a wild boar which he encountered in the wilderness, and his father made a great weeping for him in the month named after him.'

The Rabbinical references to Tammuz are more
curious than instructive with regard to the history
and development of the myths concerning him.
One (that of Rabbi Solomon Isaac, or Raashii, commenting on Exod. 20.10), in order to connect the root of Tammuz with the Chaldaean zêz, 'to make hot,' describes it as 'an image with which the women made hot in the inside, and its eyes were red, and they melted by reason of the heat of the burning, and it seemed as if it wept;' and they (the women) said, 'He asks for ourquartered.'

This and other varying traditions concerning Tammuz, however, seem to belong to the Christian
era.

4. The worship of Tammuz in Syria.—In all
probability the mourning for Hadadrimmon men-
tioned by Zechariah (12:1) is a reflexion of the
lamentations for Tammuz, with whom this deity
is said to have become identified; and in a
passage in Amos (8:9) the Israelites lament as for
'an only son.' The most noteworthy Biblical
passage, however, is seemingly that in Jeremiah (25:8), where it is said that they shall not lament for Jehoiakim, saying, 'Ah my brother! or, Ah sister! Ah lord! or, Ah his glory! and where the word 'sister' suggests the sympathy of the mourners for his bereaved spouse or lover. When Belia, his sister, in the Babylonian legend, says, 'My brother, only (one), do not cause me pain!' (by leaving the world again to go to the regions below), we perhaps have a better parallel. Byblos,
the site of the temple of Tammuz in Syria, was,
in the month of June, the funeral-festival of the smitten sun-god was held, and lasted for seven days. 'Gardens of Adonis,' covered over with seeds which
sprang up quickly, and as quickly, owing to lack
of moisture, faded away—were prepared by the
mourning women as emblems of the early death
of the youthful Adonis. Thongs of wailing women
filled the streets and the gates of the temple,
tearing their hair, disfiguring their faces, and
remaining barefoot. By the appointed priests of Ashur-tho, the spouse of Tammuz—took
part in the mourning for 'the bridegroom of her
youth.' These days of mourning were followed by
days of rejoicing for his resurrection, during which
the Boar was slain, the 'Festival of the Meat of
the Mediterranean from Alexandria—an emblem
of the severed limbs of Osiris, which, gathered up by
Istis, his inseparable spouse, after he had been
dismembered by Typhon, had of old arrived at
Gebal. Thus did the legend of Tammuz assimilate
itself with the Egyptian myth of the sun-god
Osiris.

5. Tammuz in Babylonia, his birth-place.—So
far Babylonian sources have furnished but few of
the details of the Syrian and the Greek versions
of the myth of Tammuz. To all appearance the
legend had not been carried from Syria to Babylonia, and not by the reverse. In its original form it must have been of consider-
able antiquity. According to the archaic list of royal names discovered at Nippur (Niffer), and now preserved in the British Museum, of Pennsyl-
Dar, the Babylonians called Tammuz, was a king of Erek and ruled for 100 years. His predecessor was the god Lagal-bands, who reigned for no less than 1300 years, whilst his
successor was the half-divine and only half-
historical king of Erek Supiru, Gilgames, who
ruled for 160 or possibly 180 years. According
to this record, Tammuz was a fisherman (Sumerian ak-ia) of the Gulf of Ela-a, a site as yet unidentified,
but which one would expect to find somewhere
in the neighbourhood of the Persian Gulf. Though
king of Erek, Tammuz was more especially
associated with Eri-ja, the divine city of Ela, the
god of the waters, at the head of the same
water-way, and it was only natural that a maritime
people, such as the southern Babylonians were,
should make Tammuz a fisherman. In that part
of the land he was evidently the god of the fruit-
fulness of the teeming waters, just as, inland, he
was god of the fruitfulness of the fertile Babylonian
plains.

6. Istar's search for Tammuz in Hades.—Out-
lines of this legend are given in the articles
BABYLONIANS AND ASSYRIANS,2 and HEROES AND
HERO-GODS (Babylonian). From this text we
see that Tammuz was, at the time of Ishtar's descent,
in the under world with Erês-ki-gal (Persephoné),
whither he had descended in accordance with
the decision of the king of the gods (Bel-Merodach =
Zeus). This legend likewise shows that Tammuz
had become the lover of Ishtar or, as the record
puts it, 'the husband of her youth.' The sacrifices
which she was willing to make on his account are
noteworthy, for at each of the seven gateways of
'the land of No-Return' she parted—under protest
—with an article of apparel or adornment, until
she appeared in the presence of the queen of the
region perfectly naked. As things went wrong on
earth owing to the absence of the goddess of love,
Esta, Sin, and Ea bestirred themselves and
secured her release. Here the subject suddenly
changes, and the name of Tammuz appears in the
text for the first time:

1 If she [Erês-ki-gal] hath not given thee her disposal, return to her.
2 Upon Tammuz, the husband of [her] youth, Four out pure water, [leptakî]vex elâl.
3 See Ezrît xxvii. [151-150] § 159. 2 EERI 118. 4 J. B. VI 645a.
Tammuz

Clothe him with a festive garment, let him strike up with the flute of lapstone—
Let the joy-mad dance, let the honoree one...
(Then) Bélili set down [her] instrument,...
And the women-mourners [her?].
[When she heard her brother’s voice, Bélili smote her instrument...]
Her ‘eyes-stones’ filled [her] thoughts (>).
‘My brother, only [one], do not cause [me] pain’ (>)
On the lapstone flute, they will play along with him the tambour of chalcedony (>)
The men-mourners and the women-mourners will play along with him.
May the dead (?) arise and smell the incense.

Bélili, mentioned here as the sister of Tammuz, appears also in the great list of gods in connection with Alala, as forms of the deities of the heavens, Anu and Anatum. The flute of Tammuz, like the divine vine at Éridu, was of lapstone, emblematic of the blue sky, and it is not unlikely that the other objects mentioned—Bélili’s ‘eyes-stones’ and the ‘tambour’—were of precious and similarly symbolical materials.

7. Other Babylonian references to Tammuz.—The first place ought probably to be assigned to the lists of gods, which furnish us with some of his names, and the deities with whom he was identified. The transcription of the group standing, in Sumerian, for Tammuz, *Demu-zi*—Dumu-zi, though in Semitic form, ‘Dunu-zida’, is often found. The commonly accepted rendering of this group into Semitic Babylonian is *mardu kunu*, ‘the true (or faithful) son.’ Of the lists in which the name is found the most important is probably the trilingual text (two dialects of Sumerian and Semitic Babylonian equivalents) published in *WAi* ii. pl. 59. In that inscription his character as a sun-god is indicated by the fact that his name comes towards the end of the section referring to the sun-god Šamaš, after Kēttu and Mēšarru, that deity’s two attendants. After this comes Tu-zī-zi (*from Tum-zi, in standard Sumerian [Dumu]-zi, rendered by *ba-zi:* i.e. transferring Dumu-zi into the Semitic Babylonian column—and from the next line we see that he bore in Sumerian also the name of U-lihir-sī (dialectic) or Enligrī-sī, probably meaning ‘the lord of the righteous covenant,’ or the like. The next line, which begins a new section, has the name of Sir-du, dialectic Shir-tunn, the mother of Tammuz. Other deities in this section are the ‘lady of the plain,’ Sītar, and ‘the lady of the gods.’ A section giving further names of these goddesses follows, and then comes the final section of the tablet, beginning with Eres-ki-gal and ending, alluding as Altalatu, the Babylonian Persephone. Important as showing the feminine aspect of Tammuz, which is also visible in the Syro-Greek view of the deity, is the list in which he is called Ama-uṣumgal-ana, ‘the peerless mother of heaven,’ which may be one of the aspects of the planet Venus, described as ‘male at sunrise.’ Another name, En-mersi, dialectic for Nin-Gur, the god of Lagas, identifies Tammuz with that deity and stamps him specifically as the great god of agriculture.

8. The abodes of Tammuz in Babylonia.—The chronological list preserved at Philadelphia, U.S.A., indicates that Tammuz was a king of Erech and seems to indicate that his native place was a city expressed by the characters Ha-n. In the incantation published in *WAi* iv. pl. 15, however, Éridu seems to have been his chief city, of which, therefore, Ša-ā may have been a suburb or even another name:

En Éridu a black vine grows—in a sacred spot it was made. Its substance was white-flaked lapstone, planted in the Deep.

En Éridu is filled with fruitfulness—
His seat is the (central) place of the earth.

His abode is in the bed of Enur [the Abyss].
In his holy house, which is like a forest, [his] shelter is set—no man can enter therein.

In the midst of it is Samâl [and Tammuz] Dumu-zi, between the mouths of the rivers (or canals) on both sides.

Here follow the names of the waterways in question: Kā-bengala, Iqrī-bengala, and Ka-na-ab-ul, though the true total seems to have been four.

Instead of ‘the god Šamaš (and Tammuz)’ we might read ‘the sun-god Tammuz,’ which would correctly describe his position in the Babylonian pantheon. The Sumerian original has expressed the name of Tammuz by the feminine Ama-uṣumgal-ana.

The connexion of Tammuz with the vine of Éridu, the Paradise-city, stamps him here likewise as one of the gods of fertility, and it is owing to this that he is so closely connected with the god Ea, to whose nourishing streams the great fruitfulness of the land was due. It is noteworthy that Nin-Gur, the god of Lagas, who was identified with him, bore also the name of Uru, ‘the husbandman.’

9. Tammuz as the herdsman.—It has already been noted that Dumu-zi, or Tammuz, was called the fisherman (*ša-ša = bagara*), but later he appeared as ‘the herdsman.’ This view of the deity is referred to in another incantation:

‘The milk of a yellow goat which has been brought forth in the holy fold of Tammuz [Dumu-zi].

The milk of a goat of the flock—may he give thee with his holy hand.

Pour it then into the skin of an undefiled she-goat.

Azi-angu, the uz-mah-Enīla (‘glorious goat of the god Enīla’), has caused [it] to be eaten with his Sacred hand.

Merodoch, lord of Éridu, has given the incantation—

May Nin-aqa-kuddu, the lady of the limbless fopun, make him [the sick man] holy, make him pure.

‘The incantation of the milk of the yellow goat, and the flour of the undefiled she-goat’s skin.’

The antiquity of the association of Tammuz with the flocks in Babylonia is shown by the noteworthy text in *The Amherst Tablets*, i. (London, 1908) no. 119, where ‘Fees’ is expressed by the phrase ‘sheep of the sky.’ This indicates that the flocks of Tammuz, the sun-god of spring, were the clouds illuminated by the setting sun, and comparable with the flocks of Hehlos in Greek mythology, expressed in the Sumerian inscription, nos. 110, 112, and 114 refer to the ‘grain of the priest of Tammuz,’ and no. 113 mentions his temple at Lagas. The date of these inscriptions is about 2920 B.C.

10. The Babylonian hymns to Tammuz.—At least two series of these existed, and they may have formed the originals of some of those chanted by the Hebrew women* as well as by the Phcenicians and the other nationalities who accepted or adopted the cult. The following will show their nature:

‘The eye and her lamb he taketh;
The goat and her kid he taketh.
The eye and her lamb she smiteth down;
The goat and her kid she smiteth down.

Arisen then, go, her road of “No-return.”

Alas, hero! warrior, Un-ana;
Alas, hero! my god Dumu-zi;
Alas, hero! son—my faithful lord;
Alas, hero! Glum-him the bright-eyed;
Alas, hero! god Nannar, lord of the west;
Alas, hero! overseer, lord of prayer;
Alas, hero! they who [are] my heavenly light;
Tammuz

Alas, hero! Ana-nun-ga-ana;
Alas, hero! brother, mother, heavenly vine.
He goeth, he goeth, to the bosom of the earth—
A distant land, in which there is no abundance for the land's dead.

For his lamentation, for the day of his fall,
In the unpropitious month of his year.
To the road of man's last end,
At the call of the lord,

(God, hero, to the distant land which is not seen.)

Or, according to the Sumerian original of the last four lines:

In an unpropitious month of thy year,
To the road of the people's end or rest,
At the call of the lord,

The warrior, in his distant land, is not seen.

'The unpropitious month' is probably Du'anzu, or Tammuz; 'the road of man's last end' is that leading to the under world; 'the lord,' who calls him, is possibly Merodach, but may be Nergal, king of that region, the Babylonian Mara.4

After a division-line the text continues:

'Alas, my abundance which has been withheld! Alas, my produce which has been detained!
My heart is oppressed, shepherd, dwelling in exile—
Where is his city? My heart is oppressed!
From the house of gloom he shall be brought forth—
Whom you worthy, from the house of gloom shall he be brought forth!
Alas, hero! warrior, Un-anu, etc., etc., as above.

Though these lamentations may have been recited by the women and others who joined in the ceremonies, it is probable that they were originally alliterative stanzas placed in the month of Ilun. They are plentiful and referred to is probably the fruit of the earth; the oppression of heart was due to the lack of these things, and also to the god's exile in the regions below.

The bearing of these hymns upon the legend is clear. We learn that (1) some accident had happened to Tammuz, by which his sojourn in the under world is explained; (2) this accident was that in some way he fell — either through an attack by a wild animal (boar) or, like Eshmun, the Phoenician deity, by his own hand; (3) the result was that he passed part of his life in the under world, whereby the earth suffered and the underworld profited; (4) the under world, to which Tammuz went, was man's last abode and the place of the people's rest. Notwithstanding that he was fulfilling his mission, the exile of Tammuz was still an unpropitious event for him, the realm of Eres-ki-gal not being, even for the earth-dweller, that place of delight which the man looking forward to life with his god in the realms of bliss would like it to be. It was supposed, however, that the worshipper of Tammuz, when he departed this life to dwell with his god, hoped to enjoy companionship with him not only in Hades, but also on earth when his time came to return thither.

11. The transfer of the legend to Syria.—As has already been stated, 1 the legend of Tammuz in Babylonia was of considerable antiquity—as early, in fact, as 4000 B.C. or even earlier, and it had had, therefore, ample time not only in which to spread abroad, but also to assume new forms and receive additions. Besides Byblos, the Babylonian Gubal (Ghal), Tammuz was also venerated in many intermediate states and cities — Cilicia, Cappadocia, Lydia, Lydia, Ephesus, and Phermum. Everywhere the cult was most enthusiastically adopted, falling in, as it did, so exactly with the Semitic view of the nature of things. Apart from

the theories which were held as to the creation of the universe, the legendary teaching connected with Tammuz dealt only with the continuance of what had been brought into existence by the Creator. Regarded as a sun-legend, it was recognized that the kindly fruits of the earth were due to his rays, and to the fact that, when these and their accompanying warmth were withdrawn or reduced, the growth of vegetation ceased.

12. The reflex-influence of the legend of Tammuz in Babylonia and Assyria is seen in this enthusiastic worship of the Babylonian Dumuzi, under the name of Tammuz, had influence in Babylonia and Assyria, sympathetically related as they were with the Western Semites, is but natural; and its greater importance in the countries of its adoption than in the land of its origin is also easily comprehensible. This was due to the fact that the Babylonians had, from the date of the rise of Babylon, accepted Merodach, who was also a sun-god, as their supreme deity. Tammuz therefore continued to represent simply one of his forms, and thus remained ineligible as chief of their pantheon. With the construction of a philosophical system, his position of supremacy would have destroyed.

13. The development of the legend farther west.—In all probability more than one version of the legend existed in Babylonia and migrated, with the worship, westwards. Representing the summer sun, with all its warmth and its vivifying and productive power, Tammuz was regarded as the god who passed the six months between the beginning of autumn and the end of winter in the under world. As the planet Venus seems to follow the course of the sun, her disappearance with him was interpreted as her desire to rescue him from that prison-house, but, as her movements do not coincide with the seasons, she generally had to come forth without him. When the time for his release came, therefore, he had to return to earth unaccompanied by his spouse.

In the West the legend was modified, and Tammuz-Adonis there appears as the son of the Cyprotite king Kyynras and as beloved of the goddess Aphrodite. He died, it was said, in the forest of Lebanon, killed by the wild boar typifying winter, and since the time of that catastrophe of the river Adonis now the Nahr Ibrahim, 'Abraham's stream,' flows yearly, when in flood, reddened by his blood. The name Adonis is the Greek form of the Phoenician Adon, 'lord,' which this deity, in common with many others, bore. In the Samaritan hymns (mostly in the dialect) he is constantly called the 'lord,' Ash or iawen, and it is probably owing to this, at least in part, that Adon (Adonis) became one of his names.

14. Tammuz in Cyprus.—According to Ovid, 1 the scene passes, in part, from Assyria (Syria) to Cyprus. Kyynras, king of that island, had, by an incestuous relation with his daughter 2 Myrrha, a beautiful son named Adonis. The child was brought up by the nymphs and had hardly reached manhood when he became the lover of Aphrodite. One day, notwithstanding the goddess's succussions, he went hunting in the forest of Lebanon and was wounded by a bear sent by Ares (Mars), who was jealous of the divine youth. Aphrodite, hearing of this tragedy, filled the forest with her lamentations and tried to revive him, but without success. Feeling the blood of the dying Adonis had its root, and the river Adonis was thenceforth reddened yearly by his blood.

15. The legend of Tammuz in Greece.—According to Pausanias, 3 Sophocles, 4 Adonis was the son of a princess of Assyria (Syria), Myrrha or Smyrna, 5 Metam. x. 2 See § 5, 15.

1 Variant rendering: 'Samal will make him great in the land of the dead,' but that given above seems preferable.
2 The rendering in Semitic is 'filled with lamentation on the day that he fell and (was) in distress,' but the Sumerian is insufficient for all this.
3 In the calendar of lucky and unlucky days (W 4 1 v. 45) the entries for the month Tammuz (col. iv.) include 'weeping' on the 2nd day. On the 21st day, but is it doubtful whether really refer to the legend.
4 See § 6 above, and § 14 below.
5 See § 6 above.
whom Aphrodite had infested with a violent love for her father Theias. Myrrha profited by her father's drunkenness and the darkness, but, when afterwards Theias found out what had taken place, he was at the point of killing his daughter, when he was attacked by the anger of the gods. Theias took Myrrha, flew, praying the gods for protection, and the divinities who had been the cause of her ruin, recognizing that she was the goddess of whom they were afraid, disappeared into the tree which, since that time, has borne her name. Nine months later the tree opened and gave birth to the beautiful Adonis. Aphrodite took charge of the infant, placing him in a basket, handed him to Persephone to take care of.

Other variants of the legend of Tammuz are recorded, but, as they are later developments and seem not to bear upon the origin of the myth, it is needless to speak of them here. How far the above or any other variants may be founded upon further details from Babylonia is uncertain and will not be known until the Babylonian legend of Dumu-ziha comes to light.

16. Why did the legend vary?—Not only was Tammuz faithful in fulfilling his fate and passing a part of his existence in the under world, but he was also faithful in his regard for agriculture, the fruits of the earth to perfection in their season. The climates of Babylonia and of Syria are so different that any legend common to both was bound, in its province, to differ; hence the variations in that of Tammuz noted here. According to G. Rawlinson,1 increasingly heavy showers fall in Babylonia, in November and December, raising the river-levels. As spring advances, theShowers become lighter and fewer until about May, when summer-weather arrives. From May to November rain is very rare indeed, and the sun's rays are only tempered at morning and evening by the grey mist. For five months, therefore, Babylonia is a land of drought. With this description the month-list of Lagas, whose principal deity was Nin-Girsu, identified with Tammuz—seems to agree,2 but it is the common calendar of later days3 that is the most instructive. In this it would seem that it was the fourth month, Su-(n)inanna, 'perfection of seed,' or the like (June-July), that ended the time of productivity, and that this month was called Tu-uz, the West Semitic Tammuz, as the month of the god's greatest fruitfulness. The month next following, Bibb-gur, apparently means 'month of the god,' while the month, August-September, is Kin-Inanna, 'the errand of Istar,' generally regarded as that in which Istar descended to Hades in search of her lover. Its Heb. name Elul (in Babylonian, Ululu) probably means 'grief' and seems to express the common Semitic sound of mourning and distress. In Marcheswan, the 8th month, the opening of the water-channels took place and was succeeded by the rain-clouds of November-December (the Heb. Chislev). The 11th month, January-February, was 'the month of seed' and probably marks the time when sowing became general. Finally came the 1st and 2nd Adar (Feb.-March), in Semerian Se-gur-kud and Dir se-gur-kud, the two grain-plant cutting months, when the seedlings were chopped to encourage the increase of sprouts. Roughly, the 12 months of the year fall into three groups of four each, Ninan to Tammuz marking the growth and perfection of the grain, Ab to Marcheswan practically barren owing to the great heat, and Chislev to Adar the season of deposition of the rivers and the sowing of the crops. It is probably to this that the three periods of the year of Tammuz—with Istar, with Eres-ki-gal or Persephone, and at his own disposal—are due, the division of his year into two periods of six months each being apparently Western.

17. Tammuz in the late Assyrian inscriptions. —In these documents there are certain names that appear most forcibly to the god—such, however, under the name of Dumu-zi or Tammuz, but under that of Adon. The Assyrian form appears as Adunu, and the names containing it may be divided into the specific and the general and the Assyrian—the latter apparently invocations, or translations from Syria into Assyrian. Among these are Aduna-apia-iddina, 'Adon has given a son'; Adunnasal-sual, 'Adon, giver of a son'; and Adunu-matsuwar, 'Adon, protect the land.' The purely Syrian names seem certain to be Adunaziz(i) or Adunai, i.e., perhaps 'my lord hath sprinkled'; Aduni-tu and Aduni-tari, 'my lord is my rock.' (Heb. gad'; Aduni-ba'ali, 'Adon is my lord,' is West Semitic and belongs to about 850 B.C. (he was king of Siana), but all the rest fall between 650 and 660 B.C.

Whether, with Vellay, the gods of the countries into which the worship penetrated may be regarded as having become identified with Tammuz or not is difficult to say. To the fact that Tammuz, under the name of Adon, 'lord,' was designated by a word which could be applied as a title to any god, whether the Merodach of the Babylonians, the Moloch of the Syrians, or the Hadad of the Amorites. It is this, in all probability, that caused Tammuz to become, in a measure, identified with the Adonai of the Hebrews—that more general divine name which, with them, replaced the all too sacred Jehovah (Jeboveh) of their own monotheistic creed.

18. The Tammuz-cult and its contemporary creeds.—Naturally, the idea of a kind of martyr-god, dying, it may be, for the good of mankind, notwithstanding the difficulty of bringing Tammuz into this category, has to be taken into consideration. The most striking parallel, perhaps, is the Osiris of the Egyptians; and the Babylonian Merodach, who died in order that mankind might be produced from his divine blood, is equally noteworthy. As Merodach, the 'steer of day,' was a sun-god, it is not unlikely that he was regarded as enjoying his golden hour on earth in the afternoon. The sun as Tammuz, however, died yearly, not so much that men might live, but because he fell under the evil influences of the spouse of Nergal, the god of battle, disease, and untimely death. Vellay contends that Jesus Christ, like Tammuz, was a sun-god and also like him, descended into Hades; but there are so many fundamental differences in the care of the mythical sun-god of 4000 or 5000 years B.C. and the Christ of history that comparisons may well be set aside. The half-mythical Babylonian ruler, with his 100-year reign, comparing so unfavourably with his predecessor's 1200, may have had a misadventure in the hunting-field which gave birth to the nature-myth which the Babylonians, Syrians, and Greeks have handed down to us.

TANJORE—TANTRAS

TANJORE.—1. History.—Tanjore (Tamil Tanjavur, 'city of refuge') is the capital of the District of the same name in the eastern portion of the Madras Presidency; it is situated in 10° 47' N. lat. and 78° 10' E. long.; in 1911 the population was 60,341. The District formed part of the ancient Chola country, and the kingdom reached the zenith of its power under Rajaraja I. (A.D. 1674-1701) who extended the rule of the Hoysala Ballāllivas of Dornapuram and the Pandyas of Madura. An independent Nayak dynasty was established in the 16th cent., which was displaced by a Marāṭha kingdom about 1674. It was occupied by the British in 1772 and finally ceded to them in 1799; the royal family, who were pensioned, became extinct in 1885.

2. The temple.—Tanjore owes much of its importance to the great temple built by King Rājaraja I., who was a devoted Saiva, but tolerant of other religions. It is known as Brihadisvara, Brihadisvarar, said to mean 'temple of the great god,' or Rājārāja, after its founder. Fergusson writes:

'In nine cases out of ten, Dravidian temples are a fortuitous aggregation of parts, arranged without plan, as accident dictated the place of erection of their erection. This plan gives the great excepction to this rule to be found at Tanjore. The Great Pallavas, in whose time the temple was built, were in a state of transition and st mating plan, which was persevered in till its completion.'

3. Entered by a fine gateway (gopura), which is supposed to cast no shadow on the ground, the outer court, used as an arsenal by the French in 1772, is 550 ft. long and 250 broad, and is surrounded on all sides by a cloister. The main shrine stands to the west, and above it rises to a height of about 200 ft. a magnificent tower, decorated with pillars and statues. The summit is crowned by a single block of granite, weighing 80 tons, said to have been raised to its present position upon an inclined plane commencing at a village four miles distant. An interesting feature of the tower is that the carvings are generally of a Vaishnava type, while the ornamentation of other parts is Saiva. Another curious fact is that one of the figures on the north side of the tower represents a European, the popular belief is that it is the figure of a Dane who assisted in the building or that it was erected to foretell the British occupation. It is probable that both the European figure and the Vaishnavas were selected by one of the Nayak princes, and that he was helped by some Danes who acquired Tranquebar in 1620. The base of the great temple and many of the other buildings are paved with inscriptions which have been translated, and nearly all of them belong to Rājarāja and his successors.

Another noteworthy building is the temple of Subrahmanya, god of war, younger son of Siva, with a colossal figure of Nandī, the bull of Siva, a perfect gem of carved stone-work, the tooling of the stone in the most exquisite delicate and elaborate patterns is as clear and sharp as the day it leaves the sculptor's hands.1

1. The temple, though beautiful, is not considered particularly sacred. The legendary cause of this is that the Saivite saint Appar was refused admission to it, and that therefore it was not celebrated in his hymns or those of the other three Saivite post-saints. A peculiarity about it is that Śidras are admitted to the apartment next the shrine, from which in most temples in this District they are excluded, and that Vaishnavas [a hunting, fishing, iron-making, and cultivating castel], who are usually not admitted at all, here come as far as the great bull.2

3. Tiruvādi.—Tiruvādi (Tiruvāyirāru, 'the five holy rivers'), six miles N.W. of Tanjore, is a place of great sanctity, said to be other than Benares by one-sixteenth, where pious Hindus desire to die and where their bones are cast into the river. It has a fine temple, called Paścanadīsvara, 'Lord of the five Vīrus,' which preserves inscriptions of Rājarāja and his successors.3

LITERATURE.—The authorities have been quoted in the article. For the early Tamil history see V. Kannakasabbi, The Tamil Eighteen Hundred Years ago, Madras, 1914; C. Oppert, The Original Inhabitants of Bharatavarṣa or India, London, 1803. W. Crooke, TANNAI.—See JUDAISM.

TANTRA.—In the series of sacred books of the Hindus the Tantras occupy the fifth or sixth place. According to their character and contents they are fourth in the order of inspiration and authority, the degrees being bruti, smṛti, Purānik, and Tantrik. They are also known as a fifth or the fifth Veda to those who regard them as authoritative and observe the ritual which they enjoin. In neither case is the series entirely chronological or consecutive. The Tantras, which succeed and are in part dependent on the Puranas, are also in part connected to the older Vedas of greater antiquity. Their date, however, is impossible to determine with any precision. The existing treatises are probably for the most part at least reproductions with additions and variations of older works which are no longer extant. In their present form they are usually ascribed to the 6th or 7th cent. of our era, but they may be considerably older. The Tantrik usages and popular formulas were current and practised in a much earlier age; they belong to a type of thought that is primitive and among primitive peoples varies little in the course of the centuries. Until recent years little was known of these works outside of India. A few have now been made accessible in translations, but the greater number are as yet unexplored.

The name tantra signifies a 'web' or 'warp,' then a continuous or uninterrupted series, and in religious usage an orderly rule or ritual. The word was then further applied to the doctrinal theory or system itself, and finally to the literary work or treatise in which it was set forth. In the last sense the word is not found in the Amarakosa, the great Sanskrit dictionary, nor is it used by the Chinese pilgrims. The Mahābhārata also contains no reference to the Tantras or to any religious system founded upon them. All these facts are confirmatory of the comparatively late origin of the existing books. Saikara enumerates the titles of 64 Tantras, comparatively few of which can be identified at the present day. The best-known of these treatises and the most worthy of study are perhaps the Tantrabhaumuti, Sāk̄ṣī-agama, Bādreyavamala, Kalika, Kukkura-vana, Tan-tratattva, and Mahākāśi. Translations of the two last have been published by Arthur Avalon. Parts of the Hitopadesa also are known as 4tantras.4

Traditionally the authorship of these works is attributed to Daśātreyan, who was an incarnation of the Hindu trinity, Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Siva.


4. For further titles see Monier-Williams, Sanskrit Dict., s. a., and Brahmanism and Hindūism, p. 207.
They are therefore to be regarded as equally the revelation of the three supreme divinities. In form, however, they are dependent on Siva alone, who, in dialogue with his wife Durgā or Kāli, reveals the mystical doctrines and also the sciences, which are to be received and practised by his worshippers. This authoritative or ‘higher tradition’ is further said to have been delivered from his central or fifth mouth. As such it is mythically secret and, by reason of its mystic authority, and secret and may not be revealed to the initiated. ‘The Vedas, the Śastras, and the Purāṇas are like a common woman, but this mystical Saiva teaching is like a born woman.’ And its communication is forbidden. The real authors of the several treatises are unknown. They bear the name also of Agamas, and as such are sometimes distinguished from Vignāṇa, the text of the Vedas, Dharma Śastras, and other sacred books. The Indian commentator, Kullūka Bhātta, asserts that revelation (trāti) is two-fold, Vaidik and Tantrik.1 In the popular knowledge and belief they have practically superseded the Vedas over a large part of India, where religions practice and ritual are guided by the teaching of the Dharma Śastras, Purāṇas, and Tāntras. A native writer and exponent of Vaidik beliefs equally confesses that Brahman and the second-thirds of our religious rites are Tāntric, and almost half our medicine.2 They are the Śastras, the scriptural authority and rule for the religious teachings. Tejas or the Sun, therefore, is the incumbent on all orthodox Hindus to follow their directions.

In particular, the Tāntras are the religious textbooks of the Sākta school, and of their various sects. Though the Tīrtha Śastras and Śrīvaiśnava Śastras are, however, said to be in harmony with the Vedas, while that of the Vaiṣṇavas is intended only for Sākta. Their influence unquestionably extends far beyond those who profess to accept their authority. Wilson quotes a passage from one of these treatises which claims that ‘many a man who calls himself a Saiva or a Vaishnava is secretly a Sākta, and a brother of the Mahāyāna’;3 and, in the case of N. India, are said to have adopted formule and ritual from the Tāntras, and the Lāmaism or corrupt Buddhism of Nepal and Tibet owes much to the sacred source. The teaching of the Tāntras, as of the Purāṇas, is essentially based on the bhakti-mārga (q.v.), which is regarded as superior to the karma-mārga and jñāna-mārga of the Brahma Śastras and Upaniṣads. Adoration of a personal deity is inculcated, especially of the wife of Siva, who is worshipped as the source of all regenerative power. In all these writings the female principle is personified and made prominent, to the almost total exclusion of the male. Ultimately their doctrine is derived from the philosophy of the Śāktya-Yoga, with its theory of purāya and prakṛti, with especial emphasis on the mystical side of Yoga teaching and practice. Like the Purāya, the Tāntras also evcry Tāntra should theoretically discuss in order five subjects—the creation and destruction of the universe, the worship of the gods, the doctrines of super-natural power, and the way with the Supreme Being. In reality their contents are almost entirely magical and mystical, but they range over a wide variety of subjects, scientific, religious, medical, spiritual, and even on all that concerns human need and destiny. One at least of the more important Tāntras expounds in metaphysical terms the nature of the Supreme Brahman, who is nātha, nātya, nāyi or jñāna.4 These teaching are based on true pratyā, nāyiyan, and jñāna; in the beginning only the nāyiya Brahman existed, etc. Great use is made of mystical syllables, om, om, um, um, etc., with which sometimes whole pages of writing are filled. There are also secretly sacred letters or syllables which they call bija. The significance of the letters of the alphabet is taught, the employment of mystic diagrams (yana), sacred circles (chakras), spells, charms, and amulets (karaṇas), symbolic movements and crossing of the fingers (mudrās), etc.

Together with all this, which appears to us so meaningless and puerile, there is undoubtedly much that is of historical interest in the Tāntras, and that is of value for the interpretation and interrelation of Hindu doctrine. They are generous and broad in their sympathies, recognize no distinction of caste or sex, for men and women are considered of equal importance, and the practice of sāti. According to the orthodox view, the rites and doctrine which they inculcate are to prevail until the close of the Kaliyuga.

TANTRISM (Buddhist).—A complete study of Buddhist Tantrism would include the description and the history of its rites, its deities, and its doctrines, practically the expoise of the many problems which confront the historian of mediæval India. Buddhist Tantrism is practically Buddhism, Hinduisn, Hinduism or Saivism in Buddhist garb. The present writer intends only to provide the reader with a definition of the chief types.

Buddhists are not quite clear about the specific meaning of the word tantra, ‘book.’ The Tibetan canon distinguishes the Sutra (Mōlo) and the Tantra (Rgyud), but a number of texts are classed in both sections; the limits between, e.g., Mahāyānasutras and Tantras are not fixed. On the one hand, topics which are essentially Mahāyānis—e.g., hymns to bodhisattvas (stotra), resolutions to become Buddha (prajñādhāma)—are met with in Tantras; on the other hand, Mahāyānasutras include a number of fragments and often whole chapters which would constitute by themselves so many Tantrik texts.

A good example is found in the Siddhārmapariniṣkāra, ‘Lotus of the true Law,’ which contains a whole chapter of dākārapis, or talismanic voices, invocations in literary form to a female deity. ‘Glandless’ are mentioned as protectors of the Sutra and of its readers. There are good reasons for believing that this chapter is a late addition: such an addition testifies that the spirit of Mahāyāna had become largely tinted with the spirit of Tantrism, and that the Tantric creation made little distinction between Mahāyānism and Tantrism properly so called.

Tantra books, by assuming the title of Sutra, secured ancient authority. The Kārnāḍayāna is styled Mahāyānasutradhārata-nāyiya, ‘the very best of the Sutras.’ As a matter of fact, the introductory section is written according to the pattern of a Mahāyānasutra; it does not pretend to relate, as

1 Quoted from Monier-Williams, Brāhmaṇīda and Hinduism, p. 191.
2 See Śvetāmbarīcādī vivadā Tattvākṣarā, note on Mana, ii. 1; H. H. Wilson, Essays and Lectures, p. 243.
4 Ch. xxvi.
Tantrics do, the dialogue of a god with a goddess; it preserves the old phrase, 'Thou hast I heard,' followed by the mention of the place, Śrāvasti, Jetavana, and the description of an audience of bodhisattvas. But, when we consider the chief topic of the book—the glorification of Avalokiteśvara as the owner of the 'science in six syllables,' we cannot say that the author has written what we should like to style a Sūtra. In many cases he is not even genuine, for the author does not deign to be found by mere titles; e.g., although the Swāvyaprābhaṭa is styled Sūtra, it is not in the Mdo, but in the Rgyod, that the Sanskrit and the Chinese versions of this celebrated book are to be found. But the fact remains that Mdo and Rgyod overlap in a great number of cases.

These confusions or 'overlappings' are accounted for by the fact that a number of speculations, beliefs, and practices which reach their full development in the Tāntrik or last period of Buddhism were not unknown during the former period—e.g., the use of talismanic spells. Again, the Vajrayānas establish a close connection between the word 'Tantrism' and the worse forms of Hindu (or Buddhist) paganism—magic, theurgy, left-hand worship—and so far they are right, for the magical or theurgical rite, if not a Tantrik, was a religious text, and nearly always to be found in Buddhism outside Rgyod; but these practices are not the whole of Tantrism. Tāntra, with the Hindus as with the Buddhists, covers a large field. We find in the Rgyod the texts which are concerned with worship; whether it is 'Tantrik' worship or Mahāyāna worship, including the building of domestic stūpas, the erection and the consecration of idols, the sūtras or hymns, the daily offering; Worship, with the whole of his religious practices, is a Tāntrik topic. The Bhadračāriprāpachāna, 'Resolution of Pious Conduct,' is reckoned a Tāntra, because the recitation of this prapachāna is one of the daily duties of a Buddhist devotee of the Great Vehicle; from the point of view of the Western definition of 'Tantra,' this text is absolutely non-Tāntrik: it is free from any tinge of idolatry, it breathes the most lofty spirit of the Great Vehicle. 4 Litanies, lists of 100 names, whether of Prajñāpāramitā, Avalokiteśvara, or Mañjūśrī, are also Tāntras. Litanies may be used for Tāntrik or non-Tāntrik worship, while the Great Vehicle's manuṣyāna-gaṭi, 'Collection of the Names of Mañjūśrī,' is susceptible of a twofold interpretation: the first is a gnostic or purely philosophical one, the second sociological, i.e., a mode of propagation of the most decent phrares the worst Tāntrik doctrine. 5

Therefore, in order to draw a general outline of the history of Tāntric ideas in Buddhist literature and life, we must disregard the traditional divisions as embodied in the Tibetan catalogues or the Western theories on the subject, and build a classification of our own.

I. EARLY BUDDHISM.—The Old Buddhism, as preserved in the Pāli canon and in the Sanskrit Hinayāna literature, has a number of features which are not specifically Buddhist, which are alien to the noble eightfold path, which, to put it otherwise, are more or less Tāntrik or open the way to Tāntrism properly so called. Let us mention a few topics. (1) There is a general belief in the mystic power of the 'statements of truth'; 6 Sākyamuni praises the use of half-magic 'formulas of protection' which have a large place in the more recent Sinhalese Buddhist paritta, parīta. 7 (2) In the earliest documents respect is paid to a number of deities or nonhuman beings who are both powerful and unfriendly; there is an 'orthodox' way of dealing with them, but 'orthodox' worship is the natural result of fear. Vajrapāni is regarded as the 'guardian angel' of Sākyamuni, as the protector of the avatāra of the Church. He is the pattern of the 'Dharmakālas' of a later age. (3) The worship of relics, the building of stūpas, pilgrimages, and idolatry are old features of Buddhism. (4) Last, not least, the earliest machine of meditation or trance is akin to the more intricate machinery which constitutes the basis of the Yogatantras. Buddhist 'meditation' is simply Hindu yoga more or less transformed. The 'insight into the truth' (satyaparākhyana), which is the only and the sufficient means to nirvāṇa, practically implies (a) the meditation on looth-someness (asubhābhaṭa), when the ascetic, often 'a dweller in the cemeteries,' 'purifies his bones.' 8 (b) Or a similar kind of meditation, one which sees only the bones behind, until the whole world appears to him as full of skeletons—and thus succeeds in craving desire; (b) the restraint of breath (prāṇayāma), counting the expirations, in order to render the breath more tractable and to direct it towards the Buddhist truths; (c) the vimaṅka, abhibhūtyātanā, and kṣoṣaṅa, prolonged contemplation of disks of earth, etc., by which (d) a number of supernormal states are induced, the so-called dhyānas (jñāna), or 'trances' and samāpatti, or 'ecstasies.' According to the Pāli and Sanskrit theologians it is only when absorbed in those supernormal states that a man is susceptible of rightly understanding the four Buddhist Truths (satyābhāsīnavaya) and thus progressing towards nirvāṇa. Now it is quite safe to state that meditations on corpses, restraint of breath, the diverse methods of inducing trance, and the trances themselves have been borrowed by Buddhism from Hindu yoga. Buddhism established, more or less artificially, a strong connexion with the various branches of Hinduism, religious or spiritual aim, nirvāṇa. But Buddhism did not ignore, and their books do not conceal, the fact that the discipline of yoga, when it may have been 'supramundane,' was also 'lowly.' The same is true of nirvāṇa, also provides a man with many 'mundane' (lantikiko) advantages: he who lives in cemeteries acquires power over the bhūtan and the manifold spirits who haunt these places; he who 'restrains the breath,' masters thought and the body; he who practises trance becomes the possessor of magical powers and secures rebirth amongst gods. In short, a man who practises yoga becomes a yogin, or a siddha, an owner of 'perfections' or 'powers' (siddhi). It is clear that the position of Buddhism is not a safe one. Let us state it in plain words. A monk must perform in a Buddhist spirit, i.e., for the sake of nirvāṇa, a number of ritual meditations and which confer the most precious 'mundane' advantages; he must disregard these advantages—which, in India, are the surest mark of holiness—unless he perfectly knows that he can and will enjoy them when he likes. We may be sure—even if there were no documents to this effect—that many of the monks of early

6 Satyanāma; see E. W. Burnouf, Introduction à l'histoire du bouddhisme indien, p. 325. 7 See M. C. Haig and L. de la Vallée Poussin, Catalogue of the Tibetan MSS of the Stein Collection in the Indian Office Museum, London, 1876. 8 Kaunji, Rgyod (Beckh), xxiv. 351; also in Vinaya (Dulva); J. Sanjana, A Catalogue of the Chinese Translation of the Buddhist Texts treasured at Peking, Oxford, 1883, p. 114; also Paul Pelliot, Note sur le Nātanaka, Die Bhadracari: Eine Probe Buddhistischer-religiositer Lyrik auf dem Tibetanischen, 1896. 9 The Mañjuśrīmanjusāraṇī has been published by I. P. Minayeff together with the Mahāyānaprāpta in Buddhisms, Reprints from the Petrus And. I.A.S. Mess. (in Russian); we refer to the commentary called Manjushcagā.
CHRISTIANITY were not strong enough to go so powerful a temptation; e.g., they performed miracles for 'vain glory.' In such cases they acted as 'mundane' yogis; technically they followed the rules that later constitute the Yogântarkârî.

I. MAHÂYÂNA. — In Mahâyâna bhakti, or devotion, and pîjî, or worship in the Hindu guise, increase.

Mahâyâna is, like Hinâyâna, a thoroughly Buddhist cult; but to which the disciple of Mahâyâna is a candidate for Buddhahood (bodhisattvâ, future Buddha), because Buddhas alone reach nirvâna; he will become a Buddha by acquiring the wisdom and accumulating the merit of a Buddha. But an essential feature of the doctrine is that the candidate for Buddhahood cannot succeed without the help of the Buddhas and of the future Buddhas nearing Buddhahood; this help is secured through bhakti. The early Buddhist paid worship to Sâkyamuni, to the relics, to the holy places, but there was little or no bhakti in his respectful behaviour. Now the objects of worship are so many living gods, so many bhagavats, quite different from Sâkyamuni, very much like the Hindu bhagavats, and they are entitled to the bhakti of the faithful. As has been pointed out, bhakti is a philanthropic, free from elements which easily take a Tantrik shade. To mention only one point: a man will be saved by remembering at death the name of Avalokîtêśvara or of Kârna. The names of the Buddhas or the bodhisattvas, which they have themselves placed a wonderful force, acquire a rôle in the sanctification of the devotee. Bhakti has exalted the god to such a degree that bhakti is very long ago transformed into a worship of a divinity of the Mahâyânaist school, praises without reservation the use of dharmiyâ for the pardon of sins. The schools of the Mahâyâna known as the Sâkhavâti sects place the highest spiritual advantages at the command of the man who knows how to worship Amitâbha.

Every form of pîjî, including the circumambulation of a stûpa,6 offering incense to a stûpa, going to the relics, etc., was considered very useful from the beginning. A treatise like the Advântara-pradâta7 shows us that Mahâyâna has added much to the primitive liturgy; it gives a description of the fifty-four rituals of the Mahâyânaist devotee, a 'beginner' (âdikârâkara), was expected to perform — recitations of formulas, symbolic offerings, wonderful advantages to be obtained by acts which easily assume a mechanical character, so many features which give to Tantrism its specific aspects. A daily observance of the eightfold high pîjî (stâtvâdhi amâtrâr pîjî), a sort of worship 'in spirit and truth'; confession of sins to the Buddhas and bodhisattvas—to the Buddhas who have a special claim to the title of 'Buddha of confession'—resolve to become a Buddha, 'application of merit' (parinâmam), etc. That this eightfold pîjî often becomes a mere ritualistic performance—a special kind of dhârayî —is proved by the fact that it is a part of the sādhana (see below). It is well known that Mahâyâna is prompt to admit any sort of spells that provide 'mundane' advantages — of course it objects to 'black magic.' From our point of view, it is more important to observe that Mahâyâna rewards a number of beings which are no longer Buddhist in character. The demoniac origins of Vajrayâna are not forgotten; he nevertheless obtains a body of power in the pantheon; as he is the 'destroyer of the enemies of the Law,' he is probably one of the first gods who have been worshipped under a 'choleric' aspect.8 Female figures are also supposed to have been part of the Mahâyâna; but there is not in this association any tinge of 'properly so called Tantrism.' The same can be said of Hariti, the former goddess of smallpox, the account of whose avatars is one of the most curious and the best known pages in the religious and iconographic history of Buddhism. Her worship, both in the monastic and in the popular milieu, gives a correct idea of the Mahâyânist and of the half-Tantric methods of worship.

III. TANTRISM PROPER.—Tantrism, properly so called, bears a twofold character; on the one hand, it is a systematization of the vulgar magical rites and it has existed under this form for many centuries in India and in Buddhism itself, together with its formulas and its pantheon; on the other hand, it is a 'theurgy,' a highly developed mysticism. In this form Tantrism is an innovation in Buddhism.

Tantrism has its professionals, the sorcerers (yogin, sidhi), and its laymen, the disciples of the sorcerers also the Hindus who worship deities or idols of the Tantrik type. The sorcerers, who are at the same time 'mystics' or adepts of the Vajrayâna, constitute a number of schools; there are many rival secret traditions of the 'theurgy' and different sets of formulas, of deities, and of theories.

We shall deal with only two points which deserve special notice: (1) the methods of sādhana, (2) the vajrayogâ. To be complete, it would be necessary to study a number of vâdhis, or rites, many of which are part of the Tantrik daily cult and have been adopted by Mahâyânist Buddhism. 1. Sâdhana,—the only way to perform a sādhana, i.e., the evocation of a god, the ascetic must be duly instructed by a guru and duly consecrated. The ascetics who have established the manifold secret sects of Tantrism had to prepare the gods by the ritual equations before being favoured with the manifestation of the god; they at last received from him the secrets they are now able to teach to their pupils. The guru therefore assumes great importance; he is the paramount god of his pupil and the incarnation of the Buddha himself. When he has been taught all the details of the rites, the Tantrik must undertake the sādhana, by which he renders visible any god he wishes and obtains control over him. The most important items in these magical performances are the knowledge of the bija, the mystical syllable which is the 'seed' of the god and the knowledge of the vîdhyê or mantra, which gives to its owner control over him.

On a chosen day the ascetic, after performing the regular ablations, with a fresh dress or a renewal of a solitary place, either auspicious—a wood or the bank of a river

1 E.g., by A. Barth, Observes, Paris, 1914, l. 190.
3 See Ananda Otsarâna, series ii. (Aryan), pt. 2, Oxford, 1883, and SBE v. 1894. (Note 2.)
4 E.g., by A. Barth, Observes, Paris, 1914, l. 190.
6 See Ananda Otsarâna, series ii. (Aryan), pt. 2, Oxford, 1883, and SBE v. 1894. (Note 2.)
7 See Sâkîñvatmâchôsa (Bibliothèque Buddhisîke, 1.), ed. C. Burckhardt, 1909.
8 E.g., A. Foucher, The Yoga of Tantrism, Art and other Essays, tr. by W. T. Thomas, Paris, 1900, and F. W. Thomas, Paris, 1900. (Note 4.)
9 E.g., A. Foucher, The Yoga of Tantrism, Art and other Essays, tr. by W. T. Thomas, Paris, 1900, and F. W. Thomas, Paris, 1900. (Note 4.)
10 E.g., A. Foucher, 'Harî, le Mère-de-démons,' in Bulletin de l'Ecole Franoise d'Orientalism, xlv., fasc. 3 (1917); cf. J.R.A.S., 1910, p. 188. (Note 4.)
11 E.g., A. Foucher, 'Harî, le Mère-de-démons,' in Bulletin de l'Ecole Franoise d'Orientalism, xlv., fasc. 3 (1917); cf. J.R.A.S., 1910, p. 188. (Note 4.)
13 We say sufficiently, for it is difficult to say whether Amîthâbha, e.g., is of course, or is not originally a sun-god; but Amîthâbha is strictly Buddhist and Vajrayâna, as is not the case with the Tantric doctrines, a modification of the Jain, or Vimalakîrti, or the Mahâyâna works, but a change of the rapidly-accumulating influence of the Buddhist view of the universal Buddha of the Doccic school.
14 The latest authority on the subject is A. Foucher, L'Art et autres articles, p. 46-55. (Note 4.)
17 A. Foucher, The Yoga of Tantrism, Art and other Essays, tr. by W. T. Thomas, Paris, 1900, and F. W. Thomas, Paris, 1900. (Note 4.)
—or wholesome—a cemetery—according to the purpose. He sits there,apps, in a purified space, and in order the different acts of a Mahayana-puja, offering of flowers and perfumes, either to the Buddha, the Bodhisattvas and Deities, without confession of sins, etc. He continues in the same style by practising the virtues of friendship, pity, joy, in- due, and purity, and during the course of all things. Thus he is supposed to have acquired both merit (satta) and wisdom (jnana): all this is only a preparation to the rite itself. The rite begins with the meditation on the bliss of the god who has been chosen for some technical reason (every god has his own development in undetermined matters). If the god is Yamantaka or Yamani (the enemy or the destroyer of man, god of death), the syllable is Hn; it is to be written on the disk which in the magic circle (tantrika) is the symbol of the sun. The ascetic causes to arise from him the wrathful Yamantaka, hair bristling, blue, with six faces, with six arms, with six feet, riding a bull, standing in the abheda pose, adorned with a garland of skulls, exceedingly frightful. When the god has been summoned in that way, the ascetic undertakes the second part of the rite: he fancies that he is the god; the identity of the ascetic and the god is a metaphysical truism; the ascetic does not identify himself with the god; he only realizes the identity. As soon as the ascetic knows that he is the god, he possesses all the powers that belong to the god; any wish he utters to the proper form—for his voice must be the voice of the god—will be accomplished. As A. Foucher, from whom this definition of Sddhana is borrowed, rightly observes, the description of the gods as given in Tantrik treatises must be accurate: any mistake in the mental representation of those frightful persons would be fatal. The Sddhana treatises have been the principal source of information for the Hindu and Tibetan artists, and they furnish the best means to the identification of the icons or idols. Sddhanas serve all sorts of purposes—worship, wish-fulfillment, the vehicle of the Maga Formulas, more often and more technically, the Vajrayana. Vajra, ‘lightning,’ is originally and remains the weapon of Indra, of Vajrapani, of the ascetics or yogins. And we may define them. But vajra has assumed new meanings: (1) it designates the mystic or divine energy which is identified with ‘intelligence’ (vidyā); there are vajrabodhisattvas, bodhisattvas of vajra, vajrasana, ‘divine female sorcerers,’ vajrasvarupa, ‘the divine sow’; all divine beings are so vajrasthavetas, ‘beings of vajra;’ the supreme being, the Adibuddha, is the vajrasattva per excellence. (2) On the other hand, vajra (with the variant visai) is a decent or mystic phrase for liṅga, the male organ, just as pada, lotus, is the literary rendering of bhūga or yoni.2 So this twofold meaning of vajra correspond two Tantrik schools, right-hand and left-hand. Both owe much to the Mahayānist doctrines, to Madhyanaka, and to Vījñānabha,3 they cling to the theory of universal voidness (śūnyatā), but they develop the concepts of tathatā, tathagata-garbha, etc., and result in a great variety of schools, sects, etc. While Mahayana states that all beings are ‘future Buddhas,’ that all beings are ‘embryos of tathagatas,’ the two Tantrik schools maintain that all beings are vajragarbhas or the unique Vajrasattva; they also maintain that the nature of vajra is immanent in all beings and can be actualized by appropriate meditations and rites. Now the latter reads the Tantras of vajrayana, to the nature of vajra according to the Saivite pattern; the right-hand school is nearer the Vedantist or Yoga tradition: on the one hand the traditions of the Madhakalacarnas, etc., on the other hand the Church of the MahaMrtyurajgiriSaivism, the Vajraśekhara, etc.—the modern Japanese sect of Shin-gon-shū.

In the Tantras of the Śaivite tyre we have to deal with a Buddhist adaptation of Saivism and Sāktism. The three traditional bodies of a Buddha are preserved, but the true nature of vajradhātu is his fourth body, the body of bliss (tāmā, sukhamati, mukhañālāyati), the body of vajra: it is with that body that the eternal tathāgata or bhagavat eternally embraces his lakti, Tārā or Bhagavati. From this erotic conception of the nature of being or the divine being it follows that, in order to actualize his real divine nature, the ascetic must perform the rites of union with a woman (yogini, madrī) who is the personification of the bhagavati, who is Bhagavati herself; as it is possible to unite with the male divinity, so it is possible to unite with the female. The most conspicuous topic of this literature is what is called the stripās, ‘worship of women;’ disgusting practices, both obscene and criminal, including incest, are a part of this pūjā, which is looked upon as the true ‘heroic behaviour’ (dakikara-chārya) of a bodhisattva, as the fulfilment of the perfect virtues. Buddhist mythology and mysticism are freely mixed with sikṣas; the semen is the five Bhañj (Bhañj), the essence, and is the one who says that ‘everything is pure to a pure man,’ omni sancta sanctis, is often expressed. ‘Lust is to be crushed by lust. . . Do strenuously that which is conceivable by the other party, and. . . one who is united with a woman, and united with a woman, and united with a woman. . . . If a man has the desire of love without fear. Do not fear; you do not sin.’1 We may add two remarks. (1) Some ‘morai’ rules are to be observed even in the ceremonies (ṣaṅkha) which are provided for the thorough enjoyment of the sex (maṅga, maṅgavi, maṅgas, ‘alcohol,’ maṅgavi, ‘sexual union’). A modern Śaivite work, the Mahābhairavapatarā, explains that ‘the ascetics should drink so little that their eyes do not roll and mind is not agitated. Beyond it, drinking is like the sight of a beast.’ The rites of purāṇikās or tattvatākṣakā must not be practised with any woman, but with one’s own wife; so far, but there are two marriages, one for life, the other contracted for the purpose of the ascetic and lasting only till the completion of the rite. (2) Secret rites are the business of a few ‘devotees.’

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On the whole and for the largest number of its adherents, Taoism is simply paganism.

According to the left-hand Taoist tradition which we have described, the rites of union (maithuna) are not effaced by themselves; but practising the candidate for vajrasattvā-hood must be 'purified' in a threefold respect; he must possess the body, the voice, and the thought of a tathāgata. This threefold purification constitutes the initiation of the Taoist.

These are 'aspirations' or 'consecrations' (abhishēka), 'marking' (nyāsa) which consecrates the different limbs of the body, 'prayers' (jap) which consecrates the hands, 'interwritings of the fingers' (mantra); some will admit the rite of union, but with a female described as a jñāna-mūḍrā, a mental female.¹


³ In Tintin literature is supposed to be included in a fourth basket, the Dharmaprajyotika or the Vidyadharasagotra, on which see H. Heine, J. F. Ulmann, Figures des poètes bouddhiques, under the title of Buddhist Records of the Western World, London, 1884, ii. 163; Lévi-Seroux, 'Interprétation de textes bouddhistes obligations de religieux enceints,' tr. E. Chavannes, Paris, 1894, p. 101; L. de la Ville-Poussin, JRAS, 1895, p. 428.


TAOISM.—Taoism is one of the three 'Teachings' (Tri Chinas) of China, the others being Confucianism and Buddhism. Like Confucianism, and unlike Buddhism, it claims to be a native growth.

² Chinese TAO-ting. The primary source for our know-ledge of Taoism is the Tao-Teh Ching. This small book of about 5000 characters, usually divided into two parts, 'Concerning Tao' and 'Concerning Teh,' comprising 81 chapters, is traditionally ascribed to Lao-ting (born 604 B.C.), an older contemporary of Confucius. Lao-ting, surname Li, named Er (ear), also called Lao San, a character which implies some rural peculiarity, is said to have been an official at the court of Chow and to have been visited on one occasion by Confucius, who after the interview exclaimed in his respect for Tao's hollowness: 'Respect for the world, Lao-ting retired from office and disappeared through the Western Passes, the guardian of which is deduced from leaving to compose the Tao-Teh Ching as a record of his teaching. This account of him was in later times supplemented by many marvels, e.g., his prolonged gestation, which entitled him to be called 'the father of the Taoists.' Lao-ting might also be translated. Si-ma Ch'ien (+ 85 B.C.), who gives the more sober account of Lao-ting, gives also the names of his son and grandson and of the great-great-grandson of this grandson. He tells us further that about the middle of the 2nd cent. B.C. a book of Lao's was a favourite with the widowed emperor of the second Han. The emperor Kung (166-145 B.C.) is said to have made him provost of the Han dynasty by Si-ma Ch'ien we have in Hwangian (+ 122 B.C.), Han Fei (+ 230 B.C.), and Chwang-ting (+ 4th cent. B.C.) many quotations from Lao-ting (or Lao San) which are to be found in the Tao-Teh Ching. According to Legge, the first two of these authors quote the whole or parts of 71 out of the 81 chapters of that book. On a review of the evidence thus summarized, Legge concludes that he does not know of any other book which antedates a precise date of which the authenticity of the origin and genuineness of the text are so well substantiated.

Criticism, however, has been busy both with Lao-ting and with his book. Founding upon the name Lao-ting, who may be equally well 'old philosopher' or 'old philosophers,' an extreme criticism has resolved him into a number of ancient thinkers, some of whose sayings are preserved for us in the Tao-Teh Ching. For this view there is no ground except the ambiguity of the name. A less drastic criticism, of which H. A. Giles is representative, allows that at a remote period Lao-ting lived and thought and taught, and that some fragments of his teaching are preserved in the Tao-Teh Ching, in which we have those fragments pieced together by a not too skilful forger of later schools, confounding Lao-ting with his contemporaries and successors. This conclusion is said to be practically certain. The criticism, however, by which it is attempted to falsify the evidence is founded on a tacit assumption that evidence summarized above at least does not support it; nor is it warranted to infer a coincidence in time and place of sayings ascribed to Lao-ting which do not appear in the Tao-Teh Ching and of sayings ascribed to Hwang-k'o which do appear there, or by the three added fragments produced from the Tao-Teh Ching itself (repetitions, quotations, late characters, rhyme), while the discrimination of what is called 'bouddhisme' may be rejected as compiler's padding is too subjective to be convincing. In favour of the earlier date of the Tao-Teh Ching it may be noted that, in its general type of teaching and in the avoidance of technical terms current in later Taoist authors it leaves on the reader the impression that it belongs to a less developed stage of Taoist thought than is found in the Hwang-ting, however, still awaits a thorough application of sound critical principles. Indian influence on both the matter and the form of the Tao-Teh Ching has been asserted by some. The truth of this assertion can be considered apart from the general archæological question of the intercourse between India and China. There is a certain convergence between the content of the Tao-Teh Ching and that of Buddhism, but not such as requires the dependence of one on the other as its explanation, and the present statement is far heavier and more difficult to reconcile with the scanty record of contact with Indian thought early enough to influence the Tao-Teh Ching, unless that book is derived from a remote earlier evidence. According to B. T. Suzuki, the so-called Indian influence on the early Taoists is not probable. Indeed it cannot be said that the book of the Tao-Teh Ching, ch. 29, 3, 4, is not a Chinese production. In contrast taken from a classic and its parts to which T. W. Rhys Davids is indebted on the socalled ashtamangala, the founder of the Madhyamikas of Northern Buddhism, who taught about the beginning of our era. It is to be noted, however, that this latter argument, only with a proper mixture of a classic as illustration, is found in Chwang-ting, bk. 25, p. 125.

It is not difficult to cull from the Tao-Teh Ching admirable ethical maxims.

¹ Buddhism, London, 1878, p. 97.
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The highest goodness is like water. Water is good for all things because it changes all things without being changed. Men hate water. But he who knows water is like him who knows the way that men hate (ch. 8). He who makes himself conform to the Tao, even as it runs and changes, is like to the person who, when we attempt to define it, becomes nothing (14, 25); if we must make a name for it, it is not the name of a thing. That is the power of God (14); it becomes nameable in relation to the universe that springs from it (1), in an order which may be partly known (2); not only is it the dynamic of the whole, but it seems to overpass all beginnings (21), reaching everywhere (25, 3) and doing everything, while remaining unknown to us, (25).

Summing up what we have here, we may say: (1) as transcendent existence Tao is something quite indefinite, which Lao-tse struggles to express by negatives; (2) from this indefinite ground the universe of men emerges, and in its grace the Tao is the mother of all things (55--61), and by its operation is emanation from Tao as mother and not creation by Tao as agent; (3) Tao is immanent in the world, working in an unobtrusive way, producing and bringing to perfection individual existences. On the whole, we perhaps come nearest to the meaning of Tao when we say that it is pure being (most abstract of categories) endowed with spontaneity, the ultimate essence and impulse of all definite things. Obviously this conception of Tao excludes all idea of its equation with God. In ch. 4 Lao-tse says of Tao, 'I do not know whose son it is: it appears to be before God (72). There can be no doubt that with Lao-tse Tao is the ultimate ground of all definite existences, Ts among them, while, by saying that he did not know whose son Tao was, he lets us see that, having arrived at his conception of a Tao beyond and beyond the world for in the line of logical abstraction there is no going further than 'being' which is nothing, he yet dimly felt that it did not explain itself.

The only term in the Tao-Tek King capable of a theistic interpretation is Tien, Heaven. In some instances of its use a near approach is made to what we mean by Heaven when we use it as equivalent to Providence. In this, its highest use, it is not merely the physical sky, but a power supreme in the world of visible things obscurer connected with the sky, which is the supreme exemplar of Tao, but, even so, posterior and subordinate to it. Tao is to Lao-tse the ultimate and determining fact.

His metaphysics, as thus explained, explains his ethics. The ground of existence being a perfectly indefinite spontaneity, a dark abysmal essential which, for no reason assigned, the multiplicity of the world emanates, by the immanence of which the world is and is moved—all this agrees with the ethical doctrine of abstention from self-determination and of the being held in abstinence to be found in vegetable life, in obedience to an inner impulse or appointment passes through its cycle of growth, culminating and again subduing (16). The Taoistic life is therefore a life of equable indulgence, outwardly of non-action, devout, i.e., of action for chosen ends; moved in obedience to an inward spontaneity rather than motivated by outward inducement: a life conscious, rather than self-conscious, spontaneous rather than self-determined. Hence the sage is simple (19) with the simplicity of unconstrained wood as contrasted with the delinquent of a carved beam; i.e., he is free from self-determination. Again, he grasps 'the one' (22), withdrawing himself from the manifoldness of self-determination among particular lines and holding to 'the one,' i.e., the principle which Lao-tse knows as Tao.

The metaphysics of the Tao-Tek King centre in this conception of Tao. In many passages Tao has a significance which is neither the ethical way that men should follow nor the method of action followed by Heaven (cf., 'course of Providence') or prescribed by Heaven for man's following it in its metaphysical principle (ch. 1, 4, 14, 21, 25, 34, 37, 40). The gist of what is stated in these chapters is as follows:

The origin of heaven and earth is nameless (1), is indeed non-existent (10), is without nature and exists (11). This quite indefinite, rich, when we attempt to define it, becomes nothing (14, 25); if we must make a name for it, it is not the name of a thing. That is the power of God (14); it becomes nameable in relation to the universe that springs from it (1), in an order which may be partly known (2); not only is it the dynamic of the whole, but it seems to overpass all beginnings (21), reaching everywhere (25, 3) and doing everything, while remaining unknown to us, (25).

Before turning again to the practical side of Lao-tse's teaching, we may refer to what may, by courtesy, be called his theory of knowledge. It is by freedom from desire that we can attain to a knowledge of the mysteries of Tao (1). Inasmuch as Tao is the principle of all existence, knowing it, we are at the heart of all knowledge. There is no need for the man who expounds it to start by simply moving out of doors he already knows (47).

Knowing one case, he knows all, for Tao is the one universal principle (44). We can best return to Lao-tse's practical teaching by the Tao-Tek King, which next to Tao is his key-word. Like Tao, it received from Lao-tse a
new meaning, since it is the outcome of Tao (51). There is indeed a Teh which begins where Tao ends. This Teh, the result of a lifetime of effort, self-conscious teh. Teh in the Taoist sense is usually distinguished by some epithet—'mysterious,' 'large,' 'lasting,' etc. As the outcome of Tao, it is activity devoid of self-determination. Yet it is not activity, the spontaneous activity of the immanent Tao. The various virtues commended by Lao-tse are aspects of, or approximations to, this teh. It is in this Taoist sense that we must take the numerous maxims of the Repository of Taoist Wisdom with a grain of salt, for it is a mistake to translate teh by 'kindness.' The maxim is no more than a precept of indifferent self-possession: 'Be a Taoist, even though provoked' (cf. 5).

Lao-tse's practical teaching is completed by his speculations on physiology and politics. As to the former, it is asserted that the Taoist adept aims at 'lastingness' (7, 10, 44, 59). There is no place of death in him, and so he passes through dangers unscathed (50). Hints are also given of a death which is not destruction, implying a persistence in spite of death which is true long life (50). This is doubtless, however, not development. With the other form of longevity appears to be associated a certain management of the breath (10, 52), and through this vein of thought there is a certain tendency towards certain deficiencies.

In Lao-tse's politics, as in his ethics, there are attractive thoughts—e.g., the protest against luxury in the court alongside misery among the people (53) and the devastation of war (31). The Taoist method of government is leisuré-faire. The sage king does nothing, and everything comes right of itself (32, 37, 57). Logically Lao-tse's thought implies that any sage would be the centre of a universal away (49, 57, 77), but it is hinted that the influence of a sage becomes effective only when he has the advantage of high place (56). Here Lao-tse is in line with Confucius, who asserted that his principles would transform the world if only he could find a ruler wise enough to give him office. In describing the society which would come to being under Taoist influence, Lao-tse pictures a society of self-sustained communities devoid of letters and of luxury, content with what is theirs and utterly incurious of what is not. As men within a Taoist society so societies in their relation to one another are to act Taoistically. "The earth abides in its place" (58).

There are unexplained remains in the Tao-Teh King, but Lao-tse does give us a reasoned view of things. As we think back and back, we come to something which we cannot see or hear or touch, an obscure something from which all things come. It is in all things, which could not be apart from it. Yet it never parades itself. It simply is, a mysteries, ever-going, all-working existence. Let us form ourselves to this: let us become one with it. For it is in us as in all else—our essence which would realize itself if it were not hindered by our self-will and self-seeking. If we put away these, then we know it and are and become what it tends to be. It is Tao, unqualified being, origin of things, and in them as essence and spontaneity.

2. Taoism before Lao-tse.—The question has been raised whether Taoism existed prior to Lao-tse. That there was such an early Taoism is argued on the grounds of quotations in the Tao-Teh King. That there was a Taoism, the persistent reference of Taoism not only to Lao-tse but also to the at least semi-mythical Yellow Emperor (Hwang-ti, 2697 B.C.), so that 'the words of Hwang-ti are to be taken as the fundamentals of Taoist teaching, and the allusions in the Tao-Teh King and other Taoist writings to an age when the world moved on Taoist principles. It has also been argued that, while the I-King is dualistic, it also contains enough of a Taoist strain to make it an essential part of the persistent strain in pre-Confucian speculation, and that a doctrine of that from which the dual principles derived (Tao) was in various forms well known. Hence, it is claimed, the I-King, the doctrine of Tao, and the other ethical principles intuitively known were the materials on which Confucius and Lao worked. Lao appropriating the monistic speculations of the I-King but placing his emphasis on the chief relating to the conflict of the unexplained hand down from the Yellow Emperor. In the same line E. H. Parker says that there is little doubt that Lao-tse simply gave a name (Tao) to a floating group of ethical principles already for many centuries spread far and wide over China and already well known as the maxims of Hwang-ti, and that every single thought in the Tao-Teh King had been foreshadowed, usually word for word, in the Book of History, Book of Rites, Record of Rites, Book of Changes, Book of Odes, or other very ancient work. Among these other ancient works Parker puts the volume attributed to Kwan-tse, which he dates from the 7th cent. B.C. In spite of all that is here said, it may still be reasonably maintained that there is no conclusive evidence of an explicit Taoism previous to Lao-tse. Even Parker does not deny that certain parts of Tao-tse in developing a new quietist conception of how human affairs once presumably were, and ideally should be, regulated. There may have been a Bottling group of ethical principles which Lao-tse took over, but it is the reasoned quietism of the Tao-Teh King based on Tao as metaphysical principle that alone has the right to be called Taoism, and of the earlier existence of this proof is yet lacking. In the Tao-Teh King itself there is no mention of Hwang-ti, and the allusions to the simpler social conditions of earlier times do not prove the existence then of a reasonned Taoism. Certainly this would be proved if we found Lao quoting from some sage anterior to himself who had already formulated the doctrine of inaction in the very terms we are accustomed to associate with the name and fame of Lao-tse himself. The reference is to Tao-Teh, ch. 57. But the introductory phrase may be translated 'Therefore the sage says,' meaning that such language is characteristic of the sage, whether actually or hypothetically the existence of men and things. The next chapter contains a similar gnomic reference to the sage's action. Five other quotations (22, 41, 50, 69, 78) may be admitted, but they are not of a kind to prove the existence of Taoism anterior to Lao-tse. Only if numerous other phrases introduced by the formula 'ku yieh' are treated as quotations, can justification be found for speaking as Legge does of 'the sentence-makers often drawn on by Lao-tse' for or saying that Lao-tse 'abounds in sentences out of some ancient lore of which we have no knowledge but for him.' But these phrases may not be quotations so much as aphoristic expressions of Taoist teaching, perhaps already current with Lao and his school. Parker's wide reference to ancient literature must be heavily discounted. It is difficult to justify his appeal to books so innocent of Taoism as the Book of History and Book of Odes. Moreover, it is one thing to find in ancient literature expressions congruent with Taoism and quite another thing to interpret them as expressing Taoism. It is true that Tao-Teh is a conjunction of characters.
long consecrated by use in the Book of Changes and the Book of Rites. In the Book of History or elsewhere we may meet with phrases such as 'the father and mother of the world, and as such is the King of the world,' or 'That the Prince of a State should hold dirt in his mouth is the Providence (Tao) of Heaven.' It is of course not possible to illustrate any particular Taoism which one would enjoy who was entirely under the influence of the 'heavenly' (i.e., 'natural' as opposed to 'self-determined') element of his constitution.

(b) Chwang-tse.—The most brilliant of the Taoist writers is Chwang-tse (c. 330 B.C.). In him as little as in the Tse-Tse King is there any systematic exposition of Taoism. In the development of his views he is to a great extent an anecdote, allegory, and imaginary conversation. In some places he handles somewhat freely not only Confucius, but even more ancient worthies, such as Yao and Shun. How little historical accuracy or consistency is regarded is shown by the fact that Confucius is also introduced speaking in quite a Taoist vein. It is not easy to see the drift and relevance of all Chwang-tse's chapters, but the reader cannot fail to find a characteristic attitude towards reality. As in the Tse-Tse King, the metaphysical basis of everything is Tao, which as the explanation of all things is not itself a thing.

3. Taoism after Lao-tse.—The history of Taoism immediately subsequent to Lao-tse is obscure. Somewhat later its development can be traced in a succession of authors.

(a) Lieh-tse.—The earliest of these may be Lieh-tse (= Licius, 5th cent. B.C.), but the authenticity of the work ascribed to him is doubtful. According to him, the whole of things is in perpetual transformation. The ultimate basis of all is a vague something which differentiates itself into ch'i, k'ang, and chih. The second and third terms may be translated 'form' and 'matter,' respectively, though, we must beware of assuming an exact equivalence to these terms as used elsewhere (e.g., in Greek philosophy). Ch'i is more difficult to translate. Gils gives as its meanings the 'vivifying principle or aura of Chinese cosmogeny, breath, vital fluid: force: influence.' The state of things when these three were in an undifferentiated and therefore imperceptible condition is called 'chaos,' whether this is or is not to be identified with the ultimate origin and basis of things. Progress is made from chaos by an evolution vaguely indicated, in the final stages of which the particular 'heaven,' the heavy and gross form 'earth,' and 'man' appears as the vehicle of their harmonious ch'i. The general ethical temper is quietist, based now on ignorance, now on fatalism. Another root for it is found in the subjectivity of knowledge, and the absence of any criterion of truth and falsehood, right and wrong, though this is hinted at rather than developed. Along with this may be noted a disclaiming of any discrimination in worth between waking and dreaming experiences. Views of death are given which are perhaps not quite consistent. On the one hand is put the question, which might suggest Buddhist influence, 'When the spiritual enters its gate and the material returns to its root, where do "I" survive?' On the other hand, it is asked whether death may not be another birth. Lieh-tse makes much use of anecdotes, a good many of which seem to have been treated by Taoist writers as the stock property of their school. The magical side of Taoism seems often to have developed more in comparison with the Tao-Tse King. The secret of it is such a selfless identification with the life of nature as brings the Taoist into harmony with all its forces, animate and inanimate. The alleged immortality of a drunken man from injury by accident is brought to illustrate another immortality which one would enjoy who was entirely under the influence of the 'heavenly' (i.e., 'natural' as opposed to 'self-determined') element of his constitution.

3 Parker, p. 76. 4 E.g., Appendix, iii. 5 A Chinese-English Dict., London, 1912, c.s.
Mencius criticized, and is there regarded as congruent with the teaching of Lao Tzu. Some other writers reckon as belonging to the Taoist school are Han Fei-tse († 230 B.C.) and Hwainan-tse († 122 B.C.). The writings of the former are preserved in 55 chapters, which are entitled 'Explanations of Lao.' Apparent quotations from the Tao-Teh King occur elsewhere in his writings. Han Fei-tse hardly differs in respect of the practical side of Taoism. His book is ethical-political, and is marked by shrewdness rather than by loftiness of tone. He sympathizes with the Chinese student who protests against his being classed as a Taoist and explains what he regards as the degenerate nature of the teaching as due to a perversion to a scheme of selfishness of such sayings of Lao-tse as 'When one is about to take an inspiration, he is sure to make a previous expiration;' (36) and 'The sage wishing to be above men, puts himself by his words below them'; (66) Hwainan-tse is a more genuine Taoist than Han Fei, but his writings in their fanciful analogies and extravagant statements give evidence of a progressive deterioration of Taoism. Ethically he is superior to Han Fei. In at least one statement of his fundamental ethical position he shows a close verbal approximation to Confucianism: action in accordance with the nature (hsing) is called Tao, and this nature is to be distinguished from the passions (yi). 4. Later Taoist literature. — Later Taoist literature is voluminous and reflects that medley of subjects which make up Taoism, such as the search for immortality (which Chu Hi singles out as its main object), the conquest of the passions, alchemy, the observance of fasts and sacrifices, ritual and charms, and the multiplied objects of worship. Much of present-day popular hortatory literature may be reckoned as Taoist. Probably the most well-known of all Taoist writings is The Tractate of Actions and their Retributions, which dates from the Sung dynasty. According to the original text, retribution takes effect in this world. The practiser of virtue indeed not only may receive earthly happiness but also may hope as the culmination of his reward to become immortal and immortal, hsien-jen (=psi of Buddhism). As for the transgressor, he suffers in his personal enemies if at his death guilt still remains unquieted by punishment, judgment extends to his posterity. Of this retribution Heaven and spiritual beings are recognized as the agents. In the illustrative anecdotes added in many editions to the original text the stage of retribution includes the other world and successive rebirths in this world. The complicated morality has many excellent details, but extends also to tabus—e.g., striding over a well or leaping over food.

5. Present-day Taoism. — Chang Tao-ling (A.D. 34) has been regarded as the founder of present-day popular Taoism, which is not unfairly described as a mass of superstitious magic. The earlier literature, however, makes it evident that before his time Taoism had yielded to the love of the marvellous. Chang Tao-ling is said to have received from Lao-tze himself, who appeared to him from the realm of spirits, a sword and other apparatus in virtue of which he was able to exercise control over the spirit world. Descendants of Tao-ling, in each of which he said the soul of their ancestors is successively incarnate and, whose residence is at Lung-lu Shan in Kwangsi, have inherited his powers, and since A.D. 748 hold by imperial decree the hereditary dignity of 'Master of Heaven.' They are the present keepers of a work on China as Taoist popes. After the introduction of Buddhism into China Taoism shows very evident traces of Buddhist influence, which was particularly potent in the 3rd and 6th centuries A.D. In its religious literature and practices it follows Buddhist models and borrows Buddhist phraseology. It has been said of its temple and monasteries that 'in all the statement, that the celibacy of Taoist priests has been strictly enforced since the 10th cent., is subject to qualification. Eitel says that Taoist monks withdraw to the cloister walls and spend the whole time between meals at home. Doolittle distinguishes two classes of Taoist priests. A Christian influence in the names and titles of objects of Taoist worship has also been traced by some (e.g., Wiegert). Many of the best known objects of popular worship are members of the Taoist pantheon; e.g., Yu Hwang Shang-ti, who is the Supreme Taoist god, is also he to whom the great name Shang-ti 'suns phrase' would be most readily referred by the ordinary Chinese. Lao-tse is himself worshipped as one of the 'Three Pure Ones' whose images are prominent in every Taoist temple, the two others being Yu Hwang and Pan Ku. Taoism has produced a plentiful crop of legends and fairy-tales, the influence of which is considerable.

The gulf between the Taoism of the Tao-Teie King and present-day Taoism is a wide one. It has to be remembered, however, that even in the Tao-Teie King there are passages which suggest a marvellous mastery of nature by the Taoist adept and provide a starting-point for that search after immorality which, according to Suzuki, first opened the door for the irruption of superstition. The suggestion has also been made that the opposition sharpened between Confucianism and other strains of thought, all of popular religion and superstition that found no encouragement in Confucianism took refuge in Taoism, and above all such acceptions and any particular phrases in the Tao-Teie King which might suggest a germ of magical developments, the general position of Taoism from the beginning exposed it to such deterioration. Starting from the assumption that man and nature are fundamentally one, its quietism obliterated the line between moral and physical, and promised its adept such a harmony with Nature as was willed with Nature—made him merely the vehicle of her great powers. The distinctness of the moral person was lost in the all-embracing sweep of Tao. Confucianism also speculated on the relation between man and nature, and thought of the sage as exercising a cosmic influence. But this influence is the issue of moral development, and the Confucian emphasis on self-determined morality prevented any sinking of man into nature.

The noble elements of Taoism are, however, not extinct. The Taoist pope is not recognized as head by all the Taoist priesthood. There are celibate Taoists among whom the noble Taoist stratum is cherished, who disdain any connexion with him. In some of the secret societies also elements of the higher Taoism survive. Even in Confucian circles classical Taoism has influence. The writer recalls one scholar who would not have described himself as other than Confucianist, who was well acquainted with the Tao-Teie King, and who used to repeat with genuine appreciation, 'The highest goodness is like water.'

6. State relations. — During its long history Taoism has experienced a considerable vicissitude of political favour and disfavour. In the pre-Ch'in
times the various schools of Chinese thought seem to have been allowed free play. With the Ch'in dynasty, the first emperor of which ruled from 256 to 210 B.C., Lao-tse was in favour, and it continued to enjoy imperial patronage under the early Han dynasty. Thereafter its political relations were chagrined: e.g., in the 6th century, it was suppressed under the empress of the Northern Wei dynasty, in 548, and it was again exalted by the emperor Hsiian Teung. After other such vicissitudes it was by the late Manchu dynasty reckoned along with Buddhism and Christianity as a heterodox teaching in contrast to the sacred teaching of Confucians. See also art. MYSTICISM (Chinese).

TAPAS.—See ASCETICISM (Hindu).

TARGUMS.—Thou the term 'Targum' was used by Jewish authorities to designate the translation of the Hebrew Scriptures into any language, it was specifically restricted to the Aramaic rendering of the Hebrew Bible. As translations were used liturgically; the Hebrew text was read from a scroll, and this was followed by the Aramaic, recited without book by the official called meterger. The term 'Targum' is used to the 5th century, and was in parts maintained beyond that date. It is possible that the famous rescript of Justinian in 429 was directed against the liturgical use of the Targums.

The most widely read of the Targums was that ascribed to Onqelos (i.e. Aquila), who lived in the 2nd century A.D. Aquila really rendered the Scriptures into Greek, but his name became associated also with the Aramaic version of the Bible. One of the main translation of the Pentateuch only, and it is known as the 'Babylonian Targum,' not so much because of its language, as because of its official adoption in the Babylonian Jewish academies. Thus, though edited in Babylonia, Onqelos is diacritical Palestinian. Onqelos probably includes elements of considerable antiquity, which were derived from oral tradition to some extent, on the other hand, is a descent of literary origin. Onqelos went through various re-editions, so that the exact text is not usually referred to an earlier period than the 4th or 5th century. The 'Palestinian Targum' (known also as the 'Targum of Jonathan'), though later than the earliest recension of Onqelos, contains elements older than the latter. The most remarkable theological characteristic of the Targums is the occurrence of anthropomorphisms. They are thus paraphrases rather than translations, though in very large part Onqelos is literal enough.

Similarly, there were two Targums to the Prophets: the 'Babylonian' (ascribed to Jonathan, son of Uzziel), which originated (despite its Babylonian use) in Palestine; and the 'Palestinian,' which is fuller of homiletic elements. The later, derived from the prophets (haftaroth) in the synagogues, these Targums also partook of an official character.

On the other hand, there were also such official Targums to the Psalms of the Bible from which no haftaroth were derived. Hence these Targumim to the Hagiographa form independent groups. On the whole they are free, and in some cases (as in the Second Targum to Esther) are of greater interest for folk-lore than for exegesis. The Targum to the Song of Songs is through liturgical use.

LITERATURE.—See full list of authorities in HDB b. 668. Add W. Bacher, De alteste Terminologie der jiidischen Schriftauslegung, Leipzig, 1890, p. 204 ff., and later in L.

TARTARS.—See TURKU-TATARS.

TASMANIANS.—See AUSTRALASIA, POLYNESIA.

TATHAGATA.—Whatever it may have meant originally, or from whatever source it may have been derived, Tathagata is an epithet of Buddha used to express his very personality. It is, first of all, an appellation to specify his dignity as an enlightened being and a teacher of men and gods. He is the one who has realized the four truths according to reality (yathâbhedam) and, consequently, mastered the way to the realization of the truths. Sensation, perception, and thoughts are all under his own control. He is free from the bondage of the six senses and attachment to their objects, because they are not his masters, as they are with the common people, but he is master over them. Thus he is beyond all the confusions and disturbances rising from contact with the objects of sense and thought. He was born a man, but has become a superhuman being in respect of and by virtue of these highest moral and intellectual attainments. In order to express these superhuman excellences of Buddha's personality, the Buddhis from the earliest time used to call their master the Tathagata with a special reverence. In this use, he is the master of the ancient and the modern, of the one who is nearly the same thing as Sugata ('the one who has gone blessed'). Here Tathagata means the one who has gone (gata) from the realm of attachment to the other beyond according to reality (tatha, which means the same as yathâbhedam).

But the virtue of a Buddha does not consist in attaining this position for himself alone. He teaches the people the Way to the same attainment and guides them in its realization. He is the Master who, having himself reached the castle of fearlessness, invites and leads them to the same. The Tathagata is not only sure that he has perfectly enlightened one and has thoroughly overcome the miseries of existence, but also equally sure that he is the master of the Truth and the Law. With this confidence he shows the wheel of the Dharma and roars a lion's roar in the assemblies of beings.

Thus the Tathagata is the enlightened one who knows the Way and reveals that Way by treading which he himself has become the 'thus-gone.' He practises as he preaches (yathâ-vâdah, yathâ-bhrâ) and vice versa. Though this explanation of the term is, as etymology, certainly far-fetched, it is quite natural that the Buddhists saw in their Master a being without any falsehood and self-deceit. The association of the appellation with the very personality of an unerring Master of the way to final emancipation is undeniable. A stance which is said to have been uttered by the disciples at the death of the Master is another testimony to this association. It reads:

1 See Majjhima, nos. 102 and 123 (tr. K. F. Neumann, iii. 35, 201 f.), and also ed. leucken, vi. 95, 31; 120 (PTS ed. i. 130 ff., iv. 127).

2 See Suggutta, xxxv. 39, 41, 5 (PTS ed. i. 64, 389).

3 See Suggutta, xii. 21 (PTS ed. ii. 27), and Agnivata, iv. 9 (PTS ed. ii. 9).

4 See Suggutta, vi. 7 (PTS ed. ii. 190), xvii. 58 (PTS ed. ii. 65); cf. Agnivata, vi. 64 (PTS ed. ii. 417); Majjhima, no. 35 (PTS ed. i. 372); and cf. Mahaparinibbana (PTS ed. i. 350–351).

5 See Hepikosa, 112 (PTS ed. p. 1221); Agnivata, iv. 25 (PTS ed. ii. 211). Cf. below, Lotus, ch. ii; and Mahasangâta (ed. Smârt, Paris, 1890, ii. 360, 360, 366, etc.).
The Master, such a Master as he is (pāṭhā cividus), without any parallel in the world, the Tathāgata is gone.1

The Tathāgata is the Master who has seen the way and revealed it to us, according to reality.

To the Buddhists their Master was the ‘thus-gone’ or ‘thus-descended’ (translation of Edmunds) to final enlightenment, the ‘perfected’ (der Vollendete, Neumann) in wisdom and its realization, in short, the ‘truth-winner’ (Rhys Davids). The appellation was certainly a self-designation of Buddha, for it was more used by his disciples to express their confidence in the Master.

So far the empirical aspect of the concept. We must now take up the metaphysical side of the idea conveyed or attached to the term. The Buddhists were, probably in Buddha’s lifetime, nearly realizing for themselves the truth that the revealer of the Way must be at home in it, and that therefore he is the Way itself. They said:

‘The laws (dharmas) are real and not otherwise as they are and these are perfectly known by the Tathāgata.2 Here the laws mean not only Buddha’s teaching, but the things taught in his teaching and their essence. Here the teaching: ‘He, the Blessed One, knows having known (the laws), sees having seen, born of Light, born of Wisdom, born of Truth (dharma-bhuto), and born of Brähma; He is the one who reveals and tells, the One who gives immediate knowledge (maha-sammā-samādhi) to the Tathāgata.3 Hence we have transcribed the dharmas by ‘truth’, i.e. the truth expressed in Buddha’s laws.

The idea here formulated cannot be called metaphysical speculations; still they show a tendency to base the faith in the Master on the transcendental entity of the Truth, not only revealed to us by him, but also represented personally by him. The foundation and elaboration of these ideas must proceed to a further development of Buddhological (so to speak, in analogy with Christological) speculations. The fact of the transcendental foundation of the teaching of the Master: thought and clear conception must follow it. And it is quite natural that the Buddhological ideas were always closely associated with the appellation Tathāgata. These thoughts may be studied from three aspects or phases of their development. They are: (1) the relation of the Tathāgata to the Truth (dharma) which he revealed, (2) the communion of the Tathāgata with the many other Tathāgatas, and (3) the eternity of the personality of the Tathāgata.

(1) The term dharma (in both singular and plural) is a very flexible one. But the various aspects of the term have a necessary connexion, when viewed as centring in the person of the Master. The dhamma (plural) are qualities of things, both physical and mental, which are transient, but subject to the laws. These laws make up existence,4 and our attachment to and thirst for them are the causes of the miseries of life. Misery, its genesis, its extinction, and the way of release from it—these truths have been revealed by the Tathāgata according to reality (yathābhātām). Thus our emancipation from the miseries is possible only by realizing to ourselves the laws according to reality. These are the laws of the existence of the Tathāgata. Therefore the laws have their root, light, and basis in the Blessed One,5 Buddha is the king of the laws. On the other hand, however, Buddhism is attainable only by the comprehension of the laws. Hence it is true also that Buddha is the protector of the laws, who, leaning upon the laws, reverses, honours, and adores them.6 The law and its revealer are mutual in their relations. He who

1 See Davids, ed. (v. 1.136), and v. 1.216; Latt., ed. 1.137.
2 See Mahāyana, v. 13 (PTS ed. 182); Saṃyutta, Dv. 44 (PTS ed. 116); Tathāgata, vi. 4 (PTS ed. l. 146), cf. below, v. 2.7 of the Lotus.
3 See Majjhima, no. 13 (PTS ed. 182); Saṃyutta, xxxv. 116 (PTS ed. iv. 94); cf. below, v. 2.6 of the Lotus.
4 See Majjhima, v. 12 (PTS ed. 182), v. 13 (PTS ed. l. 150), etc.
5 See Saṃyutta, xxi. 24 (PTS ed. ili. 220-217), etc.
6 See Aṅguttara, iii. 14 (PTS ed. l. 139), v. 183 (PTS ed. ili. 150), etc.

sees the Law sees the Master, and rice versa.7 The dharmas is not merely a phenomenon or an instruction; it is the Tathāgata’s truth, and by virtue of which the Master and his followers, and consequently the Buddhás of the past and future, have attained or shall attain Buddhahood.

(2) According to a great master, as given by Barmont, Tathāgata (tathā-agata, ‘thus-come’) means the one who has come thus, in the same manner as his predecessors, the Buddhás of the past; it is, on the other side, tathās and gata, thus-gone and gone, the one who has borne his burden or departed as they.8 The oneness of enlightenment and Law among the Buddhás of the past and of the present is an idea as old as the history of Buddhism, and the development of its philosophy has always had a close relation with the idea. ‘The Tathāgata (plur.) lead men by the right law (sadādharmam)’—these are the words believed to have been spoken by Buddha himself to his disciples. This and similar passages, speaking of the Tathāgatas and the Law, indicate the communion of the Tathāgatas, or the unity of Buddhahood in the same truth. Not only has the Law been proclaimed to the Law-born Buddhás,4 but they have all one and the same road to tread. This one road (ekayāna)9 consists in nothing but reverence towards and realization of the Law. Herein lies the metaphysical essence of the teaching of the Tathāgatas, or, speaking metaphysically, their entity—dhammatā or dhamma-sudhammati.10 In this concept of the essence of Buddha’s teaching or Law, and consequently of his personality as the Law-born, the Buddhist philosophers have found a metaphysical basis for their faith in Buddha as the dhamma-born. They were to find, by the help of the Tathāgata, a metaphysical foundation of the union of all the Tathāgatas. It is quite natural that Nāgārjuna,2 the Mahāyānist philosopher of the 2nd cent. A.D., founded his theory of Buddha’s dharmakīrti, or dharma-dīna, upon this concept of dhammatā and the authority of the verses speaking of the ceyyāna, above referred to.

(3) This point gives us a key to the consideration of Buddhological speculations on the eternity of the Tathāgata’s life. Whether the Tathāgata exists after his bodily death or not is a question that had been asked from very early times in Buddhist history. Buddha is said to have neither affirmed nor denied it,1 every time this question is asked Buddha is named by the epithet Tathāgata. Whatever this connexion may have implied, we see that the question is affirmed on a metaphysical basis in the Mahāyāna texts, and that here again the appellation Tathāgata comes most conspicuously to the front. We have two most important texts, which devote each a whole chapter to the question of the duration of the Tathāgata’s life (Tathāgatāyugas-pravṛddhā)—the Lotus of the Law11 and the Golden Light.12

1 See Davids, ed. (v. 1.136), and v. 1.216; Latt., ed. 1.137.
2 See Majjhima, v. 13 (PTS ed. 182); Saṃyutta, Dv. 44 (PTS ed. 116); Tathāgata, vi. 4 (PTS ed. ili. 314); cf. the Lotus, esp. ch. i.65 (PTS ed. ili. 315).
3 See Majjhima, vv. 2, 7, 19, 43 (PTS ed. l. 146, v. 434); Aṅguttara, vi. 7, 21 (PTS ed. ili. 314); cf. Pravacana-pāramitā in the Lotus, ed. (Latt.), vol. ii., p. 118.
4 See Saṃyutta, vi. 1, vi. 24 (PTS ed. l. 146, v. 434); Aṅguttara, vi. 21 (PTS ed. 21); cf. Pravāhita-pāramitā in the Lotus, ed. (Latt.), vol. ii., p. 119.
5 See Saṃyutta, vi. 1, vi. 24 (PTS ed. l. 146, v. 434); Aṅguttara, vi. 21 (PTS ed. 21); cf. Pravāhita-pāramitā in the Lotus, ed. (Latt.), vol. ii., p. 119.
6 Pyth. vers. 246 (PTS ed. iv. 195); cf. below, ch. ii. of the Lotus.
7 See Majjhima, no. 13 (PTS ed. 182); Saṃyutta, xxxv. 116 (PTS ed. iv. 94); cf. below, v. 2.6 of the Lotus.
8 See Majjhima, v. 12 (PTS ed. 182), v. 13 (PTS ed. l. 150), etc.
9 See Majjhima, v. 12 (PTS ed. 182), v. 13 (PTS ed. l. 150), etc.
10 See Saṃyutta, xxi. 24 (PTS ed. ili. 220-217), etc.
11 See Aṅguttara, iii. 14 (PTS ed. l. 139), v. 183 (PTS ed. ili. 150), etc.
12 Pyth. vers. 246 (PTS ed. iv. 195); cf. below, ch. ii. of the Lotus.
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In summing up these ideas we may see that with the Buddhists the Tathagata has meant the personal aspect of the dharma. To found metaphysical faiths in the person of the Tathagata has always been the task of Buddhist orthodoxy, even in its phases of development in the East. But, in addition to this, we should consider two other forms of thought, one besides the central one. (a) One of them is the theory that denies personality in the Tathagata or anything else. It may be designated the theory of "no-sigal (lakṣaṇa) and is represented by the Diamond-cutter\(^1\) and other texts of the so-called Prajñā class. There the person of Buddha remains as the preacher of the sermons, and the epithet Tathagata remains also; but nothing is allowed to be defined, any definition or qualification being thought to be a limitation, which means the same thing as illusion. Thus the texts which assert the omniscience of the Tathagata deny to him any ascribable quality (lakṣaṇa). \(^1\) Tathagata means one who does not go to anywhere, and does not come from anywhere.\(^2\) Here we see that the very idea of Tathagata is put away. Notwithstanding this, the identity of the Tathagata and the Law is asserted.\(^3\) This is indeed a testimony to the tenacity of the idea.

(b) Another current, opposite to the above, may be called the theory of 'signs' (dharmas-lakṣaṇa). In its theoretical aspect this doctrine cannot be distinguished from orthodoxy, being founded upon the idea that all the dharmas are realities, which are realized in the person of the Tathagata. But in practical aspects it looks to a Tathagata beside the historical Buddha. Amitābha, the lord of the Sukhāvatī, or Vaiśāja-guru, the lord of the Eastern paradise, or Maitreya, the future Buddha in the Tārā heaven, is the object of their adoration and their hope of salvation. The cult of the Tathāgatas in various heavens is found also in the Lotus,\(^4\) and it has proved to be useful for propaganda. Buddhism of this kind, whichever may be its Tathagata and ideal heaven, is founded upon the belief that any Buddha or saint is the manifestation of one Tathāgata. This philosophy of the Tathagata-ลक्षणa is a natural outcome of the early Buddhist concept of dharma and is in conformity with the faith that every dharma is the manifestation of Buddha's wisdom (providence, so to speak). Moreover, the religion is one of adoring him, the source of compassion or as our saving is not only in accordance with the philosophy, but also has a very sympathetic aspect of faith and piety. But the defect of this system lies in its losing concentration of faith in the historical Tathāgata and therefore in its running sometimes to an extreme pantheism.

To sum up the results: Buddhist philosophy started with the ideal of release from the miseries of life in conformity with the real nature of things (dhamma). As the reality, so the existence (yathā-dhammā tathā-saṅkāya). This yathā-tathā has been revealed by the Tathāgata whose personality consisted in yathā-visā tathākārī. This Buddha's personality is inseparable from the metaphysical entity of dharma, and vice versa. The idea of the Tathāgata has, in this way, become the pivot around which both philosophical speculations and religious faith have moved and developed.

LITERATURE.—Besides the works quoted, see J. H. Moore, "Saying of Buddha's Tathāgatā," J. R. A. S., 1956, p. 133. See also poems, such as "Kātanā," by Mrs. Macgregor, 1958, p. 161; M. Ansani, "Nīhīren, the Buddhist Prophet," Cambridge, Mass., 1916, Appendix IV; and M. Ansani, Tathāgata.

\(^{1}\) SBE xxii. pt. ii. (1898) pp. xii-xiii, 119-124.

\(^{2}\) Jh. ix. 118, ed. Sinart, p. 302.

\(^{3}\) Cf. Latīna-vihāra, ed. v. Lellman, p. 231.


\(^{6}\) Jh. ix. 118, ed. Sinart, p. 302.


\(^{8}\) Jh. ix. 118, ed. Sinart, p. 302.
TATI BUSHMEN.

1. Race and distribution. — The Tati Bushmen, or Bushmen of the Biechuanaland Protectorate, and of the Matabele and Zulu territories, are a branch of the Bush people of S. Africa, from whom they have many characteristics, both morphological and linguistic, in common. The Bushmen as a whole were formerly spread over a much larger area of the continent of Africa than they occupy at present. Traces of their occupation, such as paintings, weapons, and implements found far beyond their present limits, indicate that they were originally a much larger people than they are now. Indeed there is good reason for believing that at one time they occupied practically the whole continent and were driven by other peoples into their present territory.

2. The name. — The name Bushmen is derived from the Bushman language. The Tati Bushmen, who are the most numerous tribe of the Biechuanaland Protectorate, are called Bushmen by the Tati, as their neighbors among the Hottentots are called Hottentots. The name Bushmen, as their name (originally given to them by the early Dutch settlers) implies, is a name of the open country, a race of hunting savages living largely in the Stone Age. Their love of freedom amounts to a passion, and they are passionate, irresponsible, courageous, and cruel.

3. Mentality; artistic and moral life. — The Bush people as a whole are low in the scale of mental development, but they are highly intelligent, as their knowledge of the outdoor world, especially of the habits of wild animals. They are wonderful as trackers and have a remarkable sense of direction. Their reflective instincts are not highly developed, although some of their paintings, and more especially their folk-tales and songs, are not wanting in this respect. The most interesting thing among the Bushmen is their artistic ability. They have left paintings, figures on stones and rocks and incised figures upon boulders all over the country. Most of these paintings or chippings indicate objects of the chase, the habits of animals,
or more rarely scenes of war and domestic life.

The drawings of the wild animals are in many cases filled in with red, the method of which can be traced in places the gradual evolution of the art of painting. A fresco recently discovered in the Matopo Hills near Bulawayo is remarkable for its vivid colors. It is not, as is the case in most of the paintings, while the execution as a whole reminds one of the paintings of the Old Stone Age. Certain paintings of figures are supposed to have a mythological signification, as they cannot be connected with animal life. In a few instances, the paintings as a whole are not ritually important; there are other cases which show some advance, especially one by the Natal Bushmen. The Bushmen are not devoid of religious spirit.

The dance of the Bushmen is due to the same magic as the painting. This was the idea underlying it. In other words, that the Bushman painted the animals on the walls of his cave-dwelling to give him power over them in the field. While this is possible, and we can believe that it was, there is not any good evidence of it. It has been maintained that paintings usually depict animals desirable for food, and that noxious animals are conspicuous by their absence. Bushman paintings, we are concerned, this is not true. If animals such as lions, leopards, snakes, and rhinoceroses are considered, we can see that only noxious animals, they occur often enough on the paintings. But such animals are not desirable as food to the Bushmen, as they eat practically everything, and certainly would not refuse to eat the flesh of a lion, unless it happened to be the totem of the hunter. On the whole the paintings reflect more than the ordinary life of the people plus the caprice of the particular artist. At intervals of leisure—and the Bushmen, when food was plenty, had much of that—the scenes of the past would rise up in their minds, and they would attempt to visualize them by painting them on the rock, and by constant practice the faculty of drawing improved. The colours employed were yellow, brown, red, and sometimes white, and blue. Some of these paintings are ancient, and some are quite modern, as certain of the artists are or were recently alive. The faculty of drawing and painting was said to be hereditary in the Bushmen. It has been advanced that the painters and sculptors belonged to different tribes, but there is no good reason for accepting this.

The Bushmen are passionately fond of dancing, more especially at full moon and at certain seasons of the year. Fires are lit outside their caves, and dancing is kept up all night, or until the performers are exhausted. Some of these dances, in which the performers paint their faces and bodies, are of a religious nature. Some of them are more or less coarse. Songs are sung by the leaders, and the other performers join in the chorus. The motions are not at all graceful. Some dances are called after animals—e.g., the eland bull dance, the baboon dance, the bee dance, and the frog dance—and each has its own peculiar tune. The dances give very good imitations of the animal in its different moods and postures. The instruments used to accompany these dances are stringed instruments similar to an ordinary bow, with a tortoise-shell as a sound-box variously called fango, fangula, matè, and many other names. The dancers have rattles round their ankles, made of the skin of the inside of the springbok's ear, with small pebbles inside to make much sound, and the dance is a lively one. Sometimes, after the boys have undergone the ceremony, these are of a distinctly religious character. Bushman music is, as might be expected, of a very primitive and monotonous nature, the repetition of a few notes. It does not usually consist of more than six tones (which do not belong to our scale), but the strangeness of the music transforms the mere notes into a peculiar charm. There are other tunes which show some advance, especially one by the Natal Bushmen. Harmony does not exist.

The Bushmen have an extensive range of terms for family relationships, both male and female. Some of these are connected with taboo; e.g., a mother-in-law must not see her son-in-law or mention his name; he, on his part, must not mention hers. The same rule applies to some other relations also. A woman must avoid mentioning the name of her husband or any of his near relatives. There are different terms for these relationships, but the system among the Bushmen is not nearly so perfect as that among the Australians.

Marriage is usually a very simple matter among the Bushmen, some of whom are monogamists and others polygamists. In some polygamous cases, the men may marry as many women as possible, according to their worldly position. Two young people very often simply go off and live together, but usually the young man has to prove his prowess by going into the wild and killing their animal. The strongest and fiercest he can find—and presenting the whole or a selected portion to the girl's father. Among some tribes this is considered indispensable before asking the hand of a girl in marriage. If the present is accepted, the marriage is complete. Sexual intercourse before marriage, while looked upon as a crime, is very often practised. Divorce is too simple. A man or woman leaves his or her partner and goes off with some other one. The custody of the children does not cause much trouble, as the young people are accustomed to fend for themselves at an early age. Parental control is thus exceedingly weak. Marriage usually takes place within the clan, but a man cannot marry a woman of the same family as his own i.e., bearing his own surname. So far as we know, a man cannot take his own sister to wife, because of his totem, but he may take his sister-in-law. Although there is much freedom in the intercourse of the sexes, incest and adultery are regarded as crimes and punished by death, usually by retaliation of the same sort. The injured person, murderer, thief, abduction, and especially witchcraft, are crimes against the Bushmen, and are punished by fines, expulsion from the tribe, or death in the case of persistent offenders. The old people, when too infirm to follow the family in its wanderings or unable to procure food for themselves, are left to die.

4. Totemism and religion.—As has been remarked, totemism exists among the Bushmen, especially among those tribes that have had long contact with the Bantu peoples, but they are too much the children of the wild to have developed it to any extent. Some call themselves the Zehn clan, or the Eland clan, or the Duiker clan, and, while they avoid killing and eating these animals or certain portions of them, they are not at all strict about the matter when pressed by hunger. In the case of the Duiker clan, the members may eat all of the animal except the heart. Those clans whose totem was the buffalo did not scruple to eat every portion of it, although they might not eat every portion of a wild buffalo, even though they looked upon oxen as tame buffaloes.

They believe in a spiritual world, to which the northern tribes call Thor, and the southern !Kung and !Nkunggn
with one slash of the knife. It quickly retracts and so prevents excessive bleeding, and usually heals rapidly. It is not known for certain whether the girls underwent the rite or not. The southern Bushmen cut off the last joint of the little finger of the right hand in the case of boys, and of the left hand in the case of girls. This was also a religious ceremony, but whether it took the place of circumcision or was additional thereto is still uncertain. Fracturing the joints of one or more fingers was also practised as a sign of mourning.

The Tati Bushmen, whatever they may have done in the past, do not now practise finger-cutting.

5. Omens.—The great factor in the life of the Bushmen is their divining bones, commonly but erroneously called dice. The Bushmen would undertake no expedition without consulting them. They are four and sometimes five in number, and designated male and female. The female bone is usually longer than the male. They are made from the hoofs of animals, bone, horn, wood, or even the stones of wild fruits. Sometimes they are ornamented with designs on back or front. To consult them a man would clear a small space of ground, rub the bones with various kinds of medicine, blow upon them, and then cast them upon the ground. From the results of the conjuncts he divines what he wants to know, according to certain laws. If the result is unfavourable, it is useless for him to persevere in his object. Divination is also practised by means of the shoulder-blade of a springbok, and by certain other animals, such as the mantis, lion, jackal, and snake.

6. Spirits.—The Bushmen personify some animals and look upon them as men in another state of existence. They also believe that men, especially witch-doctors, can assume animal shapes at will and compel other people to do the same. This, they say, is to 'have power' over such victims. It has been held to indicate a belief in the transmigration of souls, but the point is very doubtful. They certainly believe in transformations of animals. The Tati Bushmen thoroughly believe in the existence of spirits, usually of a malevolent character, and, when closely questioned, admit that they can change their shapes at will, but they will not tell which spirits are born again into other animal shapes. Lightning, wind, eddies of dust, storms, and other natural phenomena are looked upon as spirits. This is probably a relic of primitive man's belief that the animals and all things of no account atone for their own sin by being born again from the earth—certainly to some extent the Bushman view. There are spirits of rivers, fountains, and thermal springs known to the Bushmen and much revered by them.

7. Mythology of the heavenly bodies.—The Bushmen have no regular system of mythology in the sense that the ancient Greeks or the modern Hindus have, but they have the elements of such. They are said to have worshipped the heavenly bodies and are therefore to be included among those people who attained to heathen worship. Among the Tati Bushmen no special ceremonies are connected with these bodies, although it is evident from numerous tales in which the sun and moon appear that a considerable degree of reverence is paid to them. The new moon figures in many of their tales.

The moon is the slave of the mantis. Her waxing and waning is explained as her dying and coming to life again. The Tati Bushmen have no special tales in a moralized form; e.g., one speaks of the moon coming down to wash her face in a pool of water. The Bushmen do not know why the sun is hot, and there is no heat in the moon. Among the southern Bushmen the sun is spoken of as a little boy by the wayside; and it is said to have drunk the water and run into the sky by some children while he was sleeping. Again, the moon is spoken of as being cut by the sun and after death
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carry away the people who are dead. Some of the Tati Bushmen say that the stars were once human beings and animals, and the Cape Bushmen speak of girls as having been turned into stars, and the flowers by the light of the stars. The prominent stars have particular names among the Bushmen; e.g., Jupiter is that of the female, Venus the Male. Female Steinbock, the Southern Cross the Giraffe Star (Tati Bushmen), Aldebaran the Male Hartbeest, Procyon the Male Elephant. The origin of the stars is explained in the following manner. A girl of the early races of Bushmen, born a hero, had been asked her for a certain kind of food which she had put to rest in the fire; threw it together with the wood ashes that were upon it into the fire. In this way the stars were born, and the ashes became the Milky Way. The rising of particular stars at certain seasons of the year was, as they were then related with the return of the seasons. Shooting stars were considered unlucky by the Tati Bushmen, and, if they appeared in great numbers, led to terror.

8. Folk literature.—The Bushmen have a great body of folklore, mostly relating to animals and natural objects, customs, and so on, but next to none of a historical character, certainly none that throws much light on their origin and migrations.

Not a title of those folk-tales have been garnered, and, as the race is a vastly vanishing one, they will soon be completely lost. Bleek collected a large number of them, as well as a selection from his great mass of materials was published in 1911 by his niece, Miss Lloyd. Smaller collections by Schultz, Theul, and Dorman have been issued. A study of those writings throws light on the mental and moral outlook of the Bushmen.


S. DONNAN.

TATUING.—The word 'tatu' or 'tattoo,' meaning to mark or puncture the skin, is derived from the Tahitian word tatau, a reduplication of the root tau, 'to strike.' It was used by Captain Cook in the account of his visit to Tahiti.

1 Both sexes paint their Bodies, Tatoos as it is called in their Language. This is done by inlaying the Colour of Black under their skins in such a manner as to be indelible.1

Cook was thus the first to introduce the word to the English-speaking world of his day. Many writers since his time have included in the general term 'tatu' the practice of marking the skin with cicatrizations; the two processes are, however, very different. Tatu proper is the insertion of pigment under the skin, whereby a practically permanent stain is produced, while cicatrization is the marking of the body, either by cutting or burning the skin in such a way as to cause scars forming small depresions or elevations in the skin. 

1 Antiquity and distribution.—Both these modes of personal decoration are of considerable antiquity and of wide distribution; they have been found among people of greatly varying culture, from the aborigines of Australia, who adorn their bodies with cicatrizations, to the Polynesians and Japanese, who have developed tatu proper to a fine art. At a very early stage man no doubt felt a desire for personal decoration and learnt to use pigment for this purpose; and it is possible that tatu was resorted to as a means of giving a permanent characteristic to the designs thus made to beautify the body at a stage prior to the use of clothes. Archaeological evidence can, unfortunately, give us no direct proof of the practice among primitive peoples of cicatrization and tatu, he says:

1. Premiers habitants de l'Europe préhistorique s’ornaient, comme il semble, de manière analogique, et ils n’avaient pas de particularités qui nous permettraient de les distinguer nettement de cette période entre la sculpture corporelle simple et le tatouage. C’est à un fait établi par des peuples modernes que nous devons les cicatrisations, car l’archéologie nous a donné un exemple de ces cicatrisations parmi les héliolithes, pour l’époque néolithique et le commencement de la métallurgie.2

In the pre-dynastic tombs of the old Egyptians excavated by Flinders Petrie, de Morgan, Amélineau, and others, some rude human figures have been found bearing marks that suggest the use of tatu.3

2 In the second Théban empire the Egyptians tattooed themselves on the breast or arms with the names or symbols of deities, but decorative tattoo marks are rare among Egyptian peoples of the classical period.2

3 The exhibition in LV 192; You shall not make any cuttings in your flesh for the dead, nor print any marks upon you,4 indicates that the Jews had seen these practices carried on by the heathen nations among whom their lot was cast, and perhaps had themselves adopted them.

There are many classical allusions to tatu in Europe. Herodotus writes of the Thracian women being tattooed as a sign of nobility.4 Pliny 4 says that the men of the Dacians and Sarmatians marked their bodies (corpora sua inscribant). That tatu was known to the Pictones and other tribes of Gaul is shown by the evidence from coins.5 Chinese travelers mention that the chieftain of a tribe hero Tschaipefao tattooed fatu among the Ainus of Japan, who indeed practise it to this day. In China it ceased at a very early time to be a desirable mode of decoration and survives only as a method of imposing a distinctive mark. A. T. Sinclair says that 'among the ancient natives in the West Indies, Mexico and Central America, tattooing was general if not almost universal.7 It was also practised by the early inhabitants of S. America, as notably among the coastal tribes of Ecuador and ancient Peru.8 G. Elliot Smith finds it along the coast-lines of a great part of the world and includes it in the culture-complex of the "heliolithic track.9 Darwin, in drawing attention to the universality of the custom among primitive peoples, said: 'Not one great country can be named, from Polynesia in the north to New Zealand in the south, in which the aborigines do

4 G. Elliot Smith, p. 45.
5 " FN xxv. 1.
8 J. T. Joyce, In the Age of Early Culture, London, 1912, p. 61 f.
not tattoo themselves. W. Jost goes so far as to say that no race or people exists that has not had the custom of either painting or tattooing the body. On the other hand, some investigators have failed to find traces of cicatrisation or tatoo among certain primitive tribes, such as the Veddah of Ceylon, the British Guineans, the Tati Bushmen, and others; but this negative evidence does not rule out the possibility that such practices were once known to these people and have since been lost. Cicatrization is mainly confined to dark-skinned races, while tattoo proper prevails with those of lighter colour. Thus we find cicatrisation in Australia, Tasmania, New Caledonia, Fiji, and other parts of Melanesia, in Torres Straits islands, among the Papuans of New Guinea, in the Malay Peninsula (Sakal), the Andaman Islands, and in negro Africa. It has been superseded in S. America by tatoo proper, as has been observed among the Caribs of Guiana and in Brazil. The light-colored races who have practised tatoo proper include the Maoris of New Zealand and the inhabitants of the other islands of Polynesia. It is also found in Melanesia, Micronesia, the Malay Archipelago, the Malay Peninsula, Burma, India, among the Tibetan-Burman peoples in general (but rare in Tibet), and in Java Properly speaking it is found in Egypt, among the For, the Tushilang, the Namaquas, Hottentots, and other tribes, but it is by no means so widely distributed in this continent as cicatrisation. On the other hand, cicatrisation was very prevalent in the New World, especially among the Indian tribes of N. America, such as the Iroquois, the Pricked Pawnees, the Delawares, and others. It is used extensively at the present day among the Haidas and Iroquois of the N.W. American coast, and also by the Eakimo, and in S. America, notably among the Mundrues and Guaycuru tribes.

Tatooing is said to be one of the chief occupations of the Oriental gypsies. Sinclair found that most of the tatooing among the lower orders in Syria, Mesopotamia, Arabia, Egypt, and some parts of Persia was done by them. They also tattoo themselves, and in this they differ from European gypsies, for these do not wear tattoo marks. Hence their tattooing is an easy mode of identifying Oriental gypsies, who are often seen in all parts of Europe and America. At the present day tatooing persists in Europe among the lower classes. Lombroso made a comparative study of tattoo among soldiers and criminals, and conclusion was that tatooing was of the latter. He noted that the designs in criminal tatoo are often extremely complex and are formed by the most barbarous and obscene patterns. There was a considerable revival of tatoo among the soldiers and sailors serving with the British forces in the recent war. A revival, too, is noticeable among the mountaineers of New Zealand. Tatoo ceased to be a penalty or punishment and came once more into vogue, with the result that it is now an elaborate art. Apart from these and similar isolated revivals, tatoo is, on the whole, rapidly declining, especially in Polynesia, once the centre of a highly developed system of tatoo. This change is due, no doubt, in a great measure to the action of the missionaries, who have discouraged the practice, because of the orgies that often accompanied the tatooing operations.

2. Methods and implements.—The methods and implements used to produce these marks on the body vary considerably in different parts of the world and often reflect the cultural conditions of the people among whom they have been found. It is impossible here to do more than indicate briefly some of the striking varieties of the processes which have been recorded and add a few examples by way of illustration.

(a) Cicatrisation.—In Central Africa prominent keloids are formed by detaching a piece of skin, which is raised and held by a pellet of tow till the wound is healed. A. L. Cureau alludes to 'dandies of the Upper Ubangi and Equatorial Congo' who undergo this operation as a means of obtaining the prominent crest which gives them a fierce expression. Irritant substances are sometimes rubbed into the incisions to prevent the wounds from healing too rapidly. Among the Bagashe, a Bantu people of South-Western Congo, the body of a girl is painted with red ochre. When the girl is two years old, a small groove is made in her forehead. A small piece of leather dipped in or mixed with blood is placed beneath the groove, where the blood soaks into the leather. The skin and the incision heal together, and when the scar is formed it is shaped like a small cross.

Cicatrisation begins with the Andamanese at the age of eight and continues at intervals until the sixteenth or eighteenth year is reached. It is usually done by women, who use a flake of quartz or glass helix with a knife handle attached or a crab shell. While the arm is in the air, the women hold it, and afterwards the chest, abdomen, and legs, but never the face; the special tribal marks are, in some tribes, done by women. Women with a patch of flour as a mark of distinction and for drinking purposes are also tattooed by women. Among the Bagashe, a Bantu people of South-Western Congo, the body of a girl is painted with red ochre. When the girl is two years old, a small groove is made in her forehead. A small piece of leather dipped in or mixed with blood is placed beneath the groove, where the blood soaks into the leather. The skin and the incision heal together, and when the scar is formed it is shaped like a small cross.

These are formed by making vertical incisions in the skin, rubbing in a medicine, and then binding tightly with a cloth, so that wrinkles appear in the line of the process. Cicatrisation begins with the Andamanese at the age of eight and continues at intervals until the sixteenth or eighteenth year is reached. It is usually done by women, who use a flake of quartz or glass helix with a knife handle attached or a crab shell. While the arm is in the air, the women hold it, and afterwards the chest, abdomen, and legs, but never the face; the special tribal marks are, in some tribes, done by women. Women with a patch of flour as a mark of distinction and for drinking purposes are also tattooed by women. Among the Bagashe, a Bantu people of South-Western Congo, the body of a girl is painted with red ochre. When the girl is two years old, a small groove is made in her forehead. A small piece of leather dipped in or mixed with blood is placed beneath the groove, where the blood soaks into the leather. The skin and the incision heal together, and when the scar is formed it is shaped like a small cross.
produces a bluish-black effect. This method has also been observed in some of the islands of the South Seas.

The implements used for pricking the skin range in complexity from such simple natural objects as thorns, fish spines, cactus spikes, shells, and bones, to the elaborately fashioned appliances, such as the steel and the electric needles of Japan and Europe in use at the present day. The Rorospeaking tribes of British New Guinea obtain the desired effect by very simple means. The operator, who is generally a woman, mixes colouring matter—soot mixed with water—with a fragment of wood frayed out at one end to form a coarse brush. The colour is pricked in by means of a pricker having one or more thorns set at right angles to its long axis; these thorns are driven into the skin by tapping the pricker gently with a small wooden mallet. The women of these tribes are tattooed from head to foot, but the operation takes place at intervals, and there is a regular order in which the different parts of the body must be tattooed; thus the hands and arms are done in childhood, and later the tattoo is gradually increased until the whole body is covered to the shoulders. The buttocks, legs, and last of all to the face. 2

The Polynesian method of tattooing is generally to trace the design on the skin first with charcoal and then to outline it with soot. The pattern is framed with a flared bone edge. The skin is perforated by hammering or tapping this implement with another made of wood and shaped like a paddle. But the ways and means employed vary a good deal in the South Sea Islands, and the operation is often accompanied by much ceremonial and feasting, and the keeping of certain tabus; e.g., brides in the Fiji, while being tattooed, are Indio stag, and are kept in seclusion, for they must not see the sun. 3

In New Zealand a very strict tattoo has to be observed by the person undergoing the ordeal; he may not communicate with any one not in the same condition, nor may he touch his food. The Maori chief had to be fed through a special funnel during the process, which entailed a good deal of ceremonial of a somewhat religious character. The Maori tattoo, or moko, was of two kinds, of which the older method was a cutting into the skin with a small chisel-like tool made of sea-bird's wing-bones, shark's teeth, stones, or hard wood, and of different sizes and shapes. The edge of this tool was thus applied to the skin and tapped by a small mallet, which sometimes had a broad flattened surface at one end used to wipe away the blood. This chiselling process was superseded by prick tattoo, which was done with small-toothed or serrated implements dipped in colouring matter obtained either from charcoal mixed with oil or dog's fat or burnt and powdered resin. 4

In Borneo the design is pressed on to the skin with a tattoo block dipped in pigment made from a mixture of soot and sugar-cane juice. The needle points of the pricker, which are also charged with pigment, are then driven into the skin by taps from a striker. Among the Kayans the men carve the designs on the blocks, but the tattoo is done by women. The artists are under the protection of a tutelary spirit to whom sacrifices must be made, and the operator has to avoid certain foods. The women are tattooed in a hut built for the purpose; their male relatives are dressed in bark-cloth and must remain indoors until the operation is completed; in fact it cannot be commenced unless their men-folk are at home.


It is prohibited to tattoo women at seed-time, or if a dead body lies unburied in the house, and bad dreams, such as a flood of blood, foretelling much blood-letting, will also interrupt the work. 5

In Burma the outline of the desired pattern is roughly scratched on the skin with a coarse hair brush and is then picked out in a series of punctures close together, which merge into a rough line. The pricker is of an unusual kind, being two feet long and weighted at the top with a brass or lead figure; the pattern is contained in a single line, which, when fitted into the body, is thus joined to the weighted end. 6 In Japanese steel needles of four different sizes are used; the effect of shading is procured by tying rows of needles together. Sepia, vermillion, and Prussian blue are used in the designs, which are very ornate. 7

In some parts of N. America the pigmented effect is obtained by running a needle-like implement through the skin with a thread coupled with some material coated in pigment.

This method was followed by the Salish tribes, who used a 'needle of fish-bone or a cactus spine, which passed a line at each with charcoal under the skin, or sometimes the charcoal was carried on an unthreaded needle, which was thrust under the skin in a horizontal line. 8

The E-kinono use a needle and thread smeared with soot or gun-powder. Thus, speaking of the personal appearance of the Greenlanders, D. Curtans says: No one can be finished without a tattoo of the chin, hands and feet, has been thronged with a string smeared with soot, which when drawn out leaves a black mark. The mother performs the useful operation of tattooing in childhood, fearful that she will else attract no husband. This custom obtains among the Inuit, or Eskimo, and various Tartar tribes, where both sexes practise it; the one to heighten their charise, the other to inspire terror. 9

Patterns: A detailed study of the patterns would doubtless yield results of considerable ethnological interest as pointing to the migrations and culture-contact of peoples. Flinders Petrie has drawn attention to the resemblance between the Algerian patterns described by Lucien Jacquot 7 and those on the female figure found at Tukh and on the Libyans in the tomb of Seti 1 (XIXth dynasty, 1300 B.C.). The dominating designs in Algeria are crosses and a figure resembling a fish, which are thought to be degenerate forms of the swastika—a device widely distributed in Africa and elsewhere, and of great antiquity, as is shown by its appearance on a leaf in an Egyptian hieroglyph (about 2500-2000 B.C.) and by its prevalence in ancient Crete. The designs in favour among the Haida tribes on the north-west coast of America are similar to those on their boots, house-fronts, pillars, and monuments, and include family crests and totemic symbols such as the thunder-bird, wolf, bear, codfish, and so on. There is a great variation in the patterns of the Polynesian tattoo, for almost every island has some distinctive characteristic of its own. The Marquesans, e.g. tattoo in broad straight lines. Many of their signs suggest a hieroglyphic system which can be interpreted only by their priests; in Ama, however, sea-urchina and quaint zoophytes are well represented on the leg and thigh. The Marquesan women have a design somewhat resembling a tattooed on their lips. In Tahiti the patterns are simpler, but of greater taste and elegance than those of the Marquesas Islands.

7. Les Taotouing et les Indes de l'Algerie, L'Anthropologie, x. (1899) 484.
Tatuings

The coco-nut tree is a favourite object, and figures of men, animals, as well as stars, circles, and lozenges. The Maori tautu stands out in striking contrast to that of the rest of Polynesia, its chief feature being the blending of spirals and serpentine curves, which follow the conformation of the body, yet are generally completely covered. This prevalence of curved lines suggests Melanesian influence; for Polynesian tatu is generally rectilinear in character. The Maori tattoo is more symmetrical, perhaps because it is done at different times and by different artists. Here again the patterns are very diverse and suggest, as regards some islands, Polynesian influence. Each of the three principal centres of tatu proper in New Guinea has peculiarities of design and execution; thus, curved lines prevail in Humboldt Bay instead of the broader stripes of the south coast, and in the central district the designs used in tatu resemble those on the pipes and gourds, which show a preponderance of straight lines over curves and an absence of human or animal forms. The Motu (Port Moresby) and kindred tribes are said to lack geometrical art, and their tatu is angular in character, but there seems to be no good evidence that many of their designs were naturalistic in origin and became conventionalized later. 

In the Dobu Islands the men wear cicatrices on chest and shoulders in the form of circular spots of the size of half-a-crown. Tatu proper is mainly confined to the women, who have rings round the eyes and all over the face, and diagonal lines on the upper part of the front of the body crossing one another so as to form lozenge-shaped spaces.

Completed serial designs are worn by the women in Borneo. The fingers and feet are done at the age of ten, the forearm at eleven, the thighs partly at twelve, being finished at puberty; it is thought improper to be tattooed after motherhood. The men have isolated designs, such as the dog design, in elongated or rosette form—a device prominent in Kayan art and one that can be traced in the shoulder tatau of many of the tribes including the Barawans (Sarawak). The primitive tatu in Borneo is that of the Uma Long women of Batang Kayan; it is stippled in—on the forehead only—in irregular dots. Indigenous patterns are done by freeland, no blocks being used for them. The designs are partially made to effect of tight-fitting breeches, and resembles that found among the Burmese and some of the Naga tribes. The latter have an elaborate face tatu called ok, formed of continuous lines across the forehead, round and underneath the eyes, over the cheeks, to the corners of the mouth and the chin. Rows of spots follow the outside lines, and two fine lines mark out the nose in a large diamond space.

With the Nagas both sexes tatau, but some tribes do not mark the face, and have the tatu placed on the breast, shoulders, back, wrists, and thighs. The Burmese tatau generally from the waist to the knees, but among the Shan it extends from the neck to the feet. The designs include mystic squares, triangles, and a great variety of animals. The old or jungle style was to cover the skin with tracery producing an indefinite effect; the new style is distinct in outline. Perhaps the most highly developed tatu is that of the Japoneso, who cover the body with fantastic figures of dragons, hippopotami, and landscapes, in a manner that recalls the patterns on their silks.

4. Use and significance.—(a) Magico-religious. The use and meaning of the marks vary; they can be sacred, as in the sacred mark of the Kainga, and they have played an important part in the life of primitive man, since they had a magico-religious as well as a social aspect. Their widespread use, even at the present day, as a magical protection against smallpox shows a very general belief in their supernatural efficacy. The Yquin tribe of S.E. Australia wear vertical electrifications round the upper arm to make boomerangs glance off. In Tahiti the women are made with red-hot stones on the arms and shoulders in imitation of smallpox marks to ward off that disease. The Andamanese believe that electrification is good for rheumatism, toothache, headache, paralysis, epilepsy, and phthisis; it is resorted to for these and other ailments when all else fails. The Todas use it to cure the pains caused by milking buffaloes. Tatu proper is a remedy for rheumatism much in favour with the men of the Haik caste, who work on the lands in the south of the Raipur District and the Kanker and Bastar States in India; its action is probably that of a counter-irritant. The Gonds and Raingas have a number of designs for the protection of different parts of the body, including a figure of the monkey-god Hamman to give strength, of Bhimsen's club and arrows to enable them to shoot better, and so on. The Burman has similar safeguards worn on all parts of the body; they are a protection against wounds and secure freedom from pain, and are sufficiently potent to procure even the favour of princes. The only tatu worn by the Burmese women is a love-charm in the form of a triangle between the eyes or on the lips or tongue; it is done with the 'drug of tenderness'—a mixture of vermillon with herbs and other ingredients such as the skin of trout-spotted lizards. The Shan tatu boys as a test of courage, but special designs are added to prevent injuries or other mishaps. In Borneo the Kayan men wear a special tatu on the wrist called lukut, which keeps away illness. The lukut is a much-valued bead, which was formerly fastened on the wrist of the sick man to tie in the soul; but, as the bead was liable to be lost, a tatu representation of it came to be worn instead. The Ainu women are tattooed on the lips and arms to keep away the demons of disease, who are thus driven away. The forehead is the favourite part since these are all tattued in this manner. If an epidemic occurs in a village, the women must tatu each other; they also use tatuwing as a remedy for failing eyesight.

Many races believe that the efficacy of tatu marks extends beyond the present life to that of the next world, where they serve as marks of identification—e.g., Nagas of Manipur, Kayans of Borneo, N. American Indians, and many others—as or a guide, or as currency enabling the traveller to accomplish his journey.

The Brahmanes, who inhabit the wild hilly country adjoining Chota Nagpur, say that tate marks remain on the soul after death, and that she shows them to God, probably for purposes of identification.

Women of the Brâhman caste believe that after death they will be able to sell the ornaments tattu on their bodies and to subsist on the proceeds. In Africa a similar belief is found among the Eked women, who think that in the next world they can exchange their scars for food, and that the ghost is able to remove them one by one for this 1 Howitt, p. 726.
4 Tätig, Melanismen, p. 85.
6 R. G. W. Woodthorpe, 'Notes on the Wild Tribes inhabiting the South-east of New Guinea,' JAI vi. (1851) 298.
7 Shway Yoe, p. 411.
The Eskimo and the Fijians believe in Elysium only for the tattooed; the Fijian women who are too young for certain tattoos to avoid being used as food for the gods. Some investigators have insisted upon a considerable religious element in tatau, since the operation is often accompanied by sacrifice, prayer, and other religious ceremonies, and the markings frequently represent sacred animals, objects, or other objects that may be regarded as symbols of gods. These serve to express a close union between the god and his disciple; hence the need for certain talismans to avoid the dread consequences of contact with persons in this dangerous state. The priest of the Ewe-speaking people of W. Africa has special tatu marks indicating the deity whom he serves and the rank for which he holds in the priestly order; the shoulder marks in this case are so sacred that they must not be touched by the laity. In San Domingo the priests did not wear a distinctive dress, but had a figure of a zemi (tattoo) tattooed or painted on their bodies. Tatuimg was regarded by many people as a sacred profession, and the artists were under the special protection of deities of the craft. In Tahiti these were the children of Taurao, the principal deity; their images were kept in the temples of those who practised the art professionally, prayers being addressed to them by the operator before he began his work. The Tahitians say that tatuimg originated among the gods, and there are legends in Samoa and elsewhere telling of its sacred origin.

(b) Informatory.—To people who do not possess a system of writing the wearing of permanent and distinctive body-marks is not merely an aesthetic advantage, but in many cases a real necessity. Used extensively by uncultured peoples, these marks became a convenient means of conveying to their fellow-men all kinds of information concerning their activities and environment. They serve as a record of achievement and a means of identifying a man's tribe, clan, totem, social status, age-grade, and so on; and they have been regarded by some authors as a primitive form of writing.

Thus, in Africa cicatrisation is a common form of tribal mark, the scars being worn on the face or on other parts of the body and arranged in a certain pattern. In the Andaman Islands, Sulluk, Dunka, Dalomans, Mxosa, Mtypoi, and Hausa tribes are among those who follow this practice. Scars are used for the same purpose in the Andaman Islands, and in Melville and Bathurst Islands and the New South Wales. Ellis, writing of the Maoris of New Zealand, says that their faces were much tattooed:

1 Each chief had thus imprinted on his face the marks and involutions peculiar to his family or tribe; while the figures tattooed on the faces of the dependants or retainers, though fewer in number, were the same in form as those by which the chief was distinguished.

Even individual Maoris could be identified by special marks which were tattooed on the face—usually near the ear—in addition to the general pattern. These came to be used as the signature of the wearer and have been accepted as such on documents related to transactions carried on between the Maoris and white men.

The Salish and Dené tribes of N. America have marriage generally on the breast—symbol of the totality of possessions of the individual wearing them. The Haida Indians of Queen Charlotte Islands have their family totems or crests tattooed on their bodies with great skill. The designs are often very elaborate and resemble those on the tatoos that stand outside their houses.

The R. C. Harris Museum contains an instance of the use of cicatrisation to represent the totem of the individual. Trois Strats, where he saw some women wearing it cut into their backs. He was told that the men wore it cut into the shoulder or calf of the leg.

The Kawaiyan Indians of California formerly used the tatu designs worn by a landowner as a property mark by cutting or painting them upon trees and posts selected to indicate the boundaries. It was customary for the landowner to cause the red spot tattooed on the forehead by which, if taken prisoners in war, they could be identified by friends and so ransomed.

A curious use of tatu occurs in the well-known story in Herodotus of the slave who was sent from Sparta to the court of Mileus by Histiaeus with instructions that he was to be shaved, and that Aristagoras should look at his head; this being done, it was found that a message had been tattooed on the man's head, urging Aristagoras to revolt against the Persians.

Cicatrisation and tatu proper are included in the puberty rites and initiation ceremonies of many primitive peoples. In an account of one of these ceremonies in Australia Spencer and Gillen report:

The final ceremony of initiation to manhood in the Urubumna tribe is called Wilyaru, and the same name is given to men who have passed through the whole ceremony. The most important part of the ceremony consists in making cuts on the back, one in the middle line of the neck and four or six others down each side of the backbone.

In the Marquesas Islands the tatu proper was the principal initiatory rite.

In Samoa, as a young man was tattooed, he was considered in his minority. He could not think of marriage, and he was constantly exposed to taunts and ridicule, as being poor and of low birth, and having no right to speak in the society of men. But as soon as he was tattooed he passed into his majority and considered himself entitled to the respect and privileges of mature age.

It sometimes marked the admission to secret societies, as in the Banks Islands (Melanesia), where at the performance of the kole-kole ceremonies the head of the tatuimg device adopted by members of the society is tattooed on the wrist, a part of the body highly valued.

Mary H. Kingsley says of the initiation of boys in Africa:

The boy, if he belongs to a tribe that practice tattooing, is tattooed, and handed over to instructors in the societies' secrets and formulae.

In New Zealand tatuimg began with both sexes at puberty, the women being tattooed chiefly on the lips and chin. Chin tatu on women signifies marriage, not only in New Zealand, but also among the Eskimo, the Chukchi, the Indians of the Pacific Coast, and in Syria, Egypt, and Tunis. Women are usually tattooed at puberty. This is not, however, always the case, for in some of the islands of Fiji and among the Todas of the Nilghíris it is deferred until they have borne children, while with some races it is begun in infancy and completed at marriage. Only women are tattooed among the Chukchi, most Californian tribes, the Ainus of Japan, and in many parts of India. In the Omaha tribe of N. America chest marks on women signify great honour and a rank equal to that of a chief. Bachofen saw in the limitation of tatu to women among the Thracians an expression of their desire to retain the good social qualities of the individuals wearing them. This is contrary to the view taken by Plutarch, who said that the Thracians tattooed their wives as a punishment to avenge the murder of Orpheus. In 1

1 Evolution of Law, London, 1866, p. 322.
3 Ibid. 44.
4 Across Australia, London, 1912, i. 54.
8 Dobbs, p. 83.
Melanesia, where tatau is mainly confined to women, their social position is very inferior, whereas in Polynesia, it is comparatively high, and they are seldom tattooed. But it is questionable whether there is any necessary correlation between the tatau of women and their position in the social scale. The indication of tatau to one sex or the other may be due to other causes; e.g., it is possible that in the South Seas it may be connected with the migrations of different peoples.

Among some Indians of Brazil the executioner, or matador, was scarified above the elbows by the chief of the clan 'so as to leave a permanent mark there; and this was the star and guiding light of the night in the absence of honours. There were some who cut gouges in their breasts, arms and thighs, and with a club smashed and rubbed a black powder in, which left an indelible stain."

The wearing of tatu marks proved a convenient method of recording, among other things, great achievements demanding personal value and skill. The Koita tribes of British New Guinea have a special tatau for h Dictionary.

Those of the Baronga (Bantu) who have slain an enemy used to decorate their special marks from one eyebrow to the other:

'Dreadful medicines were inoculated in the incisions and there remained plumules which gave them the appearance of a buffalo when it frowns.'

On the Mendalum river in Borneo, the Kayans reserve thigh tatau for head-taking braves. With the Western Eskimo the men are tattooed as a sign of distinction. Those who have captured whales have marks to show this, so that their tatau becomes a kind of whale tally.

In many countries it is not only a record of great events, but also a memorial of the dead. In the Saibai and Daunian Islands (Torres Straits) the women wear a shoulder scar for a brother's death; it represents his nose, and the longer the mark the greater the brother's size.

In New Zealand 'the women were the chief mourners at funerals . . . the custom was, in days gone by, that they should blacken cash faces, neck, arms, and bodies with sharp shells until they streamed with blood; the naraku or mokoro was sometimes applied to the wounds, and the stains commemorated the scenes at which the women assisted.'

In Polynesia the tongue was tattooed as a sign of mourning. Ellis saw this operation performed in a house where a number of chiefs had assembled for the purpose of defacing the memory of Queen Rihorhio's tongue for the after-life of her mother-in-law.

(c) Decorative.—Perhaps the most general use for which tatu has been put is that of personal adornment. Ellis, after noting that tatu was used in Polynesia as a badge of mourning and a kind of historical record, adds: 'But it was adopted by the greater number of people merely as a personal ornament; and tradition informs us that to this it owes its existence.' Among the Kayans of Borneo, who have a very artistic style of tatu, this is the chief decorative ornament; so do the women in Greenland, New Zealand, and elsewhere. In fact both sexes in many parts of the world attach to it considerable aesthetic value. In regard to eisatization among the Andamans, Man says that it is primarily to prove beauty, and secondarily to prove courage in enduring pain. It seems evident that in the Torres Straits islands it was adopted as a means of acquiring a certain proportion of the heroism of the various peoples, so that the women had a T-shaped scar to prevent the breasts from becoming too pendulous. This fashion is also found on the neighbouring coasts of New Guinea and was observed by Seligmann among the Otali, an Australian tribe on the south coast of Cape York.

In contrast with the opinions expressed in the writings of Walde-Gerland and others in reference to the religious significance of tatu, Joost and Westernmark see in it only an expression of marks ranks and love of adornment: 'At present tattooing is everywhere regarded exclusively, or almost exclusively, as a means of decoration, and Cook states expressly that, in the South Seas discovery, it was in no way connected with religion.' Westernmark admits, however, that it has been made to serve many purposes, but adds: 'Nevertheless, it seems to be beyond doubt that men and women began to ornament, mutilate, paint, and tattoo themselves in order to attract the opposite sex,—that they might court successfully, or be courted.' Westernmark also notes that the first one who gave magical protection against evil powers, but gradually became merely decorative, and were used to make the personal beauty of the wearer more striking, as in the case of the women, who wore them to increase their terrifying aspect. On the other hand, E. Gross thinks the priority should be given to the taste for embellishment, and that the marks only later came to have a tribal or social significance: 'Summarising the results of the investigations of the significance of primitive scarification and tattooing, we find that the marks serve partly as tribal tokens and have perhaps as such a religious meaning, although this cannot be proved for a single instance. But in other and the largest number of cases the scars and tattoo marks are for ornamen7.

5. Origin and development. Many theories have been put forward to account for the origin and development of the practice of thus marking the human body: as regards the origin, however, they must remain, for lack of evidence, little more than mere speculations. Instances have been known of involuntary tatu occurring among mechanisms and other workmen, who have accidentally grazed or cut themselves while handling charcoal or other colouring matter. Primitive man may have arrived at the notion of tatu by accident, such as the pricking of his fingers by a half-burnt stick, or throrn while kindling a fire. The unusual mark thus made might well excite his interest and so lead to an attempt at imitation and to elaboration and invention. Herbert Spencer thought that the practice arose from the custom of making blood-offerings to departed spirits, and that the marks thus made expressed subordination to or close union with them, and became in many instances tribal marks, 'as they would of course become if they were originally made when men bound themselves by blood to the dead founder of the tribe.' In this connexion P. B. Jevons writes:

'The marks probably left on legs or arms from which blood had been drawn were probably the origin of tattooing, as has occurred to various anthropologists. Like most other ideas, we may add, that tattooing must have been forced on it was not his own invention, and, being a decorative idea, it must have followed nature as which regular steps were made in all decorative art. . . . So the scars from ceremonial blood-letting may have suggested a figure; the resemblance was deliberately accentuated and next time he drew the figure from the beginning designedly arranged to form a pattern.'
TAUROBOLIUM

M. Neuberger regards tatau as one of the popular customs that have spring from primitive therapeutics; "Smearing the skin with coal-tar, with which the body is painted, the blood and blood-corpuscles are coagulated into tattooing." Wundt, Jeest, and others see a possible causal connection between body-painting and tatooing and suggest that the ancients, in a crude attempt to express their sentiments, once painted the body. Wundt regards both practices as analogous in respect to the idea of putting in pictures; hence Wundt recognizes two types, the one a crude system of simple marks often intensifying the natural lines of the body, the other a more refined that in which the skin is treated as a material to work on—just as sand or rock is used for drawing upon—when the simpler marks are replaced by pictures. The notion being, says Capart, that "the practical importance of replacing temporary marks by permanent ones, if they have a special meaning attached to them."

1 The deslins that the proponents of this view maintain, have not as yet been made permanent to save trouble. Hence arose the practice of cutting the face and the body with dyed incisions.

Concerning the origin of moko, or Maori tatu, native tradition says that the first settlers marked their faces for battle with charcoal, and later these warlike decorations were made permanent to save trouble. Hence arose the practice of cutting the face and the body with dyed incisions.

How difficult and well-nigh impossible it is to assign at this unaccustomed knowledge of the early history of such a custom may be gathered from the admission of W. Ellis, who, after many years of personal contact with, and careful observation of, the natives of the South Seas, said in reference to their tatu: "Although practised by all classes I have not been able to trace its origin."


CONSTANT VON NEXINSON

TAUROBOLIUM.—The taurobolium, a sacrifice performed in connexion with the cult of the mother of the Gods, but not limited to it, was one of the most peculiar and characteristic ceremonies of the rites of the last two centuries of paganism. A striking description of it is put by the Christian poet Prudentius, of the 4th cent., into the mouth of one of his characters, Romanus the Martyr (Peristephanon, x. 1096 F.). The high priest of the Great Mother, a golden crown on his head, his temples richly bound with fillets, his toga worn cinetra Guinna, descends into a deep fosse which is completely covered by a platform pierced by a great number of fine holes. On to this platform is laid a huge ball, bedecked with garlands of flowers, his front gleaming with gold. His breast is pierced by the consecrated spear, and the torrent of her, steaming blood floods the covering of the trench, and rains through the thousand chinks and perforations on the expectant priest below, who throws back his head the better to present his ears, lips, nose, and even tongue and palate, to the purifying baptism. When life has fled and left cold the body of the slain bull, and the flames have removed it, the priest emerges and, with solemn steps, sweeping with his feet, or standing on blood, presents himself to the expectant throng of worshippers, who salute and do obeisance to him as to one who has purified.

There are two principal notices which prompted the ceremony of the taurobolium. In the earlier period, the 2nd and 3rd cent. A.D., it was usually a sacrifice whose object was purification for the Emperor, Empire, or community. An entire college, community, or even province could give it, and a frequent date for it was March 24, the Dies Saturnalis of the annual festival of the Mother and Attis. The most frequent time of the rite in the late 3rd and 4th cent. was the purification and regeneration of an individual. Its efficacy lasted for twenty years, or was even eternal, the baptized saint. The ceremony was performed by laymen as well as priests, and by persons of all ranks and both sexes. A special altar was erected for the occasion, the time occupied by the ceremony varied from one to five days, and the expense was borne by the individual or association that inaugurated it. Besides the personal and the patriotic motive, it was performed as a fulfilment of vows, or at the command of the Mother herself. In Rome it usually took place near a shrine which existed where the present church of St. Peter stands. The erudobolium—the sacrifice of a ram—was instituted later in connexion with the legend of the taurobolium, in order to give him due prominence in the rites of the cult. See art. Chriobolium.

As the taurobolium was celebrated in honour of both the Mother and Attis, it probably possessed a significance regarding that part of the legend which concerned them both (see MOTHER OF THE GODS). The priest descends into the dark pit and leaves the light of day; Attis dies; the vegetation of the earth withers; the priest is bathed in blood, and rises from the pit purified; Attis is restored; the vegetation returns.

The similarity between Christian doctrine and the phrase taurobolium (ταυροβολίων 'horn again for eternity') is startling, and has suggested belief in some connexion between the two religions in the way of borrowing, especially as paganism vied with Christianity in later days in promising such benefits as the latter conferred. The taurobolium, however, is better explained as the survival of a primitive Oriental practice based upon the belief, not uncommon among rude peoples, that the strength of brute creation can be acquired by consumption of its actual substance or by contact with its blood. The spiritual meaning of the practice first came with the advance of culture and the discarding of the primitive, literal belief (see Cumont, op. cit. below).

Though the taurobolium might with reason be supposed to have come, with the cult of the Great Mother, from Asia Minor, there is no positive evidence that it was originally connected with it either in the East or in Italy. Cumont thinks that it was a rite in honour of the eastern Artemis Tauropoles, deriving from her name tauropolion, which was corrupted to taurobolium; and that the rite, having become widespread in Cappadocia and the neighbouring provinces in connexion with the worship of Artemis Tauropolos and other deities closely allied to her, identified with her—principally Anaitis and Bellona—naturally found its way with them into Italy early in the 2nd cent. A.D., after the annexation of that part of Asia to the Roman Empire, and was soon after popularized by the priestesses of the Great Mother. Its first known celebration took place at Pozzuoli in A.D. 131, in honour of Venus Carlesis, who, Cumont thinks, was Anaitis under a Roman name. His conclusion is that it was calculated in connexion with the worship of Bellona rests on slender evidence. Others believe it to have been a part of the Great Mother's worship in Asia Minor (Heged, op. cit. below). It is certain that the taurobolium was attained through the cult of the Great Mother.
TEETH—TELEOLOGY

It spread throughout the Empire, and maintained itself up to the fall of the last
celebrated known occurring at Rome in 394.

LITERATURE.—E. Esperandiu, Inscriptiones de Lectorum, 1892, p. 91. E.; Zippel, "Fettschreiben zum Doctorphilosophen Lehrer,

TEETH.—1. Ornament and trophy.—Among both pre-historic and savage races teeth of animals and human beings are used as an ornament, usually strung together as a necklace, head-band, or girdle. Such ornaments are already found among burial remains of Solotstane, Magdalenian, and Azilian horizons, the corpses having been buried wearing them. In a ceremonial burial of thirty-three skulls in the grotto of Ofnet, on the upper Danube, the skulls were ornamented with stag's teeth and shells.1 Among savages the custom of wearing teeth is well-nigh universal,2 and, while it may simply serve an ornamental purpose, the intention often goes further. The teeth are worn as a trophy. Thus, among the tribes of the N.W. Amazon, necklaces are made of the upper jaw-teeth and other animals' bored and threaded, or of human teeth bound into a necklace with fibre strings. These denote the skill of the wearer as a hunter, or his bravery in war, and the human teeth, which are those of an enemy, are a visible and abiding token of completed revenge, and are buried with the owner. Sometimes the larger animal teeth are ornamented with lines of carved. Analogous to the practice of wearing teeth as a trophy is the curse used by savages, 'Let their teeth be broken,' and the Psalmist's words, 'Break their teeth.'3 The Prophet says, 'Thou hast broken the teeth of the ungodly.'4 The suggestion is that of enemies as ferocious beasts deprived of their power to tear and rend.5 Men doubtless used their teeth in early times as a weapon, as savage men and monkeys still do. Divine images are known to have actual teeth set in their mouths, possibly as a trophy or offering.6

Possibly teeth worn by men also served the purpose of an amulets, as having a connexion with the qualities of the animal or person from whom they were taken, or as protecting the wearer from similar animals in time to come.7 On the other hand, a person's own teeth serve as a sort of relics in the belief that the first tooth shed by a child was so used and protected him from pain.8 Where teeth are knocked out at initiation, they are sometimes carefully preserved, or regarded as sacred, or used for magical purposes.9

Teeth taken from a corpse were used to cure toothache or for magic, and those of an old woman were used as a fertility charm in the yam gardens of the New Caldonians.10

2. Mutilation of the teeth.—Filing the teeth to a point either singly or in pairs, and knocking out certain teeth as a ceremonial act, usually at


initiation, and the purposes which these practices serve, have already been discussed.1

Staining the teeth is practised by several lower tribes,—e.g. in S. America and Indonesia—as well as at higher levels—e.g. in China (applying lac to the teeth is a custom).2

3. Teeth as relics.—Teeth of Christian saints have often been formed relics, and in early Buddhism the four canine teeth of Gautama were among his seven great relics. One of these has been famous in Ceylonese Buddhism as the Devadatta. Its miraculous preservation from every means taken to destroy it by a hostile Indian king, and its ultimate arrival in Ceylon in A.D. 312, are the subjects of a long narrative, and the Chinese traveller Fa-hian describes the procession of the relic as he saw it in 405. At a later time the Portuguese are believed to have destroyed it, though the Ceylonese allege that they only destroyed a counterfeit and that the real tooth is the one still preserved at Kandy in a shrine. It is probably not genuine.3

4. Teeth myth and legend.—Greek myth told how Cadmos, having slain the dragon guardian of the spring Areia, at the suggestion of Athena scattered its teeth on the earth like grain. From the teeth that were armed men called Spartai ("scattered") from the manner of their birth. A similar myth was told of Jason.4

In the 19th cent. a report that a child had been born with a golden tooth in Bilesia caused much anxiety in Germany, being regarded as a portent. The physician Horst in 1939 published the result of his astrological researches on the subject, and declared that the tooth symbolized a golden age preceded by the expulsion of the Turks from Christendom.5

LITERATURE.—This is referred to in the notes.

TEETOTALISM.—See ALCOHOL, DRUNKENNESS.

TEINDS.—See Tithes.

TELEOLOGY.—I. INTRODUCTORY.—I. The term.—The word 'teleology' (Mod. Lat. teleologia, Ger. Teologie, Fr. teleologie) appears to have been devised by Christian Wolff in 1728. He felt that in explaining the ends which natural phenomena appear to have in the light of the concept of end or final cause. In popularizing Leibniz's philosophy, he set explanation based on final cause side by side with explanation by efficient cause. Presumably Wolff derived teleology directly from Leibniz, 'an end,' but, as J. Burnett has remarked, the word is properly derived in the first instance from tēλων, 'complete.' Thus, etymologically regarded, it does not bear the implication, which it has historically, of an external end; and the

1 See ART. CHARMS, vol. ii, p. 233 f.
3 J. Ferguson, Tree and Serpent Worship, London, 1806, p. 385, 158 f.
4 For a connexion of these myths with the preservation of the teeth knocked out at initiation rites as a possible vehicle of resurrection or metaphorical re-introduction of the physiological, see Jane K. Harrison, Themis, Cambridge, 1912, pp. 276, 44.
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prevalent 'organic' use of it in modern thought is justified.

2. The concept.—As already indicated, the concept is much older than the term. It attaches itself primarily to that organic view of nature which was developed in the ancient Greek philo-
sophy, especially Aristotle's mechanical view. Accordingly, to the
teleological view, the whole is the product of the parts by their mutual interaction. Accord-
ing to the organic doctrine, the whole is ideally explained in this way and the purpose or determination of their mechanical actions and reactions. This last was a doctrine influential not only in the
sphere of natural philosophy but in the spheres of political and social philosophy as well, and it led to the teleological interpretation of nature as a realm of ends or final causes. As the whole was an unchangeable form, it gave to all movement a purpose and goal; and in the light of its purpose and goal the movement itself was deeply interpreted. This ancient opposition between the mechanical and teleological standpoints, as repre-
sented by Democritus and Aristotle respectively, is a problem which runs through the whole history of philosophy. The question at issue, Are natural processes subordinate to
conscious rational purpose, or is the world to be explained and interpreted by mechanical principles alone? Is the philosophical issue in its
most clear-cut form. There is a narrower issue which has assumed increasing definiteness in modern times. The fundamental question here belongs to scientific method rather than to meta-
physics, and is most prominent at the present time in the dispute between mechanism and teleology in biological theory. Are the characteristic prob-
lems of biology (e.g.) capable of solution by means of mechanical categories, or must teleological factors also be postulated?

II. HISTORICAL.—A. ANCIENT PERIOD.—I.

Anaxagoras (c. 500–428 B.C.) has been hailed as the
father of teleology, but he is 'so only in a qualified sense.'
His explanation of nature—to judge from the fragments of his Περὶ φύσεως
preserved by Simplicius and from the references in Plato and Aristotle—appears to have been virtually
a mechanical explanation on the basis of a qualifi-
atatominism, nor is it even certain that his First
Cause of motion was an immaterial or incorporeal
essence. The movement and order of the universe he was evidently to be attributed to a N환 운용 (νοείν
reason), which by an initial impulse imparted a
rotatory motion to the pre-existent chaos in which,
'All things were together.' But, once the rotatory
motion was set up, Νόει apparently had little else
to do. It may be that a thoroughly tele-
ological view of nature is logically involved in the
Anaxagorean doctrine of Νόει, whether Νόει (which
is represented as omniscient and omnipotent) be
regarded as a spiritual or a corporal essence, be
mind or mind-stuff. On the other hand, it is
altogether probable that Anaxagoras did not carry
cut the full implications of his doctrine. Socrates in the Phaedo—complains that in actual explanations he called in only mechanical causes—
'airs, athers, waters, and such like absurdities'; and
Aristotle in his Metaphysics (in a passage reminis-
cient, as Burnett allows, of the passage from
the Phaedo), charges him with making use of
Νόει merely as a deus ex machina, to account for
the formation of the cosmos or for phenomena that
he would, metalike, need to account for. Similar objections, as J. Adam reminds us, were
afterwards urged against Descartes and Newton.
But, however we may interpret the Anaxagorean
corelation, no thought is repre
sented as musicological showing than can actually be found in

1 See art. ANAXAGORAS and also art. PHILOSOPHY (Greek), vol.
ix, p. 860f.
2 J. Burnett, B. H. 4.
3 I. 4 (0565 16th.).
5 The Religious Teachers of Greece (Gifford Lectures), Edin-
burgh, 1893, p. 562.
6 See art. ANAXAGORAS, vol. i. p. 474.
7 See art. PANTELEISM (Greek and Roman.), vol. vi. p. 614.
8 Phaedo, 99 a.
9 s. iv., t. 18.
10 Religious Teachers of Greece, p. 342.
12 Men. i. iv.
Socrates. In keeping with his ethical and social philosophy, Plato seeks in his metaphysics to interpret the real in terms of the end or ideal of the Good. Ethics is for him the foundation of metaphysics, as it came to be for Lotze, and reality grows up out of the idealism of the Good. At this point he becomes clearly the adherent of the old metaphysical method of abstraction, and all the rest of his scheme is apprehended. His conception, already adumbrated in the Phaedo, of a 'Jacoab's ladder of science' (as E. Caird calls it), beginning with the lower rungs and ascending up to the highest principle of unity or the idea of the Good, by which all the others are explained, is developed more fully in the Republic. 2 The Good or Universal Reason ( Nous) is the final cause of every event and change, and to the idea of the Good all the other ideas are teleologically subordinate. The Good, as we may learn from a famous passage of the Laws, is the perfection of the whole, and in the preservation and perfection of the whole every creature has its own proper end to fulfill. Thus it was that Plato sought by means of his theory of ideas to interpret the rational nature of the whole, and to look upon the world, says J. Hutchinson Stirling, 'as a single teleological system with the Good alone as its heart.' 4 1

(b) In applying his metaphysical principles to the interpretation of natural phenomena, he was naturally liable like the Socrates of the Memorabilia to the charges of externality and abstractions. It is impossible to determine, as the Stoa, in which he so often appears, may have been, whether the phenomena of the world are found, is, in its details at least, 'mythical.' In consistency with his theory of ideas, Plato could make all the more for having weakened accounts of the phenomenal world than that they were 'likely tales' (póssed kópes). In any case he does not, even in the Theaetetus, lay much stress upon particular instances of adaptation in nature, nor does he encourage the notion of adaptations so to make the phenomena as the Teleological system, as indeed in the Philolaus in non-mythical form, a teleological interpretation is offered of the teleological concept of the whole. In offering it, Plato would apparently overcome the dualism between the ideal and the phenomenal which is inherent in his theory of knowledge and reality. God, the Demiurgy, is represented as bringing order and harmony out of the moving chaos of not-being (μη ὑπέρ), in accordance with the pattern of the Good, and in so far as natural necessity (γλυκόν) allows. Thus natural necessity comes in when divine activity according to ends fails as a principle of explanation, and something is yielded to Democritus. But, while the teleological explanation involves a recognition of divine activity, and is so far on the lines of the theistic argument, the Demiurgy of the Timaeus—the self-moving mover who fashioned the world—is not identified with the Good, nor is he to be equated with the God of modern theism.

5. Aristotle.—(a) While it may be allowed to Plato that no ultimate explanation of anything is possible without its being referred to final cause, we have to turn to Aristotle (q.v.) for a more adequate recognition of mechanical causes as principles of explanation, and this although a sort of teleological and teleologiæ and teleologiæ of the universe. In the endeavour to overcome the Platonic dualism of ideas and things, Aristotle gives an even more thorough-going interpretation of the Anaxagorean Nous than is to be found in Plato. With Plato he believes in the real existence of the form or idea, but he cannot think of it as separate from the world. It exists in the world and in things. Reality is a process of development, and in it the more imperfect to less imperfect being is to be interpreted in the light of the πάντα, which in things that are not eternal is the moving form or final state of the Cosmos. This is a system of ideal forms. Aristotle conceives of the living thing as the autonomous unit, having the teleological principle within, and with every part functionally related to every other and existing as the servant of the whole. That is the implication, we are told, of his comparison of the organism to a well-governed commonwealth, in which, once order is established, the individuals duly play their parts and a separate monarch is no more needed.

6. The Stoics.—(a) Among the so-called sects that came after Plato and Aristotle the Sceptics (q.v.) had no contribution to make in teleology. If causality was suspect with them, as with Hume in a later age, so also was finality. The contribution of the Epicureans (q.v.) was negative. Epicurus is to be classed with Leucippus and Democritus, of whom Aristotle said that they 'rejected design and referred all to necessity.' 5 But the Stoics (q.v.) recognized teleological principle, and teleology. There was one philosopher indeed, an Aristotelian, who came near to Stoicism in his opposition to the mechanical explanations of the cosmos; it was he who imputed it, he 'threw away the keystone of the Aristotelian teleology.' This was Strato of Lampsacon, who denied the existence of pure form as of 6

1 The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers (Gifford Lectures), Glasgow, 1904, I. 129.
2 Ibid., 2.
3 X. 901.
4 Philosophy and Theology (Gifford Lectures), Edinburgh, 1889, p. 116.
7 De Deo Universali, v. 18.
8 Hist. of Ancient Philosophy, p. 301.
pure matter, declaring form to be always immanent in matter, and so converting the Aristotelian system into naturalism. Stoicism may therefore be described as naturalism, but it was at the same time a pantheistic system. The old dualism of form and matter which Plato and Aristotle had inherited from Anaxagoras, and had finally been resurrected by them in the Platonic and Aristotelian systems, was treated as interchangeable or con- nontants of the great cosmic movement, and it was said that this movement had been the work of God, and that he could take the point of view of the whole. But the Stoic appeal to order and adaptation often descended to externality and anthropo- centrism, as well as to teaching attributed to Memorabilia. Thus it was said that the peacock was made for the sake of its beautiful tail, and the bee to carry man's burden. Yet an immanent or intrinsic teleology such as is characteristic of Plato and Aristotle would have been altogether congruous with Stoic principles.

(b) In carrying out this teleology, Stoicism made much of the beauty of the great divine order and the adaptation of means to end, especially in organic nature, as manifestations of the rational unity and ideal meaning of things. The evils of the world, which offered even more difficulty on the monistic hypothesis than in the Platonic and Aristotelian systems, were considered as insignificant or con- nontants of the great cosmic movement, and it was said that they would be transformed or be utilized as such. If the poet could take the point of view of the whole. But the Stoic appeal to order and adaptation often descended to externality and anthropo- centrism, as well as to teaching attributed to Memorabilia. Thus it was said that the peacock was made for the sake of its beautiful tail, and the bee to carry man’s burden. Yet an immanent or intrinsic teleology such as is characteristic of Plato and Aristotle would have been altogether congruous with Stoic principles.

(c) If the Memorabilia is possibly influenced by Stoicism, Cicero's De Natura Doemian (indubitably) is. There is therefore no difficulty in the way of the doctrine of naturalism and the adaptation of means to end, especially in organic nature, as manifestations of the rational unity and ideal meaning of things. The evils of the world, which offered even more difficulty on the monistic hypothesis than in the Platonic and Aristotelian systems, were considered as insignificant or con- nontants of the great cosmic movement, and it was said that they would be transformed or be utilized as such. If the poet could take the point of view of the whole. But the Stoic appeal to order and adaptation often descended to externality and anthropo- centrism, as well as to teaching attributed to Memorabilia. Thus it was said that the peacock was made for the sake of its beautiful tail, and the bee to carry man’s burden. Yet an immanent or intrinsic teleology such as is characteristic of Plato and Aristotle would have been altogether congruous with Stoic principles.

7. Teleology of history.—While in the ancient Greek philosophy a teleology of nature was expounded, in the religions period of the ancient world and within the early Christian Church the idea of a teleology of history gradually developed. The opposition in the Gnostic view of history to the OT religion as the revelation of an inferior Deity led to the view of history which has established itself as the truly Christian. It fastened upon the Pauline doctrine of the apocalypse of the Law and the Gospels, the climax of the divine redemption culminating in Jesus Christ. With Irenaeus the teleology of nature is ancillary to the teleology of history as thus expounded from the Christian standpoint. At the hands of Augustine the whole conception receives an impressive treatment, and the human race is regarded as a teleological unity, as being destined to receive entrance into the catholic or universal Church (citius Dei). This anthropocentric view of the teleology of history the doctrine of the divine redemption in Jesus Christ still prevails in Christian theology, in which the teleological principle of history is sometimes described as Christocentric.

B. MEDIEVAL PERIOD.—Thomas Aquinas.—All through the Middle Ages, in Christian and

1 Aristotle, Polit., i.

2 See Hutchison Stirling, Philosophy and Theology, p. 178 f. Muhannad countries alike, the Aristotelian teleology dominated philosophical and scientific thought. Uneasiness was expressed by the teleological form in its defective form by final causes alone (i.e. apart from mechanical causes), and it laid an arrest upon the movement of natural philosophy. Yet Archimedes and others who placed the problem of mechanics and natural philosophy in a somewhat facile monism, in which one eternal substance manifested itself as spirit (καθοχις σπερματικος) and matter (νηναι δυναμος). It was essentially a teleological view of the history of the world and the scholastic ages, and he quotes as exponents of it John of Damascus and Averroès on Aristotle's Physics. There is an intelligent 'somewhat,' says Aquinas, by which all natural objects are ordered in relation to an end, and this 'somewhat' we call God—which, indeed, is the gist of the teleological argument, whether in its popular or in its more philosophical form. Aquinas also catches up the patristic idea of the teleological unity of nature and history, and through his doctrine of the State gives it a more systematic expression. The State was not with him, as with Augustine, the devil's province (s. c. divisus humanae). The theory of the natural law or right (lex naturalis), which has its source in God, and the life of virtue, which Aquinas said was to be realized in the political society, was the preparation for the higher life of grace in the society or community of the Church. ' Gratia naturam non tollit sed perficit.'

C. MODERN PERIOD.—I. Bruno.—The transition from ancient and medieval to modern thought is well illustrated in this matter of teleology. Thus, in others, in the views of Giordano Bruno (q.v.). His whole philosophy represents an attempt to combine in a unitary system the Platonian and Aristotelian idealism and the modern mechanical view of nature, of which Democritus was the precursor. Like the atomists, he affirmed that only, as it were, after repeated experiments on nature's part did combinations of elements arise which, as being adapted to ends, conserved their stability. At the same time he affirmed—and here the idealist strain appears—that there is a world-soul, or inner principle of motion in nature, which is purposive in its working, and so orders all things as to secure the world's progress. Thus the mechanical and teleological views are united in this thinker.

2. Bacon.—Though Francis Bacon (q.v.) may also be said to belong to the age of transition, he was more definitely the precursor of the scientific movement. It would appear that he looked upon the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle as ' planks of lighter and less solid wood' than the physical philosophies of ancient Greece lost in the wreckage of the Roman Empire. For him philosophy was restricted to the investigation of nature, and there were certain ' idols of the tribe,' or common pre- judices, to be dismissed from the mind if nature was to be explained aright. Among these was interpretation by final causes. Under the illusion that man is the measure of things (which Prota- gorean utterance, curiously enough, is actually become the watchword of a recent philosophical movement) we interpret things in reference to ourselves (ex analogia hominum) instead of universally (ex analogia universi). Yet Bacon does not reject the reality of final causes.

1 For the causes rendered, that the hairs on the eyeballs are for the safeguard of the sight, doth not impugn the cause rendered, that pithole in relation to being doth of necessity, and causes in physics are, however, sterile like Vesta's virgins, and, worse than that; we are once more in impotence of making us conscious of monism and frus to stay and the ship from further sailing.' But final causes have their place in mythology and religion. The doctrine of perfection even appears in theology when nature 'intendeth' one thing and providence 'draweth forth' another.1
Thus Bacon throws off the two thousand years' yoke and fetters hands with Democritus and Leucippus, and in doing so, while vindicating physical causation as the one form of causation of which physical science need take cognizance, he conserves the metaphysical and religious interests which were fused together with the Platonic and Aristotelian teleology. It were incredible to him that this 'universal frame' should be 'without a Mind.' He failed, however, to appreciate the intensity of the Aristotelian concept of organization in biology, as also—but this was the legacy of the schools—the philosophical depth of the essential Aristotelian doctrine of the end.

2. Hobbes and Descartes.—(a) Hobbes (q.v.), following Bacon and Galileo, tried to liberate philosophy from the Platonic and Aristotelian ideas and forms and to substantiate the mechanical view not only of the physical world, but also of mind and society. He reduced all cause to motion, and philosophy to a doctrine of motion. (b) Though Descartes (q.v.) also dispensed with final causes in nature, he did not fall into like Hobbes into materialism. He explained natural phenomena by the mechanical principles of matter and motion, so founding the now orthodox systematic view of nature, and distinguishing himself from the ultimate positions of the ancient atomistic philosophy. Mechanical explanation was not ultimate explanation. But his rejection of final causes in nature was on theological rather than epistemological grounds. We may legitimately enough, he thought, attribute ends or purposes to God, but we cannot hope to discover these, as they are hidden in the inscrutable abyss of His wisdom. Here, as in Bacon, there is a clear distinction between the scientific and the metaphysical and religious interest in final causes—a distinction which became clear only in the modern period of thought.

4. Spinoza.—(a) The most vigorous, as it was the most uncompromising, attack upon final causes in nature came from Spinoza (q.v.). In explaining a particular phenomenon we cannot, he said, go beyond the particular attributes of the one divine substance, be it the attribute of thought or of extension, under which the phenomenon appears to us. For, while the attributes are parallel to each other, there is no interaction between them. Thus material phenomena, including the movements of the human body, are only explainable in physical terms. Matter cannot be grounded in mind. There can be no ends or purposes in nature.

(b) Apart from the incompatibility of the doctrine with his fundamental premises, the main objections are urged by Spinoza against final causes. The first is Bacon's objection—that acceptance of final causes would lead to trivial truth in mathematics, which, as dealing with the essence and properties of things, leads to rational knowledge. The other objection is that the method of explanation by final causes would express false anthropomorphic conceptions of God. A God who works purposively, or who is subject to futility, lacks perfection of being. It implies defect in God that He should be in need of anything. Nor have we any right to infer distinctions in the divine nature analogous to the elements of the human mind. The nature of God will not involve anything more analogous to our intellects and will than the constellation of the Dog in the zodiac. (c) Undoubtedly Spinoza did good service in exposing the weakness and superficiality of the traditional teleology, but it should be observed that, whilst the denial of final causes has already involved in the doctrines of substance and parallelism with which he sets out, at the close of his thought a certain light breaks in upon his system. The amor intellectus Dei with which he concludes is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves Himself and all the universe in which He is well pleased. The ideas of satisfaction and value which are essential to a teleological interpretation of the universe appear to be here conserved.1

5. Leibniz.—(a) Despite the able efforts of the Cambridge Platonists (q.v.), such as Cudworth and More, to restrict the sphere of consciousness, and, moreover, to maintain the mechanical view found increasing support, being applied also as against Platonists and vitalists to the phenomena of life, and it was left to Leibniz (q.v.) to attempt a reconciliation of the opposing principles. Leibniz's essential position still meets with great acceptance among scientists, philosophers, and theologians. In the phenomena of nature, he says, everything happens mechanically and at the same time metaphysically, and the source of the mechanical is the metaphysical. This position finds clear expression in two sayings that may be placed side by side—one from a recently discovered fragment, and the other from his 'Omnia in tota natura demonstrari posse tantum per causas finales, tum per causas efficientes.'

'Cause efficientes pendent a finalibus.'

(b) While Leibniz was as 'corporeal' as Descartes or Spinoza in the explanation of the local nature of his universe, he did not rest in the mechanical explanation. One reason appears in his metaphysical construction. It is at the present time, he says, 'the general and peculiar property of the substance. Rejecting the Cartesian and Spinozan opposition of extension and thought, and affirming substance to be force (l'estrentsubstance) and form (l'essentiel de la chose), and feeling himself obliged from an abstract to a more concrete notion. Matter was no longer to be defined as extension but as a form of force, more specifically as power of resistance; and mind was no longer to be restricted to the sphere of consciousness, and was presented as comprising subconscious states (petites perceptions). With this view of substance, and with the aid of the Aristotelian principle of continuity and development, Leibniz at length reached the speculative position that the real world consists of an infinite host of independent monads or individuals, at complete different stages of development, whose activity is fundamentally spiritual or perceptual. Now it is the very nature of the monad to think or to re-present to itself the realization of all its possible possibilities. It has to relish itself of confused perceptions and attain true knowledge. After the realization of all its possibilities, the monad becomes a Supreme Monad—an end which may only be achieved on the plane of self-consciousness and spiritual freedom. So it is, according to Leibniz, that the forces acting upon the monad may be interpreted from the standpoint of teleology. Everywhere in nature purposefulness may be discerned, whether in an inward view, or, rather, like the universal view, and the world of physical causes and effects becomes a world of means and ends. (c) The second reason that led Leibniz to uphold the teleological interpretation of the world starts from his postulate of 'pre-established harmony,' which is intimately connected with his monadology. Though independent or 'windowless,' each monad 'mirrors' the rest of the universe. Though subject to its own laws, each monad is in harmony with the universal development. Guillemain and Spinoza had already applied the principle of harmony or correspondence to the two Cartesian attributes, but Leibniz applies it to the totality of substance. He compares the correspondence which he has in view to different bands of musicians who may keep perfectly together without seeing or even hearing one another. He compares it also, not without a frequent analogy of the time (and with the relation of body and mind chief), to two clocks so skilfully made as never to get out of time. The pre-established harmony is not imposed upon the world from without, but belongs to the inner life of the monads, or, more precisely, it is derivable from the monads themselves. The only possible explanation is to be found in the will and purpose of God. It is this principle of concord which brings to pass the close connection of substances whereby the world is orderly and rational. Thus the order of the world, interpreted as a pre-established harmony, should be well understood, as Leibniz pointed out.

(c) The principle involved in the teleological inference is named by Leibniz the principle of determinate or sufficient reason, viz. that nothing can exist or be true without a sufficient reason for it, and that the contrary is not possible.2

1 S. Pringle-Pattison, The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy ('Mind', First Series, Cambridge, 1902, p. 501; also below, 9 II, C. G. 9, 10). 2

2 Enntol, xvi., 'Of Atheism.'
principle, implying the complete rationality of existence, philosophy was to be reduced to a science, as Descartes or Spinoza. But Leibniz gave the principle a characteristic application to the contingent truths of natural science, just as the principle of identity and contradiction was the foundation of the neces-

sary truths of mathematics and logic. So that the conservation

of force or energy and the equivalence of cause and effect in the

world must be teleologically explained as dependent upon the

divine wisdom and order.

(c) In biology, as in physics, Leibniz advanced the teleological position. The corpuscular theory with which Leibniz was to

establish his philosophical system was teleological in essence; the

world is a machine, subdivided into an infinite number of lesser machines, which, even in the ignorance of the 

observer, from the point of view of the divine mind, will be 

inferred to have been designed for each other with marvellous accuracy. This universal adapta-

tion of means to ends so resembles the products of human

contrivance that Leibniz felt bound to infer that the Author of nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man, both possessed, one might say, of 'design', or

Philos replies, in Hume's own sceptical vein, that the principle of analogy is not a sure basis of argument, especially as we

depart the more we get from the human sphere, or, to use

real speech, e.g., of analogy between the fabric of a house and the generation of the universe? And why do we infer

on design, intelligence, be made the model of the whole? If it

is valid to say that, because the world resembles a machine, it 

arose from design. It is not at least equally valid to say that,

because the world resembles an animal, it arose from genera-

tion? And why go beyond nature in search of a transcendent 

cause? To take one step beyond the mundane system is to

be forced to go on in an infinite progression. For the ideal

world, in which the material world is traced, is itself to be

traced into another ideal world, and so on. May it not be

that there are forces in nature by means of which, even after

a boating and bunching of many worlds throughout an

eternity, this orderly and harmonious system was struck out?

At most the argument from design can only prove the existence

of a being in time and space, fashioning a given material, and

all pretension to ascribe infinity to the deity or even perfection

in His finite capacity must be renounced. Can we even pretend

to decide from the phenomena of nature as to whether the

Deity is one or multiple? (A simile is the only figure of speech

of the argument is found in the Enquiry concerning Human

Understanding, where the author is criticized for the

assertion of the human mind's potentialities and virtue, and

made famous by Kant.)

(d) By the objections thus urged by Philos a strong impression

is made upon Clays, who, as we have seen, was too fond of

the problem of evil, that the Deity might be described in the

terms of 'benevolence, regulated by wisdom, and limited by

necessity'—an old position of the Greek theologies with which

we have been familiarised in recent thought. The carefully

formulated conclusion of the Dialogues, that (as Philos says)

'the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear

some remote analogy to human intelligence,' may not have

represented in Hume's mind the whole of 'genuine reason' 

but it dealt a destructive blow to the teleological theology

of his time, with its deistic implications, its petty teleology, 

and its hedonistic view of life.

(d) On the scientific or philosophical side, how-

ever, Hume is put in the second place. He contributed nothing to the

principle of natural teleology. The idea goes back as far as Empedocles, and is expounded in Lucretius,

that in nature the principle holds of the survival of the fit. In this sense, the Dialogues, as we have seen, may reduce

Hume gives expression to this principle, and he

does so in respect of both inorganic and organic

nature. Described as the tendency towards equilibration or equilibrium, it is a modern physical science as teleological in

character; but, when Hume speaks of it further as perhaps originally contained in matter, he at least suggests the idea that there is a deeper and
more original teleology in nature than ordinary mechanics can provide. So that with Hume the teleological appearance of nature is perhaps more than a postulate of the reflective or subjective judgment, as it is with Kant.

2. Kant.—(a) In his early work on *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens* Kant acknowledged the great value of the arguments drawn from the beauties, harmonies, and perfections of the universe, and more particularly of the human character, to establish the existence of a supremely wise and powerful Creator. At the same time he rises above the popular teleology. In a later pre-critical work on *The Only Possible Proof of the Being of God* he declares himself impressed with the physico-theological argument, but, like Hume's Philo, he doubts the validity of the inference to a Creator who is perfectly wise and good. In the *Critique of Pure Reason* a similar criticism appears, with a famous tribute to the physico-theological argument as 'the oldest, the clearest, and that most in conformity with the common reason of humanity.' The argument at the best, however, cannot take us beyond the great power and wisdom of the Author of the universe; and it can prove, not a Creator, but no more than an Architect, who is necessarily limited to the means he has chosen. His omniscience in Certe- tinancy belongs not to the matter but to the form of the world. The attempt to show that matter is contingent and dependent upon a principle of intelligence is to fall back upon the cosmological proof, which in its turn rests upon the ontological, with the consequence that the claim of the physico-teleological to be a pure induction from experience is invalidated. This argument in fact originates in the propensity of the human mind to view the order and purposiveness of nature as though they were the products of intelligence and design—a propensity for which on the principles of the critical philosophy there can be no real basis.

(b) We need not dwell on Kant's views in his pre-critical writings of the teleological principle. It is sufficient to note that they were on the lines afterwards developed in the *Critique*. In the *Critique of Pure Reason* he justifies, as against Hume's scepticism, the mechanical or scientific view of nature as subject to causal determination. In the *Critique of Judgement* he vindicates the teleological view of the spiritual life as a realm of moral freedom and independence. From the critical standpoint therefore the doctrine of nature and the doctrine of morality may be true in its own sphere, and mechanism and teleology be so far reconciled. In the *Critique of Judgement* he seeks to overcome the dualism—in his own phrase, to bridge the gulf—between nature and the moral order, which he had regarded to begin with as closed systems, independent and separate. He realized that the sensible world of things and persons is but one aspect of reality, and the supersensible world of moral values but another, and that the two must be interrelated. Accord- ingly he draws attention to certain things belonging to the sensible world of nature which we cannot describe adequately in terms of the world of purpose or end which has its proper sphere in the supersensible world of spirit. One of these is the phenomenon of beauty, the other that of organic being.

(c) The first section of the *Critique* treats of the aesthetic judgment. In the aesthetic experience the beauty of nature, as of art, is felt to be purposive, in the sense that, while it arises from functions of a non-mechanical order, it is 'unfree,' and un'seconded.' The second section has to do with the teleological judgment, in which nature is regarded as purposive in itself, and not merely, as in the aesthetic judgment, in relation to the subject of experience.

(d) The purposive character of living beings for Kant is the whole problem of the world as a teleological or organic system. Philosophy gives the notion of a priori judgment, meaning the a priori of Kant. In his use of the categories of the understanding for the subsumption of the particular under the general he follows the faculty of judgment. Kant's teleological judgment had been shown in the first *Critique* to be determin- ing or, as he says, teleological; i.e., it subsumes under a mechanical, or as he says, teleological, or a priori conceptual, category and attempts to determine or specify the phenomenal world of experience as a mechanical system under inviolable principles. But judgment is also of a priori teleological causation, and the teleological causation particular under the universal, reflective judgment makes use of the idea of subsumption to purpose or end as the ground to its operations. The determinate judgment is analytical, and simply brings particular facts under the universal principles of the understanding. The reflective judgment is synthetic, and, operating with the idea of nature as a teleological or organic unity, discovers its particular, and at every step, in the teleological, the final or inclusive principle.

9. Hegel.—(a) In the course of his examination of the critical philosophy Hegel (q.v.) dealt with Kant's view of the physico-theological proof. He agrees with Kant as to its inadequacy as a rational or logical argument. The conception of design, like that of purpose or end, is of a nature which transcends the particular and individual, but expresses the true nature of the relation of the world to God. At the same time the argument represents a further stage, the first stage being represented by the teleological argument, beginning with the universal, and ending with the particular and individual. The process whereby in the hidden or implicit logic of the appreciation of the idea of God in the fixed teleological causation. For it is impossible to distinguish the categories of mechanical and teleological causation as being constitutive and regulative of the subjective and objective, respectively. With his true apprehension of the idea of purpose as internal and immanent, Kant, but for his rationalistic prejudices, might have advanced to the recognition of the constitutive character of the organic or teleological principle. Internal

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1 Königsegg, 1756.
2 Königsegg, 1762.
3 Riga, 1781.
5 Riga, 1788.
6 Berlin and Lübeck, 1790.

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adaptation or design is no less constitutive than the principle of mechanical causation. To over-come the objections of the empiricists and nomenists, we must follow the development of the world from the realm of nature to the realm of mind and thence to the unity of nature and mind in the idea of God, in whom the world is seen to be a rational system.

10. Schelling: the philosophy of nature.—(a) If Kant promoted the movement of German idealism, it was promoted—perhaps indirectly rather than directly—by no one more than Goethe. Kant, for his part, in the recrudescence of the nominalist school, saw in the philosophy of Kant the young Schelling in the realm of nature and mind. In his Speculative and Theological writings, Schelling, the world-soul, was, at once, the great body of the scientific thinkers of his age. In his speculative teleology he had affinities with Leibniz, Spinoza, Kant, and Herbart. Indeed, Leibniz was led to conceive of the world as a plurality of real spiritual elements, but in mutual interaction according to the principle of immanent as distinguished from transcendent causality. In his endeavours to account for the causal relation and the reciprocal interaction of the elements, he was led, by a similar process of thought to that which Spinoza went through, to the idea of a universal all-embracing principle, which, for religion has the value of God. Under the influence of Herbart and the Kantian criticism, he utilizes the principle of human analogy in interpreting the inner reality of nature, which he regards as the instrument of a purpose, viz. the purpose of supreme good, though it is by a practical conviction rather than a logical or rational process that we pass from the world of things and forms to the world of values. So it is that Leibniz reaches his teleological interpretation of nature.

12. Darwin.—(a) At first sight it would appear that the theory of biological evolution associated with the name of Charles Darwin is strikingly vindicates the mechanical view of nature as to banish the idea of teleology altogether, not only from scientific explanation but also from philosophical interpretation. Certainly, as Darwin himself realized, the doctrine of descent by natural selection gave a fatal blow to the old argument from design as expounded by Paley.

"We can no longer argue," he says, "that the beautiful hinge of a bivalve shell must have been made by an intelligent being, like the hinge of a door by a man." 12

Paley had not appreciated the metaphysical difficulties involved in the notions of an external designer or contriver and of special external adaptations, and he laboured under the further limitation that he believed with the orthodox science of his time in the fixity and immutability of species. If species were not fixed and permanent forms but the results of long evolutionary processes determined by necessity or chance, then Paley's argument was still further discredited. There appeared to be no more design in the principle of natural selection than "in the course which the wind blows." 13

(b) But, while the Darwinian theory was subversive of the teleological argument in its popular form, which was deditious or rationalistic theism, it was not really anti-teleological in the Aristotelian and post-Kantian sense. No doubt the principle of natural selection is in itself fortuitous or non-teleological, and that despite the teleological flavour of the terms 'selection,' 'fitness,' by which it is expressed; so that J. Ward, borrowing a 'plain term from Herbert Spencer, would describe the principle in mechanistic language as one of 'equilibrium.' 14 Moreover, in the hands of ultra-Darwinians natural selection of random variations has been employed as an exclusive explanation of the modification and transformation of species, and, so employed, may be properly described as anti-teleological. But Darwin himself did not urge natural selection as an exclusive principle. He recognized in evolution other factors besides, both non-teleological and teleological; e.g., in the last edition of The Origin of Species he added the following note:

2 The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, 3 vols., London, 1887, i. 309.
3 Jb., i. 309.
4 The Realm of Ends (Gifford Lectures), Cambridge, 1911, p. 101.
point of saying that natural selection is "aided in an important manner by the inherited effects of the use and disuse of parts." Ward contends that this, the Lamarckian factor, like the factors of sexual and human selection, is strictly teleological. He maintains that it presupposes psychic activity, conscious or at least sentient, directed to the end of the satisfaction of needs or desires. Whether the Lamarckian is a real or suppositions factor in evolution with which we are not here concerned. It might be added, however, that the anti-Darwinian theories of evolution are more favourable to the teleological idea than the Darwinian and ultra-Darwinian theories that Darwin's general theory of organic evolution, like the general cosmogonic theory of Kant and Laplace, is being increasingly recognized as not inconsistent with an ultimate teleology, profound, subtle, and less rationalistic than Paley's.

4. "Unless the cosmos itself," says Ward, "is to be regarded as a finite and fortuitous variation persisting in an idealisable chaos, we must refer its orderliness and meaning to an indivisible informing Life and Mind." 5

13. Lacheler. — In Merz's opinion Lacheler's short tract, De Fondement de l'Induction, 6 is "conceived in the edifice of modern thought." 7 Lacheler faces the problem of the contingent (or the collocation of things in space) which, along with that of the discontinuous, is involved in the Leibnitzian philosophy, that "the things which surround us are the material in which, the laws of nature the forms through which, the world of values, or the Ideas, are, or have to be, realized." Following Comte, he took up into his philosophy the old distinction between nature passively conceived and nature hypostatized or taken actively (natura naturata, natura naturans). The possibility of inductive reasoning rests, he says, on the recognition of both these aspects of nature, which are complementary. From the one standpoint nature is a mechanical or serial unity in which the antecedent determines the consequent; from the other it is a teleological, systematic, or harmonious unity in which the whole determines the existence of the parts. Efficient causes and final causes are both needed in the inductive process. Nature is at once a science, for every producing effects from causes, and an art, for ever setting about new inventions. As there is a principle of regularity in nature, so there is a principle also of harmony or order. The contrast of mechanism with teleology, he says, is in fact just the different light in which we regard the very nature of totality. 8 We shall see that this philosophical position of Lacheler has been fruitful in the scientific investigation of the problem of universal teleology.

III. SYSTEMATIC. — A. TELEOLOGY IN EMPIRICAL DESCRIPTION. — 1. Description, explanation, interpretation. — (a) In proceeding from the historical to the systematic discussion, it will make for convenience of treatment to distinguish three aspects of teleology. Historically they have been closely associated, and it is impossible to separate them in any rigid fashion. They may be named, however, the descriptive, the explanatory, and the interpretative. If one hesitates to set up the distinctions here implied, one hesitates more as to the terms by which to designate them. For descriptive explanation, and interpretation are ill-defined terms in current usage, although — perhaps because — they circulate so freely in discussions of the world and its meaning. By descriptive teleology we mean the teleology which answers at once to the definition of the concept of end or purpose and is immediately recognizable. It might be otherwise named as formal, empirical, or de facto teleology. By explanatory teleology we mean the teleology which is postulated in scientific theory in explanation of things, processes, and events. It might be otherwise named as methodical or logical teleology. By interpretative teleology we mean the teleology which offers in philosophy and religion a spiritual interpretation of the world as a whole. It might be otherwise named as speculative, ideal, or spiritual teleology.

(b) It might be objected to in particular to this scheme that modern physical science leaves explanation to metaphysical philosophy and claims for its formulas no more than descriptive validity. It concerns itself only with the question, 'What is it?', and hands over to metaphysics and religious philosophy the questions, 'How came it to be?', and 'Why came it to be?' But it appears to us that physical science has been suffering in the last generation from an excess of reactionary modesty. Behind its so-called descriptive formulations, which are broad generalizations, lie worlds of patient observation and experiment and a host of-inducing inspirations and, if it is not true of the 'How,' it tells us a great deal about it, and is richly entitled to the larger claim involved in the term 'explanation.'

1 It is an interesting point," remarks J. Arthur Thomson, "that just about the time when physics began to proclaim emphatically that its office was to describe and not to explain, natural history in Darwin's hands passed emphatically from description to historical explanation. 9

For the rest, there is in any case enough and already classical authority for a certain individualism in matters of teleology. 10

2. Descriptive teleology. — (a) Teleology, in the sense of purposiveness or activity directed towards an end, is immediately recognizable in the ordinary work-a-day world. Conscious striving after ends, with adaptation of means to ends, is characteristic of human life. The concept of end or purpose is itself derived from observation of the human mind, and conative activity involving ends is central in human experience. But the idea of teleology is readily extended beyond the reference to consciousness. There is a teleology below consciousness, just as there is a teleology above consciousness.

Neither Charles Darwin nor the coral reefs, "were ever any design of the men or the insects which constructed them; they lay altogether deeper in the roots of things." 11 (b) As in the organic history teleological purposiveness appears to be present in the process, though the individual goes forth, like Abraham, not knowing whither he goes, so it is also in the spheres of sub-conscious and unconscious life. Many biological processes show the appearance at least of purposiveness, and Kant was right in saying that we could not attain to the knowledge of living things except under the form of the teleological judgment. The structure of the organism, the reciprocal relation of its parts as both means and ends for each other, and its growth, in which it is at once continually self-produced and self-producing, all appear to him to demand a teleological explanation. It may be that, as Kant's critical philosophy forced him to admit, the teleological principle is subjective and only regulative of knowledge. All we have to say is that the phenomena of organismal life have been explained both mechanistically and teleologically, but prima facie they are susceptible to description in teleological terms.

1. The System of Natural History (Gifford Lectures), 2 vols., London, 1820, 1. 12


(c) When we pass from organic to inorganic nature, we meet no longer with the appearance of purpose in organic things, but the causes there are, to the eyes of sight at least, no individual beings. Yet, if we were to indulge the 'pathetic fallacy,' we should look even upon inorganic nature, the stars, as a teleological in our varying moods and thus as so far teleologically constituted.

(d) But, if purposiveness may not be discerned in inorganic world, it is recognizable in products of the hands of man's device, composed of inorganic elements. To our fancy a piece of machinery is often informed with life and purpose, like the machines in Samuel Butler's satire of *Erewhon*, but the purposiveness resides not in the parts but in the processes they subserve. A machine, as Driesch says, is distinguished from other human 'artefacts' as being made for purposes. That is why the comparison of the world to a machine in the old natural theology, as by Cleanthes in Hume's *Dialogues*, is apt enough, especially when the Deity is deistically conceived as not directly in the world. There is also the reason why the comparison is inapt from the standpoint of materialism or naturalism, and why from such a standpoint mechanism as applied to the world is nearer, in its general form, to that of mechanism.

(e) Nor should it be forgotten that under descriptive teleology may be included the recognition of order, beauty, and adaptations in nature as a whole. These things are upon that empirical level of reality which has been attained by the unreflective processes of common sense, and are consequently appreciated by all; and they form the sufficient basis of the traditional argument from design. For order, beauty, adaptation, all speak the language of teleology.

3. The argument from design.—The argument classically expounded in the ancient world by the Stoic Lucius Balbus in Cicero's *De Natura Deorum*, and in the modern world by Paley in his *Natural Theology*, is doubtless made more impressive, but is not essentially strengthened, by the multiplication of curious instances of extrinsic and internal adaptation derived from the scientific order of nature. It is sufficiently based, as already said, on the fact of the empirical order. As an integral part, may the very narrow and substance, of the old nature, and the science, the *Paley and his Treatises*, the argument is liable to criticism for its debit flavour, its hedonism, its anticipated pre-evolutionary science, its old-fashioned teleology; and apart from its limiting historical associations it is liable, as Hume and Kant made it abundantly clear, to the charge of being essentially fallacious. In inferring divine purposeful agency from the teleological appearance of nature, it is guilty, as the logicians would say, of the fallacy of transcendent inference. Obviously it must be restated in a profounder way, if it is to retain validity. The essence of the argument, says K. Flint, is that order implies intelligence. It is an argument not from but to design, and it is only to be regarded as part of a great cumulative argument. G. T. Ladd admits that the argument is properly an argument from universal order, and he is careful to say that it implies the validity of the ontological argument. From the 'orderly totality' of the universe he would postulate a world-ground conception of design and purposes. But the 'plain man,' with his eye only upon the empirical order, uses the argument without hesitation or logical scruple. When his mind beholds the chain of causes 'confederate and linked together, it needs must fly to Providence and Deity.' Not only has the plain man a deeper appreciation of nature's order, but is disposed to follow the 'plain man.'

'The Logos,' says J. Arthur Thomson, 'is at the core of our system, implicit in the nebula, as now in the devout. It slept for the most part through the evolution of plants and coral-like animals, whose dream-souls are a joy for ever. It slept as the calf sleeps before birth. It became more and more aware among higher animals—feeling and knowing and willing. It became articulate in self-conscious Man,—and not least in his science.'

'There ... something,' says D'Arcy W. Thompson, 'is the order of the universe and the beauty of the world, that lives in all things living, and dwells in the mind and soul of man. ... You may call it Entelechy, you may call it the Harmony of the World; you may call it the *Étonnant*, you may call it the Breath of Life. Or you may call it, as it is called in the Story-book of Creation, and in the hearts of men—you may call it the Spirit of God.'

B. Teleology in scientific explanation.—
1. Cosmology.—(1) Mechanical explanation.—The teleological appearance of nature and the forms of life, considered above, has set a problem which science no more than philosophy can afford to ignore. In cosmology, however, narrowly interpreted as the science of the physical world, teleology is not required as a principle of explanation, whether the cosmos be considered in the spatial or in the temporal reference, i.e. from the standpoint of cosmogony or the world-order of natural theology. The inorganic world is not teleological, for physical science at least, in the sense of exhibiting imminent purposiveness. In its formulations of the things and physical world science employs only the mechanistic terms of kinematics, mechanics, physics, and chemistry; and it has amply vindicated its right to employ mechanistic terms exclusively in this sphere. Whether it may also do so in the sphere of biology, and sociology is another question. But in cosmology it has no use for the category of end or purpose, or for that matter for the categories of cause and substance, but assumes the working only of the non-spontaneous, the automatic, the mechanistic. It may possibly be that such real categories as substance and cause (whether efficient or final) are, in Macl's phrase, tinctured with 'fetishism,' but the exact sciences as such are by no means committed to a materialistic or naturalistic standpoint. Materialism and naturalism are ultimate positions, and scientific explanation is not called upon to defend that ultimate position, or to explain it. If we would include under the term 'interpretation,' in point of fact, exact science increasingly recognizes the abstract and artificial quality of its explanations, as it realizes increasingly the distinction between conceptual formulation and perceptual reality. Its formulae have been variously characterized as symbols or counterfactuals of reality, as a kind of conceptual shorthand, as economics of thought, as convenient, hypothetical summations, or, in J. Royce's favourite metaphor, as the ledger entries and balances of a particular method of book-keeping. It is open to science, as he truly remarks, to enter its accounts by other methods of book-keeping. Gravitation, e.g., may yet be explained as a mere appearance of some more genuine process of nature.

(2) Collocations.—In view of the foregoing, we may allow that mechanical explanation, if abstract and hypothetical, reigns supreme and alone in the physical domain. While therefore Chalmers may be strengthened in the case for physico-theology by reviving the Cartesian distinction between the

1 Bacon, Essays, xvi., *Of Atheism*.
3 Life and Individuation (two synopses of the Aristotelian Society), London, 1915, p. 54.
4 The World and the Individual (Gifford Lectures), 2nd ser., New York, 1901, p. 216.
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laws and the dispositions or collocations of matter, he placed his argument as follows: he said that the main evidence for a Divinity lies not in the laws of matter, but in the collocations. But what would become of this main evidence for a Divinity, remarks J. Ward, if the laws of matter could be explained by non-teleological factors? Yet, although science has been gathering the collocations within the mechanism of nature, the problem of order still remains. As in the biological applications to the cosmos, there is an ultimate collocation or configuration to be acknowledged which natural laws cannot explain. Says L. J. Henderson:

'The forms and stases and quantities of matter and energy in the nebula determine the resulting solar system.'

So that we may affirm that the universe possesses an original teleological character.

(3) Fitness of the environment.—(a) But is it possible to discern an explanation of the order of matter beyond the laws of nature's uniformity? Henderson thinks positive thought has found a clue. He points out that, the scientific or mechanistic origin of the natural order is to be explained, it must be argued principles that account not merely for the general character of orderliness in the phenomena of nature and the products of evolution, but also for that rational or fundamental departure between the order and the conditions necessary to the evolutionary process. Such principles, clearly, are to explain the order of matter beyond the laws of matter. Accordingly Henderson has investigated the properties of the elements hydrogen, carbon, and oxygen, and the two elements essential to the life of organisms which have been the chief factors in both biological and organic evolution. These properties are found to be those of groups of singular physical and chemical characteristics, so that they are unique or the fittest possible for organic life: e.g.—to take the medium in which the primary conditions of the environment—the solvent action of water is greater than the solvent action of other liquid, and the solubility of carbon dioxide in water is such that it must always be evenly distributed between the atmosphere and aqueous liquids. Or—to take the medium of the-physics and chemical properties possess the greatest number of compounds and enter into the greatest number of reactions, involving the greatest transformations of energy known to the chemist. Further (and here a teleological consideration appears), the aforesaid unique ensemble of properties is uniquely favourable to the existence of systems—of which the world of physics and chemistry consists—of numerous, diverse, stable systems. In fitness for systems no other elements and compounds even approach hydrogen, carbon and oxygen, water and carbon dioxide. In short, the fitness of the primitives, and the elements makes the diversity of the evolutionary process possible.

(b) It is Henderson's opinion, following up these results of physico-chemical research, that, as according to the law of teleology the relation between the properties and the process cannot be due to mere contingency, the properties can only be explained as, so to speak, preformation for the process, or, in other words, as resembling adaptation. There must be a functional relationship between them—something like that known in physiologically what is called 'deficiency' or 'teleology'. How otherwise can we express the fact that the collocations of properties unconnected with the vital process that to which it is necessarily related? Just as biological organization is teleological and non-mechanical, so with the connection between the properties of hydrogen, carbon, and oxygen and the process of evolution. This is the positive contribution Henderson has to offer towards the vast problem of the contingent set for natural science by Lotze and Lacheller, and it goes to strengthen the philosophical position that the teleology is at both the foundation of the natural order.

2. Biology.—(1) Evolution.—(a) The term 'evolution' (q.v.) is itself teleological in its primary meaning, and denotes the teleological process; but it is possible that the mechanism (i.e. physico-chemical) explanation of biological descent may be found sufficient in natural science. Possibly the evolutionary process is mechanistically determined throughout, and that by natural selection interpreted as non-teleological (whether working upon so-called fortuitous variations or upon variations themselves subject to the law of pure chance) and conditioned by other non-teleological factors, perhaps by some non-teleological factor yet to be discovered. On the other hand, it is evident that we regard natural selection as exclusive of teleological factors, and it may well be that the psychological principles of self-conservation and subjective selection, on the hypothesis of J. Ward, are required to give natural selection a point of appui.

(b) It is a searching test of the sufficiency of mechanistic explanation that H. Bergson in the role of biologist proposes. It could be proved, he says, that life may manifest itself in the way of apparent, by unlike means, on divergent lines of evolution, then pure mechanism would be not be enough and finally in a certain sense so far demonstrated. Accordingly he examines the evolutionary hypothesis in the two forms of it that have emerged from the "sideral" or biological considerations since Darwin's time. He puts it to neo-Darwinism and neo-Lamarckism alike, What is the explanation of the structural analogy between the eye of a vertebrate and that of a mollusk, common to other organisms? It is possible to explain neo-Darwinian principles, which enter readily into a mechanistic philosophy of life, to account for the production of the same effect by two different accumulations of an enormous number of small causes, whether the possibility be urged, as by the straiter Darwinists, on the theory of innumerable accidental variations or, as by de Vries, on the theory of sudden and simultaneous variations or, as by Euler, on the theory that assigns a direct rather than an indirect influence to the "natural causes", as in the case of life. Henderson therefore concludes that he is interested in the critical work that in their constructions. Turning to neo-Lamarckism, which explains variations not as the result of mutation but of the influence of the environment being to adapt itself to the environment, he declares it to be the only form of thought, which may express the organic effect a deeper and more psychological thing than any neo-Lamarckian supposes? So Bergson returns to his speculations which create and create new species, in the transmission of the species producing a new generation of organisms which bridge the interval between the generations. Life does not proceed by the association and addition of elements, which is the false anthropomorphic view both of mechanism and of finalism. Life proceeds by dissociation and division. It starts with a direction or tendency no doubt, and is in this sense finalistic, but we cannot foresee how and where it will end.

(2) Mechanism and vitalism.—(a) Leaving genetic considerations and concerning ourselves with the teleological hypothesis, which affirms "living matter" to be completely describable as a physio-chemical system, and organization and mechanisms to be reducible to physio-chemical bodies—to be conceivably in physico-chemical terms. But it is also maintained against this that the way of physico-chemical analysis and synthesis yields but an abstract product, falling short of what answers to the usual idea of "ensemble" which Comte advocated in the study of the living.

(b) Mechanistic theory in biology may be said to follow two main types, so far as regards the relation to teleology. Sometimes it has no traffic with teleology at all, and is still affiliated with what von Baer called 'teleophobia,' in its jealousy for the mechanical explanation. Sometimes again—and this requires the phenomenon of admittance—it finds room for the teleological view, re-affirming in fact the Aristotelian doctrine of the internal teleology of the living thing, which is its self-regulation.

(c) But, with the more synthetic method involved in this type of mechanistic theory, vitalism has appeared once again in the history of biological theory, if in subtler and more elusive forms. The teleological position of the elements of admittance and the vitalistic hypothesis may be expressed in the distinction due to Driesch between statical

1. Natureulin and Agnosticism, l. 290.
and dynamical teleology.\(^1\) Whereas in statical teleology the processes of life are judged to be purposive in virtue of a given machine-like order or form and not actuated by an external agent, dynamical teleology is in virtue of their possession of a peculiar autonomy; and dynamical teleology leads, as Driesch thinks, to some form of vitalism. We suppose in Johnson, who did much for the phenomenon, might then be also named a statical teleologist; for, while on the whole persuaded that organization (the central issue between the mechanism and vitalism) is not already contained in the information—though not as yet explained—in physico-chemical terms, he is also persuaded that the teleological concept of organization, if to be found also in sociology and in the meteorological cycle, is a necessary biological category, and that a mechanistic physiology is at fault in not recognizing this.\(^2\) But, though he thus believes with Driesch in teleology as an 'irreducible peculiarity' of vital phenomena, he is not a dynamical teleologist in the neo-vitalist sense. He might allow that organisms, like machines, are inert embodiments of purposiveness; he would not allow that they are autonomous consciousnesses.

(d) The anti-mechanists also fall into two main groups. In the first are the neo-vitalists, of whom Driesch is the most prominent representative. They contend that biological processes are not properly explicable as physico-chemical processes within the living matter of the organism, but that some non-physical principle (like Driesch's entelechy or unifying causality) impresses itself upon those processes, to suspend, regulate, or control the physical and chemical reactions. With such a principle at work, the outcome of events, experimentally considered at least, is no longer determinate and unequivocal. Bergson's \textit{elan vital} is such another non-perceptual determiner. Now, as Bergson realizes,\(^3\) the contention of neo-vitalism is relevant and weighty on the critical side, but on its positive side is beset with difficulties. Even granted the existence of the mysterious non-physical semi-psychical entity postulated in the theory, it is impossible to say where and how it works in the biological processes. In recent constructions, no doubt, there is none of the crudity ridiculed by Mollier in the obscure vitalism when he declared the cause of sleep to be the 'dormitive virtue' (which reminds one of the John Bansa test); but that the new principles we have once attributed to the learned doctor to the streptococcus of circumulatory motion. All the same the conception of neo-vitalism remains mystical in quality, and biological science is reluctant to entertain it. An entity such as Driesch formulates, which is neither an energy nor a material substance but an agent \textit{en un general}, non-spatial, albeit acting into space, non-material, but logically belonging to nature, may have a strange fascination for the metaphysician, but will hardly retain a place for itself in the world of scientific explanation. We are assured, moreover, that the second law of thermo-dynamics, which entelechy is said to be capable of suspending, will hold even in the obscure cases in morphology on which Driesch foun his theory.\(^4\) We are also assured that physical phenomena which is supposed to intervene in physical and chemical processes is invariably dependent upon the existence of physical and chemical conditions, yet it is not explained what part these conditions play in bringing about the actual results. Vitalism sets itself a hard task indeed in seeking to steer between the Scylla and Charybdis of the mechanical and metaphysical explanation. Where does the line fall?

(3) \textbf{Biological.}—(a) Even as a scientific hypothesis neo-vitalism appears already on the way to occupy an intermediate position. The issue now is between those who believe that life is somehow based upon a fundamental law, a form of teleological theory even more anti-mechanistic than neo-vitalism. For want of a better name, the theory may be called 'biologism.'\(^5\) Thus it is the last word in the mechanical theory of life. It is vitalistic in a sense, for it regards it as impossible to conceive distinctly biological phenomena in physical and chemical terms. For it the autonomy of life is more than a statical conception involving a teleological mechanism and non-mechanical relationship between mechanical things and processes. The autonomy of life is a dynamical conception, involving a dynamical teleology. But it is the living organism itself, and not some directive force within it, as in properly vitalistic theory, that is dominant in organic activity. The organism exists as such, and its structure and activities are the expression of its existence.

(b) Here, as is claimed by J. S. Haldane,\(^6\) a protagonist of the biological theory of life, we have a good working hypothesis, necessary to biology, and capable of explaining the biological phenomena. The theory, biology, he urges, is essentially different from physico-chemical approach to life. Its phenomena differ, not merely in complexity but also in kind, from physico-chemical phenomena. Although physico-chemical explanation has failed to teach us concerning the mechanical and statical destiny of the material and energy in the body, it fails to throw light upon the apparently teleological ordering of that material and energy. The inadequacy of the physico-chemical explanation appears when we enter into the deeper problems of the organism's activity, not to say fundamental problems such as reproduction and heredity. Animal heat, respiration, circulation—these examples from physiology—all contain teleological (i.e. physiological) elements that do not yield to physico-chemical analysis. Life is a unity of structure, environment, and activity, and is not reducible into mechanisms. Separate a living part from its environment, or suspend its activity, and you set it completely. What therefore matter and energy are to physics, or the atom to chemistry, the living organism is to biology.

(c) Haldane is further of opinion that, inconsistent with each other as are the biological and ordinary physico-chemical theories of life, he personally he would say that the teleological with the mythologic history of his Saxon forefathers as to the mechanistic physiology, a common meeting-ground between biology and physico-chemistry, must be discarded. Yet however, not a reduction of the organic to the inorganic, but the inclusion of both within the sphere of biological processes. In such an opinion the contrast between the principles of mechanism and biology is sharply revealed, but with it we seem to be carried beyond the universe of discourse of natural science.

(d) It appears to us that in their bearing upon scientific explanation the differences between the mechanist or statical teleologist and the biologist or dynamical teleologist (if we may wrest Driesch's terms to our own use) is not so very radical after all. It is significant that Henderson accepts the mechanistic hypothesis as upon the whole most consistent with the evidence;\(^7\) and that Haldane advocates the biological hypothesis on account of the unsatisfactoriness of the ordinary mechanistic (i.e. physico-chemical) explanation.\(^8\) They both accept the principle of organic autonomy, and are good Aristotelians (as indeed Driesch is also, and possibly they would unite upon the formula: 'Not mechanism or vitalism, but mechanism and teleology.' This is a thesis admirably supported

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by R. F. Alfred Hoernlé, who would make the particular point that in biology teleology not only is indicated by its being the dominant, but also by its being the dominant, if not overwhelming, factor in the development of the species. The telological stance is required, he says, not as substitutes for physico-chemical terms but to express the dominancy of the structure of the organism and of the organism's directives. He goes on to say—cannot be reduced to exclusively physico-chemical terms without disregard of the difference, on which Bergson insists so strikingly, between the mechanical and the vitalistic.

(c) In an intimate and eloquent discussion of mechanism and vitalism J. Arthur Thomson relates this abundantly clear that biology is at present so much more a descriptive or methodological theory. It distinguishes itself from mechanism in demanding ultra-mechanical categories, but what these categories should be is not as yet determinate. He himself describes the organism in Bergsonian language as 'a historic being,' which is a confession of its past experiences and experiences, and which has ever its creative bent towards the future.2 Restating to inter- potent with Drifled and the positive validates a new agency or directive activity, he is content to say that the organism reveals new aspects of reality transcending theoretically mechanistic formulation.

3. Psychology.-(1) Body and mind.—(a) If the teleological standpoint is required in the scientific examination of the world of objective matter, it is also required in respect of the world of mind or consciousness. The world of mind is the native sphere of purposive activity, and only a vestigial vitalist will not see its presence in these categories. According to W. K. Sorley's analysis, the contrast between a purely mechanical and a purposive system lies in this, that, although purpose is consistent with the law of causation and the principle of the conservation of energy, yet as the result of a pur- pose or mental idea there is a liberation of energy passing from the potential to the kinetic form, and the same purpose may also control, non-mechanically, the order and the direction of the movement of the body. Therefore, it is not to account completely for the activity of a purposive system to describe it in merely mechanistic terms. When this position is challenged (as it is in psychology as well as in biology), as not fitting into the mechanistic hypothesis, the discussion passes inevitably into the speculative sphere.

(b) In psychology the mechanistic position stands upon the Cartesian foundation of an objective mind, and represents the relation between brain-processes and psychic changes as one not of interaction but of consequence, and it usually takes the form of the parallelistic hypothesis known as conscious automatism or psychical epiphenomenalism (Daseinsrhein- phänomenalismus). Here is to be found or conscious states are regarded as ad- cultural products of the physical phenomena. On such prin- ciples, the acts of the mind, in particular the psychic phenomena, the appearance of purpose or ideal direction is an illusion, and the consciousnesses of purpose either belong to a different order from the physical, or is simply a reflection, however vague, shadowy, impalpable, of the neural organization. On the first alternative, every neuron has its purpose, but they cannot affect each other. On the second alternative, every neuron has its purpose, but the neuron cannot react even a very little upon the psychical. Either, then, the mechanical theory does not apply to consciousness or the principles of the conservation of energy breaks down. The mechanist must either give up his case or overthrow the foundations of his faith. If this line of argument laid down by J. Ward is valid, then we are free to turn from the mechanistic hypothesis to one that allows full value to the teleological appearance of conscious life, say, the animistic theory which so long persisted in human thought and for which W. McDougall has made no more a strong case in recent times, or the double-expect theory which under the direction of G. Lloyd Morgan is associated and which J. Arthur Thomson favours as in line with his holons theory. But it is largely based on a study of behaviour, that the organism is a psycho-physical unity.

(2) Psychology.—(a) But the working scientist need not commit himself to any speculative position on the relation of the science of psychology to what we

5 Science and the Aristotelian Society, 22nd session, 1911- 1912, p. 22.
6 Some Political Obligations, in International Review, 1911, p. 641.

4. Sociology.-(1) Two functions of psychology.—A. E. Taylor speaks of two functions of psychology, the first being not a proper function but which it exercises 'phead the majority of the world's life and work,' the latter being not a proper function but which it exercises 'phead the majority of the world's life and work.' It is to set forth mental processes as mechanical uniformities of sequence. The other function is to find the inner purposes, activities, and adjustments, and thereby to afford a suitable terminology for the sociological sciences, and in particular ethics and history. From apart
the teleological symbols supplied by psychology, ethical appreciation and historical interpretation would be impossible. With this remark let us pass on to the consideration of the teleological method in ethics and history.

(2) Ethics.—The teleological standpoint has its place in ethical theory, just as teleological symbolism has its place in the interpretation of conduct. Among the possible divisions of ethical theories a fundamental one is into the teleological and the formal or jural. In the first case the moral standard is represented by the idea of good or evil, as the secondly that of duty or right.

The teleological theory, which is found in Greek philosophy, takes the form either of hedonism or, as F. Paulsen, 1 borrowing an Aristotelian term, phrases it of, "energism." With Aristotle as with Plato the ethical end or ideal was the good personally realized in social relations as the actualization or full fruition of human powers and capacities. In modern ethical teleology, the practical and aesthetic forms of the teleological method have been revived. The formal or jural method is older than the other, as attaching itself to the legalistic stage of religion. Through Judaism it entered into the theological stage of thought, and the exposition at the hands of Kant, the fundamental idea of whose ethics is the original mental principle of the good will. As against a Kantian formalism and in favour of the teleological standpoint in ethical theory, it has often been urged that morals and motives of action are not abstract and transcendental principles but, as psychology and history teach us, general rules of the will which grow out of individual experience, and their value consists not in defining but in their power of promoting the ethical end. 2

(3) History.—(a) The teleological principle has also been applied to the interpretation of the process of history. As we have already noticed, a teleological view of history took shape under the influence of Christianity, receiving various expression in Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. But it was not until Lessing and Herder, or rather not until Hegel, that history was reflectively and intimately treated in the light of the Aristotelian principles of continuity and development.

(4) Note here the consequences of the types of historical theory. J. S. Mill recognized the principle of continuity as one that had been transferred from the natural to the historical development the atomizing, mechanizing principles of Democritus and Descartes, treating history as a kind of science of events and processes and their causes and effects, and the course of events as a rigorously determined mechanism. In this view it may be said that the hypothesis of mechanical causation is irrelevant in the sphere of history and of sociology in general, as in the sphere of psychology in its most characteristic aspect. Psychical events are not duly appreciated by means of subpersonal categories. A similar criticism is applicable to Herbert Spencer's theory of history. Although Spencer, here following Comte, applies the idea of organic or super-organic evolution to the interpretation of the historical process, he never really breaks with the conception—'fixed probably in his mind,' says J. T. Merz, "through his engineering education'—that change and process in society, as in nature and mind, are explicable on mechanical principles.

(b) The second type of historical theory is represented by Hegel himself, for whom the course of events is a continuity, not of mechanical causation but of evolutionary development. It is still a rigidly determined movement, but it is teleologically conceived, the end dominating the process. 'As the germ carries within itself the whole nature of the tree, the flourish and the root of the fruit, so the first victory to the virtuality contains the whole nature.' 3 The history of society is for Hegel the necessary evolution of the immanent idea, and the process is fixed in all its stages. Through human interests and actions the final purpose of history is carried out, but the course of events is the outcome of the inner necessity of the reason—beyond and external to human interests and actions. 4

(5) It may be objected to this organic view that, in so generalizing the Hegelianism of historical teleology, it does not bring out its true nature as a process of interaction between conscious and self-conscious minds. Nor does it appear to offer true rationale of any historical progress. A mere dietary of the historical process, in our judgment, is implied in the words of G. Gallyany, 5 following St. Silbeck, say, "setting up the spiritual vocation of humanity: it is a task which it sets to itself, but as inherent necessity of its constitution. The... ideal is freely posited, and is to be realized never that which performe must be. 1 In other words, the organic view is no longer replaced by the historical or spiritual view, in which the freedom of human personality is more clearly acknowledged. 2

(c) The fuller justification of such a position must lie in the teleological spirit. It may be here observed, for the third type of historical theory might be distinguished from the others as teleological determinism, or mechanical teleology. In its development it is acknowledged to be epigenetic or, in Wundt's phrase, creatively synthetic, whereas in the teleological and determinist views above named development is the necessary effect, as it were, of an attraction from before or an impulsion from behind, of a nai'a fronte or via a tropo.

(7) It may be also observed that teleological indeterminism in the theory of historical science naturally leads in metaphysics to a form of spiritual pluralism (p.e.), that teleological determinism makes a ready alliance with pantheism, and that mechanical determinism is at home in a naturalistic or positivistic setting. Yet it is not without significance that in J. S. Mill a survival of the deistic tendencies through the whole of his system is not unjustly said that dalsm, as a dogmatic or theological position, with its shallow rationalism of religion and its mechanical conception of the relation of God to the world, greatly promoted what J. Royce calls the 'mechanistic deduction' of our time. An 'absentee God' may be done without, so long as the mechanism of the universe keeps going. At any rate naturalism, deism, pantheism, and determinism will meet us as we pass from the world of scientific explanation into that of philosophical and religious interpretation.

C. TELEOLOGY IN SPIRITUAL INTERPRETATION.

1. Universal teleology.—As we view the world in its totality and seek to discover its meaning, we pass from empirical description and scientific or logical explanation to spiritual, i.e. philosophical and religious, interpretation. Here we are face to face with the metaphysical aspect of teleology, which is the aspect it has chiefly presented in history. The need of a philosophical interpretation of the world has always been more or less consciously realized, and in recent years there has been a renewal of interest in the deeper problems of nature, mind, and spirit. Philosophy and religion alike welcome the tendency among natural scientists to think of the universe as a great machine, and this has for long regarded as the 'foreign field' of metaphysics—a tendency begotten of the increasing recognition that no more than materialism does naturalism speak the last word on the perennial metaphysical problems. This has been largely due to the lifting influence of biology, 3 and is marked among biologists. We have already noticed the idealistic position of J. S. Haldane, and Driesch has advanced beyond a conceptual materialism, having even formulated a critical metaphysics which leans to theism. 4 The new and wider scientific outlook is well reflected in the significant preface to Herbert Spencer's last work, "The Origin of the Earth." 5

3 Hist. of European Theology, tr. 519, note.
4 "Der Begriff des Zynischen," 3d, tr., 1871, p. 21, quoted by Gallyany, p. 5.
6 "On man's origin, p. 43.
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2. Teleology and naturalism.—(a) It is the essence of naturalism to construe the phenomena of life as essentially natural or entirely reducible to the mechanical or non-mechanical conceptions which serve in physical science. But we are persuaded that thus to reduce the world to a mechanism is to fail to account for large tracts of experience. Mechanism is a scientific hypothesis, and such hypotheses may be either valid or invalid, but is inadequate as an ontological dogma. Moreover, with the mechanistic dogma teleology cannot live, i.e. teleology as philosophical interpretation. It has ever been the contention of teleologists, from Aristotle onwards that meaning and purpose underlie all material and mechanical processes, that mind or spirit is ideally prior to matter and more fundamental to reality. Naturalism, it may be said, ignores the distinction implied in Lotze's remark that 'the machinery which produces the image of a phenomenon is not identical with the meaning of this image.'

(b) The counter-contention of spiritual philosophy is to be justified on epistemological grounds, as by J. Ward in Naturalism and Agnosticism. Ward insists boldly with Kant that the intellect makes things, and though it does not create nature, he shows that the fundamental principles of knowledge, unity, causality, and regularity have entered anthropomorphically into our conception of that which is not natural. This anti-uniform is teleological, being found conformable to human intelligence and amenable to human ends. The result is that unity of nature and man in one rational and coherent scheme of things, that confronting of human reason by universal reason, in which idealism or spiritualism has always consisted. It is the fault of naturalism, as Pringle-Pattison expresses it, that it prematurely closes the record, that it substantiates the antecedents in abstraction from their consequences.

'there is no system,' as he says, 'no whole of being, no real fact at all, till the external gathers itself up, as it were, into internality, and existence sums itself up in the conscious soul.'

3. The essence of teleological interpretation.—Teleological interpretation is then necessarily anthropomorphic, or, as F. C. S. Schiller would say, humanistic. It rests upon the general epistemological principle of analogy, and is itself a particular instance of it. According to the teleologist, the worlds of nature and history are to be interpreted by teleological analogy of the analogy of the reciprocal life of man which man is conscious in himself. Since Hume and Kant, at any rate, the analogical character of the teleological principle has been widely recognized. We see it in Lotze, who believed none the less that the category of end or purpose afforded a definite clue to the nature of ultimate reality. We may see it in Bergson, who, however, regards the category of end or purpose as applicable only to the lower scientific order of reality. Yet, as H. Höfking points out, Bergson himself actually employs the principle of analogy along with that of intuition. With him intuition is only the first step towards the interpretation of reality. As mechanism proceeds by analogy in taking the organism to be a machine, and finalism in making it respond to a preconceived plan, so is it not to go against analogy to understand life as an "elan, a thrust, an effort? But in this instance, it must be allowed, the analogy is drawn not as in finalism from the intelligent self-conscious life, but from the mechanical and semi-mechanical life. While there is force in this criticism of Bergson's position, it does not follow that Bergson's philosophy of life is thereby discredited. All metaphysics, as Leibniz said, is founded on analogy.

Apart from the analogy of human experience, no kind of knowledge would be possible, and it is this analogical character of that knowledge that is of any analogy to the consideration of the truly and ultimately real. But it may be urged, as against Bergson, that the analogy of purposeful self-conscious activity—so central a feature in human experience—is a valid principle of interpretation, and that the absolute experience than does any analogy based on experience which is subpersonal. In any case what is claimed here is that teleology is a valid principle of interpretation, and that purpose may be recognized as a true cosmic principle. We shall see that, if divine purpose is actually so recognized, the "analogia hominis" must not be pressed in detail. The category of purpose or end, viewed from the side of the Absolute, requires to be delicately handled.

4. Pragmatic teleology.—Pragmatism (p. 59) claims to be different from other philosophies in respect of the clearness of its consciousness that teleology is no more than a methodological postulate. It is astounded at the misunderstanding revealed in the recent criticism that it assumes teleology as the logical conclusion of a principle that is more fundamental. It proceeds from the recognition of the necessity of human desires and needs—a presumption which is not assumed by teleology, but is derived from the recognition of the necessity of human desires and needs. In reply F. C. Schiller insists that, while the pragmatist makes use of the teleological principle, it is not for him an "a priori" truth that the universe is going to prove it, but a postulate which may be found false. This is a heuristic teleology. He assumes commensurability between the supreme reality and human faculty, and then acts upon the assumption in hope. In contrast to this methodological optimism, one recalls the attitude of Bertrand Russell, who repudiates the 'will to believe' as an argument and can only face the universe with 'unyielding despair.' For, according to his naturalistic view, the universe is blind to good and evil and indifferent to human interests. Perhaps, as C. A. Richardson suggests, it is the preoccupation of logical pluralism with the objective side of experience that leads it to lose its hold on the notion of teleology with doubt and suspicion. But more likely the attitude arises out of a personal conviction or resolution of character.

5. Teleology in personal idealism.—(a) Where personal idealism means spiritual pluralism of a theistic type, the concept of purpose applied to the interpretation of the universe yields a conclusion that satisfies. Consider first how thoroughly an application of this concept is embodied in personal idealism. It conceives reality, as in the monads of Leibniz and Lotze, as consisting of a plurality of experiencing subjects or spiritual centres of experience. In this it builds upon the analogy in respect of purposiveness between human persons and the lower forms of organic life, and upon the conjecture that even inorganic matter is composed of purposive individuals. Like organic species arrested in their evolution, or apparently so, these exhibit the minimum of spontaneity and the maximum of habit, according to the idea expressed by J. Ward, 'routine presupposes antecedent living purpose.' The essential nature of the monads or spiritual individuals is affirmed to be their self-activity, involving self-determination (conscious, subconscious, or unconscious) in...
reference to ends. Thus spirit and spontaneity, which naturalism banishes from the world, are restored on this panpsychist hypothesis throughout the whole vast and weight of experience. But that coherent experience may be made possible, a sympathetic rapport or responsive sympathy is, as with Lotze, postulated among the monads.

(c) Within the theory of a voluntaristic judge this supply of the divine activity advances from its pluralistic base to its final theistic position, in which the world-ground is also teleologically conceived. Sympathetic rapport implies unity in the plurality, and unity implies a law; and the unity of the principle is best stated not in the abstract terms characteristic of absolutist systems but in terms of that conative unity, that striving after the realization of ends, which is given at once in the most simple and the most complex individual experience; and in terms, moreover, of conscious and self-conscious activity, according to the teleological principle of the interpretation of the lower by the higher. Further, if we describe the world-ground as an ultimate self-conscious will, we are not to think of it, as in absolute idealism, as a purely immanent principle. Though God gives unity or sympathetic rapport to the world and to Himself, the self in which they subsist. There is a principle of distinction in a self-conscious mind, in virtue of which it belongs to itself and does not belong to anything or anyone else than to itself. G. Galloway, e.g., presses to a theistic conclusion.

(e) The map of reality consists, according to this theistic argument, of simple monads interacting within a common medium, or environment, which is grounded in a transcendent self-conscious will. It is claimed that the theory offers a better key to the understanding of unity and individuality than absolute idealism or natural realism can supply. It is a brave attempt at any rate, and this is our particular point to justify the teleological view of the universe on metaphysical grounds. Whether it yields too much to the voluntaristic psychology we do not pretend to judge; but we appreciate its consistency with the theism of the moral and religious consciousness, in which the teleological character of the world is felt.

At the heart of religion and morality, says Wiebeck, 'is the feeling that the world is the handiwork of an indiff erent matter, but is designed to realize a best Good.'

When therefore ethical theism, with its religious conceptions of God as the absolute ideal or the moral governor, is seen beside the metaphysical theism of the pluralistic approach to reality, it seems possible to state a conclusion in terms such as these. (1) In the language of philosophy: though individual existences and personal spirits have a being for themselves and are variously endowed with spontaneity, the development of experience remains in the control of the world-ground. (2) In the language of theology: though the actions of the creature are not absolutely foreordained or predestinated but manifest spontaneity and freedom in various degrees, they fall within the providential government of God. (3) In the language both of philosophy and of theology, and in Galloway's concluding words, if the world has its ground in a self-conscious and ethical will, which comprehends and sustains all the individual centres of experience, faith in a providential order of things is sufficiently justified.

6. Teleology of desism.—(a) While it may be said from the humanist side that the development of the universe is towards the goal of spiritual personality, it is difficult to conceive of the world-process specie externa. The desic con-

cept of it, however, is an easy target for criticism. Its view of the world has been described as 'heterotetic.' The world is regarded as a sphere of divine purpose, but divine purpose is as it were imposed upon it from without. There is an inherent dualism in this, as J. S. Mill realized.

(b) In the traditional form of the 'argument from design,' where the theistic setting of the divine Artificer fashioned the world to its present form out of an already given matter; or else, as in the ecclesiastical doctrine, the matter was first created out of nothing by divine power, then shaped by divine wisdom and benevolence. But this initial dissociation of matter and form is inconceivable, and has been 'as much a bugbear as a chimera.' The idea of external adaptation should be replaced by that of internal or immanent purpose. God is not beyond or even alongside His world, says a truer theism; He is within it as immanent life, will, intelligence.

(c) In the sphere of history, in the sphere of nature, the deistic teleology is also superficial and inadequate. Its language, if not inappropriate in the world of concrete relationships in which religious lives and moves, can hardly be literally applied in philosophy. It is imposed on God as a moral governor who imposes His laws upon man after the fashion of an earthly potentate. But, says a truer theism again, the divine laws are not externally imposed, but are immanent in man's heart and conscience; and the divine providence is not exercised ab extra, but is an immanent righteousness working in and through free human agency.

(d) May we not say that the end or purpose of God in nature and history is His self-manifestation or self-communication to personal self-conscious individuals capable of a spiritual response to Him whereby His own life receives enrichment? But, even in so saying, we speak in the manner of men in terms of time rather than eternity.

7. The purgation of purpose.—(a) With the deepening of its philosophical interpretation, the teleology of theism loses undeniably much of its traditional and popular meaning, but a substantial meaning may remain. The finite element of contrivance, with external adaptation of means to end, may rightly fall away from the idea of purpose, as applied to the nature of the infinite experience. No part of the world is then in danger of being handed over, as virtually in deistic theology, to mechanical necessity; and the inorganic becomes essentially related to the organic, and both inorganic and organic to the whole cosmic process. It is the strength of idealistic interpretation that it can thus dispense in the cosmic reference with the 'theistic Deism' and associate itself with what has been called an 'autotelic' view of the world-process. When purpose is no longer thought of as superinduced in creation and providence upon particular events of the world, but is in principle applied to the world in its totality, we learn to appreciate Kant's ideal of nature as a complete teleological system, in which for the intuitive or perceivse understanding the distinction of ends and means is transcended, and the whole appears as the unity of its members and the members as the differentiation of the whole.

(b) If the notions of contrivance and external adaptation are to be dismissed as unduly anthropomorphic, is the notion of a preconceived plan to be retained, or is the so-called plan the nature of the process itself? It would be for the personal idealist or the theistic pluralist to retain the notion than for the absolutist. It was the
conviction that God cannot be regarded, except by the logical imagination, as devising schemes and selecting the facts of the universe, from his standpoint of abstract monism or singularity, to restate the principle of human analogy altogether and to deny of God the faculties of intellect and will. These, as being exercised in the outworking of finite plans and purposes, could not be predicated of the eternal Being. There is danger as well as truth in such a position, but what we are here concerned to say is that Spinoza’s views are not only consistent with the essential idea of teleology. He denounces externalism and anthropocentrism, but none the less he looks upon the world as a significant whole, necessitated indeed, but overshadowed by the divine nature itself, which is the nature of the whole.

It is the idea,” says Pringle-Pattison, “of the divine necessity as a self-affirmed life, and not as a blind force acting within the universe like a fate which it undergoes, that constitutes the difference between a theistic and a non-theistic doctrine.”

(c) In support of Spinoza’s objection to the notion of a pre-existent cosmic plan, it is pointed out that the conception of purpose therein involved is even inapplicable to human action of the highest kind, such as moral conduct or artistic production. We may accordingly grant it to a sympathetic interpreter of Bergson, that, if the world is a purposive system, it possesses a unity or individuality in time as well as in space. Apparently such a consideration lies behind Bergson’s rejection of radical finalism—such as Leibniz’s—as being only an inverted mechanism, as implying that things and beings realize a programme previously arranged (“Tout est donné”). To postulate the totality of the universe as thus complete in the beginning is to make time (q.v.) of no account. If time does nothing, it is nothing. Yet, according to Bergson, time—not abstract spatialized time but concrete time or real duration (la durée)—is the very substance of our world, and there is no stuff more substantial or more resistant.

(d) The force of what Bergson here essentially contends for is acknowledged by idealistic thinkers. If the course of the world were preformed and predetermined—“the dull rattling off of a chain that was forged immeasurably ages ago”—there is indeed not much to choose between naturalism and idealism. In this connexion it is significant that naturalism and idealism, like fatalism and determinism, are often met and, like righteousness and mercy, kiss each other. It is also significant that method of spiritual realism, in its various forms, against the absolutist systems is for the redemption of the spiritual values sold by them—‘‘treacherously sold,” says P. C. S. Schiller—“to the bondage of naturalism. If then we abandon radical finalism with its illusion of preformation and predeterminism, shall we say that ‘the history of the universe is the history of a great adventure’? So C. P. D’Arcy puts it, in sympathy with the Bergsonian view.

(e) Where idealism differs from Bergsonism, if not from Bergson himself, is in holding that the adventure is not in the experience of the absolute but in the experience or from the standpoint of the finite subject. Moreover, for a theistic idealism there are bounds to the scope of the adventure. The theistic universe is fundamentally a theistic universe and the core of theistic faith that an eternal purpose of good is working itself out in the world. In terms of

modern Christian theology, the world is the scene of the progressive realization of the Kingdom of God.

(f) It is but to state the complementary side of this faith to affirm that the world must possess value and real existence for the divine experience, and that into the divine experience the time-process must enter somehow. The purpose which God possesses in Himself is independent of time, which is not as in Bergsonism an ultimate reality, yet it is somehow connected with the time-process in which we live, and not only revealed and yet transcended in God we do not know, nor can we. Yet we are not without a clue. In mystical contemplation and in artistic enjoyment, we may be conscious, that for them the gates of the future are ever and yet vanish from the consciousness; and it is claimed that the life of the philosopher or artist bears in this respect some kind of analogy to the divine life. It is at least suggestive of the idea for which Pringle-Pattison contends that purposive activity is the concrete reality and time only the abstract form. If this be so, then Bosanquet’s criticism of teleology, in the sense of ‘aiming at the unfilled’, is so far correct. Such a teleology, he says, gives undue importance to time and to the last term of a time-sequence. But, says Pringle-Pattison.

The last term is only important because in it is most fully revealed the nature of the principle which is present throughout. It is precisely this linkage of the first term with the last, that distinguishes the Bergsonian teleology, a teleology in the conception of an eternal reality, that seems to me to be expressed by the profound Aristotelian idea of telos or end.

(g) The question may be raised here whether the purpose that may be attributed to the infinite ground of the universe is to be regarded as conscious or unconscious. On this question Bergson would appear to range himself in the succession of Schopenhauer (q.v.) and von Hartmann,4 with this difference that for them the gates of the future are closed. Undoubtedly the vie media of unconscious purpose avoids the difficulty of explaining how one self-consciousness may exist within another, the finite within the infinite, but it possesses inherent difficulties of its own. It has to account for inorganic arrangement and process, and for the transition from the unconscious to the conscious and self-conscious, nor can it explain the reason why the vital process should tend in one direction rather than another.

“Yet,” as W. R. Sorley says, summing up an illuminating discussion, “purpose be admitted as necessary for the interpretation of organisms and if organisms are held to have arisen out of inorganic material, then there is room to postulate that the process which led to organic and purposive life was itself animated by purpose,” not individual nor merely racial purpose, but universal purpose acting, moreover, not ‘after the fashion of impulse’ but ‘in the manner of mind or consciousness’.

This theistic postulate of universal conscious purpose is to be justified in face of the facts of dys teleology, yet it appears a more reasonable postulate than that of unconscious purpose, and more hospitable too of human experience in the realms of fact and value.

8. Teleology and value.—The category of end or purpose, when purged of its finite incidents of preconceived plan and external adaptation of means to end, tends to pass into the category of worth or value (q.v.). In the teleological view of the universe the end, which is the nature of the whole, is an ethical end worthy of being purposed, i.e. worthy, so to speak, of enlisting the desire

1 Pringle-Pattison, op. cit., p. 352.
2 Principle of Individuality and Value, p. 135 et seq.
3 Ibid., p. 332.
4 Principle of Individuation and Value, p. 332.
8 James, op. cit., p. 278.
TELEPATHY

and effort of the Absolute. And may we not attribute desire and effort—conative activity—to God? 1 May we not say that in the Infinite Experience comatose and its correlative satisfaction are to be found? Because it is possible to say that we are conscious of it, 'the contradiction of a co-existence with fruition must somehow be realized.' 2 It seems to us that we must say this if the world is to be regarded as truly an effect of souls. In which case we must consider evidence cases and not fate, the concurrence of the living God and not the eternal decree, and in which spiritual values are created and realized. It is our belief that God is thus present and active in the universe and that the true image of Him is not the pre-existent Creator of the deistic theology, but the static timeless Absolute of acosmic pantheism, but the eternal Real of a cosmic common denominator.


TELEPATHY.

Telepathy, 'feeling from afar,' is a term coined by F. W. H. Myers, on the foundation of the Society for Psychical Research in 1882, to express the apparently supernormal transmission of information from mind to mind in 'thought-transference' experiments and the like, just as 'telepathy' was suggested to cover the alleged facts of clairvoyance and clairaudience. It was defined as 'communication between one mind and another otherwise than by the usual means of sense or sound.' As thus defined, the notion was in the first place not free from vagueness. For, as a certain amount of hyperesthesia of the known senses was admitted to be under the influence of telepathy, it might be extended so as to amount to miracle, while it yet in a way explained away, it was not clear how hyperesthesia was related to 'telepathy.' Secondly, the definition was essentially negative, a declaration of ignorance, which suggested no agency or adequate cause for the phenomena if described. Now this was neither satisfactory nor a very strong or stable position logically. Even if the difficulty about the limits of hyperesthesia is not raised, and if it is admitted that the possible causes of such phenomena as the senses may be taken as fairly completely explored, we are impelled to develop such a definition in one of two directions. We may imagine some unknown evidence of a sort of vibration, radiation, or 'brain-wave,' as a physical explanation of the phenomena alleged, undeterred by the facts that no positive support has yet been found for any such agency, and that, unlike physical forces, it would appear to be indifferent to distance; or else we may conceive telepathy as essentially psychic in its nature, and shall then tend to exalt it into a fundamental 'law' of spiritual being, as Myers himself subsequently inclined to do. But, so conceived, it is manifestly a challenge to further exploration of the spiritual world of which it claims to be a law; and yet it proves rather a double-beded position for beliefs about a spiritual world. It enables those indeed to hold to a very mind, incarnate or discarnate, may in principle communicate directly with any other by telepathy; but it seems to formulate this possibility so broadly as to render it almost impossible for a discarnate mind to authenticate itself by communicating information. For any verifiable information must normally be, or have been, known to incarnate minds; and if, in any living mind can tag any other, and if knowledge can 'leak' subconsciously from any mind to any other, and still more if we entertain the somewhat fanciful but not unsupported hypothesis that all knowledge may be pooled in a vast 'cosmic reservoir,' before it bubbles up in individual minds, the telepathic hypothesis can evidently be used to discredit nearly all the primae facie evidence in favour of 'spirit-communication.' Accordingly the opponents of this belief have made great play with it, even while holding also that the evidence for telepathy is itself insufficient to establish it as a vera causa. 1 This objection is one of the believers endeavour to meet in various ways. They point out rightly that, if telepathy is a fundamental psychic law, it cannot be restricted in its operations to living minds. They argue, however, that unrestricted telepathy between incarnate minds is not only logically improbable, and quite unsubstantiated. Lastly, they try to develop methods of experimentation which avoid this objection, because the information communicated, though verifiable ex post facto, can be shown never to have been, as a whole, in the possession of any living mind. Hence the importance of 'cross-correspondences' between the information received through several channels and dovetailing into a coherent message; by this method some striking successes have been recorded, though different minds will long continue to vary widely in the estimation of their weight. Again, certain sorts of prediction may be made consciously by telepathy. At present, however, no agreement, either about the nature of telepathy or about the degree to which it may be taken as a fact in nature, has been reached. The case is still required, and, until it is obtained, opinions will be determined not so much by the evidence itself as by the bias with which it is regarded. The existence of evidence of telepathy at a distance, recorded especially by Gilbert and


2 Cf. art. PSYCHICAL RESEARCH.
Pierre Janet, and experiments at close quarters, though without contact between the 'perceipient' and the 'telepathic.' The results were as cards and numbers, in reproducing diagrams and figures, etc. The transition to the 'spontaneous' evidence is mediated by a few rare cases in which the experimental projection of a phantasm is attested, or the stress is of such a sort that it becomes possible to conceive the ordinary 'ghost' as an apparition telepathically projected by the dying or the dead. In all these cases the transfer of information has an emotional intensity which is generally lacking in experiments of the first class, and this may conceivably account for their apparent capacity to override the obstacle of distance, which com- plexionally differentiates them from the former. Still it should be remembered that to ascribe these phenomena to telepathy is a hypothesis which is possible only if telepathy is established independ- ently by experimental evidence. Accordingly it is on this that the real stress falls. Now, as regards this evidence, it may be said in general that its character is very similar to that for other supernormal phenomena. Much of it is bad, some respectable, none beyond cavil. Its quality is not better than that of the best evidence for some of the most extreme phenomena, such as 'materializations.' It is liable, moreover, to the same varieties of error. If, in a certain case, (in the form of shape, codes, collusion, and mendacity), mal- observation, lapses of attention, errors of memory, coincidence. The ultimate reason for these defects is that the attempt does not exist as yet any real experimental control of the phenomena and their conditions, so that the evidence cannot be accumulated at will, crucial experiments cannot be made, and the pragmatic test cannot be applied to the doctrine of the direct intercommunication of minds and to distinguish the real from the alleged phenomena. As, however, this sort of situation occurs commonly enough in the beginnings of a science and sometimes lasts for centuries, it is no disproof of the reality of what is now provisionally called 'telepathy'; it may well be dispelled by perspicacious and concerted investigation. In any case, the matter should not be left in its present ambiguity.

LITERATURE.—This is largely the same as given in art. Psychological Research and Reviews. There may be mentioned in addition Boeke, La Psychologie, Paris, 1912; and L'avenir des sciences psychiques, do., 1917, Eng. tr., Our Understanding of the Unknown, New York, and London, 1918; the art. by F. C. Hansen and A. Lehmann in Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, 1907, pt. 4, 'Ueber unwill- kürliches Flüstern'; E. Parish, Halleck's Blinde Wahlungen and Fractions, London and New York, 1897; J. E. Cooper, Experiments in Psychical Research at Leland Stanford Junior University, Stanford University, Cal., U.S.A., 1917; L. T. Treland, A Technique for the Experimental Study of Telepathy and other Alleged Clairvoyant Processes, 1917. All but the first of these attack the historical evidence, with some success, while the last two confess also (almost) complete failure in repeating the card- and number-guessing experiments of the Society for Psychological Research.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

TELUUGI-SPEAKING PEOPLES. —See DRAVIDIANS.

TEMPERAMENT. —The doctrine of the temperaments is at once one of the earliest and one of the most persistent and popular efforts to classify the varieties of mental character in relation to bodily characteristics. It has always been recog- nized that there are broad differences of type in mind, and that some of these differences are in- born, and, practically at least, unmodified through- out life. What has been the natural life that should be looked for mainly in the feelings and emotions, which appear both more dependent upon the bodily constitution and less under individual control than of their own accord or will. The temperament is in accordance a permanent disposition to certain

forms or degrees of feeling, so far as such disposi- tion is dependent on the inherited organic consti- tution. The number of temperaments has been variously given as two, three, four, six, eight, and even much larger numbers, but on the whole the classic four has held the field down to our own day, as if it corresponded in some mysterious way to some ultimate differences in mind or body, or both.

This number was derived originally from the four elements of Empedocles, fire, earth, water, and air, and the four qualities of heat, cold, wet, and moist; on these in turn was formed Hippocrates' theory of the four cardinal humours of the body—blood, corresponding to air, warm and moist; phlegm to water, cold and moist; yellow bile to fire, warm and dry; and black bile to earth, cold and dry. From these came through Galen the names of the main temperaments, sanguine, phleg- matic, choleric, and melancholic. Occasionally physiologists have suggested other terms for the phlegmatic and the melancholic, as 'lymphatic' and 'nervous,' lymph and nerve being at least known constituents of the body; but the names most generally employed are those of the four old four have kept their ground. For the Greeks the temperament meant a mixture or union of the four elements, qualities, or humours; where this contained a certain idea of proportion (in the form of shape, ratio, and mental health; where an excessive degree of one or more, or an excessive defect, there was dis- temper or disease. There should therefore have been only one ideal temperament, and hence a variety of intertemperaments, but actually the four temperaments were regarded as falling within the limits of health and as implying only a slight pre- dominance of one or other of the four qualities. With the progress of physiology, the physical basis of the temperaments underwent a series of changes in the conception of the theorists; first the mixture was sought in the blood itself, as conveying nutri- ment to all the tissues of the body,—e.g., the pro- portion of fibrin to fluid in the blood, the width of the vessels, the porosity of their walls and of these of the tissues; then stress was laid on the presence of this or that tissue, with a corresponding nervous tissue, its strength and its excitability (Haller); and finally on the more delicate qualities of the nerves as shown in intensity, and in rate, persistence, etc., of impression and of reaction.

Here we are still in the dark. It is true, that it is with the nervous system that mental qualities and degrees are most directly correlated, but it must be admitted that we have no really scien- tific knowledge as yet of the precise relation of one to the other.

The problem may be approached from another side by considering the actual characterization or description of the four temperaments, the psychi- cal qualities which each reveals; these are inferred of course from the behaviour, more especiallythe emotional expressions and the reactions of the will upon impressions; and here also there has been a constant tendency to simplify by seeking the main features of the temperaments in two pairs of mutually opposed characters, such as receptivity and spontaneity; change and persistence; feeling and action; pleasure and pain, etc. The most satisfactory of these psychological accounts is that of Wundt, based on the strength or weakness, and on the quick or slow rate of change in feeling and in mental processes generally. Strong and quick is the choleric temperament; strong and slow, the melancholic; weak and quick, the sanguine; weak and slow, the phlegmatic.

1 Henle, Anatome, Vienna, 1807.
2 Volkman, Lehrbuch der Physiologie, 1. 297.
3 Wundt, Grundzüge der psychologischen Physiologie, 3. 105.
As E. B. Titchener has put it, 'the man who thinks quickly and feels strongly, is choleric, the man who thinks quickly and feels weakly, melancholic; the man who thinks slowly and feels weakly, the melancholic thinks slowly and feels deeply'.

The classification does not adequately explain, however, the fact that the feelings of the sanguine are predominantly cheerful or pleasant, those of the melancholic predominantly painful or gloomy; and Hoffding has suggested another classification of temperaments, or another division—'the bright and the dark temperaments'—in order to explain 'the tendency to one or other of the two great opposites of the life of feeling, which gives colour and direction to the whole disposition'.

'This opposition is more fundamental than that upon which the other four temperaments are based, for it has its root in the fundamental conditions for the preservation of the individual organism.'

More recently an interesting attempt to analyse the dominant characteristics by experimental methods has been given by Narziß Ach: he finds that it is mainly on the strength or weakness of the 'determination', along with the persistence or rapid falling away of the determining force, that the feelings, the associations, and generally the whole mental mechanism depends; according to these characters the basis of his five temperaments—for he adds a fifth, the reflective (besonnenne) temperament.

Whatever the ultimate characters may be, mental or physical, they must be such as exercise a decisive influence on the whole life, inner and outer, of the individual. The facts that the pure temperament is rare; that it makes, as Volkmann says, 'an almost uncanny impression', when it does appear; that most of us are of 'mixed' temperament (however illogical such mixture may be); that the old terms have lost all meaning, and that the scientific analysis is still to seek—these facts, which have led many psychologists to drop the doctrine of the temperaments altogether, do not dispose of the existence of broad and deep differences of mental type, mainly in the spheres of feeling and action, for which some names, and a scientific analysis, must be found.

The organism, through the afferent nerves, sends from its every part a stream of influence to the brain; to the functions of every tissue there correspond impressions and feelings which may or may not reach or effect separate consciousness, but which produce a mass-effect in the commeshed, or the self-feeling, or the feeling-tone which corresponds to it. This is the basis of the self-feeling: it is the inner or subjective aspect of the temperament. There is, as d'Henle says, a tonus, or degree of tension, in every nerve, even when the muscles which it contracts or the sense-organs from which it is impressed are 'at rest'; it differs in degree in different individuals; for each individual it varies from time to time, under varying conditions of health, fatigue, etc., but there is a relatively constant value for each below which it does not fall, so long as the nerves have life. Where the tension is high, response of feeling and action will be energetic and rapid; where it is weak, or low, response will be feeble and slow. The tonus is the physiological fact corresponding to the mass-feeling—vague and indefinite as it necessarily is, but of which the different moods of the individual are the essential expressions, down to the simplest feelings of sensory pleasurable and 'unpleasant', emerge like waves on the sea. Like all feelings, the temperamental feeling is both an index of bodily condition and a cause of bodily expression and action; like all feelings, it influences alike the intensity, the quality, and the course of thought. Hence the detailed descriptions of characteristic temperament, so far as we find them, even in some of the later writers on temperament are not without interest.

Johannes Müller, who regards the phlegmatic as the highest type—the ideal among men that the whole of his well-developed intelligence, his phlegm enables him to accomplish results impossible to others, even with their livelier feelings and desires, and a thinking capacity that cannot be induced to act of which he would repent on the morrow; he can calculate in all security the chances of the success of what he undertakes; in danger, at the decisive moment, he is master of himself, wherever it is not a question of sudden decision and energy; he feels his life, and bears them patiently, nor is he such moved by those of others; speed and quickness of choice often give others an advantage over him; but, when he has time before him, he arrives quietly at his goal, while others, heaping mistakes upon mistakes, are lost in endless side-issues.' On the other hand, Müller finds that the species of phlegma characterized by lassitude, apathy, insensibility, irresolution, equal, absence of intellect, and like, is not the true type, but a pathological form. The choleric has a remarkable power of action, both of energy and in persistence, under the influence of passion; his passions inflame at the least obstacle; his pride, his jealousy, his desire of vengeance, his thirst for dominion, know no bounds, as long as his passion moves him. He reflects little, acts without hesitation, or prevents the measure he undertakes. He is vividly conscious that he is right, and above all because such is his will. He rarely turns aside from error, but follows the course of his passion to his own ruin and that of others. With the sanguine, pleasure is the dominant tendency, along with great excitability, and a disposition to any mood sympathetic and friendly to others, but without persistence or constancy; quick to anger, but equally quick to regret; prodigal of promises, but not careful to forget them; cheerful and confident, he loves to make plans, which he soon lays aside; indulgent to the end of others, he claims the same indulgence for his own; easy to appease, frank, open, amiable, sociable, incapable of inherited calculation. With the melancholic, sadness is the prevailing tendency, and with the phlegmatic sadness; that of the sanguine, but disagreeable sensations are both more frequent and more intense than those of the melancholic. Sufferings of others call out his sympathy to a high degree; for himself he is fearful, unstable, distrustful; a trifle wounds and offends him; he scorns the mean, and renders him incapable of reasoning to overcome it; his thoughts are full of melancholy, and his sufferings appear to him beyond all consolation.

In their Psychology in the Schoolroom T. F. G. Dexter and A. H. Garlick ventures to describe, on behalf of teachers—for whom it is necessary to know their pupils' temperaments—not only the mental but also the external physical appearance of the types. The sanguine, lively, excitable, quickly but not deeply moved, with feeling generally uppermost in his character, has the circulatory and respiratory system set on edge; it has red hair, blue eyes, skin fair, and face animated. The choleric, self-reliant and independent, red hair, blue eyes, warm-sweating skin, quick to anger and inflammation of the muscular system well developed, hair and eyes dark, complexion sometimes sallow, face impassive. The phlegmatic or lymphoid, mind calm, sensitive, and soporific, sometimes puffed and proud, has the blotches of phlegm, self-reliant, and slow, has the abdomen large, face round and symmetrical; the feeling is for depression and incline to the latter. The melancolic, with great love of poetry, music, and nature, and marked indifference to the practical affairs of life, has the head large, eyes bright and expressive, figure slender and delicate, movements quick.

It may be doubted whether teachers would be well advised to guide their treatment by such physical characters as these, when noted in their pupils. Nor has the attempt been very successful to look in the physical for the temperaments for predisposition to certain diseases of the body. It is, however, antecedently probable, and appears to be confirmed by experience, that different temperaments limit or tend to certain forms of insanity; at least it is true that in insanity the differences of temperament are as clearly marked as in health.

As in drunkenness one man is ‘tactile and boshful,’ another ‘mudawrin,’ another ‘naive and violent,’ another ‘melancholy and silent’: so the lytic of sanguine temperament... is lifted up and varies in his mind, sometimes of many ways and its feeling voices; the choleric patient suspects everybody in the least of his enemies, and hates voices insulting him or urging him to deeds of violence and work, that his balance is often auditory than visual, the contrary is the case with the

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TEMPERANCE

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melancholic, and especially, as the name implies, with re-

ligious "visionaries".1

It is especially in the melancholic, nervous, or,
as it is called in extreme cases, the "neurotic" tempera-
tment that the tendency to insanity is marked. T. S. Clouston gives a striking descrip-
tion of the modern phase of this temperament.

Lecture. —J. Kant, Anthropologie et Hygiène des Hémisphères
George, Lehrbuch der Psychologie, Berlin, 1854; J. Müller,
Handbuch der Physiologie des Menschen, 2, ed. J. von Kri-
French tr., A. L. Jourdain, Paris, 1851, ii, H. Royer-Collard,
Des Tempérances, with a supplement by L. Royer-Collard,
Gedingen, 1856, 2 vol.; P. Lotze, Lehrbuch der Psychologie,
gz., 1858; Theobald Ziegler, Die Geistesz., Stuttgart, 1857; G. T. L. Gadd, Outline of Psychological
Psychology, London, 1856; E. B. Titchener, An Outline of
Psychology, New York, 1894; W. Wundt, Grundzüge der

TEMPERANCE.—There is much difference of opinion among writers on moral theology as to the true relations between grace and the human state of sobriety, moderation, and temperance. Each has
had its claims to be the archetypal virtue, which includes the others, advocated by representative writers; but it is clear to be very difficult to see why temperance should be regarded as the inclusive virtue, the chief being that it has been placed a place from early times among the 'cardinal' or principal virtues. From Plato to Aristotle the tempera-
ture is considered as based on a current classification, and it passes through Aristotle and Stoics into Christian thought. The definition of temperance given by Cicero may be accepted as typical:

' Temperamentia est rationis in libidinem, atque in alias non rectas impetus anima, firms et moderata dominatio. Eius partes sunt, communes infinito modorum classificatione, modumquisque quidem,

Aristotle, however, defines the word as ἐγκατανόημα περὶ ἄμοιος and distinguishes it from ἐγκαταναστία. The temperate man (ἐγκαταναστός) or, he says, does not feel the pressure of inordinate desires; the continent (ἐγκαταναστός) feels it, but holds desire in restraint. So Cicero: 

' Contemnentia est, per quam cupiditas consili gubennationes regit, et in quodlibet, quod est in latere, et in vitam, quod est in specie, et in illud, quod est in ullamque, et in illud quod est in illamque. Ἐγκαταναστία occurs in Ac 2:45, Gal 5:21, 2 Cor 5; 2 Cor 5:2; Ἐγκαταναστήσαμεν in 1 Cor 7:2; Ἐγκατάσθησα in Tit 1:8.

The general idea of temperance or moderation as an element in all virtue is peculiarly Greek, and it reap-"
true self-love, duty to self, necessarily takes. It
is the spirit of discipline, or rather the spirit
of love consecrating itself—body, soul, and spirit—to
God.

The function of temperance consists in restraining and moderating the desires whereby we yearn for those things which are apt to be used to excess. Hence, the virtue of temperance consists in the moderate and regulated use of those pleasures of sense, especially of touch and taste, which are most apt to draw the soul away from God, and to overflow the supremacy of the rational faculty in
man. Temperance implies the control of appetite
at those points where its demand is most impor-
tant and difficult to resist. While 'moderation'
(moderatio) means self-control in matters of less
difficulty, 'temperance' is concerned with the
instincts and passions which in average human
nature are the strongest and the least easy to
restrain.

The following points seem to be worthy of
special note.

1. The aim of the 'temperate' man is positive,
not negative. He aims not merely at the subjugation
of his lower nature, but at the cultivation of
moral and spiritual power. Temperance is the
virtue of the man of high ideals who strives to win a
'sovereign self-mastery.' It implies 'no
monotonous restraint, but an ordered use of
every gift.' The temperate man faces life and uses its gifts and blessings in the temper of an athlete training for
a contest (1 Co 9:27) or of a soldier engaged in
a campaign (2 Ti 2:5). He exercises self-control
'not only in cutting off superfluities but in allowing
himself necessities'—watchful against any form
of self-indulgence that may bring him under the
power of the world or of his lower nature (1 Co 6:12).
He is hindered and overpowered by circum-
stances, but controls them; he makes them sub-
servient to his spiritual progress; he passes through
them upwards and onwards to God.

So Augustine describes temperance as 'that action whereby the soul with the aid of God extricates itself from the love of
lower (created) beauty, and wings its way to true stability and firm security to God.'

2. Temperance holds a very prominent place in
the earliest Christian teaching (cf. Ac 24:25). In the
Acts of Thecla the substance of St. Paul's teaching
is described as μην θανατών συνελογισμός
(aor. subj.) in the early Christian writings, the word
συνελογισμός was probably identified with sexual
purity, and was gradually extended to include any
form of world-renunciation and mortification of the
body through ascetic discipline, practiced
frequently in Hermas, but already the tendency is
to connotate by them the temper of self-control or
temperance in general. It includes control of
appetite in the sphere of sex, food, and drink; but also
the temper of moderation in expenditure, of
sobriety in judgment and self-esteem, of self-
restraint in matters of speech, etc. There follows a
list of virtues in respect of which διὰ μὴν
συνελογισμός. According to Hermas, συνελογισμός is in
fact an archetypal and inclusive virtue. It is
coupled with τὸ λόγιον in Vs. ii. 3. It has a saving
virtue. The 'first commandment' is ἴησαν ἐκ τῆς
πίστεως καὶ τῆς ἀγάπης καὶ τῆς ταύτης. Self-
restraint is a fundamental duty because it is
directly involved in that conflict between flesh and
spirit which is the condition of our mortality
and the occasion of moral victory or defeat. So
Augustine asks:

'Cui pecato cohibiendo non hancum necessarium continem-
uram, ne coquatur iaculis? . Universalier ergo continenda
nobis opus est ut declinamus a malo.'

3. Temperance or self-control forms part of 'the
fruit of the Spirit' (Gal 5:22). 'Walk in the spirit
and ye shall not fulfill the lust of the flesh. As a
gift or endowment of the Spirit it was supremely
manifested in our Lord.

'Where,' asks Bernard, 'is temperance to be found if not in
that life of Christ, whose whole nature is temperate who strive to
imitate His life, . . . whose life is the mirror of temperance.'

It is of self-control that Augustine is speaking
when he exclaims, 'Du quod jubes et jube quoq
vis.' The presence of the Spirit in man gives him
liberty—the true freedom which consists not in
following the impulses of the lower nature, but in
fulfilling the will of God. Accordingly in Eph 5:18
St. Paul suggests that we 'put on the whole
man, the one infallible safeguard of temperance is the
knowledge of the presence and action of the Holy Spirit in the
soul.

The sin of intemperance is wrongly limited to
one particular form of excess. It may include
want of restraint in work, in recreation, in
intellectual speculation, in the pursuit of wealth or
power, in the use of the faculty of speech. On
such work this last point is stressed is laid by
moralists. The fact is that the habit of loose,
unrestrained speech paves the way for grave lapse
of truth, purity, or good faith. 'It defiles the
man' (Mt 15:32). It hinders or weakens that power
of controlling the whole body' (Ja 3:3) which is
implies to Christian perfection. St. James
implies that the 'sovereign sway of the Christian
conscience' must be exercised even in what seems a
small sphere, and hence gradually extended to
the whole field of human nature till man becomes
'Deo solo dominante libertas.'

LITERATURE.—Augustine, de Mor. Est. de Continencia, etc.; Ambrose, de Off. Min., i. 48; Aquinas, Summa, n. ii. qu.
Raglan,' pt. 5; B. F. Westcott, Lessons from Work, do. 1901, p. 209 f.; R. Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil, Oxford,
1907, bk. i. ch. i.; J. A. Morley, Life of Christ, vi.)

R. L. OTTLEY.

TEMPLES.—A temple, in the original sense of the Latin word templum, meant a rectangular
place marked out by the augur for the purpose
of his observations, which were taken within a
rectangular tent. An extended sense gave it the
meaning of a consecrated place or building, of
rectangular shape, 'inaugurated' by an augur.
In this sense it was applied to the house of a
god, though, strictly speaking, this meaning belonged
to the aedes. In its primitive sense templum cor-
responds to the Gr. ἱερὸν, a place marked off as
sacred to a god, in which a θᾶν, or house of the
god, might be erected. As we shall see, an enclosed
consecrated space often precedes an actual temple
in our sense of the word, viz. the house of a god, a
structure containing his image, and sometimes an
altar, though not infrequently the altar stands out-
side the god's house (as in Greece) but within the
enclosed place in the open air, as it did before any
house for the god was erected. As images became
more decorative and costly, it was natural to
provide a house for them, though this might be done
for a quite prior reason. In this case or even a fetish, as
ten, however, the chamber or house of the god
contained no image; it was merely a place where
he might invisibly dwell or which he might visit

1 De Contin., i. 17, 'In Cont. 22. 11. 10
2 For temperance in the Latin see artt. DOMO, OFAY.
3 See, e.g., Aug. de Contin. ii. 5; Ambrose, de Off. ii. 2 and 3;
4 Butler, Sermons, 654.
5 Aug. de Mor. Est. cxx.
6 Cf. the African fetish-hut.
from time to time. Where a god has his image in such a place, there are often other shrines or altars there or in subsidiary chambers connected with it. In the popular sense of the word, 'temple,' while it is connected with worship, is not usually a place within which the people worship. The priests alone enter it, if it is in the shape of a building. It was probably a result of earlier nomadic conditions prevailing after the people had become settled—and to some extent this is the case even now among aboriginal tribes in areas in which the climate offers little possibility of dwellings—had they been the product of the earliest cult—cults which have exists for centuries in the cases of certain ancient Persian and Egyptian temples which keep the precincs, if ever there. Temples vary from the smallest and simplest buildings, as they mostly were at first, to the most elaborate and vast structures.

In studying the origin of temples, no single source for all can be found, as this differs in different regions. Nomads could have no temples, though they might have tribal sacred places, or sacred tents carried in their wanderings. With the advent of a more fixed mode of life and permanent dwellings, a similar dwelling for the deity became necessary, as is seen in 2 S. A variety of primitive temples is known, and it could have been only in the course of a long period of time that the more elaborate buildings came into existence, while, generally speaking, the intermediate stages are not well known or understood.

1. Origin of temples.—(a) Sacred places.—Among savages, and probably also among most groups of primitive men, most of the rites of worship were on the open air, sometimes because no images of divinities exist, or, where they do, they are not always enclosed within walls, and sometimes because spirits are regarded as connected with natural objects. Sacrifices are usually laid on sacred stones, or cast into the waters, or into the fire, or hung upon trees. Worship takes place in the open air among many of the lowest tribes (Veddhas, Australians, Mānasus and tribals). The worshipers, such as the Dravidian tribes, Melanesians, Sakai, and Jakun) as well as among tribes at a higher level (some American Indians, Lapps, Burmats, etc.). This is often the result of a nomadic life, yet even nomads carry sacred images with them* or have a tent for these or for other sacred things. Such open places for worship tend to become sacred and to be preserved inviolate for cult purposes, and there images are set up.

Examples of this kind are found among the Sakai, Jakun, Mānasus, Fjord, and Indians of California.7 This is obviously necessary where a sacred tree or stone stands in such a place. Sometimes sacred places are associated with the trees or stones on which appears of spirits, gods, or ancestors, and must therefore be holy for all time. The mere fact that a religious gathering takes place in a certain spot once is enough to give it sanctity, and the gathering becomes recurrent there. Such sacred places will usually be marked by images or symbols, or by boundary-stones forming an enclosure.* Single graves, often with a structure over them, and places of sepulture also become recognized places of cult.

The same preference for open-air worship in a recognized sacred place is found among the Chinese—ap., in the cult of the Altar of Heaven, which dates back to early times when the genius loci was worshipped at an altar under a tree. The practice is also found in the primitive cult of the Indo-European races, as a result of their conceptions of deity, not dissimilar from the beliefs of the First peoples and stones erected to the tree or grave, the sacred spring, were places of cult and usually possessed an altar. The limits of the shrine were marked by boundary-stones or pillars set up by some religious sect or post in which the deity resided. In early Indian worship there were no temples, but dwelling permanent enclosures, which—after the altars of the cult—probably a result of earlier nomadic conditions prevailing after the people had become settled—and to some extent this is the case even now among aboriginal tribes in areas in which the climate offers little possibility of dwellings—had they been the product of the earliest cults which have existed for centuries in the cases of certain ancient Persian and Egyptian temples which keep the precincs, if ever there. Temples vary from the simplest and smallest buildings, as they mostly were at first, to the most elaborate and vast structures.

The Boi had a temple in which were stored the spoils of war, and the barrel (sn REPL) had a similar temple.8 Plutarch speaks of the temple where the Arverni hung Caesar's sword, and DioDorus of 'temples and sacred places.' The temple of the Nanaitic (Samite) women, unroofed and re-rooted in a day, must have been a simple building.9 In Gallo-Roman times elaborate temples were built after Roman models, as well as smaller shrines at sacred springs.10 Similar sacred groves existed among the Teutons, as many passages of Tacitus show.11 What we figure of the sacred tree or grove as a built and walled house, resolves itself, the farther back we go, into a holy place enclosed by human hand, embowered and shut in by self-grown trees.12 The use of the sacred grove continued during many centuries. But in these grove-like temple-like places are still found references to by Tacitus, while sagas and later ecclesiastical writings speak of them, and the sacred grove, when the altar was destroyed, a Christian church was often built on the site.13 The Latin names used for these are 'canopus, camale, and temples. The sacred grove was probably a mere tent in which stood the sacred image; the others were more elaborate buildings, whether of wood or stone.

The grove is thus a primitive holy place, which may have had an as necessary a small structure for the image which later becomes a more elaborate temple. This worship in groves, which might become the seat of a temple, is also found in the larger races of trees.

The village shrine among the Dravidian tribes of India is an example. Under a sacred tree or grove stands a heap of stones or a mound; this may be replaced by a mud platform or a mound but with a thatched roof, or by a small building of masonry with a domed roof and platform. These forms an abode for the deity and are thus a primitive kind of temple.14

The early Somitic sanctuary was a sacred place associated with a theophany or with the continued presence of a spirit or divinity. This might be a tree, a stone, on a hill, or in a cave.

These holy places were sacred territory enclosed by boundary stones or walls. At Altar, and aubhah, on the altar pole. The 'high place,' or koshāh, as its name denotes, was on a height, and in the enclosed space or court there was the altar, the aubhah, and the natajuk (q.v.) the abode of the divinity, which were connected with these 'houses' probably of the priests, which sometimes contained images (2 K 17:29), though these were also enclosed in tents (2 K 22, 15.10). These houses or tents represent a primitive abode within the heathen, and, though no clear traces of actual temples have been met with in excavations, these may have been the origin of actual Canaanite temples such as those at El Bethel and Gezer (q.v. 2).

1 Cf. Livy, xiv, 17, 1, 3; Tacitus, Agric. i, 59.2 For American Indian instances see J. R. Swanton, in HAl ii, 1915, 626.3 Cf. O. Hie and W. McDougall, The Pagan Tribes of Boraro, London, 1912, ii, 150.4 In Ely, xxiii, 39–42.5 Cf. Tüt. Crassus, 92, 10.127, 27, 35; 111, 37, 9.6 Shuk, vi, 171.7 See also T. C. Riis, Denmark, iv, 140.7 See art. Celts, xv, 2.8 Germ. b, 391, Ann. ii, 12, iv. 73.9 O. Hie, 129; of art. Old Prussian, § 4 (c).10 Tac. Ann. xvi, 18; Germ. b, 391; Crassus, 127, 1, 21; Th. Thorpe, Northern Mythology, London, 1851–52, i, 248; G. Vigfusson and F. Y. Powell, Cyclopedia of the North British, Oxford, 1845, i, 402.11 Thorpe, 711, germ. 120, c. 326.12 W. Croke, The N. W. Provinces of India, London, 1897, pp. 234, 235, 219, 235; W. J. H. Davies, India, 1879, and Dravidae (N. India), x, 27, Bengali, § 4, r. daven, 7; see E. H. Tylor, 225.

13 A tent was used as a sanctuary in the temple of Belis at Harran, and elsewhere (H. A. Clough, The Syrian world of the Hebrews, St. Louis, 1882, 131); and by the Carthaginians at a portable shrine (Hist. Soc. xx, 65).

1 From the shrine or chapel of the god on the summit of the Babylonian zigurrat, and the Jewish Temple.

2 Rom. 12:18, 19.
(b) Shrines at groves.—The grave as a sacred place may be another point of departure for the temple, when it is associated with a structure, though it be no more than an enclosing wooden fence with shrubs, as among the Tami of New Guinea—where a cult is carried on. Sometimes an altar is placed over a grave, as with the Mayans and the Nicaraguans, 4 and by the Chineses of the Khius, 5 the stone circles with a rectangular niche in their circumference found in Algeria, the rectangular, elliptical, or circular groups of stones in Syria, 6 and the stone circles in Britain, varying in size and elaboration in the composition that has been termed Stonehenge. 7

Though long regarded without evidence as 'Dedalical temples,' were probably connected with a cult of the dead in the same way that the kitty of the Khius, like the Fijian nanga presently to be referred to. Some have regarded such a circle as that of Stonehenge as a temple dedicated to the sun or other heavenly bodies. 8

Akin to these are the sacred stone enclosures, or nanga, of the Fiji islanders, now existing only as ruins. These formerly presented the form of a rough parallelogram enclosed by upright stones, divided into three compartments by cross walls called respectively the little, great, and sacred nanga, the last enclosing the sacred beer bowl. Trees stood round the enclosure, and outside, beyond the sacred nanga, was the pole haum ("sacred house"); a 1-bedrook bed. Here the forefathers of youths circumcised on behalf of a sick parent were offered to ancestral gods with prayers for the patient's recovery. In the nanga 1 the ancestral spirits are to be found by their worshippers, and latter offerings are taken on all occasions when their aid is to be invoked, and here firstfruits are presented to them. They were also used in the elaborate initiation ceremony of the Fiji people, the object of which was the initiation of the candidates to the ancestral spirits. 9

Where large chambered tombs exist, as they do in many parts of the world, they have been used for worship of the dead, either all the time of the building or on special intervals thereafter. To this extent, therefore, they form temples, and sometimes they contain a conventional image of the dead like the human figures roughly sculptured on the walls of rock-hewn tombs in France. 10 The structures built over graves may be no more than large huts, of logs and thatch, like those built over the graves of kings and chiefs among the Banyoro and Baganda, but these are regarded as tombs, with priests and attendants, where the spirits of the dead are consulted. 11

In Fiji certain temples of a primitive kind are associated with graves and with the cult of the kalamughe, or ancestor-gods. 12

Not unlike these are the huts of reed and grass built over the graves of chiefs in pre-historic Egypt, where offerings were made. They gave place to mud houses and again to structures of stone. Of the latter the megaliths had a chamber for the soul of the deceased and its offerings. The inner chapels were part of the tomb-structure, but, where pyramids were built, this chapel or temple was constructed in the pyramid, and in its cells and offerings were made. Sometimes they developed into large temples, which, like the smaller funerary chapels, had lands attached to them for their maintenance. 13

(c) Caves and temples.—Caves occasionally served as scenes of a cult, and by their shape and enclosed space may have been carried out at Stonehenge.

The caves of mid-Magdalenian times, which contained elaborated paintings of animals or even of human figures, have been regarded as the scene of religious or magical rites, but of this there were no developed into large temples, which, like the smaller funerary chapels, had lands attached to them for their maintenance. Therefore, where caves were used, was also an altar for an image or fetish, it might easily and conservatively still be regarded as the dwelling of a god, when men no longer used it for a dwelling. It might become a temple or be associated with a temple built above it. Caves used for burial purposes would doubtless also acquire a sacred character and be used for commemorative rites.

Thus some of the Canaantine 'high places' are associated with caves, which may have been abodes of the living or burials, and which, or of a magical purpose or regarded as sanctuaries of an god. 14 Natural or artificial grottoes also constituted the earliest Phrygian temples of gods, and the Sidonian shape inhabiting a cavern which served as a temple occurs in Fiji in the case of the temple of the Khius, where its worshippers and offerings were made there. Names of divinities worshipped in caves among the ancient Babylonians are known, as well as the caves themselves with inscriptions to them. Sacrifices were probably offered in front of the entrance; in the cave niches contained sacred objects. Rock temples are known in early Egypt and in N. Arabia, but they are most elaborate in India and Ceylon, where they are both hewn out of solid rock and sculptured in caverns. Some originated in Buddhist times, and many still exist as examples of striking architectural skill,—e.g., Elapana and Ellora. Their prototypes are caves used as shrines and for the cult of Hindu gods in N. India. 15 Among the Carib Indians were the places where sun and moon emerged and fertilized the earth. They were places of pilgrimages, were adorned with paintings, and contained images. Spirals were supposed to guard them. 16

Another reason for caves becoming associated with worship is the belief that men first came out from them from their subterranean home. Examples of this are found in ancient Peri and other parts of America. 17

Caves may also be the depositories of sacred cult objects or images of gods, and thus serve a purpose to which temples are also put.

The Arunta urntungal is a receptacle and sacred place for offerings, and its inwelling spirits. They are visited ceremonially and are highly sacred. 18 The Vedas keep their secret ceremonies and are contaminated, especially by women. 19 The Hupi use clefts in the rock in which to place the baks, or prayer-sticks, in honour of their deities, and the Cornellis deposit ceremonial arrows and images in sacred caves. 20 The Otokya keep their images or stones representing the gods in sanctuaries in the hills guarded by a shaman. 21

3 See the ref. in ERE ii 278, vi. 618.
4 W. R. Smith, p. 139.
6 ERE v. 607.
7 J. Ferguson, The Rock-cuts and Temples of India, London, 1891; see also art. ANAPA, CAVES, KAHNATA.
8 ERE v. 594.
12 ERE v. 594.
14 Artificial grottoes, p. 312.
15 Artificial grottoes, p. 312.
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81 Artificial grottoes, p. 312.
82 Artificial grottoes, p. 312.
(d) The village-house, man's house, etc., as temple. —In many regions where separate temples are unknown, or when separate temples do not exist, the village-house, or the kiva, to some extent serves the purpose of a temple among many of their other uses, and corresponds to the pergulum of the Greeks and the sanctuaries of the Romans.

Religious dances or sacred dramatic plays are held in the village-house among the Alaeus or in the so-called 'assembly-house' of the Washo tribes, which may contain a circular domed-shaped structure or a mere brushwood enclosure. 1 To the latter corresponds the bowen worship used in the fire-ceremony of the Washo tribe, in which certain women maintain for hours a continuous singing to the accompaniment of beating home-guts. 2 Among many South American Indian tribes, especially those living in the southwest, religious rites are associated with a sacred house, 3 as with the Hopi, which does not differ in construction from other houses in the village. Here sacred dances take place, and traditions are connected with them. 4 With the Pueblo tribes the kiva serves at once as sacred council-house, medicine-lodge, and temple of the members of a mystery society. In some districts kivas of ancient date are circular; more generally they are square and often below the surface of the ground. The pre-historic sites of Colorado and Utah are of similar type. Women will not enter the kiva except to give food to husband or son. Kivas are often very large, but the well openings are small and entrance is gained by a ladder up to the roof, whence by another ladder descent is made to the interior from a hole in the roof. The walls are often decorated with paintings of symbolic animals and are surrounded by a bench. At one end is an altar on which the symbolic objects of the society are placed. Here it is a dry and sacred place, expressing gods and forces of nature. 5 Corresponding to these are the sacred lodges and club-houses of Melanesia and Papua, which are generally the sacred approach to temple-like houses. Examples are found in the 'sacred houses' of the Solomon Islands, sometimes circular enclosures with a large room where the drums and masks were prepared and members of the society met, whence the procession proceeds to the temple-like house proper. The structure consisted mainly of wood and thatch. The men's houses of the Moriori, of New Zealand, are circular, and contains skulls and heads, effigies of the dead, and symbols associated with ancestor-worship, and sometimes masks, drums, and objects connected with the ancestors as confiscated from the uninhabited. These houses are often used for the worship of the ancestors.

(e) The house-shrine as temple.—Still another aspect of the primitive temple, sometimes suggesting a point of departure for more exclusive temple structures, is the hut or house of a corner which is sacred, a place or shrine in the hut, the image or sacred objects. This custom is well-nigh universal, and only a few examples need be noted.

Among the Banyankole in each hut is a special place for the image of the deity. A board is set in the wall, on which a leather of the boor, a strip of goats' hair, is fastened round, bound with grass laid upon it. 6 With Coast tribes the yatimta containing a spirit has an honoured position in a corner of the house. At the larger posts, which are places with the Yoruba, the house-god Olorun, represented in human form, is set up at the door, and huts have a recess in the wall for the fetish. 7 Here and there in Melanesia and Papua images of ancestors are kept in houses, or, as in certain islands off the western end of New Guinea, in a separate room of the house, in which miniature wooden houses are placed for the souls to reside in. Offerings are made to them. In the chief's house are shrines for the souls of all who have died in the community. "Such a house might well be described as a temple of the dead. 8 Among the Bajau alamans images are kept in the houses, or, as also with the Kayans, stand before them. 9 The Vedas set their earwax, or chia-god, on a shelf in the out-house. 10 In higher religions the household shrine is well known. Most Melanesian and Sudust house shrines are the edible part of a general domestic temple, and the spirit is the Shindots treasure objects of private cult on a house-altar. In ancient, high, and heroic houses he had his domain in which he sat usually a receptacle with the figure of a household god.

In certain regions the temple seems to have arisen out of the private sanctuaries of the king. In Mycenaean Greece especially the king's tombs had chapels as part of the structure, and the palace later became the temple. With the Phoenicians the temple was at first an annex of the palace, like Solomon's temple at Jerusalem. When a cult of the hero-dynasty, with Ribkal, was thrown into the fire, existed—e.g., in Roman houses—the house itself was a temple with the hearth as altar.

2. Actual temples in the lower culture.—We have seen that in the lower culture there is no separate temple structure, and that actual temples are unknown, many approaches to temples exist. Yet even savages are not devoid of temples of a primitive kind, for it was natural to suppose that the worshipper by a fire or the god or spirit also should have one, either as the permanent shelter of his image or as the place whither he might resort and be approached by men in worship.

(a) The most primitive temples are probably those found in Africa, both Negro and Bantu. While frequently the 'place of praying' is a mere clearing under the tree in the village courtyard, 11 thus conforming to the place of his altar, the European worship, sometimes an actual hut is provided for a god, not differing much from the ordinary hut.

On the Lower Niger the temples contain images standing on mud platforms, and the ju-ju house in the bush is secret to all but the priest, and contains images, while the walls are wholly decorated with paintings. 12 Similar temples exist among the Fon, and that of the rain-god is painted with the colours of the rainbow. 13 The temple was a square mud building, with a door on each side; there was a small circular hut, thatched with grass—a privilege allowed only to shrines and temples—standing in an enclosure. In it the sacred snakes were kept. 14 In Dahomey temples are circular huts, so low that a man must bend double to enter one. Images stand in them on a platform of clay, before which are earthen pots and vessels smeared with blood, eggs, and oil. Some temples are elaborately decorated, and they as well as sacred groves are distinguished by calico streamers fluttering from poles or trees. 15 Among the Yoruba—e.g., at Benin—the ju-ju temple consisted of a circle of painted mud 150 yards in diameter, thatched by a high wall, and covered with grass. At one end a long shed extended across the circle, and was made of three posts, each the whole length of the shed. This was slightly raised in the centre, and on it stood ivory tusks on bronze heads. In the lower common huts were walls adorned with hooks, and a well for the reception of the bodies of victims. Among the Baganda there was a sacred place found the king's house. They were circular structures with an elaborate roof thatch covering nearly to the ground, and supported on posts, with hides entwined in the roof. The outer wall was of plinth face of layers of reeds bound together and fastened to the top of the roof. The floor was strewn with a carpet of scented grass, dried, and cut to uniform length. These temples took some time to build, and their structure was frequently renewed. Some had also a court surrounding them, and in the case of the more important gods only the priests and mediums could enter it. In others the temple attendants had their beds in the court. Temples without courtyards could be approached and even entered by the people. The temple of the god of war was usually that of a thick, high temple consecrated to him. Each temple had its priests and mediums who lived in huts near by, where their vesicae, worn on ear-rings, the temple were kept. Young girls tended the sacred fire always burning in the temples, save in those which might not be entered by the people. The larger temples had a platform attached to them for their upkeep. Temples of gods had no images, for images are here unknown, but they were adorned with gorgeous and the invisible devil was supposed to sit, or on which his relays were kept. Sacred drums were stored in certain temples. Priests had a complex with priests and mediums in which there were special temples for the king's jaw-bone and umbilical cord,

1 ERE 1, 290, ill. 142, 149.
2 Spencer-Dillenius, p. 294.
3 Schliemann, p. 292.
4 F. S. Dellenbaugh, North Americans of Yesterday, New York, 1894, p. 233; F. W. Hodge, in JAH, 170, of ERE 1, 290.
7 J. T. B. S. 7, p. 72 ff.
8 ERK IV, 341 ff.
9 B. Parkinson, Later. A. E. Siew, 1908, 181; M. E. J. Errera, Mitthnissen anthropologischen Gesellschaft in Wien, xxxvii, 1912, 274; H. Zahn, in ethn. 314, 368; cf. ERE 1, 290.
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and others for his ghost. Temple for similar deities and for the royal jaw-bone existed among the Busho, Banyoro, etc., but with these and the Baganda the creator-god had no temple.

(b) In Melanesia temples are not common, but in the Admiralty Islands wooden, thatched huts of a beehive shape, with carved door-posts representing male and female figures, serve as temples. The doors were surmounted by the heads of pigs and turtles are attached to the rafters, as well as balls of human hair. A mystery was always made about the principal temple, which contained images, and was sometimes opened, sometimes closed. In Fiji each village had one or more temples (bare), built on a mound faced with stone rubble-work. The roof was high-pitched, with a projecting ridge-pole, and the height of the structure was twice its breadth. Each bare had two doors and a fire-place, and contained images, jars, boxes, mats, etc. From the roof hung a long piece of bark cloth reaching to the floor at one of the corner-posts, and was the holy place which none but the priest approached to be inspired by the god, who descended by this cloth. The dead were sometimes buried in the bare, but the building was only used for worship on special occasions and often became ruined in the interval. It served also as a council-house and chiefs' club-house. Bares were also erected in memory of the dead, and had an altar at the front.

In the Tamile, New Guinea, parraks, or temples, built of wood and standing on piles, are found. They consist of two storeys and have high galleries, and are approached by ladders with hand-rails carved in the form of crocodiles and apelike figures. Nothing but drums and flutes is found in the paraks, and these, played by men, signify the presence of the spirits, for whose worship the temples exist.

A certain degree of mystery attaches to the parraks; no woman or child may enter them or loiter in their vicinity.

(c) In certain parts of Polynesia—Society and Sandwich Islands—the temples, or marae, were enclosures open to the sky and they were domestic.

The national temples, called tabu-tabu-a-tea, perhaps because of the pictures were the property of the chief images and the places where great festivals were held. Each of them was composed of several marae, some with inner courts for the chief images, altars, and sacred dormitories for the chief divinities, all enclosed by stone walls on two sides. In front was the main entrance, and on the back a projection, very often of large size, with images and altars before it. At Atchura this structure was 370 ft. long, 94 broad, and 70 high. Steps led to the roof of this temple, and the enclosed area of the marae was 3,290 sq. rt. Within the enclosure were the priests' houses, and trees grew both within and around it, forming a dark grove. Offerings were placed in the marae. Men alone usually took part in the festivals, but on the completion of the year women and children also attended, but were not allowed to enter the sacred enclosure. Local marae were those belonging to the different districts; the domestic marae were for the family gods. In both of these, as well as in the royal marae, the dead were deposited, and were there under the guardianship of the gods. In other districts—i.e., Samoas—temples resembled the beehive thatched huts, or, again, the village house where the chief lived served as a temple. In some villages groves as well as temples were used as places of sacrifice.

(d) Among the coast Veddas temple structures exist. One is 12 ft. by 10, roofed, and facing eastwards, with the roof carried forward in front of the front wall and door. Outside this structure are a long pole, a wall, and a tree with a platform, and just outside the door stands an altar. The altar anterior is decorated with cloths and branches on the occasion of a ceremonial dance, and ceremonial garments are kept within it. Some of the village Veddas have temples of bark or of mud resembling their own huts. In these the Shaman dances, and symbols of the spirits are kept.

(e) With the Todas, worshippers of the sacred buffalo, the dairy forms the temple or sacred place, with its cereals and vessels and other things, which are preserved there; and precautions are taken to prevent their contamination by the touch or look of unauthorized persons. Relics of heroes are also stored in these. The temple-dairies have usually two rooms, and are of the same form as the native huts.

(f) As an example of various stages in the evolution of temples from simple to highly elaborate, over a large area, we may cite those known in N. and S. America. Most of the lower tribes, and some of the more advanced (Hurons, Iroquois), had no temples. But usually there were sacred shrines or altars, where ceremonies were performed, sacrifices offered, and images set up.

Among the Hopi such places were called pakoki, 'prayer-house,' and others of nothing to mark them but prayer-sticks—sticks with feathers attached. Others were denoted by circles of stones—e.g., the sun shrine with an opening to the direction of sunrise and sunset. The Alasks, by a single pole set up in a natural mark on a rock. To these correspond the sites on which are erected bowers or lodges for the public performances of mystery societies in other tribes, often containing an altar with sacred objects. More elaborate shrines also exist among the Hopis and the creeds of the So. America corresponding to such shrines is the secret spot where the botato, or sacred trumpeter is kept. The Orinoco tribes also have shrines where ceremonies are performed, sacrifices offered, and images set up.

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Among the Apaches, Siouks, and others, sacred caves took the place of temples, where religious rites (tabou to women) were performed, or tipsis, which were carried from place to place, like the Hebrew 'tent of meeting.' They consisted of poles tied together at the top, arranged in a circle, and covered with buffalo skins. They sheltered the three sacred objects—the sacred pole, the sacred buffalo-skin awning, and a sacred bag. The household tent as a shrine containing an altar is also sporadically found—e.g., among the Biskopa, with whom each tent has an altar, a mere hole in the ground, in which sweet sticks are burned. With the Apaches and Navaho, tipsis were also used as a place where he may be consulted. It is called a 'spirit-house' and is tabu. Here also may be mentioned the special 'medicine-lodge' of many tribes, erected for the performances of the shaman, corresponding to that found among the Ota-Affric tribes of N. Asia.

With other tribes—e.g., the Omaha—the sacred structure consisted of three sacred tents, or tipsis, which were carried from place to place, like the Hebrew 'tent of meeting.' They consisted of poles tied together at the top, arranged in a circle, and covered with buffalo skins. They sheltered the three sacred objects—the sacred pole, the sacred buffalo-skin awning, and a sacred bag. The household tent as a shrine containing an altar is also sporadically found—e.g., among the Biskopa, with whom each tent has an altar, a mere hole in the ground, in which sweet sticks are burned. With the Apaches and Navaho, tipsis were also used as a place where he may be consulted. It is called a 'spirit-house' and is tabu. Here also may be mentioned the special 'medicine-lodge' of many tribes, erected for the performances of the shaman, corresponding to that found among the Ota-Affric tribes of N. Asia.

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Throughout this region, on hills or by lakes. Among some California peoples structures, temporal or ceremonial, in honour of the god Chichi-michich, consisted of an oval enclosure, four or five yards in circumference, with interior divisions formed by branches set into the ground, and mats, and a hut or lodge, supporting an image.2 The temples of the Natives, one in each village, which stood on mounds about two-thirds the size of the house of the god Chichi-michich, contained the sacred fire as a division in which sacred objects were placed. Thus a platform in a square or rectangular area, with the sacred objects of the sun-chief, with sacred images, and in an Inca ceremony was the sun-chief or king of the sun, and the temple was the object of great reverence.3 Thus sun-temples existed over a wide region in Florida, Arkansas, and Virginia, and were no more than an enlarged mud hut, with an oval, domed-shaped roof with images of eagles. Images stood in them, and women were excluded from them. There were more elaborate or smaller temples described by travellers among Virginian tribes, in the Mississippi region, among the Fox Indians, and in B. America with the Tupinquines.3 Among the Hopis are temples (topeka), 'god-houses,' and sacred caves, though the difference between the two is not clear. The temples are larger but otherwise resemble the houses, which are circular, stone-built, and roofed with thatch, and which possess a low entrance to the east. The roof is supported by upright beams. In the centre is a fireplace—a circular basin of clay. Niches in the interior walls contain ceremonial objects, and each of them is devoted to a god, and in charge of an officer of the temple. The priests meet in the temple for consultation, and the temple is a square open space for the 'god-houses,' in which the officers live who watch the temple. They are rectangular, dome-shaped, and often have sacred images of the gods on the walls. The interior contains symbolic objects to please the gods. The pictures in the temples for communication with the gods are placed for the duties invisibly present. Images are kept in sacred caves in the mountains, sometimes set in miniature temple structures. Similar structures in Pueblo regions, containing shrines, were of the nature of temples. They consisted of sealed stone enclosures, sometimes with symbols painted on them, and contained images and symbolic representations of supernatural beings. Among the Hopi the shrine of the earth-godness is a sacred grove; it was an open space now sacred, and where the symbol of the 'new fire' ceremony a slab is removed, and offerings are placed on the shrine, while every four years the image is carried in procession. In all Pueblo shrines are placed permanent objects (images, stones, carved slabs, etc.) and a few offerings of fruits and vegetables. The sacred objects are set about in clay images.4

The small house, men's house, the kiva, etc., as serving enter all the purposes of a temple, have already been referred to.5 In the case of a kiva, or lodge of a mystery society, it is far more particularly styled. Next to host parts or the initiated may enter the sacred place; it is made the sacred objects used in the ritual; and here prayers are said, and various offerings presented, and other ceremonies—e.g., purificatory rites—are carried on.

The rude stone structures just described form a primitive aspect of the more elaborate stone temples of barbaric peoples in N. and S. America. It was also natural that, where wooden temples existed, they should be replaced by temples of stone, as the primitive inhabitants of the world, like the more advanced and civilized tribes, had no great variety in the forms of houses that were attained. Intermediate stages between these simple structures and the massive and elaborate temples—the ruins of which still command respect—are seldom met with, but Potter describes one in Hayti, and Schoolcraft another at Cayunbe—a circle of sunburnt bricks 48 ft. in diameter and 134 ft. high, with a small door, open to the sky.6 Probably many of the Peruvian temples were of such a simple character, and even the great temple of the sun at Cuzco, comprising many buildings and apartments, though it was richly adorned with gold plates, cornices, and stairs, and was provided with gardens and fields, had no pictorial or architectural characteristics. In other squares and parallellograms of one storey, roofless or thatched.7

2 Preceding the Inca
4 W. R. 406.
5 Dellenbaugh, p. 207; ERE 1909.
7 Müller, op. cit., 69, 269; John Smith, Virginia, in Halkutus Posthumus or Purchas his Pilgrimes (Halkutus loc. cit. Secr.), Glasgow, 1698, 402-3; Washington, 1781, 371.
8 A. L. Lumholtz, Unknown Mexico, ii, 277, 184; 199.
9 W. H. Holmes, in HAF II, 559.
10 § 4 (d) above.
12 Delacroix de la Vega, in Purchas, xvii. 540; Schoolcraft, v. 59.

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2 Joseph B. Strong, in Purchas, xvi. 319; R. W. 47.
3 W. H. Holmes, in HAF II, 559; A. L. Lumholtz, Unknown Mexico, ii, 277, 184; 199.
5 See art. Architecture (American), § 5; NR iv. passim.
6 See art. Architecture (American), § 5; NR iv. passim.
7 See art. Architecture (American), § 5; NR iv. passim.
9 See art. Architecture (American), § 5; NR iv. passim.
10 See art. Architecture (American), § 5; NR iv. passim.
12 W. H. Holmes, in HAF II, 559; A. L. Lumholtz, Unknown Mexico, ii, 277, 184; 199.
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resembling African native temples. The hut was sometimes square, sometimes domed, and stood on a platform of earth to save it from inundation. With a thatched roof the ground opening for light was the doorway or portico, with a mast at each side. In front was a court fenced with a palisade.

The hut gave place to a stone building, but, when additional rooms were built round the central 'house of the god,' and when the whole structure of the temple, with its spacious siphon-grammar, porticoes, courts for the images, pillared halls for processions of priests, etc., was elaborated, the dark central chamber of the god, accessible to the higher priesthood only, became the sanctuary, and the outer hall was the common assembly.

The temple building consisted of a long outer hall, opening into a smaller one with the holy place, or parthenon, where stood the image of the god. The open court of the holy place was open to the priests alone, or to a worshipper accompanied by a priest for special religious purposes. The altar stood in the court, and the inner chambers in the outer hall also. The names of temples are many, and some of them show their great sanctity, others are marked as being 'the house of the shining mountain,' 'the lofty house.' This points to the high tower like structure called the ziqqurat, which stood beyond the important temples, or towered within the sacred enclosure where stood many temples dedicated to various gods, as well as the houses of priests building up the buildings of religious cities. The ziqqurat was a storied tower or pyramid, consisting of storeys and superimposed platforms. These varied in number and symbolized the mythological mountain of the world. It consisted of several storeys, these representing the seven zones of the earth. Each storey was approached by an inclined pathway or a flight of steps, either directly up the face or diagonally across it, until the top, which formed a broad platform, was reached. On the platform stood a chamber for the god, containing a couch and screens, and perhaps an image. As with the Mexican teocalli, procession winding up the tower could be plainly seen below, and, while the Egyptian temple in its grandest development was spread over a large area, the Babylonian, as far as the ziqqurat was concerned, aimed at reaching a lofty elevation, and represented in miniature the structure of the universe. It seems to have been regarded also as the grave of the god to whom it was dedicated, and persons of importance were sometimes buried round it. 2

Both Egyptian and Babylonian temples were endowed with lands which yielded large revenues. Hence, outside their religious purpose, they had greater or less extent of control on the nation. In the Babylonian temple area also, as the priests were administrators of the law, there were courts of justice, chambers where national archives were stored, and even tanks.

(c) The Greek temple was preceded by the nympos, the open sacred place with its ἑδαμον of the deity, altar, and other sacer. In the Ægean religion the sacred cave served as a temple where the Mother-goddess was worshipped, as in the double cave (upper and lower) of Dicte in Crete, where a rich store of cult objects has been found in recent years. 3 Palaces had their domestic chapel or shrine, plain and of small size, with a lodge at one end for images and sacred objects. The ruler was a priest-king, and in one instance, that of the palace of Knossos, "The Place of the Double Axe" (Mikyos), the whole building has the character of a temple. 4 Free-standing shrines or temples also existed, like that discovered at Gournia, a small enclosure 12 ft. square, in the heart of the town, in which were found many images and statues. With the development of the temple image, a house to shelter it became necessary, and the earliest type was no more than a rectangular oblong cela, or σκόπος. To this was soon added an additional chamber, with a couple of columns supporting an architrave, the corners of which rested on flattened columns attached to the ends of the side walls. These columns were at first of wood; the earliest stone columns date from the 6th cent. B.C. Throughout the whole period of Greek religion the rectangular cela remained as the central part of all Greek temples, though it was sometimes prolonged back and front with additional chambers, or surrounded by single or double rows of columns, while these were sometimes also introduced within the cela. Vitruvius, indeed, classifies temples according to the arrangement of the columns in relation to the cela. 5 The temples of the gods faced eastwards, and opposite the entrance stood the image of the god. The cela also contained an altar or altars, votive offerings, and treasure, the last being also stored in a chamber. The cela in these temples were never large; they were merely houses for the image, and hence were often kept closed. They were decorated with sculpture and painting both within and without. The temple stood within a τεμπειον, where the great altar was placed, and where the worship was carried on. 6

(d) The Roman templum, as already shown, was originally a rectangular space of ground marked off by the augur, in which a cult was pitched for augural purposes, like the 'medicine-hut' of the shaman. Strictly speaking, the temple of a god was the ades, but the word templum was now applied to such a structure, inaugurated by the augurs, and usually of larger and more complicated structure than the ades. In the earliest times divine dwellings were unknown. The grove, the cave, the hearth, were the earlier sacred places, or the vocolion, a small place consecrated to a god, enclosed by a fence or wall, but roofless, with an altar and possibly an image. The Romans, in erecting houses for the gods, were influenced by the Etruscan, and the Greeks, and the Roman temples were of wood, oblong, with one or more chambers and an open portico. The Roman temple had also a central cela, but of much greater length than those of the Etruscans, and probably a result of Etruscan influence. The structure of temples, whether simple or elaborate, was generally determined by Greek architecture, though there were differences in detail—e.g., the absence of columns at the back. Circular temples were also built; these had become common in Greece from the 4th cent. B.C., although it was not impossible that the form may be copied from the early Italian sanctuaries.

The temple building was erected on an eminence, and faced westwards. Before building a temple, a space of ground was liberata et effata by the augurs, and consecrated by the pontifex. When the building was erected, it was consecrated to a god. In some instances, however, a building might be consecrated to religious use without the preliminary augural ceremony. Such buildings were sacer, or ades sacer, like the temple of Vesta. 6 Outside the temple stood the altar, and within burned the sacred fire. In the temple were stored votive offerings, gifts, treasure of all lands, as well as the images of the gods.

(e) During the Vedic period in India, as has been seen, there was no temple in the strict meaning of the word. The concept of the temple in the pre-Buddhist period is known, but, if any exist, they must have been of wood, as they still are in Burma, the use of stone in temples being rare.


7. Vitruvius, de Architecture, III. 2
architecture not having been introduced until Asoka's reign, as a result of contact with the West. Religious edifices are certainly known for the first time in Buddhism. The primitive sacred object in Buddhism was not an image, but a relic. This at first was not set in a temple, but enclosed in a stūpa, or tope (Sinhalese dagoba)—an elongated hemispherical structure, standing on a square base, often finely carved or ornamented, and crowned with a square capital and the chhatra, or umbrella. Many stūpas contained no relic, but were erected as commemorations of objects. A path fenced by a railing surrounded the stūpa, for circumambulation. The stūpa was decorated with flags, streamers, and flowers; and it was the chief religious edifice of early Buddhism. Another religious edifice was the chaitya, a name applied to any religious monument—e.g., a stūpa with relics—but also restricted to a building corresponding to a temple or church, the ‘chaitya hall,’ with pillars, aisles and a front facing the stūpa. This soon became an imitated Buddhist feature.

The earliest known structural building of this type—e.g., at Ter, Kathahara—consists of an apsidal chamber with high barred-membrane windows. In front is a square in two storeys—perhaps a later addition, lower in height, with a flat roof supported by arches. In another example of the hall has a niche containing now a Hindu image, which was probably at one time a window. Within the temple stood a stūpa, now replaced by a squat chaitya image. Chaitya type must have been common in India. Buddhism made use of rock excavations for an early time for chaitya halls, which sometimes had aisles.

A third structure was the vihāra—a hall where the monks assembled, with cells at the sides for sleeping. The vihāras were later used as temples and became the centre of monastic buildings grouped around them. They usually stood beside chaityas, though they came to be furnished with chapels in which religious services could be performed as well as in the chaitya.

During ten centuries from Asoka's time onwards cave chaitya halls and vihāras were excavated all over India. In early examples in Bihār the chaitya halls are merely oblong chambers, sometimes with a cell or apse at the farther end and for the dagoba with its relic. Others are more elaborate. The facade of the cave represents the exterior of a wooden chaitya in all its details. The interior is apsidal. Pillars are cut out of the rock, with cells in the apse that now has the image of Buddha in front of it. Some of these caves are highly elaborate in their carving both within and without, and are associated with buildings and structures with aisles.

These vihāras have a central pillared hall with cells at the sides for monks. Beyond these are one or two storeyed porches or cella, surrounded by chapels. These are later additions. Here the architecture and adornment varies from simple to highly elaborate. The earliest freestanding spires were probably built with cells attached, and were sometimes of a square pyramidal form, each successive story decreasing in size, and giving a series of pillared halls on one side the other, with cells for the monks on the terraces. This architectural structure supplied a form for all the later temples of southern Hinduism. Attached to great monasteries, as at Peshāvar, was a court, or vihāra, with cells for images, and beyond that, opening from it, a circular or square court surrounded by similar cells, and with a stūpa in the centre. These belong to the period of Mahāyāna Buddhism.

One of the earliest known temples, or chaityas, is at Nalanda, in the stomach of the great bower of a banyan tree. Frequent restoration, it was probably erected in the 6th cent., and is 100 ft. high by 60 ft. wide. It is rectangular with an elongated pyramidal form of nine storeys, each with exterior niches for images, and the interior cells contained originally an image of Buddha. Such a nine-storied pilared temple is unique in India, but is found frequently north of the Himalayas.

Hindu temples doubtless owe much in their conception to Buddhism, and are of great variety in structure, size, and ornamentation. But there are two principal groups, one in Southern India of the so-called Dravidian type, and the other in Northern India, each of which shows great uniformity in general plan. In S. India the structure consists of the temple proper, or vihāra, the vehicle of the gods—a square building with a pyramidal roof which may have one or several storeys, like the typical stūpa it replaced. The storeyed vihāra at Badami, the hall containing the chief image of the god, and lit only from the doorway. Between the wall of the inner cell and the outer wall is the procession path, or padakṣeti. Pillared porches, or hall, and mantapam (Skr. mandapa) preceded this entrance, and are usually larger than the vihāra. Vihāra and mantapam stand in a walled enclosure with gate-pyramids, or gopura, corresponding to the Egyptian pyramid and Egyptian winged image. Within the enclosure stand a pillared hall, priests' dwellings, tanks, and other structures. These temples are devoted to the Vaiṣṇava and Śaiva cults, and are not otherwise distinguishable apart from the sculptures and images. The earliest examples of the vihāra show its derivation from the Buddhist apsidal chaitya hall. The apse for the relic-shrine has become a niche, and in another early example the circular apse has been given place to a cell with altar and image, surrounded by a tower, and the hall in front, distinct from the cell, is pillared. Cell and pillared nave or mantapam are the remains of these vihāras, which were of immense size. The most elaborate of these temples of later date, together with the storeyed tower. The enormous size and elaborate architectural and sculptural design of these buildings make them still marvellous rivals of the cathedrals of Europe. Some, besides the original enclosure with its gate-pyramids, have a second or even third exterior enclosure, with gopura, shrines, porches, cells, etc. The shrine in itself corresponds to the ordinary Hindu village temple, and in some examples has either been such a temple or is little more imposing than one of these. Sometimes two vihāras dedicated to different divinities stand within the central enclosure. In S. India the largest group or congeries of temple buildings is at Srirangam. There are seven enclosures, leading gradually to the central shrine, and the three surrounding the central enclosure are crowded with temples, porches, halls, etc., while in each wall there are two or three gopura of great height. ‘The idea is that each investing square of walls shall contain the worship of one god, by regular gradations to a central holy of holies.’

While the temples of this kind are of comparatively late date, others of earlier date, but presenting the same general features, have been carved out of the solid rock and excavated internally, so that they are monolithic temples. The chief examples are the rathas (ratha=vihāra) at Mamallapuram and the beautiful kāḷīṇu at Ellora.

The Northern temples (Ferguson's 'Indo-Aryan style')—e.g., in Orissa—are characterized by a pyramidal curvilinear tower on a polygonal base in which the central shrine, often quite small. The interior plan is square, and in the Orissan examples there are no pillars, or these are found only in modern additions. In front is a square porch with pyramidal roof, and sometimes in front of this again additional porches. The enclosing wall is always insignificant, if it is present at all, and has no gopura. Other shrines are always subordinate to the towering temple proper with its porch. Even the most elaborate temples preserve these essential features—e.g., the Konārundu Mahāvīra devala, or temple of Siva, at Khajurāho.

In all Hindu temples the inner cell or shrine with its image is the central feature round which all the other external features, like doors, windows, etc., are elaborated, they are all subordinate. The cell is cubical, of small dimensions, unornamented,
and unlike save by the doorway, and is too sacred to be entered by any but the priests. The exterior building surrounding the cell is of the most elaborately
workmanship, often of a kind of brick, and often little too explain by the method of producing it. In some districts enormous numbers of temples exist, ancient and modern, and at Benares, the sacred city, there are 1500, though none are older than the
first century of the Christian era. Shinto temples are not large and conform in structure to the architecture of an age when tools were few and primitive. The quality of the wood used in the structure is more important, for the ornamentation
and carving, whereas the carvings on Buddhist

list temples are highly elaborate, and have much gilding, lacquer-work, and painting. The oldest Shinto temples and many of the smaller ones are thatched with the thatch of China, showing that Chinese influences prevailed.

The temple area, at least in the case of the greater temples, has several enclosures, with flowerbeds and gates, and then the shrine. The main construction of the various structures differs according to the nature of the ground, usually on a slope, giving the chief entrance into the shrine. Shinto shrines, built by the early Buddhist, are preceded by the characteristic torii-set of two wooden uprights on the four corners, the upper one projecting and curving upwards at the ends; they correspond to the gateways of stupas and temples in India, like that of the tope at Sanchi, and in similar structures in religious architecture elsewhere. The temple consists of two or three halls, one an oratory or prayer-hall for worshipers, an intercolumnial hall, and the sanctuary open only to the priests. Shinto temples have no mirrors, a mirror usually constituting the symbol of deity. Some temples are dedicated to more than one divinity. An altar stands in the shrine. The lay-worshipper, entering the prayer-hall, pulls a rope attached to a gong and so announces his presence to the deity before beginning his devotions. Within the temple enclosure, as in China, the grounds often being laid out artifically, stand a pagoda, di, or two, and a temple, for sacred dances, library, votive-offering hall, store-houses, kitchen, priests' rooms, etc. This general description applies to both Shinto and Buddhist temples, though the latter are generally more gorgeous and imposing, and contain images, lights, votive offerings, lotus-flowers of silver, and the like. These shrines are usually built of wood, with gilding and porcelain casing, and metal work for roofs and pillars.

(f) In Tibet the Buddhist monasteries are the chief architectural structures, occupying large areas and containing a square for assemblies, in which stands the temple.

This is a straight rectangular building, on the top of which is a pavilion with a roof of Chinese type. The interior is divided into a nave and side aisles by pillars, which are painted in yellow and red. The interior of the Shinto images within the shrines is at one end. Other images stand along the side walls. There are no windows, and the interior is like a temple. They are often decorated with frescoes and hang with banners, lit by lamps. Seats for the various officials and Lay visitors are arranged according to their position in the order. The two small temples of the Shinto are by a flight of steps and a gateway guarded by demoniac figures. In the vestibules are images of the kings of the four quarters, and also prayer-wheels. These, in larger temples, are placed in detached chapels, in which are images of lower divinities. Occasionally, a small temple, a smaller temple is built in stepped terraces, like a vinman, crowned by a drum-like structure, on which are a square and an oblong mosque. Shrines to the different Buddha occupy the various stories. The great 'cathedral' at Lhasa faces eastward, and is three-storied, the roof being of timber. The approach is through a hall, adorned with pictures. Beyond this is an antechamber, leading to a pillared hall, in which statues of Buddha and bodhisattva are set by a series of colonnades. It is lit from above, as there are no side windows. On the side walls are chapels. Lattice-work separates the cross, and the longer side of the temple. The sacred place is approached by a staircase. This is in form of a square, with three other similar temples, three on the side. Another altar stands in the centre, and on the west is a recess with an image of Buddha. Here too are the seats of the Dalai and Tashi Lamas, and of the other officials. Many others, in the

(g) The Hebrews had different kinds of sanctuaries before the Temple was built at Jerusalem. The ‘tent of meeting’ referred to in Ex was pitched outside the camp in the wilderness. There Moses communed with God, who appeared in a pillar of cloud (Ex 33, Nu 11:9, 12:14). It is not described, a simple tent of a simple character. Its one guardian was Joshua, who ‘departed not out of the tent’ (Ex 33:11). The tent may have contained the sacred Ark, a kind of abode of deity, as Nu 7:8 says (cf. S 13), though tent and Ark are never mentioned together. Such portable sanctuaries were used by the Semites, either in nomadic or in more settled times, in the latter case certainly in the towns, and they were carried with the army. The Hebrew ‘tent’ was used for sacred divination like the Semitic portable sanctuary, and it may be compared with the sacred tents of the Omans. The Tabernacle, elaborately

2 Le Foucar, Le Sina anciem, archéologie, épigraphie, géographie (AMG xvii., xxxi.), Paris, 1890-1908; Spheres, in Ferguson, ii. 404 ff.
5 See § 4 (f) above.
described by P., and containing the Ark, was probably never more than an ideal priestly construction put together in the past. The sanctuary was originally kept in a 'house' or temple at Shiloh (1 S. 1:3), which may have been destroyed by the Philistines, who carried off the Ark. On its recovery, it was kept from then on in private houses, and possibly in a tent (2 S. 7:2), as it was protected by David at Jerusalem (2 S. 6:1; cf. 11:1). Tevets were also used after the settlement in Canaan on the 'high places' (2 K. 23, Ezk 16, 'seven high places').

The Temple was an house of stone, faced by a porch, in front of which stood two bronze pillars called Jachin and Boaz, like those in front of other Semitic temples. The structure consisted of an oblong temple, 90 cubits long, 40 broad, and 30 high. It was roofed with cedar, and had doors into a Holy Place (kubil), and an Oracle, or Most Holy Place (dibor)—a square dark chamber with cubits in each direction, leaving a space of 10 cubits above it. The interior walls were lined with cedar, carved, and ornamented with gold, and the floor was of Cypress. Between the walls of the structure and an outer wall, running round the sides and back to the height of 20 cubits, were three storied rooms for treasures and Temple ornaments. In the Temple wall, above these, there were latticed windows. The oracle, or Most Holy Place, the adytum, was the dwelling of Jehovah, and contained the ark. In the chamber which stood the altar of shewbread, the altar of incense, and ten candlesticks, five on each side. Outside the porch, which faced east, was the altar of burnt-offering, and near it a brazen sea supported by metal oxen, as well as ten smaller lavers on wheels. The people gathered for worship in the court, though it is called 'the priests' court'. The Holy Place was for the priests alone—a suggestive difference, appearing now for the first time. Thus the main features of the Temple were common with those of Syrian and Phoenician temples of the period—porch, outer chamber, and adytum—though some have suggested Egyptian influences in its construction. Ezekiel's ideal Temple has the same division of inner and outer sanctuaries and porch, but there are two courts, an inner one for the priests, an outer for the laity; and the sacred building was to be entirely surrounded by all these buildings, and was also to be shut out from Jerusalem by the lands of the Zadokites.

Zerubbabel's Temple of the restoration period had an outer court with walls and gates, and an inner court in which stood the altar of unhewn stones, and perhaps a laver. Into the inner court the laity appear to have had access for a time at least. The Temple itself had a Holy of Holies, but was unique among temples in possessing no representation or symbol of deity, the Ark having been lost. The presence of deity, however, was marked by the ritual of the Day of Atonement. The Holy Place was separated from the Holy Place by a curtain, and this chamber contained the table of shewbread, altar of incense, and the seven-branched candlestick. The Holy Place was entered by the high-priest alone.

Herod's Temple, built about 20 B.C., was on a larger scale than any of its predecessors, but the general plan was the same.

A large outer court—'the court of the Gentiles'—was surrounded by porches or chambers with marble pillars, built against the enclosing wall. In front of this was a raised platform, a second court surrounded by a terrace and an enclosing wall, with gates, and with balconies and porticoes on its inner side. Within this none but Jews might enter. A wall across the breadth of this inner court divided it into two parts, the smaller of which was occupied by the women. The other part was open to male worshippers, and within its area was the temple building, with its sumptuous brokework of stone enclosing the court of the priests. Within this court priests could only enter, except when the High Priest offered a sacrifice which required his presence. The Temple within this inner area was preceded by a lofty porch and gateway. This gave access to the Holy of Holies, or Holy of Holies, 'the great door of which hung a curtain, and this again to the dibor, the Holy of Holies, across the entrance to which hung two curtains. Above these was an upper storey, and a side building of three storeys surrounded the Temple on three sides. In the kubil, which was open only to the priests, stood the table of shewbread, altar of incense, and seven-branched candelabrum. The dibor was empty and quite dark, and was entered by the high-priest alone on the Day of Atonement. In front of the porch outside stood the altar of burnt-offering and the laver. The building was of white marble, and the eastern front and part of the walls were covered with gold. The dibor was 20 cubicls square; the kubil 40 cubits long, 20 broad, and 40 high. The porch was 100 cubits high, 100 broad, and 20 in depth, and extended on both sides beyond the Temple, with its side buildings, by some 15 cubits. Every part of the Temple was richly hewn, gave place throughout, its dominions, and he erected this for the Jews in his capital part of the land of policy.

5. Conclusion.—A general survey of temples shows that the essential part is the cela, or chamber, for the image of the god, and that, whatever additions are made are by way of increasing the splendour of the temple or as adjuncts to it, this remains constant, and is indeed its most important feature. It is the holy place, and is seldom if ever entered save by the priests. The temple at Eleusis forms an exception, for apparently there all was open to the worshippers. But generally worship takes place in the temple area or within the hall preceding the cela, which is very often dark and unlike the windows, the great synagogue of the bộl in the future and the modern mosque, and the Christian church are not strictly temples, for they are not houses enclosing a divine image, but places of public prayer. Yet even in the mosque the process, or mihrab, indicating the direction of the kahit, towards which the worshipper prays, has a certain parallel to the cela with its image which the worshipper also faces. The great mosque at Mecca also contains the kahit with the sacred black stone, and the kahit in its old but reconstructed sanctuary within the mosque. In the Christian church the chancel and the sanctuary with the altar are not ordinarily open to the laity as a whole in the same way that they approach the altar at the Holy Communion. Certain temples are national holy places, like the Pantheon at Rome, the kahit at Mecca, and similar great temples in important centres. Pilgrimages are often made to temples, and temples form asylum whither criminals flee for safety. Frequently there is much symbolism connected with the temple, and attention is paid to the direction in which it faces, most temples facing the east or the place of the rising sun. Very often in connexion with one great temple there will be a series of lesser shrines for other deities, all forming a group of sacred buildings within an area. The area is usually enclosed by a wall with gates, which are often most elaborate, and avenues, while pillars and pales stand about it, and it is often decorated with flags and streamers. It is interesting also to notice how frequently there is attached to the temple of a religion the old sacred places are retained, and successive buildings occupy the old site, or the same temple serves for new deities.


1 Jos. B. v., Ant. xv. 11.; Mishnkh, tr. Middoth.
settled on the coasts of the Scottish islands, of Ireland, of the Netherlands, and of N. France. The last named, occupied by the Vikings under the leadership of Hrolfr, son of Rognvald, officer of Harold the Fair-haired, king of Norway, became after 911 the earldom of Normandy. From 866 onwards a large part of England too came under Scandinavian rule, though this domination was only temporary. In 870, however, those Norwegian chieftains who had become unwilling to accept the sovereignty of Harold the Fair-haired began permanently to settle in Iceland, and more than 100 years later, in 985, Greenland was colonized from Iceland. Contemporaneous with these events were similar movements across the Baltic, which probably emanated mainly from Sweden. The establishment of the Russian kingdom (traditional date 863) was due to such bands of adventurers. In the East we hear of raids by parties of Scandinavians as far as the Caspian.

2. The conversion of the Teutonic peoples.—As conversion was in general due to direct contact with the Romans, we find that the Teutonic peoples first converted who were settled within the territories of the empire. Before the middle of the 4th cent. the conversion of the Goths by Wulfila to the Arian form of the Christian religion had begun and was practiced for about a century. From then this religion must have spread very rapidly to the Gepidae in E. Hungary and to other neighbouring peoples, since the Vandals appear to have been converted before the great movement to the West began. The Rugii in the province of Austria, the Langobardi, and some of the Burgundians also adopted the Arian form of Christianity, while the Franks before the middle of the 5th cent. and the English in the 7th were converted to Catholicism. It was due largely to the efforts of Irish and English missionaries that between the 6th and 8th centuries the remaining peoples on the Continent (except the Danes), viz. Alamanni, Bavarians, Old Saxons, and Frisians, were converted. In the 8th cent. after great difficulty Charlemagne enforced the adoption of Christianity throughout the territory of the Old Saxons who had been conquered by him. Among the Danes and the Swedes missionary enterprises met with some temporary success, especially in the 9th cent. during the time of the missionary Bishop Ansgar (868 to his death in 905). But Christianity was not permanently established in Denmark till after the defeat of Harold Gormsson by Otto II. in 973. In Norway Hakon I. (934–980) and his successors Harold II. and his brothers (986–975) were Christians, but the country was very little affected till the time of Olaf Tryggvason (995–1000), to whom conversion was really due. Many of the Scandinavians settled in the British Isles were converted before the close of the 9th cent., and these countries had become entirely Christian in the course of the 10th century. Some of the early settlers of Iceland had been converted to Christianity in the British Isles, but it was abandoned by their descendants and not established in the island till 1000. The traditional date of the establishment of Christianity in Sweden was 1008, but it was only towards the close of the 11th cent. that the heathen religion was entirely abolished. The adoption of Christianity by the Russians dates from 988.

3. Authorities.—(1) The little information which we possess relating to the religion of the Teutonic peoples during the period before their invasion of Roman territories in the 6th cent. is derived from the writings of Caesar, Strabo, and Tacitus—especially from the former two—authentic, written in the 1st cent. Some little evidence is also furnished by Roman inscriptions. Still less information is to be obtained from the period during which the Teutonic peoples lived on the Continent when they were converted, though a few scattered notices are preserved in the writings of such contemporaries as Marcellinus, bishop of Poitiers (c. 550), and especially ofProcopius (about the same
data). In the 8th and 9th centuries a similar evidence is to be derived from laws and capitulations in which heathen practices are prohibited, and survivals of heathen practices are occasionally acknowledged. The authority of the 9th century, however, is almost entirely Greek and Latin, in the 7th and 8th century, and, with the exception of Jordanes, a monk of Gothic family, we have no records of Teutonic antiquity.

As to actual beliefs we learn very little. The only myth which has come down to us from the pagan period and connected obviously with an attempt to explain the name of that people is given by Thirion in his "History of the West Langar barbarians," an anonymous work dating probably from the 7th century. There are also two German metrical charms from Mecklenburg (9th and 10th centuries). Beyond this we have scarcely more than a few names, particularly those of the days of the week, which are translations from Latin and date probably from the 4th century.

(4) English.—In England most of the evidence available, which is by far the most important, is contained in the writings of Bede (c. 672—735), who, who in the Chronicule attached to the de Rationale Temporum has left an account of the English in heathen times. A few references to their religion before conversion are preserved also in the Ecclesiastical History. No Anglo-Saxon poem is known which contains evidence of heathen practices, though some certain amount of information relating to heathen practices and stones survives in Latin documents, which are an account, of the calendar used by the English in heathen times. A few references to their religion before conversion are preserved also in the Ecclesiastical History. No Anglo-Saxon poem is known which contains evidence of heathen practices, though some certain amount of information relating to heathen practices and stones survives in Latin documents, which are an account, of the calendar used by the English in heathen times.

The their sources, which are stored with attestations of historical events, I have examined somewhat closely, and have woven together stories and legends in a manner resembling a medieval epopee. Their importance evidence from earlier times is also to be obtained from inscriptions and sculptured monuments of the heathen

(4) Norway and Iceland.—(a) For the religion of Norway and Iceland far more abundant information is available from the sources, which is given in general is a more detailed account of the evidence of heathen ceremonies. The first important are the Islendinga Saga ("Stories of the Icelanders"). Anonymous works written chiefly in the 10th century, though a few may be slightly older. They are based on oral sagas-stories preserved by oral tradition in a more or less fixed form of words—found in the later part of the 10th and early 11th centuries. Among these special mention may be made of the Edda of Snorre Sturlason, which is the earliest extant book of poetry, which contains the religious practices of a certain Thorolf of Møre, who emigrated to Iceland c. 824 to escape from Harold the Fair-haired. The Edda contains many of the characteristics which are also given in Egils Saga, Njöls Saga, Völg-Vigna Saga. These sagas tell us much about the rites and beliefs of the heathen Icelanders both before and after the settlement. For throughout the period covered by the Islendinga Saga (c. 920-1000) it was the custom of the Icelanders to visit their country, and consequently the scene of the sagas is often laid in Norway.

Norwe. A 11th-century inscription from the island of Yggdras, contained in the same account, which is the earliest extant book of poetry, which contains the religious practices of a certain Thorolf of Møre, who emigrated to Iceland c. 824 to escape from Harold the Fair-haired. The Edda contains many of the characteristics which are also given in Egils Saga, Njöls Saga, Völg-Vigna Saga. These sagas tell us much about the rites and beliefs of the heathen Icelanders both before and after the settlement. For throughout the period covered by the Islendinga Saga (c. 920-1000) it was the custom of the Icelanders to visit their country, and consequently the scene of the sagas is often laid in Norway.

(c) The chief authority for the ethics of heathen times is the Edda poems called the Poetic Edda, which is preserved as a composite work, made up of five different poems. In substance it may be compared with Hesiod's Works and Days and Theogony, but with the one exception of Theogony, the heathen maxims occur in several other Edda poems, particularly in the Fornaldar Saga and the early works of Snorre Sturlason. The earliest Anglo-Saxon poems, though these do not often contain distinctively heathen precepts. The ethical standards of heathen times are no doubt faithfully portrayed in early Norse poetry and in saga relating to the same period. With certain reservations the same may be said of Beowulf and other Anglo-Saxon poems.

4. Difficulties.—One of the greatest difficulties which the student of Teutonic mythology has to face is the question of how far the mythological and religious practices found in Iceland alone or in Norway, or elsewhere, are derived from the older Teutonic religions and practices found in Iceland and Norway, that positive nor negative conclusions can be drawn with any confidence. Thus we have no information except from Norwegian and Icelandic sources of some of the more important early Teutonic resurrection myths, such as Frigg's thornchapel or Odin's scandin; yet are we justified in assuming that these deities were unknown except in Norway and Iceland? One is forced to hesitate; for occasionally evidence of their existence is found in the monuments and concepts in which one might justifiably have assumed to be the creation of Norse literature. Othnir's horse, Sleipnir—to quote one instance—is
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represented as having eight legs in Norse mythology, and we find a clear representation of such a hero worshipped as Odin, the god of Iduna, of Gotland.1 The riding valkyryr too (one of the most picturesque conceptions of Norse mythology) might well have been regarded as the creation of Norwegian poetry, had we not met with the same conception on a Swedish inscription at Rök; indeed with great probability it may be traced also in an Anglo-Saxon charm.

The difficulty which confronts the student is that at first sight there appears to be an irreconcilable discrepancy between the account of Norse mythology given by Snorri and the references to religious beliefs and observances recorded in the Íslendinga Saga. The former represents Odin as the chief and most important god of the Norse pantheon; and the early poems of the Edda and of the skalds agree with this representation. The Íslendinga Saga, on the other hand, scarcely records a single instance of worship of Odin. In them Thor is by far the most prominent deity, and after him Frey. It is only in the Formular Sagor, with the emphasis on valhalla, corresponding to the legendary period 2 that we find Odin prominent. The explanation of this fact is probably that the worship of Odin and that of Thor belong to different classes of the population; the former was the god of the royal families and of their retinue of followers, while the latter was the god of the free population in general. Kingship never existed in Iceland, and very few settlers appear to have been of royal blood, and consequently the god of this class of society, though still celebrated in poetry, does not seem to have received any actual worship.

Lastly, one characteristic of Norse mythology may doubtless be accounted for by the fact that so much of our information is drawn from Iceland. In peculiar contrast to the mythology of other peoples, the Norse deities are not associated with particular localities, and herein no student can fail to contrast Norse and Greek mythologies. Frey indeed is traditionally associated with Upsala, and there are indications which connect Gifjon with Sjælland; but these instances are rare. The homes of the gods mentioned in the Edda poems—Breithablik, the house of Balder, Himinbjorg, the home of Heimdall, etc.—seem to be purely mythical. Some evidence is to be found in the Roman-Saxon period, that various deities were connected with localities; Oneglia, Riga, Stockholm, and Iceland as well as with districts in other Teutonic lands. The reason for this comparative absence of local association is obviously to be found in the fact that by their emigration the colonists were cut off from the ancient sanctuaries of their race.

II. GODS, SPIRITS, AND MYTHICAL BEINGS.

Since Norse literature offers an abundance of material for the study of its mythology and religion, it seems almost necessary to make it the basis of any description of Teutonic mythology and religion. In the following account under each heading an attempt will be made to show also how far the testimony available for the mythology of the other Teutonic peoples is corroborative or discordant. In the first place, it is convenient to distinguish between (1) beings essentially mythical and (2) beings or phenomena in themselves natural but treated mythologically.

I. BEINGS ESSENTIALLY MYTHICAL.

- This class consists of the following: (1) aesar (sing. daz) and aesi (sing. dgsi); (2) yndi, yndi (sing. dgsi); (3) dvergir (sing. dvergr); (4) alfir (sing. alfr); (5) heimskir, noer; (6) valkyryr (sing. valkyrja), (7) fyjgar (sing. fylgja), (8) landeterir, (9) such impersonal conceptions as Yggdrasil's ash.

1 Cf. De Chastis, The Viking Age, I, 53.
2 Cf. Íslendinga Saga.
The association of Freyr with Upsala does not belong to this category. Besides their individual homes, the gods collectively are said to inhabit Asgard. Their meeting-place is called Ytha-völfr. In Gæstræks Saga, 7, the hero Starkathing is represented as attending a conference of the gods. The significance of this (together with Yggdrasíl's asb and the fact that völfr originally meant 'wood') is seen below, IV. 4.

A totally different account of the gods is given by Snorri, curiously enough, in the early chapters of Ynglings Saga. Here they are represented as men who had once lived on the earth and come to Sweden from S.E. Europe. Odin is represented as dying and being succeeded in the leadership of the gods by Njóðr, whose reign was marked by prosperity and peace. The latter on his death was succeeded by his son Frey, whose reign was of the same character. Frey was succeeded by his sister Freyja, and she in turn by Frey's sons, grandsons, etc., who are no longer represented as gods. 2 This story is no doubt of numismatic origin, but the association of Freyr with Upsala is ancient and traditional. In Saxo he is represented as instituting the Upsala sacrifices and is said to be the ancestor of certain Swedish warriors. Ynglings Saga itself is largely based on an early poem Ynglingatal, which traces the ancestry of the Scandinavian royal family through the god Freyr to Frey, who is probably to be identified with Frico of Adam of Bremen's account. 3

There are many stories relating the appearances of the gods to men. These occur most frequently in the Foraldrar Sögur, and the deity most mentioned in Odin. 4

(b) Danish and Swedish. On examining non-Norse sources, we find a number of the Norse gods mentioned by Saxo, including Woden (Othin), Thor, Freyr, Frigg, and Oller (Ullr), as well as Balder and Hoder (Höðr), who, however, are by him represented as demi-god and human being respectively. It is not always clear how far Saxo draws from jezehane sources, but there can be little doubt that the majority of these names can be traced back to Frey, who is certainly associated with Upsala and Sweden, and Saxo is also the only authority who gives the story of the Oller (Ullr). 5 With Saxo the home of the gods is sometimes called Byzantium, which apparently is used to translate Asgard. With regard to Swedish beliefs, we have important earlier evidence in Adam of Bremen's description of the sanctuary at Upsala. This contained the images of three gods, Thor, Woden (i.e., Odin), and a deity Frico, who is in all probability to be identified with Freyr. No stories of the gods are, however, recorded from Sweden. It was not until much later that we have a short account of the stories of the people of Thule (i.e. Scandinavia) written by Procopius. 6 The only deity specially mentioned by him is Ares, and it is not clear whether by this name we are to understand Odin or Tyr. An early trace of worship of Freyr may be preserved in the name Fröve(n)—the god among the Wagri of N.E. Holstein.

(c) English. For the mythology of the heathen English we have little or no information except that to be obtained from names. The A.S. word osa, corresponding to the O.N. ass, occurs as the name of one of the letters of the English alphabet (though here apparently its meaning is forgotten). 7 It also is to be found very frequently in personal names, as in Oswald, and the plural form occurs only in the genitive case in an A.S. charm. 8 The form Uth or assa does not occur, except in a few personal names—e.g., Wanaeara—unless this is possibly the origin of the preix winter in wintacne ('epileptic'), in which case we might compare elf-adu in Saxon Lœcchdun, 9 ii. 344. 50.

Othin's name is also preserved—A. S. Woden—as the ancestor of all the royal families except that of Essex, which traced its genealogy to a certain Saxenmeat. His name is also preserved in 'Wednesday,' (as a translation of Wodan's name). (O.N. Thor) is known only from 'Thursday' (where his name is used to translate 'Jupiter') and from certain place-names, e.g., Thunresleah and Thunresford.

The name of Fri (i.e. Frigg) is preserved only in 'Friday' (as translation of 'Venus'), and Ti (Tig) (O.N. Tyr) occurs in glossaries as translation of 'Mars,' and, like osa, is the name of one of the letters of the Runic alphabet. His name is preserved also in 'Tuesday.' In Bede's account of the heathen English calendar two months (corresponding to March and April) are said to derive their names from goddesses called Hrafn (Hraста) and Eastre (Easter). The existence of these deities has been doubted by some modern writers. We also find a reference, in a charm which appears to be a mixture of Christian and heathen beliefs, to Erce ('Mother of Earth'), with which we may compare Semmes Mate (Leitth). Lastly, mention may be made of Ing, the name of one of the letters in the Runic alphabet. In the verses dealing with Ing we are told that when Ing appeared first among the East Danes, but afterwards he went east over the sea, his car speeding after him.

(d) German. With regard to German mythology, a fragment relating to gods is preserved in one of the Merseburg charms, in which we are told that Wodan and 'Phol' were riding to the forest when the pastorn joint of the latter's horse was dislocated. Various deities tried by their incantations to put it right. The names mentioned are Friga and her sister Volva, 9 and Smithgund and her sister Sunna. The only other myth recorded occurs in certain Langobardic writings and is rather striking. 'The two tribes of Vandals and Langobardi (then called Wimines) appealed to the gods for victory in their war with each other. The Vandals approached Woden, who replied: 'Whatsoever I shall first look upon when the sun rises, to him will I give victory.' Woden appeared to Frigg, wife of Wodan, who gave counsel that at sunrise the women of the Wimines should come with their husbands and let down their hair about their faces, like beards. And when Woden saw the Wimines women, he said: 'Who are these Langobardi?' And Friga replied: 'As a token of the name give them also victory.' And he gave them victory.' 4

Apart from these references, the gods are known from the name of the week: Donar (O.N. Thor; A.S. Thanur) throughout the German area; Fria (Frigg, Fri) at least in the greater part of German area; Wodan (Othin, Woden) only in the north-west and in Holland; Ti (Tig) only in the south-west. Occasional references to the gods are also found in lives of missionary saints. Thus the worship of Wodan among the Alamanni is mentioned in Jona's Life of Columbanus, while in other cases German deities are no doubt intended by old names such as Jupiter. In a formula used after baptism and commonly supposed to have come from the region of the Old Saxons (though the language is rather peculiar) the convert is required to adjure Wodan and Thunor and Saxnot together with other monsters (Unholden) associated with them. This Saxnot is doubtless to be identified with the name that stands at the head of the genealogy of the Saxnot. Lastly, in Aelred's Life of St. Cuthbert we hear of a god called Fosite. He was worshipped on a certain island, called after him and identified

2 Cf. Thundersleagh in Essex and Thundersfield in Surrey.
3 Cf. Pelling's Old Norse mythology.
3 Gringo langobardiarm. 
by Adam of Bremen with Halogaland. 1 Grimm and others have identified this deity with Forsete, the son of Baldur, 2 but discrepancies in the spelling of his name have hindered this theory.

In Gothic no names of deities have been preserved, unless we place in this category the name of the Runic letter Enguz (A. S. Inguz). The word ananis, however (O. N. Annis), is of Teutonic origin. Hence it is generally accepted that Norse Thor is a name frequently used. The Teutonic Thor has a particularly interesting connexion. He states that the Gods called their chief to whose good fortune they thought they owed their victory, 'non parus homines sed seminodes id casae.' In early Norse times Thor, 3 though unfortunately he seldom mentions Teutonic deities by their native names, twice mentions Mars and Mercurius among the deities of the Germans, and in the Germania specially mentions Mercurius as the deity most worshipped by them. There can be no doubt that the deities meant are the later Zin and Wotan (N. Tirand Othin). In ch. 9 too he mentions Hercules and in Annals, ii. 12, a grove sacred to him. It is not easy to ascertain the identity of their deities. Some modern writers believe Donar (O. N. Thor); A. S. Thunor) to be intended; others think the reference is to a tribal deity. 4 In the same chapter Tacitus calls Thor the best shipman with the symbol of a ship. Here again we are left in doubt as to the identity of the deity. Perhaps we may include the 'templeum Tanfanne' mentioned in Annals, i. 21, and 'Iacum quem Badahemna vocabat' among their deities.

In Germ. 43 he speaks of a grove in which Castor and Pollux are worshipped under the name of deities. The fullest account, however, of a Teutonic deity which may be Thors is in the accenting with the inscription from the world. It is to be observed that the name Nertas is identical with the O. N. Jöthor, and, in spite of the difference in sex, we need scarcely doubt their original identity. Rites similar to those which Tacitus describes in connexion with Nertas are associated with Freyr, son of Jöthor.

Apart from Tacitus, practically the only reference to Teutonic deities occur in inscriptions upon altars raised by soldiers in the Rhenish forests. Besides Mars, these altars sometimes record a deity Nebalennia with the prow of a ship, and this may possibly be a reference to his connexion with the sea. In the introduction to Germ. 2 Tacitus states that in their ancient poems the Germans trace the origin of their race to a god called Tanito. When the race became settled he was the son of Jomunga ('Jomunga') (and he again had three sons from whom three groups of peoples were named and descendent. The former Ingaves (or Ingase), Pieaves, and Etaeaves. These groups-name are mentioned also by Filleni the Elder, and a genealogy of the kind classifying Teutonic and other peoples is found in Merovingian times. We have no trace elsewhere of any god or hero called Isis, but there is some slight evidence for an Irish. The name Ingaves (or Ingase) is undoubtedly to be connected with A. S. Ing, who is associated in tradition with the Danes and with the titles Ingulsa Eoder and Frea Ingulsa, used in Beowulf of the King of the Danes. It is further to be noticed that in Norse the god Frey and his descendants sometimes bear the title Yngvi, the full title of the god being Yngvi-Freyr or Ingim-Freyr. His descendants—the ancient kings of Sweden—are known collectively as Ynglings. It will be seen that there is some discrepancy between Norse and English tradition, the former connecting the name with Sweden, the latter with Denmark; whatever may be the explanation of this, the association of the word with Frey, the son of Jöthor, seems to point to some connexion with the worship of Nertas—a conclusion which is confirmed by the fact that Tacitus, with whom Filleni is substantially in agreement, refers to his deities as 'frost-giants.' 5

2. Jötnar.—(a) Norse.—Giants or monsters play an important part in the stories of Norse mythology. When viewed collectively, they are called jötnar or thursar. Sometimes also we hear of the jotnar, the 'frost-giants' and jotnar ('cliff-giants'). Most often, however, they appear singly, and the corresponding feminine form of the word jötunn is ygrir. Unlike the aseir, they do not appear to form an organized community as a whole, though sometimes individual jötunar (like Thrym, 'Lord of the Thursar') seem to have communities under their dominion. The home of the giant is known as Jötunhelmin, by some called by the name of the giant. The story, far to the north-east, remote from Asgard, the home of the aseir. The general characteristics of the giants were huge form and superhuman strength.

The story of Skrymnir 1 tells dramatically how huge and strong a giant was conceived to be in Norse literature. For the god Thor to take refuge one night in the thunor of one of his gloves, and, having placed it on his hammer, Skrymnir only asked whether a leaf had fluttered down into his face.

Although the giants may have had monster shapes, it seems clear that sometimes the giantesses were deemed very beautiful, as in the case of Gerthor, to whose radiant beauty Freyr lost his heart.

It is necessary to distinguish between anthropo-

and thoromorphous, though it is difficult to draw a definite line between them; e.g., Loki has thoromorphous children. Many of the former dwarf in runic inscriptions,捷 figures. Such giants, as they have been described as the sons of Frey, Thrymr, Hymir, Lungnir, Geirröthr, and Thjazi, all of whom fight with Thor, and are slain by him.

Sometimes the jötunar are on friendly terms with the aseir: cf. 2 Homer, if a thyrsus of Thor. Our picture of the goddesses is established through an appeal to her strength that the funeral ship was able to be launched. Further, we find a number of marriages between gods and giants; Njörð married Skath, the daughter of Thjalfa, 3 Freyr married Gerthor, daughter of Gyanir; and even Odin, father of the gods, had a son and Magri by a giantess Jarna-Saxa. This giantess, with others, the daughter of Geirröthr, appears as the mother of Heimdelin in Hymiltilfú, but this part of the poem (the short Vöðupsa) is commonly believed to be a late composition. The giants too are often represented as waiting to marry ygrir: Thjazi carries off Thun, and Freyja was sued for by Thrymr. It may here be mentioned that anthropomorphous giants often had the power to assume the form of animals. In the incident referred to above, Thjazi assumes the form of an eagle, and in Vatthváthmairi, 4 the wind-demon Hraenavarg is described as a jötn in the shape of an eagle.

Although the giants are presumably gifted with tremendous physical strength, they are not always lacking in intelligence. For we have an incident of Othin's visit to the giant Vatrathrúnin in order to learn of his store of wisdom.

The chief thoromorphous jötunar are the Mithgarthornar, or mountain-giants, and the Fenrisulf, both of whom together with Hiel are said to be the offspring of Lod and the giantess Angroth (she who bodes distress). Mithgarthornar is represented in Gylfasingin, 34, as a kind of vast serpent stretching round the earth. In Hymiskvitha, 23, Thor goes fishing and catches it on his hook. Fenrisulf is a wolf which the gods succeed after great difficulty in lettering, though not until he has bitten off Tyr's hand, which has been placed in his mouth as a pledge of the good faith of the gods. 2 At the end of the world he will burst his bonds and attack the gods in conjunction with Mithgarthornar, Loki, Surrr (a fire-demon), and other monsters. Although usually found in the company of the aseir, it would seem that Lod belonged to the jotunar. Here also we should perhaps mention Egir; the name of the being, who is on friendly terms with the gods and visits them. 4 From Formaldr Sigr, ii. 17, it seems clear that he was the son of Forncjotr, and in Hymiskvitha, 1, 2, he is described as a berys ("cliff-dweller") or a "frost-dweller"—both words are synonymous with jötunn. His wife is called Iara,
and is said to have a net in which she catches all who perish in the sea. There is a suggestion too from the story in Pétur Smári Sogu that a man drowning bath by drowning would do well to carry gold on his person in order to be received well in the halls of Ran. 1

Apart from mythological works monsters are not infrequently mentioned both in the Islandinga Söguðr and in sagas of the kings, as well as in the Formaldar Söguðr, though they are more usually called frökk than jötnar.

A Norse creature consists of two demons (male and female) at Sand Hagsa in the north of Iceland encountered by Greitr; 2 the female demon who ate eleven merchants in a frost house in the Norwegian mountains; 3 and the monster Brêt and his mother in the form of a black cat encountered by Ónar Stórólfsson in the Saga of Old Tryggvason. 4

In those Formaldar Söguðr which deal with the north of Norway, viz. Ketilt Saga Haengo and Grims Saga Lothinskamma, monsters are frequently mentioned. It may be noticed that Thorgestur Helgabréthr once appears among them, 4 and Saxo's Danish History abounds with such stories. Tales like these recall Procopius's remark: 'The rest of the inhabitants of Thule ... worship gods and demons in heaven and in air and in sea and certain other daemons which are said to be in the waters of springs and rivers.' 5

A spring was the home of Mimir. His story is given in Frey's Saga, 6 where the asir named Himör sends a pledge to the men, who cut off his head and return it to the asir. Óthin then smears the head with words to preserve it and keeps it for divining purposes. In Völuspá, 45, Óthin is said to converse with Mimir's head. We are told further 7 that under one of the roots of Yggdrasíi's ash is Aluminæwar ('Mimir's spring'), in which are hidden cunning and wisdom. Óthin is told later that the asir was drinking a drink and was refused until he left his eye as a pledge. This he granted, and in Völuspá, 98, the stëiþ says: 'Mimir drinks mead every morning from the root of the asir.'

A reference to a Miming is made by Saxo 8 in his story of Balder and Höðr. Here Miming is called the 'silvarum satyrus,' and is said to have in his possession 'a golden and magic bracelet, the former of which alone of all weapons will prevail against the charmed life of Balder.' At the beginning of Thithrekra Saga too Mimir is the name of the teacher, both of Sigfrid and Velint. It is to be noticed also that Miming was the name of Weland's famous sword in the poem of Waldhere.

Perhaps originally Mimir was famed for his wisdom, but later tradition laid stress on his skill in ✔

(c) German.—There is no doubt that these monsters were known also in Germany, where we 1 fon for them the words duris (i.e. thurses). No stories of them, however, from very early times have come to have been preserved, but mediaval German poetry and legend abound with references to such beings.

3. Dvergar.—(a) Norse.—Dvergar is the name given collectively to the dwarfs in Old Norse literature, and to many of them are assigned individual names in Völuspá, 15 ff., where also their connexion is said. In Gigfjörgfégningi, 14, Snorri tells us that they first received life as maggots in the flesh of Ymir, but were endowed with intelligence by the gods, and given human shape. The dvergar were said to live either down in the earth or more frequently in stones (rocks), in front of which they were sometimes seen in the evening.

Svegdr one evening at sunset saw a dwarf sitting under a stone, and, when the dwarf refused him gold, he tortured him and put an end to him.

It is perhaps to their connexion with rocks that the word for echo—dvergrmal ('dwarf-speech')—owes its origin. In Norse literature they were renowned particularly for their skill in metal-work, and those where the work was fashioned by their hands —so much so that a compound word has been formed to denote great skill, viz. dverg-heyr. 9

On most occasions the dwarfs appear in human form, though small, but in Reginndad Atlavari lives in a water-fall in the shape of a pike and is caught in that form by Loki, who borrows Baldr's net for the purpose. It is from him that Loki gets the gold required to ransom himself and his companions, Óthin and Höðr, from Hreimothri, and that Jókr after he plays an important part in the Völuspá says: 'The dvergar sages, after this; Andvari withdraws into the stone and curses all who shall possess the gold. 10

Possibly, too, 'Mingius, sylvanar satyrus' mentioned by Saxo is associated with dwarfs, and possibly this Mingius is identical with Völundr or Weland, the most famous of all such beings.

(b) The word corresponding to O.N. dowari is to be found in all languages of the Teutonic peoples extant—O.H.G. tveor, A.S. dowor. In A.S. literature we find a charm against a dwarf. Dwarfs are also figured in German folklore. Thus in the Seyfriedthiad the treasure which the hero won after killing the dragon belonged in reality to some dwarfs, sons of Nybing. 11

4. Aftár—see these see art. DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Teutonic), vol. iv. p. 635.

5. Norrn.—For these see art. DOOM, DOOM MYTHS (Teutonic).

6. Valkyriy.—(a) Norse.—Valkyries, or 'choosers of the slain,' were supernatural maidens sent by Óthin to determine the course of battles and to choose warriors for Valhall. They are also known as valkyriy, bålóyn, valkyriy, and okseyngar, and in Völuspá, 31— if the phrase is not an interpolation—they are called monnur herjas. By the Edda poems, Grimmismad, 36, and Völuspá, 31, we are given certain information about them, and of the former poem Snorri has made use in Gigf. 36. In Grimmismad our attention is drawn mainly to one aspect of the valkyries—their duties in Valhall; for Óthin is represented in the poem as crying to his maidens to bear him the ale as they do the einherjar, which are feasting in the evening in the hall. Here we have the names of thirteen valkyries given.

Snorri inserts this stanza from Grimmismad in his early account of Valhall in Gigf. 38, expanding it in prose and adding that Óthin sends these maidens to battle. He specially mentions—

1 Cf. art. DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Teutonic), vol. iv. p. 624.
2 Gigf. 155, 15; also Hóerrar Saga, 6.
3 See art. DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Teutonic), vol. iv. p. 633.
Guthr, Rosta, and Skuld, the youngest norm, as undertaking this work. It is this function of the Valkyries that the poet of Völuspá deals with in his poem. He gives a picture of a band of Valkyries, six in number and named, equipped and ready to ride into battle. From other references in Norse literature we learn that the four were riding in the air and over the sea ('lopt ok lög'), white and shining with their helmets, shields, and spears—a splendid company of maiden warriors.1

With the Valkyries may perhaps be compared the Slavic conception of the elka, who was thought to ride a seven-year-old stag and bridge him with snakes. The characteristic, attributed to her by the Slavs, of discharging fatal darts at men while in the air is especially interesting when compared with a similar reference in an A.S. charm.2

Other Valkyries, who became the wives and lovers of heroes, and are represented as human in origin, although included by Othin among his battle-maidens, are mentioned below.3 From a story in Saxo4 we hear of maidens called 'sympieic sylvester, who seem to be Valkyries.

Hotherus (O.N. Höðr), the enemy of Balder, was hunting in a wood when he came to a lodge where he was greeted by several Valkyries. Just as they were going to leave him, they told him that they had married him in that lodge to determine the fortunes of war and that often they secretly assisted their friends in battle, and gained thereby the victory.

Saemund and the Valkyries were so closely bound up with the fate of warriors and the issue of battles, it is clear that they cannot be entirely dissociated from the norms. The close relationship between the two conceptions is clearly seen in the poem given in Njáls Saga, 156.

There in the accompanying prose account a certain Darruth saw women riding twelve together to a bower and, looking within, he saw that they had set up a large 'nótt'—men's heads served for weights, men's entrails for the weft and warp, a sward for the cloth, and an arrow for the shaft. They sang at their work and in their song seemed to describe themselves as Valkyries, and finally they rode away, six to the south and six to the north.

Moreover, in Gylf. 36 Skuld, the 'youngest norm,' is included among the Valkyries. In contrast with the norms, however, the Valkyries are in Norse mythology associated chiefly with Othin, whose messengers they are, though in one passage quoted from Saxo they seem to assist Hother, who is an enemy of the gods.

(b) Anglo-Saxon.—In A.S. literature we find on several occasions the word wælcyrge (O.N. waelcyrge). In glossaries5 it is glossed 'Eriyris,' 'Belona,' 'Tisiphone.' In Wolstan's Sermon on Anglos the wælcyrge are clasped together with other words and in a clause mention is made of certain women who ride over the land and array their forces. They hurl darts at human beings, who are thereafter seized with sudden pain. The word wælcyrge is not mentioned in the latter example, but there can be little doubt that the lines refer to them.

(c) German.—In German the word does not occur, though the idea does in the Merseburg charm, where they are called idar. They are represented as fastening bonds, holding back the host, and tagging at the fetter.

7. Fyglir.—For these see art. SOUL (Teutonic).

Landvaettr.—Just as the fylgiu presided over the individual, so the landvaettr presided over the country as its tutelary spirits. A certain number of references are to be found in Norse literature, not the least interesting being the historical law mentioned in the Landnámabók, iv. 7, which ordered that figure-heads of ships were to be removed on approaching the island, lest they should frighten the landvaettr with their 'yawn-
ing heads and gaping snouts.' In Egin Saga, 57, Egil turns a curse against the landvaettr of Norway in order to free one Einar, King Eric and Gunn unhild, from whom he was fleeing. Sometimes landvaettr seemed to favour certain individuals, as was the case with Bjorn, the he-goat whom the Fyglir accompanied to the battle, and his brothers were accompanied by them when hunting and fishing.1

The landvaettr seem not always to be very clearly distinguished from the fylgiu of individuals; e.g. in the Saga of Olaf Tryggvasson (Heimskringla), 36, it seems to be suggested that the landvaettr of Iceland seen by the wizard are connected in some way with the great chiefs of the land. The word vaettr (pl. vaettir) is identical with A.S. wæht, 'creature,' etc., although the latter has not the specialized meaning of Old Norse. For the idea itself we may refer to the genius loci of the Romans.

9. Yggdrasil's ash.—Our information for Yggdrasil's ash is mainly derived from Völuspá, 19, 20, 27, and Grímnismál, 29–35. References also appear in Eyrkynnsáld, 15–18. From Völuspá we learn that the ash Yggdrasil, from whose lot falls over the well of Úrðr ('Fate'), and from it falls dew into the vales beneath. Under this tree dwell the three norms. In Grímnismál not only do we learn that 'trexgoe' goes daily to the judgment-seat under the ash, but we are given many details about its appearance.

It has three roots stretching in three directions. Hel dwells under one, the forefathers under another, and under the third of the children of men. Its branches are the home of an eagle, a hawk, and a squired Bataatik, who bears messages to Nithög dwelling below. Four harts gnaw the ash, their branches, and many are the serpents which lie under its boughs.

In Gylf. 15f. Snorri adds that in the spring of Fatre dwell two swans, from whom are sprung all birds of that race, and also from the branches of the ash drops dwell called 'honey-dew,' on which bees feed. The ash is sometimes called Yggdorasl, Askr Yggdrasill, Lóðrithr, Mjötvítir, and Mima-neithr seem to be names for the same tree. In both Grímnismál and Eyrkynnsáld we have indications that the ash is being gradually destroyed; a hart bites it from above, it rots in its side, and Nithög gnaws it from beneath. And, according to Völuspá, 47, the last years come, it will shiver and groan. The golden foliaged Glásir which stands by 'Sigtuns' halls' is perhaps to be identified with it. One other striking passage should be mentioned—Yggdrasil is described as hanging on that tree of which no one knows from whose roots it proceeds.

A similar conception to that of a world-tree is certainly to be found among other Teutonic peoples—e.g., among the Old Saxons, who worshipped the Irmenusl. Several features in Adam of Bremen's description of the tree beside the temple of Upsala also recall Yggdrasil's ash.2

ii. NATURAL THINGS VIEWED MYTHOLOGI-
CALLY.—1. Day and night.—From references in Vafthrásinnatal, 13, 25, Night, the daughter of Nórr, is depicted as driving across the sky her chariot and as a reinman, from whom falls the spume which makes the dew in the valleys. Of Day we are only told that he is born of Dellingr. In Gylf. 10 Snorri gives further genealogical details. In Aslenssáld, 30, is given a list of names by which Night is known among the jötnar, elves, and gods. In the document Haukr Noregr Bygthi we find a genealogy traced back to Swan the Red, son of Dag, his son of Deilár, and the lady of Sol, daughter of Dulitt. For the personifi-

1 Cf. Landnámabók, iv. 12.
2 Cf. Skåldskaparmál, 56.
3 Cf. schoo. 134 to Adam of Bremen.
4 See art. SIX, MOON, AND STARS (Teutonic and Balto-Slavic).
5 Cotton MS, Vitellius A 15.
6 Cotton MS, Vitellius A 15.
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Greek mythology, especially the allusions to the chariots of the Sun and the Moon. 1

2. Sun: For this see art. SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Teutonic and Balto-Slavic).

3. Rainbow.—To the old Norse people the rainbow was the bridge built by the gods to span the space between earth and heaven. Birnæs or Birna was also the name, and it was triple-hued. Though it is made with cunning and of great strength, Snorri tells 2 that the day will come when it shall be broken. This bridge is referred to as Birnæs in the Older Edda, though it is not explicitly identified with the rainbow. In Gylf. 27 Heindallr is named as guarding it against the frost and cliff giants.

4. Winds and seasons.—In Vafthrúðnismál, 27, 37, references are made to the winds and seasons. The winds, according to the poet, arise from beneath the wings of the giant Hraesvelgr, who sits at the end of heaven in the form of an eagle. In Vafth. 27 Vindőr is said to be the father of Winter and Svasudr of Summer. In Gylf. 18 Snorri gives further details, explaining that the difference between Summer and Winter is to be accounted for by the difference of parentage, for each has inherited the disposition of his father.

5. Thor.—In the preceding paragraphs we have been considering those natural phenomena which are scarcely distinguished from the natural bodies or phenomena which have given rise to them. There can be no doubt, however, that other mythological conceptions originated from similar phenomena in early times, though their identity with these was subsequently forgotten. Thus the name of the god Thor is identical with the word for "thunder" preserved in English and German. The identity was practically forgotten in Norse owing largely to the fact that the word had gone out of use, but it is clearly preserved in Adam of Bremen's account of the Upsala sanctuary, where he speaks of Thor, "qui tonat et fulmina...gubernat." 3 We may refer also to the "malos jovinles" which were carried off by the Danish prince Magnus on one of his raids among the Swedish islands, and which, according to Saxo, 4 had been venerated as symbols of thunder.

In English and German the name of the god is not distinguished, and consequently with the small evidence at our disposal it is not always clear which of the two was meant. The thunder-god (especially personifications of thunder) is of course wide-spread among the people of Europe. It is sufficient here to refer to the Tanais of the Celts (whom name appears to be identical with that of the Scandinavian Thor), Jupiter Tonans of the Romans, Zeus Keraunios of the Greeks.

6. Odin.—Many writers hold that Odin originated in a personification of the wind. This view is largely based upon the association of the god with the raving host, the antiquity of which is not very clear. The name Woden itself, which seems originally to have meant "inspired or frenzied," hardly furnishes a parallel to the case of Thor.

7. Jötnar.—It has been supposed that writers who not only gods but also jötnar largely owe their origin to personification of natural phenomena. The krímikursarr ("frost-giants") indeed, of whom we often hear collectively, can hardly be of other origin. The friendly jötnar Aegir is very closely associated with the sea, for which his name is often used in poetry. There is some reason also for suspecting that Thrymr, the jötnar who takes Thor's hammer, was a counterpart of Thor, a rival thunder-god. It has been proposed by some that the eaten Grendel in Beowulf arose from a personification of storm-dooms, but this explanation is open to the objection that the story is clearly based on an early folk-tale, the original locality of which has not yet been determined. If the jötnar in general had been derived from the personification of natural phenomena, we might expect them to have an obvious meaning for their names, as in the case of Thor and perhaps of Thrymr, but as a matter of fact the etymology of the majority of their names is quite obscure.

According to another view, which has obtained more currency in recent times, the jötnar largely represent the communities of a more primitive race or civilization. This view also can be justified in some cases by the records. The giant Hrungr fights against Thor with a horn, which may perhaps represent a stone hammer, and the word berg-búti ("mountain-hut") points in the same direction. In some stories, as in the case of Grendel, the jötnar have cannibal propensities, and for this practice there is thought to be evidence in the way human bones are found mixed with those of animals in the Norwegian countries. It is based occasionally also on the word jötna in applied to witches of "Finnish" (Lappish) origin, while in Hyndluljóth Heithr is said to be the daughter of the jötnar Hrungr.

Occasionally also the word jötna is applied in some MSS to persons also described as Finnr, as in the case of Swasi, father-in-law of Harold the Fair-hand. In the genealogy of the gods given in the document Íversu Norrøn Bryggjó's some connexion is hinted at between Finn and Jötna. With the evidence at our disposal we are not yet in a position to determine their origin. It has been suggested also that the dwarfar may be derived from communities of more primitive inhabitants.

8. Nornir.—The nornir bear so close a resemblance to the volva ("wise women"), not infrequently mentioned in the sagas, that there can be little doubt that they are at least partly derived from them. Sometimes indeed the words norn and volva are used interchangeably.

9. Valkyria. It is not unlikely that the valkyrja is a word of Germanic origin. Sometimes the name is applied to human beings endowed with supernatural powers, as, e.g., to Svava, the heroine of Helgakviða Hryrvarðsoðar, and to Sigrun in Helgakviða Hunding-bana II., and to Sigrdrifa, a valkyrie who was punished by Olthor for not carrying out his commands. And, as most authorities identify her with Brynhild, the term is applied to the latter also. This conception of human valkyries is not confined to the North. For, in Wulstan's Scrvn ad Anglos, wodegar are mentioned besides wiccean, among a list of bad characters, from which the country is said to be suffering. 7 It is more difficult, however, to explain how the conception arose. We hear of fighting women more than once in Saxo, and the human skyldamenn in the Atlakviða point perhaps in the same direction.

10. Kings.—Among other human beings we may notice especially kings who were credited with supernatural powers both during their lives and after their death. Two of the legendary kings of Sweden, Dönlaid and Olaf Trétegja, are said to have been put to death to order bad harvests for which they were held responsible. 8 This belief lasted down to late times, since Gustav Vasa is

1 See art. DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Teutonic), vol. iv. p. 620.
2 Cf. H. I. 6 (P).
3 Fælingsk Saga, 18.
said to have complained that the Swedes blamed him for bad weather. Nor was it peculiar to the North. According to Ammianus Marcellinus, xx. 42. 4, *History* among the Burgundians to depose their kings in time of famine as well as after military disaster.

11. The dead.—Norse literature shows by constant reference both to the temple-toll and to the dead a belief in supernatural powers. Among those most commonly referred to is that of bringing prosperity and abundant harvest.

In *Fingolfs Saga*, xii, the god Freyr is said to die, but his dead body was never seen by the subjects of the Swedes. His dead body was preserved that prosperity might abound in the land. A similar story is told about Haldan the Black, for his body after death was cut in four pieces, which were buried in different parts of the kingdom, so that all sections of the land might have plentiful years. A similar belief underlies the story of Olaf Grímnalds-son, and that of Guthmundr, who after death was thought by his people to be a god, and was therefore worshipped. Yet another example is to be found in *Lundamæl*, 1. 14, where Þórrór Sjúfarr is mentioned as being worshipped after death. A curious instance of worship of the dead occurs in *Kristni Saga*, 2, where the missionary Thórunn takes by a necromancer from the Church in which the ancestor (ár-mæður or spá-mæður) of the latter is said to have dwelt for a long time. Kodran averred that, when the missionary had sprinkled the stone with holy water, his ancestor had come out and complained that the water had scalded his little finger.

12. Yggdrasil’s ash.—This is a very complex conception, as it may be seen from the variety of phenomena attatched to it.4 The descriptions indeed are hard to visualize and are apparently inconsistent. Sometimes the ash seems to spread out over the whole world; sometimes again it is represented as a definite locality to which the gods ride or walk to hold their court. If the tree called Lóður is a ninth wonder, it is to be identified with the ash, as seems probable, it must be regarded as standing very near to Othin’s hall. Now it was, and indeed still is, the custom for country houses in the North, especially in Sweden, to have standing by them a tree known as várdræði (‘protecting tree’), on which the worship of the house is supposed to depend. Such trees were doubtless regarded as especially sacred in heathen times, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that the original conception of Yggdrasil’s ash may have been that of a várdræði of the divine community. In *Voluspa* the reference to the ash seems to point to a tree on which the destiny of the country is laid rather than to any comprehending world-tree. That its origin is to be found in actual trees is rendered probable by the Irmanen, which likewise was all-comprehending (‘universal column’),7 and there is no reason to think that for this was a real tree, or rather a tree-trunk, in spite of the property assigned to it. Further, the adjutants mentioned in *Grímnismál* and *Gylfaginning*,7 the harte, snakes, etc.—all of which are connected with grove sanctuaries. We may refer particularly to those of the Lithuanians and Prussians, especially to the sacred one at Romove. It was forbidden to injure any birds or animals in such groves. The description indicates that the sacred oak as such was a good omen and furnished an interesting parallel to Yggdrasil’s ash from real life. In the North itself we can find parallels for all the features involved; e.g., snakes seem to have dwelt in the sacred oak described from the North sanctuaries before the date of our records, yet a very interesting analogy in some respects is furnished by the description of the sacred tree at Upsala in scholion 134 to Adam of Bremen’s *History*.

iii. Cosmology.—See *art. Cosmogony and Cosmology* (Teutonic).


III. WORSHIP.—The Teutonic festivals are treated separately under the heading FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Teutonic). There are also separate sections on SACRIFICE (Teutonic). The various superstitions are covered under the headings DIVINATION (Teutonic), MAGIC (Teutonic), and ORDEAL (Teutonic), and under the later section to speak of prophecy and the priesthood.

1. Prophecy.—According to Tacitus, *Hist.* iv. 61, numbers of women among the Germans were considered to possess the gift of prophecy in consequence of which many were revered as goddesses, though he denies elsewhere that the veneration paid to them was so great as this. One of the chief of these prophetic women was known as Veleda, a prophetess of the Bructeri, who ruled over considerable territory. To increase the honour in which she was held, she lived at the top of a high tower, and questions and oracular responses were conveyed to her and the public by a near relative ‘like a messenger who had converse with the gods.’12 The name Veleda, strictly speaking, does not appear to be a proper name but a Gaulish word for ‘prophetess.’ We may here mention the story of the Goth Orm, who in his last campaign was met on the banks of the Elbe by a woman taller than human who prophesied to him the manner of his death even as it afterwards came about.4 According to Strabo, the Cymbri had prophetesses who practised divination with slaughtered prisoners.6

2. Priesthood.—(a) Priest.—(i. In Norway, and especially in Iceland, the duties of the priest were performed by the leading magistrates. Sometimes, however, it was the chief who undertook the office.4 During the colonization of Iceland the more important of the chiefs who went out from Norway built their own temples, not infrequently of the wood of which their temples had been made in Norway. Thus we read in *Eyrbyggja Saga*, 4, that Þórtórr of Móstr built a temple to Thor of such wood. To this temple all the men in his own district had to pay a tax called ‘temple-toll,’ but the chief himself paid for the upkeep of the building and performed all the necessary duties in connection with the temple and the temple services, while at the same time exercising judicial authority over the people of the neighbourhood. Again in *Hrafnkjóla’s Saga* *Freyr* and *Gímróth*, 2, we are told that there existed at that time a temple of Freyr in Atthóló, where he ‘made offerings to Freyr of the half of all the best things that he had.’ Hrundkósi settled the whole of the valley and gave land to people on condition that he should be regarded as their chief and exercise the authority of his office over them.7

The priest was called *golithi*, and his office *golithr*. In each *golithr* was a consecrated place set apart for the thing (gathering of the people). Small settlers who were not of sufficient substance and authority to build temples of their own joined one or other of the *golithr* so as to have the benefit of the temple services and the temporal protection of the *golithi*. So inseparable was the political function from that of the priest in Iceland that the *golithr* formed the starting-point for the foundation of the constitution of Iceland. The title of *golithi* continued in existence after the adoption of Christianity, although now it had lost all religious significance and was no more than magistrate (*lögumkvæði*). It is interesting to observe that the *golithr* was a hereditary office and could even be bought and sold like any other property.8 This combination of priesthood with secular authority existed also no doubt in Norway, whence the original priests of Iceland came, though—and here is a difference from Iceland—the power of the
local chiefs in Norway was subordinate to that of kings. The word *gothi* is occasionally applied to local chiefs—e.g., to Thorhárd the Old, who was *høf-gothi* at Maerum in Trondhjem 1—and on several occasions we hear of priests in Iceland who had formed the *høft*. On such occasions, the *høft* is stated to have acted through the chief's **sáni**. The *sáni* of Håkon the Good (Heimskringla), 16, gives an account of a great sacrificial feast at Hlíðar of which Earl Sigurðr sustained the whole cost himself, and of a sacrifice to Tyr in Snæfellsnes (Heimskringla, 76), we learn that it had been the custom of Olaf's predecessors to offer sacrifices in Trondhjem. In poetry we sometimes meet with such expressions as *virðr rístalla* ('guardian of the altar') applied to kings of the past. In cases where this is as in Iceland, it is clear that no exclusively priestly class existed, and that priestly duties were in all cases combined with temporal power.

For Denmark very little evidence is available. On three Runic inscriptions found in Fyn, and dating approximately from the 9th cent., the word *kultti* (i.e. *gothi*) is found in combination with the word *manni* for a common word, Hróulf and Ali are said to have been *rukar* (Nora-gothi) and *nuuluubaut* (Sölr-gothi) respectively. It has been suggested that Nørri and Söleri are the names of men; but it seems at least equally possible that these words imply that if a deity of this kind is as, Hróulf and Ali may have been local chieftains, like those on the west coast of Norway. It is significant that Saxo, who frequently refers to the laws and customs of heathen times, makes no references to a priestly class in Denmark.

For Sweden the evidence is more abundant. Adam of Bremen states in connexion with the great temple of Ypsala

> "Assigns to all the gods that they have priest to present the sacrifices of the people."

It does not necessarily follow perhaps from this statement that the duties referred to these persons were of an exclusively priestly nature. Elsewhere the evidence seems rather to point to a union in Sweden, like that in Norway and Iceland, of priestly duties with secular authority.

Thus we read in *Younga Saga*, 47, that a famine which arose in the days of the legendary king Olaf *Trjóltakýr* was attributed by the people to the king's remissness in offering sacrifices; and even through the cenotaphs of the kings, as in Herastick Saga, ad fin., of one ÞóUGHTS in *sacrificing-Svein*), obtaining its name through his use of his promise to officiate on behalf of the people, which he actually carried out. Rimhótt describes the formal definition of the Swedish king *Eric*; and it will be remembered that the national Synod, the *Ynglinga*, traced their descent from the god Frey.

Thus, while the evidence is perhaps less direct and convincing for Sweden than for Norway, it seems on the whole to indicate a close union from the earliest times between secular and religious power.

(ii.) Except in Tacitus references to priests among the Teutonic peoples are of rare occurrence. In later times we read in the *History of Ammianus Marcellinus* that the priests of the Burgundians were presided over by a chief priest who held his office for life. *Jordanes* states that the priests of the Goths were of secular extraction.

(iii.) We learn from *Beowulf* that the priests of the ancient English were forbidden to bear arms and to ride except on mares. Heathen priests are also referred to, perhaps the most interesting instance being that of Coili.

*Edda*, in his description of the shipwreck of *Wulfstan* off the Sussex coast, refers to the *prince *sacerdotum nobilissimorum* standing both on country land and on the sea, and by his magic arts seeming to cast fetters on the hands of the people of God.

(iv.) Among the Teutonic peoples of the Continent in ancient times the priestesses have to have combined to a great extent spiritual with temporal powers. According to *Tacitus*, his duties were threefold: (1) the consultation of omens on public occasions, (2) the performance of sacrifices, and (3) the guardianship of the sacred groves and symbols, and other holy objects, which they also carried with the host to battle. They no doubt had duties also in connexion with the sacred public rites. Indeed it may be said that their functions as a whole were essentially of a public character. There is little or no trace of any mystical relationship between the priest and the god, or of any peculiarly spiritual qualification in the priest such as we find noted, e.g., in the case of prophetesses like Veleda, or in the account of the Druids given by *Diodorus*.

(b) Priestesses.—(i.) In Iceland the word *gýfylk* (‘priestess’) occasionally occurs, and seems to be applied to women belonging to the ruling families of Iceland (i.e. those who held *g dyst yr*).

In *Kristin* we are told that the woman who was ‘in the temple offering sacrifices’ while Thorvald was preaching the Christian faith hard by. The *g yfylk*, however, is said to be merely a ‘sacred priest’, and it is possible that she was only acting as deputy for her husband, who was absent at that time (‘general assembly’). Mention is made in *Viga-gils* Saga, 10, of a woman called *Steinhv*, who is described as *høf-gýfylk* (‘high priestess’) and who occupied the highest station among the clergy (‘public temple’) and claimed temple-toll. When she wished to enforce the civil authority of the *g dyst yr*, she was obliged to apply to her kinsman *Iðr* for help. But that she was conscious of her full religious responsibilities seems to be borne out by an amusing anecdote given in *Kristin Saga*, 5, of a ‘flying’ between *Thangbrandr* the priest and one *Steinhv*, the mother of the poet *Reid*, who is without doubt to be identified with the *Steinhv* mentioned in *Viga-gils* Saga. *Thangbrandr* is told that, after she had preached heathenism to *Thangbrandr* at some length, she made the startling announcement that ‘Thor challenged Christ to fight in single combat; but he dared not fight against Thor!’

Beyond this, however, there is no evidence of priestesses in the old Scandinavian countries, except indeed to persons of a different character, these references are no more than suggestive.

In *Stavanger Saga*, 12, 13, we are told of *høf-gýfylk* in a temple, which, however, was *Finnish*. Again in *Younga Saga*, 4, we are told that the goddess Freyja was a *bild-gýfylk* (‘sacred priestess’), and that after *Freyr* had been kept up the temple and sacrifices at Upnax. Here also we are told from the story of Gunnarr Helming, who is related in ch. 278 of the *Saga of Olaf Tryggvesson* (*Platesjuridik*) to have personated the god *Freyr* after destroying his idol. *Freyr's* fires was kept in a temple in Sweden, and his shrine is said to have been attended by a young and beautiful woman who was known as his wife, and with whom he used to make an annual progress through the land, driven in a chariot. This person is not actually called a priestess (*gýfylk*), but at all events she apparently had charge of the sanctuary and interpreted the answers of the god. We may here compare the account of Freyja, who in *Younga Saga*, 4, is said to have upheld the sacrifices at *Upnax* after the death of *Freyr*.

(ii.) We have no definite evidence for the existence of priestesses in the strict sense of the term among the Teutonic peoples. Tacitus speaks of ‘numbers of women of prophetic power,’ but these recall the *wäldr* rather than the priestesses of the North. The former existence of a priestess may, however, perhaps be inferred from the account of the sacred grove of the Nahanarvall, which is said to have been under the charge of a priestess *

IV. Temples and Sanctuaries.—(a) Iceland.—(i) In the last temples the temple was the centre of jurisdiction, one belonging to each of the 39

1 In the last duty he was accompanied by the king; cf. *Germ. 10*, 11.
2 *Ib.* 7, 11.
3 *Ib.* 7, 11.
4 *Ib.* 7, 11.
5 *Ib.* 7, 11.
6 *Germ.* 43.
gathorh. One of the fullest descriptions of such temples which we possess occurs in Eyrbyggja Saga, 4.

Here we are told that Thórríðr of Mosefjord set up a great temple to Thor by river's. There was a door in the wall near one end of the temple with a great cross-bar of silver, which were called roynslagur ("holy pogs"). On these pillars the image of Thor was carved. The temple was of a very holy place. At the end of the temple furthest from the door there was an annexe like a large paling round the place, and in the midst of the floor stood a stalti which served as an altar, and thereon lay a jointless ring weighing twenty ounces on which all who served the temple had been sworn. It was a cross-bar upon his arm at all assemblies. On the stalti stood also the sacred drinking-cup wherein was sacred wine, which served as a sprinkler, wherewith was sprinkled the blood from the bowl which was called hlaut-bolli. That was the blood that was shed by such creatures as were sacrificed to the gods. In the annexe round about the stalti were the gods ranged. To that temple all men had to pay tribute, and they were under obligation to accompany the temple priests on all such journeys as thingmen now take with their chiefs, and the godhi kept up the temple at his own cost so that it should not fall out of repair, and in it he upheld the sacrificial feasts.

Some additional details are furnished by the descriptions of the temple at Kjalarnes in Ærlings Saga, 2, 4.

This temple was 60 ft. in breadth, and, like the one built by Ingimundr in Vatsafjord, 100 ft. in length. Thor was the god most honoured in that temple. The interior of the temple was circular, like a hull of a ship. Thor stood in the midst of it, and other gods were ranged around him. He was made with great skill and covered with iron. On it there was a fire which was never allowed to die down. They called it the "consecrated fire." On that stalti there lay also a great "ring" of silver. The temple priest wore it on his arm at all assemblies. Men took the godhi's word on it. On that altar there lay also a great bowl of copper into which was poured the blood which came from the cattle which were sacrificed to Thor or from men. This blood they called hlaut, and (the bowl they called) hlaut-bolli. Men and cattle were sprinkled with the hlaut, but the temple priest threw them for entertaining the company when sacrificial feasts were held. And the men who were sacrificed were sunk in the pool which was outside by the door, and which was called hlotbelda ("sacred spring"). The temple was surrounded by a wooden fence too high to climb, and both the temple and the fence contained doors that locked. Finally we are told that the beams of the temple were very excellent.

Thorhœdr the Old, like many another, took the temple-mould and the high-seat pillars from his Norwegian temple and used them for his temple in Iceland. We are also told that Jónurðr godhi raised a temple in Svertingestathir. Numerous of their instances might be cited.

In Kristni Saga, 3, heathen sacrifices are mentioned as being offered in a temple at Hvamm. In Hrafnkels Saga Freyrgitha, 3, we are told that Hrafnkels raised a great temple to Frey in Athabal. This temple stood on a rock above the sea; on its side was a pool in the river and contained images of the gods which had some kind of rock over it. Some of the rocks upon them. A sacrifice offered to Frey is also mentioned in Ægle Glæs Saga, 5, as being "on the sacred place called Hrafnkelsstathir." From the same saga we read that there were three temples on Eyjafjörðr. In ch. 55 we have an interesting confirmation of the accounts of the cathedral mentioned above. In the temple in Dýjafjörd on Eyjafjörðr "whoever took the temple-oath took in his hand the silver ring which was reddened in the blood of the cattle sacrificed and which weighed fully three ounces." Possibly the ring of Tomar (Thmorn) which was carried off from Dublin by King Charles Malachi in 994 was one of the sacred rings upon which oaths were sworn. Here we may compare the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, where the oath-ring is represented as the most binding form of engagement known to the Danes.

(ii.) Not only the temple itself, but also the land round about, was regarded as sanctuary.

Thus in Eyrbyggja Saga, 4, we are told that Thórríðr of Mosefjord held and kept a hill in the precincts of his temple on Thornsæ. Here the thing of the men of the Western Firths was held, and Atli Ósvingr was allowed turn his ring and was never vexed, and no blood was to be shed there. Thórríðr's sons preserved the sanctuary inviolate as long as they could; and, when it had been violated a blood feud was kindled by the Norsemen, and the place was declared unhallowed and the thing removed to another part of the promontory, where the dómbrungur is still pointed out to travellers—"the one of the holiest places.

A curious tradition of sanctity is found in Landnámabók, ii. 16. Author the Deep-Minded was a Christian. She was accou-\ndeemed to say that God's note was raised for the promotion of the place. No sooner was the temple raised there, for she was baptized and a good Christian. Members of her family afterwards showed great reverence for that hill. A great many offerings were made there when they began sacrifices. They believed that they would pass into the hill when they died.

(b) Norway.—(i.) From Eyrbyggja Saga, 3, we learn that, before Thórríðr of Mosefjord left Norway for Iceland, he had charge of Thor's temple on the island of Mosefell. He was a great friend of Thor. The framework of this temple was transferred bodily to Iceland. Another island is mentioned in the Saga of Olaf Tryggvason 4 as containing a large temple dedicated to Thor. Guthbrandr of the Dales also possessed a temple dedicated to Thor. 5 His predecessor was a great friend of Earl Hákon of Hlíðir. They had a temple in common in Guthbrandstala, which contained figures of Thor and of Hód's patron goddesses, Thorgerðr and Írpa. Thorgerðr is described as being as tall as a full-grown man and having a hood on her head. Thor was seated in his car, and all were adorned with clothes or ornaments and had gold rings on their fingers. The temple of his at Hlíðir is said to have been the two chief temples in Norway. 6 When Earl Hákon first took possession of Norway, 7 he commanded throughout his whole kingdom that the temples should be maintained, 8 and later, when the emis-\nsaries of the emperor Otto had overthrown the temples of S. Norway, Earl Hákon caused them to be restored and the heathen sacrifices to be re-\n\n\n
1 Cf. Vatnsaele Saga, 15.
2 Here we may compare the story given in Landn. v. 12 of Kongsset. The vikings were so rich that the order was given to make a cross-beam of silver in the temple which they were building on Mounteb. His son, however, did not carry out his orders.
3 Cf. Landn. v. 12, p. 63; cf. also 8, 9, 19.
4 Cf. Annals of the Four Masters, sub ann. 994. Sub ann. 876. 5 Cf. ib. 10, 10.
7 Cf. Flateyjarbók, 313.
8 Cf. Olaf's Saga of Olaf Tryggvason (Flateyjarbók), 31.
9 Fl. 31; cf. also 319-319.
10 Flateyjarbók.
11 Fl. 295.
12 Cf. 2, 4.
13 Ct. e., e.g., Holmsvölska Hýrvarðskmam, 4.
The phrase 'höhr' and 'hof' high-timbered' occurs also in 
Vulpe, 7. It has been suggested that the word 'high-timbered' is merely conventional and that the höhr was a stone structure as opposed to the wooden temples so common in Norway and Iceland. In Órvar Odda Saga, 29, we are told that Oddr 'burnt a hof and broke a höhr'; but in the pagan days both hof and hörr were spoken of as 'being burnt.' Hof and hörr are spoken of as burnt in ch. 165 of the Saga of Olaf Tryg- 
gvason (Fornmanna Sagar). But in ch. 141 of the same saga we are told that the king commanded 'a hörr and hof to be burned.' The hörr is frequently mentioned in connexion with women.

Thus in Gýf, 14 the goddesses are said to inhabit 'a hörr which was a very fair house.' It was called Vingdæt.' In Hér- 
ræra Saga, 1, Starthath is said to have carried off Alfhildr as she was 'walking beside a high-timbered' night after 
the great disband. After the death of Ænir the Christian, her relatives made a hörr on the hill where she had set up her 
crosses.

The word is still traditionally connected with high places in popular speech. Thus, when the 
land lies deep in snow, the Icelanders say that 'only the highest högr or jut out.' And in the Norwegian 
periods the hov or hörr was a resting place of a hörr. Perhaps the word is a survival of an older form of 
religion when places of worship were more primitive than the carefully constructed hof. It is obviously 
connected ultimately with the O.H.G. harne.

(iii.) It will be seen that there are certain obvious 
discrepancies in regard to the use of the term hörr.
It appears in some cases to have been a cairn, but in 
other cases it is a high and noble place. Sometimes it is made of stone, in other cases perhaps 
of wood. The difficulty is increased by the fact that the 
word is obviously identical with the early Ger-
man word hurn, which is used to gloss the words 
scumae, lucus, while the corresponding A.S. húr is 
also perhaps used for 'grove.' Such woods or groves were probably common in early 
times, since many place-names are composed 
with the word hurn (sacred grove). Moreover, 
the usual name for the place of assembly in the 
North is thingsgöl, which must originally have 
meant 'wood of the assembly,' söl being cognate 
with the German hurn (forest).

The legendary sanctuary at Glasirvellir 1 previously 
was probably connected with a holy grove, and is 
no doubt identical with Gliasir, the name of one 
of the ash trees by Vallotin, Ötinh, a heathen 
place, mentioned in Skjaldskaparmál, 31. It is a forest 
clearing that the gods meet to decide the fate of Starthath. 2 According to a 
myth, the name of the goddess 
'goddess of the green justica) 
under Æggras.ash. Perhaps we may also instance Tomar's 
wood, which was situated near Dublin. It has been 
suggested that this means 'grove of Thor.'

It is noteworthy that the two great assembly 
places, Frosta and Gaula, are both on peninsulas. 
Sacred islands may also have been known, as can 
perhaps be inferred from the occurrence of such 
names as Njardrey, Vé-ey, Thorsey, and possibly 
Halogaland.

(d) Sweden. — (i.) The great temple of the Swedes 
was at Upsala.

The Swedes have a most magnificent temple which is called 
Upsala (Upsala) not far distant from the city of Sigtuna (Sigturna). 
In this temple, which is fitted (f) entirely with gold, they 
worship the statues of three gods. Thor, the most powerful of them, 
has his seat in the midst of the couch (f), while Woden and 
Frige occupy niches on either side of it. Woden the 
represent as armed, just as our people represent Mars, while 
Thor with his spear seems to copy Jupiter.

'That temple is surrounded by a golden chain which hangs 
over the roof (f) of the building, and the gleam of which is 
visible to visitors as they ascend to the temple. For the sky is 
level ground with hills round it like a theatre.'

(ii.) In the (contemporary) scholium 134 we have 
an expression of a holy grove which stood beside the 
temple, and which contained an ever- 
green tree of great sanctity. 

'Near that temple there is a very large tree stretching out its 
branches afar, and it is always covered with a roof. 
No one knows what kind of tree it is. There also is a spring 
in which it is the custom of the heathen to do sacrifice by 
sacrificing a living man in it. If he does not reappear, the prayers of 
the people will be fulfilled.'

The description of Æggras.ash, which is said 
to overshadow Angel, 1 is no doubt derived 
from the Upsala evergreen, as the description of 
the home of the gods is surely derived from some 
Northern sanctuary, in all probability the identic 
holighthouse at Upsala.

There are many other references to this sanctuary 
in both Norse and Danish authorities, and it was in 
fact the most famous one in the North. In 
Ynglinga Saga, 12, and in Saxo, iii. 90, its establish- 
ment is attributed to the god Freyr, who in the 
former is represented as having lived and died at 
Upsala. This is no doubt also the scene of the 
story of Gunnar Helmingr, although in this story 
the place is not actually mentioned.

In Jonsvikingsa Saga, 12, we are told of a temple 
in Gotland which contained 100 gods and also 
temple treasure and temple servants to offer the 
sacrifices, but apart from the great temple at 
Upsala, we know little of the heathen temples of 
Sweden.

(d) Denmark. — No records of Danish temples 
appear to have been preserved. The chief sancta- 

tuary of the Danes was at Leire. This was no 
doubt a sanctuary of great antiquity. It is the 
home of the famous kings of the 6th cent., Hróarr 
and Hróðfr Kraki (the Hrothgar and Hrothulf of 
Beowulf). In Ynglinga Saga, 5, it is said to 
have been the home of the goddess Gyfjö and her 
husband Skjoldr, the eponymous ancestor of the 
Skjoldungar (A.S. Skyldings), the Danish royal 
family. Like Upsala, the locality is remarkable 
for its barrows, some of which date from the earliest 
times.

The existence of ancient sanctuaries in the old 
Danish kingdom is also implied by some of the place-names; e.g., 
Lund, the name of the old ecclesiastical capital in Skaney, 
meant originally a 'sacred grove.' Cf. also Velborg (mod. Viborg; 
'sanctuary of the name of the holy grove') in Jutland; Ótinh or 
'Óthein's (Óthin's) Sanctuary') on the island of Fyen, and Hlésy, 
besides many other Danish (Norwegian and 
Swedish) place-names.

(e) England. — In England the worship of idols 
and the existence of heathen temples were well 
known to Bede. In A.D. 601 Pope Gregory sent a 
letter to the abbot Mellitus urging that, while he 
is to destroy the idols in England, he is to leave 
the heathen temples standing that they may 
be consecrated for purposes of Christian worship. 
He says expressly, 'It is their custom to slay many 
oxen in sacrifice to devils.' 2 The East Anglian 
king Redwald, who had been converted to Christi-

1 Cf. also Skjaldskaparmál, 31.
2 Gýf. 15.
3 H. H. i. 30.
4 Jb. ii. 16.
5 Jb. iii. 8.
meaning 'grove of thunder,' perhaps indicate the existence of groves sacred to the thunder-god among the ancient English, and there are other reminiscences of heathen worship no doubt preserved in such place-names as Thundersley and Wensley.

In Beowulf, 175, we hear of offerings made set heaerstafan, which perhaps means 'shrine' covered with canopies. The word heaer, identical with Norse hørgi, is of frequent occurrence standing alone, and is used to translate various Latin terms such as fanum and idolium. There are other passages in which the word seems to mean a 'grove,' as in German, and it is not uncommon in place-names—e.g., Harrow. A number of other words which appear in Christian usage were presumably applied at first to heathen sanctuaries—e.g., scoedof ('altar').

(f) The Continent.—(i.) References to temples on the Continent are rare. In the 6th cent. a Frankish temple was destroyed by Rudegund, wife of Chlotar. Gregory of Tours describes a temple at Cologne which contained figures of the gods and in which sacrificial feasts were held. The Frisians seem to have had temples, but the notices are not always clear.

(ii.) The word fanum, by which these sanctuaries are usually denoted, is also used of the Irmen, which, according to Thietmar of Merseburg, was an immense wooden shaft or pillar worshipped by the Old Saxons in a place called Erasburg. According to the Vita S. Alex. 3, this pillar was 'set up aloft in the open.' In their own language they called it 'Irmenal, quod latine dietur universalis col- umnæ, quae aeterna est.' In the year 772 by Charlemagne, who spent three days destroying the sanctuary and carried off much gold and silver.

Among the Teutonic practices of the Old Saxons condemned in the Indenula Superstitionum and elsewhere we hear of sanctuaries connected with woods, of springs connected with sacrifices, and of various places which are venerated as holy.

The chief sanctuary of the Frisians was that of Fosite's Land.' According to Aeluin's Vita S. Willibrordi, 10, it took its name from the god Fosite.

The fans of this god were 'constructed' (constructa) on it. This place was held so sacred by the country folk that no one dared to touch the cattle or anything else that fed there. He also mentions that no spring on the island, Adam of Bremen identifies this land with the island of Heligoland (Halogaland). In the Vita S. Bonifatii, 23, we read of a sacred oak of gigantic size, the robor Jovis, which was cut down by the saint amid the clamorous protests of the heathen.

There is no doubt that sacred trees and groves were of frequent occurrence among all the Teutonic peoples of the Continent. In the Translatio S. Alexandrini, 3, we are told that the Saxons worshipped trees and streams. Claudian speaks of 'groves grim with ancient religious rites and oaks resembling barbaric divinity.'

The O.H.G. word haru, like the O.N. hørgi and A.S. heaer, presents some difficulty, being used sometimes to gloss neman, hrods, sometimes fanum, dalbrum. It has been suggested by Mogk that it may not be clear distinction between the terms for the natural and the artificially constructed sanctuary is due to the utilization of old sanctuaries as sites for later temples.

(iii.) References to Teutonic temples in earlier times in the Edda, both sacred and doubtful.

In Ann. i. 51 it is stated that Germanicra razed to the ground the temple which they called the temple of Tamsfana and which was most frequented by those tribes. Again, in Germ. 40 mention is made of the templum of Nœthris, but it is not unlikely that the word is used loosely for sanctuary. 'The holy grove on the island in the ocean,' the home of the goddess Nœthris, who visits the nations in a consecrated car covered with a garment.

One priest alone is permitted to touch it. He is able to perceive when the goddess is present in her sanctuary and accompanies her with the utmost reverence as she is drawn along by covered seats, a season of rejoicing, and a period of festivity reigns wherever she deigns to go and be received. They do not undertake bodily, 'the holy grove on the island,' every weapon is put away; peace and quiet are then only known and welcomed, until the goddess, weary of human intercourse, is at length restored by the same priest to her temple. Afterwards the car, the garments, and, if you are willing to believe it, the divin herself, are cleansed in a secret lake.' This rite is performed by slaves who are instantaneously swallowed up by its waters.'

The indications given by Tacitus are too vague to enable the site of this sanctuary to be fixed with any certainty. It is said that the Nœthris of the Danes was the Danish sanctuary of Leire. In that case Nœthris may have lived on as Gifjönn. Her name, however, is identical with that of the Norse god Njöðr.

According to Germ. 9, 'the Germani deem it to be inconsistent with the majesty of the gods to confine them within walls or to reserve to them after any similar fashion, to them they dedicate groves and woods and call by the names of gods that invisible thing which they see only with the eye of faith.' Sacred groves are mentioned by Tacitus in several other places, but their life is not distinct. Here was a sacred grove sacred to Hercules. Civilis brings his army together in a sacred wood. According to Germ. 48, the Naharnavall had a grove of ancient sanctity. It was in this sacred grove that they kept the sacred symbols. Here also were reared the sacred white horses which were never allowed to do work for mankind, but were employed to draw the sacred cars, when their steering was carefully observed by the priest and king of the state.

According to ib. 39, the Semnones had a wood of immemorial antiquity and holiness. Here on certain occasions there met embassies from all the kindred peoples (the various branches of the Suevi) to celebrate their barbaric rites by the slaying of a man. The grove was held in reverence, and no one was allowed to enter unless he was bound with chains to weigh his own humility and the power of the grove.


For material relating to customs and archaeology in general see Ehrich, a. w. 'Germany' and 'Scandinavian Civilization,' with the bibliographical appendices.
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or companies carried valuable goods or large amounts of gold and silver, and then with much skill and cunning contrived to win their confidence. They would talk of trading for days or even weeks, until time, place, and all else were favorable to their purpose, when, at a signal, they suddenly set upon the unsuspecting party, strangled them all in a few minutes, buried their bodies, distributed the booty, and decapitated. They used a cloth in strangling their victims. Similar methods were practised on the rivers.

One of the most extraordinary of their history is the almost unbroken immunity which they enjoyed: it was only very rarely that a Thag was caught and punished for his crimes. Thags bore their profession to be a religious duty, and all that they did was done under the sanction of religion. They were fully convinced that the goddess Káli, the wife of Siva, called also Durga and Bhawani, had commanded them to strangle and rob, and had laid down all the rules which they followed in the course of their operations. Many Bráhmans were Thags; and, when there was a Bráhman member in a gang, he conducted their particular party under the son of a Thag or a new accession, was initiated in an impressive religious ceremony, and took a dread oath of absolute fidelity to the brotherhood. Before starting on the next operation, the gang met in a suitable place, and took part in a solemn act of worship. As soon as possible after every successful operation another religious ceremony was carried out. Once in seven days at least the goddess was worshipped, and on the greater occasions animals were sacrificed in her honour. They would not start on a journey, admit a new member, or decide upon an act of murder, unless the goddess granted them favourable omens. In every ceremony she was worshipped, and to her their prayers were offered. No image was used; but the pickaxe for digging the graves of their victims, solemnly consecrated, stood for the goddess, and was believed to be filled with her power and inspired by her to guide them. In every ceremony the offerings of gur (i.e. coarse sugar) and water were made to the pickaxe; over it every oath was taken; and at all times it was regarded with extreme reverence, confidence, and fear. On every occasion when gur and water were offered to the pickaxe, every fully qualified Thag also offered the pickaxe his own personal prostration. At the close of each period of operations a percentage of the gains was solemnly presented to the goddess in one of her temples.

Among the rules which guided the Thags perhaps the most noticeable was the law that they must never strangle a woman.

3. Sources of the system.—The religious and political conditions of medieval India provided the soil and the seed from which this extraordinary organization grew. The following facts require to be realized.

(3) In all parts of India today exist criminal tribes, i.e. tribes whose regular caste-occupation is some form of crime. In each case there is a belief that some divinity has imposed on the tribe the particular type of crime which it practices and has also laid down the rules under which it is to be carried out. It is the duty of every member of the tribe to make the practice of the crime his regular occupation, and to obey all the religious rules which are laid down for his guidance in it. So long as he does so, he regards himself as a religious man. A percentage of the gains is regularly dedicated to the goddess and gives the tribe its criminal profession. A few of these tribes profess Muhammadanism, and dedicate their gains to some sūr (Muhammadan saint); but they are probably the remnant of the great grass-gang and money-lender, discovered which individuals


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monarchy. The idea is to make him truly absolute, to sever Hindus from the most decisive way, not only from the earthly and sensual, but from all human conditions as well. This, therefore, makes very clear that in Himself and in all being separated from both good and evil, it becomes possible to acknowledge that He is indifferent to the world, and is equally the cause of both. Hence it is that God should be all-powerful. Those who are wrong to the Hindu to be not only quite natural but also inevitable.

(c) The Śākta sect of Hinduism, which worships the wife of Śiva (Kali), has been a centre of several extraordinary features. Only one need be mentioned here, viz., that for many centuries now the Chandi also human sacrifice was permitted. In 1535 the British Government prohibited human sacrifice, but until then it was common in the chief shrines of the goddesses in North and Central India. According to the ritual law, only males can be sacrificed to her.

(d) In the worship of the goddess in the homes of the people, pots, pieces of metal, and diagrams are more often used than images; and both images and symbols, when duly consecrated, are believed to be filled with the presence and power of the goddess.

(e) In modern India there are many groups of ignorant Muhammadans who take part in Hindu worship. They not only join in the great festivals, but also visit Hindu temples and make offerings at gods, in order to acquire immunity from disease and to obtain other boons. Muhammadans of a lower creed generally regard it as an insult.

These facts enable one to realize that, in medivial India, there might readily appear a community organized on the basis of the worship of the goddess and the practice of murder and robbery. At first, it was little more than an ordinary criminal tribe; and the first Thags would be ignorant Hindus who had been worshippers of the goddess before they formed the society to struggle and rob unwary travellers. To pass from participation in human sacrifice before the altar of the goddess to the search for victims for her on the high roads would be no violent change. Nor would even the thoughtful Hindu be shocked by the doctrine that the goddess had ordered the programme of murder. Hindu theology provides a substantial basis for the idea. Further, the fundamental document on which the worship of the Devi rests is full of blood and horror. The story in that document of her struggle with a demon named Raktabija and her final triumph over him was made by Thags the starting-point of the tale in which history unfolds the original Thags to strangulate men. 2 The ritual law that only males should be sacrificed to her is clearly the source of the rule that Thags must not kill women. It would also seem quite natural to devotees of the goddess to use the symbol of a powder mixed into an image and they would instinctively believe that the power and the will of the goddess were present in it.

Nor need we wonder that Muhammadans, in order to become Thags, were willing to participate in Hindu worship, since so many are to-day accustomed to supplement Muslim rites with the cult of Hindu divinities.

(f) India has usually been ruled, not by one Imperial Government, but by a multitude of petty states, each of which sought only to secure peace and order within its own narrow territory, and cared little for gods, or in order to acquire immunity from disease and to obtain other boons. Muhammadans of a lower creed generally regard it as an insult.

These and similar facts account for the almost universal immunity which the Thags enjoyed. Thugs were extremely numerous over all India, and were closely bound to one another by oath and interest, and were usually only too well able to take prompt vengeance on any who molested the brotherhood.

Thus only an Imperial Government using wider powers could successfully grapple with them.

4. The rise and fall of the Thags.

It is clear that the Thag conspiracy was originally a Hindu organization, as we have already suggested, and that it came into being before the Muhammadan conquest of North India (1190–1200). It was called the Thak-charita the Hindu poet Manka or Manka (f. c. A.D. 1150) compares the thievish spring to a Thag. 1 Clearly by his time the community was already well known.

If the community was very successful, it would soon attract indigent Hindus of high caste, and there would be plenty of poor Brahmans who would be eager to enter. It seems probable that, after the Muhammadan conquest, during one of the many periods when anarchy was wide-spread, the strangers found unusual opportunities for their depredations, and waxed so rapidly rich that many Muhammadans became Thags and readily acquiesced in the established cult of the goddess. The great success and the wonderful immunity from punishment which the movement enjoyed would be to the credit of the system.

There is conclusive evidence that Muhammadan Thags looked back with great veneration to Nizám al-Din Awliyá, a famous Muslim saint, who lived at Delhi in the first quarter of the 14th cent., and that they regarded him as one of the founders of the system. 2 This fits in perfectly with our theory that, at some time after the conquest, numerous Muslims joined the community. It is probable that the event occurred about A.D. 1300. The story that Muhammadan Thags were all descended from seven famous tribes 3 may also have a historical root.

The community spread and flourished for many centuries, and was still extremely prosperous at the moment when it had the ill fortune to attract the attention of the British Government in India. In 1829 special officers were appointed to investigate the system, and a serious campaign was started for the destruction of the whole organization. Within seven years the work was done. The success of this great effort is mainly due to the devotion and genius of Captain, later Major-General, Sir W. H. Sleeman.

5. Religious and ethical character of the Thags.

—Those Europeans who had extended intercourse with Thags, during the period when the British Government was endeavouring to eradicate the system, gave very vivid descriptions of the kind of men they were.

(a) Every Thag was fully convinced that the goddess had created the system, and that she invariably saved Thags from punishment or disaster, so long as they obeyed the rules she had laid down for their operations. They were also innately convinced that the consecrated pickaxe was so filled with the presence of the goddess as to be able to guide the Thags in their wanderings and to bring dire disaster on every one who disobeyed. 4

(b) No Thag ever showed the slightest compunctions of conscience for his crimes. Sleeman writes:

Thag considers the persons murdered precisely in the light of victims offered up to the Goddess; and he remembers them, as a Priest of Jupiter remembered the oxen, and a Priest of Saturn the she-goats and sheep, and he gratifies his goddess without any misgivings, he perpetuates them without any emotions of pity, and he remembers them without any feelings of regret. They gratify her, and she does their retribution ever cause him iniquity in darkness, in solitude, or in the hour of death. 5

Never did the strength of religious faith or the extraordinary domination which religion exercises over man's moral nature find clearer illustration.

2 Sleeman, Ramban, p. 11.
3 Ibid, p. 9.
4 Sleeman, Ramban, p. 12.
5 ib. p. 71.
THANESAR—THEISM

descriptive of the Fraternity, etc., Calcutta, 1836; Report on the
Depredations committed by the Tho Gany, do. 1849; Meadows Taylor, Confessions of a Thug (a novel), London, 1850, new ed., do. 1896; J. Hutton, Popular Account of the

J. N. FARQUHAR.

THALES.—See Ionic Philosophy.

THANESAR. — Thanesar (Skr. athāṅkavāra, athāṅku, a local name of Siva, ēṅkāra, 'lord'; also athāṅkavāra, athāṅku, 'shrine,' and athāṅkavāra, an inhabitant of the Panjāb, lat. 29° 59' N.; long. 76° 50' E., on the banks of the river Sarasvati (q.v.). The Chinese pilgrim, Hiuen-Tsang, describes it under the name of Sa-
cūra-ni-shā-la, as the centre of the Hindu Holy
Land (Dharmaksheta, Kurukshetra) and gives the local legends.1 It has been identified with the Ostio-
balasara or Batangakaisara of Ptolemy.2 In A.D.
1014 it was sacked by Mahbudh of Ghazni.3 The
most famous shrine was that dedicated to Kach-
ravānī, Viṣṇu, 'lord of the discus.' The statue
is said to have been taken to Ghazni to be broken
up and trodden under foot. It was finally des-
graced.2

Numerous crowds of pilgrims visit the place to bathe at eclipses of the
sun.

LITERATURE.—A. Cunningham, Archaeological Survey of
W. BROOKE.

THANK-OFFERING.—See SACRIFICE.

THEATRE.—See DRAMA.

THEFT.—See CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS.

THEISM.—1. Definition.—The word 'theism' (Fr. théisme, Germ. Theismus) is a purely modern
word, implying a non-existent, Greek Ἱστισμός and an equally non-existent verb ἱστιεῖν (on the anal-
ogy of the verb ἱππεῖν, 'to ride,' and the English 'to ride,' and there is a certain vagueness about the meaning of the word in current English, it is necessary to begin this article with a convention as to the sense in which 'theism' will be employed in what follows. The
word will be used throughout as a name for a
philosophical theory as distinct from a practical
religion. Perhaps the faith and the theory are not
absolutely disjointed, but they are at
least logically distinguishable. It may be doubted
whether any man wholly untouched by the spirit of adoration and wholly devoid of love to God has
ever been a genuine theist in philosophy, and
again, many who are regarding a God in accordance with a philo-
sophical belief in God without being led on to
regulate his life by that belief. But it is at least
possible to practise love of God and trust in God
without making any conscious attempt to find a
speculative explanation of the world. There are
many who, in George Tyrrell's phrase, share the
faith of Simon Peter without concerning them-
selves about his theology. The present article will
be exclusively concerned with the philosophical
conception of God as the ultimate ground of things.
Current usage seems to require a further distinc-
tion. It seems necessary to make determinateatheism (q.v.), the denial that God exists, and scepticism or agnosticism (q.v.), the refusal to answer any question about the ultimate ground of things, but also from deism (q.v.), which, in its way, also treats God as an
ultimate ground. We shall probably not depart
far from the implications of current language if we
agree to define theism as the doctrine that the ultimate ground of things is a single supreme

reality which is the source of everything other than itself and has the characters of being (a) in-
trinsically complete and perfect and (b) as a com-
plete, unqualified object of unqualified adoration or worship. Belief in a ground of things which is not intrinsically complete and perfect, and consequently no adequate object of adoration, but at best of respect and admiration, would at the present day probably be described by
every one as deism rather than as theism. Thus
the suggested definition in fact coincides with the
famous formula of St. Anselmus, The God is "cogitari
nou potest, 'the being than which none greater can be thought.'

It is evident that theism, thus understood, is
incompatible with polytheism (q.v.) and also with
any doctrine, theological or metaphysical, which
asserts a plurality of independent and equally
ultimate 'realms,' whether in the form of a duality
between God and the good principle, and an im-
material evil principle (Zoroastrianism, Manichae-
ism (q.v.)), or between God and matter, or in that
of an ultimate plurality of unoriginated 'souls'
or 'persons,' or in any other shape. All such
doctrines involve the denial that there is any object which answers to the definition id quo
cogitari non potest. For this reason the various modern
theories of a finite or limited deity are incommensurable with strict theism. All theories of a
limited by restrictions arising outside his own
nature is manifestly not the source of all reality
other than himself, and not God in the sense in
which was earlier that word. As all the 'limitations'
are asserted to be self-limitations, due to the
nature of God Himself (as in the philosophy of Hastings Rashdall), we have to face a
dilemma. Either the presence of these limita-
tions in the deity is a defect, and the deity is
therefore not God in our sense at all, or their
presence is not a defect, and there is then no sense
in calling them restrictions or limitations, as it is
their absence which would, in this case, be the
defect.

It is mainly on the ground of alleged difficulties in the notion of the divine Omniscience that these theories are recom-
mented. But the difficulties seem due to misunderstanding. Omniscience means only power to do whatever is consistent with God's own nature. It is not a real limitation of God, but a power to hold, as most theologians and philosophers have
done, that God cannot do something otherwise. It is false to say that God cannot do something otherwise, but God can, in such a way, do something other than he did before; his existence if he grows tired of it, is a mere false paradox.

It is, perhaps, more important to be clear on the
point that theism, as defined, is equally incon-
sistent with the type of philosophic monism called
by James Ward 'singularism'—the theory that there is only one existent, the Absolute, and that
this single existent is the true subject of all
'significant propositions. If we mean by God a
being from whom all else that exists derives its
being and who can be worshipped, then the belief
in God necessarily implies belief in the real
existence of beings who can worship God. To say
that God is the source of existence implies that
God is not all that exists. From a theistic point of
view it is, no doubt, proper to call God, the
being from whom all others are derived, the
Absolute or unconditioned being, but only on the
condition that the Absolute is not equated with all
that really exists. The undeterred source of ex-
istence may, in virtue of its unique intrinsinc
completeness or perfection, be called the ens realis-
simus, but the name of such a phrase implies that there are other entia realia.

It will probably be readily admitted that the i'sum as doctrine of singularism is in no sense
anomalous or abnormal, and none, the
have the most distinguished representatives of singularism in

1 Prolegomen, ch. 2.

2 J. Bougl., Confessions, 1841, i. 182 f.
3 W. McCrindle, Ancient India as described by Ptolemy, Calcutta, 1886, p. 128.
our own times shown any desire to claim the name of theist. It should be recognized that the popular language about a purely ‘immanent God’, as opposed to the ‘transcendent God’, is equivalent to the distinction between theology, is incompatible with genuine atheism, inasmuch as it conflicts with the recognition of a God above the superstructure of existence and the dependent existents. It is just this distinction which is vital in a theistic philosophy, and, for this reason, it may be taken for granted that all that would seem to be the way of conceiving the relation of its God to the world is consistent with the critical recognition of the dependence of existence.

2. Philosophy and theism.—If we look at the history of European philosophy, it may be said that in the main the general trend of philosophic thought, even independently of the influence of positive religions, has been theistic, at least from the time of Plato to our own day. Even the agnosticism of Herbert Spencer, when all the qualifications with which it is enunciated by its author and taken fully into account, has a recognizable theistic tendency and might be said, apart from its blunders about dynamics, to be little more than a very crude reproduction of the ‘negative theology’ which is really one-half of the orthotheism (q.v.), would seem to have been shown directly, this tendency to theism is a direct consequence of the permanent influence of Plato on all subsequent developments in philosophy. Apart from materialism (q.v.), which has never produced a philosopher of the first rank, the main anti-theistic influence in modern European philosophy has been that of Spinoza’s (q.v.), which has steadily affected metaphysical thought, perhaps even more outside than within the professionally philosophic schools, from the time of Jacobi and Lessing down to the end of the 19th century. This is partly accounted for by the powerful attraction exercised by the naturalistic strain in Spinoza’s doctrine on the devotees of physical science, partly by the tendency of many of the most prominent 19th cent. representatives of the Hegelian line of thought to interpret Hegel (q.v.) in Spinozistic sense.

Whether the Spinozistic interpretation of Hegel is the true one might admit of question, and it has been rejected by some such eminent Hegeliasts as Hesse and Hegelians as Heinrich Scholz and J. M. E. McTaggart, in the case for a definitely theistic interpretation, in the other for a version which has more affinity with the monism of Leibniz (q.v.) than with Spinoza’s singularities. But in the main Hegel has become known, at least in the English-speaking world, through the work of such philosophers with strong Spinozistic propensities, with the consequence that the influence of these has ways of theism been definitely hostile to theism. Even among professedly Christian theologians allegiance to Hegel in philosophy has usually led to an anti-theistic doctrine of God which at least compromised the theistic position.

More ephemeral has been the influence excited in the last half of the 19th cent. by the pessimistic atheism of Schopenhauer (q.v.), and in the last twenty or twenty-five years by the brilliant, if incoherent, anti-Christian polemics of Nietzsche (q.v.). Both the pessimism of Schopenhauer and the anti-theism of Nietzsche are, however, too little reasoned and too obviously matters of personal temperament to be regarded as of permanent philosophical importance. The influence of Hegel, also, and still more the doctrine of God, would seem to be for the present a spent force. In the present state of philosophy the most formidable rival to theism as an explanation of the world appears to be the ‘horrifying negations’ of those who claim the ‘new realism’, represented at its best by the writings of Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore. Of this doctrine, as well as of the supposed objection to them arising from the evolutionists’ alleged ‘redistributed of matter as red-in-tooth-and-claw’, something is said below (§ 17).

3. Plato.—The importance of Plato as the creator of philosophical theology makes it necessary to review, very roughly, as a philosophical theory with a clear statement of the Platonic position, so far as that position was expressed by Plato in his writings. To call Plato the creator of philosophic theology does not, of course, mean that the belief in God is an invention of Plato. As has been often remarked, the general trend of the best Greek thought on the problems of human conduct and destiny—e.g., by such poets as Aeschylus and Euripides—is in the direction of a vague monism. And it cannot be seriously doubted that an earnest of that faith in God, as theistic, of Pythagoras and of Socrates. Even the most unreasonable scepticism about the historical good faith of Plato’s accounts of his master cannot obscure the fact that Socrates gave up the whole of his mature life to the execution of a mission to which he believed himself to have been called by God and died as a martyr to his calling. But this, so far as we know, was a matter of personal religious conviction rather than of speculative theory. Even Plato himself does not attempt a formal philosophical statement and justification of the belief in God until we come to the megrum opus of his old age, Proclus. It is best known of his earlier writings—e.g., the Republic—great stress is laid upon the importance for the formation of moral character of an ethically adequate conception of the divine nature. God must be thought of as perfect, and current actions must be purified of everything which suggests that there is anything unethical in His character or that His dealings with men have any other purpose than their true good. It is just because God is perfectly good that (Republic, Theaetetus) the end of life may be said to be to ‘become like God.’ God fashioned the world and made it the best possible world because it would be unworthy of His goodness to make it otherwise (Timaeus). True piety is to be a ‘fellow-worker’ with God (Euthyphro). We are God’s sheep and He is our shepherd (Politicus). The souls of the righteous are in the hand of God, and when they depart from us it is to be with Him (Phaedo).

But this, of course, the language of religion, not of science, and we are made to understand the difference by the simple fact that nearly all that is said of God, outside the Laws, beyond the one emphatic statement about His perfect goodness, is conveyed in ‘myths,’ i.e., in imaginary stories, as to which we are cautioned that we cannot undertake to pronounce the truth. Not any attempt made to prove either the existence or the perfect goodness of God. In particular the story of creation in the Timaeus is, as we are explicitly warned, not to be taken as scientific truth, but as a tale which is the most probable that can be told about matters which lie outside the region within which scientific knowledge is possible. If we did not possess the Laws, it would be legitimate, as in fact it is not, to doubt whether Plato did not agree with Kant that reasoned scientific knowledge of God is impossible, though on grounds which are not identical with Kant’s. In the tenth book of the Laws, however, 1 we have a very definite doctrine of God which at least attempted to avoid of any features of mythical colouring, which is expressly declared to be conclusive. The argument, the main principle of which had been already anticipated in the Phaedrus, 2 is as follows. The most universal characteristic of things is motion and change. Now, motions are of two kinds, (a) impressed, and (b) original or spontaneous. Or, to use Plato’s phrase, there are motions which are able only to move something else (impressed or communicated movements), and there are motions which move themselves as well as other things. And motion or spontaneous movement is essentially an impressed or communicated movement. We cannot

1 S.v. A-899 E.
2 Phaedrus, 245 C-E.
regard all movements as impressed or communicated without falling into an impossible logical regression. Furthermore, in each instance which moves itself is precisely what we mean when we talk of ψυχή, 'soul.' 'Soul' is simply a shorter name for the κόσμος ενώπιον καθένας ἑαυτοῦ. In Plato, the only thing that is capable of internally initiated movement or change that we feel bound to say that the thing in question is 'animated' or has a 'soul.' It follows, then, that souls and their various 'motions' (judgments, volitions, hopes, desires, and the like) are prior to bodies and their motions or changes. All bodily processes are derivative from and dependent on 'motions' of the soul, and it is just for this reason that Plato explicitly denies the doctrine, often implied to him by the sceptics, that 'matter' can be the principle of evil. Further, good souls, in the degree of their goodness, are sources of orderly and beneficial motions; evil souls, of disorderly and evil motions. Now, the great recurrent motions which science discovers in the universe (the periodic motions of the heavenly bodies) are all regular and orderly and belong to the class of 'good' souls; they must be due to good souls. (It had been carefully laid down in an earlier passage that all apparent irregularities and anomalies in these motions are only apparent; the more accurate activity of our world-soul becomes more evident.) If, then, we define God as a perfectly good soul, we may say that, since the great motions of the universe are all perfectly orderly, they must be caused by God. God, however, cannot be the only soul, or 'movement that moves itself.' For, though the magnalia naturae exhibit perfect regularity, there are also irregular and destructive motions, such as those, e.g., of diseases or those due to a wicked will; and these are just as actual as facts anywhere. Thus the facts of the universe bear witness to the existence of souls which are not wholly good. There must be at least one 'bad' soul, which is not God, and there may, of course, be many more as are required to account for the observed facts. The transcendance of God is thus safeguarded.

Plato's language about the 'bad' souls has been misunderstood both in ancient and in modern times. Plato thought that the single soul postulated in Plato's doctrine of an ultimate dualism between a good and an evil world-soul. This view did not find favour with the Platonists of antiquity, but has found a new lease of life in modern times by the weight of whose name it has obtained a wholly undeserved consideration. Few today have any idea of what activity of the Good or anywhere else. What he does say 2 is merely that all motions cannot be due to a single soul; there must be at least two, the 'beneficent' and that which has power to effect the contrary results.' The whole context suggests that the bad souls of which he is thinking are chiefly those of passionate and ignorant men, which, of course, are numerous. It should further be noted that, in the passage of the Laws containing the theistic argument, Plato speaks throughout in the plural of 'souls,' giving the soul which moves the sun as an example of his meaning. This is, however, a mere consequence of the fact that the legislation of the Laws is designed for an ordinary Greek community. It is assumed that the State religion of the colony will recognize 'souls many,' and Plato's object is to substitute the heavenly bodies, or rather the souls which move them, as types of regularity and beneficence, for the merely frail and passionate anthropomorphic deities of actual Greek religion. Further, the personal conviction of all God tions are not of concern to us. The unity of God, 'the best soul,' follows, in fact, as we may see from the Timaeus, from the unity of the universe. The universe is one and is a rational system; therefore it is the product of one intelligence. 2 That a Greek writing for the profane world should allow himself to speculate on such mysteries as what is really significant is that Plato speaks so frequently, and just when he wishes to be most impressive, of this. 3

From the goodness of God, since God is a soul (δύναμις) which moves all the other parts of the world in the way that it does, it follows that: 1. De animae procreat. in Timaeo, 1014 E. 2 Laws, 870 B. 3 Timaeus, 30 D-31 B.

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The one fundamental principle of the cosmological argument from the contingency of the world 1 to the existence of a First Cause and that of the argument from design, which is not degraded by Plato, as it has often been by modern apologists, into an argument from the alleged adaptation of the world to our individual convenience. As understood by Plato, the

1. The distinction in this form became fixed in consequence of the fact that it was adopted by the Roman encyclopaedist M. Tertullian (b. 155) and taken over from him by St. Augustine in the de Civitate Dei. The theology of the philosophers was called 'natural' either in contrast with the 'supernatural' of the Church or with 'revealed' truth, but because it was held to be scientific and true, unlike mythology, which the poets were believed to have invented. If, in a tenth book of the Theology puts it, 'is not philosophy but law.'

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argument from design is simply the argument from the intelligibleness of the world of actual facts and events to intelligence in the cause which produced them. Plato and Aristotle both gave a variety of arguments, but the most famous is the argumentum a posteriori, in the correct scholastic, not in the inaccurate Kantian, sense of the phrase a posteriori; i.e., it is an argument from the character of a known truth, or the very fact of its being, to the character of the first cause. That there is a world of mutable things, and that, as scientific insight advances, the processes in this world of mutability are more and more found to exhibit conformity to intelligible laws, are assumed as empirical, rather than known truths, and without these empirical premises the demonstration would not work. There is no hint in Plato of the line of thought which at a later date crystallized into the one genuinely a priori argument for the existence of God, the ontological proof, which, if valid, establishes its conclusion without any empirical premises whatsoever.

4. Aristotle.—Aristotle's doctrine of God, though better known to the modern world than Plato's, is simply the Platonic doctrine rather more precisely expressed and shorn of its ethical and practical applications. With Aristotle, as with Plato, the central argument is moved, and the argument is once more based upon the assumption of the causal principle. Like Plato, Aristotle contends that communicated or impressed motions are the presence of the universe. Aristotle says of motion and change that he regards ψυχή as the one source of spontaneous movement. But here he is led to make a further refinement. The 'motions of the soul', not ψυχή, 'appetition', and appetite is always apposition of something apprehended as good (ἀγαθόν ἐπὶ διά ἴδει). This apprehension of an object as good is an exercise of ψυχή, an act of immediate intelligent apprehension. The apprehension is not itself a movement, though it gives rise to motions both of the soul and of the body. We must not then be content to trace back all motions to the motions of the soul. This point is Aristotle's starting point in the 'movement which can move itself'; but behind even this we must look for a 'unmoved mover', an unchanging initiator of all change. Otherwise we shall simply fall into an indefinite regress, and an indefinite regress in the order of efficient causes is unhackable (the principle of the argument from the 'contingency of the world'). The unity of the supreme First Mover once more follows from the unity of the physical world. The whole physical world is a 'design' in which latent things are developed into actuality by the agency of efficient causes which are already themselves developed actualities. Behind every process of development lies the agency of such already developed actualities, and thus, just because there really is something and not nothing, there must be some actual agents which have never developed at all, but have been eternally and immutable active. From Aristotle's point of view, all processes of development depend upon the eternally regular and uninterrupted movements of the heavenly bodies. Hence there must be as many 'unmoved movers', in Aristotle's phrase (ἀγαθόν ψυχή), as there are independent astronomical movements. Further, astronomical movements form a hierarchy. Each of the 50 odd concentric spheres which Aristotle postulates to account for the apparent movements of the heavenly bodies has its own proper revolution and its own 'unmoved mover'. But there is one sphere which, without being enclosed by any other, encluses all the rest, and, according to the Aristotelian cosmology (which disagrees with Plato's point of view), the heaven, which is the only existing heaven (Sophistes, 249 A, Philebus, 30 D, Timaeus, 30 B).

The notion of an unconscious intelligence or reason as the ground of things is Aristotelian. Aristotle's planet is thus a matter of argumentum a posteriori, in the correct scholastic, not in the inaccurate Kantian, sense of the phrase a posteriori; i.e., it is an argument from the character of a known truth, or the very fact of its being, to the character of the first cause. That there is a world of mutable things, and that, as scientific insight advances, the processes in this world of mutability are more and more found to exhibit conformity to intelligible laws, are assumed as empirical, rather than known truths, and without these empirical premises the demonstration would not work. There is no hint in Plato of the line of thought which at a later date crystallized into the one genuinely a priori argument for the existence of God, the ontological proof, which, if valid, establishes its conclusion without any empirical premises whatsoever.

Further, this object must be adequate to occupy the divine mind through eternity. It follows that the object of God's unbroken Sabbath of contemplation is God Himself. He thinks Himself and He is thinking God. In a phrase, He is thinking God. 12 In fact, though without the presence of God there could be no motion in the universe, God is supposed to be wholly unaware of the existence of the universe unless He is present in it by being an object of apperciption to it, and thus it is aware of Him, but He is no more aware of it than the various objects of our human apprehensions need be aware of us and our desire for them. The world's desire after God is precisely and exactly the desire of the IIth for the star. This conception, due apparently to Aristotle's own temperamentally inclined to the practical life, of course strikes out of philosophical theology the doctrine of Providence and of the rightness of God's dealings with man. In fact, since Aristotle held that 'goodness of character' is a different thing from 'goodness of intellect', he is quite consistent when at the end of his Ethics he expressly denies that goodness of character or moral goodness is predicable of God. 3 God, in fact, becomes in Aristotle what Aristotle himself would have liked to be, if the conditions of human life were any. A mere 'magnified and non-natural' scientific thinker. In respect of this evacuation of all ethical content from the idea of God, Aristotle may fairly be accused of having been more of a Platonist than a naturalist, even as Plato was the founder of philosophical theism. It is clear that to Aristotle and his disciple Eudoxus, who identifies the speculative life with the contemplation and worship of God, 4 the First Mover was an object of genuine worship and reverence, therefore the worship of such a being could have no real connexion with active good works; but a non-ethical deity, who knows nothing of humanity's needs and aspirations, can never become the centre of an enduring religion. Hence it is not surprising that, while Platonism continued throughout later antiquity to be the creed of educated religious men, Aristotelianism was reduced to simple naturalism within half a century of Aristotle's death by the third head of the school, Strato of Lamprocemenes. 5

5. Epicureans.—The deism of the Epicureans is 6 of no significance in natural theology. For all practical purposes the school were, what their opponents called them, pure atheists, since it was

1 See for all this in particular Metaphysics, 1072a 19-1073b 17, Physics, 255b 10ff.
2 Metaphysics, 1074a 32.
3 Ethica Nicomachean, 1178b 7-25.
4 See the discourses of Plato and of Epicurus, esp. on Euthyphro, 155b 30).
5 Cicero, Academ., I, 38, de Natura Deorum, i. 35; Plutarch, Def. Colotem, p. 1115.
one of their principal tenets that the gods not merely take no interest in the doings of men but play no part in cosmology; the world has been formed by the pre-Roman gods and demi-gods. The only use made by Epicurus of gods is a trivial one; their existence accounts for the phantasms of superhuman beings which are seen in dreams.

On the other hand, natural theology of a kind plays a prominent part, though the original Stoic doctrine can hardly be called theistic. The theology of Zeno, Clearchus, and Chrysippus was a materialistic theology of immanence. The substance of all that exists is a single body; in fact, the universe is a 'fire.' The cosmic fire is intelligent, and this is fire that is God. This doctrine, borrowed by the founders of Stoicism from Heraclitus, but put forward with a conscious opposition, which Heraclitus would not have understood, to the immaterialism of Plato and Aristotle, is the nearest counterpart that ancient thought has to show the Stoic conception of the original substance with its plurality of disparate but 'parallel' attributes. But with the Stoics it is not, as with Spinoza, thought, but extension, that is the 'Aaron's rod that swallows all the rest' of the attributes.

As to the details of the doctrine, God and the world, though really one, are logically distinguished. At one time in the literature of the Stoics the phrase the 'fire,' which alone in its singularity and purity contains within itself all the substantiality of the half-world of gods, or according to the Stoic way of thinking, a process of progressive evolution, identified by the Stoics with the 'downward path,' of ῥεῖσιν, of Heraclitus, in which the στοιχεῖα λόγοι of all the inhabited world and the world of divine and human beings partook. There is a second and antithetical process, regarded as identical with the 'upward path,' and ending in an ο̣ν, general configuration; the plurality of divine existents of Providence and the divine original fire, and God is left once more as the only existent. The whole double process of evolution followed by involution constitutes a 'great cosmos' in which the universe is made up of an endless succession of such 'great years,' each repeating the events of the preceding without variation (a fancy which we know from a fragment of Eudemos preserved by Simplicius in his commentary on the Physics of Aristotle 1) to go back to the early Pythagoreans, and which has been revived in our own time by Nietzsche as the doctrine of 'eternal recurrence.' The details of the process of evolution belong to the Stoic physics and do not concern us here. In accord with this doctrine, God is sometimes declared to be the same as the στοιχεῖα, or universe, somehow disconnected from it. Thus the word στοιχεῖα in three senses, to mean (1) God Himself . . . who is, of course, impervious to the world-order; (2) the world-order itself; (3) the world-order, which resums into Himself and again begets out of Himself the whole of being in accord with certain cycles of time; (4) the world-order as the heavenly body or the heavenly composition of these two. Hence the full definition of God was that God is στοιχεῖα τῶν στοιχείων, 'the first principle of things,' καθ' ὅσα ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἐπικόνωσις γενέται, 'a fire of craft [or 'art'] proceeding in order to the general regulation of the world, containing in its constitution ratios in accord with all things to come to be in order of destiny.' But this being so, the doctrine that God is equal to God with the στοιχεῖα is not in itself, at all, since it denies that there are any real existents other than God. But religiously the founders of Stoicism, as we see from the well-known Ἰδιομετρία of Cleanthes, were fervent worshippers of God. It was characteristic of the school from the first that they insisted strongly on the moral side of things. Like the Platonists, they were vigorous exponents of Providence and used the doctrine to justify evil by arguing such things as astrology, prophetic dreams, oracles, and divination. Providence was, however, regarded as identical with absolute predestination, and scientifically explained by the rigid mechanical concatenation of all events in a single causal system. Hence, as may be seen from the controversial essay on theContributionsto Stoiicism (vgl. στοιχεῖα, στοιχεῖα, στοιχεῖα), the devices by which the Stoic philosophers tried to contradict the popular religious belief in a providential order with their materialistic monism were often really fatal to the Stoic moral ideal. But this is a digression.

In the writings of the Stoics of the Roman period, from whom the ideas of the school have become familiar to the modern world, the ethical and fatalistic elements of the doctrine are less prominent. They often seem to be teaching a simple spiritual theism. It must be remembered that all these writers were later than Zeno and were greatly influenced by the philosophy of Apelles (first half of 1st cent. B.C.), who gravely modified the original doctrine of Zeno and Chrysippus by contaminating it with Platonic elements, and who is usually known as long after he tried unsuccessfully to introduce Stoicism into the Academy. It is precisely because the Stoics of the latter period are not natural philosophers that we can be shown to depend most completely on Posteriorius in whom the monoism and materialism of Stoicism is least apparent. To understand the later Stoics is to understand the system. Consequently we shall have to study it as it was before Posteriorius had Platonicized it. For this purpose the pre-Stoic essays of Zeno and Chrysippus, and the account of Stoic doctrine given in the life of Zeno by Diogenes Laertius are particularly valuable. Indispensable for special students is Isocrates, the history of the Stoics of the pre-Roman period, Stoicorum Venerum Fragmenta, 3 vols., Leipzig, 1901–9.

The one really original contribution made by Stoicism to natural theology is the appeal to 'innate ideas,' and the consensus gentium as an argument for the existence of God. 'The doctrine of innate ideas' (consensus, nativitas communis) is a consequence of the Aristotelian criticism of Plato. According to the theory of method expounded more specially in the Phaedo and the central books of the Republic, the work of science begins with the provisional assumption of a theory (ordo) to account for a group of observed facts. If the observed facts (ά φασιν) agree with the results of 'Arts' (πρᾶξις, from the ἀρχηγοί) these 'agreements' are said to be 'saved' by the theory, and it is so far vindicated. It may still, however, be called in question, and in that case will have to be defended by arguments derived from some more certain premises which the impugner himself admits. It thus becomes a task for dialectic (or, as we should say, metaphysics), the highest science of all, to make a critical examination of the provisional assumptions (the unproved postulates) of all the other sciences and to discover the real unquestionable presuppositions of all knowledge. Aristotle endeavored, against this view, that the special postulates of each science must be self-evident when once they have been formulated. For the Stoics this doctrine, that every science depends upon self-evident universal premises, created a difficulty, as in their theory of knowledge they were, unlike Aristotle, extreme sensationalists, regarding particular sense-perceptions as the foundation of all knowledge. They were accordingly obliged to provide some criticism or test by which they could distinguish universal propositions which are valid generalizations from sensation may be discriminated from those which are not. An obvious test suggested itself. God, as the only real existent, and certain special groups of men or by particular individuals may fairly be supposed to be due to temperamental, educational, national, or racial bias; those which appear to be made without exception by all men, no matter how widely they differ in temperament, education, national traditions, social institutions, may be presumed to be formed spontaneously, and therefore naturally, i.e. as a consequence of the intrinsic character of mind. It is thus reasonable to regard these generalizations as true and thus to take the consensus gentium as the best guarantee for the truth of a belief. The Stoic concept, 'common notions,' are thus innate in the very sense in which Descartes afterwards used the word. It is not meant that we come into the world with them already in our possession, but that we have the power of realizing them by the normal development of intelligence independently of any kind of bias.

As the most obvious examples of such common notions the Stoics instance the beliefs, which they held to be common to all mankind, that there is a God and the gods and the universe 11.

1 Diels, p. 723. 26 = Diels, Fragmenta der Vorwissenschaft, 1892, II, 365, 8.

1 Diogenes Laertius, vii. 107, 137.

2 Diod. Siculus. v, ii. 29.

3 Atticus, Plutarch, 1, 7, 33 (Diels, Diodorographi Graeci, Berlin, 1894, 834, 100. 3, 4). The same definition was used by Isocrates, 'natur.' Cfr. Cicero, de Deo, Nat. ii. 57: 'Zenoigitur suam naturam, ut easdam dici omnem esse artificiosam, ad gignendum propter gentes.'

1 Diod. Laert. vii. 36, 52.
of the belief in God and why their critics have often laid great stress on travellers’ reports which have been supposed to indicate the existence of ‘atheistic’ savages. The Stoics themselves, in appealing to this evidence, have not, of course, meant to deny the sporadic appearance of individual atheists. This could be accounted for as the consequence of individual prejudices due to improper education and ‘unnatural’ institutions. We should not, therefore, press this evidence too seriously, merely because that belief in God and Providence is too wildly diffused to be regarded as anything but a spontaneous and ‘natural’ conviction. The position taken up by some modern agnostics who deny that there has ever been a single convinced and sincere atheist is an exaggeration of the Stoic doctrine.¹ It may be added that the degradation of the argument from design or ‘intentional causality’ into the crude form which it assumes in so much of our popular apologetics is mainly due to the extravagant exaltation of man by the Stoic philosophy. With Plato and Aristotle teleology means a complex type of general causality and processes is so ordered that it realizes an end which has absolute intrinsic worth.² It is to the Stoics that we owe the consoining of the thought in which they have been deprecated. The words comfort and content, as well as the intrinsic and absolute good which is the end realized by the cosmic processes, thus they maintained that plants and animals exist only to furnish man with food and rainment convenient for him, or even with agreeable luxuries.

Porphyry’s ³ quotes from Chrysippus the statement that ‘the gods made us for ourselves and one another, but animals for us, the horse to help us in war and the dog in hunting, kelpies bears, and lions, to practise ourselves in valour upon. The pig was made for nothing but to be sacrificed, and God who made man clothed his flesh like a reasoning to make it readily digestible for us. Shell fish of all kinds and birds he contrived that we might have them for food or sport’ and enterat.⁴ Against Plutarch, Porphyry carried things so far that he asserted in his work ἐστὶν θεοῦ that God made hares to prevent us from sleeping too long and mice to teach us to take proper care of our cupboards.

7. Neo-Platonism.—In any account of the popular theism of antiquity prominence would have to be given to the utterances of the later Platonizing Roman Stoics, such as Seneca, and to the earnest defence of the ethical side of the theism by writers like Plutarch and his contemporary Maximus of Tyre. Plutarch’s philosophical essays which deal with the supreme benefactor of Pythagoras regarded as the soul of the Epicurean but also of the Stoic pantheistic necessitarianism (especially in the essay τέλος ἀντικειμένων, which aims at showing that the materialism, pantheism, and determinism of Zeno and Chrysippus are inconsistent with their moral optimism and professed belief in an ethical Providence). Interesting, however, as this theological literature is to the historian of Platonism, it cannot be said to add anything of value to philosophical theism. The Neo-Platonic school, founded in Rome by Plotinus (c. A.D. 205–270), worked out for the first time the combination of mystical and metaphysical theism which provided the philosophical basis for the Christian theism of the whole Middle Ages. For purposes of the present article it will be most convenient to reproduce the main features of this doctrine as it is presented by the great systematizer of the school, Proclus (A.D. 410–455), in his στοιχεῖα τεολογίας, Rudiiments of Platonic Theology.¹ In what follows nothing will be quoted from Porphyrius which does not form part of the teaching of the whole Neo-Platonic school from Plotinus onwards.

In Plato’s own theology, or at least in the state- ment of it which he gives in his writings, as we have seen, God is not quite all that the Christian theist has usually meant by God. God is the supremely good ‘soul’ and the source, it appears, of all existents other than Himself. But we are not positively told what is the relation of God to the supreme principles of the Platonic system, the forms (ἐδῶς, θέου) or numbers, and in the mythical picture-language of the Timaeus these forms (or numbers) are identified respectively with the divine and with God; they are the pre-existing model or pattern which God contemplates in fashioning the world of finite existents, or, as Plato calls it, the world of ‘being’ or ‘beings.’ There is no warrant anywhere in Plato for the psychologizing interpretation, often put on his language since the time of Philo of Alexandria, which makes the forms into thoughts of the divine mind. This means in modern language that, though God is regarded as the source of actuality, He is not unambiguously held to be also the source of all real possibility. In Neo-Platonism the further step is taken. God is thought of as the absolute prior of everything, and the world of existents as dependent on Him not only for its actuality but also for all its possibilities. God is no longer regarded as a soul or even as a mind, but is simply identified at once with the Good which is described in Republic, book vi., as the source of ‘being and knowledge,’ though itself ‘on the other side of’ both being and knowledge, and with the One which, according to Aristotle, is the origin of the absolute actual or self-sufficient, in the forms themselves and as the same thing as the Good.² The One thus becomes in Neo-Platonism a transcendent God of whom nothing can in strictness be said to be ‘soul’ or ‘being’.³ It is not a being, since it is identical with goodness, not a subject to which goodness can be ascribed as an attribute. Nor must it be said to exist; it is not a being or existent, but the transcendent source of all being, and is therefore regularly said to be ἄπώτερον, ‘super-essential’, or ‘super-substantial.’² God, thus conceived as the transcendent and ineffable source both of actuality and of real possibility (of existences and of ‘essences’), is connected with the actual world by the Neo-Platonic theory of causality. The theory is commonly known as that of ‘emanation,’ but the metaphor of emanation is with Plotinus and Proclus only a metaphor, and the

¹ There is no good critical edition of this important work. The least defective is in F. Cremona’s In vitia philosophica ac theologica, 3 vols, Leipsic, 1839–42, and in the Greek text of Knobloch, 1869–73.

² Metaphys., Α. 1 20.: ἦμεν ἄναρχοι τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τοῦ μεγαλοῦ ἐκείνου, ἦμεν καὶ αὑτοῖς ἀρχομεν· καὶ τούτῳ διὰ τοῦ καλοῦ πάντως, τοῖς στιχοῖς ἐπικεφαλέως εἰκοσιedia τεκμηρίων·

³ If we have omitted the word τοῦ μεγαλοῦ we have followed the reading of the majority of manuscripts and of F. Cremona. In τοῦ μεγαλοῦ is the reading of E. Schone, which is to be preferred to the reading του μεγαλου of C. W. L. Beuron. ἦμεν ἄναρχοι τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τοῦ μεγαλοῦ ἐκείνου, ἦμεν καὶ αὑτοῖς ἀρχομεν· καὶ τούτῳ διὰ τοῦ καλοῦ πάντως, τοῖς στιχοῖς ἐπικεφαλέως εἰκοσιedia τεκμηρίων., is in the distinction between existence and essence, valid for every other existing case, cases to have any meaning. It is from this last thought that the famous ontological argument for the being of God was destined to take its origin.
theory requires to be explained a little more fully, as it was not only influential throughout the Middle Ages but is tacitly presupposed in the famous attacks on it by the Neo-Platonists to establish the existence of God in the Third Meditation. Causality, as understood by the Neo-Platonists, does not necessarily imply contemporaneity in time and is always a relation between a producer and a producer of events. The relation is dyadic and unites between a producer (τὸ παραγόν) and something which the activity of the producer calls into being (τὸ παραγόνω). It is therefore derived on the ground not merely of the existence of that thing but of its being what it is and having the character which it has (the cause of its essentia as well as of its actuality). Causality is a relation of 'participation' (περιεχόμενα) or 'likeness'; i.e., the effect (τὸ παραγόνωμεν), since it derives the fact that it is and its whole quality from its cause (τὸ παραγόν), is like its cause, exhibits the same character but in a less perfect form.

The Neo-Platonic theology is strictly creaturely, not in the popular sense of regarding the world as having been made at a definite date in the past (all the Neo-Platonists held strongly that Plato, like Aristotle, meant to teach the eternity of the world), but in the philosophical sense of maintaining the causality of all that exists in relation to a supreme upon God and upon God alone. What 'really is' and what 'becomes' form a hierarchy of manifestations of the excellence contained 'emmanually' in each number of the hierarchy, according as it is at a farther remove from God, exhibiting these excellences in a less perfect way. On the other hand, the further point that the causal activity of the higher principles extends farther down in the scale of being than that of those below them, that interior or God, as we have seen, is 'above being' and is absolutely simple, not because it is void of character, but just because all relations are completed and perfectly unified and interpenetrant in it. The reason why the One creates at all is that the One itself, goodness, is of its very nature, absolute and simple, or 'divine.' Thus the One, already produced by the 'over-lying' is 'wise, intelligence' or 'understanding'; or, since the fundamental inferiority of produced to producer shows itself at this stage in the form of a distance, it is not together with the objects it contemplates, τὸ παράγων, the connected system of scientific concepts. The two are inseparable, for the παραγόν have no substance outside the understanding; they are not a realm of 'themselves,' for which Neo-Platonism has no room. As mind or understanding is an imperfect image or mirroring of the divine One, so soul is a further image or mirroring of mind. And mind and soul together make up for the Neo-Platonist the whole system of υφαίνω, real things. Bodies, the natural world as disclosed through the senses, are images of soul and are properly not υφάσμα but υφαίνοντα; they are not, 'they become,' 'are made,' υφαίνοντα, though we must remember that the really do appear and are the appearances or shows of souls, though consciousness is of the essence of real things, just as God was placed above the real things themselves, stands that 'shadow of a shade,' υφαίσθησις, bare stuff, 'which neither is nor is not,' but as a mere potential nature of something better than itself, may properly be called µέρος.

Bodies are not absolutely dependent on God, the series of υφαίνοντα and υφάσμα is further connected with the One by τοῦτον τὸ παραγόν, 'the One itself.' It does not necessarily proceed from its cause, but is inverted or reflected back into its cause. This, in fact, a consequence of the Identificatio of the First Cause with the universal Good. For the good of anything is that to union with which the thing in question aspire, and the universal Good is therefore, according to the old definition of Plato, that which all things desire to become, that which all things desire to attain. As all things have their source in God, so all things find their end or completion in God as well, and when all things have taken place, as Proclus puts it, ψυχήν τε καί ψυχῆς, as a source, or knowing. It is in turning back on their sources in contemplation that they come to know-knowledge, and are thus inverted as well as into it. The soul gets to know itself by learning to contemplate the One, the principle of the contemplation of the One; in both cases self-knowledge is got by reaching out of one's self towards the higher. Thus the transcendence of God, though it is so complete that we may not even predicate 'being' of Him, in no way interferes with the truth that the self-knowledge of the soul and the self-knowledge of the soul has no origin but support God. The monotheism of this philosophy of religion is, of course, no more affected by the belief of the Neo-Platonists in an elaborate hierarchy of superhuman beings whom they call gods than the monotheism of Christian theology, the belief in the one God, on the other hand, is the same that of Milton by his application of the appellation 'gods' to the fallen angels in Paradise Lost.

It should be particularly observed that the Neo-
Platonic school, by definitely making the One its God and teaching that the One is 'beyond being,' is committed to theism as against pantheism. The world is to One, but precisely because the effect is only an imperfect mirroring of its cause, it would not be true to say in the same sense that the One is in the world. The relation between God and the world is that of one-sidedness, of God over the world, υφαίνοντα and υφάσμα, ψυχή, and bodies; they do not produce the One. In fact, in the mythology elaborated by Proclus the ἐν οὐσίᾳ θεός occupy the lowest rank among the gods, the one-sidedness of the 'world' by which the name 'god,' thus corresponding to some of the middle ranks of the mediaeval hierarchy of angels.}

Anselm.—As is well known, when the Christian Church began to feel the need of a philosophical foundation for its theology, it sought that foundation primarily in Neo-Platonism. The Neo-Platonic influence was exerted in three main ways—through the Court of Paris, through the influence of the theological and angelological speculations of Proclus. The Neo-Platonic conception of God thus became part and parcel of orthodox Christian thought. It is this conception that St. Anselm assumes in the arguments attempted to show the existence of God by an argument which, in one form or another, has been a centre of philosophical controversy from the date of its first becoming generally known to our own day—the so-called "ontological proof" of the existence of God. St. Anselm's own formulation of his argument will be found in chs. 2-3 of the little tract, written before he had been called from his monastery at Bec, to which he gave originally the name Fides quaevis intellectus and afterwards that of Pros-
logion seu Allegoriam de Dei existentia. The object of the reasoning is to show that the existence of God is in fact an immediately evident truth. Uncertainty about God's existence is possible only so long as we are unaware of the true meaning of the word Deus. The argument, as given by Anselm, runs thus: By 'God,' we

1. Bodies are incapable of 'inversion into self,' and they are not inverted into their immediate cause, soul, ψυχή.
2. When Kingsley in Hypatia makes his Neo-Platonic phi-


3. For the sources of the preceding paragraphs see Proclus, Ἰντελεχος, τοιοῦτον τοῦ παραγόν, 1-4 (unlike and plurality), 7-11 (causation, the good), 13-21 (inversion), 21, 23, 34, 38.
mean 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived.' It seems that a doubt may be felt about the existence of anything answering to this definition, since Scripture tells us that the fool has said in his heart (i.e. has thought) that there is no God. But Anselm, in reply to this 'fool,' argues as follows. Even the fool who doubts or denies the existence of 'that than which nothing greater can be thought' must understand what this phrase means, because he knows for certain that there is such a thing.1 Thus it is certain that God, as defined, is in intellectu—a phrase which means simply that the words 'that than which nothing greater can be thought' have a definite meaning. But, if God were only in intellectu (i.e., if there we no object answering to the definition), we could think of something greater than God, for we could at least conceive that such a being was not merely thinkable but real.2 Thus the argument is that, if 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived' exists only in intellectu, 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived' is not 'something than which nothing greater can be conceived,' and this is a formal contradiction in terminis. It follows therefore that God cannot be conceived as existing without substance, but his substance cannot be conceived not to exist. How can it be true that the fool 'has said in his heart' that God does not exist? Only in the sense that the fool attaches no sense or a mistaken sense to the word 'God.' 3 These few lines contain the whole of the Anselmian argument that id quod nihil minus cogitari potest exists at least in the intellectus even of the atheistic fool. It is assumed that God exists in intellectu, and the only point discussed is whether He can be conceived not to exist. Hence the existence of God is proved by simply urging that we know what the atheist means when he says that God exists. To make the fool invalid, it ought to be shown that the fool cannot understand what the theist means without also seeing that his assertion is true, and Gaunilo denies that Anselm has established this point. Arguing, not as an empiricist, but from Neo-Platonic premises common to himself with Anselm, he urges that in point of fact we have no positive adequate concept of God; and it adds nothing to our information to be told that God is greater than all the things of which we have positive concepts.4

So far Gaunilo (who has been oddly mistaken by some modern critics for an empiricist) is simply playing off the negative or agnostic side of the theology committed by his master to something greater than the positive, and it is significant of his real purpose, which is that of a mystic rather than of an empiricist, that he quietly replaces Anselm's definition of God ad tunc that which nothing greater can be conceived 'that which is greater than all which can be conceived.' He then continues as follows. Even if I admit, what is itself questionable, that I understand the meaning of the phrase 'something which is greater than all which can be conceived,' Anselm's argument cannot force me to admit that there really is such a thing. All that the argument proves is that it would be inconsistent to admit that there is such a thing and at the same time to deny its reality, since, if it is not real, it is not greater than things which are conceived and are real. But the 'fool' is not really convicted of this. The Christian is being led to believe that he admits is, at the outside, that he understands the sense of the words 'something greater than all that can be conceived.' To make Anselm's argument cogent, one ought to be taught that God is something actually exists. If this proof is once forthcoming, Anselm's further demonstration that the something in question is all that God is

1 Certe ilium ipsum insipientium, cum audit hoc ipsius quod dico, id est intelligat et quod intellectus ejus est, estiam non intelligi illius esse (Prologion, ch. 2).
2 Et quod intellectus ejus est, estiam non intelligi illius esse (Prologion, ch. 2).
3 Sic ergo vere est aliquid quod cognoscit potest ut nec cognosci possit non esse: et hoc esse tu, Domine Deus nostri (ch. 3).
4 Nemo intelligens id quod Deus est, potest cognosci quia Deus non est in consensu, nec in intentione, neque in intellectu solo. Si enim vel in solo intellectu est, potest cognisci et in sensu diuinorum, non in sensu sensibilium (ch. 4).
5 Hoc enim est olim quod ille susurrat et PhI. divinit. quae in intellectu neque constat illud habere, cum audiat intell. intelligitur discernere esse aliquid multis omnibus quae valeant cogitari (ch. 4, § 4).

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held to be well valid. It is to illustrate this second point that Gaunilo introduces the reference to the famous lost island by which he is principally remembered. The island, as described to us, was as wealthy and better than any inhabited land, I should readily understand the meaning of the words, and the lost island would be 'in my understanding' in the same sense in which God may be unconsciously identical with the whole of the face of the earth. But it would be idle to say that the island must also really exist somewhere in the ocean because it would otherwise not be, as by definition it is, richer than all the lands. Finally he believes that it is not, as Anselm had assumed, a *proprum* of God that He can only be thought of as existing; it is true, no doubt, that we know that God exists cannot think the proposition

'There is no God' true, but neither can we think any other proposition to be false which we know to be true; e.g., I cannot think it true that I do not exist at this moment, because I know it to be true. The phrase 'in my own existence,' and, if there is, it is equally possible, in the same sense, to think of the non-existence of Gaunilo's island. This last point, of course, anticipates Hume's criticism that whatever we can think of as existing we can equally think of as not existing, and if this is admitted fatal to every argument of the ontological type.

Anselm's reply to his critic is contained in the short Liber Apologeticus contra Gaunilone re- spondentem pro Insigniis. He points out, naturally enough, that Gaunilo's substitution of the phrase 'that which is greater than everything which can be conceived' for 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived' alters the character of the argument, and that Gaunilo's reasoning about the lost island is not a real parallel to his own proof, which, as he insists, is applicable only in the case of the concept 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived.' What he does not prove, but merely asserts, is that this phrase really has a definite meaning and is not a non-
sensical or insignificant sound. On this point he is content to say that even the 'fool' must concede the meaning of the words before he can deny that they stand for a reality.

It is very difficult to follow Anselm here. If his reasoning is sound, it is not only the real existence of God but all the existence (in the logician's sense of nothing, round squares, equilateral right-angled triangles, fabulous monsters, the greatest number of all integers, etc., would be; that the three propositions 'There is no such thing as a round square,' 'There are no fabulous monsters,' 'There is no integer which is the greatest of all integers,' etc., are true; and it may then be argued that, since they are true, round squares, etc., must exist in the *intellectus* of the person who asserts the propositions. What Anselm is assuming is, as he himself says, that a proposition cannot be understood unless its 'parts' are sever-

ally understood. From this he infers that, if there is no such thing as *x* is a significant proposition, *x* must be a significant term. The assumption is plainly not justified, since my ground for asserting the proposition may be precisely that *x* has no intelligible meaning. The state of the case, then, seems to be that Anselm's argument certainly proves that, if 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived' (or 'that which cannot be conceived as not existing') exists in *intellectus*, it also exists in *re*. But the question whether it exists in *re* is certainly not settled by this argument.

9. Thomas Aquinas.—The history of the sub-
sequent fortunes of Anselm's theistic argument is a highly interesting one. In the 13th cent., the golden age of scholastic philosophy, it was widely known and disputed by all the leading thinkers. In the main the mediaval philosophers seem to have been disposed to accept it until it was rejected as a sophism by St. Thomas, whose great authority has ever since discredited it. The principal 13th cent. texts relative to the subject have been edited with an acute commentary by the Benedictine Augustin of Cassel. It is true that, although all the teachers of the second half of the 13th cent. seem to have felt themselves obliged to make their attitude to Anselm's argument clear, no theologian of the 12th cent. appears to have taken any part in the controversy. The explanation of this silence seems to be that of Daniels, that the circulation of the *Proslogion* was slow and the work unknown to theologians in general until well above the 13th century. It is certainly not true, as is sometimes said, that acceptance of the argument was confined to the Oxford Franciscans. Of the fifteen scholastics whose writings are examined by Daniels, three (one of whom is Albert the Great) express no opinion on the validity of the proof, ten (including Alexander of Hales, Bonaventura, and Scotus) accept it, only two (Richard of Middleton and St. Thomas) reject it. These facts seem of some importance. It now seems that the discrediting of which the ontological argument fell —it will be remembered that, when Descartes revived it in the 17th cent., critics were quick to remind him that the very virtues of the argument, such as the least suspicion of heterodoxy—was due almost entirely to the general recognition of the weight of St. Thomas's criticisms. They are, in fact, so formidable that we still repay the trouble of reading them, and are, in the present writer's opinion, altogether on a much higher philosophical level than the better-known polemics of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The general position of Thomas is precisely what we should expect from a philosopher whose thought has been moulded partly by Neo-
Platonism and partly by Aristotelianism. He holds that the existence of God can be, and has been, sufficiently proved a posteriori, by reasoning from the works of God to their Author, and consequently he accepts as valid both the argument from the necessity of an unmoved First Mover (the Aristotelian argument) and the argument from design, in the wide sense of an argument from final or intentional causality (the Platonic argument from order and intelligibility in the world to an intelligent Creator). But on principle he rejects the attempt to demonstrate the existence of God *a priori* (from a mere consideration of the content of the concept of God).

The most important of the relevant passages in the works of Thomas are to be found in *Summa Theologiae*, t. qu. ii. art. 1, both dealing formally with the question whether God exists; and *Summa Contra Gentiles*, l. iv. 11, and *Summa Theologiae*, t. qu. ii. art. 1, both dealing formally with the question whether God exists. His own view on this question is that the proposition is self-evident if the *essentia* of God is once adequately known, but, since we in this life do not behold the *essentia* of God, His existence is not self-evident to our understanding. It is not immediately evident to us that there is anything 'than which a greater cannot be conceived,' or 'Than God cannot be thought not to exist'; on this point St. Thomas is in complete agreement with Gaunilo. Anselm's argument, in fact, is a sophism arising from failure to distinguish between that which is *nomen per se simpliciter* and that which is *nomen per se notum*, and evidence to this.

Theism in its broadest sense is the belief in a supreme being who is active in the world, either directly or through agents. This concept is often associated with monotheistic religions such as Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. The term is derived from the Greek theos, meaning "god." The concept of theism includes the belief in the existence of a single, personal, and transcendent God who is the creator and ruler of the universe, who is the source of moral law, and who judges the actions of humankind. Theism holds that the laws of the universe are not merely natural laws, but are the direct expression of God's will and nature. Theism is a fundamental tenet of many monotheistic religions and is often contrasted with atheism and pantheism.
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The process of 'passing to the limits,' of which mathematical reasoning furnishes so many examples. But we are not really assured of our authority to consider the limit of a series or of a sum of terms that a given series has a limit or a given sum has a limit, if the limit of a sum has a limiting value or not to be discovered by examination in each special case; it is notorious that mathematicians down to a very recent time have failed so to do. It is an essential assumption that there exists, in point of fact, do they do so fail, as far as it is necessary to assume existence without more ado. It is hard to believe, as Descartes does, that St. Thomas is really right in confining the concept of God to that which he has made to resemble God. He has, for instance, to take an answer of the proof as anything more than a glaring petitio principii.

II. Spinoza.—With Spinoza's attempt to give a pantleistic turn to the Neo-Platonic and Cartesian lines of thought, there is a further and more important discovery to bear upon himself further than to remark that the whole of the First Part of the Ethics is logically no better than one long petitio. The first, third, and sixth of the definitions already contain the two assumptions, that God is substantia unica (one and not two), and that causae sui (which is defined as 'that whereof the nature cannot be conceived but as existing'), and two assumptions entirely independent of one another, that God is in reality, and that the definition of causae sui is more than a meaningless noise.

One particularly glaring example of Spinoza's singular carelessness about logical necessity is in his argument in the first of his main highest, that all that exists is God. It has been taken from Neo-Platonism the first and most fundamental notion of his system, that of causae sui (n — adaequatio Proclus). No one can fairly reproach a Neo-Platonist with taking the name adaequatio to minds and souls and expressly maintained that the One God of the Greeks having no cause, being unproduced, is adaequatio in the most complete sense. Theologians had done the same thing; as Arnoldi said in his commentary on the 'Spinoza's' his God, that is, the most perfect thing, that is, the Name adaequatio, and that is, the notion that God's existence (nisi Deus, and so on), the most perfect thing, that is, the Name adaequatio, and that is, the notion that God's existence is necessarily independent of one another, that God is in reality, and that the definition of causae sui is more than a meaningless noise.

12. Locke.—Locke's proof of theism, which he regards as another name for the Metaphysical certainty, though in some ways perfunctory, is in its general character of the Neo-Platonic type. He does not refer to the a priori or ontological argument, and refuses to pronounce any opinion on Descartes' own special argument from our possession of an idea of God except to remark that 'it is an ill way of establishing this truth and silencing atheists to lay the whole stress of so important a point as this upon that sole foundation.' (As the context shows, Locke thinks that it would be a true and relevant criticism of Descartes to say that some men have no idea, and others false ideas, of God.) It is not quite clear whether Locke regards the certainty of theism as equal to the certainty with which we know actually perceived facts or the fact of our own existence. He says that we have more certainty of it than of anything our senses have not immediately discovered to us,' and again that we 'more certainly know that there is a God, than that there is anything else.' This certainty looks as if Locke held (as Descartes did not) that the distance of God is less certain than our own, and
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possibly less certain than that of the objects of actual and mental perception. But it is also possible that he only means that our certainty in the last two cases is immediate, but in the first depends on an ability, not found in all men, to follow the steps of a deduction. He may not intend to suggest that, to the man who can perform the deduction, its conclusion is inferior in certainty to any immediate cognition, 'intuitive' or 'sensitive'.

Locke's own proof is the usual a posteriori one based on the principle of causality and the empirical proposition (guaranteed by the ego) that something (viz. myself) exists. It is also assumed, as usual, that a cause must contain more reality or perfection than any of its effects, as the Neo-Platonists had taught. The argument then becomes this: I exist; therefore I must have a cause; this cause cannot be 'bare nothing'; therefore it is a positive something. Since 'bare nothing' cannot be the cause of anything, therefore the cause of my own existence and that of all other existents must be eternal. (The impossibility of the endless regress and the 'contingency of the world' are not mentioned, but are of course tacitly presupposed.) An effect must derive all its properties from its cause. Therefore 'eternal cause' must be the most powerful of things. (It is assumed that the cause has not only as much reality as 'the effects, but more, and further that there can only be one 'eternal cause' — a point which Locke is hardly entitled by his own metaphysics to assume.) There is intelligibility in this principle of the existence of a higher intelligence (of a higher degree) in the cause. 'The eternal cause' is thus not only the most powerful, but also 'the most perfect', and this Locke thinks it follows that this cause is what we mean by God; whether we use the name or not is a mere matter of vocabulary. The same argument can be repeated again and again, and therefore Leibniz, which either any one will please to call God, it matters not. The argument, therefore, assumes that we can derive by inspection the materiality of the eternal cause. The goodness of this cause Locke presumably held, as any Platonist might, to be inseparable from its perfection. It consists, therefore, in reasoning back to find a cause of the present universe, of which any one will please to call God, it matters not. The essential characteristic of the subject is that it is thus only the familiar one from causality badly stated and with most of its real premises left unexpressed.

3. LEIBNIZ.

Leibniz's treatment of the subject is far more adequate. In his system, at least as represented in his best known works, the proposition 'God exists' holds a unique position. It is a truth of fact, and therefore, like all 'truths of fact', synthetic. But it is the only truth of fact which is capable of demonstration. In general, only 'truths of reason,' analytic propositions, admit of formal demonstration, because the demonstration of a proposition is nothing but its analysis into simpler propositions which are seen on inspection to be identities. This is why the 'principle of contradiction' (A is not non-A) is regarded by Leibniz as the supreme principle of all analytic propositions. (Truths which assert actual existence) do not fall under the principle of contradiction, but under that of sufficient reason, and thus, with the only exception of the proposition that God exists, they are not analysable into identities and cannot be formally demonstrated. The anomalous character of the proposition 'God exists' vanishes, however, when we discover from the papers published by Couturat 1 that Leibniz's real view was that all truths are analytic, the only difference between 'truths of reason' and 'truths of fact' being that the former can be resolved into identities by a finite number of steps of analysis, the latter require (like the extraction of the square root of an integer which is not a perfect square) an infinite number of intermediate steps. 2 It follows that God, being omnipresent, his existence must be part of his Being (that is, it can be included in them to be identities), just as Leibniz says more

1 Opuscules et fragments inédits de Leibniz, Paris, 1908, p. 515 ff.
2 ibid., p. 518: 'Semper ignotum praedictum sequens non subiecto seu antecedenti se incompositum, nisi in ipso consistat natural veritas in universum'; p. 519: 'the law of sufficient reason itself is a consequence of this, for all logic veritas, directum, quia non posset probari a priori, seu quia non resolveretur in infinitas series, non est verum, nisi tale, quod expositum, sine dubio, naturales, necessares, non possum demonstrari nisi infinita scholia.'

than once that God sees 'from eternity' in the sense of knowing of that Peter will repent of his denial, and in the notion of fatalism this will die immanent, and that the distinction between the necessary truths of reason and the contingent truths of fact means nothing to him. Quod nos a priori, God exists, is merely the proposition demanded for its proof a priori an infinite series of resolutions. In being capable of resolution into identities by a finite number of steps it resembles the truths of reason.

Consequently Leibniz is bound to hold that the Anselmian argument a priori from the meaning of the concept of God to the real existence of God is in principle valid. Since he held that all propositions with which he was dealing were naturally accepted the form of the argument used by Descartes, viz. that the proposition demand its proof a priori, he has also maintained an infinite analysis. The peculiarity of the one truth of fact which is necessary quod nos, 'God exists,' is merely the proposition demanded for its proof a priori an infinite series of resolutions. In being capable of resolution into identities by a finite number of steps it resembles the truths of reason. 3

3 Cf. what has been said above about the attitude of Socrates, by whom Leibniz may very possibly have been influenced.

1 Nouveaux Essais, op. cit. 
2 La Cognitione, ser. ii, vol. i, part i. 
3 See the discussion of them in B. Russell, A Critical exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, ch. ix.
Leibniz himself at times explaining why the actual world, rather than any other equally possible world, exists, by ascribing the existence of the actual world (existence, the actual existence (existence actualis)) to its degree of internal harmony, and saying that the most orderly of them is actual just because its external harmony is of a higher grade. This is what happens in more popular writings, treating existence as something which is conducive to the highest degree of possible worlds by God in virtue of His 'choice of the best.' Unless one is prepared, as the present writer after long study is not, to accuse Leibniz of insincerity, it seems impossible not to recognize here a fundamental inconsistency between his personal religious belief and his metaphysics, his natural physical system. If all true propositions are identities, philosophy cannot beistic.  

14. Hume.—The most important philosophical treatment of the theistic problem between Leibniz and Kant is unmistakably that of Hume in his Dialogues concerning Natural Religion (written apparently before 1751, though not published until 1777, three years after the author's death). In judging this work it must be borne in mind that it makes no pretence to expound the theology of the author. It is strictly what it purports to be, a conversation between a supporter of philosophical naturalism, 'natural theology,' Cleanthes, a violent atheist, Demes, intended as a representative of orthodoxy, and a sceptic, Philo. The responsibility for the positions taken by the three parties is entirely with themselves. Hume abstains from indicating his own sympathies except in the final sentence, where he suggests that the 'opinions' he has given are to be regarded as arguments for the 'natural theologian.' Cleanthes probably comes nearer to the truth than those of Philo, and those of Philo than those of Demes. Hume's real position in natural theology, as in philosophy in general, seems to have been that of a consistent Academic. Genuine scepticism is a rare thing and liable to be misunderstood. So Hume's general philosophy has commonly been mistaken, as by T. H. Green, Huxley, and others, for a shallow sensationalistic phenomenism. In reality he is neither a sensationalist nor a phenomenalist. He holds that there are insuperable difficulties in the Cartesian rationalism, and that, on the other hand, sensationalism leads to the conclusion that science is an impossibility. Being unable to accept either Cartesianism or sensationalism, and knowing of no third choice in philosophy, he adopts the sceptical attitude of 

quote

"The universe is a thing whose nature we cannot know, let us therefore be content to ascribe nothing to it and to live in the midst of this uncertainty.

"We do not, as it is we wished to be convinced, vindicating our faith, though Hume lets us see that personally he inclines to accept it. His attitude is neither that of a zealous 'indef' nor that of a philosophical and anathema. Neither

1 Cf. Couturat, La Logique de Leibniz, Paris, 1901, pp. 234-254, with the passages cited there.

2 For a useful concordance of all the more important utterances of Leibniz on the existence of God known before the publication of Couturat's volume of Oeuvres see Russell, Crit. Essays, of the Philosophy of Leibniz, pp. 234-251, and, for a 'summary,' but by no means final, attack on all the four arguments, ch. ix. of the same work.

3 Ie, natural theology., a mode in good faith seems clear from Hume's letter to Gilbert Elliot of March 10th, 1751, where he speaks of Cleanthes as the 'hero' of the dialogue and asks his friend for any suggestions which will 'strengthen that side of the dialogue,' protesting against the ascription to himself of 'any thing or the like,' by which he plainly means the side of Philo. No one could suspect him of 'propensity' to the side of the 'anti-theist.'

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There is no sign of irony in this utterance, and its seriousness is all the more probable. So Hume proceeds to express the intellectual difference between the characters of the dialogue, assigning an 'accurate philosophical turn' to Cleanthes the theist, 'carefully to Philo the atheist.'

2 The truth so obvious, so certain, as the being of a god 

want truth so important as this which is the ground of all our hopes, the basis of our confidence in the existence of the support of society, and the only principle which ought never to be a moment abased from consideration. We cannot but be moved in treating of this obvious and important truth; what obscure questions occur, concerning the nature of that divine being: his attributes, his abode, his plan of provision.

There is no sign of irony in this utterance, and its seriousness is all the more probable. So Hume proceeds to express the intellectual difference between the characters of the dialogue, assigning an 'accurate philosophical turn' to Cleanthes the theist, 'carefully to Philo the atheist.'

Hume's view of the problem. No one could suspect him of 'propensity' to the side of the 'anti-theist.'

1 That Hume was personally an orthodox Christian is, I believe, unlikely, but there is no reason to suppose that he was much further removed from orthodoxy than more of the prominent 18th. cent. latitudinarian bishops or Scottish 'moderates,' and in his philosophy he never commits himself to any view not compatible with the complete orthodoxy, as orthodoxy was understood in his day. Huxley's anti-clericalism is quite incompatible with Hume.

2 There is a certain want of definiteness about the position ascribed to Demes. He is spoken of as a philosophical sceptic, and a depreciator of the powers of reason; on the other hand, he is the champion of the 'simple and sublime argument a priori'—an odd attitude for a 'sceptic.' Hume does not seem to have distinguished between negative theology, the creation of philosophical rationalism to explain the scepticism, and the scepticism which arises from sheer distrust of reason. Philo's 'scepticism' is quite another thing, a mere declaration that, 'as at present advised, he has no sufficient motive for a positive conclusion.'

3 Demes, in fact, so little of a real theologian that he is unaware that it is impossible to prove the existence of God known only by revelation. Perhaps, like Hume himself, according to Johnson, 'he had never read the New Testament with any great deal of attention' and he almost says, not knowing that his position had been formerly condemned by the Fifth Lateran Council.

4 Huxley's exploitation of Philo for an antitheistic purpose rests on the false assumption that it is who is the real 'hero' of the dialogue.'
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effect to cause, the known effect is not perfect and we are not
entitled to infer that it is free from errors or from defects which
or from moral deficiencies, or even that 'several defects' may
not; our knowledge is defective, and we have nothing to operate
to build a house or ship. 'A man, who follows your hypothesis,
is able, perhaps, to assert, or conjecture, that the universe, somethings, and that which we call divine, beyond the
position he cannot ascertain one single circumstance, and is left
in the dark, and therefore, to suppose the ultimate
licence of fancy and hypothesis.' 1

The God of Cleanthes, in
fact, a 'finite deity,' and a finite deity is as bad as none at all.
And, if we cannot place any object of any reality there
should we look on the material world as an animal of God
and not even a spirit? We have to seek to astound the
affirmation of the eternity of the world contrary to the position of
Cleanthes, who assumed that we could have no
account for its origin. Or, again, if the world is more like
an animal or vegetable than a watch or loom, why should we
not infer that words are pronounced, everlastingly good
ought may be the 'egg' of a solar system. Demons, of course,
comments on the absence of any data for such 'wild' theories.
But this is exactly the point on which Philo wishes to insist:
we have no data to establish any system of cosmogony.
He establishes the existence of the 'all-purposes' or 'me
ding that intelligence itself is caused by physical generation.
Generation, itself an unintelligent process, is explained as
a 'principle of order in nature,' and we 'see every day the
latter [Intelligence] arise from the former [generation], never
the reverse.' 2

It is clear that there is nothing obvious that
Cleanthes is here making two very questionable assumptions—
that 'the material causes' consists in the 'body, universe,' and that
because an oak or a spider is not rational, the growth of the
and the instinctive behaviour of the other are not guided by
'simplicity' does not of itself ensure us of those
.' Philo finally reaches the climax of his position,
argues that the 'unguided' notions of material particles may give rise to
'an uniformity of appearance,' and thus 'account for all the
appearance of order in the universe.' We may hope
for such a position, or rather be assured of it, from the eternal
revelation of some God. The condition of cosmogony does not
warrant the statement that there is ever has been
'the whole of this system.' He makes the notion that
we know from existence to an halt. This implies
that we have to
the case with the universe at present. . .
May we not hope

at hand. For he
by suggesting that the only reason why there is order in the
world is that it works itself. 3
Cleanthes reasonably resorts to the
degree of harmonious adaptation in the known part of the
universe as evidence that he,
the world.
are put into the
mouth of the
Cleanthes, the
for which he
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is, in fact, as
its
and
as
1 a posteriori
by the argument by which the existence of the
selfrealism is to be established from an analysis of its own nature. The
exposition of this argument is given to Demea, the spokesman of
the materialists. Philo puts the argument into the
fact of motion to a First Mover and the argument from
the possible to the necessary. Since the infidel regresses to illegitimate
in arguing from effects to causes, we must come to
a First Cause, and when we ask why the 'succession of causes'
ought to be what it is and not a different series, we are forced to
answer that the First Cause is a 'necessarily-existent Being,
who is not and is not.' This last sentence gets in the
mind of the ontological proof under cover of the argument from causality:
this may be
justification for calling Democ's reasoning a priori.
Or
is, in fact, as

It

the argument

the argument

Philosophical


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Or
is, in fact, as

... the argument

Philosophical


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justification for calling Democ's reasoning a priori.
possibility of demonstrating theism. In his thesis for his degree,1 which aims at showing the irreducibility of the principle of sufficient reason to the absence of contradiction (or the impossibility) of the constituents of a 'complex notion.' The 'constituents' are thus presupposed as the 'matter' of the 'complex notion.' Thus a 'possibility' without any presuppositions, a 'possibility' when nothing whatever has been given as actual, is meaningless. It follows that 'nothing can be conceived as possible unless that which is real in every possible notion exists, and, indeed, exists with absolute necessity (since, if you leave this (reality) out of account, nothing whatever would be possible, i.e., everything would be impossible). Further, he urges, this 'necessary reality' must be a single being. The argument for this is that, if we suppose 'the real,' which are, so to say, the matter of all possible concepts, to be found distributed among many existents (i.e., if we suppose a plurality of ultimate 'reals'), each 'real' will have limitations, i.e., 'privations,' contrary to a single being as absolutely necessary. The supposed 'reals' will therefore all contain an element of contradiction, and the whole of the possible concepts will therefore be without any limitations and therefore infinite. (But God, who is the infinitely perfect being, cannot have a plurality of absolutely necessary predicates.) Kant thus, by deducing the existence of God from the principle itself, is fully self-consistent. He says, it is already anticipating the doctrine of the Critique that all existential solutions are synthetic without exception. Descartes' ontological argument is premises essentially invalid, precisely because it attempts to deduce the 'existence' of God from the principle of contradiction ('possibility' is an absolute necessary predicate), whereas, if we demonstrate that 'reality' is itself made to depend on 'existence,' it is nothing more than a syllogism. Kant's subject is the short essay, *On the Only Possible Proof of the Being of God.2* The proof offered is substantially that of his thesis of 1755, devestated of scholastic terminology. Existence is not a predicate or determination of a subject, but the absolute positive of the subject itself; e.g., when I am fully acquainted with the whole story of Julius Caesar and know every predicate of the hero of the story, it is still an intelligible question whether Julius Caesar is a 'real' man or only the hero of a fiction, and by calling him a 'real' man I do not add an (n + 1)th predicate to the n predicates which I have already ascribed to him (while a hypothetical proposition like: there is a difference between a 'real' and a merely possible thing lies not in what is posited in each case, but in the way in which it is posited. If I think of a triangle as a possible thing, then the Law of the Implication of the universe as a complex of simple substances or monads. His object is to show that such a complex must depend for its existence and character upon a supreme and necessary 'extra-mundane substance,' which is God. The theistic argument is more specially contained in §§ 17-22, and runs as follows. The principles of interrelation between a plurality of substances cannot have their complete ground in the existence of these substances. Each substance is indebted for its mere subsistence only to its cause (if it has a cause). But the relation of effect to cause is not, commercium reciprocum, not commercium dependens (one-sided dependence), and what we have to account for is the commercium of the substances which make up the universe. Not all these substances could be 'self-existing' because, if they were, they would be absolutely without dependence on each other; there would be no commercium between them, and they would not form a world at all. The world, or 'totality

2 §§ 11, 12, prop. 7.
3 Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daemot en Gottes, Königsberg, 1798 (Werke, ii. 100-200).

nothing should exist.' (In more modern language this means that the difference between the logically possible and impossible depends on the composibility of some predicate and the irreducibility of the possibility of others; thus, that there may be so much as the difference between what is logically impossible and what is possible, there must be predicates, and predicates are predicated of something. Hence there must be something, to the predicate if the very word 'possible' is to have a meaning.) Thus we get back to the starting-point of the proof of 1755. Possibility logically presupposes an actual existence as its foundation. Therefore there is something actual, the elimination of which would destroy all 'internal possibility'; i.e., there is 'an unconditionally necessary being.' Kant then proceeds, as in 1755, to prove that the necessary being is one, simple, immutable, and eternal, and, as that, which contains the data of all possibilities, is, in fact, the ens realessimum. From these attributes it is inferred that 'the necessary being is a spirit (Geist), and this completes the proof that God exists. It still remains for Kant to show that his form of the argument—from the possible to the necessary—is the only valid logical and theological proof. This requires the definition of God and His attributes. Kant first introduces the definition of God, putting aside on the ground that it treats existence as a predicate. The familiar argument of the throne of God and the supposition that the world is an effect, therefore it has a cause which is itself uncaused and therefore unique, is as follows. Kant then allows in this essay, as he does not in the Critique, that the difference to an uncaused First Cause may be valid. It is not so clear that 'this independent thing is unconditionally necessary,' i.e., it cannot even be thought not to exist, since the demonstration of this turns on the principle of contradiction, reason, which is not admitted by all philosophers. But, even if the point be conceded for the sake of argument, it is not proved that the absolutely necessary being is what we mean by God, i.e., is utterly perfect and utterly One. To establish this point (that 'the absolutely being = the perfect being') we require to prove that, 'if A is perfect, A necessarily exists,' and this is just the ontological argument, with its treatment of existence as one predicate among others, over and over again (a point on which Kant expatiates more fully in the *Critique*). The teleological or, as Kant calls it, the physico-theological proof here, as in the *Critique*, comes off better. Like Hume's Philo (in one of his moods), Kant is convinced that there is such evident system, adaptation, and benevolence in nature that its author must be thought of as One, wise, and good. But, though the argument deserves to be enforced in the interests of practical piety, it is not enough to prove perfect wisdom or benevolence in the Creator, and thus not enough to prove that He is all we mean by God. The same criticism will meet us again in the *Critique*.

The argument for the dependence of the world on a 'necessarily existing being' recurs again, in a slightly different form and thought, in a parallel work—Kant's inaugural lecture as professor on 'The Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World.' As in the two works already considered, Kant's assumption is that there is a complete constitution of the universe as a complex of simple substances or monads. His object is to show that such a complex must depend for its existence and character upon a supreme and necessary 'extra-mundane substance,' which is God. The theistic argument is more specially contained in §§ 17-22, and runs as follows. The principles of interrelation between a plurality of substances cannot have their complete ground in the existence of these substances. Each substance is indebted for its mere subsistence only to its cause (if it has a cause). But the relation of effect to cause is not, commercium reciprocum, not commercium dependens (one-sided dependence), and what we have to account for is the commercium of the substances which make up the universe. Not all these substances could be 'self-existing' because, if they were, they would be absolutely without dependence on each other; there would be no commercium between them, and they would not form a world at all. The world, or 'totality
of substances,' is, therefore, a 'totality of genius' in the world in virtue of its essence, consists of mere contingents. Moreover, no necessary substance is connected with the world (mundus) at all, unless as cause with effect, and therefore the cause is intelligible, a prerequisite to the existence of the parts of one and the same whole are connected by reciprocal dependence, a relation which does not affect a necessary being. The cause of the world, then, is an intelligible thing being seen as a 'sound of being required.' And the necessary being which is the extra-mundane cause of the world is one and not many. For the effects of different necessary beings would stand in no relations of reciprocal dependence, since their assumed causes are not reciprocally inter-related. Hence the unity of the substances composing the world in a single system is a consequence of the dependence of them all on one being, and it follows that this one being is not a mere 'architect of the universe' (i.e. delmorphos), but its Creator. Incidentally also the argument removes the ambiguity which had haunted Leibniz's account of the 'pre-established harmony' to God, thereby makes the harmony itself dependent on God.1

Thus down to 1770 Kant shows no doubt of the possibility of demonstrating theology. The arguments of religion remain the same—the Neo-Platonic argument a posteriori—and rest on the assumption that the world is a contingent object for which the principle of causality is required to seek an explanation.2 The proof, as with every other metaphysical argument, aims at establishing the existence of the One—the single, internally simple and perfect, extra-mundane source of all the existents which together make up the cosmos. The peculiarity of Kant's special version of it is that, to escape the criticisms which had been directed against Descartes, he draws himself to deduce to the existence of a 'being which cannot be thought not to exist,' not from the logical concept of ens realissimum, but from the consideration that, in the proof of existence of the one, being which exists of the same thing and some combinations of relations between the same things are possible, and others not. The existence of an actual extra-mundane being once established as a pre-condition of the difference in intra-mundane things between what is possible and what is impossible, the internal unity, simplicity, and perfection of the necessary being are then deduced as consequences of its necessary existence. If this line of argument is not fallacious—i.e. if it really proves that something exists—necessary—'it clearly has the double merit of being free from the objection to the ontological proof, and of being equally untouched by the criticisms urged by Philo and Democritus in heaven against the a posteriori proof. If the principle on which Kant relies—that the possible presupposes the actual—is sound, his argument seems to be a complete scepticism in respect of the being capable of being deduced to its most succinct expression. Why, then, did Kant, in his later 'critique of pure reason' demand the question of the a posteriori proof to be transcendental—i.e. outside the legitimate limits of speculative investigation—and all 'proofs of the existence of God,' including that of the existence of a world itself formerly claimed 'geometrical certainty, mere fallacies'?2

In dealing with Kant's drastic assault on speculative natural theology in the Critique of Pure Reason, we may perhaps distinguish two questions which Kant himself naturally treated as one. It is one question whether Kant has proved that the demonstration of theology is impossible on the assumption that the special doctrine of his Critique as to the limits of human knowledge is true, but quite another question whether that doctrine is true, and consequently whether Kant has proved the falsity of natural theology unconditionally. The first of these two questions no doubt permits of only one answer. Kant is clearly right when he asserts that all existent propositions are hypothetical at best (to repeat the distinction of St. Thomas to which Kant pays no regard) quod nos. And it follows at once from this single consideration that, if, as the Critique maintains, the synthesis in a synthetic proposition depends on the total knowledge of the world, which is itself the result of an application of formal 'categories of the understanding' to a material supplied in sensation or sensuous imagination, no synthetic proposition (and, by consequence, no existential proposition) can be affirmed of a subject which is purely empirical. And it seems to many to be this main a point in his criticism of the ontological proof. Unfortunately, however, this doctrine, if carried out to its full logical consequences, would lead to a result which Kant has been the first to reject. For it follows that the world must be conceived to consist of an infinity of pure arithmetic and pure geometry. The subjects about which synthetic propositions are asserted in these sciences are one and all Objekte des reinen Denkens no less than the ens necessarium or the ens realissimum of speculative theology. No element whatever supplied by sense enters into the mathematician's concept of a circle, a parallelogram, or an integer, or a real number. Kant overlooks this all-important point because he assumes throughout his whole reasoning that, before I can demonstrate a proposition in geometry, I must draw the figures of which the propositions are to be deduced to the existence of numbers. If, on the contrary, he sets about it in a manner he would certainly think more logical, before I can say what the sum of two integers is, I must count the units of which he supposes the integers to consist. The erroneous character of this view has been sufficiently demonstrated by the subsequent history of mathematics, which has been shown to have been clear to Kant himself. Even if all geometry, as he tacitly assumes, were metrical geometry, he ought to have seen that Descartes' invention of the geometrical method, which had already long been in use, and which essentially consists in the drawing of figures in principle superfluous in geometrical science. His conception of arithmetic is even more superfluous—in fact, on a level with Aristotle's.2 Kant has correctly observed that Kant's examples are all drawn from the demonstration of singular propositions (such as 7+5=12). If he had asked himself how any general truth in the theory of numbers is proved (how, e.g., we prove Fermat's theorem) he would have seen at once the inadequacy of his own theories. Indeed, mere consideration of a singular proposition which does not relate to integers (e.g., the proposition 2.3+4.3=6.16) might have taught him that arithmetic is not the same thing as counting, and even suggested to him that an integer is not a 'collection of units.'3

With the discussion of Kant's 'Transcendental Aesthetic' and the section of the 'Transcendental Dialectic' containing the famous antinomies, which may now be fairly regarded as a 'fait accompli,' one becomes conscious of the impossibility of considering whether natural theology does or does not involve a priori rational knowledge. Kant has declared an illegitimacy of all metaphysical demonstration of pure logic. From Kant's point of view, to be sure, it does. But this is just because Kant assumes that the only legitimate use of logical principles is their employment to order a material given by sense. If the doctrine of his 'Aesthetic' is rejected, and with it that of the 'Dialectic' in which he absurdly tries to show that the mathematical doctrine of infinite series leads to antinomies, it is no longer obvious that what Kant calls a transcendental employment of the principles of logic—i.e. their employment independently of application to 'the manifold' of sense—need be illegitimate. In fact, it is not clear that the whole of the general theory of arithmetic is not just such an employment of logical principles as 'constitutive de la Denkobjekte.' It is certainly so if it is as probable the case, the series of natural integers can be defined wholly in terms of the primitive inductive principles of the mind. Kant in particular, may be noticed here, as it plays a prominent part in the assault on the theistic arguments. Kant claims that all the arguments for the 'necessary being' based on the causal principle depend on employing this principle, which is a mere rule for ordening the appearances of the mathematical, and has no meaning apart from these appearances, as a means of transcending the world of sense.3 It is the same to remark that one form of cartesianism which we are intimately acquainted with and to our own volitional activity. In this activity, which is both self-sufficient and independent of any external cause, what are connected as cause and effect are not an earlier and simply consequent effect. The activity of creation, by an

1 Commercium itaque omnium substantiarum universi est externe stabilimum per causam omnium commonom 'ib. p. 22.
2 Philo, in Hume, it will be remembered, had at least suggested that the mind need not be the case; the material world may be its own explanation.
3 On the absurdity of all this see, in particular, the crushing exposure of Contur, De l'infinit mathématique, Paris, 1856, iv. ch. 4.
4 Kritik der reinen Vernunft II, Riga, 1787, p. 637.
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which does belong to it. Kant could not deny the causal relation between the rational self and events in the Simplicius without ruining the foundations of his体系, but the admission of such causality ought to debar him from attacking natural theology on the ground that it 'uses the principle of connection of cause and effect to nonsense.' He only escapes open self-contradiction by his monstrous theory, which makes us suppose that at the present day, that self with which we are acquainted is not the real self at all, but a phenomenal self apprehended by an inner sense. From the world of logic, the criticism is content to a refusul to admit the validity of any logical inference from the terms of the problem to the conclusion of the series. It is not in itself any more absurd to hold that examination of the things and events of the Simplicius in the light of the causal principle reveals their true nature when something which does not belong to that world than it is to hold that a series of which every term is a rational fact can be shown to have a limit which is not a rational fraction. (This is, e.g., the case when we represent a surd 'square root' as a recurrent continued fraction. Each of the 'convergents' is a rational fraction, but the limit of the series is not.) The general argument is thus invalid. No a priori reason can be given why the causal principle should not enable us to transcend the world of sense, and the only real question which remains is whether the particular arguments of the critics will stand scrutiny on their merits. There is no general logical presumption against them of this kind, however.

We are thus brought to the consideration of the force of Kant's attack on natural theology taken by itself and apart from its connexion with a general theory of the nature of scientific knowledge. We may therefore confine ourselves to the sections of the Critique of Pure Reason which profess to make a complete enumeration of the possible proofs of the existence of God and to convict each of the 'proofs' of fallacy, together with the 'Critique of All Speculative Theology,' in which Kant sums up his results. The general line of argument is as follows: The scientist's interpretation of facts consists in regarding any given actual condition of things as conditioned and asking for the antecedent facts which condition it. When they have been found, science once more requires an interpretation of them on the same lines, and so on in definitum. Every set of facts has thus to be regarded by the scientific intellect as conditioned by an antecedent state of things which has, in its turn, to be discovered. The scientific 'explanation' of the world is thus a task which, from its nature, can never be completed. Behind every set of conditions, however remote, at which we may arrive there is always a body of still more remote conditions to be discovered. (The conditions, in every case, like the facts they condition, are facts and processes of the Simplicius.) The unending regress from conditioned to conditions, however remote, is supposed to prove that the whole process of explanation would be completed if we could find something ultimate, itself unconditional but the condition of everything else. Thus we arrive at the notion of a being which 'exists necessarily' and contains in itself the explanation of everything else, the one and only being which is not contingent (i.e. a consequence of something other than itself).

Next, it occurs to us that, if there is a 'necessarily existing' being, it must, as the condition of everything else, contain in itself that which is truly real or positive; what is real in all limited and finite things must come to them from the one. This was the en necessarium with the ens realessimum ('dos nesje nie was alle Realiteit enthalt'). Finally, since we ourselves, who are among the things dependent on this being, are intelligent beings, we can 'personify' this being, and thus we arrive at the conception of God as the Supreme Being and source of the world. But the whole process has no scientific foundation or intelligibility in it. The inference then of the existence of a 'necessary being' is invalid because it employs the causal principle, which is really only a rule for the interconnexion of sensible events, as a means of connecting the sensible with the intelligible (a general criticism which has already been considered in the last paragraph); we have no positive conception whatever of the character of this necessary being, and have no right to seek and the attempt to find one by identifying it with the 'most real being' will not stand examination, since it is logically possible that there might be a plurality of 'necessary' beings, each imperfect and finite (the same idea of the 'indefinite series'). The ultimate 'reality' is a 'society' of unoriginate 'persons' without any Creator); and the attempt to prove the existence of a single 'most real being' directly is a pure sophism. The conclusion then is that, though speculation may suggest to us the possibility that God (conceived after the fashion of the Neo-Platonic 'One') is the source of the world, it can do no more. It cannot even prove that the possibility is more than 'logical'; i.e., speculation may convince us that there is no internal contradiction in the notion of such a being; it cannot show that God is a 'real possibility'—i.e., that there is no incompatibility between the existence of God and the actual facts of the world of experience, if we knew them all instead of being aware of a mere fragment of them. The whole line of argument is thus to suggest this mere possibility, to warn us that we are not speculatively justified in regarding the sensible world as ureal, but must keep an open mind. If, however, apart from all speculative philosophy, there are practical grounds for believing in God—i.e., if the reality of absolute moral obligation can only be made intelligible to our reason by a dependence on God—then for practical purposes, the open possibility is converted into a moral certainty. Kant means, as he explains, that, in shaping the conduct of our lives, it 'suffit pour.' We must act either on the assumption that moral obligation is absolute or on the assumption that it is not; there is no third course. But all moral obligation, as is shown at length in the Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik der Sitten, is absolute, and there is no fact more certain than this. Without God as ruler of the world, however, the system of absolute obligations would be a logically flawless construction ('in der Idee der Verummt ganz reich'), but would have no 'reality of application to ourselves, i.e. would be without motives.' A virtuous man is thus necessitated to a firm rational belief in them, but that which makes the necessity is not the purely demonstrative force of the theistic arguments (which in fact is zero), but the virtuous man's immediate conviction of the absoluteness of moral obligations. This is what Kant meant when he described himself as abolishing knowledge to make room for faith. If our unfavourable judgment on the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' is justified, we plainly cannot concede to Kant that all speculative theism must be baseless. The theistic arguments must be scrutinized on their merits, not condemned en bloc like the generals at Argusana. With his usual love for formal schematism Kant urges that this be done and only three ways of trying to prove the existence of the Supreme. We may attempt to...

1 Kritik der reien Vernunft, pp. 611-670.
prove the existence of the 'most real being' entirely a priori (i.e. without the use of any
'truth'][argument or premises] by arguing that existence is included in its very nature—the ontological proof; we may, departing from the strictly a priori method, employ the single truth of the God hypothesis and the empirical postulates, and then argue to the conclusion that a 'necessary being' exists—the cosmological proof; we may include among our premises specific assertions about the nature of the universe, or the like, i.e., we may argue from the marks of intelligent and benevolent design in the actual world to intelligeice and benevolence in its source—the physico-theological proof. All of these proofs is now to be shown unsatisfactory.

The refutation of the 'ontological proof' is one of the best-known passages of the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant speaks of the proof as the 'first of the three', and his review of its outcomes.

He examines it only in the form in which it has been revived by Descartes, and particularly by the Scholastic writers. The critics, of course, make the point that Kant's definitions of the 'God' concept are dependent on the 'ontological proposition' ('God exists') categorically. In fact, existence is not the predicate of any 'real' 'dollars' in a precise sense. Thus, Kant's view that the existence of a Supreme Being is in many respects a most useful idea, but just because it is merely an idea it is wholly inexplicable of extending our knowledge of what exists by means of itself alone. Since Hegel undertook to rehabilitate the argument, it has been fashionable to retort on Kant that, though it may be true that the real existence of a sum of a hundred dollars cannot be inferred from analysis of the corresponding concept, the case is wholly altered when we come to deal with the unique and exalted concept of the Supreme Being. The present writer does not feel that Hegel's criticisms on this point are any answer to Kant's criticism. Kant is certainly right in saying that mere success in defining a concept without contradiction does not in general warrant our asserting that the concept has an 'extension'. The logical investigations which have been brought forward have been very valuable in this respect, but it must be remembered that when we reason from a concept to an ontological proposition ('God exists') categorically. In fact, existence is not the predicate of any 'real' 'dollars' in a precise sense. Thus, Kant's view that the existence of a Supreme Being is in many respects a most useful idea, but just because it is merely an idea it is wholly inexplicable of extending our knowledge of what exists by means of itself alone. 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An example of the phenomenon is that the series of events has a first term, or, like St. Thomas, hold that it can only be known by revelation whether the series has a first term or not. The cosmological argument is not a First Cause argument (or ‘movers’ or ‘agents’ in the plural), as the case may be, the world has been demonstrated to have two independent causes, cosas are what they are because there happen to be such and such agents, and the reason why there is no need to be determined and no others is that there happen to be (or ‘to have been’) certain others by which the set first mentioned have been produced, and so on in this fashion. This means that there have been no world at all, or one quite different from that which we see. As a result, it may be possible to maintain this thesis, and we shall have to face it in the sequel. But it is an injustoio elenchoi to defend it by assuming physical evolution. On the other hand, prove that the cosmological argument is valid, for which it is indispensable that every human self shall be a ‘first cause’ of its own morally and legally impeccable acts. If ‘first cause’ really means nothing indestructible, Kant’s practical philosophy is no better than an idle sporting with ingenuous words. One must hold that the full force of the cosmological argument is only seen when it is combined with the argument from intentional causality. If the historical world is the result of the will of any kind of being, the suppositions must be made in connection with the being or the object of the implication of the sort of all the natural constitute universe happen to be what are. An ultimate pluralism, to prove that there is no meaning in all the world-process. But, again, the Kantian phenomenology is a question of the logical constitution, this view. As to the last point, it does depend on the special principles of the critical philosophy, and, in particular, on the theory that there is a self at the root of the valid synthetic propositions. As has already been remarked, this theory is supported by the simple consideration that every proposition in the theory of numbers is synthetic in Kant’s self, thus, on the one hand, the argument is unfounded. Even the complaint that we have no positive conception of either ‘necessary’ or ‘real’ being only amounts to a demand that we know what it would be to be God—a proposition which no reasonable theist, least of all Kant, would be inclined to concede to the argument. For the matter of that, I do not know what it would be like to be my cat, but that is merely an insufficient reason for denying my account. Kant’s treatment of the argument from intentional causality is much more lucid, and may be summarized more briefly. This argument, which he reduces to the argument from design, he regards with great respect as the most important one. His argument seems to assume the negative that it is not a truth of the design. This is because it is not a self-evident fact that it is impossible to be designed in this way, and a priori there is no ground for objection to speculative theological consideration similar to the Kant’s, and the fact that it is true is self-evident—an impossible idea is impossible in this sense: still less it would be possible to maintain that, when one utters the well-known proposition, every integer can be represented as the sum of two prime numbers, in the case of the integer—i.e., at least is not true, one is not transcribing anything that is impossible to be true. In any case, to verify the proposition by examining its validity for each successive integer is an impossible idea. But, though I could, e.g., prove the proposition quoted to hold good for a few cases by actual counting, I manifestly cannot carry out this process of verification by the method of the problem to intuition. Again, we know the test is a logical argument by which a logically true proposition can be demonstrated. We may be concerned only with objects that fall under the forms of intuition. Kant’s treatment of the argument from design is much more lucid, and may be summarized more briefly. Kant’s argument is that the existence of the universe is an ‘a priori’ and not an empirical fact. He assumes the existence of the universe as a self-evident fact, and he assumes the fact to exist. But the fact is not self-evident, and it is not possible to prove it. Kant’s treatment of the argument from design is much more lucid, and may be summarized more briefly. Kant’s argument is that the existence of the universe is an ‘a priori’ and not an empirical fact. He assumes the existence of the universe as a self-evident fact, and he assumes the fact to exist. But the fact is not self-evident, and it is not possible to prove it.
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old speculative natural theology, it is even more his purpose to replace it by a positive moral theology, and it is probably true to say that it is primarily intended to this end. At the same time, it is mainly upon the moral argument that popular theistic philosophy continues to base itself. As the Kantian moral theology has often been very inadequately understood, whether its right application to state Kant's real position rather carefully, in order to put in the clearest light the differences between Kant and those who hold that the existence of God remains a sufficient moral problem, though not established by the facts of the moral life, or those who hold that it is a doctrine recommended mainly by its comforting character. To appreciate the strength of Kant's position, it is necessary to understand that theism is not in any sense an arbitrary hypothesis tacked on to a system of ethics, or, as Bosanquet calls it, a ‘survival’ of belated superstition, but a logically necessary part of ‘practical’ philosophy. The argument starts from premises which are taken as once for all established in the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten and the Analytic of Practical Reason. These premises are the following:--

1. That the Critique of Practical Reason should be divided, like the Critique of Pure Reason, into an 'Analytic' and a 'Dialectic'—of course there can be no 'Aesthetic' in this case—and that the 'Dialectic' must have its antithesis a pure piece of pedantic formalism which Kant would have done well to do without.

2. The words of this statement are not precisely those of Kant, but have been chosen to express as briefly and untechnically as possible the main substance of his thought. Kant's own expression is carefully observed that the central thought is not egotistic. Kant's point is that the 'ideal spectator,' apart from any consideration of his own happiness, would judge unfavourably of a world in which the will of the good will be virtuous (a). The highest good—object of the moral will—is thus a union of virtue with happiness, but a union in which the inner virtue of the agent is the condition and cause of his happiness. Since the highest good, in which a rational being is (a) deserving of happiness, deserving that his will be done, as in heaven so in earth, and (b) has the happiness which he deserves as a consequence of his deserving it.

(More briefly, the highest good is that the actual order of things should be a moral order.) But—and here comes in the antinomy which Kant thinks indispensable in a Critique—the principle, as distinct from the object, of the virtuous will is always to act from reverence for the unconditional moral law, without any consideration of the result of our actions. We must, as moral beings, will the highest good, yet we must also, as moral beings, will to do right for its own sake, without even asking the question whether our right actions will lead to the fruition of this good or not. We cannot escape from this antinomy, as Kant holds we can from those of speculative reason, by dismissing it as illusory. For we are not absolute obligations, and we cannot be really virtuous without desiring the highest good, nor yet can we be really virtuous if we allow this desire to affect our will to do right because it is right, regardless of consequences. Thus, if morality is to be more than an empty dream, the union of virtue and happiness must be realized, though we must not set ourselves to realize it by treating virtuous actions as a means to it. The realization of the union must be brought about for us, not by us. Now, experience shows abundantly that in the empirically known system of nature there is no dependence of happiness on virtue. The virtuous man is not a force, whose will is actually done 'in earth,' nor the man whose will is done the man whose volitions are morally purest. The union must therefore be effected for us by a supreme power, not our own, to which the 'intuitive world' which discloses the course of events so that, if we could see the whole infinite series at once, we should see that every man is happy in proportion to the degree in which he deserves to be happy. Further, since morality demands not merely that the virtuous shall be happy but that the happiness shall be a consequence of their virtue, we could not regard the union of virtue and happiness as effected by a mere blind 'natural tendency' in things. The virtuous man's virtue must be the motive of the disposing power to make him happy—i.e., this disposing power must be thought of as an intelligent and absolutely holy will. Thus it becomes a postulate of morality that there is an absolutely wise and holy Supreme Being. We have already seen that the speculative use of reason in finding an explanation for natural events themselves suggested the hypothesis that there is a Supreme Being, though all our attempts to demonstrate the truth of this hypothesis proved to rest on fallacy. The conception of the presuppositions of morality now show that, unless there is to be a contradiction between our conception of the highest good and the first principle of duty, such a Supreme Being must really exist and, what is more, must be spiritual. Practical reason then does not introduce us to any new idea; it did, there might be an insoluble conflict between its suggestions and the results of speculative criticism. It only gives us the right to affirm as a reality what speculative reason itself unavoidably suggests as a possibility, the complete dependence of the world on a Supreme Being, and enables us to determine the character of that Being so far as to say that it combines perfect wisdom, holiness, and power. Beyond this moral absolutely cannot go. It tells us what God must be if the world is to have moral order, and it tells us nothing more. Kant pushes this consideration so far that he is not content to say with the Neo-Platonists and scholastics that we do not know God secundum essentiam suam. Recurring to his view that an object of possible experience must have sensuous forms, he suggests (in the language of intuition), he in effect denies that we have any experience of God at all. 'Mystics' profess to experience the divine, but for that very reason Kant sets them down summarily as 'fanatics' who must not be allowed a hearing.
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The value of Kant's moral argument for theism seems to rest on the independence of our concept of the critical philosophy as a whole. The phenomenalism which is the weakest point of the system only affects Kant's unvalueable estimate of specific religious evidence. If anything, he might be said with an appearance of plausibility that God as the source of the subordination of nature to the moral order is only brought in to solve a difficulty which Kant has created for himself by the abstract formalism of his ethical system. If we come in for more unsparing reprobation than the famous theory that the moral worth of an act depends upon its being done from reverence for universal law as such, and is destroyed if any desire for a specific result influences the agent's motives. But, apart from this untenable theory, it may be said, there is really no antithesis between the supreme object of virtuous willing and its true principle: the realization of the good is at once object and principle. And thus the problem which, according to Kant, is solved for us by the existence of God is not a real problem at all. Yet such criticism surely misses the mark. The problem Kant has in mind still remains when the pure formalism of his own conception of the good will has been dismissed. One and the same concept of the maxims and end values, the right of decisions to control the world, compels us to pronounce the world evil and our own moral striving a vain show if the highest good is not realized or realizable, and also forbids us to aim directly at the realization of this highest good by doing moral evil that good may come out of it or leaving the undone undone because the consequences of our actions are not limited by any limits in a certain case, bad. It is certain that good often comes out of moral evil, and that moral integrity itself often demands action which leads to bad results which would not have followed if the agent had been less virtuous. Thus, quite independently of any special Kantian theses in ethics, we are confronted by the dilemma: either the order of things, rightly understood (the intelligible world), is a moral order and realizes the highest good or the highest good is not realized and all moral effort is senseless and foredoomed to failure, in which case the conviction of the absolute value of the good, on which morality is based, is a mere illusion. If this be so, the argument from the reality of the absolute values to the all-wise, all-holy, and all-powerful Supreme Being, in the present writer's judgment, holds, exactly on the lines on which Kant has conducted it. It is precisely the same argument, divested of its incidental trappings of Kantian 'critical' phraseology, which Solovyov compresses into a sentence when he writes:

'The unconditional principle of morality, logically involved in religious experience, contains the complete good (or the right relation of all to everything) not merely as a demand or an idea, but as an actual power that can fulfil this demand and create the perfect moral order or Kingdom of God in which the absolute significance of every being is realized.'

16. Lotze.—This article cannot undertake to follow the history of the treatment of theism in philosophy beyond Kant with any detail. To do so would require a substantial volume, and it does not seem to the present writer that anything which is new in principle has been added to the arguments for or against theism since Kant's development of the moral proof in the Critique of Practical Reason. An exception, however, may be made for Lotze, more particularly on the ground that he has done so much, in the face of Kant's critical repudiation of his own earlier position, to vindicate the Kantian problem that philosophical theology is exhausted by the one proposition that God exists.

1 See the entertaining illustrations of this point in V. Solovyov, The Futilization of the Good, Eng. tr., London, 1918, pi. iii. ch. 5. p. 193. The whole of Solovyov's book is worth reading as a starting point for Kant's philosophy of religion which he himself relied upon for advanced middle age.

2 It may seem strange to describe Lotze as reasserting the particular version of the cosmological argument which finds in God the reductio ad absurdum of a point of view. But it is clear from the fact that Lotze himself, in the chapter on 'Proofs of the Existence of God, in the Grundzüge der Religionsphilosophie, professes to have disposed of the cosmological proof in one or two paragraphs of not very profound criticism. Yet an analysis of his own method will show that Lotze does not rest on Kant's doctrine or argument for the being which exists with an absolute necessity. The starting-point of Lotze's train of thought was historically determined for him by the necessity of taking up a definite attitude towards the philosophy of Herbart, and to a lesser degree of Hegel; this special concern with the problems raised in the metaphysics of Herbart further accounts for the very marked influence of Leibnitz.

3 We can neither dismiss change or becoming as a mere illusion, even if Kant's doctrine of the subordination of natural processes to any infinite being for the world is, as Kant said, 'irregularly, though not absolutely, necessary,' we must suppose that there is a reason in the state of things in which A was present, which can be replaced by B rather than by C or Q, and that on special occasions A (we say 'coincidentally') followed by B (dictated by B). If B, on the other hand, we require B to exist, then again we must require necessarily that the changes of state of the various things are intericoned by laws according to which a definite change of state in one of the existents is conditional by changes of state in the rest. The very fact that, e.g., A only exhibits the change from state to state (on the condition that certain account of the pre-conditions of this universal fact of change, 3

The universe were really a collection of independent existents, or 'things,' how could the occurrence of a change of state be the corresponding change in another (the occurrence of a state a on b)? This is the fundamental fact which the universe is and cannot be not be find.

1 Lotze's treatment of the subject is to be found partly in his Metaphysics, Introd. ed., Leipzig, 1912, Eng. tr., 2 vols., Oxford, 1938, see particularly bh. i. chs. 6-7, with which may be compared the treatment of the subject in the second critical edition of the Grundzüge der Religionsphilosophie, Leipzig, 1882, Eng. tr., Outlines of Metaphysics, Boston, U.S.A., 1886, particularly the chapter 'Of Causes and Effects' (Eng. tr., pp. 57-73), partly in the Grundzüge der Religionsphilosophie, Leipzig, 1894, A longer and more popularly written exposition is given in his later work, The Unity of Things, Eng. tr., 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1894, bk. ix., 'The Unity of Things.' Only the general outline of Lotze's doctrine can be dealt with here.

2 It must be understood that Lotze is here thoroughly unacquainted with Leibnitz's most important papers, which were mostly unpublished until after he had been dead for several decades. It was his only fundamental doctrines; hence his version of the earlier philosopher's thought is not to be implicitly trusted.

This view of Kant's religious problems which had specially occupied Herbert and the Herbartians.
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is not fully known to us. But it is important to be quite clear on one point of the first importance. This is the so-called 'M' problem. This is a problem described as 'subject to meaningful definitions'. If the world of the 'M' problem is composed of things subject to meaningful definitions, then this secures an intelligible account of the relation between the things and the laws. The laws of the 'M' problem are not a concrete "M" and its individual acts of self-expression and self-maintenance. Since we are part of the contents of M, we cannot possibly, according to Lotze, assign any meaning and so come to formulate general propositions. We can even consider the matter so far as we have the notions of "class" and 'member of a class," to think of M, the real world itself, as one member of a class of worlds, and to speculate on the possibility that thought might be other—"poetical" say Leibniz said. Then we may be led, as Leibniz was, into the insoluble problem of why just which things are 'real', not distinguished from the non-real, is real. But this whole way of thinking of possibilities as metaphysically anterior to reality, or of the hypothetical propositions we call laws as anterior to temporal relations are, and as what we have, these laws, rests on illusion. Metaphysically speaking, it is the actual nature of M that accounts for our existence and our possession of the mental capacities which we exercise in framing laws and hypotheses. If M were other than it is, its elements, it seems, would cease to exist and serve as our views as to what alternatives would be possible would be different also. This is the philosophical theory to confound logical with metaphysical priority.1

How M can be the in & well required by the theory we are accounting for in detail, but broadly speaking, at any rate, that M cannot be material. The only thing with which we are acquainted which is not directly or indirectly discharged for materiality is the functions which M must discharge for the totality is the soul which at once has or owns a multiplicity of states or activities and also a personal identity of itself and not dependent on its own unity and its distinction from each and all of these states and activities. M is thus said to be an unity of forms, and these form, is real. And though this whole way of thinking of possibilities as metaphysically anterior to reality, or of the hypothetical propositions we call laws as anterior to temporal relations are, and as what we have, these laws, rests on illusion. Metaphysically speaking, it is the actual nature of M that accounts for our existence and our possession of the mental capacities which we exercise in framing laws and hypotheses. If M were other than it is, its elements, it seems, would cease to exist and serve as our views as to what alternatives would be possible would be different also. This is the philosophical theory to confound logical with metaphysical priority.1

We have said that M, the real world itself, is a class of worlds, and that thought might be other—"poetical" say Leibniz said. Then we may be led, as Leibniz was, into the insoluble problem of why just which things are 'real', not distinguished from the non-real, is real. But this whole way of thinking of possibilities as metaphysically anterior to reality, or of the hypothetical propositions we call laws as anterior to temporal relations are, and as what we have, these laws, rests on illusion. Metaphysically speaking, it is the actual nature of M that accounts for our existence and our possession of the mental capacities which we exercise in framing laws and hypotheses. If M were other than it is, its elements, it seems, would cease to exist and serve as our views as to what alternatives would be possible would be different also. This is the philosophical theory to confound logical with metaphysical priority.1

The construction of a metaphysical system, we must be content to indicate the general view to which their studies in logic, ethics, and the philosophy of the mind have led them to the conclusion, which is that of pluralism of the type in question would take issue with Lotze over the validity of the ground on which he maintains the existence of such a being as M. It would insist that the concept of "dualism" which Lotze assumes to be unthinkable —the 'dualism' of actual existence and hypothetical universal laws. It would be maintained that what we actually find the 'world' to consist of is a plurality of existing things standing in a complicated network of relations of all kinds with one another. These relations, it would be further said, cannot all be reduced, as Lotze assumes, to reciprocal causal inter-connections. Causal connection is only one of the many types of relation; there are others, such, e.g., as the mere 'togetherness' or 'comprehension' which language represents by the word 'and', the 'disjunction' symbolized by 'or', and 'else', and so forth, in which causality is not a component at all. Relations are all 'universals', and no relation is an 'existent', while 'existents' are all individual. We have to accept it as an ultimate fact with these ways of non-of individuality. And it would therefore be said that specific individual existents stand in certain definite relations to other specific individual existents. To ask why this is so is to ask a question quite as illegitimate as to ask why there exists a thing, or the pure scientific philosophers whom we ridicule for asking 'how being is made'. More particularly, the special problem which leads Lotze to frame the concept of M—the problem of a change of "state" is brought about, say one thing can exhibit a succession of different states or first have a relation to a second thing and then lose it—would be declared illegitimate. According to the view which has been most elaborately developed by Russell,2 the proposition that at a certain moment A changes its state from a1 to a2 or changes its relation to B from R1 to R2, if expressed accurately, only means that the whole duration of A's existence can be resolved into two mutually exclusive classes of moments. In any moment of the one class a has the state a1 or stands in the relation R1 to any moment of the other class a2 has the state a2 or stands in the relation R2. And, further, every moment of the one class a, comes before any moment of the other class a2. There is no moment in the whole conjunction of the class a, at which a1 and a2 overlap, is derived from this character. And mere inanimate things are held to be a support of this view. There are, accurately, only the living body and his acts. Some of these acts are souls with a real spiritual individuality of their own. In this way, while avoiding the customary theistic language about the transcendence of God, Lotze secures the same result by maintaining that God is immanent in the world, but that the world is immanent in God. The limitation of real individuality to souls naturally reminds us of the Neo-Platonic view that souls hold the lowest place in the system of souls bodies not being real but 'wholesome', what becomes,' or eidos eis eidos, 'images of the soul.' The resemblance with Neo-Platonism is even more marked when Lotze uses his view of M as the metaphysical prius of universal laws or eternal truths as a ground for urging the same sort of incompatibility. The monologue phrase has it, 'naturally prior to God; God is Himself the connate ground of which all things are mere conjunction.'

17. Logical pluralism. —The foregoing statement of the theistic argument as presented by Lotze provides an opportunity for considering the type of ultimate pluralism of which we have spoken as the commonest philosophical connotation of theistic. This type of view is best represented in contemporary English philosophy by the writings of G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, though, as nearly as can be estimated, the present writer regards Lotze's argument for the unicity-of-M as in principle identical with Kant's pre-critical argument for a 'necessarily existent' at the foundation of real personality.1

1 In The Principles of Mathematics, Cambridge, 1903. The later work of Russell and Whitehead, Principia Mathematica, Cambridge, 1910 and subsequent years, does not assume this metaphysics.

It will be clear from these last statements of Lotze's present writer regards Lotze's argument for the unicity-in-multiplicity of M as in principle identical with Kant's pre-critical argument for a 'necessarily existent' at the foundation of real personality.
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1 It would be a superficial objection to say that 'because it is worst' would be also an answer to our question. Good (no one has doubted) does exist on the point that there is something definite and positive. So 'best' has a meaning, but 'worst' has none, any more than 'so crooked that nothing can be crooked' has.

a 'being which cannot be conceived not to exist.' Causality, as commonly understood by metaphysicians, like it disappears. The causal principle reduces to the modest proposition that an observed frequent sequence of an event of the class $\beta$ on an event of the class $\alpha$ affords ground for the judgment that in cases not previously observed as well as in $\beta$ it is likely to have been followed by an event of class $\alpha$. How likely this conclusion is then a mere problem in the mathematical theory of probability. Whether all events have causes or merely open, we may say, and must always remain so. It is clear that such a theory leaves no room for theism in philosophy. If it is really the last word of metaphysics, belief in God loses all rational foundation, though it is, to be sure, still possible that the belief may 'happen' to be true. It must further be admitted that the theory has its strong points. It is by no means obvious that a philosopher is entitled to assume as axiomatic such a conviction about the thoroughly interconnected interconnexion of all events as Lotze makes the basis of his argument. In what sense or to what degree the 'world' is a unity is a question to which perhaps we may find no answer, but the answer itself may conceivably be very much looser than Lotze is willing to admit. And it seems clear that the mathematical analysis by which the problem of the interconnexion is eliminated, as far as it goes, entirely justifies.\(^1\) Nor yet can it be denied that the very modest statement to which the principle of causality is reduced is all that is required at any rate for the purposes of a system of such sciences.

It still, however, remains a question whether we could possibly be content with a logical pluralism of the kind just described as the final answer to our intellectual demand for a rational explanation of the world. For the purposes of the present article it must be enough to call attention to a few of the considerations which suggest that such a theory can only be provisional. One may fairly doubt whether it can really be called an explanation or interpretation at all. The system of inter-related existents with which it presents us as the solution of a perennally intellectual problem seems to be simply the problem itself stated in an unusually abstract way. And it ought to be clear that, when it has been granted to the full that the special problem about the meaning of change has been solved, there is a more fundamental open problem which the theory has simply left out of account. However true it may be that 'we live in a changeless world'—i.e., that there never is a 'moment' in which anything is 'passing from one state to another'—Lotze's main contention, that the analysis of the universe into relations and existents, which are the terms of the relations, rests on the uncriticial assumption that the successive steps of the logical construction by which we try to make things intelligible correspond exactly to the steps of the real process by which 'being,' so to say, constructs itself, has been left unaniered. Logical pluralism, no less than the 'panologism' of Hegel, simply assumes that the logically prior and the metaphysically prior are identical. The only difference is that the logic of Hegel is so much inferior as logic. To put the point in the simplest possible way, we cannot avoid raising the question why, out of the infinity of relations open to the study of the logician, some are selected, and that it is a 'mathematical' 'limit': The 'Theory of Relativity' becomes important at this point (consult A. N. Whitehead, Principia Mathematica, Principles of Natural Knowledge, Cambridge, 1917.)

Yet it is surely true, as maintained, e.g., by Whitehead, that 'passage' is just the fundamental fact about Nature, however we choose to analyse it. 'Nature' is, as Plato called it, a *ψυχικόν*, and only some are actualized—have existents as their terms. Logical pluralism has no answer to this inevitable question except that 'it happens to be so.' And this is really no answer at all. It amounts to saying not merely that the world might have been wholly different from what it is, but that there might equally well be no actual existents whatever; or that things have been theory or have been and are still, for the same sort of reason as that which prevents the ontological proof from producing conviction. Just as that argument assumes that 'there must be something,' so this argument assumes that 'there might just as well be nothing.' Now, we cannot prove that there must be something, nor can we prove that there might have been nothing; we have to start from the fact that there is something and that this something has a definite character. Hence, to the present writer, Lotze seems right in contending that it is the character of this something that accounts for the range of logical possibilities itself being what it is, and Kant in arguing that there is an actual ground presupposed by the very distinction between the possible and the impossible. In fact the logical pluralism is not so much an interpretation of the structure of the world as explicable only by the metaphysically 'first' character of the 'necessary being'; and, when once we have taken this step, it is not hard to show that the 'necessary being' must necessarily be the character of the end and must itself, if it be its own justification, its own *raison d'etre*. If so much be granted, it follows at once that, though we can form no adequate concept of an 'endless' Being, the least inadequate way in which to think of it is in terms of the highest values known to us—i.e. by analogy with the human spirit at its best. How inadequate such an analogy is has always been patented. Even of the human spirit at its best we can only form very inadequate notions from what we see of its actual achievements, and our notion of the Supreme Reality which is the measure of our estimates of worth, as of all other possibilities, must necessarily be doubly imperfect when it has to be framed in so unsatisfactory a way. But we can at least say that such a being must be all that we mean when we think of it as the end which is the character of the end only. If we are not satisfied with theories which, under a disguise, offer us the unexplained detail of the world as its own explanation, it is only in the thought of the detail as conditioned or conditioned by the living Good that the intellect itself can finally acquiesce. Of course we cannot expect to know in particular how each constituent of this detail is consequent on the character of the Good—why, e.g., it is 'best' for us in particular to be living on the particular planet on which we do live, rather than any other; why there should be just the number of members of our planetary system there are; why the range of colours we can perceive should be neither more nor less extended than it is; and the like. But the conviction that all this detail is as it is 'because it is best' gives an adequate reason why it is what it is, even though we may be quite unable to see why it is best.\(^1\) And it is only the thought of the dependence of the world on the absolute Good which, by removing the problematical and the metaphysical from the realm of fact and the realm of values, can achieve
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the solution of the supreme intellectual problem, the reconciliation of science with life. These considerations suggest certain further reflections on the limitations of logical pluralism. The theory that the universe is in the exclusive interest of pure mathematics and the application of mathematics in the natural sciences, and for that purpose it works admirably, but there is no reason to suppose that these sciences take into account. Even within their limits it remains to be seen whether the theory as it stands will really do all that a philosophy of the sciences should. The fundamental difficulty is that it is a consequence of the theory that, as has already been said, the establishment of scientific laws by induction comes to be simply a problem in the theory of probabilities. But the theory of probabilities, taken by itself, seems to give no ground whatever for attributing to the conclusion of an inductive generalization any finite probability, however small.1 Science would thus seem to be impossible in principle by the discovery of new requisites for induction, which is not included in the theory of probabilities, can be unearthed; and it remains to be seen whether such a premise, if discovered, is consistent with the rest of the known natural sciences. The individual exists of popular common sense and ordinary science by infinite series of momentary individuals seems an absolutely necessary consequence of the initial assumption of the theory, and, so far as the things of the external world as conceived by common sense, or the constituents of the physical order as conceived by the physicist, are concerned, there might be no difficulty about it.2 But it is quite another question whether the substitution does not destroy the whole significance of the moral realm, the system of intelligent spirits. It is not merely that it creates a difficulty in psychology, though surely it does create such a difficulty. The immediate witness of consciousness to our identity as subjects of experience is a real fact which no logical theory about the constitution of the world has a right to ignore. It may be that the "mind thinks not always," that there are intervals in which each of us is wholly unconscious, though such evidence as we have does not seem favourable to the supposition; but, at least, money is conscious act fills an actual interval and yet has its absolutely unitary character. A "duration," though a brief one, is necessary to think the simplest proposition, and much more, it is one of the fundamental thoughts of the proposition or the making of the inference is a unitary act only intelligible as the act of unitary intelligence. It is nonsensical to say that, when I think "God is," this thought, as a mental event, is really made up of an infinity of momentary "mental states" of similar but numerically different minds, or that the "I" which resolves on a given act and the "I" which carries out the resolve are each an infinity of different "I's" with a further infinity of still different "I's" between them. Only the elementary blunder in analysis of resolving activity into mere succession can account for the prohibition of such a view. It is a still more serious matter that the doctrine is wholly incompatible with the fundamental pre- requisites of ethics. This point is capable of being developed in great detail and from more than one side, but in principle it should be enough to say that the denial of permanent personality is fatal to the conception of personality as having moral worth. If we analyse any act upon which a moral judgment would normally be passed into an infinity of momentary phases, no moral predicate can be ascribed to any one of these stages. The moral judgment for approval or censure is no longer possible; no meaning if it be applied to any such single stage; to be significant, it must be passed on the whole act, considered as one, and as an expression in act as well as the result of the inner will of a subject who is the same from its first inception in thought to its completion. Similarly the notion of duty loses all its meaning with the relegation of permanent selfhood to the realm of illusion. That an act is may be genuine and existing in the present situation means that it is something not yet done, but which ought to be done and to be done by me. But if "I" only exist at a mathematical punctum temporis, the proposition that I ought now to do a certain act has no longer an intelligible significance. A merely momentary "I" can do nothing and can be nothing except just what it is; "ought" is a category which has no application to it. If a mere accident that Russell should have dropped significant hints in his latest writings of conversion to the view that moral judgments are only "subjective," mere expressions of fundamentally irrational mind. The real outcome of a logical pluralism in ethics would not be the ultimate truth about what is, nor even that standing dualism of what is and what ought to be of which Lotze complains; it is rather the pronouncement that categories of value (there can be no reason to confine the conclusion to specifically ethical values) are one and all devoid of any real application. For those who cannot accept this result, Kant's moral argument for theism seems to the present writer unanswerable. For it is only if the Good is also the supreme principle of all existence that it becomes possible to understand how what is and what ought to be can form one "world," and from the recognition of the Good as the Supreme being theism follows directly. This seems to be illustrated by the present state of philosophical opinion in our own country. Throughout the thirty years or so, from the seventies of the last century onward, in which Hegelianism, interpreted with a marked Spinozistic bias, was the dominant philosophy in academic circles, there was a natural tendency to make it almost the test of a man's philosophical capacity that his attitude towards the problems raised by the religious life should be an emotional pantheism; atheism was in discredit as indicative (as indeed it is) of lack of interest in or understanding of the religious values of personal values; theism as a supposed mark of want of logical thoroughness. In the present generation, the issues seem to be clearing. Philosophers are certainly tending, though not without exception, to range themselves into two camps. Those to whom the business of philosophy seems to consist mainly, if not exclusively, in providing a logical basis and a methodology for exact science appear to be identifying themselves with the doctrine of logical pluralism and taking up a distinctly atheistic attitude which involves the denial of the objectivity of judgments of value; to the other hand, who are convinced that the business of philosophy is to make life, as well as science, intelligible, and consequently find themselves obliged to maintain the validity of these categories of worth apart from which life would have no significance, are, in the main, declared theists.

1. Objections to theism.—It may be desirable to add some brief observations on certain types of objections which are often quite well directed against a theistic interpretation of the world. In principle none of these difficulties are novel; most of them find their expression in Hume and may be traced back far behind Hume to the literature of

1 See the acute discussion by C. D. Broad, in Mind, new ser., cviii, 190–404. Broad, in the terms of H. B. Hume's Mind, new ser., cx, 102–190. Jourdain's criticisms do not seem to the present writer to reflect the soundness of Broad's conclusions.

2 But the philosophical interpreters of the "Theory of Relativity" would have something to say on this point.
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the ancient world. Popularity these objections are often called 'scientific,' though their only con-
exclusion with modern natural science is that its
discoveries enable some of them to be stated in a
more impressive way. For the most part they are
in the antithetical assertion of Lucretius that the existing world is too bad to
have been created or to be administered by a divine
intelligence, 'tanta stat praedita culpa. Thus it is
is reasonably said, an inference of the antithetical assertion is too
great, the cost of the 'struggle for existence'
too painful, for us to ascribe a world like that we
know to a benevolent Creator. Or, again, it is
said that an allmighty Creator might have made
the human race, in particular, such that it would
not be exposed as it is to suffering, to constant
struggle with its environment, to the conse-
quences of its own mistakes and wrongdoing. It is
then inferred that, if there is a superhuman intelligence
behind nature, that intelligence is either deficient
in wisdom or wanting in goodness. Now, obviously,
criticisms of this kind rest upon premises which
may be fairly called in question. One might
reasonably doubt whether the pessimistic interpre-
tation of the facts which sees misery predominant
everywhere in animal and human life has any real
weight. An unbiased observer after an animal
does not seem normally to give signs that it finds
its existence miserable, and it is notable that
suicide is not common among men, and, unless
the stories of the scorpions which kill themselves when
surrounded by burning charcoal and the like are true, apparently as good as
non-existent among the lower animals. The mis-
use of the metaphorical phrase which describes the
process by which species are selected for survival
as a 'struggle' is too glaring to need more than a
word of comment. If competition plays a promi-
nent part in the economy of the animal and
vegetable kingdoms, as it does in the economy of
commercial life, it no more follows that the life of every
animal, or most animals (and? vegetables), is one of
wretchedness than it follows that all or most
business men are hopelessly miserable. Still,
of course, it may be said that there is, at any rate,
suffering in the world and that perfect
goodness would have permitted none at all. Such
an argument, however, tacitly assumes that perfect
goodness can have only one end, a hedonistic one, and falls
into the fallacy of supposing that whatever the
end which perfect goodness conjoined with omni-
potence would propose to itself—and we clearly
are not in a position to say what that end would be—
other thing is permissible to suppose that it
can be the mere promotion of agreeable feeling, an
end which even we ourselves regard as a low one.
If we could know the purpose of creation, it might
well be that we should see that it is entirely good
and at the same time could not be attained without
the presence of an element of hedonic evil in things.
Similarly, with respect to the objection based on
the view that it would be 'better' that human
beings should have been placed in a world where
there were no unfriendly or intractable envi-
ronment to master, and should have been ab initio
infallible and impeccable, it is obvious that it loses
its force if we decline to assume (1) the hedonistic
identification of good with pleasure, and (2) the
proposition that the good of the human race must be the sole or at least the principal design of God. If God
aim in dealing with us is to educate us into
a noble character—so much worthier aim than
that of making us comfortable—it may well be
that such an end could not be obtained except by
the discipline of struggle with our surroundings,
with our own mistakes and our own misdeeds.

1 And is it possibly, in the present state of knowledge, to
regard 'competition' as playing anything like the part Darwin
assigned to it in determining the fate of 'varieties'? Nor have we the right to assume that the human
race must necessarily be the 'sole or even the chief
object of the divine care; we do know, unless
ethics is a delusion, that a human soul is a thing
of absolute worth; that it is of higher worth than
everything else which God has created is more
than we can know. Indeed there is a rival objec-
tion which proceeds on the opposite assumption.
We are asked to think of the enormous spaces
of the universe, the innumerable planets, the
bulky of the heavenly bodies, and then to reflect on
the absurdity of supposing that the fate of the
inhabitants of one petty planet can count for any-
thing in the scheme of the universe. Yet it is
clear that here, too, the antitheist is reasoning (if
it can be called reasoning) upon a false assumption.
He is assuming that we know that the absolute
worth of a member of the universe is estimated by
its bulk and duration. Man must be of little value
in the scheme of things because his body is tiny
and its lifetime short. Plainly we have no right
to make serious objections to the theist's belief in
God's care for man on such flimsy grounds. We do
not know that man is the thing of highest worth
in the creation, neither do we know that he is not.
The one thing which a theist can affirm is that the
absolute worth of a member of the universe is as
pected in a system which is the work of God,
'Justorum animae in manu Dei sunt'; that is all
we can say, but surely it suffices. If the Good is
the principle of actuality, that means only we may
say that whatever comes to be because it was
better that it should be than that it should not;
it is where and when it is because this is better
than that it should be otherwhere and otherwhen;
that befalls it which is ultimately the best.
Thus, best that it should befall—is, i.e., God is alike Creator,
Providence, and Judge of His creatures. Of course,
if we had no grounds at all for our theistic con-
viction, difficulties like those mentioned might
forbid us to entertain it as a mere 'extra' belief.
But, if it is true, as has been urged in this article,
that speculation and practice alike point to the
eternal nature of God. As the object in which both
find their completion, we have a double exigence
of the practical and the speculative reason on the
side of theism, and in the presence of such an
exigence we are justified in applying Newman's
remark: 'Since the world is one, and if we are to
be led to one doubt.' One might add that there is a third
exigence—the specifically religious. It would be
perhaps a more serious objection to theism than
any we could bring to bear that it was not
usual procedure in looking for a First Cause is
vitated by one obvious fallacy. The world, it might be
said, even if it has attained its present structure
as the result of processes which are in the last
resort reducible to mere redistributions of un-
intelligent primary constituents, directed by
mind and having no end, still must, of course, have
a perfectly determinate structure, and, as we our-

selves happen to be included in that structure, of
course we inevitably discover adaptations in our
environment to our special needs, and are led to
fancy that such adaptations are evidence of the
direction of the world by an intelligent power
which aims at supplying our needs. But the real fact
is simply that it is not the world that has been
adapted to us, but we who have learned and are
learning to adapt ourselves to the world. If we
did not so adapt ourselves, we should not be here,
and, if a time ever comes when our capacity for
such 'adjustment' of our 'inner relations' to the
outer world has been exhausted, we shall be
here. If the actual course of events had been
different, all the reactions which we now call
good, because they further adaptation, might have
hindered it, and those which now hinder it might

have fared better. If in such a state of things there had been reflecting beings at all, they, judging from their environment, would in all probability have thought evil, and evil all that we think evil, and evil all that we think good. They would have inferred benevolent divine activity from the existence of conditions which we should regard as indicating the control of nature by a beneficent and benevolent intelligence, and their inferences would have just as much foundation as ours. These considerations, it might be said, are a *reductio ad absurdum* not merely of all attempts to escape from the difficulties through the only effect of peripheral aid, but also of the moral argument itself, since they show after all that standards of valuation are and must be in the end purely subjective. Since the human race existence, and so long as it continues to maintain itself, there must, of course, be no irresolvable discord between human estimates of value and the actual conditions of existence. But, as the illustration shows, we have no right whatever to argue from this simple and obvious fact to the dependence of existence on an absolute ‘Good.’ In fact, any of the races which have ‘gone under’ in the struggle for existence would be equally justified in asserting that the Good leads the good fight with the best of the evil. Here, as it seems to the present writer, we are confronted by the real ultimate difficulty for theism. If there is, after all, no realm of absolute values, a belief in heroism is a product of the imagination, determined by the conviction that the realm of facts and the realm of values cannot be separated must manifestly be futile. It is just the recurrent fear that the ‘realm of values’ may turn out to be a fiction of our imagination that is, in speculation, the last enemy to be overcome. How is it to be met? The answer, it may be suggested, is the old one, given in the memorable utterance of Pascal: ‘Tu ne me chercheras pas si tu ne m’essais. Ne t’inquiète donc pas.’\(^1\) The sentences may be applied to ultimate doubt about the reality of every kind of human value. Is a man tempted to doubt whether there really is any absolute and certain truth, whether all our ‘truths’ may not be mere ‘human’ or even ‘personal’ points of view, *βρότον δὲθητι αὐτοὶ οὐκέν πάντας ἀληθεῖς;* Let him be think himself that it is only because he is not acquainted with truths that he can frame the notion of the absolutely true, and only because he has framed the notion that he can raise his doubt. So it is only because we are all along secretly aware that all our notions of what is good is something of a fiction, and that we are really able to do the question whether any given accepted obligation is really unconditional can so much as be put. If we knew no beauty, we could not even ask ourselves whether our judgments about beauty rest on illusion. In like manner it is only because the absolutely Good and utterly Adorable has not left Himself without a witness in our hearts that we feel the need of an object to worship and are driven on from the worship of trees, or streams, or animals, or mighty men, or anthropomorphic deities, towards an object in which our adoration can at last find rest because that on which it is directed is adequate to sustain it. Prayer and adoration need no more justification than the questioning attitude towards things which leads to science, or the impulse to make things of beauty which leads to art, the desire to do right which leads to morality. It is not for nothing that man, as the Greeks said, is the only animal who has a god. If we look at the matter from this point of view, we may fairly say that the God of the theists is a projection of their love and not the attainment of a normal demonstration, still contains a thought which goes to the very root of things. There are, of course, individual men who do not feel the impulse to seek for something that they may worship with a *rationabile obseverium*, as there are men with no sense of humour, or men to whom music means nothing, or men who cannot believe that the difference between right and wrong is anything more than the difference between what society will allow them to do and what it will not let them do without making them uncomfortable. The existence of such individuals is about as important in any one of these cases as in any other. Nor does the number of such men without a religion seem to be on the increase. In our own day the leading reason for atheism is not that there is a dream appears to be that they transfer their worship to the demonstrably not most high; we get such quaint aberrations as the Comité worship of ‘humanity,’ or the elevation of Marxist Socialism into a faith. The one real question is not what certain individuals are unable to feel the necessity of searching for, but what those who do seek find, *sed quid inventissent?* The lives of the ‘saints’ are the real answer of theism to the last insistent perplexities of the doubter who lurks in each of us. Others, without the theist’s faith, have often led noble lives; they have fought a good fight with the utmost sincerity, they have believed in their hearts to be stupid or malignant; yet the most clear-minded among them, like Huxley, have confessed that mortal gauntlets of the struggle against evil forces. Such heroes, after all, do but apply to the universe the saying of the Emperor Marcus about base men: ‘The finest revenge is not to become like them’; they have revenged themselves on the world. What they lack—and one does not see how the lack is to be made good—is the secret of spiritual joy which belongs to those who are assured that it is the Good which is supreme in heaven and in earth. It would be tempting to develop this argument farther, from a slightly different point of view—that of love. To love, no less than to worship, it may be said, is an ultimate human need. At least, if a man does not feel the imperativeness of the need, we should probably say there was something ‘inhuman’ about him. And love too, like worship, seeks its adequate object—that which, without any yielding to illusion, a man can love with all his heart and mind and strength. Love, with no limitations, if it is clear-sighted, for us at least must be an *amor ascendentem*, and, as it has its source in good (for real love is only for what is good), it is the realization that is evil, in its object), so, unless it can at last rest in the supreme Good, which is good altogether, it must remain unsatisfied. But we cannot here pursue the point farther. Only one thing more will be said in conclusion, and that for the believer in ‘science’ who scruples at admitting the reality of the Good. Why do we believe in science at all? Why do we, as we must if we have this belief, refuse to entertain the possibility that the ‘progress of science’ is only bringing us nearer to a point at which the whole construction would be found to culminate in manifest and hopeless contradictions? As a mere logical possibility there seems to be nothing absurd about the suggestion. If we dismiss it, as we do, it is because we believe that knowledge is good, and because in our hearts, whatever we may say with our lips, we believe that the Good is real. Therefore, little as we know of the facts of the world, we work on in confidence that, however drastically the discovery of new facts may compel us to modify our statements of truth and good order and as provisional results we once thought established for ever, no new fact of the infinity which might be discovered in an endless ‘progress’ will ever show that ‘science’ has been a secular nightmare of the race.

THEOCRACY

Literature—Besides works mentioned in the text, the following, recommended or cited, are among the most important:

Moab, Milcom ruled Ammon, Jahweh ruled Israel, and so on. Sooner or later, however, this kind of theocracy was to lead to a breakdown in every settled of the state. The gods of such tribes as Edom and Moab passed away, with the tribal independence, before the attack of Assyria, or Babylon, or Persia. In other lands polytheism survived on hethistoty. There the idea of the theocracy was more or less a different idea, the state. The Hebrews, however, thought that Jahweh's rule evolved to meet the varying challenge of national need. To set this out fully would be to write the whole story of Israel. Here a narrow question is in place: the idea of government by Jahweh being constant in Israel, how did the idea of its method evolve?

The study of the method of any kind of polity turns largely on the nature of its organs, for almost all civilized governments rule through organs. This is peculiarly so with theocracies, since it is only in legend that gods speak directly to their peoples. Josephus is perhaps the one passage where we get the idea of theocracy, as when he coins the term 'theocracy,' speaks, not of Jahweh, but of Moses, as 'our law-giver.' In Israel, as elsewhere, the organs of theocratic government are the lines of the sacred shrines and their priests. Shiloh, Shiloh, and Bethel are instances. The shrine, so to speak, gave the organ authenticity. When doubt or dispute arose about Jahweh's Law, appeal would be made to the guardians of some great shrine. These came to form a priestly class. At the great shrines, too, there soon began to be books of Jahweh's torah, here as well as elsewhere, the few men who could read could be considered priestly. At least, the original Law had been given, and its first edicts written, at the shrine of Horeb or Sinai. In later times, no doubt, when a Hebrew visited a shrine to learn Jahweh's will, its authorized exponents, the priest, would not only read the appropriate law, but explain it. Sometimes, again, he would need to extend an old principle to meet a new case. So, little by little, the 'Law of Jahweh' would insensibly grow. For early Israel three things were indissoluble—Jahweh's shrine, Jahweh's book, Jahweh's priest. The three together formed the normal organ of theocracy.

The history of pre-monarchic Israel, however, has traced the development of other theocratic organs—the so-called 'judge' and the 'prophet.' Of these a distinctive phrase is used: 'the spirit of the Lord came upon' so-and-so. The phrase has variants, but this is its usual form. It is the earliest explanation of the method of theocracy. There are some hints that the 'judge' was usually connected with a sacred spot. If so, this theocratic organ also cohered with the shrine. It is perhaps a similar connection at first between the shrine and 'prophesying.' Before the days of Samuel the

1 The 'Ark of God' was originally a kind of movable shrine.
2 Cf. Ex. 25:10 and parallel; 1 S 25:7f
3 Cf. Josh. 5:14, Jg 3:13—17, 1:9, 100,
4 Ex. 25:13.
5 E.g., Jg 11:9; Nu 24:2. 1 S 19:9
6 Cf. e.g., Jg 6:24.
7 It is possible that historical study may weaken some of those organs of the 'spirit of Jahweh' (cf. Nu 11:17); one who had saved Israel (cf. Jg 5:1—31) etc. was also such an organ. Not introduced at all 'judge', because a 'prophet' and later Hebrew writers, not the constant union of the captain and the judge, which seems to have been treated as it was in later times too (e.g., Jg 5:9, 9:14). Yet there seems to have been judges who were neither priests nor 'saviors' (Jg 10:26—31; 1 S 11:18). It is clear, however, that there were distinct theocratic functions, though two of them might unite in the same person.
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Hebrew 'prophet' was probably hardly more than the wandering saint of other Eastern faiths—"a man who lived a separate and so a 'holy' life. In all lands these have frequented shrines, for, even when not connected with a particular ritual, temples offer the best opportunities for the alms by which they live. The first band of 'prophets' named in the Hebrew records appears as 'heroes' of impending disaster to destroy, nations and their gods together. Even in exile, however, Israel believed in the rule of its God. Of this creed the unknown prophet now called 'Deuteronomy' was the great exponent. The thought does not readily isolate the different organs of a god's activity.

Scholars differ about the degree in which the re-invention of pre-monarchic Israelism identified other tribal faiths, but all allow that within the period of the monarchy Hebraism became unique. In that period all the theocratic organs named above persisted, but in persisting changed. Every other Hebrew shrine was eclipsed by the Temple in Jerusalem, and at length disappeared. So, too, the Temple became at last the depository of the one recognized book of Jahweh's Law. In Judaism, again, the priesthood of Israel underwent a monumental concentration. At crises in the history of the Southern Kingdom the high-priest sometimes played a decisive part, and there is evidence that the Temple was the shrine of the teachers, who surpassed all contemporary priesthoods in the loftiness of their teaching and the purity of their lives. Their permanent memorial is the book of Deuteronomy. It was only at the close of the monarchy that they became utterly corrupt—a fate that also beffiled the 'sons of the prophets'—and even then Jahweh's great witness, Jeremiah, was born a priest. Of the three other theocratic functions found in the times before the kings, two—leadership in war and judgment in peace—which had previously often united in a single person now permanently blent in the king. While, of course, there were inferior captains and subordinate judges, he was both supreme captain and supreme judge. He was effectually both. A king, unlike the earlier 'savior,' held permanent office, and, unlike the earlier judge, had power to enforce his decisions. And he was king by the will of God. He was Jahweh's 'son,' as having His mind and acting under His guidance. He was 'the Lord's anointed.' At times even a wretched king fell back upon Jahweh's blessing at the pinch of his people's need. It is true that one king after another did that which was evil in the sight of the Lord, and so repulsed the righteous God. At times one of the leaders—so, for instance, as a king who, like David, did the will of Jahweh remained a part of the hope of Israel. Ideally the Hebrew monarchy was theocratic.

The chief glory of monarchical Israel, however, was its prophets. They were different indeed from all other 'prophets'! With them the connexion of theocracy with shrines, maintained by the kings, began to loosen. At times, again, the prophet must perform denounce the priest. Yet the prophets, more than any else, were the true organs of theocracy. 'Thus saith the Lord' was their watchword. They spoke under the impulse of the Spirit. In a sense they knew it. Indeed, it is true that, from the time of Elijah, Israel began to refuse their guidance, that at last the Northern Kingdom rejected it altogether, and that even in Judah they became the leaders only of a 'remnant.' But it was just this 'remnant' that meant so much for the future of the world.

is unique among theocracies because of its prophets.

The Exile was a signal proof of their greatness, for no other ancient people survived exile. To be carried captive for ever to a distant and new land was to destroy, nations and their gods together. Even in exile, however, Israel believed in the rule of its God. Of this creed the unknown prophet now called 'Deuteronomy' was the great exponent. The thought does not readily isolate the different organs of a god's activity.

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1 E.g., 1 S 10.
2 1 S 105.
3 R E 239 ("the book").
4 2 K 11, 22.
6 See footnote 7 on p. 287.
7 Cf. 2 S 114. The idea of a Divine monarch with an earthly visage is common among Semitic peoples (Cf. Robinson Smith, Religion of the Semites, lect. ii.).
8 E.g., 1 K 20, 5.
9 2 S 6, 1 K 1907.
10 Cf. Ez 39.
Jahweh was thought of as 'filled with' His Spirit. This was why and how he knew God's will. Men thought their own wishes had been divinely willed by OT thinkers, that a perfect theocracy, therefore, could come only if all its citizens, and not a few only, had the Spirit of Jahweh. This idea is rooted deep in the evolution of the Christian doctrine of the personality of the Holy Ghost. There can be a perfect theocracy only when every man acts always under the guidance of the Spirit of God. Here is the culmination of Biblical theocratic doctrine. Yet here also is its euthanasm.

For this kind of 'theocracy' does not satisfy the definition given above. It is not a 'theory of national polity.' The Christian doctrine of the Holy Spirit is naturally individual, and as naturally universal, but it is not naturally national. Again, the term 'polity' implies government and its coercions, and one of the marks of the Spirit's sway is that it is inexorable. Yet the husk of Israel's theocratic idea held a kernel of 'eternal' value. The last human society will be a Kingdom of God.

LITERATURE.—For Josephus's use of the term 'theocracy' see H.C. Leibniz, op. cit., p. 337 (V. H. Stanton); for the facts about the general Semitic notion of theocracy see W. Robertson Smith, The Religion of the Semites, London, 1901, lect. ii, and 'The Prophets of Jerusalem,' 1907, lect. ii.; for the development of the idea in Israel and in the apocalyptic literature see the standard authorities on the religion of Israel, the theology of the OT, and the extra-canonical Jewish books; the corresponding authorities on the NT discuss the relation of the idea of the kingdom of God to the theocratic doctrine. Separate treatment of the subject is unusual.

C. RYDER SMITH.

THEODICY.—I. The term.—Theodicy (Germ. Theodizee, adapted from Fr. théodicée, which is compounded of G. théos, 'God' + diex, 'justice') means literally the (or a) justification or vindication of God. Leibniz appears to have been the first to use the word in its distinctive sense. In a letter written in 1697 he spoke of employing it as the title of an intended work, and in 1710 the work duly appeared. The complete title was, 'Essais de Théodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme, et l'origine du mal.' Since Leibniz's time the word 'theodicy' has been in common use.

2. The concept.—In modern usage the scope of the term is vague and ill-defined. Sometimes it is employed, as by P. Janet and G. Séeséilles, as equivalent to natural theology or philosophy of religion. For those writers theodicy comprises the general problem of religion, though it is also understood by them in a more particular sense, as comprising only the central problems of the nature of God and the relation of God to the world. In either of these senses it may escape the charge of being a theory put forward 'to save the situation.' But in the usual sense it does not so readily escape such a charge. For as a rule the use of the term is more in keeping with its literal meaning, and theodicy is understood as the (or a) vindication of the divine providence or government in view of the existence of evil. The 'theodicæan' assumes the validity of the theist's conception of God as powerful, wise, and good, and on this basis seeks to defend the divine administration: he would

assent eternal Providence, and justify the ways of God.

3. Origin of the concept.—The need of such a defence and vindication is not felt in primitive religion under polytheism, with its animistic or spiritistic view of nature, because under polytheism the evil is subject to a multitude of spirits both good and evil, who live and act on the throne or grounds; and are themselves limited by the natural order. Nor is the need felt even at the polytheistic stage of religious belief, with its multitude or hierarchy of gods and goddesses,那种indulged from science or gorillas because at this stage thought, if no longer naive and instinctive, is still uncritical, and the gods are conceived as being subject to fate or necessity or as governing a world already given and never properly under their control. At the monothestic stage of religion, however, where thought is become critical and reflective, the problem of theodicy arises and calls for a solution. Sometimes, as in Persian religion, a dualism in the divine nature is postulated, and the world represented as the scene of a grand conflict between the principles of good and evil, in which good is destined to final triumph; and obviously a dualistic philosophy of religion, if it could be otherwise satisfying, would ease the problem. Under a monistic philosophy of religion, again, the tendency is actually to get rid of the problem by distinguishing evil from evil, or reducing evil to illusion. This tendency is observable in the cosmic and acosmic pantheisms of Stoicism and Brahmansim respectively. Only in a philosophy of religion in which God is recognized as wholly good, and evil as truly evil, is the problem of theodicy felt in all its insistence. Si deus bonus, unde malum? Christianity, theistically interpreted, supplies such a philosophy, and in the course of Christian history the problem of theodicy received distinctive treatment in the ecclesiastical doctrine of the Fall. Whatever may be said as to the form of that doctrine, it stands for a principle which should be acknowledged in theistic interpretations of the world, namely the principle of human freedom and responsibility. It is not without significance that the classical theodicy or theistic apologia of Leibniz bears its title not only 'the goodness of God' and 'the origin of evil,' but also 'the freedom of man.'

4. Leibniz's Théodicée.—(a) In the problems of theodicy Leibniz had been interested since his boyhood, and he claims to have given more attention to them than most. There are many references to them, certainly, in his correspondence during the last decades of the 17th century, with Poinssot, Bossuet, and others; and the Essais itself also bears ample witness to his long-continued interest in them. It should be remarked, however, that the Essais is not, properly speaking, a systematic presentation of the questions involved in theodicy. It is, in Leibnitz's own word, a 'tissu' of what he had said and written in the course of the theological and philosophical discussions, centred in Piet Bayle's works and especially his Dictionnaire historique et critique, which he carried on with Sophia Charlotte, queen of Prussia. From a letter of Leibniz's written to Sir Thomas Burnett in 1717 it appears that the Essais was compiled at the request of his friends and as a memorial to the deceased queen. The book was extraordinarily popular, and apparently the author finds satisfaction in recording that it was welcomed
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by Catholics as well as Lutherans and Evangelicals. 1 No doubt the Eunomus served its purpose well in an age of theological rationalism, and helped to predicate an apologetic which was now beginning to threaten the foundations of religion itself. 2 But Leibniz's theistic apologia does not commend itself so readily in our time.

(b) It will be sufficient for the purposes of this article to indicate a few salient points in Leibniz's theodicy, for the sake of illustrating the difference between the older and the newer theism in apologetic method and outlook.

On Leibniz's own recent exponents of a theistic philosophy of religion, Leibniz was of the belief that the being or existence of God could be demonstrated by purely logical or rational proof. Theodicy is neglected, he says, for the existence of the whole collection of contingent things which constitutes all of creation and it is to the Substance which carries with it the reason or cause of its own existence, and which is consequently necessary and eternal; and that Substance which is necessary and eternal is God. Leibniz is moved to this argument that it is logically fallacious, as containing more in truth than can be, the actual, indeed, is contained in the possible, and the possible is contingent, so must also be the conclusion. 3 As for the proof from the eternal truths—i.e. truths which involve no reference to contingent facts of existence—it is largely dependent upon Leibniz's notion of possibility. For Leibniz, everything in Spinoza, the possible is greater than the actual, existence than existence; and he argues that, if the eternal or metaphysical necessary truths are real, and founded on these, that existing necessarily means be the metaphysically necessary Being of God, in whom essence involves existence, and to be and to be possible is to be.

God not only would there be nothing existent, but there would be nothing possible. 4 Against this proof, as handled by Leibniz, it may be urged that it is inconsistent in one who regards the possible as wider than the actual, the essential than the existent, to regard a truth as existent upon existence; and that in any case we cannot on the premises reach a necessary being separate from the existent and actual world. In all such arguments indeed, as B. Russell points out, there is difficulty in avoiding Spinoism. 5

(2) The world—In presenting what may be named his telescological optimism Leibniz still moves on the high plane of metaphysical notions and a priori logical proof, nor condescends to the lower empirical world, to which Bayle would bring him down. Founding upon the principle of sufficient reason and the idea of the preestablished harmony, he holds that there is not a single one of these worlds possible; or, were a better world than this world possible, God is deceived in choosing it. 6 God is the best of all possible worlds and good; and His goodness moved Him to create and produce all possible good, His wisdom led Him by a moral necessity to choose in his choice of the best, His power enabled Him to execute His great design. 7 It is curious to reflect that the Leibnizian deism is supplanted with the most diverse ethical valuations of life, optimistic, pessimistic, millerotic; which gives point to Schopenhauer's objection that, even if this is the best possible world, it does not prove that it is a world good enough to have been actualized. 8 An objection, this, on philosophical grounds, thus meeting Leibniz on his own plane, but it is on empirical grounds that the Leibnizian optimism has been most frequently challenged, from Voltaire's Candide down to the present. Nor could Leibniz himself ignore the empirical aspect of the problem of theodicy.

(c) Evil. —Accordingly, apart from this metaphysical theory of evil as necessary limitation appertaining to finite existence and the source of both moral and physical evil—our idea that evil exists in the very nature of things, some evil, especially physical evil, is to be interpreted as an instrument or means of good. In advocating this theory he sought to counter Bayle's contention that the strength of Manichaeism was due to its conformity with an empirical rather than a priori concept of the world. Even from the exegesis of the prior notion, Leibniz would reply, physical evil may be reasonably accounted for by the theodicy that, just as the will of the natural evil, it could not be prevented by God without the subversion of the freedom of self-determination which belongs to spiritual beings and makes them free and responsible. 9 But in the later arguments also Leibniz supports his doctrine of optimism, and enough has been shown to show that, if this world is forced to recognize the standpoint of experience, it rests primarily—like his theistic proofs—on metaphysical considerations.

(d) The difference between Leibniz's theodicy and the modern attitude in theodicy may now be briefly stated. Leibniz approached the problem of evil with a God whose existence had already been proved, as also His character of absolute perfection in power, wisdom, and goodness; and it was therefore an altogether reasonable presupposition on Leibniz's part that this world as being the creation of such a God was the best possible. No matter what exception might be taken to the case as presented, the case itself was excellent. But nowadays, with the spirit of pessimism abroad in society, and the spirit too—not unakin—of anti-religious agnosticism, the problem of evil has become more acute, and one has learned to sympathize with W. James and others in the modern rationalism and the complacency of his attitude, e.g., a dogma like eternal punishment. The 'charmingly written Theodicee' is even described by W. James as a piece of 'superficiality incarnate'; as a 'cold literary exercise, whose cheerful substance even hell-fire does not warm.' 10 Such strictures are too severe, but let them be a reminder of the shift in attitude in such matters between the old and the new approach to the problem of evil. It would be quite untrue to say of modern exponents of theism that they compose theodicy 'with their heads buried in monstrous wigs.' 11 The modern theist is conscious of the failure of rationalistic or purely speculative theology to establish its claims, and of the necessity of fundamentally empirical methods in theology if scientific results are to be gained, and he therefore examines the world of experience in face of evil as an empirical problem, with the view of testing the reasonable-ness of the theistic faith in God as just, holy, and loving. He is led to recognize that the observed facts of nature and history do not afford an unexceptionable argument for the goodness of God, and that after all the most solid ground of belief in the divine goodness lies in the needs and claims of the theistic faith itself. If there would be a circulus in arguendo involved here if such considerations were put forward as a solution of the problem of evil. On the one hand, it is the faith of religion that God is affirmed to be perfectly good, despite the evil to be found in the world of His creation and governance. On the other hand, religious faith is based on the power of religion as a solvent, or at least a partial solvent of the problem of evil in religion men seek refuge from the various evils that assail, from without and from within—which shows that a non-rationalist theism could not offer a real solution of the problem of evil. Nor does it profess to do so.

5. Theodicy and philosophical reflexion.—It is not necessary that this article should enter into a comprehensive discussion of the problem of theodicy from the side of philosophical explanation. This will be found in the art. GOOD AND EVII, where it is affirmed with most students of the subject that 'every proposed solution either

1 Die philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, vi. 264.
3 Thoetidice, 7 (Gerhard, vi. 100 f.)
5 Thoetidice, 114 (Gerhard, 326 f.); cf. also Philosophische Abhandlungen, ix. 46 (Gerhard, vi. 5!)
7 Thoetidice, 8 (Gerhard, vi. 107), 116 (Gerhard, vi. 107), 285 (Gerhard, 252 f.)
9 1 Pragmatism, New York and London, pp. 33, 47. 2 The Will to Believe, New York and London, 1889, p. 82.
leaves the old question—"si Deus bonus, unde malum?"—unanswered or raises new ones. None of the less we should like to express our sympathy with a type of solution—partial as it must be—which is on the lines of Leibniz in its recognition of human freedom as real, in the sense of implying self-limitation on God's part. Self-limitation does not necessitate, nor imply, any loss of qualified indeterminism. Such a solution is not only consistent with the moral and religious consciousness, but alleviates also the burden of the mystery of evil; and it lends itself to expositions in the speculative sphere, as in the humanistic or personalistic idealisms which arouse so much interest at present. Yet it still leaves God, as indeed must every theodicy, ultimately responsible for both physical and moral evil. At the same time the recognition of the instrumental worth of evil somewhat relieves the weight of the divine responsibility. Take it first in connexion with the problem of physical evil. Pain and suffering are no doubt largely retributive and to be accounted for as the wages of individual and racial sin. But retribution is not an end in itself, and the positive rather than the negative character of physical suffering is more and more emphasized. Through pain, hardship, and loss moral energy may be stimulated and character moulded and shaped to finer issues. In this sense the suffering of the blessed, blessing those who suffer and those brought into contact with them. Take it also in connexion with the problem of moral evil. Here again the instrumental theory applies, and evil may be regarded as for education and discipline. In fact many theists regard moral evil or sin as having been always under the divine control, and interpret it as necessary for physical evil to human development. It is the discord without which there could be no harmony, the shade without which there could be no light. Through sin man learns his weakness, and his need of strength from on high. Through sin, and its direful effects in society, he learns the meaning of brotherly service and the measure of the sacrificial love of God.8 Christianity looks for the time when man's moral education shall be brought to completion, and his suffering and sin have served their purpose.9 Yet, when all is said, the problem of evil remains.

6. Theodicy and the religious consciousness.—Theodicy, the solution of the problem of evil, employs empirical grounds, and in particular of the instrumental theory of value, leads us to a consideration of the religious solution. There is a philosophical theodicy, and there is a religious theodicy. In the first, evil is explained—or an attempt is made to explain it—in the light of the divine goodness; in the second, evil is not explained, nor is there any attempt to explain it—it is simply to be overcome. As Eucken has remarked, 'religion does not so much explain as presuppose evil';10 and, as F. T. Forsyth so well insists, a religious theodicy is not an answer to a riddle but a victory in a battle. As a religious theodicy it is not man who justifies God's ways, but God who justifies His own ways, and that not by accounting for the world's evil, but by saving men from it. While this is said, religion can have no more philosophy escape the problem of evil. For the individual believer in God and His goodness the problem receives a practical solution through the working of faith; he finds in it no more nor less by hedonistic standards, but discovers the Supran.


2 The Truth of Religion, p. 500.


Good in moral and spiritual union with God. From the universal point of view the religious solution of the problem may be stated broadly in terms of the teleological idea. The end or purpose reached by the universe is the creation of free ethical personalities capable of personal intercourse with God and of reflecting as in a flawless mirror the divine image and likeness.11 To that purpose the pain of suffering and personal discord, and there are traces of it even in animate nature, which we have too often regarded as merely a field of struggle and carnage.

'There is no ultimate scientific sense,' says J. Arthur Thomson, 'in which it may be said that Man is part of the system of Nature and the crown of its evolution; and it is assuredly of some significance that he can find in Animal Nature far-reaching correspondences to his ideals of the True, the Beautiful, and the Good.' We might therefore be content to state our theodicy in the following terms, which give due regard to the fact—made clear in modern science—that our world is still in the making, and which also illustrate the newer empirical as distinguished from the older rationalistic way of approaching the problem of evil, as well as the pragmatic tendency in modern theology and religious philosophy:

'We hold that this world is a finite and imperfect creation and that the final and ultimate solution of the problem of evil will be the perfecting and completion of the world's development with a new universe in which the original imperfections shall be removed and the new world shall be free from suffering and personal discord. In the meantime we hold that the universe is by no means complete, but is in a state of development and that the divine purpose is being realized in a measure.

This is not to say that the problem of evil is not real, for it is real today as in the past. We hold that it will be solved in the future, in the same way as it was solved on earth by the complete victory of Christianity over its adversaries, by the overcoming of all evil by the victorious doctrine of the Incarnation. For the time being, however, we do not, as some have done, regard the problem of evil as a mere figment of imagination, but as a reality which must be faced and dealt with, and which will be solved in the same way as it has been solved in the past.

1 It is here that, in a more extended treatment, the 'theodism' aspect of the problem of immortality might be considered.


friends, including a Simides who may be the poet. After the first 100 lines there is little sequence or coherence of ideas. There are many repetitions, and some of the verses occur in the fragments of Solon, Phocylides, Tyrtaeus, and Meleager. These considerations, and the fact that quotations in Plato6 in a passage attributed by Stobaeus to Xenophon are susceptible of various interpretations, raise many problems about the composition of the poem, if it is in any sense a whole, and have given rise to an almost entire German literature of hypothesis most conveniently surveyed in E. Harrison's Studies in Theognis.7 Harrison argues plausibly, if not always quite convincingly, that the poems do stand as a connected sequence. His book concludes with an excellent chapter on the life and times of Theognis. He was a noble of Nissaean Megara, who apparently at one time was also a citizen of Hyblean Megara in Sicily. He spoke of the terror of the Medes,8 and is therefore conjectured to have lived to see the invasion of Xerxes. He lived in a time of social and political revolution at Megara, vaguely known to us from three references in Aristophanes' Politics9 and from one passage in Plutarch.10 His temper was embittered by the temporary triumph of the popular party,11 the loss of his property,12 and the impossibility of securing redress for the crimes of the travels in Eubea, Sparta, and Sicily to which he refers.13 To these experiences we may trace his pessimism,12 his cynicism,12 his harping on the hardships of poverty that constrains a man to deeds to which his will does not consent,14 his complaint that money makes the man and that mercenary marriages corrupt the breed of men,15 his emphasis on the virtue of faith5 or loyalty to caste, club, and matter,5 his utilization of 'good' and other ethical terms in the political or social sense.16

Too much has been made of this last idea by Theognis' translator J. H. Frere,10 by Nietzsche, whose own philosophy is largely based upon it, and by Grote, who, however, admits that the ethical meanings are not absolutely unknown.19 Theognis is merely the chief example, the conveniently quoted 'classic instance', so to speak, for general human tendency. We still speak of the better classes as they did in Aristotle's time,21 and Homer characterizes menial tasks as the services that the worse sort perform for the good.22 We cannot infer that the ethical idea was lacking.23 We can only say that before Plato it was easier to confound pure or absolute ethics with prudential, conventional, tribal, caste, or political morality than it has been since. Much the same may be said of the naive inconstancy between Theognis' general commendations of truth, justice, good faith, and kindness, and his passionate praises for vengeance,24 his (per-

1 669, 667.
2 Euseb. 96 ff.
3 Plor. lxxxvii. 14.
4 Cambridge, 1892.
5 764.
6 Quint. Orat. 18.
7 551 ff., 1015-1016.
8 219, 332.
9 763.
10 102, 105-109, 425-429.
12 155, 175, 207, 384, 629, 640, 667 ff., and passim.
14 Theognis, 77: The Plat. Laur., 690; cf. pl. 88, 121, 299, 293, 416, 529, 861, 1137, and passim.
15 2, 41, 91, 95, 97, 113, 115, 411, 416, 643, 851, 1169 (the abstract expression).
16 28, 28, 47. For Íppórt (often in the Elizabethan sense of 'sweet') see note 39 below. In 850 and in 1100 it is courage in battle. For Íppórt, 'sober,' politically, isolated, see note 42. cf. 379, 431, 458, 465, 470, 701, 714, 583, and Shorey in AJPh xxii. 391 (1910).
19 P. 232.
20 Cf. n. 87, 117-149, 315 ff., 465.
22 (Theognis' ironical) counsel to set your heel on the empty-headed demons,1 to be all things to all men,2 to adapt yourself to your environment with the protective resemblance of the polyp which takes the hue of the rock to which it is clinging,3 and to the demon who, by means of revenge,4 brings your power in your power and then take your revenge.5 The last precept appears almost as nakedly in one of the noblest Greek poets, Pindar.6 Plato first laid it down that the good man will not wrong even his enemy, and Plato did not apply the principle to international politics in the Tolstoyan way. Lastly, the erotic verses of Theognis—most of them, to be sure, in a separable and perhaps spurious part of the collection, dealing with themes repugnant to modern feeling—seem to us incompatible with the conception of him as a moralist and still more with the use of his elegies as a 'literature of prudential precepts and moral admonition known by the name of sophrosyne.'7 And no less a moralist in his own esteem than Isocrates recommends the study and excerpting of them as entirely edifying. At any rate, whether the erotic elements of the elegies and the occasional use of 'grammar' and other ethical terms in the political or social sense.

Not to be born into life were the best for us, creepers on earth's face,10 Never to look on the sun's burning and pitiless rays;10 Happiest lot of the living is thers who come quickest to Hell Gate Laid out quiet and stark, wrapped in a mantle of earth.12 Jobb on Antigone, 622, quotes Theognis, 403, as one of the anticipations of the untraced 'queen of Jupiter vult perdere dementis pruis.' Antigone, 607.13 Theognis, 311, echoes Aristotle's definition of 'good,' and the man who thinks that he alone is wise is himself void of wisdom. Soph. frag. 356 repeats the commonplace that health is best and justice fairest of things; 14 frag. 525 the humorous fancy that even Zeus cannot please all, whether he raise or hold up.15 But these are only conspicuous examples of an indeterminate list. When Euripides praises the man who is as true to absent as to present friends,16 way cannot be certain whether he is or is not paraphrasing Theogn 93-95, and the same holds of the coincidence between Phainias, 435-440, and Theogn. 717 f. in the sentiment that

1 547.
2 65 ff.

3 265; see J. Girard, Le Sentiment religieux en Grece d'Homere a Aristocles, Paris, 1887, p. 157; Schmidt, ii. 312.
4 Pyth. 5, 84.
5 1290-1309.
6 Epigraph et Sceleton, Gleeson, 1896, 49.
7 See loc. ad Nic. 431.
8 Antithenes is said to have written a commentary in five books (Long. Laert. vi. 19).
9 314.
11 Thoenge. 355.
12 Hu. 34 and 801.
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wealth is all-powerful. Plato's saying 1 that a spirit of reverence (αἰδρία) is a better inheritance than great riches is, the present writer thinks, a distinct reference to Theog. 403b. Ilocrates, l. 19, equals Theog. 72, and i. 29, Theog. 105.

Among the chief commonplaces of Greek ethics expressed by Theognis 2 are man's dependence on the gods, the belief that what the future has in store, his duties to the suppliant and the guest, 3 and to parents, 4 the doctrine of the mean, 5 of nothing too much, 6 of ἀκόσμος and ἀπωμος, 7 the late punishment of the wicked, 8 the darkness and terror 9 of light, 10 the admission that all gains are costly, 11 that ill-gotten gains do not abide, 12 that for the lust of wealth is insatiate, 13 and that the beautiful word (εὖρος μηρα) 14 or the forewarned forecast provokes the gods and invites vengeance, the complaint that shame and reverence are exiled from a degenerate world, 15 and that men value nothing but wealth. 16 Other commonplaces, whether of ethics or of criticism of life, are the immortality of song, 17 the praise of patience, 18 the Analectic, Epicurean, Horatian Carpe diem, 19 evil communications, 20 in vino veritas, 21 there is no perfect man, 22 or the ingratitude of children, 23 the fable of censernuousness and self-praise, 24 and the generalized metaphor of the counterfeit man. 25 His convivial and social precepts, his slight anticipations of later modern morality, such as the temperance of the professional, political, 26 or worldly wisdom 27 do not further concern us here. Lines 823 and 1181 are in apparent contradiction on the justification of tyrannic. Theognis appears not to mention the condemnation of the innocent with the guilty, or the jealousy of the gods except as involved in the nemeses that attaches to the too confident oath. 28

As an aristocrat, he, like Pindar, emphasized mankind against teaching. 29 No teacher can put sense into a man, 30 or make a bad man good. Plato 31 finds a contradiction between this and the admission to associate only with the good because from them you will learn good. But it is Theognis's belief that it is easier to correct the good than to reform the bad. In lines 153-159 there is a suggestion of the nobler thought of mature Greek ethics, the idea that the mutability of fortune and our common frailty impose the duty of leniency and compassion upon all men. 32

Especially interesting are Theognis's direct appeals to Zeus. He complains that the punishment of the wicked cannot be doubted upon the moral government of the world. 33 This, however, is rather a development of the motive of Menelaus's speech in the Iliad 34 than the startlingly new thought which Croesus finds in it. 35 Theognis's pro-

1 Test against the visitation of the sins of the fathers upon the children, which results from the late punishment of the wicked, 1 invites illustration both from the Theog. 4ff. and from later ethical literature. 1 1731 ff.; cf. 292-293.

2 Cf. Jow 219f.; Spencer, Principles of Ethics, § 140; Schmitt, 1. 71 ff.

LITERATURE.—The fullest recension of the text is in the latest ed. of T. Brugger's Poetae Eleogici, Leipzig, 1915. The ed. of Immanuel Bekker (Leipzig, 1832), and the revised ed. of E. Welcker (Frankfort, 1830) and the critical literature of the subject are discussed in A. B. P. Parker's book referred to above. Cf. also T. Hudson Williams, The Essays of Theognis, London, 1910.

Paul Shorey.


THEOLOGY.—I. Definition.—Theology may be briefly defined as the science which deals, according to scientific method, with the facts and phenomena of religion and culminates in a comprehensive synthesis or philosophy of religion, which seeks to set forth in a systematic way all that can be known regarding the objective grounds of religious belief.

According to its etymological meaning, the word 'theology' denotes 'discourse or doctrine concerning God.' In this sense it was used among the Greeks to describe the work of Homer and Hesiod when they wrote of the gods and their doings, and that of philosophers like Plato and Aristotle when they speculated regarding the supernatural reality or ultimate ground of all things. In early Christian literature the distinctive appellation of 'theologian' is applied to the author of the Apocalypse, probably because he maintained the divinity of the θεός, asserting the identity of the θεός that became flesh in Christ with God (θεός). In this sense the term is applied to orthodox Greek Fathers like Athanasius and Gregory Nazianzen, who distinguished themselves in defending the personality and divinity of the θεός. But doctrine concerning God—His being and attributes—is only one branch or department of theology, as that is now commonly understood. Man's knowledge of God is part of the content of that matter of human experience which is termed 'religion,' and which includes other content also, referring to the world of nature and of man, to sin and death, to salvation and immortal life. And, as science in general deals with some definite department of human experience, it is more in accordance with the proper conception of science to regard theology as that branch of science which deals with the department of human experience known as religion, from which experience man's knowledge of God and divine things is obtained. Theology is the science which, by right use of reason, in accordance with proper scientific method, correlates, systematizes, and organizes the matter of human religious experience in such a way as to reach a unified body of coherent doctrine, fitted to satisfy the mind's demand for truth and to furnish guidance for the practical life.

As the science of religion it deals not merely with the subjective contents of the religious consciousness, or the opinions, emotions, and actions of men in the religious sphere, but also with the objective grounds of religion and the ultimate truth or reality which underlies and explains the life of mankind. Thus not merely the science of religions dealing with the various historical religions which have developed among men (though that is a part of it), but the science of religion regarded as an independent department of human science, of which which claim its own merit or no mere subjective delusion, but to have a real and rational foundation in objective reality or fact.

2. THEOLOGY AND RELIGION.—As theology is the science of religion, religion precedes and is wider
than theology and furnishes it with the matter with which it deals. In all departments of human life and activity experience, in which feeling, intuition, and volition are the predominant factors and which are not accurately described by theory or science, which seeks to exhibit and make explicit the reason, thought, or principles of truth and reality underlying and accounting for the experience. Thus the use of numbers in the relations and activities of the practical life precedes the science of mathematics; the practical use of speech precedes the science of language; the use of reasoning in practice precedes the science of logic; and the sailing of the seas proceeds the science of navigation. So too the experience and use of religion as a practical factor in life’s activities precedes the science of religion, or theology. And, as men may attain considerable efficiency and success in various departments of life without having rationalized or reduced their experience to system and exhibited its underlying principles, so men may live a truly religious life and have a rich and full religious experience without having attained to any very clear or coherent system of theology. But, while a man may be religious without being a theologian, religious experience is enabled to build up and be organized to be a competent theologian; and the fuller and richer his religious experience has been, the more likely is he to prove a trustworthy and satisfactory theologian.

Schleiermacher was so impressed with the importance of the part played by feeling or emotion in religion that he gave it not merely the predominant but the exclusive place. Over against the long prevailing doctrine of religion consisting in ‘knowing and doing homage to God,’ he defined religious piety as in its essence consisting neither in knowledge nor in action but in a determination of the feeling. The root of all religion he held to be man’s feeling of absolute dependence on some power or powers other than himself. But this dictum, while it emphasizes the important truth as to the large part played by feeling in religion, if strictly taken, is one-sided and exaggerated, in that it ignores the part played by the cognitive faculty in forming some conception, more or less definite, of the power or powers on which we are dependent and will in choosing and adopting means for getting into harmony with that Supreme Power or Being, which are elements characteristic of all religion.

An attempt to reduce the cognitive faculty, or reason, is predominant. It succeeds religion, and seeks by a right use of reason on the matter of experience furnished by religion to evolve out of it a system of connected and coherent truth to which the term ‘science’ can be properly applied.

3. Theology and science.—The aim of science in any of its departments is to apply reason, with its powers of analysis and generalization and its laws of inference, induction, and deduction, to the data of experience in that department in such a way as to discover the laws or principles underlying and relating the given facts and phenomena, and to unify the entire content of experience in that department into a coherent systematic whole or body of truth such as may be described as knowledge of reality. Inasmuch as theology seeks to do this as regards the data of religious experience in the realm or department of religion, it is rightly described as a branch of science. The instrument which the scientist makes use of in ascertaining, analyzing, and systematizing the given data of experience in the department selected for scientific investigation is the reason with its powers and laws of perception, conception, evidence, inference, etc. And reason is the instrument made use of by the scientific theologian in investigating the facts and phenomena of religious experience and building up a science of theology not less than is the scientist in the other sciences. The matter of clearness as to the place and function of reason in theology is apt to lead to confusion and disagreement as to what theology is and what are its aims and scope. Thus in some quarters it is maintained that theology differs from other sciences insasmuch as the matter with which religion is concerned is given to us by revelation and not by reason as in the other sciences. But this contrast between reason and revelation as sources of knowledge is unsound. Reason is not the source from which, in any case, we get the matter which we build up into science, but merely the instrument by means of which we grasp, analyze, classify, co-ordinate, and systematize that matter which is given to us by revelation from without in experience. This is as true of other sciences as it is of theology. As a matter of fact, the material which we build up by use of reason into the natural sciences, as they are called, such as mechanics, chemistry, biology, etc., is given to us by revelation from without in experience not less than the matter which we seek to apprehend and co-ordinate into a coherent whole of knowledge of the truth, as is the former. The knowledge got by using reason to grasp, co-ordinate, and systematize the given matter of experience is of the same kind in both cases. In both cases it rests ultimately on a foundation of faith—faith in the revelation of our faculties of knowledge (perception, cognition, inference, etc.) and on the ultimate reasonableness or cognizability of all that is given to us in experience. We go on using our powers of perception, cognition, inference, etc., in reference to what is given to us from without in experience, never doubting that the knowledge thus reached is real knowledge or knowledge of truth and reality, even though we may know and realize that our knowledge in any department of experience is incomplete and leaves room for progress. Thus the physicist may realize that he does not know the ultimate nature of matter, that the chemist does not know what makes up matter, and that the biologist may explain what space and time are, and the biologist may feel that he does not know what, at bottom, life and consciousness are.

But the point from which there remain unsolved questions of an ultimate kind, in regard to the data of experience in various departments, does not nullify or render valueless the results of scientific investigation and systematization in those departments. It merely shows that our knowledge of what is revealed to us in experience is as yet incomplete, and that an adequate synthesis of knowledge or metaphysic of being has not yet been reached by us, not that such a metaphysic is unattainable. So too with the data of religious experience. It is the function of theology as a branch of science to collect, examine, analyse, compare, classify, co-ordinate, and systematize all that is revealed to us in this department of experience, so as to reach a whole of scientific knowledge in this sphere, as in other departments of experience and knowledge. We must use our reason as far as it will goes in synthesizing the data of religious experience and validating the knowledge reached by the application of sound scientific method to the data of experience, nor deprive it of the right to be regarded as
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science or knowledge of truth. It merely shows that our science in this sphere is incomplete and spurs us on to reach out towards a more comprehensive and ultimate knowledge in an adequate metaphysic or philosophy of being.

4. Theology and philosophy.—It is here that the science of religion passes over into the philosophy of religion or knowledge of the phenomena which is the consummation aimed at by theology. Science in all its departments is limited and incomplete as knowledge of reality. It leaves unsolved ultimate questions as to the nature and relations of matter, mind or mind and space and time, life and consciousness. It is the function of philosophy, as the ultimate form of knowledge, to grapple with these ultimate problems and seek a satisfactory solution of them. And it is along the lines of moral and religious experience, and the data furnished thereby, that light on such ultimate problems may most hopefully be looked for.

Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason, began a movement in philosophy which has had far-reaching influence on modern theology as well as on philosophy. His contention is that in unifying the given matter of perceptual experience into an ordered and scientifical system of knowledge the mind or reason of the perceiving subject makes use of forms of perception and cognition which are subjective (i.e. belonging to the nature or constitution of the subject) or objective (i.e. belonging to the object or reality as it is in itself apart from its being known or cognized). Thus exact scientific knowledge, according to Kant, is limited to knowledge of the phenomenal world and cannot reach to ultimate reality. The use of those very forms of perception and cognition which give definiteness to our knowledge makes it knowledge of the phenomenal as contrasted with the ultimate real or thing-in-itself. All scientific or theoretic knowledge is thus knowledge of the phenomenal only. If there be a noumenal world of reality, and if it be in any way accessible to us, it must be something beyond that of rational knowledge. Kant maintains that access to a noumenal world of reality is gained by us, not through the pure reason but through the practical reason or moral consciousness, by means of which we may and do reach a kind of faith-knowledge of God, freedom, and immortality, which, though not rational theoretic knowledge, such as we have in science, is yet of value for the moral and religious life. This demarcation of the limits of valid, rational, scientific or theoretic knowledge, and differentiation from it of the kind of knowledge got through moral and religious experience or through supernatural historic revelation is characteristic of many theological writers since Kant. The argument of the Critique of Pure Reason is supposed to be conclusive against the possibility of our ever reaching any rational metaphysic or valid theoretic knowledge of ultimate reality. Huxley and Spencer pressed Kant's conclusion into the service of their doctrine that God or ultimate reality is an abstraction of moral and religious being by man, and that therefore a science of theology is impossible. Hamilton and Mansel endeavored to reconcile the anostic conclusions of Kant in regard to rational metaphysic with the acceptance of traditional Christian doctrine as grounded on revelation, not on reason. The Ritschlian school accept Kant's conclusions as to the impossibility of a rational, theoretically valid, knowledge of God or ultimate reality, so grounded, or rational theology as incompetent; but, while eliminating all metaphysic from Christian theology as untenable, they seek to retain in large measure the traditional Christian theology as grounded on a divine historic revelation culminating in Christ, of which Scripture is the record. As with Kant, they seek to find a grounding for this in the immediate deliveries of the moral and religious consciousness, which furnishes them with a basis for 'value-judgments' where valid theoretic knowledge fails. This sharp differentiation between the kind of knowledge got by making use of reason, our cognitive faculty, in grasping, analyzing, and systematizing the data of perceptive experience in the sphere, say, of physics or chemistry and the kind of knowledge got by using reason in the same way,—call it practical reason or what you will,—in grasping, co-ordinating, and systematizing the data of moral and religious experience is arbitrary and unconvincing. The world of reality revealed to us in experience—whether it be the world of science or the religious world which grounds our common knowledge or the moral and religious experience which grounds our religions knowledge—is one whole, and our knowledge of both the natural and the religious is possible of being synthesized as one coherent whole. The attempt of the Kantians and Ritschians to rule out all metaphysic and natural theology as going beyond the proper limits of the reason, and yet to build up a theology of value-judgments founded on the needs of the moral consciousness or practical reason or on the data of a historic divine revelation, is not satisfying to the inquiring mind that seeks for unity and coherence and consistency in its knowledge. Theology, as the philosophy of religion, is to be looked upon, not as the rival or opponent of rational science, but rather as its copetition and completion.

True theology can never come into conflict with true science. For it includes all the data and verified results of true science among its material or postulates. It seeks to co-ordinate or synthesize all our knowledge into a comprehensive and coherent whole of truth or knowledge of reality, based upon the data of human experience regarded as a whole, tested, analyzed, systematized, and systematized by rational and scientific methods.

5. Reason and intuition.—Akin to the distinction which Kantians draw between the theoretic reason, which gives us definite knowledge of a phenomenal world, and the practical reason, which gives us vague knowledge of noumenal reality, is the distinction which more recent philosophers such as Henri Bergson draw between reason, or intellect, and instinct, or intuition, as sources of knowledge. Intuition, it is alleged, brings us more immediately into touch with the living flowing stream of reality, of which as individual persons we form a part, and enables us to adapt ourselves thereto more surely and satisfactorily than reason or intellect, whose forms of thought and processes of inference are adapted to matter that is fixed or static rather than to the ever-changing creative flux of actual reality or real time. But this contrast or antithesis between intuition and intellect, like that between faith and reason, is unsound. The intuitions of a rational being are implicit and indiscernable by man, and that therefore a science of theology is impossible. Hamilton and Mansel endeavored to reconcile the anostic conclusions of Kant in regard to rational metaphysic with the acceptance of traditional Christian doctrine as grounded on...
authority and court of appeal for rational conscious beings is reason based on an ultimate inerradicable faith in the reasonableness of our experience, which is the underlying assumption of all science, including theology, subject to intuition or instinct as an instrument of knowledge is to incur moral and intellectual bankruptcy which is unworthy of a rational being such as man. It is to take a step downwards towards the brutal condition, not upwards towards the goal of true personality.

For conscious rational being the only reality which has or can have meaning is reality which is or may be apprehended by rational consciousness. In the case of reality of which we are, or suppose ourselves to be, dimly aware in subconscious apprehension or intuition, it is assumed that to a more perfect or adequate consciousness this would evidence itself as real. Reality for us means reality apprehended or apprehensible by a conscious being. To affirm an unknown reality may mean simply that we are dimly aware of the existence of some power or force which we have not yet been able to adjust to our incomplete synthesis or scheme of knowledge. But to affirm a reality which is, and which must ever remain, inaccessible to the theologian is to recognize that to affirm a contradiction in terms or to use words without meaning.

Practical reason, faith, intuition or instinct, to which some would point as the proper guides in theology rather than what they call the pure or theoretic reason, are all forms of conscious apprehension which enable us to build up the data of experience into some more or less coherent whole of knowledge. The data to be unified and synthesized in a science of systematic theology are not indeed given to us by reason from within, but by revelation from without. Reason, however, is our only proper instrument for the apprehending, co-ordinating, and systematizing of these data.

6. THEOLOGY and the Bible.—Some theologians conceive of the task of theology as that of setting forth in coherent systematic form the content of that revelation concerning God, the world, and man of which the Bible is the inspired record. But, while this points to a very important department of theology, it is too narrow a view to take of the science and function of the study as a whole. There are other materials or data for theological construction besides those furnished by the Bible, which cannot be overlooked or ignored by the theologian. Thus the discipline which takes a wide and comprehensive view of his subject. The revelation of ultimate reality given in the natural world around us with its varied facts and phenomena, which it is the function of natural science to investigate, furnishes material which the theologian must interpret and construe. So too the course of general human history, which it is the function of historical science to present and elucidate in the light of general principles or laws, affords data of experience which are of value for theological construction.

And the moral consciousness of mankind generally, the investigation of which is the special task of the science of ethics, furnishes (a) the material for the scientific theologian to help in the upbuilding of a system of theology. But the revelation given in the history and religious experience of Israel as a nation and of the outstanding personalities among the contributors to the history of mankind, is of such supreme importance and unique significance in the religious sphere that it is customary and convenient to distinguish between the general revelation to mankind as a whole in nature and history and conscience, which is treated of under the heading of natural theology, and the special historic revelation culminating in Christ, which is treated of under the heading of specifically Christian theology, and which may be regarded not as something entirely different from natural theology, but rather an unknown natural theology.

7. Classification of theological sciences or disciplines; theological encyclopaedia.—Having such a vast and varied material to deal with, theological science has many branches or disciplines with aims and methods differing according to the material dealt with and the purpose kept in view. To elucidate and classify these various disciplines is the function of what is known as theological encyclopaedia, which itself constitutes a branch of theological study.

Religion as an object of investigation has two aspects: (a) a historical aspect, under which it is to be regarded as a historical phenomenon appearing under various forms among various peoples with characteristics which furnish ample material for historical inquiry and investigation; and (b) a normative aspect, under which it appears as a present inner power of life making claim to truth and to the right to regulate individual and social life. This twofold aspect of religion furnishes us with guidance for classifying the branches of theology, which are the two main divisions: (a) the historical or phenomenological branches, including all those sciences which deal with religion on its phenomenological side as an actual appearance in history; and (b) the normative or constructive branches, including those sciences which deal with religion as a present-day reality and power, claiming to be truth by which the practical life of man should be moulded and regulated. The last distinction already referred to between natural theology and specifically Christian theology furnishes ground for suitable further subdivision of the material falling to be dealt with under these two main divisions, thus affording a basis for a convenient classification of theological disciplines or branches of study.

(a) The investigation of religion in its phenomenological aspect may be conveniently subdivided into (1) a general branch dealing with the phenomenology of the ethnic religions other than Christian that have appeared in history, which will include (1) history of religions, with a descriptive account of the methods and of the results of the study of the religions beliefs as they have appeared in history, (2) comparative study of religion, and (3) psychology of religion in so far as historical investigation can throw light upon the spiritual factor in the life and thought of mankind dealing with the phenomenology of the Christian religion. This will embrace, under the general heading of Biblical science, (4) linguistics, or a study of the Bible languages and the principles of interpretation and exegesis; (5) Biblical introduction, or investigation into text, date, authorship, and historical setting of the various books of the Bible; (6) Biblical history and antiquities, and (7) Biblical theology, which aims at setting forth by means of impartial exegesis the ideas as to God, man, and the world and their relations set forth in the different Biblical writings; and, under the general heading of ecclesiastical history, (8) Church history, or the history of the spread of the Church, (9) history of doctrine, and (10) symbolic, or the history of the different creeds and confessions in which Christian doctrine has been embodied.

(b) The investigation of religion in its normative and constructive aspect may be subdivided into (iii.) a general branch dealing with the presentation, defence, and application of the truths of natural religion in the light of the general revelation to mankind as a whole in nature and history and conscience, which is treated of under the heading of natural theology, and the special
truth of Christianity as the highest and final form of religion; this embraces (14) the apologetic of the Christian religion; systematic theology, which includes systematic ethic; and practical theology, which includes (17) homiletic, (18) liturgic, (19) catechetical, or paideutic, (20) pastoral theology; (21) ecclesiastical policy, or the scheme of missions; (v.) the final synthesis of the truths reached in the various theological disciplines, historic and theoretic or normative, which is the aim of (22) theology, in which theology reaches its consummation.

8. Method in theology.—The method to be made use of in dealing with the data of theological science in its various branches will vary with the matter dealt with and the purpose or end in view. In the historical or phenomenological branches of theology the end in view is simply the ascertainment and accurate presentation of historic fact, and the methods to be made use of are those which are appropriate to historical inquiry in general.

(1) Thus in setting forth the history of religions the investigator must make himself acquainted as widely as possible by observation and inquiry, with the features and characteristics of extinct religions as they now appear and are practised among men. He must further acquaint himself with the development of these religions by the study of such books, monuments, and other records of the past as are available. Careful observation and industrious inquiry and research are thus the methods most needful for success in this department of theological science.

(2) In the comparative study of religion the investigator must use the material furnished by the history of religions, and seek by analysis, comparison, and spiritual insight to show the relations of the various religions to one another and their grading as manifestations of the common spirit of religion. This calls for more of speculative thought and philosophic reflexion, as regards method, than the previous discipline.

(3) In psychology of religion the investigator must discuss the origin and form of religion generally from the psychological point of view, and seek to show what part the various mental faculties and capacities—intelligence, feeling, desire, will, imagination, etc.—have in religious experience, and how they enter into and manifest themselves in the religious history. By methods appropriate to scientific psychology—observation, reflexion, induction, and deduction—have proper application in this discipline.

(4) Biblical linguistics, which is the study of the languages in which the Bible was originally written, is just a branch of philology, and the methods of philological study and inquiry have here their proper application. Hermeneutics and exegesis, which deal with the interpretation of the text of Scripture, may be brought in under linguistics.

(5) In Biblical introduction the methods of the lower or textual criticism and of the higher or historical criticism have a proper place. Textual criticism investigates the various manuscripts of the Bible that have come down to us and the various readings in the texts of these manuscripts, and seeks by rational principles to get as nearly as possible at the true original text. Historical criticism investigates the evidences of compositeness in different books of the Bible and seeks with the help of the history of a known language to gain reliable knowledge as to the composition, date, authorship, and historical setting or circumstances of the various books of the Bible, and to interpret the writers' purpose and function as elements in a progressive revelation.

(6) Biblical history deals with the history of the Jewish people and the rise of the Christian Church as recorded in the Bible, while Biblical antiquities deals with the doctrine of inspiration and the history of religions as presented by the various writers of the OT and NT. It is the crown and completion of Biblical science, and, for those who accept the Bible as the inspired record of a revelation from God, it is the religion, in which theology reaches its consummation.

(7) Biblical theology (including Biblical psychology) aims at unfolding and presenting in a clear and orderly fashion the doctrine of the revelation as presented by the various writers. It is the task of Biblical theology to define the importance for furnishing material towards the up-building of a comprehensive, normative, systematic theology. But of itself it is a purely historic discipline, aiming at the accurate presentation of historic fact and recorded thought in an impartial objective way, without means taking into account the bearing of that on permanent normative religious truth. The methods to be used in Biblical theology are those of sound philology and impartial scientific exegesis or interpretation, so as to make sure that the ideas or doctrines set forth are those of the various Bible writers them-selves, unqualified by the personal bias of the interpreter. The work of adjusting the scheme of thought faithfully gathered from the Scriptures by sound impartial exegesis to a comprehensive and or- ganic system of normative systematic theology is the important task of the Christian systematic theologian.

(8) Church history, or the history of the spread of Christianity, aims at recounting accurately the gradual enlargement of the area known as Christian endom, the conflict of Christianity with anti-Christian forces, and the growth of the Church's constitution and cultus, showing how the polity and worship of the Christian Church developed as time went on, and how divisions over questions of constitution and government and cultus arose among Christians.

(9) The history of doctrine describes the dogma, or body of doctrine, accepted by the Christian Church, and traces its development along the centuries.

(10) Symbolic gives a more detailed attention to the various 'symbols'—creeds or confessions—that have been formulated from time to time in the Church's history than can be given in a general history of doctrine. These are obviously purely historic in their nature, and accurate presentation of historic facts, for the achievement of which the proper methods to be used are the methods of impartial historic research and inquiry.

(11) The apologetic of religion in general has as its function to inquire into the nature and essence of religion generally and to establish the truth of the religious view of the world over against all irreligious, antithetic, or agnostic views. It aims at discussing and exhibiting (a) the nature and essence of religion in general; (b) the nature and validity of religious belief and the relation of the knowledge of natural objects gained through perception and rational cognition; (c) the truth and reality of what is postulated and affirmed in religious belief, as against atheism, materialism, agnosticism, and other forms of unbelief; (d) the rational proofs for the existence of God or the ways in which the human mind by valid process rises to the apprehension of supreme personal Spirit as the ultimate reality, for a reductive contemplation of the changing natural world and its phenomena, of the course of human history, and of the facts of the moral consciousness; (e) the evidence contained in the general revelation of God given to all men for the immortality of the soul and a future state.
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(12) Closely associated with the general apologetic of religion is that systematic presentation of the truths underlying natural religion to which the name of natural theology is usually given. Its aim is to arrive at the holy love of God and to all that may be known concerning God and the world and man, and their mutual relations, from that general revelation which is given in nature, mind, and history. It is, therefore, that we call the \( \text{Christian} \) or \( \text{natural} \) religion, as philosophical theism is its apologetic.

(13) Akin to natural theology is philosophical ethics, whose aim is to ground a science of practical conduct on the immediate deliveries of the moral consciousness and the knowledge of God and duty derivable therefrom. The ethic of Kant, associated with what he described as a ‘religion within the limits of pure reason,’ may be taken as illustrative of the aims and methods of philosophic ethic, defective though it may be as a presentation of the results of such ethic, even as his ‘religion within the limits of pure reason’ is defective as a presentation of the results of natural theology. In this region of natural theology and philosophic ethic the aim is to reach not merely historic but permanent normative truth, in which the mind of the rational thinker is at liberty to pursue practical conduct can be regulated. The methods by which, at all, such results can be reached are those of speculative thought and philosophic reflection on the data of moral and religious experience—not merely of our own personal experience, but of the experience of mankind generally as far as that can be ascertained, analysed, and used as the basis of rational inference, induction, and deduction. A great accession to the material or data of experience, on which a comprehensive and satisfactory philosophic theology and ethic may be grounded, is given us when we take into account the special revelation, culminating in the fact of Christ, of which the Bible is the record. Apart from this, indeed, the data on which natural theology and philosophic ethic seek to build are so incomplete that the probable conclusions reached are lacking in fullness of content and convincing power. The new data of experience furnished by this special revelation not only add cogency to the probable conclusions reached by philosophic theism and ethic, but also bring a greater fullness of content to constructive normative theology, by which it is enriched and made more satisfying to the mind and heart of man.

(14) Christian apologetic has as its function to introduce the Christian religion, grounded on the historic revelation of which the Bible is the record, and to set forth in order the evidences of its truth. It deals with such questions as these: (a) the idea of revelation, its spheres and modes, and the manner of its apprehension; (b) the idea of inspiration and its results; (c) the trustworthiness of the Bible as a reliable record of fact and experience; (d) the evidences of a progressive revelation of different kinds given in the Bible and the significance of the fact of Christ as consummating and completing that revelation; (e) the evidences of the truth of the gospel proclaimed by Christ and its fitness to meet human need and to bring salvation and satisfaction to mankind. Christian apologetic clears and prepares the way for

(15) Christian dogmatics, which aims at setting forth in accurate and systematic manner, and in such a way as to show its consistency with all our other knowledge of truth, the intellectual content of the Christian life as that becomes our inward possession by the Christian act of faith as the reception of the truths of this nature through the receptivity of faith. It presupposes and includes the conclusions reached by philosophic reflection in the sphere of theism and natural theo-

logy, and gives added cogency and convincing power to them and greater richness and fullness of content to our knowledge of God the supreme reality, as not only intelligent personal Spirit but also love and wisdom. It deals with such questions as these: (a) theology proper, or the doctrine of God involving an exposition and justification of the Christian conception of God as trine, which was the prominent feature of Greek philosophy during the 4th cent. when various forms of unitarianism (Monarchianism, Sabellianism, Ariusism) were combated by Athanasius and the Cappadocian Fathers; (b) Christology, or the doctrine of the Person of Christ, to which the attention of the Church was particularly directed after the Council of Nicea (A.D. 325) by the theorems propounded by Apollinarius, Nestorius, and Eutyches, which were condemned at the Councils of Constantinople (A.D. 381), Ephesus (A.D. 431), and Chalcedon (A.D. 451); (c) pneumatology, or the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, to which attention was first prominently given by the Church by the theories of those which were condemned by the Council of Constantinople; (d) anthropology, or the Christian doctrine of man; (e) hamartiology, or the doctrine of sin, which first came to the front of Christian theology in the 5th cent. Augustine and Pelagius in the 5th cent.; (f) soteriology, or the Christian doctrine of salvation, which, through Augustine and Pelagius, became an important feature in Western theology, receiving fresh development at the hands of Anselm, Bernard of Clairvaux, and Thomas Aquinas, who devoted attention to the redemptive work of Christ and its application to sinful men, and engaging prominently the thoughts of theologians in the Reformation period when the doctrines of justification by faith and reconciliation with God came into prominence; (g) ecclesiology, or the doctrine of the Church and the sacraments, which first received prominence in the early Church at the hands of Cyprian of Carthage (A.D. 250), was further developed by Augustine (in his City of God) and Thomas Aquinas (in his Summa Theologica), and received much attention from Luther and Calvinistic theologians at the Reformation and from Ritschl and Anglican High Churchmen in modern times; and (h) eschatology, or the doctrine of the last things, which has occupied a foremost place in recent theological discussion.

(16) Christian ethics has as its aim to set forth the content of the Christian life as it works itself out in disposition and action on the ground of the self-activity the life produces in Christ and His Church. It looks upon the Christian life from the viewpoint of man and his duty, while dogmatic looks upon it rather from the viewpoint of God and His will. Both deal with the same subject-matter, viz. God and man and their relations to one another, but under different aspects or from different viewpoints, so that, while they belong together to systematic theology, they are most conveniently treated as separate or distinct branches of that science. Christian ethics presupposes the conclusions of philosophic ethic, just as Christian dogmatics presupposes those of natural theology. But it adds new fullness and richness of content and new power to philosophic ethic through the new data of moral and religious experience, centred in the fact of Christ, which it contributes. The first attempts to formulate Christian ethic in separation from Christian dogmatics were made by Lambert Daneau, a French Protestant, in 1557, and G. Calixtus, a Lutheran, in his Epitome Theologicarum morum in 1634. Since the time of Schleiermacher this separate treatment of Christian ethics as a branch of theology has been generally followed in Germany, Britain, and America; and numerous works on Christian ethic have appeared in which
the relevant material is dealt with under different divisions. A convenient division followed in the main by Martensen and other writers is (1) general introduction; (2) definition and scope of Christian ethics, its relation to other disciplines, and its place in a classification of ethical systems; (3) fundamental conceptions of the science as a whole, norm, and motive; (4) practical conceptions of the science, e.g., anthropological, cosmical, and eschatological; (5) the source of our knowledge of the Christian moral ideal, the content of that ideal, and the means of its realization; (ii) individual ethical ideal, with the origin and progress of the Christian life in the individual soul and its manifestation in the virtues and graces of the Christian character; (iii) social ethical, dealing with the realization of the Christian ideal in the various spheres of society—the family, the Church, the State or nation.

Practical Christian theology in its various departments treats of the Christian religion from the point of view of its power to expand and to build up Christian life in the Church. It includes those disciplines that are concerned with the application of Christian theology in the practical sphere of life.

(17) Homiletic deals with the art of sermon-making.

(18) Liturgical deals with worship and its forms.

(19) Ecclesiastical polity deals with Church government, law, and procedure.

(20) Evangelistic theology, or theory of missions, deals with the best methods of propagating the Christian religion at home and among heathen peoples abroad.

The methods appropriate for use in the building of a scientific normative Christian systematic theology, into which the content of Biblical theology as a historical discipline is taken up and adjusted, are in part the methods commonly made use of by science in general—analysis, classification, inference, induction, deduction, etc.—but partly also the less easily applied methods of philosophic reflexion and speculative thought, by means of which the philosopher must seek to bring unity and consistency into his entire knowledge of the real. The God revealed in the Bible and the whole Christian and Christ-historical experience—the truine God of Christian revelation—must be related and harmonized through rational thought with the God of the theistic proofs and natural theology, if our theology is to be at once Christian and philosophic.

(23) Philosophy of religion, which is the highest stage or form of theology, has for its data the results reached as truth by the use of scientific method in the previously mentioned theological disciplines; and its aim is to combine these elements of truth in a comprehensive synthesis of knowledge, such as will exhibit the relations of the various aspects or parts of truth and their harmonious cohesion in an organic whole of truth or reality. Its special function is to harmonize the results reached by reflective thought along the line of philosophic theism and natural theology with the results reached through believing appropriation of the Christian revelation.

If reason is indeed the means whereby we apprehend the truth of God and reality, then we should not rest satisfied until we accept as true or real what is shown to commend itself to our reason as reasonable, and so 'worthy of all acceptation.' We must therefore strive to make our theology rational or reasonable, if it is to be the expression of truth.

If, again, the Christian revelation concerning God and the world and man and their relations be true, as Christians believe it is, then the Christian philosopher must strive to make his philosophy and metaphysic religious and so adequate to embrace and express the truth of religions, and specifically of Christian, experience. Only when theology becomes religious and philosophy becomes religious can there be hope of such a unification between the two as will yield a satisfactory philosophy of religion which will also be the most adequate and satisfactory metaphysic of being. To reach such a philosophy of religion is the very aspiration of the Christian speculative theologian who, while not ignoring the importance of faith alike in science, theology, and philosophy, strives to secure that the faith on which he rests shall be a reasonable faith.


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THEOSOPHICAL SOCIETY.—I. Definition and scope.—Every great religion has two parts, an inner and an outer, a spirit and a body, 'the knowledge of God,' which 'is Eternal Life,' and its dogmas, rites, and ceremonies. The inner part, 'the wisdom of God in a mystery,' spoken of by St. Paul as known to 'the perfect,' is that which has since the 3rd cent., been known in the West as 'theosophy'; in the East it has been known for ages under the name of Brahma-vidyā, 'God-wisdom,' 'God-knowledge,' or 'God-science.' Such theosophy, or mysticism, the direct knowledge of God by man, belongs equally to all great religions, as to all man's spiritual life, and may be possessed by any individual, even outside any religious organization. The Brahavadins, 'knowers of God,' in Hindisms; the Gnostics, the 'knowers,' who, Origin declared, were necessary to the very existence of the Christian Church; the shielah in Islamic Sūfism—these are typical theosophists from the standpoint of the modern Theosophical Society. No man is truly a theosophist who has not direct knowledge of God, but he may win this through any religion or by his own unaided efforts.

Theosophy, in the modern as in the ancient world, proclaims the possibility of such knowledge, as the inevitable result of the Universal Being. Man is essentially a spiritual being, his self, or spirit, being an emanation from the Universal Self, or Universal Spirit, God, as ray is an emanation from the Universal Spirit. He who knows himself, his deepest self, is to know God; he can sink in consciousness into the depths of his own being, beyond the body, the passions, the emotions, the mind, the reasoning power and the will, and he can pass beyond them all, and realize himself as separate from them, the pure 'I,' pure being. This is the universal experience of those who successfully seek the Kingdom of Heaven within, and it is followed by the recognition that this Universal Being into which the self opens transcends all the beings in which it is manifested, and is alike in all. Out of this experience, repeated for every one who becomes a knower of God, or theosophist, are built the two fundamental truths of theosophy: the immanence and transcendance of God, and the solidarity, or brotherhood, of all living beings. The realization of the first truth, man's identity of nature with God, as a fact in consciousness, and the subsequent realization of the second, his identity of nature with all around him, by a blending of his self with their self, a conscious dwelling in their forms as in his own—these sum up theosophy in its fullest and deepest sense. The man who thus reached self-realization in God and in all beings is a theosophist; and those who deliberately aim at such self-realization are also generally called theosophists.

The word 'theosophy' has further, historically, a second meaning; it denotes a body of truths, or facts, concerning such spiritual reality, and these may conveniently be classified under three heads: religion, philosophy, and science.
Theosophy is based on the system of ethics, rational, inspiring, and compelling. In considering this body of truths we are not studying a system as it is taught and published in modern days; we have to do with what has aptly been termed the Wisdom-Tradition, handed down in all civilized countries, ancient and modern, by a long succession of prophets, teachers, and writers. It may be traced in the Upanishads, Pythagoras, and epics of the Hindus, and in the six systems (darmakas) of Hindu philosophy; it underlies many of the Chinese systems, especially Taoism, and is seen in such books as the Ancient Egyptian, Persian, Brahmanical, and others.

In the Theosophical Society, all existences actual and potential, the super-life and super-consciousness in which all lives and consciousnesses inhere, eternal beneath the transitory, changeless beneath the fleeting, un-supported by matter, all containing all, the One without a second—this is the central teaching of theosophy as of all religions, the first universal truth of religion.

The Trinitarian concept of God is the second great and universal truth of religion, and therefore of theosophy. Theosophy speaks of the manifested God as the Logos, borrowing the term from Plato, the Logos and the Fourth Gospel.

Climbing from the depths of the One Existence, from the One beyond all thought and all speech, a Logos, by imposing on Himself a limit, commencing voluntarily the range of His own Being, becomes the Manifested God, and tracing the limiting sphere of His activity, thus outlines the area of His universe. Within that area the universe is born, is evolved and dies; it lives, it moves, it has its being in Him; its matter is His breath; its forces and energies are elements of His life; He is immanent in every atom; all pervading; all-sustaining; all-creating; He is its source and its end, its cause and its object, its content and circumference; it is built on Him as the sole foundation, it breathes in Him as its enclosing space; He is its life and its light, and everything is held in His grasp. The Sages of the Ancient Wisdom taught us of the beginning of the manifested worlds. From the same source we learn of the Self-antecedent Cause, who, descending into the Logos, the Root of all Being, the Will which outbreathes and inbreathes, who, being from Him the Second, unites the two aspects of life and form, the primal duality, making the two poles of nature between which the web of the universe is to be woven, the creative and the receptive, Father-Mother of the Worlds—the Wisdom, or Pure Reason, or Pure Intellect, and the powers and adventitious limbs, sustaining the universe; the Third Logos, the Universal Active or Creative Mind, that in which all archetypes exist, the source of all the forces of the universe, the treasure-house in which are stored up all the archetypal forms which are morally presented to the universe. Out of the universal Logos the evolution of the universe, the fruits of past universes, brought over as seeds for the present.

The unity of beings is the third truth universally accepted: the seven spirits before the throne of God; the primary emanations of the Supreme Trinity; the ranks of secondary Logoi, who rule congregies of solar systems, down to the Logoi of a single solar system. In such a system the vast hosts of spiritual intelligences (the devas, archangels, and angels of religions), the grades of spirits encased in human bodies, the sub-human intelligences, and 'those yet undeveloped into intelligence—all these, with the solar Logoi at their head, form the ladder of lives, and evolve within the system. The sub-human intelligences include the genii, genii, the genii, genii, the genii, genii, who play so great a part in folk-life, the living through limited intelligences who make all nature a living responsive organism instead of a soulless mechanism, whom little children sometimes see, and who are visible to the ordinary seer.

The fourth truth in theosophy is that of universal brotherhood, the inevitable deduction from the preceding; since there is but one life in all forms, all forms must be inter-related, linked together, and, however unequal they may be in development, they none the less make one huge family, are of one blood. The universal brotherhood of theosophy differs from the modern conception of 'equality,' the foundation of modern democracy, in that it postulates identity of origin and of potentiality, but recognizes varying degrees of development; the latter yielding the hierarchy of being or ladder of lives. In the theosophy resembles it, with its broad division of mankind into the enlightened and the profane, and the subdivisions of the enlightened into degrees and grades of development, and its ultimate aim of a hierarchical order and due subordination. In this both theosophy and freemasonry are in harmony with nature, increasing power going hand-in-hand with increasing knowledge and increasing

responsible. Wisdom, supported by strength and made manifest by beauty, rules in a true brotherhood, as in nature.

It is interesting to note that these four primary religious truths of theosophy, of universal religion, are but the intellectual formulation of the intuitions of the people—of the two primary spiritual truths directly contacted by the knower of the higher truths, the mystic, the theosophist. These are religious dogmas, expressing intellectually the first spiritual truth; the fourth is the expression in the outer life of the second spiritual truth. The other truths can become only in individual self-realization; they may be intellectually taught and comprehended from the religious standpoint, in theosophy. Adoration is the intellectual presentation of a truth known by the spirit, and believed on external authority.

3. Philosophical teachings.—Philosophically, theosophy is idealistic; consciousness is primary, the one indubitable fact, which can neither be strengthened nor weakened by argument. "I am" is the testimony of consciousness to itself, and ought can disprove its witness, since every disproof, every argument, must be addressed to that same consciousness, and imply its existence. To the All-Self, matter is but the limitations imposed by Himself on His thoughts, to us evolving in a universe which is the manifestation of our Logos, matter is His thought, limitations imposed on us by His thought and activity—limitations which we cannot transcend until we can escape from the prison of the human, though feeble and undeveloped, of the same nature as divine thought, and increases its power over matter with its increasing growth; thought is the one creative and moulding power, and, as evolving man realizes this, and so clarifies his lower nature that this aspect of the self can work through it, he becomes the master of that lower nature and all his surroundings, the creator and controller of his destiny. By thought, mastering the science of physical nature, he bends it to his will and utilizes it; by thought, mastering the science of the emotions, he builds virtues and destroys vices; by thought, mastering the science of mind, he subdues its turbulent energies into orderly obedience; by thought, directing will and controlling activity, he brings all things, within and without, into subjection to the self, the inner ruler, immortal.

Only by such fit rule and due subjection can man attain perfect health of body, emotions, and mind, and reach the highest good. Hence, one of the chief theosophical teachings deals with this power and control of thought.

The eternity of spirit—more loosely spoken of as the immortality of the soul—is an integral part of theosophical philosophy. It is an inevitable deduction from the identity of nature, of the human and the universal Self; ‘unborn, undying, perpetual,’ it is eternal as God Himself. The continuity of consciousness is equally inevitable, since the self is conscious and continuous, and in the self must consequently abide all its experiences, of which a successive survey is memory. The extent to which these memories are carried on by the material sheaths, or bodies, of the self—i.e. the surviving of the individual and the person—will be better considered under the constitution of man.

The method of unfolding of this continuous and conscious self in the human kingdom is by reincarnation. Reincarnation is, in fact, the only doctrine of immortality that philosophy can look at, as Hume said. It means that the self, having united with the human, descends in the human stage, from the three worlds (see below) and builds it into bodies, suitable for life in those worlds, beginning in the stage of barharism, as a savage of a lower life or creature, then living during the life of earth, free from all experiences, pleasant and peaceful; after death he meets the results of these experiences—the lower in the

intermediate world, where he suffers in the appropriate body of matter belonging to that world, and the higher in the heavenly world, where he enjoys in the appropriate body of matter belonging to that world, and converts all these experiences into spiritual and mental capacities. If he has not been converted, he returns to earth-life, bringing with him these capacities wrought out of experiences, into new bodies built to express and utilize them. In these he goes through a similar cycle, gathering, suffering, transforming, and the same process of birth brings the fruition of the preceding lives to start the new pilgrimage, and this is the inborn character and temperament mental, moral, physical. Step by step he climbs the ladder, working under inflexible and inviolable laws, until he reaches the stature of the perfect man; he passes through all the classes of the school of life until he has mastered all that this world has to teach, and is anekkath—he who has no more to learn. He is then a man, beyond birth and death, fitted for immortality, ready for work in the larger life.

4. Scientific teachings.—Theosophy differs from modern science in the fact that it includes under 'science' investigations into superphysical worlds. Its methods are the same: investigation by observation of objective phenomena, reasoning on observations, forming of hypotheses, and testing by disproof, of invariable sequences (i.e. of natural laws), repeated experiments to verify deductions, and formulation of results. It uses the senses for observation, but the sensations, as well as the other senses, in fact—responding to vibrations of matter finer than that which affects the physical senses.

As with modern science, so with theosophical—' occult science,' it is usually called—there is a body of accepted facts, laid down by ancient experts and largely verified by later experiments, and a fringe of modern discoveries, constantly added to, revised, and modified. The accepted facts have been established by generations of occult experts, and their existence is often referred to in the scriptures of various religions; the more accessible of these are being constantly verified by occult students to-day, but the larger, more cosmological facts are beyond our powers of proof. Any discoveries made by students are subject to revision and modification, as observations are repeated and the instruments of observation are improved.

(a) The constitution of the universe.—The broad outline of this comes from the sires of the past, and is largely confirmed in the scriptures. It appears reasonable to us, and is congruous with the observation of nature. We are able to verify the laws of analogy and recapitulation confirm it, for we see its outlines repeated in minature within our own range of observation, and we see sequences rapidly repeated in minature which the sires have described as occurring in a universe—as the somatic evolution of the kingdoms of nature is mimicked in the growth of the embryo in the womb. A universe consists of seven kinds of matter, or planes, of which the densest is called physical or solid; the next finer, astral, or watery; the next, mental or fiery; the next, spiritual or airy; the next, superphysical or etherial; and the two finest, divine. What are called solar systems are all on the physical plane of the universe, and a solar system repeats within itself the seven kinds or states of matter, these subdivisions of the vast cosmic plane forming its planes, or worlds.

Within a solar system these subdivisions can be mostly studied by less developed sirs, and we are in a field of research open to the occult students of our own day. We have a relation to our own earth: 'physical matter,' all formed by aggregations of similar physical atoms, similar except that some are positive, some negative; aggregations are solids, liquids, gases, and three kinds of ethers; 'astral matter,' formed by aggregations of astral atoms, the forms of these being astral, or light, or spiritual, or material, or mental; 'physical atomic' and 'mental matter,' formed by aggregations of atomic atoms, again divided into their sub-classes and again grouped as before; the 'spiritual' and 'superphysical worlds' are formed on the same basis, each having its planes and systems, and its own corresponding states of aggregation. Of the 'divine worlds' we cannot directly say Anything.

The constitution of man is analogous to that of the solar system, and hence the possibility of knowledge concerning it. As said, he is a fragment of the Universal Life, and is subject to the laws in the matter of his system. In the divine world dwells his
true self, the monad, and his consciousness appropriates matter from each of the five worlds below in order that he may know and conquer them; as the matter from the superphysical, spiritual, and the finer regions of the mental world are the most difficult to conquer. Paul speaks it grows and evolves through the whole cycle of reincarnation, and even beyond that, to death or in birth or death; probably so. Paul refers to this whole evolution of the soul as "our house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens," which he says "we build." Of course, "we" means the Ego, and the material basis of the Ego, which is the re-incarnating Ego, or individual, though the term is often used to include the physical bodies of all the lower classes of consciousness, the finer mental matter, in what is termed "the causal body," a subdivision of the spiritual taken separately. When the reincarnating Ego takes on a new physical body, it carries with it some of the coarser matter of the mental world for his 'mental body,' some of the matter of the astral world for his 'astral body,' some of the matter of the physical world for his 'physical body'; his consciousness, in thinking, uses mental matter; in desiring or sensing, uses astral matter; the feeling in the physical body is pure physical matter; these are the 'three worlds,' in which his evolution grows and evolves from without and transmigrating him, and is a personality, or person, i.e., as limited in expression by grosser matter; the individual body is closely related to the brain, through which consciousness is active in the physical world; the astral body is mainly correlated with the brain, through which consciousness is active in the astral world; it is generally in the brain and its controlling faculties as it is in the physical world, as the brain is controlled by a central brain sense of its experiences in vivid and coherent 'dreams'; it keeps in magnetic touch with its physical body. In death this magnetic touch is broken off, and the causal body of the Ego, and its causal body for a while in the astral world, called often "the intermediate world," in religious literature, in the earth. After a while the astral body dies, and the man passes in the mental body into the physical world, or, heaven, or, the abodes for a period extending to many centuries, the length depending chiefly on the richness of his intellectual, emotional, and artistic nature, and on the evolution of his body. When he has assimilated all the experiences of this nature accumulated on earth, the mental body tries to replace the coarser withdrawn to the spiritual body with all that has gathered to enliven the Ego. Then the Ego builds a set of new bodies for a new pilgrimage in the three worlds, to be utilized by them by birth. The extension of man is carried on in three worlds, brooded over by the spirit—himself—of the Ego, as he accumulates worlds of experience; he is an inhabitant of the three during waking life; of two during sleep and for a period after death; of one during his heart-monad. The lowest, the physical body, is at present the most perfectly organized, and therefore the most capable of receiving new impressions from without and transmigrating them to the consciousness. The astral body is rapidly becoming organized, and its proper senses are developing, so that it is ready to receive many impressions from the astral world, through, generally, with a lack of sharpness and accuracy; these include the phenomena of second-sight, prescience, apparitions, warnings, visions, perception of phantoms of the living and the dead, etc.; the phenomena to which modern psychology is turned. Among the most remarkable of people are "sensitive," or "psychic," and are using the supersenses, i.e., the supersensuous body, more or less organically. The mental body is becoming well organized in educated people, but more in relation to its organ, the brain, than as an independent vehicle, as a vehicle, active in any sense of the word. Consciousness, in the mental body, is in-tumed rather than outward, turned toward the Ego, the habit of special methods—meditation, concentration, etc.—artificially forced the evolution of the astral and mental bodies beyond the normal, i.e., as regards these, many centuries ahead of his time; he uses the supersenses for life in the astral and mental worlds in his waking consciousness, and thus carries on his investigations in them as the physical scientist does in the physical world. The dying of the three bodies, and the building of new ones for each successive lifespan, is the cause of the loss of memory of past lives; that memory is in the reincarnating Ego, and is shared by the consciousness when animating the lower bodies only if, in those bodies, the man has realized himself as one with the higher.

(e) The law of action and reaction is universal, and exists in the worlds of emotion, thought, and spirit as much as in the physical universe. Man can enlarge his character as scientifically as he can build up his body, and disregard of the meanest law of sowing and reaping, or of the "natural" life of growth, and laws of nature; he is thus subject to the law of the moral law. It evolves and transmigrates, or becomes, that as the nervous system—that of a root-race, when a considerable number of reincarnating Egos are ready to develop a higher quality of consciousness. The difference between the two races, was the first to assume the really human type in the middle period of its evolution—when the previous types being embryonic; the

surviving remnant of the Lemurian are the negroes and the many negroid peoples scattered over the world. The fourth, or Atlantean, race, as we have seen, has the most developed a spontaneous type of re-incarnation. These two races are represented as sub-races—the Aryans of India, the Mediterranean Aryans (Arabs, the later higher-class Egyptians, etc.), the Iranians, the Celts, and Phoenicians. Each of these has developed the various types aforesaid to the reincarnation Egos the necessary varieties for the evolution of these three racial types. Each of these races and sub-races as often as is necessary for the unfolding of the qualities characteristic of them.

(c) Human perfection.—By repeated reincarnations under invisible law, each man reaping exactly as he has sown, man reaches his ideal goal—human perfection. At the present stage of evolution it is possible for him to reach this goal in advance of the tenth root-race. The evolution of the Ego is the living of many millions of years. By strenuous exertions and noble and unselfish living, he may attract the attention of the spiritual guardians of mankind, who will teach him how to quicken his evolution, so that he may enter on the "path of holiness," pass through its five initiations—or stages of widening consciousness—and become a "master," the last of the five initiations opening the gateway of superhuman evolution. He may then pass into other worlds, or enter the ranks of the guardians of this world, as he wills. From the hierarchy of these guardians have come the founders of world-religions, the lesser prophets and teachers being their disciples.

5. The ethics of theosophy.—These are not definitely formulated into any code, but consist of the highest in the general teachings of the world's noblest saints, prophets, and founders of religions. All that is sweetest and most lofty in the world's Bibles, all that is most inspiring and ennobling in the writings of the great universal teachers, all that most clearly forms the ethics of theosophy. As man lives by the highest ethic he can grasp, he becomes capable of appreciating ethical yet sublime; the theosophist strives to live by the spirit of Christ rather than by any legal code, and, cultivating love, he hopes to be enlightened by the lords of love. Broadly speaking, that which works with the Divine Will in evolution is right; that which works against it is wrong. The Divine Will is the will of the Supreme Being, it is found in such divine men as the Buddha and the Christ. These theosophist looks up to as examples, and strives to reproduce their likeness in himself.

6. The Theosophical Society.—This association was founded on 17th Nov. 1875, in New York City, U.S.A., by Helena Petrovna Blavatsky and Henry Steele Olcott. The former was a Russian noblewoman, of Olympian breeding, and that some had been trained and cultivated to the highest point by her 'master,' an Eastern occultist; she gave up social rank, wealth, and family to seek him and to spend some years near Shigatze, when returning to the world, she gave the rest of her life to carrying out his directions. In America she met, at the famous Eddy farmhouse, a man who had won high distinction during the Civil War, Colonel Henry Steele Olcott, and he became her pupil. She endeavoured first to collaborate with the American spiritualists, but, failing in this, she, with Olcott, founded the Theosophical Society; she became its corresponding secretary, an office which she held for many years, and her president; its organization is due to him and he remained president until his death in 1907, when the present writer was elected as his successor.

The unit of organization is a lodge, of not less than seven members—men and women; in some, not less than seven, exist in any territory, they may group themselves into a section, or national society, which is self-governing, within the wide limits of the general constitution of the headquarters in New York. Mr. Olcott was president, vice-president, treasurer, recording secretary, a general corresponding secretary of the general council, each elected by his own national society, but with not less than five additional councillors, chosen by the general secretaries. It meets once a year for an annual congress under the presidency of the whole Society; but it may not meddle with the business of the sections, unless they desire it, simply as a source of information. The annual report of 1917 showed 19 national societies, 104 lodges, with 28,923 active members. Round each lodge are gathered many thousands of spiritualists, race, who are the first to assume the really human type in the middle period of its evolution—when the previous types being embryonic; the

headquarters of the Society were first in New York; in 1879 the
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founders left America for India, and fixed the headquarters in Benares; in December 1882 they moved to Adyar, a suburb of Madras, where the headquarters have since remained. The Theosophical Society owns there an estate of 250 acres, with several fine buildings, and a library which is known all over the world as the Adyar Library. A collection of 

While the Society exists for the purpose of spreading the ideas formulated above, it does not impose them upon the public. In the same way, the members, who, providing they accept the principle of universal brotherhood, are absolutely free to think as they will. Admission to membership is obtained on recommendation of Two Fellows of the Society, and the acceptance of the following objects: 

'To form a nucleus of the Universal Brotherhood of Humanity, without distinction of race, creed, sex, caste, or colour.\n
'To hold the study of comparative religious philosophy, and science.\n
'To investigate the unexplained laws of Nature and the powers latent in man.'

The following, written many years ago by the present president, states the general position of the Theosophical Society:

'The Theosophical Society is composed of students, belonging to any religion in the world or to none, who are united by their sympathy with their objects, by their desire for religious commonplaces, and to draw together men of good will, whatsoever their religious opinions, and by their desire for religious truths and the study of them in their studies with others. Their bond of union is not the profession of a common belief, but the desire to discover and the aspiration for knowledge. It is held that Truth should be sought by study, by reflection, by purity of life, by devotion to high ideals, and they regard Truth as a prize to be striven for, not as a dogma to be imposed by authority. They consider that belief should be the result of individual study and the acceptance of proof, and not a dogma which should rest on knowledge, not on assertion. They extend tolerance to all, even contradictory beliefs, not as a privilege they bestow, but as a duty they perform, and they seek to remove ignorance, not to punish it. They see every religion as an expression of the Divine Wisdom, and prefer to study to its condensation, and its practice to proselytism. Peace is their watchword as Truth is their aim.'

Theosophy is the body of truths which forms the basis of all religions, and which cannot be claimed as the exclusive possession of any. It offers a philosophy which renders life intelligible, and which demonstrates the justice and the love which guide evolution. It puts death in its rightful place as a recurring incident in an endless life, opening the gateway of a fuller and more radiant existence. It restores to the world the Science of the Spirit, teaching man to know the Spirit as himself, and the mind and body as his servants. It illuminates the scriptures and doctrines of religions by unveiling their hidden meanings, and thus justifying them at the bar of intelligence, as they are ever justified in the eyes of intuition. Members of the Theosophical Society study the truths, and Theosophists endeavour to live them. Every one willing to study the nature of life, and to live in accordance with the law of the universe, is welcomed as a member, and it rests with the member to become a true Theosophist.\n
There have been some offshoots from the Theosophy which have become independent of the central organization, but which spread the same truths. There are two international societies, with headquarters in America, and some scattered independent bodies in Germany and Austria.


A. BESENT.

THEOSOPHY.—Theosophy has characteristics which relate it closely to religion, and somewhat more remotely to philosophy. It also attempts to determine man's place in the universe and to solve the riddles of life and of death. Like religion, it aims at guaranteeing to its followers a more favourable destiny by showing them the way of healing and salvation. Like philosophy, it proposes to have recourse only to the resources which nature, on the one hand, and the human intellect on the other, place at its disposal, and it is by knowledge that it saves men. But the knowledge which it obtains is not grounded on the observation of facts which are within the reach of ordinary intelligence; it is intuitive, depending on exceptional clear-sightedness of men on a superior level, and communicated to them by their disciples. There is then a theosophical knowledge, just as there is a religious and a philosophical knowledge. Besides, it may well be that the content is through-out materially the same. Such a concept, e.g., as that of the immortality of the soul may be found in all three. By what distinctive marks then can we recognize that a doctrine is theosophical? Now we know that there is a criterion which makes it possible for us, without risk of error, to distinguish between what is philosophical and what is religious. If a doctrine has been established by means of observation, induction and deduction, it is philosophical; it is religious if there has been concerned in its origination an intuition operating under the influence of feeling and imagination; it is only at subsequent stages that the ordinary processes of the human intellect intervene. Theosophy also begins with affirmations having an intuitive basis, and its constructions may have great emotional and imaginative value. The question is: can this foundation, it may proceed, like theology, to construct, in accordance with the demands of reason, a system of satisfying coherence. The difference between theosophy and theology is not that they have neither in their ideas nor in their method. It is in the attitude which the religious man, on the one hand, and the theosophist, on the other, assume towards the objects presented. The one hopes to work, by fear, reverence, and adoration, upon the will of powerful beings for his own advantage; the other depends upon himself, upon the immediate efficacy of his own knowledge and action; religion is humble, whereas theosophy is proud.\n
1 This self-reliance the theosophist has in common

1 Thespeosy, p. 91.

1 It is to be noticed, however, that, though the suggestion of pride is justifiable in connexion with the esoteric tendencies, the prevailing influence, and result, is of a religious kind: religious economy noticeable in modern theosophical teaching, yet there is also an element of humility frequently to be found in the teachings. The classical theosophical method of reference to teachers or adepts, and it is urged that their teachings should be simplified, and that the direct and immediate efficacy of knowledge in obtaining the desired results may indeed be exaggerated and may become an instrument of error if the individual thinker is not encouraged to depend merely on his own knowledge or even on the knowledge of his contemporaries. He, therefore, has to be prepared to renounce the past and accept the teachings which have been handed down from remote ages and are rediscoverable for men of the present age when the obscure incursions upon religious systems have been removed.
with the magician. Both—the one more consciously than the other—admit the existence in the universe of hidden forces, for the control of which knowledge of them is sufficient. Both also show individualistic tendencies. They detach themselves from the religions community and break through the menial limitations to which the theosophist is recognized around them. But we may notice at least this difference between the magician and the theosophist: the one aims at using his power in an external way—he desires to gain advantage or the disadvantage of his fellows; the other is a contemplative, who acts but little except on himself and for his own sake. The theosophical spirit has left a very deep mark upon Indian thought. It is possible to trace its influence from its origin to our own day. India would be for the investigator a remarkable field for study if the chronological sequence of ideas and systems were not veiled in a darkness which up to the present time has not been penetrated. It is impossible for us to date the most important of the texts from which we derive our information. Many of them are marked by an unexpected period when the theories which they set forth were formulated. Under such circumstances it becomes exceedingly difficult to settle the debit and credit side of the account of each. However, the result may be considered to be now established: there has been in India a continuity of theosophical tendency. The systems interface with and influence one another. The intuition on which their authors pride themselves is almost indefinable, and the discovery of the 'truths' which a kind of heredity has tended to fix in the Indian mentality. The task of the great philosophical schools has to a large extent been the reconciliation of the ideas enshrined in the Upanishads. Buddhism would be unintelligible if the way had not been prepared for it, if not in these very schools, at least in antecedent groups bearing a very strong resemblance to them. And the reformers who have appeared in India in such large numbers since the Middle Ages have drunk at the same source. If, then, we cannot yet dream of giving a strictly historical presentation of theosophical speculations, it is at least not impossible to discern the order in which the principal systems have appeared. We shall follow (1) the development of this thought in circles which are strictly speaking, Brahmanic, at least closely related to Brāhmanism (the Upanishads and the Vedānta, the Sāṅkhya, and the Yoga); (2) the transformation of theosophy into religion (into Jainism and Buddhism); (3) its invasions into popular religions of long standing, with which it has associated itself, not without a certain sacrifice of its own character and significance; and finally (4) we shall see how modern theosophy in India is dominated by ancient philosophical tradition.

1. The Brāhmanic theosophy (q.v.). The Beginnings. The two tendencies which characterize Hindu thought throughout its course appear early in Brāhmānic circles. The one is the spirit of theosophy: the other, a form of theosophical doctrine characteristic of the Ṛgveda, i.e., the rule, which derives its authority simply from its antiquity, thus gradually performs only by those who are in possession of liturgical knowledge, viz. by the Brāhmanas. The dhāraṇa, i.e., the rule, which derives its authority simply from its antiquity, thus gradually extends its domination over men's minds. It becomes systematic in one of the six darśanas, the Purāṇa Mimamsa. Anxious care in observing traditional forms has created the power of the priesthood. The fathers of families have been deprived of their religious importance to the advantage of the Brāhmanas. The gulf between sacred and profane makes itself more and more evident. Contrariwise, it is the spirit of novelty which manifests itself in the other tendency. During all the Vedic period the treasury of hymns and rites is taking on an ever increasing aspect. Two facts are certain: if the gods have at first made use of these, it is not the gods who have revealed the knowledge of them. The yajñis have seen and have communicated their visions to mankind. We have preferred to have the exclusive proprietors. Signs of this double tendency are to be found even in the same texts. We may be sure that, in circles associated with writing, the religious tradition and originality existed side by side without offence. Why should they have entered into conflict? Did not both of them find their point of departure in the same hymns? Yet of the Vedic deities can scarcely be distinguished from the forces and elements in which they reveal their power. They have almost no characterization, and they represent vaguely the divine which permeates the objects and phenomena of nature. Out of this naturalism, frequently rude in character, there easily emerge the pantheistic conceptions which were so soon to dominate Indian theosophy. Besides, do not rishis and innovators alike make knowledge the essential condition of religious efficacy? Are not both of them Brāhmanas, i.e., the heirs of the magicians who were charged from the beginning with the protection of the sacred ritual from the precarious influence of evil spirits? Finally—and most important of all—do not both believe that there is in every being and in every sacred act a mysterious energy which establishes harmony and co-ordination between man and the universe? And are they not now on the earth, like the 'fathers' of ancient times and the gods in the heavens, the depositaries and the agents of the mysterious force, creator of order and of life? When there is the thought of turning the secret power of the sacrifice to the benefit of the individual, with a view to assuring him of happiness beyond the grave and guaranteeing himself against a second death which would be fatal, there are here the essential elements of theosophical doctrine—desire for deliverance from suffering and death, hope for salvation by personal effort, confidence in the saving efficacy of knowledge. (2) The ancient Upanishads. —Theosophical thought, which is to be found in germ in the hymns and in the Brāhmanas, obtains form and growth in the Upanishads. Certainly the authors of those old treatises were far from

\[1\] See art. INSPIRATION (Hindu).
having broken their connexion with the traditional cult. But they love to give the sacred actions a symbolic interpretation which will relieve them of their mechanical character. A still more singular thing is that they manifest a well-marked esoteric tendency; usually a long time is spent in appealing to the master before he consents to reveal the supreme truth, and the disciple is only allowed to approach the subject, not to touch upon it, except to a particularly dear and well-qualified person. The method of discovery is always intuition; thought proceeds by abrupt illuminations. Moving ideas are often found by a step by side with one another without concerning itself about their contradistinctions. It does not demonstrate; it is content to illustrate by beautiful metaphors and arresting subtilties.

In an yet vague form the idea of the essential unity of the universe was implicitly contained in the Brahmanic theory of sacrifice. There is now posited the existence of a Being in which all that is is real, and that Being is Brahman, the name of the energy which manifests itself in the sacred action. It is also designated the atman, i.e. the self or the soul of all things.

Thus the theme is stated which the Upa-niṣ kṣ works go on to develop and repeat as its own essence.

This Being is the only absolute. He has no determinations. One can say nothing of him except that he is. No definition is possible which may at least try to name him, so convinced are we that we know the Being of which we know the name. He is that, that is, in no sense, for he deny every quality, which would be to reduce him to a finite existence. He is the supreme reality of realities, satya satyagga. Beyond the reach of all comparisons, he is the only pure self, the only essence, one side by side with one another—especially without concerning about their contradistinctions. It does not demonstrate; it is content to illustrate by beautiful metaphors and arresting subtilties.

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do not exact in affirming my existence—'I am Brahman,' provided that 'I' am demand of every quality and of all conceivable conditions of individuality. In this way, I am Brahman entire, for Brahman, being absolute, could not have parts.

Nevertheless the confusion between the subject knowing and the object known; it is also the relation which emerges between the absolute, all the same, and the differentiated, classified names and forms. To this cosmic process, more particularly, the name māyā is given. Māyā (q.v.) signifies the alternation which takes place in the present life and which is reflected in the absolute, so that it becomes itself as many as there are classifications of names and forms. By the existence of māyā the unqualified Brahman becomes the qualified Brahman, the effect Brahman, the lower Brahman. Sākāra gives to this Brahman also the name of God, Śiva; but this Śiva, the attributes and objects of which are without the lower Brahman creating, preserves, and destroys, do also exist in virtue of nescience; all is phenomenal, illusory. From the point of view we true knowers have, He is Brahman, and in effect; neither Śiva nor world; neither agent nor act; but only being unchangeable, indeterminate. Under the influence of māyā, the ātmāna becomes a jīva. The jīva becomes individualized through everything which serves as a substratum, or as a substratum is to be understood, the power of duty, of law, and the faculties of knowledge. But the attributes of the jīva have no more reality than those of Śiva. Truly speaking, the self is not a product; it is incorporeal, spiritual, insubstantial, infinite, one.

For practical purposes and provisionally, both the world and the individual exist. To both of them even Śākāra pays considerable attention. The union of self and objects of action. Their destiny is determined by karma. An act cannot be annulled; this is the universal law; or, at least, it cannot be annulled if it has worked out the end of its action produces life, and life produces action. The self which acts will be reborn, for action, and, again, for rebirth. The chain of causes and effects has not had a beginning. How could it have an end? Fortunately, cause and effect, and act and result, are the work of the self. If the self becomes nescient, knowledge, knowl-

ing will destroy. 'As long as nescience has not been abolished, the self is unfruitful, and the individual soul continues to be the sphere of good and evil.' The individ-

dual can, by a knowledge of Brahman, escape from karma and māyā. This is not only a liberation, if he has discovered how he may attain this by a severe spiritual discipline, he can, through contemplation, begin to act. 'We are to understand this by a kind of spontaneous effort, reach the 'perfect vision,' i.e., he can perceive the Self in himself and thus have an intuition of his identity with Brahman. This vision destroys in him the remnants of personality and dissipates the mirage of the individual, which in the light of Brahman, and in consequence he is, in an absolute sense, being, thought, and bliss.

(4) The Śākāra. — The Śākāra (q.v.) is of ancient origin, for its influence upon primitive Buddhism cannot well be disputed. The main pronouncements of the school are, however, of late date and go in several centuries subsequent to the birth of Buddha. Fortunately there are other works—e.g., the Mahābhārata and some ancient Buddhist writings—which mark out the path of de-

development from the Upanisads to the classical form of the Śākāra. It has now entered the third stage, the Śākāra, realistic and atheistical, is Brahmanical. It has no difficulty in including the Veda among the standards of knowledge. It may be that, originating outside of Brahmanical, it was at a later date recognized by the latter, and has paid for this advantage by an admission, more or less nominal, to the authority of revelation. Nevertheless, we find in works comparable or close to the ante-

cedents of several essential doctrines of this system, it is more probable that it has originated from the same circles as those in which the ancient Upanisads took their first expression. It can be best explained if it is regarded as a product of reaction against the radical idealism which is implicit in the Upanisads and develops in the Vedānta.

Brahmanical philosophy posits the absolute reality of the empirical world. If it is said that the world of things is the theatre of a personal being and that it is impossible to imagine a world of which all that is not personal belongs to it, his answer is that a thing is not real only at the moment when it manifests itself; it also has an absolute reality outside of its effect. For the effect is already to be found in its entirety in the cause. "If a dog is barking, it is not because it is hearing the voice of the other dog:"

Thus, over against a substance composite and changing, the Śākāra philosophy posits a simple and stable substance; with the purusa, the privy, the self, the subject, the ego, the self only in appearance. Māyā modifies on the one hand Brahman and thus creates the world; but it modifies also in appearance. Reality is not destroyed under the influence of gross, subtle, and the organs of knowledge, all depend upon purusa. This includes Ātman, as well as Śiva, since, in the living being, the Ātman must react to the process of growth and growth.

The change which emerges in the physical and psychical universe is a regular evolution, taking form a determination, a growing reality, an increasing multiplicity of the simple, creative aspect evolution brings the gross out of the subtle. At the dissolution of the world the gross resolves itself into the subject of the Śākāra, which minutely described the successive phases of the evolutionary processes, poises 24 principles against each another in a relation established the common foundation of all phenomenal existence, to the gross elements and their combinations. It is because the purusa is not simple, nor tathātā the relation of the Ātman to all things and the entire sphere of the things of the physical and mental world. It is threefold. It is composed of three aspects, themselves multiple in creative. The purusa are sattva, rajas, and tamas, goodness, passion, and darkness. It is in their presence in infinitely varying quantities, the things affect men differently. The body which in the evolution emerge between purusa at the one hand and the 24 principles at the other, is the prakṛti, which form the 'characteristic body,' the tūla śārira. The tūla śārira is subtle and is to the gross body as the cause is to the effect; it explains the imperfection and action, which distinguish individuals from one another. Whilst the gross body is causative, the subtle body is a mirror of the whole universe. The subtle body is like capital which bears as interest the quality of succeeding existence. This knowledge becomes possible through a reflection of the immediate presence of the soul. It is the form in which is expressed the relation between the purusa and the Ātman. Another word for this relation involves the identity of the soul. It is real, but it is not inherent in the soul. Because it is real, determination of the Ātman is necessary; because it is not inherent, deliverance is possible.

Both the purusa and the prakṛti have to submit to certain consequences. The prakṛti, which is the substratum, the Purusa, illuminated by the purusa, the modifications which take place in the Ātman of the individual become conscious. These again are reflected upon the soul, which thus becomes subject to all the interplay of the affections. It is in this roundabout way that the soul arrives at a knowledge of itself. For, though it is the subject of all knowledge, the prakṛti cannot know itself directly. This knowledge becomes possible through a reflection coming from the mirror provided by the internal organs. The purusa, full of light but inactive, and the prakṛti, active but unconscious, stand in relation to each other to the blind. Their association is discovered to be beneficial for both. The mode of the prakṛti, the soul itself, which is the subject of all knowledge, the prakṛti cannot know itself directly. This knowledge has no other end than to make knowledge possible for the soul—which knowledge necessarily eventuates in salvation.

A slow and elaborate process is necessary to break the bond and support the deliverance of the soul. This process is to destroy actual suffering, which on other grounds would be impossible, but which is possible in its germinal form in the disposition stored in subtle form in the internal organ. A slow internal struggle brings a man from the natural state—i.e., the meditative and the alabaster or hardened soul—which may provide the ground, but it is knowledge which is truly efficacious. The final deliverance, in the proper and figurative sense, are, we may arrive at an assertion of the truth: 'I am not; nothing is mine; this is not me.' One thus gets a direct per-

ception of the void, the voidness, and the nothingness. To establish this distinction is to destroy the bond and to see the prakṛti. But the soul is not identical with the void, as there is no other substance than itself; there is no further association with the subtle body, no reflection east by it; the soul is healed.
The Yoga also derives advantage from a deliverance which, in effect, suppresses suffering for it, inasmuch as suffering is not felt except for so long as the process is not interfered with by the soul itself. And to be creative in relation to the soul and its salvation, it ceases to be active and returns to the original condition of the gunas. Meditation had no value except for the liberated soul. "Since, notwithstanding the infinity of time, they are still souls not liberated, there will be such to all eternity."

(5) The Yoga.—It might be asked if in the history of Indian theosophy the place of the Yoga belongs to the Vedanta. It is not. If its affinities are not in an altogether different direction and with the group of systems which, though they adopted many theosophical systems, are obviously theistic and devotional in tendency. Does it not make a place for God, for that Isvara who is a soul apart, a unique Being, eternal, all-powerful, all-good, all-knowing, exposed to no suffering, to no desire or change? Does not this God show an infinitely benevolent activity on behalf of men desirous of salvation? Does He not vouchsafe spiritual vision to His elect? Does not the yogi, to obtain salvation, surrender himself to God with that consent and submission which is called prasyadhana? Finally, is not salvation obtained by means of a discipline in which the strictly intellectual processes have little place? What have the recognized means for purifying the body and delivering the soul from the gunas which organ of thought to do with the pursuit of jinda, the knowledge which brings salvation? It is easy to answer these objections. First of all we may remark that the role attributed to Isvara in the scheme of salvation is really secondary. After the preliminary process is gone through, there is no further intervention of divine assistance to fulfill the efforts of the yogi, and everything happens as if he had only his own powers to rely upon. Further, the supreme end is not, by any means, as in theistic religions, eternal life in God or near God; what is desired is the absolute isolation of the individual soul. It follows that, probably, when the Yoga came to be systematized, Isvara was merely a survival of a period when practices of asceticism and sorcery were associated with Siva, a god whose vigorous personality might seem incompatible with an exclusively human conception of salvation. In fine, Isvara was no more an inconvenient intrusion in the Brahmanical Yoga than in the monistic Vedanta. To Isvara is attributed the most indirect, the most remote, the most inconsequential influence, indirectly the sign of the penetration of the Yoga by the theosophical spirit.

The Yoga, destined to emphasize the practical conditions of meditation and saving ecstasy, would naturally disregard study and reflection, since neither of them was of service in securing the marvellous powers for which the yogi was ambitious. But, as in Brahmanizing itself it had adopted very nearly in its entirety the doctrine of the Sûkhya, there was really no need to indicate the acquisition of knowledge as among the demands imposed by the need of salvation. This acquisition could have been considered as implicitly prescribed from beginning to end. In any case it is interesting to point out that in an Upanisad greatly influenced by Yoga ideas, the Mûrti Upanisad, the examination of reflexion, had a place among the members of Yoga. Perhaps we have in this a proof drawn from a period before the Yoga became entirely allied to the Sûkhya.

In short, the Yoga, which the Yogins at first, are very closely connected with the Sûkhya which is itself faithful to the theosophical spirit. It rests upon very ancient beliefs closely related to magic. The remarkable manifestations of patience, will-power, and intelligence which the presence of supernatural faculties imply, are necessary for the new acquisition of energy. Besides, the accomplish-

lent of salvation depends entirely upon personal effort. There is no possible doubt that the Yoga belongs legitimately to the same spiritual family as the Sûkhya and the Vedanta.

Properly speaking, the Yoga is the act by which the senses of the mind are held in restraint; turned resolutely in one single direction, the mind acquires greater force and certain new faculties. The processes regarded as efficacious had already been employed in the Sûkhya. Patanjali formulated his theory of them. If, as is probable, the author of the Yoga Sûtras is the same as the illustrious grammarian of the same name, then this spiritual prescription was systematized in the 2nd cent. B.C. But, in the influence which from the beginning it exerted upon Buddhism, we have proof that it goes much farther back. The proper object of the Yoga, as supplied with doctrines by the Sûkhya, is, as the first of the Sûtras says, 'the suppression of the modifications of the thinking principle,' i.e. of the understanding. Freed from all clittsa, the purâva regains its own nature, its own freedom, its own domain.

The yogi pupil has difficult conditions to fulfil. A long and painful process of preparation is imposed upon him, which may triumph over all the obstacles inherent in the feebleness of man. It is in the first phase of this process that devotion and the practice of the discipline play an essential role. Whenever this propulsive function has fulfilled its functions, the adept may proceed to another process which lead to the mastery of the intellectual functions and the detachment of the soul. According to the authoritative scheme, the programme of this gyanic is divided up into five main phases: meditation, contemplation, and the bringing of the body under control. They comprise interdictions and exercises, proscriptions, prescriptions, and positions to be taken in meditation, and others which have for their aim the control of breathing; and, finally, the procedure which has to be followed in restraining the senses and destroying communications between the mind and the external world. There is special insistence upon the regulation of the breath, on the ground that individual life and thought are bound up with respiration, and that to control the one is to dominate the other. When, finally, the body has been purified, it becomes possible to exercise control on thought; three kinds of exercises to read it progress from the least to the severest, from the external to the individual, and from the individual to isolation.

Another method, more violent and more complicated, is founded upon the yogi's own kind of physiology. Through modifying and even stopping the circulation of the vital spirits in the channels of the body, the yogi seeks to influence the natural functions of the understanding and in exciting the power of action and of vision. Strange phenomena accompany the last phases of the spiritual process: colours appear which are invisible to the ordinary man; sounds are heard; the yogi links into a 'universe' the sounds which, to the deaf, mean too much effort ends in madness. The texts express at great length on the manifold advantages which Yoga brings to its disciples. First of all there are benefits of an entirely mundane character: health, youth, and beauty. Especially there is obtained a 'sovereign power' which enables those who possess it to realize immediately all that they desire, to make themselves at will exceedingly small or big, light or heavy; to control the elements; to guide the will or sentiments of another; to change the nature of substances, to distribute their personality amongst several different bodies, etc. But for the yogi the spiritual results have more value. In seven stages the soul obtains liberation, first of all from the external world, then from the hindrances which come to it through its association with the organs of the intelligence and the will. Liberated from the world of results, the yogi relishes in pure tranquillity, in the separation from the internal organs, it tastes the ineffable delights of eternity, and regains at last the state of integral union (kantiyogam) in which it is salvation.

Before leaving Brahmanical theosophy, we may point out that in more than one characteristic it is linked very closely with Vedantism (q.v.). Our theosophists have, like the Vedantists, a marked tendency towards monism; their anthropology has borrowed much from the Sûkhya philosophy; they authorize exercises, the first, not without analogy to those prescribed by the Yoga.

2. Theosophy as the germ of new religions.—In
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Brāhmaṇism the theosophical doctrines are placed alongside of the old tradition, and religious society recognizes. For that reason the theosophy is transformed into a religion, the conditions are altogether altered. Henceforth a man becomes a member of a community, not because of his birth, but because of his adherence to a certain belief; the idea of the group is to some extent more expansive. Moreover, theosophy ceases to be a mere intellectual doctrine; it takes entire possession of the individual, and aims at maintaining and unifying the unity of discipline and of life.

Two religions have sprung from the movement of thought which we find permeating the old Upanisads, viz. Jainism and Buddhism. Seeing that they are born in the same spiritual environment, it is not strange that they should have many characteristics in common. Their doctrines, their legends, their rules of life, have an unmistakable air of family relationship. The worship itself, in its outer forms, is so similar in various particulars that from the outside one might easily confuse the two systems; witness only the tale of Asvaghosa in which one finds Kaniska worshipping a Jain stūpa under the impression that it is Buddhistic. Jainism and Buddhism are both products of the process of crystallization which was a feature of the entire age of the Upanisads. The best of the Brāhmans practising strict observance of rites and a solitary asceticism, India has been familiar with what one might call wandering cenobitism. The teachers, accompanied by their disciples, go from place to place, not settling down anywhere except during the months of the rainy season. These parivrājaka, in the course of instructing their pupils, discuss the most diverse subjects. The groups are not closed. Round about a knot of faithful disciples there gathers a numerous body of adherents and friends. If Jainism and Buddhism have been able to transform themselves into Churches, the reason is that they have understood better than some other saṅghas how to attach the laity by solid bonds and to organize the community by fixed rules. There is now no doubt that Jainism is prior to Buddhism. Buddhists themselves do not hesitate to admit the fact. But Jain writings are certainly posterior—and very much so—to those of Buddhism. It may well be that, if there has been any connexion, the Jains have been the debtors. If we begin with them, they are not in order to lay stress on the relative dates, but rather because, on the whole, the Jainist Church has remained more faithful to the theosophical tradition of the Upanisads.

(1) Jainism.—Jainism (g.n.) has all the characteristics of a theosophical religion. It puts at the centre of its teaching the doctrine of karmā (g.n.), and shows itself chiefl[y interested in human destiny. It aims at delivering men from the misery of the saṃsāra. It demands that the individual should be the instrument of his own regeneration. It searches for the saving truth beyond phenomena and sensible perception, and, as a consequence, asserts the authority of persons endowed with exceptional faculties of vision and knowledge. It places itself outside the Brāhmaṇic tradition. Nothing more is heard of Śivāra. Jainism is a ‘human’ doctrine. Sākara sees in this a reason for its condemnation. Because it opposes to Vedic tradition a new rule, this theologian accuses the religious reform of being revealed. And yet Jainism also makes it a duty for its disciples to have faith in the words of an omniscient master, who made known the way of emancipation, who has triumphed on the world of death, and who, because of this, has received the surname of Jina (the Victorious).

Perhaps because the Jains appeal to omniscient teachers, they have professed a rigorous theory of knowledge, an absolute affirmation or denial. Every proposition has a relative value only (nekacintānta); a thing is not; thus in the world of appearances, things are not; and that it is not, that it cannot be spoken of, etc., only if it is understood that these products are not the mere relatives of the two extreme reservations (gupta-vādita). As far as one can conjecture from the examples which illustrate the various dialectic ‘rebellions’ (bhāna), it is not to be supposed that the system can be known except in relation to the totality of the universe, where birth, death, reincarnation, and death rule absolutely, i.e., relatively to this indeterminate universe, things are themselves indeterminate.

Everything is indeterminate by the very fact of its existence. The aim of this teaching is to destroy at one and the same time the nomistic dogmatism of the Vedánta and the nominalism of the sectarian schools.

Everything in the universe comes under one or other of the five categories of substances (dravya): soul (lecher, hi), space, merit, non-merit, and material delivery. Souls (jīvas and molecules (pudgala) are infinitely numerous; space, merit, and non-merit are single. Merit (bhārana) has the effect of furthering the progress of the soul; non-merit (abhārana) leaves it stationary. The progress of the soul is the consequence of its karmas.

In fact, the soul is by its nature limited and active. As limited, it has the dimensions of the body, which serves as its substratum; it is lessened and increased along with the body. As active, it is in virtue of its karmas an entity of variable molecules, which, according to their quality, are black, blue, grey, yellow, rose-colour, and white, and which affect the jīva by giving it or taking it away. That part of a molecule which is the bond which links the soul to the saṃsāra.

The individual who aspire to liberation has the task of purifying his soul by asceticism he eliminates the pudgala which stain it. By draining off the acquired karmas, asceticism is the essential factor in nirvāṇa, or spiritual emancipation, in other words, the end of existence. The characteristics of Jainism is the extreme importance which it assigns to action; it is not sufficient to annul the past; it is also necessary to prevent the formation of new karmas. And this desirable result is produced by discipline, by saṅgha. In its two principal stages it prevents the accumulation of karmic pudgala into the jīva; the two forms are control (gyypt) and good behaviour (kamma). By gypt the soul reproduces itself in the activity of the body, of speech, and of the mind; by kamma it so behaves as not to injure or offend any one. Reflection and meditation, as distinct ways of discipline are classified as “acts of injury against the pernicious influx. Right vision (Aa, right faith), right knowledge (gyypt), and right conduct (karma) are the three ways of discipline and of defence against the pernicious influx. Right vision (Aa, right faith), right knowledge (gyypt), and right conduct (karma) are the three ways of discipline and of defence against the pernicious influx. Right vision (Aa, right faith), right knowledge (gyypt), and right conduct (karma) are the three ways of discipline and of defence against the pernicious influx.

He summons all men to salvation. ‘The gate of immortality is open for all beings. Let him who has care come, hear the Word and be saved.’

He rejects the authority and traditional knowledge of the Brāhmans. ‘In a line of blind men who attach themselves to one another, the first does not see, the man in the middle does not see, the last does not see. Such are the discourses of the Brāhmans. The Brāhmans in which is without foundation.

He makes salvation a personal matter for each individual.

Be your own master, nor be your own master. Each man must decide for himself what he wants, for himself; and he must provide for himself for a lump or a refuge.1 You must make for yourself the necessary effort. A Buddha is only an enlightened man.

Finally, this framework of the building erected by Buddha

1 Sarvadharma Sutras, p. 29.
2 Bhagavata, X. 1. 4.
3 Mahābhārata, XIII. 170.8
4 Ib. ii. 1018 A.
5 Dīpika, 11. 1123.
6 Dīpika, 11. 1123 (Mācchakaśeṣamvīka, ch. II.).
7 Mahābhārata, v. 270.
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is constructed almost entirely from materials borrowed from the Brahmanical schools, nurtured in the teaching of the Upanishads.

The method of salvation which Buddha preaches to men includes rules of life and truths of an intellectual character. But since it is well understood that his teaching has but one essence, there is no reason why they should not be learned in this realm, and in it, as it is, or, search for knowledge because of the practical or intellectual satisfaction which knowledge brings. Morality and learning, in intention at least, are looked on as devices for the narrow path of view of salvation. Thence come the limits within which they move. In fact, Buddha did not wish to teach either morality or science, but only a therapeutical way of the will and a transitory of the mind.

When once a man is healed from moral evil and from error, he may work towards salvation.

(5) Therapeutic of the conduct.—Only a soul purified by moral good conduct can be saved. Like good conduct, it has capacity to a spiritual value. In theosophy, connected with Brahmansm, knowledge is a working out of deliverance in a manner to follow the law of nature. The pure word, that word, the truth, the soul, and human destiny there is a body of knowledge directly efficacious for salvation. But the point of view of Buddha is that the quality of his disciples is quite different, and that what they want is to know the mind from unsatisfactory things which may hinder the individual or at least retard the soul in a true way. It can be understood how different are the conditions under which the spiritual guidance presents itself according to his views. It is well to point out the existence of the two imposssible beings, whether immaterial or transcendental or both. Buddha's aim was to show that there is no animal or human as was revealed which was not itself phenomenal, and to deduce from this proposition the consequences affecting the moral life of the individual. There are beings who know nor wished to recognize anything other than phenomena. Phenomena, both physical and psychical, constitute dhamma. In us and outside of us we reach nothing but dhamma, not because of our mental incapacity, but because neither in us nor outside of us there is anything but dhamma. The constituents of dhamma are not hung, as it were, upon a substance of which they are the momentary changes; they are the processes of the whole reality. Primitive Buddhism is thus at the opposite pole from the Vedanta, which abounds from phenomena and regards them as the real principle.

Whether subjective or objective, phenomena are incessantly changed, but to find those whose are involved in essential flux. Phenomena are just those states of individuals and objects which are being disrupted. The characteristic of consciousness, the character, the duality and homogeneity, can be permanent. The human individual is an assemblage of five kinds of aggregates, and the same from moment to moment as far as time and space are concerned. That which is called the individual (atman) is a series, more or less lengthy, of the phases of composite continually altering. The movement of aggregates, or of combinations of aggregates, does not take place by chance, or without any system. One cause determines the condition of every new combination, and this cause is the quality of the antecedent combination. With conscious individuals, who alone are interested in the theory of salvation, the causal combination is an agent, and his action produces results of two kinds; it manifests itself externally as the immediate cause of phenomena, and internally as a modification of the its own action of the whole universe. This reaction takes place generally as the dissolution of the body after death, in such a way that the leading force of one individual becomes the life of another. In the Upanishads, it has disserted every hypothesis not connected with visible forms of existence. It does not pass a table body as the vehicle of karmas, or an eva as the controller of events. Even at a distance karmas is a force which works mechanically. Moreover, the law of the universe is nothing but the combination of the congenial differences which are found among men, and of a certain tenuring. In the hearts of the faithful adhering the feeling of their moral responsibility.

Karma is far from being a doctrine specifically Buddhist. The law of Karma and the law of Dharma, the law of Samsara and the law of Nisarga, are the two sides of the same coin, both of which constitutes the main cause of the universal law of the universe. Prabhuvacana, the law of Karma, is likewise always said as its own. The Truths are suffering, the cause, its suppression, and the way which leads to suppression. What is important here is that suffering is suffering.

1. Subhuti Netranjala, p. 29.
2. Mahatmya, i. v. 20.
3. I. vi. 21.
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in they thought that the sinner, following in the footsteps of Buddha, should become a saviour. It can be easily understood that their more powerful, infinitely varied career of the bodhisattva separated themselves perceptibly from one another.

(a) The way to arhatship.—Conversion makes of the Buddhist a samaner (i.e., an energetic and long-continued struggle to destroy himself in the adverse principles. This refers to the goal now set before him. The one is through a series of spiritual exercises: Meditation and intense concentration secure in him servile service to duty (dharma). No more of attachment, no more of desire; the very residues of desire are destroyed. The results of the illumination of the heart are clear vision (prajña) and wisdom (prajñā). The other way is that of enfranchisement (rimeseya). The path to the awakening is by ecstatic contemplation (dhyāna). From ecstasy to ecstasy the monk rises in eight stages (the snāna-patti) to a state of being which is neither thought nor the absence of thought. It is the suppression of volitional ideas, of discursive ideas, of joy, of breathing—the abolition of the world of forms by that of space, and of the world of space by that of knowledge; of the world of knowledge by that of the non-existence of things, and of the last by that in which there are neither ideas nor the absence of ideas. Arrived at this already very elevated stage, the arya enters into possession of superior power (the abhijñā). But it is necessary for him to rise yet higher. And it is necessary that samāna-patti leads to the 'dissolution of all conscious perception,' to 'the awakening of the mind' by the way of wisdom or of enfranchisement, one becomes an arhat (q.v.) a saint.

The arhat has done 'that which he had to do.' When his karma or karmic preparation is off, he will be enfranchised, but not with his last thought or his last aggregate giving rise to a further thought, a further combination.

(b) The way to Buddha-ship.—As the ideal is higher, the method is correspondingly more refined. The career of the bodhisattva (q.v.) demands a long preparation and superlative piles. There must emerge in the man the 'thought of illumination' (bodhi-kritta), that begins to form the resolution of the desire to arrive at the goal (prārthāna); that by an act of will shall assign to the Buddha the his heart and to the Buddha his actions (pāramitā). Then commences the struggle properly so called. In order to obtain illumination, the bodhisattva must proceed in a double fashion: 1. the acquisition of a double equipment of spiritual and moral knowledge. The programme has to be followed includes acts of worship, viole, and conduct, and the practices of meditation.

The object is to acquire successively the ten perfections (prārthāna), each corresponding to a spiritual world (a bhumi). At the end of this long ascent the bodhisattva obtains finally the illumination which makes him a buddha, i.e., a creator of being, an omnipresent being still sojourning for a time in the phenomenal world.

For arhat and bodhisattva the eventuality is the same—nirvāna (q.v.), extinction. What does it mean? We may quote the Blessed's authoritative disciples have said what nirvāna is? If one knows that it is the abolition of suffering and death, of relative and individual existence, that is enough to make it an infinitely desirable state. If Buddha has gained control over natures of the most diverse qualities, it is just because he has left them the liberty of imagining a nirvāna conformable to their needs and their aspirations.

Let us take a look backwards. We may agree that Buddhism has certainly characteristic marks of a theosophical system. It regards ignorance as the source of all the evil of living, and knowledge as the panacea of suffering. It seeks to deliver its adherents from the fear of death. It endeavours to upset the Brahmanical methods of salvation. It denies that texts or doctrines have any direct value for salvation, and it abhors the value of 'vision,' of intuition arrived at by internal concentration and ecstatic meditation. It demands that every man should be the architect of his own salvation, and, even though it multiplies the 'saviours,' it has lost faith in the individual the necessity of personal effort. It teaches that knowledge is power, and that spiritual excellence manifests itself outwardly in extraordinary forms. Realization and the pure meditative framework and urges the individual to work without procrastination towards his regeneration and so to arrange matters that this labour shall fill his whole life.

3 Introduction of theosophy into sectarian religions.—Brahmanism in its different aspects was only one of the forms of the religions; in every period there was also the popular current, that is, the more powerful, infinitely varied career of the bodhisattva, which in the sacerdotal tradition minutely elaborated rites occupy the principal place, gods and demons are central in the popular religion, and the worship of the ship which is given to them, mixed through the sacerdotal tradition minutely elaborated rites occupy the principal place, gods and demons are central in the popular religion, and the worship of the ship which is given to them, mixed through

— and encyclopaedia of the traditional knowledge of the Hindus is something more than a witness; it was also one of the agents, perhaps the most effective of all, in the expansion of Brahmanism in India. Before, during, and after the composition of the great epic, a mass of writings emerge to illuminate or supplement its evidence—sectarian Upānīdás, Dhār-

mikāstāra (as the first of which we may regard that which bears the name of Manu), Purāṇas, books written in prose by Brahmanic and non-Brahmanic reformers of Hinduism or under their influence. Unfortunately the investigation of this rich literature has not yet been completed.

By gaining entrance into works definitely popular, the ideas whose development we have hitherto followed in the texts of a school or in the monastic literature began to exert a powerful influence upon the general body of Brahmanical and others. It was more effectively the plasticity of religious thought than the faithfulness with which conceptions originally monistic and anti-theistic persist, almost
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unchanged, in sects permeated with the most ancient devotion.

As in the ancient theosophy, the soul is haunted by the thought of death: '1 'Some men in their fear of death have died of fear.' 2 The world is full of hymns of Death. How few think of it! 'Do to day that which you will have to do tomorrow: do this morning what you will have to do to-night. Death does not knock at one great door and enter with what one has not done. It seizes a man as a wolf carries off a lamb.' 3 There is a word to live by to-morrow: 'The soul pass away; life wears to an end. Repose yourself and run.' 4

The new religious conceptions lure home to men the necessity of a new way of salvation: 'Let a man search for a remedy through the suppression of suffering: let him apply it without remorse. Then he will be free from misery.' 5 There is always the same hate of the body and its fugitive pleasures: 'Let one becoming an ascetic, abandon this sickly body, full of filth and urine, subject to old age and disappearance, the abode of multitudes, burnt by passions and perils.' 6

'All the joys which arise from contact with the world are a source of suffering; they begin; they end; the wise man does not find in them any pleasure.' 7

How man is to be saved? The means of salvation have become more numerous and more varied. There is nothing more interesting than to mark the persistence of the ancient ideas amongst the modern. This idea is still alive. Salvation is a part of the old. Salvation is the result of an effort entirely personal, 'Strengthens the soul by its soul, vanquish the enemy who recedes the forms of desire, and who is difficult to strike.' 9

The joy is he who finds within himself his happiness, within himself he finds his light. Let a man establish the self by the self and suffer not the self to be over- taken by another, let his soul, his mind sink into his own mind, or any other enemy than himself.' 10 Salvation is still the result of knowledge, a knowledge which is acquired by concentration of thought and meditation: 'Knowledge is the only road (for traversing the sea of the senses).' 11 To know Brahaman is to enter the secret sacrifice as its final result nirvāna; 12 it is oneself to become Brahaman.

As may be seen from the last passages, it is the solution of the Vac invited which obtains most favour of all those proposed by the Brahmanical schools. In consequence is found readily to the Saikiyana when one wishes to analyze the universe and the soul, or to the Yoga for teaching as to the practice of concentration and ecstasy; but the theory of measure remains essentially monistic and pantheistic. As far as the evidence gathered from the great epig is concerned, the doctrine which is adhered to is not the radical monism of Saikara (which was indeed later) but the monism during which the Mahābhārata was finally reduced, but the monism of the Upēnisads and of Baidāryāya: the world of names and forms is real, but it is Brahaman who is the reality of its reality. The Bhagavad-Gītā does not differ from this point of view.

The Brahaman has obtained the power to worship as a being at once universal and individual, who, and whose only self he is, extends himself to every direction. 13 The knowledge of good is that through which is seen in all beings the one imperishable Being, a whole in every particular being. 14 One portion of my soul has entered into the world of living beings, as the soul of the individual, the imperishable portion. 15 The knowledge by which the wise will perceive every being without exception in thyself and then in me, will for ever give thee a refuge from error. 16 In the Brahaman, in the ox and the elephant, in the dog and also in the eagle, the flesh of the dog, the wise man sees only one and the same being. 17 'He who sees in everything and everything in me, is never far from me, and I am never far from him.' 18

God is immanent in all beings, but He is not confused with them; He is the principle of life which animates them, the principle of all spirituality.

Finally, Hinduism not only immortality, but also transcendence. Things are in him, but He is not in them. The world of phenomena does not exist

1 Mahābhārata, Ill. 2, 40.
2 Bhagavad-Gītā, v. 18.
3 Ib. Ill. 301, 26.
4 Laws of Manu, v. 701.
5 Bhagavad-Gītā, v. 32.
6 Ib. vi. 7.
7 Bhagavad-Gītā, ii. 70 ff.
8 Bhagavad-Gītā, v. 29.
9 Mahābhārata, Ill. 40, 13.
10 Mahābhārata, Ill. 40, 13.
11 Bh. G. III. 301, 26.
12 Bh. G. III. 301, 26.
13 Bh. G. v. 29.
14 Bh. G. v. 29.
15 Bh. G. v. 29.
16 Bh. G. v. 29.
17 Bh. G. v. 29.
18 Bh. G. v. 29.
19 Bh. G. v. 29.
The great Vaishnavite and Sāvaitė sects are, quite as much as Śikhism, impregnated with theosophy. Their appearance is in itself evidence of an individualism in revolt against the excessive pressure of a religious tradition. Those who assert the authority of the Vedas are ridiculed. The framework in which the divine is placed is broken; no greater pertinacity is attached to the name which the gods bear—Śiva or Viṣṇu, the label is different, but it is always the same god. The human framework is also broken; the religious values which the religious oracles asserted were called to salvation. The distinction between the sacred and the profane is abolished. Generally the first concern of the reformers is to put Sanskrit on one side in favour of an exclusive use of the popular language.

'Whoever loves the truth is pure.' 

All food and drink which come from God are pure. 

The mechanical and the excessively ritualistic elements in the old religion are removed. Religion tends to become more human, more closely connected with ordinary life; the Bhragavad-Gītā has already expressed something approaching a sentiment of human solidarity, then an idea new in India. Moreover, religious tolerance becomes almost universal; it is asserted that the Śrāmanas, Jainīs, Buddhism, Śaivism, and Vaiṣṇavism have their representatives in the same families, and the sovereigns extend their favours to all the communities. Is it not clear that religion has become an affair of the individual, and that the son is not in this respect bound to follow the example of his father?

Unfortunately the sects which were originally the boldest very soon fall into the old errors, or, rather, a new tradition, also altogether tyrannical, is established in place of the ancient tradition; or, still more frequently, the older safeguards are rescinded and most weighty concessions are made to the prevailing ideas. The popular language takes on, in its turn, a sacred character. Caste and restrictions about food recover all their influence. One returns to the old formalism and to the grosser superstitions; and the work of reform, to which men constantly address themselves, has always to be done over again.

Their admission into the popular religions was not for the propagation of philosophical ideas. They remain in the outer courts, in an altogether subordinate position. In the Bhagavad-Gītā every thing that is merely a heritage from the past, a survival, is theosophical. The elements which are truly living and fruitful are of an entirely different origin. The religious emotion and the fervour of feeling which spring up in hearts full of adoration do not come from the Upaniṣads or their derivatives. Far from celebrating the triumph of theosophical ideas in India, the sectarian writings rather indicate their failure, since they make salvation depend on the love and grace of a personal and transcedent God.

4. [Theosophy and ancient Indian philosophy.]

In dealing with the introduction of theosophy into sectarian religions we have been tracing what might be described as a lengthening of the influence of theosophy. In the Gītā and in the sectarian writings theosophical elements are largely overlaid by materials gathered from other sources. But the last few decades have witnessed a remarkable revival of theosophical teaching. This is to a great extent connected with an incursion of influences from the West and especially with the teachings of Madame Blavatsky and Mrs. Besant.

The authority of Madame Blavatsky has been largely discredited, but Mrs. Besant is still a living force and her followers are numerous. Indeed India can claim a larger number of theosophists than any other country in the world. The latest available report (1917) shows 355 Indian lodges, with a total of 7344 members, among whom are some outstanding personalities. Their literary activity is great, at least in quantity, and the flow of publications addressed to the laymen is numerous. Theosophy is to be found in the hands of thinking men who would disclaim any connexion with a theosophical society. The popularity of theosophy is not, however, always due to purely theoretical reasons. Theosophy in India glories in having no creed, and thus claims to appeal to men of all creeds and to interpret for them the hidden values of their respective religions. But, though it is not a creed, theosophy has a threefold aim which is stated by Mrs. Besant, as follows:

(1) To form a nucleus of the Universal Brotherhood of Humanity; 
(2) To encourage the study of comparative religion, philosophy, and science; 
(3) To investigate the unexplained laws of Nature and the powers latent in man.

The popularity of theosophy at the present time in India is due to the fact that it is often the only refuge of those three sins. Unless we give a very wide interpretation to the term, the two first are not particularly theosophical, but they are universally acceptable. They thus strengthen the appeal of the third—the only properly theosophical enterprise. The first aims afford an opportunity for an easy transition from religions to political activity and a reinforcement of the former through the popularity of the latter. The second sets itself in seemingly attractive opposition to the harsh judgments of certain apologists for particular religions, and appeals to that specious liberality of mind which Meniere expansion in the oft-repeated assertion that one religion is as good as another. It calls forth the retrospective tendency which seems to be inherent in all theosophy and thus enables theosophy to serve itself, as the heir of the ages. Emphasis is laid upon the idea of a hidden tradition which is traced through the magic of medieval Europe, through the lore of the Knights Templar and the mystics, through Freemasonry and the spirituality of alchemy, to the Alexandrian, until the ultimate source is postulated in the Great White Brotherhood, a vague and indefinable society which Madame Blavatsky alleges to have existed from time immemorial in the mountains of Tibet and to have delegated one of their number to act as her Master during a period of many years. This mystic brotherhood is believed still to have operative power and to have charge not only of the education and development of the human race, but also of cosmic evolution. Their doctrines embody the truths which are said to be at the basis of all religions, but, on investigating the matter more closely, we find that they are in a very special manner the fundamental principles of Indian thought. Theosophy thus gives a universal importance to Indian philosophical speculation and in so doing inevitably enhances its popularity in India. It leives contributions from all the more important Indian systems, taking from the Upaniṣads the doctrine of a fundamental unknowable and characterless Unity, and the identity of the human and the divine; from the Sāṁkarṣa the idea that spiritual advancement consists in a gradual detachment from the processes of the phenomenal world; from Buddhist the idea of karmic birth and death; and from Yoga the conception of various occult methods by which freedom of thought and

1. Cf. M. A. Macauliffe, The Sikh Religion, i. 243; cf. i. 43.

spirit may be won. Further, by an application of its ideas of graded being and of development extended over many generations, it is able to allow a moderate amount of justification even to the grossest faults of the soul. Where our vague words carry farther the process of infusing theosophical ideas into the cults of the people which, as pointed out, had but moderate success in earlier centuries.

The premise that theosophy is the ultimate Being is an unknown and unknowable ground of all things, acquiring character as a Logos with the triple functions of will, wisdom, and activity. This differentiates itself into the human monads, having a similar triad.

The human monad descends through various grades of being until it reaches the causal body, which has also a slightly lower mental aspect, uniting it with the grades of being of which even an ordinary man may be aware, and forming the basis of personality as we know it. The mental body has as its appropriate sphere the heavenly world, but the soul as it proceeds downwards enters also the astral world or the world of emotion and desire, and finally reaches the physical world. Over and over again there is incarnation reaching downwards ultimately to the physical world, and in each incarnation there are experiences leading, if rightly used, to the development of the soul.

The supreme aim of the soul is to rise upwards to its original source, and the degree of ascent will be proportionate to the use it has made of the experiences of each incarnation. The working of the law of karma is inexorable. A man will receive the fruit of the deeds done in the body, and according to the nature or quality will be the duration of the period spent on each plane before another incarnation takes place. The aim of the whole process is to get rid of the separating sheaths of personality and reach absorption in the Absolute.

Theosophy is thus definitely committed to the doctrine of reincarnation and transmigration, with, on the one hand, its plausible explanation of the inequalities of human life, its stern insistence on moral consequences, its distant prospect of negative salvation, and, on the other hand, its ethical weakness arising out of its tendency to fatalism and encouragement of procrastination. It is the law of karma as it traces the succeeding phases of individual development and promises reunion with those we love only in a 'togetherness' of absorption in which the definite character which was previously acknowledged appears.

The doctrines of theosophy claim a scientific basis in experience, but this experience is found to be very different from the experience of the ordinary man. It is dependent on the development of our latent powers, by the use of which we may acquire that knowledge which is already possessed by the masters of the human race, the adepts or initiates, and which may give to us a wonderful penetration into the hitherto undiscovered laws of nature. It is at this point that theosophy differentiates itself most completely from philosophy. Once make the initial assumption that the operation of these powers is possible and that the latent faculties can be exercised, and all is easy. We may attain a wonderful amount of detailed knowledge about the lower at least of the super-physical planes. We may discover, e.g., that even during physical life the astral body projects a few inches beyond our physical body, and that it is shaped like an egg; also that various astral bodies are formed by the vibrations of thoughts, and we canreich by an unerring affection producing bodies of pale rose colour, intellectual effort resulting in yellow bodies, devotional feeling in blue, etc. We may discover also facts on a higher ethical level,—e.g., that our prayers produce beings functioning as guardian angels and that our thoughts eventuate in actual astral existences, fulfilling the purposes into which our vague words of wish, which had opportunity waited upon our desires. In short, with an almost total disregard of the law of parsimony and of the rule against the multiplication of entities, we may explain man.

The mysteries of our present life and many of the hitherto unexplained problems of nature by simply transferring the difficulty to a higher plane and 'discovering' things personally responsible for what previously appeared to be a mysterious occurrence. It is at least doubtful whether modern theosophy in India distinguishes sufficiently between subjective imagination and the controlling power of objective facts, and this considerably lessens the force of the rebuke which it administers to our materialism, diminishes the value of its insistence upon the power of thought and prayer, and weakens its encouragement to explore farther than has yet been done the phenomena of spiritualism and telepathy as well as the more weighty experiences of the mysteries of all ages.

Conclusion: The history of theosophical ideas, far more than that of religious ideas, allows us to establish the spiritual unity and continuity of India. Moreover, we have here an excellent field of observation for any one who wishes to know the meaning of theosophy, its principles, its aspirations, its method, and its influence upon life. With the idea that Indian theosophy is typical of this form of thought, we shall rapidly pass in review its principal elements:

(a) The most obvious quality is its concentration on the self, which not only occupies the first place in its scheme of thought, but also concerns itself with the Ego as if it were the only existence—as if everything else existed only for it and in reference to it. This theosophical individualism is both proud and exclusive. The vulgar intelligences, concerned with superstitions and traditional practices, are despised, and with jealous care the precious truth is guarded for a small number of the elect. *There is nothing in common between popular religion and knowledge.* As if to show clearly the existence of a double current in religion, and its expression in the Ego, a verse in the Mahabharata 2 says that the gods, women, and the worlds have only one divinity, one guru only, but that the Brahmins have two, Agni and Brahma, the god of sacrifice and the Being without a second.

(b) It is always flattering to belong to a privileged group; esotericism was an attractive element in theosophy. And there were others. Those who were terrified by threatening death and mysterious destiny, those who were shocked by the spectacle of physical and social injustice, found in the doctrine of karma,再生劇, and moksa just the solution fitted to give them moral serenity and courage to face. All the theosophical systems teach some way of salvation; they deliver their followers from the painful prospect of a second death, from an interminable series of lives poisoned by the expectation of death.

(c) Another advantage: truth is not arrived at slowly and patiently by study and reflection; it is grasped by sudden internal vision. Once the premises have been given by intuition in rigorous dialectic can construct a system whose scientific appearance has an element of attractiveness for persistently intellectualistic minds eager to 'know.'

(d) The intuitive method of attaining, at the expense of apparently trustworthy: it is also very fruitful.

1. Saikara, पाद्यम्; cf., e.g., Gaua, on the Vedânta-Sûtras, p. 829.
2. Mahabharata, 1. 65. 7.
Therapeutes.-The Therapeutes\(^1\) were a radical offshoot of the movement in pre-Christian Judaism which threw up an order like the Essenes (q.v.); but, unlike the Essenes, they were purely an Egyptian phenomenon partaking of both Jewish and Egyptian elements, and with a tendency towards a schism. Their development, however, as with the Essenes, is by no means an easy matter to trace.\(^2\) The rise of the monastic movement in the Church drew their attention, and in the end their former spirit was submerged in the current of the Church, and they are now no longer a recognised sect.

\(^{1}\) See E.B.E.v. VII.278.

\(^{2}\) As the de Vl. Cen. was indubitably Philo's, the only logical way of explaining this panegyric on Christian monks was to make Philius himself a Christian when he wrote it.

\(\text{Therapeutes.}\) De Vie Contemplative (\textit{vgl. Bouddhisme et \textit{i} stigmat\textit{i} \\left(\textit{arrest\textit{v}}\right)\, or, better, \textit{\textit{Thou\textit{es}} \textit{i} \\left(\textit{seigneur\textit{v}}\right) \textit{et \textit{Thou\textit{es}} \textit{d'\textit{Gothique}}}舀), included in the appendices of the book compiled by Eusebius.\(^3\) The rise of the monastic movement in the Church drew their attention, and in the end their former spirit was submerged in the current of the Church, and they are now no longer a recognised sect.

\(^{3}\) See E.B.E.v. VII.278.

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\(^{3}\) See E.B.E.v. VII.278.
treatise was finally vindicated. Whether it was composed by Philo or by some contemporary Jew is another and subordinate question. The treatise is in two parts: the first is a pre-Christian or non-Christian description of actual reclines in the Judaism of Egypt about the end of the 1st cent. B.C. or the beginning of the 1st cent. A.D. Contemporary is the standard authority on the Greek text. His translation is folklore which suggests that no other treatment of the subject has made so good a case for the hypothesis that the de Vitis Contemplativa was originally a sequel to the lost Philonic account of such reclines. The Massonian treatise which was written on the sacred vestments of the temple, 3 to signify that the Therapeutes are too humble to emulate the exalted bread reserved for the priests. This is a sequel to the treatises which Eusebius drew his information. But their interpretation of the text of the account of the Therapeutae is sometimes open to serious criticism.

2. Characteristics.—According to Philo, the Therapeutes are part of a movement which is known outside Egypt. It was the more or less organized semi-religious retreat from cities and a corrupting civilization to the simple life of retirement. Though the movement is not confined to the environs of Alexandria, is there that the Therapeutes are most numerous. 4

They are Jewish recluse who reside in simple huts, at a short and suitable distance from one another (i.e., they resembled the communities of Indian monks in a later day, and being hermits and anchorites). Each hut has a sacred chamber (μνηστήριον or σαφοντήριον), reserved for their devoted books (The Law, the Prophets, and other writings, ότι τοιούτα et ἑν τῷ σαφοντήριῳ, τό εἰς ἱερά καὶ ἱερά κατά τάσσεται ἱερήν ὅλην). After praying at dawn, they devote the day to meditation upon the sacred Mediterranean Scriptures. In the course of the day, the Pirminia (συνάστια) draw upon the ancient founders of their sect, by which Philo probably means the literature current under the names of Abraham or other. One of the most important is the Pirminia de so-called Abrahamic. The book has been regarded as the principal ascetic and recluses, the ideal progenitors of the Therapeutae movement. The study of the book is a literal interpretation of the passages found in the book, and one outcome of it is the composition of sacred hymns. Prayers at sunset close the day. Each is the life long. On the seventh day, the various recluses meet for common worship; the two meet at a fountain, sitting on the ground with the right hand between the chest and the chin, but the left tucked down along the thigh. The senior recluses deliver their orations in which all listen in tail nodding assent. A partition, ten or twelve feet high, separates the men from the women, so that no other can hear the speaker without being seen by the male recluses.

The seventh day 5 is their day for relaxation. On the other days no one eats before sunset, and some go fasting almost entirely for three or even six days, in their contemplative capture. But all use oil (as a physical refreshment, unlike the Essenes), and on the seventh day all "profess the moste of them, and the fourth the moste of the natural creatures; the diet is simply water and bread, seasoned with salt, and occasionally supplemented by hyssop. None of your drunkards or orgiasts! Philo anticipates Lucian in his scorn of these rowdy gatherings.

Once every seven weeks 6 they assemble for their supreme festival, the 1st festival of the year. The number fifty has often been cited as 7, robed in white and with looks of serious joy. At a given sign from the seniors, the leaders arrange them in ranks, raising eyes and hands to heaven 8 His hands, because they are pure from unjust gains, being stained by no pretense of material wealth. In such festival, they divested themselves of their possessions, their flocks without turning back, having abandoned brethren, children, wives, parents, all the throng of their kindred, all their friends, all their friends and acquaintances, all their necessities, which they were born and bred. 9 Philo describes this with a wistful enthusiasm, as he described the renunciation of Enoch 10 and of Abraham. 11 But he is careful to explain why they prefer solitude to cities. It is only because intercourse with the unsympathetic world would injure them, "not from any harsh and deliberate hatred of mankind"—a declaration 12

1 ERE v. 3300.
2 De Vitis, Con. 8.
3 In this omission accidental? Or do we regard it as a part of the present day's action (cf. ERE x. 1917)?
4 De Vitis, Con. 4.
5 A trait of popular religious worship in Egypt (cf. ERE v. 2999) and, generally, x. 3880.
6 Miriam, in such a description of early mystical literature, is the counterpart of Isas, and she plays an important rôle in Gnostic speculations, as well as in the Gnostic Epistles (P.E., 10, 1904, p. 136 n.). Her popularity among the Therapeutae is probably another Egyptian goddess.
7 Lifebick. (Saints Eunice and the Colossians and to Philo, London, 1818, pp. 35, 372) took this to mean sunworship; but let us see nothing more of the Essenes than more than the Essenes did (see ERE v. 3868, note 4).
8 Unlike the Arabians, the primitive, and of the Aethiopians (Ac. 279), with whom Euniceus (I.B. 17) would fail connect them on this account, the Therapeutae did not pool their funds for the benefit of the community.
9 De Vitis, Con. 2.
10 De Vitis, Con. 2.
11 De Abrash. 3.
12 He had made the same disclaimer of misanthropy in speaking of Abraham (de Abrash. 4).
of the *odium humani* generis for which Jews were blamed by the outside world. Philo always protested against the people, whose name is not in the sects

tion, only because they lacked public spirit. He also anticipated the criticism which might be passed on the Therapeutae, that they acted from a morbid misanthropy. Hence his defence of the

They, in fact, realize for Philo what he had always dreamt of, a small (only a small) number or *θεος* of spiritual artists, acting from the highest of motives, carry-

ing through the question of making the supreme renunciation in order to attain the highest vision of God and truth.1 To them he applies his favourite Platonic metaphor of the wealth of eyes (i.e. the mystic rapture of

the soul enriched with the vision of truth); no wonder, when they possess this inward treasure, that they abandon their blind wealth (*τὸν θρόνον φαντασίασι*),2 to blind worldlings!3 For their renuncia-

tion does not empty life. It is not a mere nega-

tion; it is the soul surrendering to a higher passion for God (οὐ* ἔρωτας ἄρπασθεῖται φαντασίαν*), which enriches life past dreams of avarice. The Thera-

peutae, men of truth, is an ecstatic yearning for the positive vision of Truth. ‘It is as easy to close the eyes of the mind, as those of the body,’ Bishop Butler wrote;4 it is as easy for Philo to close his eyes of the mind, his soul be closed by luxury and money-making, and he applauds the Therapeutae for sacrificing their great possessions and position in order to keep the higher vision unimpaired.

Another feature of the Therapeutae which goes to Philo’s heart is that their allegorical interpre-

tation of the OT does not render them indifferent to the actual rites and Institutions of Judaism. He disdained the ultra-spiritualists5 who evaporated the historical element in religion, and dropped all adherence to the forms of their faith. But he delighted in people like the Therapeutae who, e.g., attached, as he did, in his own enthusiasm, a high mystical sense to the number ‘seven,’ and yet not only kept the seventh day strictly but also celebrated a special festival after every 49 days, out of their reverence for Philo’s pater- 

noster number and its multiple (7 x 7). This appeared to him to be a healthy form of mysticism. The Therapeutae appealed to Philo more than the Essenes did, because they were on old Jewish lines, adherents of the *synagog* at Jerusalem, and capable of attaining the heights of contemplative ecstasy without abandoning the lowly duties prescribed by the Torah.

A third feature which evidently pleased the gentle Philo was their freedom from angry controversy and flashy rhetoric. With his eye not only upon the quarrels of Greek sages at their symposia but also upon the rabbinic disputants at Jerusalem, he tells of the most sanitations style practised by the Therapeutic speakers, of the rapt attention shown by the audience, and of the respectful demeanour of the gathering—exalting the very virtues which Paul recommended to the showy, noisy Christians at Corinth (cf. 1 Co 4:20). Philo loves them for their quiet demeanour. The Therapeutae never wasted their time over rabbine exegesis of the letter of Scripture. They gazed placidly through that, as through a glass, into the mystical significance which held them spellbound. Their wisdom was pure and peaceable; it combined plain living and high thinking, and the sequins did not tear their tippets.

All this, added to their philosophic aspirations

1 Cf., e.g., *de Mut.* Nom. 4.
2 *De Vid.* Con. 2.
3 *E. Fitz* and G. K. Gliddon, Oxford, 1890, x. x 13.
4 *Crit. ERE I*, 319.
B) Nor is the book of Wisdom distinctively Therapeutae, as some thought.

The emphasis on  eros and on ion in the text, rather than on the more outward  via mundi, certainly suggests that the monasticism emphasized by  is more closely connected with Jewish piety than is  in Judaism. It is not in praise of celibacy, and even if it were, the tendency to exalt celibacy in the later Judaism was not confined to the more ascetic cohabitation of Therapeuticism (see 3:4). In the Therapeutae the  is largely synonymous with the  that is measured by its content of 24:34. It has nothing whatever to do with the Therapeutic regulation  that senility was reckoned by the years the common wisdom. The allusion in 22:38 to the  being treasured to  is not altogether surprising, for with whom they were anxious to live, in order to bring forth not mortal children but 'the immortal progeny which the God-enamoured soul is able alone to bring forth of itself.' But this metaphorical description applies in the one case to men, in the other to women, and it is too general and common (cf. Sir 159, Pr 219) to be confined to the Therapeutae; in  de Juda Contemplatives,  Philo is speaking as he speaks of the Egyptian priest, the sacred priest who offered prayer at sunrise (see above) was not peculiar to them among the Jews, but that he used before the sun is giving thanks to thee, and one should plead with thee at the dawning of light) need not be a glimpse of these recusals—the legal and religious teaching is said about their eastward position by the writer of Wisdom, who is simply moralizing about the story of the sun.

5. Origin. In view of the various Oriental and Hellenistic influences which were playing upon the later Judaism towards the close of the 1st cent. B.C., a phenomenon like the existence of the Therapeutae with their celibacy, their aversion to social life, their absorption in a divine  , and their mystical speculations, all carried out 'in accordance with the most holy counsels of the prophet Moses, is not altogether surprising.

The societies of the Essenes and the Therapeutae . . . belong, just as the medieval and modern Hasidic ascetics belong to Judaism, quite as much as do any of its more normal institutions.

It is still less surprising to find such a gild or monastic settlement in Egypt. The soil of Egyptian popular religion was full of 'monastic germ'; there were men and women recusals in the Serapeum at Memphis, whose  embraced both study and mystical dreams; the very name of the  was connected with the worship of  , which also had its mystic raptures, combined with an emphasis on asceticism and celibacy; the climate itself, and the granit desert, stretching away from the cities and towns, invited those who had had the  movement of the Church first developed its varied and most distinctive forms three centuries later, and the development was no more surprising upon the basis of primitive Christianity than that of the Therapeutae or of the Essenes upon the basis of orthodox Masoeism. One of the most suggestive parallels to the Therapeutic discipline is to be found in the contemporary asceticism of the modern mages which is given by Chaeremon, the Egyptian  , cited it by Porphyry, and some sentences

3 De Vit. Conv. 8: * For they do not regard as elders those who can count their years and are merely aged, but, on the contrary, some inner circle or set of mere infirmatics, in case they have been late in embracing the vocation.*
5 cp. the Gnostic inscription, e.g., quoted by A. Mordtmann, in RA xxii (1879) 351.
6 cp. Abadon, N. 6, 8.

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They chose sanctuaries (  ) as the place in which to study philosophy, since by doing so in the gods was in harmony with their later longing for vision (see above). Besides, this gave them security, owing to the reverence felt for the gods, since all men honoured these philosophers as if they were sacred creatures. They also lived in solitude, only mixing with other people at the command of authorities and for the good of their sect. They renounced every other employment and all human toils (  ), supposing that they were engaged simply to the contemplation and vision of things divine . . . for to be in constant association with divine knowledge and inspiration delivers men from all lust (  ), seduces the passions, and rouses life to intelligence (  ). They also studiously to be frugal in food and clothing . . . Their hands were always inside their garments . . . When they were not engaged in purification, they used to eat bread up with honey, as they declared by honey was extremely potent in purifying bread . . . They trained themselves to endure hunger and thirst and sun, since all their lives . . . The day they spent in the worship of the gods (see  ), singing hymns to them three or four times, at dawn and at eventide.

The origin of the Therapeutae lay in Jewish Hellenism, as that was specially affected by its Egyptian environment. Nothing more is required to explain the ascetic and mystical habits of those recusals beside Lake Mareotis. But it would be unfruitful to dismiss this problem without some reference to the question which has repeatedly been asked: Do the several traits of the Therapeutic discipline recall Buddhist monasticism—  , the combination of a cenobitic life with study and devout contemplation, and the vegetarianism? The latter at least of the marks which sharply distinguish the Therapeutae from the Essenes who were not vegetarians. But there is at least one feature of the Essenes themselves which is analogous to Indian practices, and it is open to conjecture whether some Buddhist influences had not penetrated Egyptian Hellenism by the 1st cent. B.C., as it is sometimes held to have penetrated the later Gnosticism.

Robertson Smith, after observing that 'in Egypt, the doctrine that the highest degree of holiness can only be attained by asceticism from all animal food, was the result of the political tension of a number of local cults in one national religion, with a national priesthood that represented imperial ideas,' added that 'later developments of liberal asceticism almost certainly stood under foreign influences, among which Buddhism seems to have had a larger and earlier share than it has been usual to admit.'

The Therapeutic avoidance of animal food need not, of course, be Buddhist; the practice of the Orphic societies in Egypt or of the Neo-Pythagoreanism which affected the Essenes in other ways may have account for it. Several traits of the Therapeutic discipline appear to be derived from the  , and some other features. Indeed, so far as our scanty data go, with regard to the Therapeutae, the Essenes, the evidence does not appear to warrant any hypothesis of direct Buddhist influence, although the Orientalism which had filtered into Jewish Hellenism, even in Egypt, by the 1st cent. B.C. may have contained some elements of Buddhist religious tendency. The trade connections between Alexandria and India, and the intercourse of both countries ever since the 3rd cent. B.C., makes it quite possible to suppose that Indian merchants reached Egypt by the 1st cent., B.C. who could point this out. Still, the question of the connection, detailing the Indian and Buddhist elements in Greek fiction. But the interaction

1 Cf. RE, X, 303, note 5.
2 C. S. G. H. 423, vi. 234.
4 EEFV, 424.
5 This again distinguishes them from the Essenes. C. A. Budge, in his recent paper of the Essenes (JVP xii (1931) 167), argues that the Palestinian Essenes must have cultivated song and music in the Egyptian fashion.
6 H. 507, and  , the matter. Had hymns been a prominent feature of the Essene cult, they would have been mentioned by Philo or Josephus.
with knowing; but it must open for itself a converse with the world of spirit. It would elevate and sanctify the prerogatives of soul. This broad use of the word makes prominent the fact that a common principal is the basis of all religious experience, and the differences we find in all the pretensions, both of heathen and of Christian miraclemongers. The celestial hierarchy of Dionysius and the benign elements of Paul and Peter, on the one hand; the Christian theurgy, by Platonist, by Calabist, or by saint, alike receives this success and is in effect the same with supernatural cure; so far Apollo in India and Peter of Alcantara, Ascelpigens and St. Theresa, must occupy as religious magistrates the same province. The case is otherwise in the case of the divine efficacy. This is attributed to rites and formulas, sprinklings, or fumigations, rods or incantations, of naturalistic chemical education. Some form of belief in theurgy is at least as old as history and literature. Homer's heroes are constantly raised beyond themselves and perform deeds which seem to be done through them by the Olympian deities. These to their aid Oriental as well as Grecian mythology everywhere assumes theurgic powers. The celestial Gnostics, who drew upon many popular religions and sacred books as the sources of their divine gnosis, also believed and taught that great divine powers became available to those who were initiated and who thus received something of the fullness—the Pleroma—of the Godhead.

The Neo-Platonists, especially in their later periods, gave new impetus to theurgy and were unwittingly the transmitters of it into Christian circles. Porphyry, the last of these, was a metaphysician of high rank and a noble mystic whose influence on Christian mysticism can hardly be overestimated, but he was not interested in occult knowledge or in theurgical phenomena. His Syrian successors, however, especially Iamblichus and Macrina, were concerned with the problem of discovering and applying divine powers or energies in the sphere of human action. Iamblichus, who strongly revealed Gnostic influence, by his ideas and hypostases of Platonism into divinities, i.e. personalized beings, and he holds that these 'intelligences' work wonders in the macrocosmic outside and in the microcosmic within. Many of the Neo-Platonists, however, who came into the soul of the mystic on high occasions, possess it, and enable it to do works beyond human capacity. There are, according to Iamblichus, hierarchal orders of these divine powers in varying ranks, and it belongs to mystical wisdom to know how to invoke the higher and more benignant powers and to gain their theurgical assistance. This theurgical system is set forth in Iamblichus' treatise de Mysteriis Theurgia. Of the last important name among the Neo-Platonists, was a much greater philosopher than Iamblichus, but he also expended a system of theurgy and encouraged belief in hierarchal powers, arranged in triadic orders, who work divinely and mysteriously through those who are raised into union with these higher powers. Through the Gnostics, the Neo-Platonists, especially through the Christian Neo-Platonist who wrote under the pseudonym Dionysius the Areopagite, and above all through contact with the pagan world and its wide-spread belief in magic, the Christian Church unconsciously absorbed a multifform faith in theurgy. Angels of many orders, saints who have been glorified, the Virgin Mary and her divine Son, can and do work wonders, it is believed, for faithful worshippers. Water and bread and wine and other elements of nature are by miraculous divine grace transformed into spiritual substances, become, in fact, the real divine presence, and supply to the recipient supernatural powers, with which 400 or 500 or 1000 or more scribes, Roman Catholic saints and many 14th and 15th century, mystics believed themselves possessed of special theurgical powers. Stigmata of nail-pricks were believed to be divinely produced in the hands and feet of saints of Assisi and of the real St. Siena. Others had the power to 'levitate' them,

1 Hours with the Mystics, i. 46.
selves and to soar above the earth in moments of possession. Others had the miraculous gift of shedding tears in extraordinary measure or of emitting fumes from the body in periods of ecstasy, while still others underwent profound physical transformations or radiated light like a self-luminous body. The entire field of theurgical practice was thus found in close up with the psychology of hysteric and auto-suggestion. Automatism of many types is now scientifically recognized. It seems to the subject, when parts of his own body perform functions without his conscious will, as if emission foreign to himself had entered and possessed him and were using his hands or his feet or his lips. Where the results are beneficent and constructive, it seems natural to believe that doing such things done of their own accord, and such like these. These things may seem incredible, yet read but the ensuing treatise and thou shalt see the possibility confirmed both by reason and example.

Once more in modern times there has appeared a recrudescence of theurgy in spiritualistic and theosophical circles. The element of fact in it now, as of old in taught by St. Thomas and held by what is known as the Thomistic school, who is mainly but not exclusively composed of Dominicans.

2. Historical survey. — The foundation of Thomism is incontestably due to the personal influence of St. Thomas Aquinas. It should not, however, be forgotten that Albert the Great did much to prepare the way for the birth of the new system, so that the names of both master and pupil will ever remain inseparable in the onward work. Although there were many points of contact between the minds of Albert and Thomas, the genius of the one was entirely different from that of the other. The mind of Thomas was more critical than that of Albert; the latter was much more of a theologian, the former a profound searcher. Albert, who was not a man of the world, was in his subject quite perfectly; there is a lack of precision in details and a certain want of synthesis necessary to unify his knowledge. On the contrary, Thomas possesses his matter perfectly; not above all, he has a power for order; his precision is nicer and his analysis finer; his vision is more penetrating and more embracing; and his power of analysis is on equal footing with his power of synthesis. Albert revealed to his age an intellectual world unknown to it; Thomas with the debris of the intellectual world of the ancients created a new one. Both aimed at incorporating Aristotle into Christian philosophy and theology. Albert's venture has the merit of initiative, but it remained incomplete and only provisional; Thomas with a magician's hand forwarded the work and produced a masterpiece which he embellished with a finish undreamed of by Albert.

Before the time of St. Thomas several attempts had been made to synthesize the sum of human knowledge, by bringing together philosophy and theology, and had been the result. The work of reformation undertaken by St. Thomas was so vast and complicated that it is not surprising that he was at first a little hesitating and diffident; but, as he advanced in
years and learning, his vision became clearer, and at the age of thirty he took up a position that, with regard to his method of philosophizing and final. Being perfectly familiar with all the problems discussed by philosophy and theology, and having carefully weighed the value of the respective solutions and examined the systematic points of view already attempted, he said that a perfect system necessarily demanded the unification of the whole of knowledge. This perfect ordering of the whole of knowledge which he bequeathed to the world was due to his belief in the philosophy of Augustine. It is because St. Thomas surpassed the host of thinkers of his time as metaphysician that he produced a unique work.

In philosophy he is the first to proclaim the autonomy of reason; and he has produced his philosophic works without once having recourse to an authority other than experience and reason to establish his conclusions and defend them. Starting from the 'sensible' world as from a secure basis, St. Thomas passes to the region of the absolute, to the highest and purest intellectualism. In theology he proclaims the autonomy of revelation. At this point he points out the impossibility of a real conflict between the natural and supernatural orders which have the same source of truth, viz. God. Thus he synthesizes natural and supernatural, as Aquinas and Thomas. To assimilate his thought it is necessary to understand, above all, the functioning of his general synthesis, and especially of his metaphysics, which rules the whole system of his work. Eclecticism has no meaning with regard to Thomistic doctrines; their value and strength reside essentially in the marvel of their unity and solidarity.

3 Progress of Thomism. — The Dominican order was the teaching of St. Thomas, but not without opposition; some of its members were still imbued with the doctrines of Augustinism, and these could not be converted to a new system in a day.

Robert Kilwarby, archbishop of Canterbury and a Dominican, condemned St. Thomas's theory of the unity of substantial form, on 15th March 1277. A few years later, however, the English Dominicans were among the most resolute defenders of this doctrine. In Germany Ulrich Engelbert de Strasburg (+ 1277) inclined towards Augustinianism and the Neo-Pistismon of the Arabs. Eckhart (+1239) was inclined towards Pistismon. Thierry (+ towards 1315) was an Augustinian strongly influenced by Avicenna; the latter never hesitated to combat the doctrine of St. Thomas.

In France the great adversary of the new system was Durand de Saint-Pourçain. In Italy Umberto Guidi was punished by the Dominican Provincial Chapter of Arezzo in 1315 for attacking St. Thomas; and the General Chapter of Puy (+1344) cautioned Thomas of Naples for opposition to St. Thomas. Many chapters of the Dominican order encouraged and promoted Thomistic doctrines. Worthy of mention are the General Chapters of Paris (1280), of Saragossa (1290), of Metz (1315), of Castres (1289), of Brive (1346). So great indeed was the attachment of the Dominicans to the Summa Theologica that the celebrated Spanish Arnald de Villemagne (+1311) wrote a work against the Dominicans in 1304 (Gaudios iugunla Thoms- tis), in which he accuses the Dominicans of preferring the study of the Summa to that of the Bible. Two centuries later Erasmus formulated the same reproach.\footnote{Opera Omnia, Leyden, 1763-68, III, 515.}

4. Introduction of St. Thomas's writings as text-books in schools. — At the end of the 13th century a Dominican was the principal writer, and the Sentences of Peter the Lombard was the theolog-}

cal text par excellence. The Dominicans introduced the reading of the Sentences \footnote{Opera Omnia, Leyden, 1763-68, III, 515.} in via Thomae, i.e. according to the method of philosophy and theology. For schools following this example taught the Sentences 'in via Alberti,' 'in via Durandi,' 'in via Scoti,' etc. Not until the end of the 15th cent. did the Dominicans substitute entirely the Summa for the Sentences.

5. Thomistic polemics. — The fights sustained by the Dominican order during the end of the Middle Ages in defence of their school were (1) to make a good stand against Augustinism; and (2) to defend certain doctrines special to Thomism.

(a) General. — In favour of Augustinism a great reaction was made by the Friars Minor in a work composed by William de la Mare. The Oxford Dominicans replied in a work known as the Corruptorium. A further work, Correctorium Corruptorii, was published by two Oxford Dominicans, William de Makelsfeld and Richard Knapwell. At the end of the 13th cent. another general defence of Thomism was written by Robert de Bologne, Apologeticon pro St. Thoma. Last of all a great work (sometimes was written by a celebrated Thomist, Hervé Noll de Nedeletville, in the university of Paris and master-general of the Dominicans, Defensa doctrinarum St. Thoma Her- venue Natalis.

Other important works written towards the end of the Middle Ages are Defensiones theologiae duci Thoma Aquatistii \footnote{Opera Omnia, Leyden, 1763-68, III, 515.} by John Capreolus (+1444), who was called the 'princiss Thomistarum,' and Thomistiarum contra modernos et Sociatas \footnote{Opera Omnia, Leyden, 1763-68, III, 515.} by Pierre Nicer (+1431). Diego de Deza (+1423), the illustrious protector of Christopher Columbus, wrote two polemical works in favour of Thomism, of which the more important is: Novarum defensee doctrinarum Angelici Doctoris beat St. Thomae de diversis controversia quaeritur libri (1513) and certain quaestiones, etc.

(b) Special. — (1) St. Thomas formulated the theory of the unity of the human person by making the intellectual soul the only form of the human composite. Against the Averroins (taught at Paris) which held the unicity of intellect for the human species, and against Augustinism, which held the plurality of forms, several treatises were written by Thomists—e.g., by Pierre de Tarantaise, Gilles de Lessines, William de Makelsfeld, Thomas de Sutton, Jean de Fainza, etc.

The General Council of Venice defined the Thomistic doctrine on this matter, which was further confirmed by the 5th Council of Lateran (1515), and by Pope Pius IX. in a letter to the archbishop of Tours (1857).

(2) The question of the nature of religious poverty and its practice by Christ and the apostles was hotly discussed between the Dominicans and the Friars Minor. The discussion became so divided towards the doctrine of Christ and the apostles did not possess anything, or did not perform acts of proprietorship, viz. buying and selling, etc. (12th Nov. 1829, Case infer multis).

(3) There was another theological combat between the Dominicans and the Minor with regard to the blood of Christ shed during the Passion. The Minor said that this was united to the divinity of Christ, the Dominicans that the union did not cease. Eventually Pope Pius II. forbade both parties to discuss the question further.\footnote{Acc. The General Council of Venice, 1515, cap. VIII.}

(4) The Dominicans strenuously fought against the nominalism \footnote{Opera Omnia, Leyden, 1763-68, III, 515.} of the 14th cent. of Durand de Saint-Pourçain and William Ockham were the leaders.\footnote{Opera Omnia, Leyden, 1763-68, III, 515.}
THOMISM

5. The Averroism against which Albert the Great and St. Thomas fought was renewed again at the beginning of the 16th cent. in Italy. This time the leader was Cajetan, who published a commentary on the de Animis of Aristotle (Florence, 1500). A few years later the Council of Lateran (19th Dec. 1513) condemned the teaching of Averroism on the point, and further exacted that professors of the philosophies should answer the contrary arguments, which Cajetan held only theologians could do.

6. In the 14th cent. disputes concerning the Immaculate Conception arose. St. Thomas undoubtedly leaves the question unsolved, but he was at great pains to show that the Blessed Virgin was not excluded from the redemption. St. Thomas says that the precise moment of sanctification is unknown; he therefore never proponned the question whether Mary was sanctified at the very instant of conception. He believed it better to be silent on this point, although, had he followed his personal inclination, he had without doubt concluded in the affirmative, as his first declaration witnesses in IV. Sent. 1, dist. xlv. qu. 1, art. 3, ad 3. But his superior theological sense did not let him take sides in the silence and the negative position of many theologians, and in particular the reserved attitude of the Church. The endeavour to drag St. Thomas to the negative or positive side is to force his meaning, since he voluntarily abstained from either.

6. Renascence of Thomism.—In the 14th and 15th centuries there was an intellectual decadence in philosophy and theology. Thomism could not altogether abstract itself from the influence of the time. However, even in the 15th cent. there was notable vitality among Thomists like John Capreolus, St. Antonius of Florence, and Jean de Torquemada. At the end of the 15th cent. the intellectual life of Thomism received new vigour, which manifested itself in the 16th cent. and continued for two centuries afterwards. In 1531 the General Chapter of Salamanca ordered the text of St. Thomas's writings to be used as text-books in all its schools. Hence at this time the great commentaries began to be written. Cajetan wrote from 1507 to 1522; Conrad Kollin in the Prima secundae (Cologne, 1512). Francois de Vitoria (whose commentaries remained in MSS) and Barthelemy de Medina from 1577 to 1578; Banez from 1584 to 1594; Sylvester Ferrarinis in the Summa contra Gentiles; Venice, 1566. The humanist movement of the 16th cent. had a great influence on certain Thomists. Francois de Vitoria took the lead; of his disciples the most famous was Melchior Cano († 1560), whose work, de Legis theologica, is a tribute to the humanist movement by its purity and beauty of style. Two new doctrines issued from the humanist state of thought: Ambrose Catharin († 1553) put forward new theories on predestination and grace; and Barthelemy de Medina formulated probabilism. Thomists combated the former doctrine; whilst in answer to the desire of Pope Alexander VII they combated strongly the new probabilist doctrines.

7. Thomism and the Council of Trent.—Thomists held an important part in this council. The Thomistic school had grave interests at stake on account of the dogmatic question regarding the doctrine of justification. Of the 55 members of the commission instituted by Paul III. to study this question three were Dominicans, of whom Bartholomew Spinac, master of the Sacred Palace, was the most prominent. The decree on justification was not drawn up without the help of St. Thomas. The text of the decree as regards the mode of preparation for justification is taken in its every detail from the Summa, III. qu. lxxxv. art. 5. The decree numbers six acts preparatory to justification. They are the same in nature, number, and order to which St. Thomas had pointed in his commentary on the de Animis of Aristotle (Florence, 1500). A few years later the Council of Lateran (19th Dec. 1513) condemned the teaching of Averroism on the point, and further exacted that professors of the philosophies should answer the contrary arguments, which Cajetan held only theologians could do.

8. Thomism and Molinism.—See art. Molinism ; also see below § 12.

9. Thomism and Jansenism.—In his posthumous work Augustinus (Louvain, 1640) Jansenius strove to prove that the new theology, especially that of Molina and Suarez, was against the doctrine of St. Augustine and contrary to the doctrine of the Council of Trent. This position many centuries aroused much opposition among the Jesuits. After an examination of the book, the Dominicans found that it militated not only against Molinism, but also against Thomism. Two Dominicans wrote against Jansenius—Alexander Schoultz (de Augustinis et SS. Patrum de libero arbitrio interpres thomisticus adversus Cornidii Jansenii doctrinam, Mayence, 1632), and Bernard Guguyard (Discriminatio inter doctrinam Thomisticam et Jansenianam, Paris, 1653).

10. Thomism and probabilism.—The theory of probabilism (q.v.) was unfolded by Bartholemew de Medina, a Dominican, in his Expositio in Primum Sentendae D. Thome (Salamanca, 1577). The Jesuits generally adopted this new theory. But, since the case with which any opinion could be made probable, provided the contradictory was probable, led to grave abuses, Alexander VII asked the Dominicans to combat strongly the probabilist doctrines. They did, and from that time no Dominican theologian has written in favour of probabilism.

11. Neo-Thomism and the revival of Scholasticism.—At the beginning of the 19th cent. Scholasticism (q.v.) began to revive, and there followed a revival of Thomism. The encyclical Aeterni Patris of Pius IX (Lett. pont, 1855) and the decisions of St. Thomas Aquinas as the great model and master of Catholic philosophy and theology. From that time all schools have studied the works of the master and have endeavoured to make his thought their own. The endeavour to keep in touch with the progress of modern science, and to show that the fundamentals of Thomism are in perfect accord with the latest discoveries of science, was set on foot, not, as is sometimes supposed, by the Institut Superior de Philosophie of Louvain University, but by the Thomist Sanseverino, one of the most learned and vigorous promoters of the movement. This is confirmed by his work, Philosophia Christiana cum antiqua et nova comparata. This great movement has been fostered and developed by the Institut Superior de Philosophie, founded by Cardinal Mercier at Louvain. Certain Reviews are now published in which the teachings of Neo-Thomism and Neo-Scholasticism are consistently set forth. The Review Thomistiche e Neo-scolastico di Filosofia are worthy of mention.

12. Essence of Thomism.—Thomism is above all a system of philosophy and theology. Now a
system necessarily implies harmony and solidarity among the doctrines of which the system is built up. In proportion as a system has unity, so much of its force is secured. Many philosophers and theologians have endeavoured to give systems of knowledge to the world, but on examination it is found that they lack the first essential of a system—that of thought every department. If certain principles are laid down in metaphysics, no doctrine in any department of applied metaphysics (as, e.g., in psychology, cosmology, ethics, etc.) should be at variance with those principles. Moreover, if a system claims to be a system of the whole of knowledge, both of that attained by human reason and of that attained by revelation, then no doctrine formulated by natural reason should be at variance with the doctrines formulated by faith; and conversely. It is evident that, if there be a system of this nature, it is eminently constructive or synthetic. Every stone in the structure must be in its proper place, and, if the building is to stand firm, there must be some grand unifying principle or foundation upon which it is built up. If there be any archipelago of buildings, there cannot be several foundations, but only one ultimate foundation, so in Thomism there is one fundamental principle unifying the system and insuring harmony and solidarity to every department which it embraces.

13. The fundamental principle of Thomism.—An examination of the various departments of Thomist metaphysics, of applied metaphysics, and of the whole realm of Thomist theology will show that the fundamental doctrines of each department are applications to various matters of a great principle inculcated by Aristotle in his metaphysics. It is the principle of the real distinction between act and potentiality. One has not far to seek in order to understand what is meant by 'act' and by 'potentiality.' 'Act' means perfection; 'potentiality' means absence of perfection. A thing in the state of potentiality is in an imperfect state, and is therefore capable of receiving what it lacks, viz., some perfection or an act (as it is termed in scholastic language), whereby it ceases to be in a state of potentiality and is brought to a state of having some perfection. There are, as is evident, many kinds of states of potentiality and many kinds of corresponding states of act, but it is not necessary to discuss all of them, since the doctrine underlying them all is one and the same. Furthermore, it is clear that the state of potentiality must be really distinct from the state of act; for, if this be not true, then 'to run' and 'to be able to run,' 'to know' and 'to be able to know,' 'to be hot' and 'to be able to be hot,' are one and the same, which is absurd. Hence there must be a real (extra-mental) distinction between the two states. This principle, then, may be formulated thus: Between the state of potentiality and the state of act there is a real distinction. Further, the first unfolding of this principle necessarily implies that that which is in a state of potentiality cannot cease to be in that state unless it be 'moved' from that state by something which is in the state of act; e.g., cold water has the potentiality to become hot, but it is impossible for cold water to become hot unless it be 'moved' from that state by something that actually possesses heat. It will be seen that this conclusion is an immediate inference of the real distinction between the states of potentiality and act. Hence the principle in a more explicit way may be formulated thus: Potentiality, which is really distinct from act, can never become act unless it be reduced to act by something else in a state of act. This is the fundamental principle of the entire Thomist system; established at the outset in metaphysics, it is applied without exception to the fundamental doctrines in every department of Thomist philosophy and theology. Whoever draws a single conclusion which is in any way at variance with this principle, although he may hold all other doctrines of the Thomist system, causes himself to be excluded from the Thomist.

14. The application of the principle.—(a) In metaphysics.—The Thomist doctrine of real distinction between essence and existence in created things, whereby essence is conceived as potentiality and existence as an act, is an application of the principle; likewise the real distinction between substance and its accidents, wherein substance is conceived as in potentiality to the accidents which are its acts or perfections; likewise the doctrine concerning the nature of dimensive quantity, the essence of which is not that it actually extends the parts of a corporeal substance in place, i.e. in triple dimension, but that it distributes the parts of that substance within the substance itself (which internal parts are only potentially distributed in triple dimension by dimensive quantity), and that it has the potentiality of extending those parts and of extending those parts in place according to triple dimension. Upon this doctrine of the nature of dimensive quantity is founded the doctrine of the real presencing of the whole body in a small consecrated Host; also the doctrine of the virgin birth of Christ, of His passing into a room, the doors being shut, etc. Likewise the important doctrine of cause and effect, or the principle of causality, is an application of the aforesaid fundamental principle. An analysis of 'that which begins to be (effect) must have a reason (cause) for its inception' shows the underlining great principle.

(b) In psychology.—The doctrine of the unity of the human composite, viz. that the intellectual soul is the substantial form of the body, and that it is the only form, is an application of the same principle. The 'prime matter,' a pure potentiality, which is informed by the intellectual soul (or act) receives from this act all that makes it body, and human body, and living. Through this principle it follows that the faculties of intellect and will are really distinct from the substance of the soul, because they are the acts or perfections of the soul, which in regard to them is a potentiality. And it follows also that every faculty is really distinct from its object as potentiality to act, but also that, in regard to it as object, every faculty is passive, not active. Hence the important doctrine that the human intellect is a passive, not active, power or faculty, in that it receives, and does not make, its object of thought as object.

Further (and this is most important from the point of view of Thomism versus Molinism), the human will, which is the faculty of choice, must ultimately be moved to the very act of choosing by something which is in act; and the reason is that, before the act of choosing (giving everything necessary for this action save this action itself), the will is in a state of potentiality and must therefore be 'moved' by something outside it to the state of perfection which is 'choosing.' Only God, the actus pars, can move the will to the very act of choosing; if angered else did this, the will ipso facto would cease to be free. This is the Thomist doctrine of causality treated which is a rigorous application of the aforesaid fundamental principle.

(c) In cosmology.—In this department of applied metaphysics the fundamental question concerns the precise nature of, and as body. Applying the aforesaid principle, Thomism concludes that
body, as body, is a composite of two principles, one of which is substantial form and the other prime matter. Prime matter is a pure potentiality of which the substantial form is the act; and latent in it, as a consequence, there is a real distinction.

(d) In natural theology.—The classic proof for the existence of God, viz. from the existence of motion in the world, is nothing more than a rigorous application of the same principle. Motion is here taken in its widest sense, embracing not only local motion but every kind of ‘passing from potentiality to act.’

(c) In ethics.—All the doctrines concerning habits and their formation, of the passions, of virtues and vices, of laws, etc., have their mainstay in the same fundamental principle.

(f) In theology.—For the existence of God see above (d). It is only necessary to run through the Summa to see that the same principle is fundamental in the doctrines concerning revelation and concerning inspiration (in which is implied the doctrine of cause and effect, and in particular of instrumental causality). By an understanding of the same great principle it is concluded that God alone is pure act with no admixture of potentiality whatever; hence, things are contained in both potentiality and act. It is further concluded not only that God’s essence is identically the same as His existence, but that His intellect and His will, His attributes of unity, goodness, truth, His knowledge and love are likewise identically the same as His essence. The same grand principle underlies the whole of the doctrine concerning the mystery of the trinity of persons in God. A further application is to be found in the treatment on the angels, whose existence is really distinct from their essence, whose minds and wills are really distinct from their substance, etc. Thus through the whole of the Summa one finds the same principle applied. It will be necessary to take only two more cases in order to show the solidarity of Thomistic doctrines. According to St. Thomas, the sacraments are the instrumental causes of grace; they are not more channels through which grace is infused into the soul; they are real, physical, instrumental causes which produce or infuse grace into the soul. The soul in its total intellectuality, in its potentiality, is a potentiality (potentia obducentialis), and grace is the act.

The final instance we shall take to illustrate the application of the fundamental principle of Thomism concerns the doctrine of actual grace. Just as in the natural order it was concluded that the human will is physically premoved by God to the act of choice, so in the supernatural order an actual grace is nothing more than a physical premotion in that order. Hence the Thomists speak of ‘gratia efficax ab intrinseco,’ a grace intrinsically or of its very nature efficacious, and not of grace, intrinsically indifferent, to be made efficacious by consent of the will to accept, or to remain inefficacious by refusal of the will to accept. Thus Thomism, by a relentless logic, applies the great principle to the doctrine of actual grace. To the mind of St. Thomas, whilst the apparent difficulties, of the principle, this doctrine is the only logical conclusion. For Thomism the theory of Molina or Suarez bristles with more difficulties in that the theses of the actualities of God and the Prime Mover of all things, of causality, and of the great metaphysical principle: Potentiality, which is really distinct from act, can never become act unless it is premoved by God. In short, for the sake of a difficulty in applied metaphysics (i.e. the freedom of the will under God’s physical promotion), Molina and Suarez gain no principle already established in metaphysics, just as he who, on account of some difficulty in algebra or mathematics, gainsays a principle of pure mathematics.

Any conclusion other than the one drawn above wrecks a system of the whole of knowledge in the mind of the Thomist. It is owing to the perfect consistency of this system that the single first principle aforesaid to every department of knowledge that Thomas bequeathed to the world a sublime system remarkable for its perfect unity, harmony, and solidarity of thought.

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Alfred Whittacre.

THRACE (Θρᾴκη, Ὀχρᾳ).—Thrace was the name given in classical times to a mountainous region lying north of Greece proper. The inhabitants (Θρᾴκοι, Ὀχραῖοι) were a barbarous people, having no close affinities to the Greeks in language, race, or government. In the last field, however, their influence on their more civilized neighbours was considerable, beginning early and continuing fairly late. In particular, they appear to have been partly responsible for the remarkable change in the spirit of Greek religion which took place about the beginning of the classical epoch or shortly before it. This change must not be thought of as something revolutionary, akin, e.g., to the conversion of most of N. Europe from Roman Catholicism to Protestantism at the Reformation; for the large majority, probably if not certainly, religious beliefs and practices changed little if at all. The change was rather the advent of a new element, which rendered possible the holding by many Greeks of ideas either unknown to their fathers or existing among them in a very undeveloped form, and largely forgotten when first we hear of them definite and distinct from the older region of the Balkans and the countries west and east of that district (Bulgaria and Greece proper), except So-scenic or the Carpathians. Driven back by the Huns, the Strobiloi tribes from the region of the Vistula, or possibly from sheer restlessness or desire for fresh
Priam's and the Thracian.

"They his Trojans habiting only not Homer and the races from Thrace. That Thracians were more honoured to be identified with the Greeks, being connected with the Thracians and the Thracian people, who are often confused with them, and the Agathys, whose name seems to indicate that they were held in no great esteem by their Scythian neighbours (the first two syllables are probably to be connected with Zend agha, 'bad'), and who appear from Herodotus to have practised the very primitive custom of group-marrying. On the whole, the northern group shows certain curious traces of the domestic tradition of the Thracians, especially, as already mentioned, with the Thracian.

3. Language.—As the Thracians seem to have had no knowledge of writing, the few inscriptions we have from Thrace are late and of little value. The Thracian remains, however, a number of glosses, some 80 of which we may take as genuine Thracian words; about 25 names of plants given as Thracian by Diodorus, and a considerable number of proper names, both of persons (including deities) and of places. From these it appears that the language was Indo-Germanic, of the E. European group, having as its nearest ancient cognates Phrygian and Armenian. Traces appear of two distinct linguistic stocks, and possibly of two races; and this we may consider along with the fact reported by Pausanias that these Thracians differed from that of the common people. The Thracian.

4. Material culture.—It has been pointed out that Homer does not consider the Thracians to be of inferior culture. In the Iliad the Thracians are for the most part the allies of the Trojans; Priam's treasury includes a cup of their giving; the son of Aeneas was brought up in Thrace and married there; Thracian comes to Triarn's aid with a strong Thracian contingent. On the other hand, some of them at least traded with the Greeks. No hint is given that they are in any sense savages; in particular, the descriptions of Thracian manners are lucidly mannerly. But there is no need to suppose, as Heilig does, that the Thracians of that day, under the Phrygians and other foreign influences, were still practising a short period of 'choise' culture which brought them for a time to higher levels than they ever afterwards attained. The true case seems to be that Homer knows nothing of the later division between Greek and barbarian, and that the Greek world was barbarous everywhere. This, he says, was the development of the Greek world; that of the barbarian. The difference was that the Greeks developed marvelously rapidly in the next 300 years or so, while the Thracians remained backward.

Passing to classical authors of the later periods, we find one chief account of the descent of Herodotus, who

towards the Thracians, while not unkindly, is clearly that of civilized man describing interesting barbarians; and this is indeed a certain judgment of the Thracians, of little importance owing to their lack of unity; their culture is on the whole uniform. That the Thracians appear to have despised agriculture, and in fact, to have considered it as 'bad', or 'not to be done', and to have lived by plunder. They have, however, some arts, as they can weave very good cloth of hand-spun wool. To this day the Greek and other authors tell us that they showed skill in making various tools and weapons of iron. They were accustomed to dye their hair red, and to have black faces; they were said to be a polygynous; that they lived under father-right, not mother-right, is clearly mentioned; and the Thracian women, being in the marital jealousy was strongly developed, though the chastity of an unmarried girl was quite disregarded,—i.e., their women were apparently thought of chiefly as valuable property, belonging to their fathers so long as they were unmarried,—hence the light view taken of their immoralities. For any child, whether they might bear out of wedlock would also belong to their own family,—but afterwards belonged to their husbands, who had paid for the exclusive use of them. When we add that as a race they were cattle-breeders and especially famous for their horses from very early times, it is clear that we shall not be far wrong in comparing them to some one of the principal Baucic peoples, such as the Amazons, before the latter attained unity of government under T. Chalko. Physically, however, they were at the other end of the colour-scale, being fair-skinned and yellow-haired.

Finally, four points should be noted as giving the clue to many features in their religion. According to the practically unanimous voice of antiquity, (1) the Thracians were desperately brave, having little fear of death; (2) they were excitable, and, in particular, short of temper, with a strong sexual passion; (3) they were heavy drinkers; and (4) they were intensely jealous of their own country, and fiercely patriotic.

In addition, their country was a mountainous one, in which caves were no rarity.

5. Religion. — They may take as our starting-point the famous passage of Herodotus, v. 7: 'They worship only the following gods, Ares, Dionysos, and Artemis; but their kings... reverence Hermes above all other gods, swear by him alone, and say that a person who is shown a dream by Hermes, and speaks in the dream, mean exactly what he said, and the Hebrew prophet who speaks of the name of his God as being 'great among the Gentiles' means his words to be startling to a heathen, a-Greek always assumes that the gods of all nations are much the same as his own and never scruples to talk of the Egyptian cult of Hermes or the Roman worship of him, meaning thereby Thoth and Juno. We shall see from when and to whom such a statement of Herodotus' statement is true of one deity only.

(a) Areas.—That Ares is a Thracian deity is a fairly widespread opinion. As far back as Homer (a) we find Thracian gods mentioned in their proper names, and this by Homer, and later writers echo Homer. Ares lies, moreover, certainly non-Greek features; his cult is wholly without any of those higher forms which distinguish, e.g., Apollo or Athena and remains throughout that of a war-god pure and simple. Homer's whole attitude towards him is one of dislike; he supports the Trojans throughout; and in his rival we find one feature paralleled in Thracian hard to parallel in purely Greek cult—the dog-sacrifice to him under the name of Enyalios at Sparta.

At the same time it must be confessed that none 1. Between Greeks as a whole and Thracians as a whole, no bitterness seems to have existed. The references to Thracians as bloodthirsty savages are mostly in comparatively late authors like Pausanias, xix. 22. 2. The mention that the delusive conduct of certain Thracian mercenaries in the Peloponnesian War was a source of shame to the Thracians must have had something to do with this, while later their savage battles against the Romans prejudiced the latter against them.

2. Herod. ii. 6, 7 ff.; xix. 22, 23, 25, 27. 3. References in Tomasek, i. 119. 4. Id. 5. References in Herodotus, x. 119. 6. Mal. 111. 7. Il. xiii. 301 and elsewhere. 8. Eph., Verg., Aes., Ill. 9. Vit. Helv. 10. St. 11. 12. References to other passages of Herodotus are cited in the notes. For fuller authorities see Tomasek, Die attor Thuker, i. 111 ff.
of the above features are conclusive against his Greek origin. Among a people brave enough, but not fond of war for its own sake, the war-god needs to retain some "functional" features; it is not wanting to be altogether neglected, too unpopular to develop. Among the traditional friends of Troy are also Apollo, Artemis, and at times Zeus himself; not unlike the Thracian god, who was made from a single god who had lost his prominence region to an obscure ritual; and the references to Thracian need mean no more than that the Thracians, being war-like, had a popular cult of a war-god. And we must remember that the cult of Artemis by old men is full of references to his name. It is not possible to appear then that somewhere after the downfall of the Homerian (Achian) culture, and during the period of reconstruction, of which very little is known, his worship crossed the border and was carried, it is no longer possible to say exactly how, or by whom, to all parts of Greece, meeting with considerable opposition, but finally establishing itself as part of the state religion and becoming largely civilized in the process, though recrudescences of its original barbarism, such as the well-known one in Italy, were always possible.

No detailed description of the cult of Dionysos in Thracian has come down to us from authors who speak of this god as Thracian are literally correct. The chief arguments in favour of this statement are as follows:

(b) Dionysos. — The case of Dionysos is very different, and there is little serious doubt that this god was by nature a war-god, and that his name is not only plausibly derived from an Aryan root, which in itself proves nothing, but has a characteristic Greek formation.

It is therefore, on the whole, that the Thracians did not originate the Greek cult of Ares, but had from very early times a war-god of their own, about whose ritual we must be content to remain ignorant. It is worth mentioning that Herodotus seems to speak of him as an oracular god in one rather obscure passage.

The old ritual of Ares Tweussebhos (Paus. vm. xviii. 4, 5) may point to Amazonianism, which is not Greek. This is exceedingly doubtful.

The forms Apesos (Hom. Ione.) and Apesse (Alk. Ind.) indicate a stem in -epes; cf. προεφωνος. The root is akin to sl. rete, \( \text{rte} \), See C. A. M. Pellens in C. U. xil. (1928) 283.

vii. 76, \( \text{εκ} \) τοιοποιοι των αυτου\( \text{ς} \)\( \text{ερεις} \) εκ των καυσωνιων. The context is corrupt, and it is uncertain who are referred to, quite possibly not Thracians at all.

The counter-theory, that he is a Cretan deity, is supported by E. Harrison (Prolegomena, ch. viii.). The argument for it reduce to (e) the fact that a cult of a god of this type did exist in Crete from very early times and remained so powerful that Zeus himself is absorbed by it; (f) the certain features of Cretean Dionysos ritual. But, in view of the overwhelming evidence for a Thracian origin, these are little weight. The former is common to many localities; the latter is naturally explained by supposing that the worship of Dionysos is transferred to the name of the god who was so powerful in Thessaly because it was so like the native worship, and so was little modified.

We must remember that the name looks as if it were a Cretan one, or the like is too absurd to deserve more than passing mention. The Thracian Dionysos has been supposed to be originally a god of agriculture, but possibly connected with the holy mountain Yaus, which is variously located but apparently Thracian in Homer.

2 Hom. Pt. Alex. vi. 319, 320.

3 The best known form of the legend is that given in Erlidis, 376, 1197; Arist. sp. Maurob. Sat. i. 34, 35.

4 Cf. art. Pneumatos.

5 C. R. S. 25: 325. Od. xxiv. 74.

6 It was an age of religious and poetical prophecy (see p. 36, 9, iii. 68.), The favourable reception of the women may have had a good deal to do with it also.

7 Liv. xxxii. 3.

8 To save a multitude of quotations, we refer the reader for detailed authorities to the 'Thesaurus Graecae Linguae' of Scyl. and the end of this article.

9 The root is possibly \( \text{φαγεω} \) (Curtius), in both names, but \( \text{φαγεω} \) is from \( \text{φαγεω} \). Enthus is derived from the well-known cry "faye!"

The present writer holds religious and sexual emotion to be essentially the same; see, e.g., W. James, \textit{Varieties of Religious Experience}, London, and New York, 1902, passim. The frequency of ‘conversions’ and the like during adolescence and the regular employment by mystics of all nationalities of erotic metaphors are among the facts supporting this view.

of Greece some time, probably not very long, before the dawn of Greek history. In Homer lie is apparently a foreign god, little known and not much regarded; of the five mentions of him two \( ^3 \) are certain interpolations, one \( ^4 \) is unimportant, the others come in the story of Lykurgos. When we come to the Homeric hymns, however, he is a well-known and important deity, and all later literature is full of references to him and to his history. It appears that somewhere after the downfall of the Homerian (Achian) culture, and during the period of reconstruction, of which very little is known, his worship crossed the border and was carried, it is no longer possible to say exactly how, or by whom, to all parts of Greece, meeting with considerable opposition, but finally establishing itself as part of the state religion and becoming largely civilized in the process, though recrudescences of its original barbarism, such as the well-known one in Italy, were always possible.
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327 cave.' the god visits his worshippers in early spring (the time of most of the festivals), it is welcomed by them, and is joined to them by a sort of primitive sacrament. Of the death or expulsion of the worn-out god, later in the year, we do not hear so much, but there are traces of it. In the legend of Lykurgos already referred to (p. 327), the god of the sea—the throwing of the vegetation-spirit into water is a very common rite; there was a strong tradition that he had died, and was buried at Delphi;1 and there is also a legend of his descent into Hades to fetch up Thame.2 We are therefore, in view of these facts and on the analogy of all similar ritual elsewhere, justified in supposing that his death was part of the ceremonial of his cult; and this belief is strengthened by the curious relic of Dionysiac worship found in Thrace by R. M. Dawkins,3 in which the death of one of the characters in the mummers' play is a prominent feature. Closely allied with this went the ritual representing his birth and eroding in the Μίνως, or winnowing-fan. The last detail, however, marking him definitely as a corn-god, is Greek rather than Thracian.4

In the ritual of Dionysos the forms of the god change bewilderingly. We have reason to suppose him to have been conceived as bull, goat, kid, sheep, serpent, stag, and even pig.5 For all these animal manifestations are shown to have been sacred to him, and, as he is at times said to have taken the forms of some of them, notably bull and serpent, we may conjecture that he was more or less familiar with the others as well. But the iconography he is always human, and he had human attributes, as might be expected from the human sacrifices.

(c) Divine kings—Lykurgos, Penthemon, Rhesos, Orpheus. Several of the legends seem to indicate that in Thrace, as elsewhere, there existed kings of the type described by Strabo, i.e., they were of the local god, who ended by being sacrificed, possibly demoted, by the Greeks probably never had had this sort of king—certainly had forgotten it—they naturally misunderstood the legend. The story goes in the National Gallery.

Dionysos; Potamia, Ταυροθησία; Πτυχών (Plut. Them. 12.)

2 See Plut. de Is. et Os. 352.

3 See Elian, Nup. Anim. xii. 31. The Thracian ritual seems to have been touched down almost into a normal sacrificial.

4 For a few examples see art. FEASTS AND FASTS (Greek), p. 143. For other examples see art. MYTHOLOGICAL (Greek), p. 255. For a full discussion see art. FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Greek), p. 142.

5 See Plut. de Is. et Os. 352.


8 A selection of the relevant passages will be found in C.G. v. 2001.

above mythological figures exactly correspond to the Fracian type. Lykurgos persecutes Dionysos; but the form which his persecution takes is a pursuit (probably originally ritual) of the god and his attendants and the lopping of them with the κυκλή, but which is possibly meant, not an act of good, but a whip of bull's hide, a fertilizing ἕφαρμα like the hide thongs of the Roman Luperci. He is not torn in pieces by the god's followers, as one would expect from a genuine act of inhuman cruelty, but as in the Dionysiac replicas (which varies in detail) is punished, by blindness or otherwise, and imprisoned in a cave.1 Pentheus opposes the Bakchai and is torn in pieces by them. Orpheus is a royal priest of Dionysos and is torn in pieces by the Mistrades—an act for which mythologists assign sundry fanciful reasons.2 Rhesos is a vague figure, but it has been urged that his name may be connected with ῥής (Gothic roitz) and the royal Thracian name Ρησάς. After his death he appears—the exact sense and reading are matters of dispute—to be represented by the author of the play bearing his name as having an oracular deity or semi-deity (ἀνάμνησις ék̓ θυμάμαν) of somewhat Dionysiac type.3 Add to all this the facts that the Getic priest-king was called 'god' 4 and that we get as a royal name of frequent occurrence in the god's cult the name of a certain Kotyo, it becomes at last plausible that the cult of Dionysos and other gods of the same kind in Thrace had at its head in early times 5 a priest-king who was the incarnation of the deity and ended by being devoured, naturally making the way to death to make way for a fresh incarnation.

(d) Orphicos.—Of the persons mentioned in the last section one is of such importance as to deserve separate treatment, viz., Orphicos. In the legends concerning this priest-king the tradition of antiquity is fairly constant. He is a more or less historical figure; he existed some time before the Trojan War;6 he was a Thracian,7 son of King Echion, and afterwards priest-king of the Thracian god. The later writers locate him on the coast of Thrace, near the mouth of the Hellespont. After various adventures, the most notable of which was the descent into the Under-world, he travelled into the Lykaion, 'a marvellous musician. His home, when exactly localized, is generally said by our earlier authorities to have been Mt. Pangaios, the site of an ancient sanctuary of the god. Some later writers mention a location in Euboea, near the city of Magnesia, while others place the site of his later home in the eastern Peloponesus. His name is known to us under a number of different spellings, e.g., his declaration of his intention to give oracles. The ancient evidence is to be found in H. x. 1; [Eur.] Rhes. 555 f.; Polyb. vi. 59. xxvii.

1 See Soph. Ant. 555 ff., and Jebb, ad loc.

2 For examples see Serv. on Verg. Georg. i. 510.

3 See Kinder, ι. 151, who rather too confidently assumes Rhesos to have been a far-famed god. W. Leaf (JHS xxv. [1915] 1) goes too far in the opposite direction. On the whole the present writer is of opinion that Rhesos may really have been a half-forgotten king of some Thracian tribe, who after his death was supposed to give oracles. The ancient evidence is to be found in H. x. 1; [Eur.] Rhes. 555 f.; Polyb. vi. 59. xxvii.

4 Strabo, vii. 228.

5 Presumably not in historical times, as one can hardly suppose that none of our authors would have mentioned it in that case.

6 For an isolated expression of doubt see Oec. de Nat. Deor. i. 35 (Sua). Orphicos postea doctus Aristoleos magnum fuisse, which from the context is almost certainly a denial of Orphicos' existence. His mountain may merely have meant to deny his authorship of the 'Orphic' poems.

7 Contemporary with the Argonauts, according to most versions of the myth of the Argonauts, see e. g., Plut. Mor. 30, frags. 1407 ff., 1304, 1295, 1408. He was a member of the Kastoi, i.e., of a sort of Phrygian Rhodians.

8 'Thracius Orphicos' (Var. Ec. iv. 55) is his stock epithet.

9 I.e., not a writer on the theoretical basis of religion in general, or of any particular religion, but one who describes the nature, mysteries, cults, or deities. In this sense Herodotus, e.g., is a 'theologian' (θεολόγος).
Torn in pieces by a band of women, possessed by real or pretended Dionysiac frenzy.

Next came another period, in Hades, during which the process was known apparently as the κόκυλον, or cycle of reincarnations. 2 Release from this could be obtained by a series of good lives on both sides of the grave—apparently the world was the heaven or purgatory of the other. After a triple good life on either side—three on earth and three in Hades—the soul had purged itself from the sin and was able to enter a permanent paradise, with no more prospect of reincarnation, and in the enjoyment of divine or heroic rank. 3

This theology, and much besides, was embodied in a large literature, attributed either to Orpheus himself or to his pupil Mousaios, 2 the oldest parts of which probably date from the 6th cent. b.c., while the latest representatives, the Hymns and Orphic Argumenta, are about 1000 years later. 4 Of this the greater part has perished, and especially the earliest and most valuable part; and we have of undoubted and fairly early Orphic origin only one set of documents, the so-called Petelia Tablets, gold plates found in Orphic graves in S. Italy. It appears from these that a pious Orpheus was in the habit of burying with his dead friend directions for his conduct in Hades, to aid him in his travels there, and charitable to suppose that the life just completed was the last of the series of good lives required to qualify for escape from the circle. 5

The tablets present the following picture of Hades. The soul, apparently after long and thirsty wanderings, travels along a road flanked on either side by springs. Avoiding the left-hand spring, 6 it addresses the guardian of the entrance to Hades, who declares itself to be of divine race, and begs for a draught of 7 the cold water which flows forth from the lake of Memory. The request is granted, and the soul is hailed as having 8 endured that which aforetime it had never endured. 9 It addresses Persephone and the other deities of the under world, and is admitted into their society.

The poem to which all these tablets go back is of unknown authorship and date, but it is evident that it or something like it stands behind the passages of Findlay and Plato already cited and also behind much that is to be found in other authors, mostly late. The connecting link is to be found in Pythagoreanism, which, it would seem, had found Orphism already established in S. Italy, and incorporated much of its teaching. This results in a confusion between the two systems so complete that it is practically hopeless to separate the documents, to say definitely with regard to any eschatological passage that it is purely Orphic or purely Pythagorean. Through the Pythagorean exiles which reached Greece proper after the dispersion of their communities in Magna Graecia the higher forms of the doctrine became known to Plato, in whom consequently we find side by side strong Orphic-Pythagorean influence and hearty contempt for Orphic charlatanism. Not dissimilar is the attitude of Aristophanes, who, on the one hand:

2 Cf. Proclus, in Plat. Resp. 390: Orphikos ὁ τῶν Διόνυσου ἀριστεύων τύχανον προσέρχεσθαι διὸ εὐμετάλληκεν αὐτῷ ὁ θεὸς. 3 The details varied (see Bobbe, II. 115 f.; Gruppe, col. 1139 ff.). The Orphic writings being largely kraft, has to be patched together from various sources, many of them obscure.
4 The theology does not differ from the theistic in essential; the chief departure are the insertion of the soul into the egg-laid by Night and of two of vague deities, Peisces and Erykapos.
5 T. S., transl. E. Krapp, Perséphone-Zémeda, S. 523. The Orphic writings being largely kraft, has to be patched together from various sources, many of them obscure.
6 From one side to the other; for reference to this see Hym. 392 f., and Pind. Gr. vi. 76.
7 Condemned from Plat. Resp. ii. 304 E.
8 J. B., transl. B. 615 A, B; cf. Verg. Aen. vii. 748; of these the former is probably Orphico-Pythagorean; the latter is generally held to be Orphic.
9 From this προσέρχεσθαι διὸ εὐμετάλληκεν αὐτῷ ὁ θεὸς.
10 For reference to this see Hym. 392 f., and Pind. Gr. vi. 76.
11 Condemned from Plat. Resp. ii. 304 E.
12 Orphic notion: Hym. i. 252, 256; of these the former is probably Orphico-Pythagorean; the latter is generally held to be Orphic.
13 Orphic notion: Hym. i. 252, 256; of these the former is probably Orphico-Pythagorean; the latter is generally held to be Orphic.
hand, parodies private mysteries of the Orphic type in the Clouds and, on the other, draws in the Frogs on the same type of ideas for his half-serious parody of the dominant world.

Another problem which we cannot solve with any great exactness is the amount of non-Thracian thought which goes to the making of Orphism as we know it. The very name of the founder is in doubt. We have either a Thracian name,¹ others point to the occurrence of Greek cognates² as indicating it to be Greek. As to the doctrines, it is unreasonable to suppose that the Thracians produced so elaborate and quasi-philosophical a system of reincarnation; this is rather the result of Greek exegesis on Thracian Dionysiac material. Thrace, on the other hand, is the likeliest claimant for the grotesque myth on which the whole system rests; but here again we do not know how much was contributed by obscure superstitions from backward corners of the Greek world. The asceticism we may not unfairly call Thracian, though the details of it are not definitely non-Hellenic.

Exactly what form the Orphic religion took, in its external and long line it remained a potent force, is precisely a question. Without any less what proportion of the Greek peoples was seriously affected by it. With regard to the first point, however, it would appear that Orphism had its origin in Thrace, a view which seems to be confirmed by the presence of Orphic documents in the 4th cent. A.D., but, like other productions of that epoch, they show unmistakable traces of syncretism, and of Orphism we have little or nothing outside of literature. Therefore, on the whole, we are disposed to attach less importance than Dieterich does to the undeniable coincidences between Orphic imagery, e.g., and that of certain Chaldean and Christian writings; we would look for the source of that imagery, and the many common points of ritual and belief in Christian and non-Christian cults, to the numerous Hellenized Oriental influences rather than to Orphic proper, holding that the language which once was chieftly, if not peculiarly, Orphic had become common property,³ while Orphism itself had become very unimportant. This, however, cannot be considered as settled beyond reasonable doubt.

1 See Tomasevich, ii. 52.
2 Orph. given as a Laconian name in Serv. on Verg. Buc., v. 123; Philo Judaeus; 1 Macc. vi. 28; 1 Cor. xiv. 16; 1 Tim. iv. 1; 2 Macc. xiii. 2, 18; and the root of the adj. ἄφοραν. See B. R. Æm. 826 ff. The form of the former cited is found again on Osidian tomb (G. Kehrle, IG Neele und Itaion, Berlin, 1600, nos. 1489, 1705, etc.), and on at least one which is about 1580. (G. Kehrle, IG Neele und Itaion, Berlin, 1600, nos. 1489, 1705, etc.)
3 The expression is the first occurrence of the term, appearing as the Christian refrigerate; cf. the ‘water of life’ of the NT.

We may now consider briefly the moral value of the Dionysiac and Orphic cults. That they were immoral in the obvious sense is not likely. It is true that they made us all ‘livy,’ e.g., makes out Dionysiac orgies to have been scenes of huge riots of indulgence and lust; but he is speaking of a late form of the worship, far from its native place, and has all the Roman prejudice against any secret conclave—the same prejudice that later gave rise to the same tales about the early meetings of the Christians. But in a broader sense we may say that all such cults were immoral, for they were untrue to Hellenism, replacing the Egyptian formula. They also were just as common to life with a misty other-worldliness, sure to lead to intellectual decay, however brilliant the first flowerings of its mysticism might be in such a mind as that of Plato. Not till the notion of the ancient world did such doctrines really become prevalent; and the overthrow of the Pythagorean communities, primarily political, may be thought of as also an unconscious revolt against a force traitor to Greek civilization.⁴

(e) Artemis.—Here we need have no doubt that Herodotos is not to be taken too literally. All we have any reason to believe is that a Thracian Artemis, probably of Thracian origin, was the mother of Artemis, and that we have not the faintest trace—is that some great nature-goddess was worshipped in that country. We can give at least two names of such deities. One is that of Kottys, the Thracian who, although generally spoken of as a Phrygian, was also Edonian.⁵ Another deity, who was to some extent naturalized in Greece in fairly early times,⁶ was Bendis, whose cult is mentioned together with that of Kottyo by Strabo.⁷ Of the details of her worship we know little but that the torch-race mentioned by Plato⁸ fits well enough with any deity equated with the torch-bearing Artemis, but is by no means peculiar to her; and of the native worship of her we hear chiefly that it was noisy.⁹ Probably enough there were a score of such female personifications of the fertility of nature, worshipped with orgiastic rites not unlike those of Dionysos himself, possibly in connexion with him.¹⁰

(f) Hermes.—With regard to Herodotos’ statement that the Thracian kings especially venerate Hermes, we are not aware that any very convincing evidence has been brought forward, but in few of the facts mentioned in the next paragraph, we suggest that he means Hermes Cithoniou and identifies with him some one of the deities after the patria potestas.

(g) Zoismoa.¹¹—Our chief authority for this deity is again Herodotos, who informs us¹² that the

¹ xxxix. 10, and elsewhere in his description of the Thracian-salynian affair.
² The above account of the origin and progress of Orphism, while in our opinion the correct one, has been contended against by R. Eder (Weltanschauung und Hinnehmung, Munich, 1910, ch. v). He endeavours to prove that its origin is due to Asiaic, particularly Persian, influences, and this theory is accepted by some later writers (e.g., H. A. Strong, Apokathes and After Life, London, 1910, p. 314). We hold that, with all deference to Eder’s great learning and industry, his arguments are wholly insufficient for the Orphism of the times of Pythagoras or of Plato, whatever light they may throw on the orphic system which at the beginning of the Christian era met with that name.
⁴ 149 n. c., see Plat. Resp. i. 237 A f.; cf. schol. ad loc. and commentary, esp. the close of p. 324 (Weltenmantel). We endeavours to prove that its origin is due to Asian, particularly Persian, influences, and this theory is accepted by some later writers (e.g., H. A. Strong, Apokathes and After Life, London, 1910, p. 341). We hold that, with all deference to Eder’s great learning and industry, his arguments are wholly insufficient for the Orphism of the times of Pythagoras or of Plato, whatever light they may throw on the orphic system which at the beginning of the Christian era met with that name.
⁵ E.T. ‘Hermes’ fr. 55 Dindorf: ἅμαρτεία κήρυκς εἰς Ἰαβούνειον: cf. the common royal name Kottos.
⁶ 149 n. c., see Plat. Resp. i. 237 A f.; cf. schol. ad loc. and commentary, esp. the close of p. 324 (Weltenmantel). We endeavours to prove that its origin is due to Asian, particularly Persian, influences, and this theory is accepted by some later writers (e.g., H. A. Strong, Apokathes and After Life, London, 1910, p. 341). We hold that, with all deference to Eder’s great learning and industry, his arguments are wholly insufficient for the Orphism of the times of Pythagoras or of Plato, whatever light they may throw on the orphic system which at the beginning of the Christian era met with that name.
⁸ Or in conjunction with some of the other Dionysiac deities, such as Sabazios (Thracus-Pyrganos).
⁹ Or in conjunction with some of the other Dionysiac deities, such as Sabazios (Thracus-Pyrganos).
¹¹ Ycv θυσία. For this passage, xcv. 4, tum: ἀθέτητε τοὺς θυσίας θυσίας Θρακικάς: cf. IG Neele und Itaion, Berlin, 1600, nos. 1489, 1705, etc.)
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Getai worshipped him, and so exclusively that they regarded no one else as a true god, even the heavens themselves. What his nature was we can gather in part from the rationalistic story told of him, that he was a slave of Pythagoras, who, returning home, taught him the secrets of his master's philosophy, insisting especially on the immortality awaiting the faithful. To prove this, he disappeared for a time, hiding in an underground room; after three years he returned, and so made every one believe he had been in Hades and was come again. It is noteworthy that the same story is told of Pythagoras himself, and it smacks strongly of the Elysian, Greek and other, of superhuman persons who live in caves or under mountains and thence return occasionally or in some way intervene in human affairs. With this story we must join the decided suspicion of Herodotus himself that Zalchnicos is a local divinity, not a mortal at all, and the statement of Strabo that he was worshipped in an άρτρόδες χαρίν in Mt. Kogaloon. He is clearly, like Dionysos himself, a god belonging to the under world, but not Greek (inclusively) method of excavating. Did this worth, on which, we may perhaps suppose from the myth, he was thought to appear every year, as Dionysos frequently did every second year. As an infernal deity, he is represented as presiding over so many points, and the proper term to apply to what seems to have been rather a sort of fantastic messenger service. Once every four years the Getai chose a man by lot, whom they accompanied and fed like a dying and superhuman person. If he died, he deemed to have been immortal; if not, the god had rejected him, and he was disgraced. Before being tossed, he was charged with the messages of the people to the infernal world in various forms. The idea, found amongst many races, that the dying can take to the dead the mandates of the living.

(a) Other religious practices. — Besides the cult of definite gods, we have a few facts relative to the general religious attitude of the Thracians. In particular, we have Herodotus' description of a funeral ceremony, which sounds oddly like Homer's account of the funeral of Patroclus. The corpse, if of an important man, lies in state three days, during which mourning and sacrificial feasts go on; finally there comes the actual funeral, when the body is buried or burned, a mound raised, and offerings of various kinds, the principal one being a single combat, are celebrated. This was the usual rite, and it indicates at any rate high honour paid to the dead. The duel especially as if he were 'dead' for his god, which would involve a contradiction in terms: 'They threaten the god they believe in because they don't believe in him.' The correct translation is of course Αρέας or 'Zeus'; cf. Ith. F.; εὐκρισίας Διονυσίου τοῖς τεκείνοις ... ο θεός (Zeus, not Dionysos) εὐκρισίας διότι, and many other passages in which ο θεός means 'sky' or 'heavenly bodies.'

1 Hermippus, op. Diog. Laerct. viii. 41. This story is perhaps imitated from the one in Herodotus, which probably is an invention of the Greeks of the Pontos.

2 Examples in Bohde, 111 ff. 4 ill. 285.

3 He seems to be regulariteriteri, i.e. in alternate years, by the Greeks (inclusively) method of counting. To originate in a custom of shifting the cultivation every other year, vouched for by Homer, is the most plausible theory, but gives a phallus or divine person as occurring among the Getai? Among a people backward in agriculture the practice may well have varied, the period of cultivation being altered from one, two, or three years to the districts according to the richness of the soil. The author owes this suggestion to Farnell.

4 Ith. F.; θεός τε διάζωντος (this becomes their stock phrase, which has the force of the), 2, 3.

5 The idea is particularly common in modern Greek ballads.

6 Ιτ.; 8. 8.

7 The exact interpretation given to these facts depends upon the view taken of the origin of άρτρόδες in general. The present writer holds that they do not originate in funeral ceremonies, or even divine mountain deities, but are often associated with both. The duel, however, is, like the Roman gladiatorial shows, distinctly a sacrificial rite in this case.

may reasonably be thought to have been a form of blood-sacrifice. This in some of the wilder tribes, was no mere form; beyond Krestone, we are told, lived a race which practised sati; the favourite wife, chosen, it would seem, after careful examination of the relatives, was sacrificed by her next-of-kin at the tomb and then buried with her husband. The Trausoi again made a death a subject of rejoicing, and mourned at a birth. We see, then, that the whole of Thracian religion was permeated by the idea of the vast importance of the future life.

(i) Summary: general characteristics of Thracian religion. — We find in Thrace a religion of a barbarous kind, but by no means incapable of development into something higher and more spiritual. The chief marks of barbarism, besides the revolting character of some of the rites, were (a) the largely magical character of much of the ceremonial, unconnected with anything either ethical or spiritual, and tending rather to excite than to elevate; and (b) the materialistic conception of the future life. Cosmogonists, which is live underground, occasionally intervening for the bodily good of their worshippers and rewarding the faithful departed with drunken feasts; or the receptacle for the spirits of the dead; as the Zalchnicos already quoted, in which he is represented as feasting the Thracians, and the taunt of Plato that the inferior sort of Orphics considered external drunkenness the highest possible felicity. This is not to say that Thracean religion was always of a sensual character. It is noteworthy that the northern races, or some of them, had a reputation not only for courage but also for virtue and even for superhuman powers.

Thus the Getae are the 'bravest and most righteous' of the Thracians; the holy Hyperboreans live somewhere near the Thracian region; in and around which country are the sacred and asetonic Argipalos, the just Iseodones, and the Neurid, who are all magicians, besides the Samnacountal, who are of Amazonian stock; while the glorified shade of Achilles haunts various localities of the Black Sea region.

A great part at least of this persistent attribution of saintly or magical distinction to the northern districts may well have for its justification the natural complement of the strong sexuality of the races, asceticism, which we have already seen, was a strong feature of Orphism. Another reason no doubt is simply the fact that many of these peoples were distant and unknown. Yet another is, quite likely, the existence, not of whole nations, but of castes, which were priestly. We have already seen that the Bassoi certainly, and other tribes probably, had divine kings, and this often enough, as in Egypt, means the domination of a sacrificial clan or caste.

To sum up, therefore, Thrace had, so far as we can learn from the observations of its nearest civilized neighbours in classical times, a religion predominantly eolian, other-worldly, mystical, gloomy, often cruel and barbaric, but not un-spiritual—a sharp contrast with the brightness of the characteristic Greek cult of the Olympian deities.

LITERATURE. —(A) Ethnology, etc., of Thrace: J. A. Tomn- skow, Die ältesten Thraker, pt. i. 'Ubersicht der Stämme,' SBAB cxxvii. (1855) pt. ii. 'Die Sperchonti,' SBAB cxxvi. (1865).

1 v. 5.


3 Plato (Charm. 110) uses the 'physical' of 'Zalchnicos' and appears playfully to interpret ἀνασκάλεων as referring to their skill. They were probably a sort of shaman or medicine-men, who may, like their Siberian confrères, have combined medicine and prophecy.


6 Of the piece of the Homeric Ethiopians (II. 495).
TIBET.

The Tibetans are entitled to be regarded as one of the most "religious" peoples in the world, if by 'religion' is understood not only the belief in spiritual beings, but also the binding influence of that belief, as formulated by their Church, for the better regulation of their worldly actions in everyday life, and for procuring for them by pious observance of the incalculable maxims the satisfying hope of a higher position in the life after death. Not only is this the proportion of its inhabitants which the population in Tibet which devotes itself to religion greater than that in any other country, being at least about one to eight of the population; but in its whole extent, the life of the laity is also dominated and pervaded by their religion to an exceptional extent.

1. Climatic environments.

The peculiarities in the climate and physical character of Tibet have determined its topographical position, between the two great civilizations on either side, the Indian and the Chinese, from both of which it has derived elements of its composite form of Buddhism, explain to a considerable extent the peculiarities of its religion. The vast awe-inspiring solitudes with the rigorous nature of the climate have impressed themselves visibly on the religion of the country. And Nature has contributed, by the massive physical barriers she has erected against access to that land, to maintain to the present day the isolation of that country from the rest of the world, and to preserve the monastic and archaic forms of religion and superstitions.

Perched on the summit of the great plateau of Central Asia, and stretching across over twenty degrees of longitude, in the plateau region, from the Himalayas to the Kuen-lun mountains and Western China, it includes the loftiest tableland on the surface of the earth. Although generally called a plateau, it is in fact composed of innumerable hills and mountains, cut up by ravines, the stretches of level land being relatively few and far apart. The general elevation of the permanently inhabited tract seldom falls below 11,000 feet above sea-level, while a very great extent of the country exceeds 16,000 feet, which is about the limit there of perpetual snow. Its highest border lies along the Himalayas, rising in mountains, the highest on the globe, from which its surface slopes gradually eastwards into China—a feature explained by the fact that in not very remote geological times the land of Tibet formed part of the bottom of the China Sea of the Pacific. And the writer has picked up fossil shells on the Tibetan side of the Himalayas which were of the same species as those he obtained from similar strata.

The former deals chiefly with history and ethnology, the latter with linguistics.

(1) Thibetan cults: L. R. Parnell, COS, Oxford, 1896-1909, v. (Areas, Dyonossus); J. H. Harrison, Prolegomena to the Study of Buddhist Art and Architecture, Cambridge, 1905 (Dyonossus; also Orphism); see also the articles 'Bondiss,' 'Vorvater,' 'Kopf,' in Roscher.


O. Gruppe, art. 'Orphens' in Roscher: E. Abel, Orphics, Leipzig, 1904 (diagram); Dieterich, Thracian Religion; and Farnell, Thespis.

2 The increase of the population hitherto was that by the Chinese in 1573, which gave the proportion of the Lamas as one to three of the total population. At the present day about one to eight appears to be near the mark, in accordance with the present writer's own observations and those of W. W. Rockhill.

3 This is the estimate of W. W. Rockhill (Land of the Lamas, p. 336), and it generally agrees with that of the present writer.
also call them ‘the givers of alms’ (sbyin-blo-bag), at the same time making it understood that it is the donors who benefit most by the exercise of this charity. And certainly the last epithet is well deserved, for the Tibetans, the most priest-ridden people in the world, are among the most lavish in their religious gifts.

Notwithstanding the large amount of non-Buddhist elements in Lâmasiun, derived from the pre-Buddhist cult, the belief that it is surprising to find how deeply the everyday life and notions of the laity are leavened by the Buddhist spirit. The doctrine of metempsychosis and its korrum and the potency of acquired merit by good deeds enters into the ordinary habits and speech of the people to a remarkable extent. Their proverbs, folk-lòra, songs, and lay dramas are full of it; and they explain human as well as animal friendships on this principle. Even practices which are clearly dishonest and sinful are at times justified on the same principle, or rather by its abuse. Thus the more sordid Tibetan reconcile themselves to their misfortunes by vaguely convincing themselves that the person whom they now attempts to defraud had previously swindled him ‘in a former existence,’ and that justice demands retribution. Congenital defects, even such as blind- ness—reputed a curse and stigma—are viewed as retributions due to the individual having in a previous life abused or sinned with the particular limb or organ now affected. Indeed this is the orthodox dogma of Buddha’s own teaching and forms the basis of the Jâtakas, or tales of the previous births of Buddha, which are diffused by itinerant or friar Lâmas, and greatly impress the people; a feat of the better-known Jâtakas in many cases copy or in block-printed booklets form, with the manuals of ritual and divination, the chief books of those Tibetan laity who are able to read; and they also form the subject of the chief dramas enacted by the lady.

This wide-spread belief in metempsychosis also includes the people in the treatment of their cattle and other dumb animals. They treat these exceptionally humanely, and life is seldom wantonly taken. The taking of animal life unnecessarily, even for food, is largely prohibited, and, although in such a cold climate animal food is an essential staple of diet, the professional butchers are rare and the Profession of Lâmas is, ‘By the three Holiest Ones’—the Buddhist Trinity.

The non-Buddhist features and practices of the Tibetan religion, however, are also conspicuous, and reflect their pre-Buddhist cult, the shamanistic Bon. The physical environment of their life, in their rigorous climate where they see Nature in her roughest mood, in pitiless fury of storms and cold, terrorizing the brave as well as the timid, has impelled them to worship the more obvious forces of Nature as malignant demons which seem to wreck their fields and flocks, and vex them with disease and disaster. Their invariable craving for material protection against those malignant gods and demons, as they thought them to be, has caused them to pin their faith on the efficacy of charms and amulets, which cherished objects are seen everywhere dangling from the dress of every man, woman, and child, not even excepting the Lâmas themselves. These charms, as we have seen, are mostly sentences of scriptural texts borrowed from holy books of Buddhism, and they are supplemented by bodily and other relics of holy Lâmas, such as bits of their dress, crumbs dropped by them, nail-parings, etc.; and by these the Tibetans believe that they muzzle or bind or banish the devils.

A more cheerful and graceful side to their worship is seen in their popular practice of planting the tall inscribed ‘prayer-flags,’ which picturesquely flutter in the breeze around every village, and in the strings of inscribed flaglets which flounce from house-tops, bridges, sacred trees, and passes, and from other places believed to be specially infested by malignant spirits or demons.

As the people live in an atmosphere of the marvellous, no story is too absurd for them to credit, if only it is told by Lâmas. They are ever on the outlook for omens, and the everyday affairs of life are governed by a superstitions regard for lucky and unlucky days and the influences of unpropitious planetary portents. Although special diversions are sought from the occupation of Lâmas in the most serious events in life—in birth, marriage, sickness, and death, and often in sowing, reaping, building, etc.—each lamaian determines for himself the auguries for the more trivial matters.
of his ordinary business, for travelling, buying and selling. At home they are apt to forget that Confucius and Cicero—to mention only these instances—believed in astrological aguraries.

Pilgrimages to sacred shrines are very popular, and little is thought of the hardships and expenses of long journeys for this purpose. Every opportunity is seized to visit celebrated shrines and to circumambulate the numerous holy buildings and sacred spots.

Prayers ever hang upon the lips of the people in the intervals of their work and even during their work. But the prayers are addressed chiefly to devils, threatening them with punishment through the saints and deified Buddhas, or imploring them for freedom or release from their infictions; or they are plain, naive requests for aid in obtaining the good things of this life. At all spare times, day and night, the people ply their prayer-wheels (g.e.v.), and tell their beads and mutter especially the mystic Sanskrit six-syllabled spell, Om ma-ni pad me hum, * Om the jewel in the lotus Hnbn, * the sentence which, they are led to believe, gains them their goal, the glorious heaven of eternal bliss, the paradise of the fabulous Buddha of Boundless Light (Amitabha) or the 'Boundless Life' (Amitayus g.e.v.). Yet with all their strivings the Tibetans are sincere in order to obtain real peace of mind in religious matters.

3. Bon or pre-Buddhist religion.—The aboriginal pre-Buddhist religion of Tibet is called by the people Bon (pronounced Fon); and those who profess it are called Bon-pa, i.e. 'the Bons.' The meaning of the word is unknown. It is essentially a shamanist, devil-charming, necromantic cult with devil-dancing, allied to the Taoism of China, and, like the latter, has been largely intermingled with Buddhist externals. But it still retains its essentially demonist character. It was actively suppressed and its establishments were destroyed by the Tibetan rulers on their conversion to Buddhism from the 7th cent. A.D. onwards, at the instigation of the Lamas, as it indulged freely in animal and human sacrifices; and it is still strictly forbidden by the Lamaist hierarchy which holds the temporal rule in Central and Western Tibet. But it is still largely and openly professed over the greater part of Eastern and South-Eastern Tibet, the most populous part of the country, which, for many centuries, was under Chinese rule and outside the domination of the Grand Lamas. Indeed it was an appeal by the people of these provinces to China to protect them and their Bon religion that induced the Chinese to administer these provinces on behalf of the Bons. This unsuspected fact of the wide prevalence of the Bon religion there was brought to light by W. W. Rockhill in his extensive travels in these provinces, where he found it to be much more popular and prevalent than Lamaism. It was especially popular among the settled agricultural people, whilst the nomads, whose business led them into the territory of the Grand Lamas, were more attached to Lamaism. So numerous were its adherents that Rockhill estimated that about two-thirds of the population of Tibet were Bons. In Central and Western Tibet, where the repressive policy of the Lamas prevents the profession of the Bon cult, it is rare to meet with any Bon priest. The present writer has met only a few itinerant priests who were clandestinely performing their demonist rites for villagers who they were usually illiterate and uncouth-looking men, exceptionally dirty, with long shaggy hair, and bedecked with little tufts of wool and tiny flags; and they indulged in devilish antics and inelegant chants.

In Eastern Tibet, however, where they are free to practise their cult, the Bon priests live in large flourishing monasteries, which they call gon-pas, like the Lamaist establishments; and they have many imitations of godling and demons generally resembling in appearance those of Lamaism, but bearing different names. Their chief god they call *Shen-rabs Mi-bo, who is reputed to be the god of the demified priests of the Bonist Padma Sambhava. They have bulky printed and MS books of ritual, which Rockhill found to consist of a Sanskrit jargon for the most part interspersed with other meaningless words.

The present writer observed that the words in some of their MSS, which are written in the Tibetan script, were the Lamaist Sanskrit words spelt backwards: the lotus-jewel formula of the Lamas was spelt *Mul-nam pad-mo,* thus, while attesting their borrowing from Lamaism, emphasizing their anti-Lamaist character. The swastika also, which they use extensively, is invariably figured with its ends or 'feet' turned in the reverse direction to that of the swastika proper (the feet of the latter turn to the right in the direction of the sun's course), and thus indicate the Bon cult to be of a lunar character which is evidently not only from the bloody sacrifices, but also from the predominance of the dragon-worship therein.

A significant glimpse into the original character of the Bon cult is obtained from the Chinese annals of the 8th cent. A.D. (i.e. before the introduction of Buddhism into Tibet), where the rites of the Tibetans are described:

"The officers (Tibetans) are assembled once every year for the lesser oath of the Bon religion, which is called the 'Bon ceremony,' first breaking their legs, and then killing them afterwards, exposing the intestines and cutting them into pieces. The sorcerers having being summoned, they call on the gods of heaven and earth, of the mountains and rivers, of the sun, moon, stars and planets, saying: 'Should your hearts become enraged, and your thoughts disorder, the gods will see clearly and make you like these sheep and dogs.' Every three years there is a grand ceremony, during which all are assembled in the middle of the night on a raised altar, on which are spread savoury meats. The victims sacrificed are men, horses, oxen, and asses, and prayers are offered up in this form: 'Do you all with one heart and united strength cherish our native country. The gods of heaven and the spirit of the earth will both know your thoughts, and if you break this oath, they will cause your bodies to be cut into pieces and you these victims.'"^2

Even in the Buddhist period, in the 8th cent. A.D., similar bloody rites were celebrated by the professing Buddhist king of Tibet in concluding a treaty with the Chinese.

The attire of the Bon priest in his special celebrations is a coat of mail armour, from the shoulders of which project small flags, and a high-crowned hat bordered by effigies of human skulls and ornamented by flags and tufts of wool; a sword and shield are in the hands to fight the demons. (The black-hatted devil-dancers are of the Bon sect.) On ordinary occasions they wear a red robe, and occasionally have human skulls embroidered on their dress. Their hair is worn shaggy, and not tamed like the Lamas. They offer on their altars wool and yak hair, and images of men and animals made of dough, and such, as shown by the present writer, instead of the sacrificed animal of the primitive cult.

Whilst the present-day lion religion has acquired many of the formalities of Lamaism, many of the elements of the old Bon religion have been incorporated into the latter, just as so many of the pagan rites of Roman and Celtic heathendom have

1 See art. DEVICATION (Buddhist).
2 See art. PILGRIMAGE (Buddhist), 6(0).
3 See art. JEWEL (Buddhist).
4 See art. JEWEL (Buddhist).
5 Diary of a Journey through Mongolia and Tibet, pp. 88, 89.
6 See the figure in L. A. Waddell, Buddhism of Tibet, p. 30.
been incorporated into the later Christianity. The reformed Lamaist Church of the Yellow-hat sect occupies a more ancient line of descent such as the necromantic expelling of the death-demon and the demons of sickness, and much of their divination-ritual. The unreformed Yellow-hat sect still retains some ancient rites to a much greater extent, including the erection of masts attached to dogs' and sheep's skulls, to 'bar the door' to the earth- and sky-demons.

Lamaism and its rites.—The various aspects of Lamaism and its sects and rites have already been described in previous articles.1


L. A. WADDELL.

TIME.—I. Introductory.—Temporal characteristics are among the most fundamental in the organism of experience, and cannot be defined by us. We must start by admitting that we can in certain cases judge that one experienced event is later than another, in the same immediate way we can assign one such object to the right of another. A good example of the immediate judgment in question is when we hear a tune and judge that of two notes, both of which come in our present series, one precedes the other. Another example, judgment about a needed fact, is made in genuine memory. On these relations of before and after which we immediately recognize in certain objects of our experience all further knowledge is built.

It must be noticed that the relation, as given in experience, connects what we may call protensive events, i.e. events that have some duration, and not momentary events. We are not directly aware of events without duration, still less of moments of empty time, and therefore are not directly aware of the relations between such objects. Momentary events, moments of time, are mere relations which order those objects which are all known only after a long process of reflexion, abstraction, and intellectual construction. This does not necessarily imply that they do not exist in nature, still less that they are subjective and arbitrary; all that is meant at present is that they are not the objects of direct awareness. Again we must notice that the relations of before, after, and simultaneous with, as given in experience, are not mutually exclusive. Protensive events may very well overlap, and therefore we must recognize that the most general relation between them is that of partial precedence or consequence. Of course, we are very familiar with the construction of momentary events and see how convenient it is to we tend to define partial precedence in terms of them and their relation of total precedence. But the opposite direction must be followed if we want to start with the experienced facts and trace the logical development from them of the scientific

1 *Buddhism of Tibet*, p. 341.

2 *Celticism* (Tibetan); Asta; Thubten, *Ethnology in Tibet* (Tibetan); *Chödmas and Amuletary* (Tibetan); *Death and Disposal of the Dead* (Tibetan); *Deities and Spiritb* (Tibetan); *Divination* (Tibetan); *Incarnation* (Tibetan); *Itulgu* (Tibetan); *Jewel* (Buddhist); *Lamaism*; *Lotus* (Indian); *Padma*; *Pratek* (Tibetan).

3 *We shall consider later what the Theory of Relativity has to say as to the impossibility of separating time and space and as to the notion of a single time-series.*

4 It is commonly believed that, when the analysis is made into moments and momentary events, all the events in the history of the world fall into their places in a single series of moments. So too it is supposed that, when the analysis is made into material and geometrical points, all the points in the world take their places in a single three-dimensional series of geometrical points.

5 *Alleged differences.*—(1) It is commonly held that all events have temporal relations to each other, but this is not true of geometrical relations. This is denied by a small number of philosophers, notably by Samuel Alexander.
Without questionning the possibility of correlating psychical events with positions in space, we must hold that this alleged difference is a genuine one. If in introspection we contemplate our states of mind in the same sense as in perception, we cannot deny that our states of mind show no trace of being extended or standing in spatial relations, but do have duration and stand in temporal ones. Alexander would, however, deny that we can contemplate states of mind. If this be so, it would of course be quite possible that we should fail to become aware of the spatial characteristics of our mental states, even though they possess them; but of course we have no right to pass from this merely negative position to the conclusion that they actually do possess them. Alexander's positive reasons are bound up with a large and complex metaphysical theory into which we cannot here enter. In any case the present difference is merely an external one, and would not affect the essential similarity of space and time.

(2) A much more important point is that time is said essentially to involve the distinction between past, present, and future as well as that between before and after. Now nothing in space obviates the possibility of time disappearing in time.

(3) Closely connected with this alleged difference are a number of rather vague statements often made—e.g., that parts of space co-exist, but that only the present moment exists. These are, if anything, the greatest differences between space and time may be treated together. They rest largely on confusions into which it is very natural to fall. The distinction between past, present, and future is not one which, like that between before and after, lies wholly in the experienced objects, but is one that rests on the relations between experienced objects and the states of mind in which they are experienced. To begin with, the distinction between present and not-present at any rate may be usefully compared with that between here and elsewhere in space. Here means near my body, elsewhere means distant from my body. If we want an analogy to the distinction between past and future, we can find one in the distinction between things before and things behind our body. It is true, however, that this analogy is incomplete, and that for an important reason, though one extraneous to the nature of time. The reason is that our practical and cognitive relations towards the future are different from those towards the past. The former is a part of the past at any rate directly by memory, but we know the future only indirectly by probable inference. There is no analogy to this in space; our knowledge of what is behind our body is of the same kind and of the same degree of certainty as our knowledge of what is in front of it. But we may imagine that a distinction like that between past and future would have arisen for space also, if we had been able to see straight in front of us but had never been able to turn our heads or our bodies round.

The distinction is sometimes drawn that the past is fixed and unalterable, while the matter depends, in part at any rate, on our volitions. In some sense is this true?

Without involving ourselves in controversies about free will and determination, we may at least assume that the laws of logic apply to propositions about the future. Hence any proposition asserting the occurrence of any future event must be true or false, and cannot be both. In that sense the future is as determinate as the past. But two points have to be noticed. (1) However much we may know about the laws of nature, I cannot make probable inference from the future to the present; nor can we acquire knowledge of the future, but I can make probable inference from the past to the future; e.g., if I know by observation that if the sun rises the future is now determinately true or false, I may be able to judge now from my knowledge of the past, that if there is no sun, and of the laws of nature, what propositions about future events are much more likely to be true than others. (It must of course be remembered in this connection that a proposition that is actually false may be much more likely to be true on my present information than one that is actually true.) We know with regard to certain classes of events that such events never occur unless preceded by a desire for their occurrence, and that such desire is directly correlated with the occurrence of the corresponding events. But the existence of a desire for a event does not introduce any probability that the event will occur; we did we might be said to affect the past in exactly the same sense in which we are said to affect the future. Thus the assertion that the sun rises in the future but that we cannot tell when to come down to this: (a) that propositions about the future can be inferred from other propositions about our knowledge of past and present, but not conversely, because of our lack of direct acquaintance with the future; and (b) that the general laws connecting a desire for a with the occurrence of other event must be of a class as a consequence and never as an antecedent.

3. Relation of time to logic. This brings us to the very important question of the relations of time to logic. If we say of any event e that it is present, this proposition will generally be false, and will be true only at one moment. It seems, then, as if the truth of the proposition altered with time. Any other proposition asserting the occurrence of an event—e.g., Queen Anne is dead—seems to be equally at the mercy of time. Then again there seems to be other propositions that are totally independent of time—e.g., 2 x 5 = 4. These are sometimes called universal truths; they always state relations between universals, and all our a propositions are of this kind; we may say that there are propositions which essentially involve time, but claim to apply to any time; e.g., whenever it rains and I am out without my umbrella, I get wet. Thus, on the face of it, there seem to be three kinds of propositions as regards time: (1) temporal truths, which are independent of time because they deal with the timeless relations of timeless objects; (2) hypotheticals asserting relations between various events—these contain an essential reference to time, but not to any particular time; (3) propositions which assert the occurrence of particular events, and which may be true at some times and false at all others, though this is not really so. There are two points to notice about the last class of propositions. (a) All propositions about events essentially contain a reference to a time, as all propositions about particular events essentially contain a reference to the particular time at which the event happens. This reference is not always made explicit; but, until this has been done, we cannot say that the verbal form stands for any definite proposition. (b) We have to distinguish between the time at which a judgment is made and the time involved in the proposition that is judged. When the latter is not temporally determined, the judgment is not temporal; or, to put it thus, it is not a temporal proposition. Only then, if I say "It is raining," does the expression involve time, since it clearly intends to refer to a particular event, and not just the state of affairs as a "It is raining," it is not a temporal proposition, since it says nothing about the time at which it rains. Therefore it seems to be sometimes true and sometimes false. But, as actually asserted, the event would be taken to express my judgment of the proposition. "It is raining at the time at which I say it," and this judgment is true or false, subject to a further correction which we shall add in moment. In fact, whenever we are told that a proposition is sometimes true and sometimes false, we know that we are dealing with an incomplete statement about an event, and that the real state of affairs is that a propositional function of the form e happens at t' gives true propositions for some values of t and false propositions for other values. But the propositions themselves are timeless true or false.

It is important to notice that in practice there is always the possibility of any verbal statement about events, no matter how uncertain it is, being sometimes true and sometimes false. We are not directly aware of moments of time, and so can date events only by other events. And the persons who read and use our verbal statements can only by some description the event which we use for purposes of dating. Now we can never be certain theoretically that only one unique event corresponds to any description. But this is often the case, and often there is real ambiguity in practice. Take, e.g., the amended expression offered above: "It is raining at the time at which I say it," and this is often the case. To any reader of this article the
expression remains ambiguous, because he knows that the event is not determined by a very ambiguous description, 'The writer's statement of the words "it is raining"—a description which applies to dozens of different events. In practice the writer may safely infer the fact that all the manifold circumstances under which the particular conversation takes place go into the description and make it practically unambiguous. In writing, the difficulty is solved practically by using only the original of dates sequence, such as the birth of Christ, whose full description is so complicated that it is almost certain that only one event answers to it. But the theoretical difficulty remains, and so we are tempted to say that any proposition about events is sometimes true and sometimes false. The proper thing to say is that any verbal expression referring to events, no matter how carefully put, always runs a theoretical risk of ambiguity—i.e., it might with equal propriety make one reader think of one proposition which is true, and another of another proposition which is false.

We can now apply these general results to the special case of events being sometimes future, and then present, and finally past. The statement 'e is present' is essentially incomplete and ambiguous, as it is for present tense, and sometimes true and sometimes false. The first thing, then, is to fill in the special time involved in the proposition. We then get 'e is present at t', where t is some definite moment fixed by some system of dating from a well-known and presumably unique event. What does this statement mean? Assuming that there are such things as moments, it means that e is at the moment t in an analogous way to that in which an object is at a position in space. The statement 'e is present at t' may be compared with the statement 'Mr. Asquith is present at the meeting', which means that his body is in the place where the meeting is held. In all complete statements of the form 'e is at t' we must understand the word 'is' as standing for a timeless copula, and distinguish it from the 'is' of the present tense, which is contrasted with 'was' and 'will be'. Let us denote the 'is' of the present tense by 'is now'. Then the statement 'e is now present' is an incomplete statement which is interpreted in use to mean 'e is at (or occupies) the same moment as my assertion that it is e is now present at t'. Similarly, 'e will be present' means 'e is future e is at a moment subsequent to my statement that e is now present. The laws of logic are of course concerned with the timeless copula, and they presuppose that statements containing tenses are reduced in the way suggested above.

4. Past, present, and future.—We see, then, that the real source of the distinction between past, present, and future, and of the difference here between time and space, is that our judgments as well as the events judged about are in time, while our judgments about things in space are not in any obvious sense in space. These three distinctions correspond to the three possible temporal relations between our judgments and the events which our judgments are about. These distinctions are important, and they have been enshrined in language because they are correlated with important epistemological and psychological distinctions. We all know that states of mind are essentially contemporary with their objects—e.g., the immediate awareness of visual sense-data when I open my eyes. Other states are essentially later than their objects—e.g., my memories. If we exclude the present moment, we may state the important epistemological proposition that all states of mind which give us an immediate knowledge of existents are either contemporary with or later than the existents.

It is important to notice that these statements are not merely analytic. There is a psychical difference between memories and awarenesses of contemporary sense-data which is open to introspection (though, of course, there may be marginal cases where the difference falls below the threshold of distinguishability), so that the statement that the former succeed and the latter are contemporary with their objects is a synthetic proposition.

We must, moreover, take into account the facts described in psychology as the specious present. In the first place, we must say that, if an object be known directly by a state of mind which succeeds it by more than a certain short time, t, which seems to be fairly constant for a given individual, the state counts introspectively as a memory, and the object is judged to be past. If the period between the object and the direct awareness of it be not greater than t, the awareness does not count for introspection as a memory, and the object is judged to be present. To say, then, that an object has not yet been presented (as is invariably the case in (timeless) the object of an immediate awareness which succeeds it by less than t, and (b) that my statement 'It is now past' succeeds it by more than t. We have still, however, to consider what is meant by the presentness of a state of mind. This seems to mean that, if a state of mind be the object of an act of introspection which succeeds it by less than certain short period, the state presents a certain peculiarity which does not present to any other act of introspection.

We can now deal with such statements as that only the present exists, or that the present is a mere transition from one infinite non-existent to another. These phrases are mere rhetoric rooted in confusions. It is perfectly true, of course, that the whole history of the world is not a complex of co-existing parts (in the sense of parts existing at the same time), as a table is. But this does not mean that it is not a whole, or that one part of it exists any less than any other part. To say that X no longer exists, or does not yet exist, simply means that X occupies my present mental state, or that I do not perceive my statement about it. At another moment I may make another statement of the same verbal form about X, and, since this no longer stands for the moment, I occupy my present mental state, or that I do not perceive my statement about it. But this involves no change in X itself. That X exists at a certain moment simply means that X occupies that moment, and this is timeless true. Similarly, the fact that this moment has a certain temporal relation to any definite assertion that I may make about X is a timeless true. That it has different and incompatible temporal relations to various assertions of the same verbal form made by me is also timeless true, and is not merely compatible with but also a necessary consequence of X's existence at its own moment. An event must continue to be, if it is to continue to stand in relations; the battle of Hastings continues to precede the battle of Waterloo, and therefore both these events must eternally be at their own respective moments. That both have ceased to be, it is to continue to stand in relations; the battle of Hastings continues to precede the battle of Waterloo, and therefore both these events must eternally be at their own respective moments. That both have ceased to be, if it is to continue to stand in relations; the battle of Hastings continues to precede the battle of Waterloo, and therefore both these events must eternally be at their own respective moments. That both have ceased to be, if it is to continue to stand in relations; the battle of Hastings continues to precede the battle of Waterloo, and therefore both these events must eternally be at their own respective moments.
The fallacy which we have to avoid is that of confounding the subject of co-existence; in one sense the parts of any related whole co-exist; in another only those events that occupy the same moment of time co-exist. It is clear that the whole course of events is in a certain sense a tetom simul; it becomes easy to see the answer to the famous theological problem: How can God’s foreknowledge of men’s actions be compatible with the freedom of men’s wills? The answer is as follows. Whether man’s wills be free or not, every man’s future actions are as completely determinate as his past ones; this is a mere consequence of the laws of logic. If indeterminism be true, then no amount of knowledge about past actions but that it becomethat the general laws of nature or the particular habits of a man, will enable us or even God to infer with certainty what the man’s volition at t actually is, although it is eternally perfectly determinate. These two statements are clearly quite compatible. Finally, in spite of the fact that God cannot infer the man’s volition at t, He may at any and every moment be directly aware of it in precisely the same way as we are aware directly (and not merely inferentially) of certain events through memories which are themselves later events. The facts that at a certain moment t, God can have a state of mind whose eternal volition is the volition of a man at some later moment t₂, and that no amount of knowledge of events before t₂ would enable Him to infer the volition at t₂, are perfectly compatible; and they cease to be even paradoxical when we compare the ease of memory and note that there is no essential difference between past, present, and future.

5. Divinity of time.—A great many philosophers have been concerned to deny the reality of time. Their arguments fall into two groups: (1) those that depend on the supposed infinity and continuity of time, and are therefore equally applicable to space; (2) those that depend on the supposed peculiarities of time—e.g., on the distinction of past, present, and future. Before considering the arguments in detail, it will be useful to make some quite general reflections.

(i.) It is a matter of direct inspection that the immediate objects of some of our states of mind have temporal characteristics. It is as certain that one note in a heard melody is after another in the same aperiod present and that each has some duration as that some objects in my field of view are red or square and to the right or left of each other. It is then quite certain that some objects in the world have temporal characteristics, viz., the immediate objects of some states of mind. Now it is also certain that these objects exist at least as long as I am aware of them, for, in such cases, I am obviously not aware of nothing. Hence there cannot be anything self-contradictory in the temporal characteristics found in these objects, for otherwise we should have to admit the existence of objects with incompatible characteristics. Hence there is no necessity why temporal characteristics should not also apply to what is not the immediate object of any state of mind. It follows, then, that criticism cannot reasonably be directed against temporal characteristics of the second sense, and it is thought that this prevents it from co-existing in the first. Yet this is necessarily false, since it is admitted that events do have and continue to have temporal relations, and therefore they must manifestly be the peculiarities those parts have being. The confusion is increased by the belief that past, present, and future are essential characteristics of objects in time in the same way as before and after are, instead of being analysable into the temporal relations of states of mind and their objects.

When it is once recognized that the whole course of events is in a certain sense a tetom simul, it becomes easy to see the answer to the famous theological problem: How can God’s foreknowledge of men’s actions be compatible with the freedom of men’s wills? The answer is as follows. Whether man’s wills be free or not, every man’s future actions are as completely determinate as his past ones; this is a mere consequence of the laws of logic. If indeterminism be true, then no amount of knowledge about past actions but that it becomethat the general laws of nature or the particular habits of a man, will enable us or even God to infer with certainty what the man’s volition at t actually is, although it is eternally perfectly determinate. These two statements are clearly quite compatible. Finally, in spite of the fact that God cannot infer the man’s volition at t, He may at any and every moment be directly aware of it in precisely the same way as we are aware directly (and not merely inferentially) of certain events through memories which are themselves later events. The facts that at a certain moment t, God can have a state of mind whose eternal volition is the volition of a man at some later moment t₂, and that no amount of knowledge of events before t₂ would enable Him to infer the volition at t₂, are perfectly compatible; and they cease to be even paradoxical when we compare the ease of memory and note that there is no essential difference between past, present, and future.

(ii.) It is an obvious of importance to be clear as to what is the particular view of time that is attacked by special arguments. The important distinction for us to make is this: it is possible to say (a) that there are no moments of moments of time, and that events occupy some of them but are distinct from them, and have temporal relations to each other in virtue of those which subsist between the moments that they occupy; or (b) that there are no such things as moments distinct from events, but that events really do have direct temporal relations to each other; or (c) that there are no moments, and that even events only appear to have temporal relations to each other. It is clearly possible to deny (a) without denying (b). To do this can hardly be called denying the reality of time; it should rather be called denying the arbitrariness of time in favour of the relative theory. It is only philosophers who deny both (a) and (b) and support (c) who can strictly be said to deny the reality of time. It is quite possible, however, that some arguments might be equally fatal to (a) and to (b).

It will be well at this point to say what we can about the controversy between absolutists and relativists. The absolute theory strictly means that temporal relations between events are regarded as compounded out of two relations—(1) that of an event to the moment of time which it occupies, and (2) the relation of before and after between moments of time. The relative theory holds that there are no moments, but that temporal relations hold directly between events. Its most important philosophical upholder is Leibniz, though he goes a good way further in the direction of (c); it is also held, with a good deal of misunderstanding and confusion, by many modern physicists of a philosophical bent. We may say that the relative theory stands at one remove, and the absolute theory at two removes, from what we find in the objects of immediate experience. Here we find, as we have seen, an infinity of finite duration and relations of partial precedence. The relative theory replaces those objects by series of momentary events of no duration, and the relations by those of total precedence and simultaneity. The absolute theory takes the further step of replacing a whole new set of objects which have no duration and stand in relations of total precedence but never of simultaneity, and a new relation, viz., that between a momentary event and the moment which it occupies.

Neither theory has been very accurately stated by most of its supporters. Newton, for instance, one of the chief upholders of the absolute theory, was mainly concerned with the measurement of time and the desire to have a constant rate-measurer; but in his later theories, when thought out, may be reduced to what has been stated above. We may say at once that we know of no way of deciding conclusively between the two. But if some past events and momentary states may exist, we now know that all their
work can be done by certain logical functions of nothing but events and their duration and their connectedness. Hence both theories may be said to be assuming entities which are not necessary to science and cannot be either discovered (i.e., momentary events in the relative theory, and moments in the absolute theory), and the absolutes is the worse of the two. As certain logical functions of what actually exists (viz., certain classes of events) moments do exist; but whether there also exists any a priori logical connection of the type of individuals and not of that of classes is it seems folly to attempt to determine. It is, however, often convenient to continue to speak in terms of moments, and this is harmless for the reasons given above.

(1) Those based on its supposed infinity commonly confuse infinity with endlessness. They generally proceed on the assumption that what is meant by the infinity of time is that it has neither a first nor a last moment. But this would be perfectly compatible with the whole course of time lasting for no more than a second. The fractions between 0 and 1, arranged in order of magnitude, have neither a first nor a last term, and yet the interval between any two of them is less than unity. But all attempts to prove that time or the series of events is endless fail. Thus attempts to prove that they cannot have ends. The most celebrated argument on both sides of this question is contained in Kant’s first antimony. His argument against the endlessness of time, interpreted as characteristically possible, comes to the statement that, because there are definite points in the time-series—in particular, the point which we have reached when we read Kant’s argument—therefore the series must have a definite beginning point. Otherwise, Kant says, the series of events could never have reached the definite point which it admittedly has reached. The argument is, of course, a complete non-sequitur, for it practically amounts to saying that a series cannot have any definite term unless it has end points. And this is sufficiently refuted by considering that the number 22 is perfectly definite, although the series of numbers with signs in it has neither a first nor a last term.

Arguments to prove that time or the series of events in time cannot have a beginning are perhaps more plausible. It is difficult for us psychologically to imagine a first event or a first momentum, because all the events that we can remember have been preceded by others. Also there are some difficulties connected with causation in the notion of a first momentum that do not apply to a first moment or to a last event. A first event is one which no event precedes, though there may of course be moments that precede a first event. Now, the only plausible general proposition about causation seems to be that, if the whole universe be completely causes for a finite time, it could not begin to exist.1 This means that, if the universe be in the same state at any two moments $t_1$ and $t_2$ and at all moments between them, it will be in the same state at all moments later than $t_2$. Now, to say that a change happens at $t_1$ means that, if the state of the universe at $t_1$ be $s$, and if it also be $s$ at any later moment $t_2$, then there is a moment between $t_1$ and $t_2$ at which its state is different from $s$. It follows from this definition that to say that a first event happens at $t$ involves that the universe has been in the same state for a finite time before $t$. And this is contrary to our proposition about causation. If, then, we accept this proposition as an a priori truth, there is a first event, though that might be a first event in certain isolated parts of the universe (e.g., the creation of the world) provided that there had never been a first event in other parts (e.g., in the mind of God). But, of course, there remains the doubt whether our axiom about causation be not a mere prejudice masquerading as a self-evident fact.

It must be carefully noted that, if there be a first event, there need not be a first moment of time, and that, if there be a first moment of time, there need not be a first event. There must be a first moment of time and no first event, either there might be no moment, except the first, that was not occupied by an event, or there might be a duration unoccupied by events. These consequences follow from the continuity of time, and have often been overlooked by philosophers ignorant of the mathematical theory of continuity.

Leibnit was the main argument against the absolute theory of time on the fact that, if it were true, there might be a period, finite or infinite, before any event happened. This period must be definite; and yet, the moments of time having no intrinsic difference, there is no reason why the first of it should be ended or limited by one moment rather than another. If, on the other hand, we avoid this by assuming that there is an event at every moment of time, there is no reason for assuming both events and moments, for the series of events will suffice.

This argument is a sound one against assuming that there are moments, though it certainly cannot disprove it. If, however, we suppose that there were moments, they would doubtless have intrinsic differences, though we could not discover them. We must further recognize some ultimate facts, and none of these might be that the course of events is preceded by such and such a duration of empty time.

We may sum up our conclusions as follows. Arguments to disprove the reality of time from its infinity and continuity either confine themselves to criticizing infinity and continuity as such or introduce considerations about causality. Arguments of the first kind would be equally fatal to any infinite or continuous series, and therefore prove too much, for they would destroy the series of real numbers. And we now know that all such arguments do rest on confusions and attempts at an insufficient analysis of the notions of infinity and continuity. There is therefore no reason why the series of moments at any rate should not be either (a) endless or (b) of infinite length. The second set of arguments can apply only to events and not to the series of events which do not apply to a first moment or to a last event. A first event is one which no event precedes, though there may of course be moments that precede a first event. Now, the only plausible general proposition about causation seems to be that, if the whole universe be completely causes for a finite time, it could not begin to exist.1 This means that, if the universe be in the same state at any two moments $t_1$ and $t_2$ and at all moments between them, it will be in the same state at all moments later than $t_2$. Now, to say that a change happens at $t_1$ means that, if the state of the universe at $t_1$ be $s$, and if it also be $s$ at any later moment $t_2$, then there is a moment between $t_1$ and $t_2$ at which its state is different from $s$. It follows from this definition that to say that a first event happens at $t$ involves that the universe has been in the same state for a finite time before $t$. And this is contrary to our proposition about causation. If, then, we accept this proposition as an a priori truth, there is a first event, though that might be a first event in certain isolated parts of the universe (e.g., the creation of the world) provided that there had never been a first event in the universe here must be taken to include God, if there be one.

1 The universe here must be taken to include God, if there be one.
by Leibniz against absolute time, though it would presumably apply to events just as well. It is met, of course, by the consideration that past, present, and future are equally real, and that these characteristics do not belong to events as such, but in virtue of the temporal relations between them and certain psychical events.

A somewhat different argument against the reality of time has been produced by J. M. E. McTaggart. 1 His argument is that every event is past or present, and that an attempt to avoid the incompatibility of these predicates by saying that the event has been future, is present, and will be past involves a vicious circle or a vicious infinite regress. The answer is that, whenever we consider any definite statement about the pastness, presentness, or futurity of an event, we can see that there is no contradiction. Take a definite statement by McTaggart that Queen Anne’s death is now past and has been present and future. Suppose we interpret this to mean that Queen Anne’s death is not the direct object of any awareness (even a memory) which is contemporary with McTaggart, but that it is contemporaneous with some states of mind (e.g., Lord Bolingbroke’s) which prece ded McTaggart’s statement; and that it is later than some thoughts about it (e.g., William III’s), which also prece ded the statement. Then these propositions seem to be timelessly true, perfectly compatible, and to contain all that is meant in the assertion by McTaggart that Queen Anne’s death is past and has been present and future.

We may conclude, then, that no satisfactory proof has been offered even that absolute time is unreal, still less that the series of events and their direct temporal succession cannot exist.

6. Measurement of duration.—It seems to have been the question of a rate-measurer that led Newton to the theory of absolute time. Newton considers a number of periodic events which are roughly isochronous, and compares their rough isochronism with ‘absolute time, which flows uniformly.’ It is an unfortunate way of introducing absolute time. In the first place, it is of no practical use to any one. Whether absolute time flows uniformly or not, we can only observe events and must use them, or processes based on them, as our rate-measurers. Again, the statement that these processes are isochronous completely obscures. Time cannot be said to flow, for this seems to imply that time changes; and this would make time consist of a series of events in time. Nor is it at all clear what Newton meant by uniformity in this connexion. Presumably the meaning must be that the moments of time form a series like the real numbers. What we really want to know is whether we can find any periodic process such that the time that elapses between corresponding stages in each repetition is the same. But no essential reference to absolute time is involved here. We must beware of confusing the two statements: (1) there are definite intervals of a certain determinate duration, and this duration is independent of our methods of measurement; and (2) there are absolute moments of time, and their interval between any two of them has a definite magnitude. The latter implies the former, but not conversely. The real problem is: Granted that there is a definite interval between pairs of events, how are we to measure it?

1 The Unreality of Time,’ Mind, new ser., xvii. [1908] 457-474.

space, and we may have fairly good reasons to believe that it has not altered in length. The corresponding procedure in time-measurement is to find some process which can be repeated at any moment and can be assumed to have the same period whenever it is repeated. Such processes may be called isochronous. But, even when an isochronous process has been secured, it cannot be used to measure time in the same direct way in which a rod can be used to measure length. A rod will not as a rule fit an exact number of times into what we want to measure; it is therefore divided into a number of equal parts. Similarly we want an isochronous process that can be divided into equal subdivisions which can be easily recognized; i.e., we want a process which itself consists of a number of similar processes which all occupy equal times. Now, it is not nearly so easy to see that a process takes the same time whenever it is repeated as to be sure that a rod keeps the same length wherever we use it; and it is much less easy to divide a process into parts that occupy equal times than to divide a rod into parts that have equal lengths. The recognizable divisions in a process of which we are not conscious, while divisions on a rod can be fixed by us with marks without affecting the rod as a whole.

Nevertheless the assumptions that have to be made, and the peculiar mixture of observation and convention that is involved, are the same in principle for the measurement of time and of space. The fact is that we can make immediate comparisons both of length and of time with a certain amount of accuracy. We believe that these judgments are the more accurate the nearer the objects to be compared are in time and space, and the more similar the circumstances under which each is inspected. Turning to these judgments, we see reason to believe that both the lengths of rods and the time taken by processes may vary when the rods are moved or the processes repeated. But we believe that the variation always depends on the fact that change of position in space or time involves change in the relations of the rod or the process to pieces of matter, and that mere changes of position in absolute time and space—whether such changes be—makes no difference. We learn by experience what are the most important factors that determine change of length or of period, and we can allow for them. It is found that the lengths of the periods of clocks are more largely affected by changes in the surroundings than are the lengths of such bodies as steel rods.

Our method of determining an ideal rate-measurer is somewhat as follows. We begin with some process which is sensibly isochronous— e.g., the swing of a pendulum, or the time taken for a complete rotation of the earth on its axis. We can judge of this isochronism with a certain amount of accuracy by direct comparison in memory, just as we can compare lengths by looking at them. We can go farther than this. Just as we are greatly helped in our comparison of lengths by putting the objects to be compared side by side, so we can use expedients to hold our judgments of the isochronism of processes. If we start two pendulums together and then reverse their periods back to the same, the divergence will become more and more marked the longer they swing. If no divergence be noted after many swings, we may conclude that each swing of one takes the same time as the corresponding swing of the other. This does not prove that the successive swings of either are isochronous; for the period of each may be varying according to the same law. But, if we also find that the periods of one of a pair of pendulums begins to lag behind the corresponding period of some other
sensibly isochronous process which is physically very different, it becomes very improbable that there should be any law by which the successive periods of two such very different processes alter in precisely the same way. We are therefore justified in concluding on evidence that the successive periods of these sensibly isochronous processes are actually isochronous. The next step is to state all the laws of nature which have been introduced for the purpose of accounting for the equal intervals of time measured by complete periods of such processes. We find, e.g., that, if it be supposed that the successive rotations of the earth on its axis are isochronous, the laws of motion can be very simply stated and are very nearly verified by all the mechanical phenomena that we can observe. So far we are entirely in the region of what can be experienced or rendered very probable from what we experience. But now a conventional element enters. We shall probably find that, when time is measured by an actual physical process and when our laws have been stated in terms of time so measured, a new process of popular cause can be given that there are slight divergences from the laws which cannot be accounted for by mere experimental errors. The last stage in the determination of the equality of times now begins. We argue that the suggested laws are reasonable, that this is the most reasonable plan is not to keep the same time-measures and complicate the laws, but to suppose that the laws are rigidly true but the time-measurer not perfectly accurate; i.e., that the successive periods of this physical process are not perfectly isochronous. We therefore erect the laws into principles, define equality of times by them, and apply the necessary corrections to our observed time-measure. There is nothing particularly arbitrary about this. We believed, to begin with, as the result of direct judgments assisted by the use of such expedients as have been described above, that a certain periodic process is isochronous. We admitted, however, that deviations from isochronism so small as to escape the notice of any direct method are possible. We then stated our laws in terms of time as measured by this process, and found them to be simple and very nearly true; but, if they are to retain their simple form and become quite true, a small correction must be made in the assumed isochronism of the process. This correction is one which can be deduced from our experience; for we admitted all along the possibility of errors too small for direct detection. The procedure has the least trace of arbitrariness if, as is often the case, we can see the physical cause of the lack of complete isochronism in our time-measurer and can fully explain this lack in accordance with the laws which we have erected into principles. This has happened, e.g., with the earth as a time-measurer, where we can explain its small defect from isochronism, when once we have to assume it, by the frictional effect of the tides acting according to the laws of mechanics. Even when no physical cause can be detected for the presumed lack of isochronism, it is always possible to suggest a hypothetical one. But, in so far as this has to be done, our procedure does become more arbitrary; and a point may be reached where a full explanation of all the phenomena demands a real change in the form of the laws with or without a change in the time-measurer. This has happened in recent years to the laws of motion. The recent investigations on the movements of small electrically charged particles with a velocity comparable to that of light.

7. Theory of Relativity.—The next point to be considered is the difficulty of distinguishing between the phenomena and simultaneity among events which are not the objects of any one experience. We have seen that in favourable cases we can immediately judge that one event that we experience is after another that we experience. Other people can make similar judgments about events in their experience. But we cannot directly judge of the temporal relations of events which we and not others experience. Matters are on exactly the same footing with spatial relations. I may be immediately aware that one object in my field of view is to the right of another. How can I be aware of movements and be able to make similar judgments about his visual sense-data. But it remains to be seen what is meant by saying that an object which A experiences is at the right of one which B experiences; or again what is meant by the statement that of two objects which no one experiences—a.g., two atoms—one is to the right of the other. What is wanted is to be able to date events in a time-series which is neutral as between A’s experience and B’s, and shall contain events that do not fall into the direct experience of any one. In this problem we must carefully distinguish between two questions which are liable to be confused: (1) How do we know with regard to any two definite events, e1 and e2, whether e1 is before or after or simultaneous with e2? The answer to the first question is that the relations in the neutral series are regarded as having the same logical properties as those which we directly experience, or at any rate as being capable of statement in terms of the logical properties of these relations. Possibly a temporal relation as experienced by A has a sensuous particularity different from that possessed by one experienced by B; just as it is impossible to say whether the quality of what one sees at a moment is really the same as that which another sees at a moment. But we may be able to say that the relations in the neutral series are always in agreement with the relations of the same objects in the experiences of the two people. The distinction between the space and time of each man’s experience and a neutral space and time runs parallel with the distinction between the immediate objects of each man’s experience and neutral (or, as we call them, physical) objects. However we may suppose these objects are constituted, and whatever we suppose to be the relation between our minds and them, it must be assumed that physical objects are in the neutral space, and that their changes take place in the neutral time and make themselves known to us by correlated changes in the immediate objects of our experience.

It is not necessary here to consider how a number of people, M1, . . . , Mn, in their respective sense-data are all correlated with the same physical event. But it is necessary to notice that they will find, by and by, in the case of sound, that, if their physical laws are to give at all a simple and complete account of what they may expect to hear under given circumstances, they must assume that the sounds heard by various people, and all correlated by them with a single physical event, are not in general contemporaneous with each other. The greatest accuracy and simplicity is introduced into the laws of sound by supposing that the hearing of the various people takes place at times dependent on the positions of their bodies in physical space and on the spatio-temporal position of the single physical event correlated with each sound. This example brings out three very important points. (1) The determination of the temporal
relations between events in the minds or in the immediate objects of the minds of different people can be accomplished only when these events have been correlated in some definite way with supposed neutral physical events; (2) the temporal relations of the events are such as to make the laws telling us what sensations to expect in given circumstances as simple and accurate as possible; (3) it follows from these considerations that the determination of the neutral time-series and of the positions of physical objects in a neutral space must proceed pari passu.

Suppose, e.g., that we say that the velocity of sound is $v$ centimetres per second: (1) we want to connect all the known facts about the sounds which people hear under circumstances that can be directly experienced; (2) we want to do this compatibly with the assumptions which have already been made as to what heard sounds are to be classed together as connected with one physical event; and (3) we want our laws which sum up the known facts and anticipate experience to be as simple as is compatible with accuracy. We find that these ends can best be accomplished by supposing that A's hearing of $s_1$ and B's hearing of $s_2$ (as and $s_2$ being both correlated with the single physical event $S$) take place at times $t_1$ and $t_2$ respectively, where $t_1$ is the date of $S$ in the neutral time-series, and $s_1$ and $s_2$ are the respective distances between the place where $S$ happens in physical space and $A$'s and $B$'s bodies as physical objects. We must remember that the correlation of several sources of data with a single physical event and the assignment of positions in neutral space to physical events are carried out according to general principles as the dating of events in neutral time and as the measurement of distance already described; i.e., we start with instinctive judgment of distance and velocity, and then proceed to make a more accurate determination of our terms, guided by the general motive of maximum simplicity and simplicity of scientific laws.

As we have seen, sound is the first and most obvious case where it is necessary to assume different dates for different members of a group of sense-data which are all correlated with a single physical event. The more accurate researches of science necessitate a similar process for dealing with the sense-data of sight, and so the notion of a velocity of light is introduced. These velocities, once determined, furnish a criterion of before and after among physical events, and, through them, for events in different minds.

Let us denote any moment at B by the symbol $\tau_B$, and an event which happens at the point $A$ at the moment $\tau_A$ by $\sigma_A$. Let us use the same notation for events and moments at B. Then we can say: An event $\sigma_B$ precedes an event $\sigma_A$ if a disturbance leaving $\sigma_B$ reaches $\tau_A$ before it. Now, however, it is to be observed that we do not believe that any disturbance travels faster than light. It can be shown that, if the celerity of a material body in a medium is to be less if time between events at different places, there will be pairs of such events of which we have no reason to say that one is either before, after, or contemporaneous with the other.

To see this, consider the following case. Let $\sigma_A$ happen at $A \equiv t_1$. A signal which leaves $A$ at $\tau_1$ cannot reach $B$ before a certain moment $\tau_2$. Again, a signal that reaches $A$ at $\tau_1$ cannot have left $B$ after a certain moment $\tau_3$. On our criterion, therefore, $\sigma_B$ is before any moment that is after $\tau_2$ and is after any moment that is before $\tau_3$. But how are events at $B$ which happen between $\tau_2$ and $\tau_3$ related to the event $\sigma_1$? Take an event $\sigma_B$ such that $\tau_B$ is between $\tau_2$ and $\tau_3$. You cannot say that it is before $\tau_1$; for a disturbance leaving $B \equiv t_2$ would reach $A$ later than $\tau_1$. But you also cannot say that $\tau_2$ is before it; for a disturbance leaving $A \equiv t_1$ would reach $B$ later than $\tau_2$ (viz. at $\tau_3$). Hence on our criterion we can neither say that $\tau_2$ is before $\tau_B$ nor that $\tau_B$ is before $\tau_3$. Moreover, there is an infinite number of events at B of the form $\tau_B$, where $t_2$ is between 0 and 2. Thus we cannot cut the knot by saying that, since they are neither before nor after $\tau_1$, they are contemporaneous with it, or they are not contemporary with each other. Thus one and only one of the class of events $\tau_B$, can be taken to be contemporary with $\tau_1$, and the rest, so far as our present ideas go, must be held to be neither before, after, nor simultaneous with $\tau_1$. We are thus compelled to recognize that we may have no means of deciding whether a pair of events in different places in physical space are contemporary or not in physical time.

We can, if we like, accept this result, and build up our physics on the assumption that physical time really is non-consecutive; i.e., that, though all events have temporal relations to some events, none have temporal relations to all events. This has recently been done very fully and ably by A. A. Robb. 1 One may say that the course of assuming that physical time really is consecutive, but that in certain cases all criteria fail to determine the actual temporal relations which subsist between events in different places. We then must rely on a priori considerations (for example) that one particular event of the class of events at B, whose temporal relations to $\tau_B$ are left doubtful by our criteria, is contemporary with $\tau_B$ and that whatever precedes this one precedes $\tau_B$ and whatever follows it follows $\tau_B$. It is customary to assume that the event at B which comes midway between $\tau_B$ and $\tau_B$ is contemporary with $\tau_B$, but it must be noticed that this is a mere convention, though doubtless the most reasonable one to make. (On our notation this event would naturally be $\tau_B$.)

We must notice further that, for this convention to be determinate at all, we must assume that we know that the time-measurer at B goes at the same rate as that at A, and that both go uniformly. Now, if the time-measurers cannot be moved about with the same uniformity as the emitting and receiving signals from one to the other—e.g., light-signals—and, even if they can be moved about, our only test for the continuance of their synchronism, when they have been moved apart and are no longer in view together, is by light-signals. On the other hand, the question whether our tests for synchronism by light-signals are genuine tests (i.e., involve synchronism in physical time) depends on whether the velocity of light relative to the system containing the time-measurers is constant in time and the same in all directions. And this last point cannot be determined until the time-measurers in two places have been synchronized; for it is obvious that to measure a velocity we need to know the time in two places. We see, then, that the possibility of synchronizing time-measurers and the uniformity of the velocity of light stand and fall together, and that neither can be proved independently of the other. If we allow that the velocity of light relative to the system is constant and uniform in all directions, our tests for synchronism and uniformity in our time-measurers are valid; if we allow that the criteria ensure physical synchronism, the physical velocity of light (as distinct from its numerical measure on our convention) will be constant and uniform. But neither question is or ever will be capable of independent settlement; and therefore we simply have to make a convention that the meaning to be attached to synchronism in different places is agreement with the tests based on light-signals, and another convention that distances shall be so measured that the measure of the velocity of light relative to the system is independent of time and of direction.

Suppose now that the people on a system S determine their spatio-temporal co-ordinates in this way, and that another system S', moving with uniform translational velocity relative to S, determine their spatio-temporal co-ordinates similarly. Let them arrange, as they can do, that the time-measurers at the origin of each go at the same rate; and further let them arrange their units so that the velocity of light as measured by each from experiments with sources and mirrors fixed in their own system shall have the same magnitude and measure. Then it can be proved that each will find the same numerical measure for the velocity of light, even though the sources and mirrors be in uniform motion relative

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1 A Theory of Time and Space.
to the two systems. (6) It is possible to find equations connecting the space-time co-ordinates of two systems S and S', such that the co-ordinates of the people on S give to any momentary event which they observe with those in which the people on S' give to the same event. These are the celebrated transformations of the Theory of Relativity. Now, as we should expect, perfectly reciprocal, since the relative motion of S and S' is a perfectly mutual phenomenon. But (c) they lead to certain rather startling results. (1) Lengths and times are not defined, while the motion of relative motion which are judged to be equal by the people on one system will be judged to be unequal by those on the other. The ratio depends on the relative velocity and on the value of the velocity of light which is common to the two systems. (2) Events in different places which are judged to be contemporaneous by the people on one system will be judged to occur at different times by those on the other system, and the difference of time will depend on the distance apart parallel to the direction of relative motion.

Although the observers on the two systems thus differ, they cannot criticize each other. Each has his own plan in setting out his co-ordinates and synchronizing his time-measurers. And it would be quite futile for one to claim that his results are the right ones because his system is at rest, while the other is in motion. For the relative motion is completely reciprocal, and neither absolute motion nor any consequence of it can be observed. Lastly, it is equally futile for one to say that he is at rest 'relative to the ether,' while the other is in motion; for we know that no experiment whatever has been able to demonstrate motion 'relative to the ether,' and this motion may fairly be discredited as a fiction. This is a snapshot of the matter is that there is nothing to choose between their respective judgments, and that all the laws of nature can be stated as truly and will have precisely the same form, no matter which of an infinite number of systems in uniform translational motion be taken as the basis for spatio-temporal co-ordinates. This result, with the mathematical consequences that flow from it, is known as the Theory of Relativity. Its philosophical importance is that it enables us to see the tacit assumptions that are made when we talk of events at different places being contemporaneous; and the fact that measurement of distance is entangled with measurement of time with the distance between objects at any time involves a decision as to what is meant, by the same time in two different places. Though it no more completely refutes the possibility of absolute space and time than does any other argument (for after all it only deals with our numerical measures and leaves it open whether one system of time-measurers is physically uniform and synchronous and one system of space-measurers directly represents distances in physical space), yet it helps to render the notions of absolute space and time still more spectral and remote from all possible experience than before. For it enables us to see that there are a certain indeterminateness and conventionality even in the measurement of the distance between physical objects and of the lapse between events; and that therefore what we can know is even at a further remove than we had thought from the points of absolute space and the moments of absolute time.

The Theory of Relativity sketched above was first put forward in the 'Lorentz-Fitzgerald contraction paper,' 'Über das Relativitätssnipp and die aus denselben gezogenen Folgerungen,' which appeared in the Jahrbuch der Radioaktivität und Elektronik for 1907. This may be called the restricted Theory of Relativity, that is to say, it is merely characterized as consisting of an experimental fact and a philosophical principle suggested by a great number of facts. The philosophical principle is that, since we can never observe absolute time, space, or motion, even if there be such things, the laws of physical phenomena as learned from observation must retain the same form for acts of observers in uniform motion relative to each other. This persistence of form (or covariance, as it is technically called) in the differential equations that express the laws of nature does not in general imply that the actual magnitudes measured by two observers in uniform relative motion will be the same.

Finally, an observer moving with his instruments relative to an electrically charged body will detect magnetic as well as electric forces, whilst one who is at rest with his instruments relative to this body will observe only electrical forces, but the differential equations connecting the effects noted by one observer with another and his x, y, z, and 4 coordinates will be precisely the same as those connecting the effects noted by the other observer with each other and with his x, y, z, and 4 coordinates.

This principle by itself, however, would be of little use, since it does not enable us to say what connexion exists between the co-ordinates of the two observers. But, if there be any magnitude, which is not merely covariant but also invariant as between different observers in uniform relative motion, the transformations connecting the two sets of co-ordinates which express the laws of nature for one observer with those of another who is moving relative to the first. The precise significance of Einstein's principle of the 'Constancy of Light Velocity' has been indicated above, and shown to be connected with the way in which we are forced to lay out a system of co-ordinates and to define simultaneity between events in different places. Einstein's restricted theory has claimed many triumphs. It explains at once what is known as Fresnel's dragging-coefficient for light passing through matter that moves relative to the observer. It also accounts for the change of mass with velocity which is observed when small particles move with speed comparable to that of light. The principle necessitates slight changes in the previously accepted form of some of the laws of nature. Maxwell's equations and the laws of hydrodynamics in hydrodynamics do indeed at once and without modification fulfill the condition of covariance. But the laws of mechanics, as they stand, are not in accord with the principle and need modifications which only become practically important in dealing with the motion of matter with velocities comparable to that of light.

Considerable philosophic importance, in connexion with the nature of time, attaches to the work of Minkowski.

On the ordinary Newtonian mechanics the form of the laws of nature is unchanged if the three spatial axes be twisted in space about their right angle so as to make a rigid body. Minkowski showed that the Lorentz-Einstein transformation is equivalent to a twist of the space nature performed on a set of four mutually rectangular axes in a four-dimensional space. These axes are the ordinary spatial axes, the time axis multiplied by the square root of -1, the root of which is -i. So far the theory must be regarded as a merely elegant mathematical device, since the fourth axis is imaginary in the mathematical sense, and the angle of solution is also imaginary. But, if we do not assume that the geometry of space-time is four-dimensional 'space-time,' we have an important meaning. We can utilize Minkowski's transformation of the relative transformation to those systems we suppose space-time to be hyperbolic (i.e., the geometry of Lobatchewski), the absolute transformations of common sense to be represented by a set of four real co-ordinates, and the idea simply depends on the fact that we can utilize space and space; so that really we are dealing with a four-dimensional
manifest in which space and time are homogeneous with each other, but whose geometry is not Euclidean but Lobat- istic.

The work of philosophical mathematicians since Minkowski's death has consisted largely in de- veloping the notion that the ultimate data in the world are events in space-time, i.e. events extended both in space and in time. The concept of a apecious present forms an example of such data. Space and time as used in the sciences only emerge at the end as elaborate mathematical constructions built on initially perceptible relations between extended events.

The best exposition of this point of view is con- tained in A. N. Whitehead's Principles of Natural Knowledge, which begins with a severe criticism of the concepts of classical physics and proceeds to elaborate the notions of space, time, and matter from the crude data of sense and their immediately given spatio-temporal relations. It seems hardly possible to doubt that this is the right path for further research, but it demands a combination of philosophical and mathematical abilities of so high an order that few can tread it successfully. A lexicographer's Gifted Lecturer has developed the notion of space-time with great full- ness from the purely philosophic side, but, at the time of writing, his lectures have not appeared in print and it is impossible to give an account of his views from the short synopses which are alone available.

It remains to say a few words about the general- ized Theory of Relativity. As far as we have only considered observers in uniform relative motion and have laid down a principle of relativity for them, Einstein has occupied himself in the last few years in removing this restriction and thus laying the foundations of the older theory, into the scope of the Theory of Relativity.

A particle is said to be under the action of no force if it moves uniformly in a straight line. But the question whether it moves in a straight line and whether it moves uniformly is clearly related to our spatial axes and to our measure of time. If, e.g., a particle moves uniformly in a straight line relative to the rectangular axes $x$ and $y$, it will not do so relative to axes which rotate about the origin in the $xy$ plane. Accordingly, relative to one set of axes it will be said to be under the action of no force, whilst relative to the second set it will be said to be under the force required to produce the observed accelerations. Now the 'forces' introduced by these mere changes of our axes of reference in this respect very much like the force of gravitation. They, like it, affect all forms of matter indifferently and depend only on the mass, not on the special nature of the moving body. On the other hand, a genuine force field cannot be altogether transformed away by a suitable change of axes, say from $x$ and $y$ to $x'$ and $y'$, so that the particle this can be done by choosing axes fixed in the particle, but relative to these axes the other particles in the field will still be accelerated. Now, it seems clear that a mere change of axes could not make any difference to the form of the laws of nature, and, therefore, if gravitation were capable of being transformed away merely by a suitable change of axes, the principle of relativity would assert that the presence of a gravitational field makes no difference to the form of the laws of nature. For the reason mentioned above the principle of relativity cannot be taken in this unrestricted sense. It may, however, be taken to assert that the form of the laws of nature is unaltered in a gravitational field up to a certain (yet undetermined) order of differential coefficients.

It is now necessary to see the bearing of these results on the constitution of the 'space-time' of nature.

It has been proved by Riemann that the metrical geometry of any space is completely determined when the 'linear element,' i.e. the interval between any pair of infinitely near points, is expressed as a function of the coordinates of the two points.

This three-dimensional Euclidean space is com- pletely defined by the equation

\[ ds^2 = dx^2 + dy^2 + dz^2 \]

for the linear element. Now the metrical properties of four- dimensional 'space-time' will be completely determined when we denote by $x$, $y$, $z$, and $t$ (the interval of any pair of adjacent points in it) as expressed as a function of the coordinates of the two points.

In space-time, therefore, the ten coefficients of $dx^2$, $dy^2$, and $dz^2$, etc. in space-time, therefore, the ten coefficients of $dx^2$, $dy^2$, and $dz^2$, etc. must be known in order to determine $ds^2$. In general positions of the plane will be functions of $x$, $y$, $z$, and $t$.

These equations are denoted by the letters $g_{x}$, $g_{y}$, $g_{z}$, etc. Any transformation of axes corresponds to a change in these $g_{x}$ and therefore to a change in the form of the linear element. It follows that, as regards forces introduced simply by changes of axis, it is a matter of perfect indifference whether we say (a) that the space of space-time is such and such and that such and such forces are acting, or (b) that the geometry of space-time is such as to pro- duce the appearance of these forces. Thus the requirement that forces be either (a) as completely determining the forces on a given assumption about the geometry of space-time or (b) as deter- mining the metrical properties of space-time itself. The ex- tended Theory of Relativity refers to the second view of them and to drop all reference to forces; on the first view the $g_{x}$ are of the nature of potentials. Now, in theory, any function whatever might be given for the $g_{x}$, but the actions of nature are subject to gravitation. This means that the choice of $g_{x}$ is not absolutely arbitrary, but that the uniform system of axes for describing nature the $g_{x}$ will be subject to a set of differential equations connecting them with each other and with the $g_{y}$, $g_{z}$, and $t$ of this system. These equations then express the law of gravitation and at the same time express it as a fundamental property of space-time.

It is extremely difficult to render Einstein's theory intelligible without mathematics, and the mathematics needed is somewhat formidable. It is hoped, however, that the above sketch may illustrate that extreme entanglement of time with space and with matter which undoubtedly occurs in our crude sense data and is now seen to persist even in the most refined speculations of mathematical physics. It may perhaps be added that Einstein's generalized theory, derived from the special philosophic interpretations which may be put on it, is not a mere idle speculation, but has already explained the anomalies in the peri- helion of Mercury, and has correctly foretold the amount of deviation in a ray of light due to its passing near a heavy body like the sun.

3. Historically important speculations about time.—Our knowledge of time as of space owes more to the laboratories of mathematicians and physicists than to those of professed philosophers. The sharp distinction between time and what changes, and between space and what moves in it and is ex- tended, is largely due to the development of the subject of mechanics, and latterly of electrodynamics.

To the Greeks we owe much less with regard to time than with regard to most matters of philo- sophic or scientific speculation. This may perhaps be ascribed to the late development of dynamics; the Greek approach to the problems of time was mainly by way of astronomy. Of course, Zeno's celebrated arguments have an important bearing on change and continuity, and, whatever may have been the real intention of their author, they remained the best discussion on these subjects so closely related to time until the final treatment of infinity and the development of the infinitesimal calculus in the latter part of the 19th century. Time plays an important part in the Timaeus of Plato; and, although his treatment cannot be called satis- factory, it has the merit of distinguishing time from what is in time. Plato says that God wished the created world to resemble the intelligible one as far as possible. Now, it was not possible for it to be eternal, and the nearest analogue to eternity which He could provide was to make 'a moving image of eternity.' This is time, and it is closely connected with the motions of the heavens; eternity 'rests in unity,' but the universe is 'a motion according to a number.' Before the heavens were created, there were no days, years, etc.; but, when God created the heavens, He created these divisions of time also. Time was not created with the heavens, and, if one were to be dissolved, so would the other be. But Plato does not appear to identify time with the motion of the heavens, though it is difficult to see what he supposes it to be in itself. According to Plato, past and future are created species of time which we wrongly transfer to the eternal essence; strictly 'was' and 'will be' are to be asserted only of generation in time, for they are motions. The analogy of the moving image to the eternal
is that the created heavens have been, are, and will be in all time. This view has something in common with that of Spinoza, who makes things as they really are for ratio timeless, but holds that this timeless essence is given by imagination, which represents it confusedly as duration through endless time.

Aristotle defines time as 'the number of motions relative to before and after.' Number here appears to refer to a point, and it is the birth of a monad number that is numbered. The now in borne along with the movable as a point may be regarded as moving and making up a line. So in a sense there is only one now, though in another sense there are many nows. This is obviously a very unsatisfactory metaphor, and there seems no reason to think that Aristotle was really clear as to the distinction between time and motion.

The Schoolmen in the main adopted Aristotle's views, though with certain modifications. St. Thomas Aquinas, in the tract de Instantibus, discusses time and change with some fullness. He draws a distinction between the time in which angels perform their acts and that in which men and matter operate. The time of angels is discrete, that of men continuous; the difference arises from the fact that continuity is essentially connected with the eternity of substances. An instant for an angel is the time occupied by a single act; it may thus correspond to a long period in our time. This may be compared with Royce's views about the varying lengths of the specious present in various beings.

In modern philosophy the men who have most concerned themselves with time are Leibniz and Kant. Leibniz argued strongly for the relative view of time in his letters to Clarke, who represented Newton and the absolute theory. His arguments turn mainly on the identity of indiscernibles and the principle of sufficient reason. Leibniz carefully distinguished duration from the relation of before and after, and he compared duration to the extension of matter. Leibniz's view is that time is a system of possible positions of possible events related by before, after, and simultaneous with. He holds that all possible worlds must be in time, though, of course, the particular temporal relations of the actual world are contingent. To make Leibniz's theory coherent, it would be necessary to modify it in the case of time and the time-series of the universe. He attempted to explain the relation between successive states of the universe, but by saying that the earlier ones have the quality of being desires for the later ones.

As an attempt to replace relations by qualities this clearly fails, since 'desire for' anything is clearly a disguised relation. And as an attempt to define before and after it also fails; for it is clearly a synthetic proposition that desire for $X$ precedes $Y$. Then again it seems essential to Leibniz's doctrine of the reflexion by one monad of the states of another that we should have some account of the temporal relations between corresponding states in different monads. The state of a monad at a given moment in its own time-series is presumably the reflexion of the contemporary states of other monads; but we are not told what is meant by a time-series common to the monads, nor is it clear that this would be consistent with Leibniz's dislike of relations.

The absolute theory of time has never had much philosophic support; there can be little doubt that Leibniz had the better of Clarke. Perhaps the best arguments for absolute time and space are to be found in the work of the mathematicians.

Leibniz. They do not seem to the present writer to be conclusive, and their author has lately taken a much more relativistic view.

Locke, Berkeley, and Hume insisted that the notion of time comes from the succession of our ideas. But they never made it clear how their temporal relations are connected with the time that things-in-themselves have. Berkeley and Hume in particular fail to give any reasonable account of the distinction that we certainly make between the temporal order of our ideas and the temporal order of the objects which we claim to know by them. It is not even clear what is the importance of this point in his 'analogy of experience,' though the distinction will certainly not bear the superstructure which he built on it.

He attempted to prove that an infinite number of states-in-themselves results from the permanence of substance (which he seems to identify with the chemical law of the conservation of mass) and the law of causation among experienced objects. His arguments are entirely inconclusive even to prove that, in order to make the distinction, we must believe in these principles; much less to prove, what the transcendental method always tends to confuse with this, that the principles are true.

Time plays perhaps more, and more important, parts in Kant's philosophy than in any other.

(1) In the *Esthetic* he tries to prove that it is a form of intuition, the form of time, which seems to mean that, just as we can only perceive physical objects as being in space, though there is no reason to think that things-in-themselves are spatial, so things-in-themselves are not perceived by ourselves and our mental states in introspection as being in time, though there is no reason to think that this is not the case.

This certainly seems to raise the special difficulty that, unless we know ourselves as we are and not merely as we appear, we cannot know what our forms of intuition are, but only what they appear to be, whilst Kant's argument certainly assumes that we know what they are. (2) In the *Logic*, as we have seen, Kant has an antimony about time. This apparently would, if valid, overthrow not merely absolute time but also the temporal character of events and the temporal relations between them. We have already seen how grave are the difficulties involved in any such distinction in a system in which all powers rest and do not commit errors. There is a danger that this distinction will be maintained through his arguments to prove it.

(3) In the *Analytic* time plays an important part in the difficult doctrine of the schematism of the categories. The position seems to be that the categories as pure conceptions of the understanding cannot be applied immediately to the manifold given in sense, even after that has been synthesized by imagination. They have to be mediated through time; thus the category of ground and consequent, which is purely logical, can be applied to the world of sensible experience only after it has been schematized into the temporal form of cause and effect. The whole argument here is confused and weak to a remarkable degree; the principle appears to be that the manifold is as provided with temporal characteristics by intuition; that these remain and are elaborated by the synthesis of imagination; and that then they may be analyzed in time.

The first schematized so that they and the synthesized manifold share the temporal character of common concepts. The only possible solution of his own antimony is that the infinity involved in time is not an actual infinite, as it would have to be if time applied to things-in-themselves, but only the concept of infinity which we have of always synthesizing farther than we have yet gone in constructing a temporal series. To this Lotze makes the very pertinent criticism that it surely depends on the nature of things-in-themselves whether we shall be indefinitely supplied with material to synthesis.

The modern development of our knowledge about time is due mainly to two sets of people: (1) philosophical mathematicians, like Deleclain and Cantor, who have given a satisfactory analysis of the infinity and continuity, and thus finally refuted all antinomies based on these; (2) mathematical physicists who have been led by their studies in the optics of moving systems to elaborate the Theory of Relativity. The pioneer work is Lorentz; the theory itself was first formulated by Einstein; and the mathematical and philosophical consequences have been drawn and elaborated by Einstein, Minkowski, Robb, Whitehead, and others.

It is also necessary to mention among recent philosophers Bergson, in whose works time, nominally at any rate, plays a role. Bergson holds that the attempt to treat time as similar to space is a perverse one philosophically; it may work very well in dealing with dead matter, but it
shows its falsity in biology, psychology, and philo-
sophy. He also falls foul of the mathematical theory of the continuum as applied to time; he ad-
dresses it as they cannot, but denies that it describes what anybody really means by change and motion. Bergson's arguments seem to rest partly on a comparison between change as a sense-datum (e.g., the peculiar characteristic of
what we see when we look at the second hand of a
watch as distinct from the hour hand) and physical change, and partly on the erroneous view that a whole of related states cannot be a change unless each of its terms is a change. Again, in some of his remarks about memory he seems to suppose that,
because a memory-act is a later awareness of an earlier event, the earlier event and the later awareness must somehow be contemporary. Finally, he seems to think that the ordinary view of time is refuted by the facts, of which he is strongly convinced, that no two total states of
mind at different times can be exactly alike, that
there are not, strictly speaking, distinct elements which can recur as parts of different mental states, and that no amount of knowledge about earlier states will enable us to foretell later ones com-
pletely. But Bergson's most surprising doctrines belong to the subject of change rather than to that of time.


C. D. BROAD.

TINNEH.—See DÉNÉS.

TIPITAKA.—See LITERATURE (Buddhist), vol. viii. p. 89.

TIRUPATI.—Tirupati, vulg. Tripetty (Tel. Tirupati, tiru, Skr. sri, 'venerable, pati, 'lord'), a town in Chittoor District, Madras (lat. 18° 38' N.; long. 78° 17' E.), is a famous centre of pilgrimage, situated on the Tirumalai or sacred hill, usually known to Europeans as Upper Tirupati, in contrast to the lower town at its base. The whole area is considered sacred, and up to 1870 had never been visited by Europeans. Mark Wilks states that he was on duty for eighteen months in the neighbourhood, and, though he frequently climbed the adjoining hills, he could never catch even a distant view of the pagoda.1 The belief that much crime was committed without detection in the holy town led to the issue of an order by Government that it should be thrown open to the District officers, but this policy was shortly reversed by local opposition; but European visits now cause little sensation. The sanctity of this hill-range rests on the legend that it forms part of the sacred mountain Meru. The range has seven principal peaks, each of which is sacred, and has a name and a meaning of its own. One of the peaks, known as Seshâchalam, 'serpent hill,' takes its name from the belief that it was torn from Meru by Mridu Aadi, the first queen of the Sivâ family.

1 Hist. Sketches of the South of India, Madras, 1890, i. 246 n.

strength with the wind-god, Vâyu. Vâyu raised
so great a tempest that the peak was blown away and fell to earth in its present position. Near this peak is a small hill, called Littcarl, but deniers of it, and no European has been allowed to enter it. It is a building of little architectural beauty or importance, but the cultus of the deity is interesting. It is a manifestation of local non-Aryan beliefs with orthodox elements.

Within a small chamber lighted by lamps is the idol, a stone image of Visnu, seven feet in height. It represents the god as Chaturbhuja, 'four-armed,' and, in the hands holding the discus (chakra), one of the left the conch-shell (sankha), the second right hand pointing to the earth to draw attention to the miraculous origin of the holy hill, while the remaining left hand grasps a lotus. The deity possesses 1008 titles, the most common of which are Srîvîvāsa, 'dwelling with Sîr or Laksmî,' goddess of prosperity, and Venkatachâlpatî, the title of the sacred hill, which has been adopted into Sanskrit from the Tamil vam, 'white,' Radham, 'hill slope,' thus showing that the deity was adopted into Brâhmansîm from a Dravidian cult. By visitors to Tirupati and Deccan, it is generally known as Bâlîjî, which, according to Monier-Williams,2 is the name of a human incarnation of Visnu or Krsna of whom little is known, save that he was remarkable for many extraordinary feats, and that the hill, as the inmost adja-

1 S. Thurston, Castes and Tribes of S. India, iv. 310f.

2 B. Thurston, Castes and Tribes of S. India, 1806, p. 322.
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often pierce the flesh of the bearer, who submits cheerfully to the torture. At the Ganganam festival held at the temple ‘language truly filthy and obscene’ is used to the goddess herself. The explanation of this custom is obscure.

Abode of Titas was believed to be in certain circumstances to bring good luck to the person against whom it is directed. On this theory the obscene may possibly be regarded as a form of mimetic magic intended to repel the power of evil from the temple, and thus advance her powers of promoting fertility.

Again, on the road leading up to the temple ‘small stones hidden under a hermit’s hat, and knots of the young date palm leaves may be seen. These are the work of virgins who accompany the parties of pilgrims. The necks are tied in order to ensure the tying of the tall strings on their necks (as marriage), and the hanging up of stones is done with a view to ensuring the birth of children to them. If the girls revict the hill after marriage and the birth of children, they unite the knot on a leaf, and disarrange one of the hearts. Men cause their accounts, whenever such a woman becomes too old to please the deity, the priests make a mark on her breast, the emblem of the god, and give her a patent certifying that she acted for a certain number of years as one of his wives, that he is now tired of her and recommends her to the charity of the public.

H. A. Stuart, however, denies that any dancing-girls attend the god; but he adds that the state of morality among priests and pilgrims was deteriorated, and that the female Bairagi and priests taking their paramours with them up the sacred hill. In the Deccan it is very common for a woman to make a vow that, if she is relieved from sickness or other trouble, she will shave her head to the god at Tirupati. After being shaved, she walks thrice round the temple, worships the image, pays a fee to have lighted camphor waved round the idol, receives a pinch of the sugar offered to the god, distributes food to the poor and to the monkeys which swarm round the temple, offers charity, and returns home. The care of children is also performed at the temple.

LITERATURE.—This art. is mainly based on an excellent account of the place by A. F. Cox, Manual of the N. Arect District, Madras, 1881, p. 146, supplemented by later information supplied by its writer. In addition to the authorities quoted, see J. B. Tavener, Journ. of India, tr. ed. of 1867 and ed. v. 1872, ii. 343. For details concerning the worship of the god among the people of S. India see also E. Thurston, Costumes and Tribes of South India, Madras, 1901, i. 195, 355, 359, ii. 451, 112 f., iii. 43, 461, iv. 310, 326.

W. CROOKE.

TITANS.—The Titans, like the Giants (p. 349), are potencies belonging to an early pre-Olympian stage of Greek mythology. The two tend to be confused by late authors, but in origin they are distinct. The Titans are distinguished from Giants by the following well-marked characteristics: (1) they are gods (θεοί), and as such immortal, whereas the Giants are mortal; (2) they are sky-potencies (Οὐρανόπασες) as contrasted with the Giants, who are earth-born (γεώτερες); Titans and Giants alike are to Hosiod the offspring of Earth and Heaven, but the Titans tend skywards, the Giants with their snake-tails earthwards. To Shakespeare Titan is the sun.

And Titan, tired in the mid-day best,
With burning eye did hotly overlook them.9

To Pausanias 10 Titan, according to the local legend of Titan, is ‘brother to the Dorians’ (cf. Gallic, who himself held that Titan ‘was great at marking seasons of the year.’ Empedocles holds a less specialized and perhaps juster view; he places side by side.

Gains and hillbrow ocean and air with its moisture.

And Titan, embracing the All in a circle.14

The Titan Phaethon is the sun and sun’s charioteer; the Titans Phoebus on the moon; the Titans Atlas and Prometheus are the sky-potencies supporting Ouranos. The Titans are an integral part of that primordial cosmos of earth and sky, ousted in Greece by the anthropomorphic Olympians, but remembered as part of their Indo-European heritage by the Northern Muses who came to Helicon and taught their lore to Hosiod.

The etymology of Gigas, ‘giant’, is uncertain; that of Titan is happily secure, and it throws a flood of light on the function of these sky-potencies of older date and explains in a flash the two Titan myths—(a) the Titanomachia, (b) the rendering of Zagreus, which, but for this etymology, must have remained obscure. Three glasses of Hebraics make it certain that Titan means simply ‘king’.

They are as follows: τάνγος basecles (the word glossed is from a lost play of Aeschylus); τάνγος (for τάνγος) ζεbascles, and τάνγος ΰζεbascles. Thus Honigs, and the τάνγος ΰζεbascles. Titan is king, ‘honoured one,’ but—and here is the interesting point, or rather series of vitally interconnected points—he is the king of the old order, the king-god or divine king; and as such he is a sky-potency, for one main function of the old king-god was to order the goings of the heavenly bodies and generally to control the weather. Here we have that odd blending of physical phenomena with human and social potencies which lies at the back of most gods and certainly of Zeus himself.

The Titanomachia is at once clear. For on the physical point of view it is, as described in Hosiod, just a half-humanized thunder-storm, Zeus, the new sky- and thunder-god, fighting the old sky-potencies; from the theological point of view it is the new anthropomorphism against the old religion of the king-god or main-caste-man who controls the weather. The Olympian religion naturally regarded these old Titan kings as criminals, rebels against high heaven, condemned to Tartarus for their sin of Zeus, just like them the counterpart of the arch-Titan Prometheus.
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The second Titan myth, the rending of Zagreus, is less transparent, but in the light of the Titan kings ever more illuminating, for we catch the king in his earliest stage of all, when he was tribal elder or monarch, before he devoted himself to kingship. The Titans, according to a version of the story as early as Onomakritos, 1 lure away the infant Zagreus, dismember, and (in some versions) cast him down the slopes of Mount Helicon. 2 This is an initiation myth based on the familiar initiation ritual of the mock death and resurrection of the initiate. The initiates are the elders or dynasts of the tribe, the elders of the tribe. The Titans are the sons of the old-world kings, who are well in place; as a form of giant they are absurd. The name Zagreus takes us to Crete, and in Crete we find the Titans in a connexion that again points to initiation mysteries. The Cretans, according to Diodorus, 3 said that in the time of the Kourotes those who were called Titans ruled over the region of Cnosos, where were shown the foundations of the house of Rhea and a sacred cypress-grove of hoary antiquity. These Titans again must have been the old king-medicine-men, contemporary with the Kourotes and, like them, initiators into the 'men's house' of the Mother Rhea. 4 On a red-figured kylix from Attica, 5 Zagreus is depicted as actually devoured by the Titans, and these Titans wear the characteristic dress of Thracian chieftains. We may safely infer that the Titan myth of the rending of Zagreus was known from Thrace to Crete, and we may suggest that it arose in that early stratum of 'saten' speaking population known to the later Greeks as "Pelasgic"—a stratum specially addicted to the mystery-rallies of the son of Semele.

LITERATURE.—M. Mayer, Die Giganten und Titanen, Berlin, 1837. For the Titans as Oiranones, J. E. Harrison, Themis, Cambridge, 1914, pp. 453-60. The word 'Titan' was derived from the root τίτων, 'honour,' was first seen by L. Fiedler, Gr. Mythologie, Leipzig, 1854, p. 44. Its meaning as 'king' was made clear by P. Solmsen, in Indogermanische Forschungen, xxx. [1912] 25. The full significance of the 'king' meaning in relation to the mystery-rite of the anephegesis, as practised in Crete and by Thracian chieftains, was established by A. B. Cook, Zeus, Cambridge, 1914, i. 655 § 5, in relation to his republication of the British Museum vase in pl. xxxvi. The previous literature of the subject will be found in Cook's notes. On p. 655, note 2, he rightly points out that the present writer's former derivation (Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion, London, 1883, p. 592, infr. 19) of the word 'Titan' from the hydria, 'white-clay man,' is erroneous. As initiators the Titans probably were dapted with white clay, but the name is not derived from the disguise.

J. E. HARRISON.

TITHE.—1. Origin and purpose.—Tithes are connected, on the one hand, religiously, with other gifts of firstfruits (e.g., taxes levied on the land); on the other hand, politically, with tribute and taxation. While taxation often took the form of a tenth, the amount might vary, less or more, though the name 'tenth' (decima, &c.) was retained. Voluntary offerings to a deity soon became customary, and even necessary, especially where kings began to impose taxation and tribute, and where a god was now thought to be a divine monarch. To keep up his sanctuary was as much an obligation to keep up the royal person and court. An early example shows this. The people of Tyre paid tithes to Melkarth as king of the city, and the Carthaginians similarly sent their tithes to Tyre. 6 W. R. Smith 7 shows that in this case the tithe was as much political as religious.

The voluntary offering necessarily became tribute and taxation. A sanctuary became more elaborate, the sanctuary itself more splendid, and the attendant priests more numerous. Why a tithe or tenth should have been fixed on so generally is not clear, but probably it is connected with primitive views about numbers, or with methods of counting—e.g., by fingers and toes. 1 In Babylon, whether the tithe was native or borrowed, its use is found in the time of Nebuchadnezzar ii. Earlier evidence is so far lacking, and there is no trace of it in the Assyrian period. It was a due paid to the temple of a god from the land, and was paid by all, including the lastling, who assigned to temples founded by him an annual amount from cultivated lands and from the treasury. Numerous tablets concern tithes, and show that the peddler tale were taxed for support of the temple. Tithe was of the nature of a fixed charge on the land and even became negotiable. Such tablets may be regarded as of the nature of a receipt for payment of tithe, which was generally paid in kind—corn, oil, sesame, dates, flour, oxen, sheep, and ass—though this might be commuted for a money payment. One man sometimes paid it collectively for a group of men, and possibly this signifies a systematic collection of tithe in one district by an authorized person. 2 At the same time Babylonian kings had a tithe of all imports, and paid also Persian satraps. 3 In S. Arabia tithes were paid for accrued interest of sacred moniments. 4 Cyrus, on the advice of Croesus, caused his soldier to devote a tenth of their booty to Zeus. 5 The tithe as a tax on land was well known in Greece of the archaic period. It was paid to temples on special occasions was not uncommon. Pausanias gives many instances of this—e.g., a tenth of war-booty being set aside to make an image or a vessel for a temple.

In Egypt the use was apparently greater freedom. Temples were usually provided with lands for their upkeep, but the gods expected to receive a share of the produce of fields, vineyards, orchards, and fish-ponds. The kings in time of war dedicated a tenth of their booty to the temples, as well as of tribute levied on vassal states and of prisoners who were made slaves of the conqueror.

Zoroastrian literature refers to the fourth rank of men—traders, artisans, market dealers, &c.—who should pay a tithe to the high priest and to the king. 6 Chinese sacred literature mentions a tenth of the produce of the fields being annually levied; whether as a religious tribute or not is not clear. 7 The Confucian Analects tell how 'the Duke Gao enquired of Yew 34 whether the year is one of scarcity, and the returns for expenditure are not sufficient. What is to be done?' He desired to take two tenths, instead of the usual statutory single tithe, from the 44 districts of the kingdom against which Yew 36 protested. 8

2. Tithe in the Old Testament.—Among the Hebrews the relation of tithe to firstfruits 9 is complicated, and opinions differ as to whether they were distinct or not. Firstfruits would naturally vary in quantity. Tithe expresses more or less a fixed proportion. Perhaps the tithe represents firstfruits made systematic, or different names may have been favoured at different times and in different localities. The tithe is called 'an heave offering' in Nn 18 10, but the two are apparently separate inDt 12a. In the later legislation firstfruits and tithes appear to be distinguished.

The tithe, which is not mentioned in the Book of the Covenant, appears first in the Northern

1 See art. Numbere (Introduction).
6 See art. MOUNTAIN-MOTHER and KOUROTES and KOURTOJ.
7 See art. KOUROTES and KOUROTTES.
8 K. 240. See art. KOUROTES and KOURTOJ.
9 K. 240.
10 See art. KOUROTES and KOURTOJ.
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Kingdom in the time of Jeroboam II. as the material given for a feast at the sanctuary (Am 5:10; cf. 4:), though the feast was one for the rich at the expense of the poor. Here it appears as a fixed tribute. In Gn 28:22 (E) Jacob promises a tenth of all to God—perhaps a reflection of later custom, though not necessarily so—and Melchizedec receives a tenth of all (14:18). In I S 8:17 tithes is paid to the king, and perhaps he devoted this to the support of the Levites. In the Talmud, the Deuteronomic Code is not a forced tribute. The tithe of corn, wine, and oil, with the heave offering, free-will offering, and firstlings of herd and flock, are to be brought to the sanctuary and eaten there as a feast with Levite and Levite (Dt 12:7, 17). Here the connection with firstlings suggests that the tithe was the firstfruits of produce, or perhaps included these. This was a private feast at the sanctuary, and may have been a reform due to the fact that the ruling classes, as in Am 5:10, secured the best for themselves. It was not a direct due for the priesthood or Levite, money one-sixth part of the produce. The distance to the central sanctuary was too great for the offering to be taken there, it might be commuted for money, and this would furnish the material for the feast at the sanctuary as before (Dt 12:10). In the third year tithe was to be paid aside to furnish a feast or feasts at home for the Levite, stranger, fatherless, and widow (14:28-29).

Does the tithe here referred to form the equivalent of the firstfruits, the ritual of which, as perhaps forming part of the tithe, is detailed in Dt 26:2. Probably they are ultimately the same, including an offering of part as firstfruits, and a feast for Levite and stranger, just as in 18 firstfruits are to be given to the priests. If so, the words in 26:1, 'Thou shalt rejoice in all the good which the Lord thy God hath given unto thee, and unto thine house, thou, and the Levite, and the stranger,' would refer to the feast and be equivalent to the feast on tithes of 14:29, while the earlier part of ch. 26 would refer to the offering of part as a firstfruits offering.

In the third year's tithe additional to the tithe given each year, or is it a special form of treating tithe in the third year? Here again opinions differ, but most regard it as a diverting the usual custom of the priesthood, who would be deprived of the tithes through the new custom of feasting at the central sanctuary. Others regard it as a second tithe, and this is supported by the LXX, which renders the doctrine of the tithe as 'the second tithe,' to δεύτερον ἑσώπτερον. But two tithes in every third year would mean a large amount, and it is unlikely that such demands would be made, or, if made, carried out. In the Priestly Code the tithe assumes the form of a fixed due. A tithe of the produce of the land, of fruit, and of the herd and flocks (i.e. of their yearly increase) is 'holy unto the Lord.' If collected, the money one-sixth part of the value is to be added (Lv 27:30). This is probably the tithe of produce referred to in Nu 18:21, which was to be given to the Levites, they in turn giving a tenth of it to the storehouse for the support of the priests (cf. Neh 10:19), who received now also firstfruits of corn, oil, and wine (Nu 18:12). The tithe of cattle and sheep in Lv 27:24, which is to be paid to the Levite, suggests that the firstlings used at the Deuteronomic tithe-feast, but claimed later by the priests (Nu 18:26) as apart from the Levites, but it is not referred to in

Neh 10:9, where the tithe is described (cf. 12:42-23:19), and may be a later addition. It is, however, mentioned as paid to the priests in To 1, by Philo, and in the Book of Jubilees (39:22). Rabbinic authorities regard it as furnishing, along with a second tithe of produce (Lv 27:30), additional, therefore, to the tithe of produce in Nu 18:21—a feast for the tithe and guests at Jerusalem, as ordained in Dt 14:23. The purpose of the Priestly Code was probably to arrogate the law of the tithe in Deuteronomy, but later harmonizers did not take this view and spoke of two tithes, and even three, the third-year tithe of Deuteronomy being regarded as an additional one. The law of P is reflected in Hezekiah's legislation, which ordered that firstfruits and tithes of produce, sheep, and oxen should be brought for the priests and Levites (2 Ch 31); hence, if the tithes of animals is in addition to the original law of Lv 27:30, it may have come into force after Nehemiah's time.

In Neh 10:32 firstfruits and firstlings and firstfruits of dough were for the priests, and tithes of produce for the Levites—the latter collected by the Levites under the supervision of a priest, and a tithe of the tithes being given to the priests (cf. 12:19). Thereafter, however, the money was paid to the Levites, as Nehemiah discovered, and they had to cultivate their own land. At Nehemiah's remonstrance it was paid (13:10). At a later time the priests themselves collected the tithe, and the subsequent history of the Levites in connexion with it is obscure, while they no longer shared in the tithe, either from the time of Ezra or from that of John Hyrcanus.

The Pharisees, as well as the regulations of the Talmud, considered minutely the things to be tithed (Lk 11:42), the former even paying tithes of garden herbs—mint, anise, cumin. Under the Rabbinic system of three tithes referred to above, the first was collected yearly; the second was due in the first, second, fourth, and fifth years; the third in the third and sixth years. Two were thus taken every year, except in the seventh year, when the land lay fallow. The poor's title suggested tithing of earnings, all of which was given to them. Extravagant claims were made for the virtue of tithes: e.g., through it the priests gave and only their meat was punished in hell which is the lot of the wicked.

In Ezechiel's proposed legislation, which marks the transition to P, the first of all the firstfruits of everything is reserved for the support of the Officium. There is here set forth the price for the support of ritual and feasts out of wheat, oil, and fruits (44:24). The tithing is separately mentioned, as are the payments to be made to the priests as in P.

3. Early and medieval Church usage.—In the Christian Church the need of supporting the clergy, who were early withdrawn from secular business, was recognized, but the system of tithing was not generally resorted to for several centuries. Once it did become general, tithes were regarded, on the analogy of its use in the Jewish Church, as de jure divinum, and supported by such passages as Mt 10:8, Lk 10:1, 1 Cor 9:6—an argument which Selden was the first to show groundless, in his work on the subject. Until the 16th century little is heard of it, and the controversy regarding the matter from a totally different point of view from that which was later adopted. There are, referring to tithes in the Jewish system, says characteristic ally that Christ, as 'the firstfruits,' isiju in the liberty, set aside all their possessions for the Lord's purposes, bestowing joyfully and freely not the less valuable portions of their property.

1 Cited by S. R. Driver, Flowers of Aramaic (175), Edinburgh, 1886, and by biblical scholars generally.
2 Deuteronomy 12:43, assigning the land, the vine, and oil, and of wool to the Levites is out of harmony with the other parts of the Deuteronomic legislation, if firstfruits and tithe were one and the same.
3 Philo, de Predestinatione, 2, 1, 2, de Republica, 2, 1, 15. For the numbers, cf. Philo, 2, 6, 15.
4 Jos. Ant. iv. 4, 31, vii. 22; cf. ib. xii. 3, 10; P. 17.
6 So the Talmud, Yohananah, 97; Hagg. 131; Kethibheth, 58.
7 J B xii. 1915.
TITHES

regards tithes as something to be far exceeded in Christian giving,1 and Epiphanius says that tithe is no more binding than circumcision.2 Augustine regards it as a fundamental duty of Christians to God, though he and others are prompted also by the finer ideal of freedom in all Christian giving. It was inevitable, however, that, as the Church spread far and wide, circumstances should make it necessary to fall back upon rule, based upon legal provision, and the old standard of a tenth was set up, and the Christian priest was commanded by the Bishop to exact tithe from his flocks and Levite. Ambrose and many other Fathers accordingly maintain that tithes should be given, but their views were not generally accepted in the Eastern Church. Even in the West there is evidence that this species of ecclesiastical property was acquired not only by degrees, but with considerable opposition.3 The moral duty of paying tithe was now generally taught, but, even after it was made a matter of law, tithe was paid reluctantly and irregularly. In A.D. 885 the Council of Mainz ordained its payment, while priests were to use it in helping the poor and in redressing the abuses of those who refused to pay it or who paid it was to be excommunicated. Other councils enjoined it, but it was not until the time of Charlemagne that it became matter of law. In one of his capitularies he ordained it to be paid to churches and clergy. Preachers had already exhorted strenuously towards its payment as tending to Christian perfection, and doubtless it was now more generally rendered. At the same time it has to be remembered that, apart from ecclesiastical law, under Roman law colonists had to pay a tenth to the State as rent from the ager publicus. This had already in large measure fallen into the hands of the Church. While the ecclesiastical tithe was usually paid to the bishop, who apportioned it, Charlemagne's capitulary regulates its division into three parts—for the bishop and clergy, for the poor, and for the support of church fabrics. In later times tithe was often appropriated to particular churches and to monastic foundations. Once the payment of tithe became a matter of legal due, excommunication or temporal penalties were decreed against those who refused to pay it. Meanwhile abuses had risen in connexion with the appropriation of tithe. Sometimes, instead of appropriating it to a church, monastery, or diocese, the payent was appropriated to his own uses or even sold it. It had also become common for ecclesiastics to grant tithes to laymen as an award for service or in recognition of their protection. These were now regarded as evils, and it was set forth as a legal maxim that all tithes are of ecclesiastical origin. Where they had been appropriated by laymen, they were withheld from the Church only by robbery or by feudal grant (decrev infuente). No layman could possess tithes without risking his salvation. Hence the Third Lateran Council of 1179 forbade detention of tithes by laymen as well as transference of them to other laymen. The Council also declared that any one who violated this decree endangered his soul, and would be deprived of Christian sepulture. As a result of this, many tithes were restored to ecclesiastical use. Towards the 19th century, tithe was also extended from the fruits of the earth, or prelial tithes, to all kinds of profit and wages. It was divided by the canonists into (1) prelial—derived from the fruits of the earth; (2) of the soil, or products derived from the soil, or those due partly to its productiveness, partly to human skill and labour; (3) personal—

1 In Num. hom. xi.
2 H. Isala, View of the State of Europe during the Middle Ages, London, 1855, p. 145.
3 H. Isala, View of the State of Europe during the Middle Ages, London, 1855, p. 145.
4 H. Isala, View of the State of Europe during the Middle Ages, London, 1855, p. 145.
received the whole teind. In other or 'patrimonial' parishes the teind belonged to the bishop, or to a religious house, and the vicar who served the church derived his stipend from the teinds, but in some cases, sometimes a small part of the vicarage teinds. When teinds first began as such in Scotland is not known with certainty, but they are frequently mentioned in charters of the 12th century, and are often mentioned in writs of that period to enforce their payment. Canons of provincial councils in the pre-Reformation period regulate this payment and appropriation. Many abuses arose regarding teinds, and the decrees of the Lateran Council were often ignored. Certain ecclesiastical lands (i.e., lands which were the property of monastic orders) were granted freedom from payment of tithe by papal privilege. When such lands were feued to laymen, this exemption also passed to them. In view of the coming Reformation, ecclesiastics frequently made grants to landowners, called titulars, conferring heritable rights to teinds by feu or by long lease. At the Reformation church lands passed into the hands of laymen by grant from the crown or otherwise, but payment of teind still continued, though the stipends of ministers were entirely at the discretion of the new owner of the amount. In 1557 the General Assembly petitioned the Privy Council to make permanent provision for the maintenance of ministers. The Council thereupon resolved that one-third of all ecclesiastical revenues should be divided between ministers and the crown. On the rent-rolls being made up, this sum was found to amount to over £6000. But, as a result of imperfect returns, remission, and refusal of payments, much less than half of this sum was available. In 1657 Parliament, under the scheme known as the 'assumption of thirds,' ordered that 'the thirteenth parts of the annual rents of this realm' be paid now and for all time coming to ministers until 'the Kirk come to the full possession of their patronimie, qhillik is the teinides.' This third was never paid in full, but the system remained in force until 1633. While Parliament thus recognized the right of the Kirk to teinds—a proprietary right fully enjoyed by the pre-Reformation clergy—that right was nullified, and teinds had been 'evicted from their former owners, diverted from their former use, and acquired and dealt with by the crown and nobles as their own property.'

An Act of 1617 appointed a commission authorized to augment stipends out of the crop, the number of stipends being decreed.

In 1627, as a result of Charles I's intention to receive surrenders of alienated church lands and teinds, and of the opposition which this roused, a commission was appointed to deal with the subject and to make provision for churches. Submissions were made to the king by those who had benefited by grants of teinds or were interested in them, and as a result he issued his 'decrees-arbitral,' which were confirmed by Act of Parliament in 1633, and commissioners were appointed to deal with the whole matter. Teinds were to be valued at 'the fifth part of the constant rent which each land payeth in stock and teind where the same are valued jointly,' or, if valued apart, the commissioners were to declare their value. Titulars of teinds were to sell them to heritors at nine years' purchase, but only so far as not already devoted locally to the minister of the parish. The valuation thus made fixed the amount of teind for all time coming, and the minister's stipend was to be paid out of the commuted teinds as a permanent endowment, with a further provision that the stipend thus formed a paramount claim upon teind. These decrees were confirmed by Act of the Scots Parliament in 1633, and still continue to regulate the right to teinds and the payment of stipends of ministers of the Established Church. The whole matter of teinds was vested in certain ministers, but was transferred under the Union of 1707 and subsequent Acts to the Lords of Council and Session, acting as a Court of Commission of Teinds. This Court of Teinds makes awards of commutation of teinds, and in particular hears all claims for augmentation of stipend out of the unexhausted or free teinds, where such exist in the possession of the proprietor of the property of a stipend. Such claims can be preferred only twenty years after a previous claim has been upheld.

In valuing teinds under the Act of 1633, the valuation was made either in grain or in money. While according to value of grain, it was valued according to civil prices of the county, as determined by a local court who strike the value for the crop and year.


**Tithes (Greek).—** It is difficult to separate tithes (λειτουργία) and firstfruits (ἀρπάγα), since the title is only a special form of firstfruits. Many nations and tribes, if not nearly all, have had the custom of setting apart a portion of their goods for the gods; and when, as was sometimes the case, the king or chief was a Sadducee, he took his share by compulsion. It seems to have been a wide-spread belief that some sacrifice was due to the local spirits whenever men broke new ground, built a settlement, or bridged a river; and it was certainly common in very early times to leave a portion of the new land to the possession of the old divinity. Perhaps for the same reason portions of the fruits of the earth were left, or otherwise given to the gods. It is not likely that this portion was always the same fraction of the whole; but the tenth was found to be a convenient fraction early and in many nations, among them the Jews. Now the tithe is the decimal part of something, or something to do with this choice. In Greece a few traces are known of the early custom just mentioned.—e.g., the sacred groves of Artemis, with game that no men might kill except in a sacred hunt.

The Pelasgians are said by Stephanus to have offered the tithe, which in later days they dedicated at Delphi; and Herodotus says how the Hyperboreans used to send their annual tithe to Delos. The tithe is not mentioned in Homer; and the earliest records come with the inscriptions, although legendary tithing is spoken of earlier. When Agamemnon returned from Troy, he and his Mycenaeans have dedicated a tenth to the gods. An epic poem, the Eurotis, two lines of which are quoted by Clement of Alexandria, mentions the dedication of tithes at Delphi. The Liparians, on conquering the mainlands, dedicated a title of the spoils at Delphi. After the Persian invasion the Greeks took an oath to tithe all those cities which

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2. See Tithes, 'Tithes.


5. Stephanus, op. cit. pp. 19, 20; Dionysius, x. 18, 49.

6. Ed. xii, 56.

7. Ibrahim, i. 409 (Stylburg).

8. Ed. xii. 59.
had sided with the enemy.1 Titles of that great struggle are also mentioned as being upon the Athenian Acropolis.2 A helmet exists that was part of a war-tithe, dedicated by Hiero probably from the spoils of Cyme.3 Titles of spoils are recorded on the stele of the Euryomedon.4 Tithe is a certain restoration in the inscription that records how the Cnidians built their Σπαρατός at Delphi.5 Statues on the Sacred Way at Bovotis, and we have the tradition of the tithe.6 Two colossal figures were purchased with the tithe of Plato;7 the Cilianators also dedicated another as a 'tithe from many cities.'8 A bronze Apollo in the Pythium at Athens belongs to the 4th cent.,9 and an archaic bronze figure of the 'Apollo' type bears the word 'tithe.'10 Even the private person speaks with pride of the tithe that he offered to Athens, in the amount of more than half a talent.11 Most of the dedications of arms and spoils are without the distinctive word; but the war-tithe is recorded from the following places: Apollonia, Athens, Bovotis,12 Branchides,13 Crete,14 Didyma,15 Megara,16 Sparta,17 Thessaly;18 at Delphi by Athenians,19 Capyres,20 Cnidians,21 Liparians,22 Spartans,23 and Tarentines;24 at Olympia by Cilianators,25 Eleans,26 Messenians, and many other places.

Other titles are mentioned in Anaphe,27 Areades,28 Argolis,29 Athens,30 Bovotis,31 Calabria,32 Calympa,33 Crete,34 Cyrene,35 Delos,36 Delphi,37 Didyma,38 Epidaurus,39 in Argolis, Halicarnassus,40 Ithaca,41 Megara,42 Naxos,43 Peestum,44 Paros,45 Rhodes,46 Samos,47 Thera,48 Siphnos.49 They are dedicated by men or women, or by groups of persons, to Apollo, Artemis, Athens, Demeter, Hercules, Zeus. The articles tithed are all kinds of produce, corn and the fruits of the earth, hunting, fish, gotten minerals, or the profits of trade and industry. Thus we find the Siphnians tithing the output of their mines,50 the Corinthians their fish,51 the Samians their profits.52 But the Persian invasion the farmer offers a tithe of his farm;53 other early dedications of tithes are made by fallers and shipwrights.54


We also read of a butcher,1 a courtesan,2 and others who speak generally of the kind of their work.3 Sometimes friends or relatives offer the tithe for another.4 Some of the female statues of the Acropolis were tithes.5 See also art. FIRST- FRUITS (tithe). LITERATURE.—Daremberg-Saglio, s. v. 'Dekate'; Pauly- Wissowa, s. v. 'Dekate'; H. Lassell, The Sacred Truth, 2 vols. London, 1906; W. H. D. Rouse, Great Indian Epigraphic Discoveries, Cambridge, 1902, ch. ii. and index; J. Seiden, The History of Trade, London, 1818; W. R. Smith, The Religion of the Semite, 2d ed. 1884, pp. 244 ff., 435 ff. 1 W. H. D. ROUSE.

TLINTING—The Tlinton, who occupied the coast of Alaska from Portland Canal to Copper River, were organized into two main phratries and one subsidiary phratrial group, and the phratries were subdivided into clans. The character of their country and their manners and customs were almost the same as those of the Haida (q.v.), though the northern towns had not adopted the elaborately carved poles so characteristic of the latter, and their potlatches were conducted in a somewhat different manner. 1. Cosmological beliefs.—The outlines of Tlinton belief were like those of the Haida and indeed of all the other tribes of the north Pacific coast, but in detail they were considerably different. As to the Haida, they believed that the earth was flat and the sky a solid vault hung above it like an inverted cup and tenanted by various supernatural beings. The whites were supposed to have left the earth and light the reflection of the sea. The sun and moon were also occupied by special beings, and more regard was paid to the sun than by the Haida. Shooting stars were supposed to be live coals thrown down by departed spirits, and the northern lights were those spirits at play. Under the earth was an old woman called Old-Woman-under-the-earth, who supported a great post, on which the solid land rested. According to one story, she was the sister of four brothers, who were favourite heroes of Tlinton mythology, and who in early days travelled all over the world killing harmful animals, putting things in order, and establishing culture for future generations. One of these brothers, Kashkistik, was a powerful shaman who succeeded where his brothers had failed, and was frequently called upon to restore to life, while another, Hikayak, was always finding them into trouble by his impetuous and trilling character. He was suspected of an amour with his own sister, and, when his brothers discovered that their suspicions were well founded, they drove him away, and he became the wilder of the thunders. His sister, overcome with shame, went down into the earth at a place where the extinct crater of Mt. Edgecombe now is, near Sitka, and became Old-Woman-under-the- earth. The remaining brothers and their mother were turned into rocks while trying to cross the Stikine River, and they may be seen there at the present day. According to a version of this story told at Wrangell, the sister was also turned into rock at that place and Old- woman-under-the-earth was an entirely different person. Old-woman-under-the-earth liked to receive food and prayers from human beings, and she was especially fond of girls because they made the fires on earth which warred her. When she did not get enough attention from mankind, she became angry and put out her pole, causing an earthquake. Others said that the earthquake was caused by her anger at some persons who were teasing her, and Veni-
Tlingit

Aminoff 1 was told that it was because Raven was angry with mankind and was trying to drive her away to the south with soothing music down to the sea. Though Hikayak was said to cause thunder, it was more often ascribed, as in the case of the Haida, to a huge bird; the flapping of its wings produced the thunder and the opening of its eyes the lightning; it lived principally on whales, which it carried up into the mountains, and their bones were often found there. Still another story relates that several brothers became wizards in order to win the hand of a young woman whom a giant with which they had dragged her up on the side of a steep cliff, and, having learned to fly, afterwards became thunder beings. When a peak of thunder was heard, people shook themselves and jumped into the air, crying, ‘Take all my sickness from me.’

2. Supernatural beings.—Except in the general way common to all American tribes, we do not hear much of sky-beings. The ‘above-people’ of the Haida were said to have been first heard of through the Tlingit, however, and the conception of Täxét’s house also originated with them, although they did not recognize any special being of that name.

The four brothers have been referred to as the originators of culture and customs, but they by no means supplant Raven, whose personality, functions, and attributes are as prominent in the Queen Charlotte Islands. 2 It is ethnographically important to note that he began his career on the Nass River, and, according to some accounts, returned to its head as his final home.

In connexion with Raven we have the nearest approach to a supreme deity that the Tlingit seem to have possessed, for the heaven-god of the Haida appears to be entirely wanting among them. This personage was called Raven—at the-head-of-Nass (Nashakiyeh), and it was from him that Raven obtained the sun, moon, stars, and eagle to distribute all over the world. Some of the more thoughtful Indians at the present day elevate this being to a position far above that which he occupied aborignally, but there is no doubt that he always had a real existence. He was called in some stories ‘the king of birds,’ and Raven was therefore subordinate to him. Up to the present time, however, no account of him has been obtained in the northern Tlingit towns—a fact which may indicate that Tsimshian and Haida influence has been involved with him.

Although held in considerable regard, killer-whales did not receive a tithe as much attention as among the Haida, nor do they appear to have been associated with points and reefs. Land-owners, however, and the land-otter men (ksháthko)—the Tlingit equivalent of the goqflit—played a great part in Tlingit mythology and in the rites of shamans, and were viewed with even greater terror. We also find a counterpart of the Haida Property-woman called Tlenahidak, and a counterpart of Master-carpenter. The increased importance of hunting is shown by the conception of Mountain-dweller, who lived far back among the mountains and had a house always abundantly stocked with game. Mountains generally were called upon for a fair wind. Other patron-deities were undoubtedly believed in, but the tendency in this direction does not appear to have been so strong as among the Haida. Another belief peculiar to the Tlingit was in a race of seal-men. When one of these was seen, they poured a bucket of fresh water into the sea. The grey bears and mountain-sheep, which are wanting in the Queen Charlotte Islands, were naturally held in greater regard than there, and, when bears were killed, their skins were hung up and adorned with eagle-down and red paint, being addressed meanwhile to the bear-spirits. It is still feared that the bear’s relatives would be angry and would kill the hunter. Favourite among Tlingit myths was that of a hunter named Kata, who was captured by a female grizzly bear that killed her bear-husband in order to marry him. His children by her were a famous race of bears known as ‘Kata’s children.’ They destroyed many people and committed great depredations, but were finally killed in battle by a group of shaman warriors, which served as heraldic crests in many of the most prominent families. There were also special tabus regarding mountain-sheep and the handling of their skins.

People obtained good luck by grasping at the sun’s disk and pretending to put it upon anything that they desired to be lucky. Like the Haida, the Tlingit gave food to any thing or any being that they wished to help them, and called to it, mentioning their wants. Everything was believed to have a spirit connected with it—there was one in every trail that a person followed and in everything that he touched.

3. The dead.—The regions of the dead are said to have been three—one below and two above the plane of earth. The first was the country of the killer-whale, and was below sea level. This was the abode of the drowned, and the third, or highest, was for those who had died by violence, corresponding to the Täxét’s house of the Haida. The approach to this place was through a hole reached by a single log, and this was guarded by a person who admitted only such as had perished in the prescribed manner. The trail thither was infested by grizzly bears and other animals. All other persons passed after death to the lower country Sagi-kavu-ani (‘souls’ home’), which corresponded closely to the Giettlgai of the Haida. The person who was to go thither found himself on a trail, and, following it, came to a fork. One of the two paths had been much trodden upon, while the other was very faint. The former came out on the bank of a river, beyond which were the houses of the departed, but, however loudly the new-comer shouted to the other souls to carry him across, they paid no attention until by chance he yawned, when they exclaimed that a soul had arrived, ferried him over, and gave him food. This river was said to have been forced by the tears of his family shed over the departed, and therefore it was not good to weep much until one’s friend had crossed the river. A story recorded by Krause 3 adds the important fact that only the souls of those who had friends among the spirits got to the other side, the remainder being forced to wander about miserably, and also that the river itself was as green and bitter as gall. The souls were dependent for their food on what their friends put into the fire for them, and all had to do their own work except those for whom slaves had been killed. Cremation, which was well-nigh universal among the Tlingit, was accounted for by the belief that only those whose bodies were burned could go near the fire in the spirit-world, the others being forced to shiver near the doors of the houses. According to Venininnoff, 4 the path of those whose friends wept much was muddy and watery, but for those whose friends wept less it was smooth and even. A world for wicked persons was sometimes spoken of, called Yeilikkwakwwo (‘Raven’s home’), and the Tlingit believed that any one who committed a crime, but it is possible that the belief was due to missionary influence.

4. Rebirth.—As among the Haida, belief in rebirth was general—so much so that it is said

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2 See BRFV, 472.
that a poor person would wish to die in hope of being reborn in a higher position in life. If a pregnant woman dreamed of some dead relative, it was regarded as a sign that he might protect his soul, and in consequence the child was given the relative’s name. A belief in four rebirths followed by annihilation has also been recorded, but this was perhaps a distorted rendering of the Haida idea. A so-called wrenched spirit, or wrenched soul, might be assisted by the relatives of the shaman who were to assist him might eat or drink. They cleansed themselves internally by drinking water and introducing a feather into the throat to bring on vomiting. At sunset all eating the uninitiated had been thoroughly cleansed and provided with new floor-planks. Then the shaman came out from behind a screen and began to run round the fire, his friends singing all the time, until the spirit came to him.

5. Shamanism.—Shamanism reached its highest development among the Tlingit, and nowhere on the coast were shamans of such exalted social rank, so well received, or so powerful when performing, the Tlingit shaman was dressed much like his Haida counterpart, but he also assumed a wooden mask, and, besides being possessed by one principal spirit, he was, if not possessed, at least accompanied, by several subordinate ones. The latter were represented on the masks by small figures round the eyes, jaws, ears, etc., of the principal figure, and were supposed to strengthen the corresponding features of the shaman. Still other spirits had charge of his rattle. With each of the masks went a certain number of songs. One of the most popular spirits was the wood-worm, which enabled the shaman to cut through any thing just as the wood-worm cuts through wood. In addition to his other neck ornaments, the shaman sometimes had a bird’s head tied in front. He also wore his highest development of paraphernalia, best time for him, and told the other people what to do. This assistant was generally the man who was to succeed to his office. According to Veniaminoff, the successor was a son or a sister’s son, but for a son to succeed to his father’s position seems to have been the exception. The right to certain spirits might be inherited, and in saying that this seldom happened Krause has gone decidedly too far.1

Not infrequently the spirit came to a novitiate shaman on the death of his predecessor, but often he was compelled to stay as long as two weeks in the mountains and woods before it showed itself. When it finally made its appearance, it usually sent him the land-otter, the tongue of which he wrenched out, catching the blood on a little bundle of sticks. Krause4 says that the shaman killed this land-otter by explaining ‘Oh! I four times very loudly, each time in a different tone of voice. He also notes that none of the sticks in his bundle were retained except those on which the blood had fallen. After the shaman drew out the tongue, he could have explained, ‘May I be skilful in my new calling,’ ‘May I be able to charm and dance well,’ etc. The tongue was afterwards concealed in the bundle, which was then kept in an out-of-the-way place, for, if an uninitiated person were to come upon it, he would lose his reason. The skin he removed carefully and preserved as a visible mark of his calling, but he buried the flesh in the earth. The part played by land-otters in shamanism and in mythology generally inspired the Tlingit with such respect and dread that, before the coming of the Russians, they would not shoot one of them.

If a person could not otherwise succeed in becoming a shaman, he might go at night to the grave of some dead shaman and take from the body a tooth or the end of one of the little fingers, and place it in his mouth. A shaman who did not observe certain regulations carefully might be killed by his own spirits, and, on the other hand, he could throw the spirit of one who did not believe in him and destroy him. The great exhibitions or performances of the shamans were undertaken only during the new or full moon. Shamans then called upon their spirits to bring good fortune and health to their town and people. From the morning of the day before that appointed until the following day, if a very close relative of the shaman who was to assist him might eat or drink. They cleansed themselves internally by drinking water and introducing a feather into the throat to bring on vomiting. At sunset all eating the uninitiated had been thoroughly cleansed and provided with new floor-planks. Then the shaman came out from behind a screen and began to run round the fire, his friends singing all the time, until the spirit came to him. Veniaminoff2 divides the spirits that spoke through shamans into spirits from above, land-spirits, and water-spirits. The first were the souls from the above-country already referred to. The land-spirits appeared in the form of land-animals, but were said to be the spirits of those who had died a natural death and who had their dwellings in the distant north. The water-spirits appeared in the forms of sea-animals, and were in fact the spirits of those animals. According to Krause,2 every Tlingit, whether shaman or not, had his own protecting spirit, but this belief is not seems to have assumed the importance which it bears among the inland Indians.

6. Witchcraft.—As shamanism had reached its highest development with the Tlingit, so also had witchcraft, which might almost be described as a diseased shamanism. A wizard accomplished his object by obtaining some portion of the person or clothing of the victim and laying it by an unburned body, among the ashes of a burned body, or on the body of a dog. When a person was suspected of being a wizard, his hands were bound behind his back and he was imprisoned in an empty hut but without food and with nothing to drink but sea-water. There he was kept until he confessed, lost his reason, or died, unless his friends were powerful enough to liberate him.

The person who confessed to having bewitched any one was forced to wade out into the sea with the medicine or compound which had caused the illness and to scatter it upon the water, accompanying his actions with certain formulas. Instead of being imprisoned, a suspected wizard was sometimes bound hand and foot and exposed on the beach for the rising tide to cover him. Sometimes he was dealt with in a still more summary manner. Any other accomplishers, wizards and witches were universally believed to possess the power of flight.

7. Charms, etc.—The principal families and many in humble circumstances kept charms to bring wealth and good fortune. They believed in all sorts of signs, which they extracted from, or rather read into, natural phenomena, and they thought that natural phenomena would be affected by the breaking of this or that taboo. After a person had died, his body was carried through a temporary hole in the side of the house, and a dog, dead or alive, was thrown out after it, either that the spirits might follow it out of the house or that the dead man might be protected in his journey to the spirit world.

LITERATURE.—The monumental work of A. Krause, Die Tlingit-Indiener, Jenae, 1833, is the authority on the subject. Most of the important mythological material contained in L. Veniaminoff’s Russian writers has been culled into it. See also J. R. Swanton, ‘Social Condition, Beliefs, and Linguistic Relationship of the Tlingit Indians,’ in 28 RLBl 459 (1919); L. Krause, Mythical and Religious Ideas of the Tlingit Indians, 28 RBBl 459 (1919); F. Boas, report v. ‘On the North-Western Tribes of Canada,’ in Journal of the Anthropological Association for the Improvement of Science, 1889, p. 501 ff.; John R. Swanton.

TOAD.—See ANIMALS.
TODAS.—The Todas are a small community, about 700 in number, living on the undulating plateau, about 7000 ft. above sea-level, of the Nilgiri hills in Southern India. They are a purely pastoral people, occupying about 1500 sq. ft. They are provided with the products of agriculture by the Badagas, a Cannarese tribe who also live on the plateau, while the Kotas, allied to the jungle peoples of Southern India, furnish their metal-work and pottery. Except for these commercial relations, the Todas form a wholly separate community and have few other relations with the Badagas or Kotas. With the Kurumbas, a jungle tribe living on the slopes of the Nilgiris, the Todas have even less frequent relations, and these arise chiefly out of the Toda belief that the Kurumbas are sorcerers.

1. Social organization.—The people are divided into two sections called the Tartharol and the Teivali, each of which is strictly endogamous, though irregular unions are allowed between men and women of the two. Each section is divided into a number of exogamous clans. Each clan owns a number of villages, or mad (commonly called madd), and takes its name from the etimation, or chief of these villages. The villages are small settlements, juts, or villages, usually only one or two houses with a dairy and buffalo-pen. They are scattered over the hills, but most of the villages of a clan are near one another. Each clan is divided into two divisions called kudr, 'horn,' which should properly be, and usually are, only two in number. These divisions are of importance only in ceremonial. Another division of the clan is the polm, by which the sharing of communal expenses, such as those incurred in the repair or rebuilding of the chief dairies of the clan, is regulated. The Todas recognize the existence of the family, or kutupel, as a social unit, and this often corresponds with the polm. One clan, the Melgarsol, has an exceptional position in that, though belonging to the Tartharol, it shares many duties and privileges with the Teivali.

Descent is always patrilineal. A man belongs to the clan of his father. The effect of fatherhood is not determined by marriage, however, but by a ceremony of giving a bow and arrow which takes place at the seventh month of pregnancy. This ceremony is performed only once in a lifetime by a person is regarded as the child of the man who was the last to perform this ceremony with his or her mother.

The Toda practise polyandry, nearly always of the fraternal type. Formerly this practice was possible in a pure form owing to the existence of female infanticide. Though girls are probably sometimes killed at birth, the practice is now less frequent. There is still a considerable excess of men, but polyandry is often combined with polygyny, producing a state which may be regarded as a variety of group marriage. In addition to orthodox marriage there is a regular system of unions in which a woman has connubial relations with one or more men called mokhkhodvaid. This kind of union may take place between a Tartharol man and a Teivali woman or vice versa, the difference being marriage proper, which is confined to members of one section. The orthodox marriage is between cross-cousins, and this institution is reflected in the nomenclature of relationship which is used in the living generation of the Todas. The cross-cousin is classified with the spouse, the mother's brother with the father-in-law, and the father's sister with the mother-in-law, as having the same rights and liabilities at law, and this practice is probably responsible for a custom of tranferring wives from one man to another which has now become very frequent. The custom seems to have been originally one by means of which a widower could obtain a wife in a community where, through the practice of infant betrothal, it was rare for a man to have no wife or many step-wives, but it has now become a process set in action whenever one man desires the wife of another.

The people are governed by a council of five called the nain, one of the members of which should properly be a Badaga. This council is chiefly engaged in settling disputes arising out of the transference of wives. It is also the business of the nain to arrange when ceremonies shall be performed, especially those of the more important dairies. There is a headman called monegor, but he is chiefly concerned with the payment of the assessment to the Government, and the institution is almost certainly recent. On the other hand, the headship of the clan is certainly an old institution. Its functions are not especially important, and this also holds good of the headship of the kudr and polm.

2. Religion.—The Todas believe in certain superior beings who may be regarded as gods, and speak of them as 1600 or 1800 in number, but these are the customary Toda expressions for an unattainable number. The two most important are On and Teikirzi. On is a male deity who presides over Amnox, the world of the dead. He is believed to have created the Todas and their buffaloes and to have been himself a dairyman. More important in the minds of the people is Teikirzi, a female deity, who is believed to have lived on the Nilgiris and ruled the people. Most of the Toda social and ceremonial laws are ascribed to her ordinance. These two deities are not especially connected with hills, but nearly all the others seem to be hill-deities, each being associated with a special hill-top. Two are rivers, associated with the two chief rivers of the district.

The ritual of the Toda religion is concerned almost exclusively with the buffaloes and the treatment of their milk. The dairies are the temples; the dairymen are the priests; and various incidents in the lives of the buffaloes, such as their movements from one grazing ground to another, the first milking, and the giving of salt, cereals, and water to the buffalo, have become associated with the performance of ceremonial which has a religious character. This ritual stands in a definite relation to the gods, for these beings are mentioned in the formulas of the dairy ritual, the general character of which indicates that they must be regarded as rice prayers. The names used for the deities in these prayers differ from those used in ordinary speech, and form part of a series of expressions called keworkam, in which special names of deities, buffaloes, dairies, utensils, and other objects are uttered, preceded by the word ith, said to mean 'for the sake of.' The dairies and the buffalo-herds form a somewhat complicated organization, especially among the Tartharol. Every village has a number of buffaloes devoid of any element of sanctity, and their milk is churned in a dairy, also devoid of sanctity, with no special ritual. Most of the buffaloes, however, belong to herds with varying degrees of sanctity, and in correspondence with these there are great differences in the elaboration of the ritual with which the milk is treated and in the ceremonial regulations of the lives of the dairy priests. This complicated system is confined to the buffaloes of the Tartharol, the Teivali having only one variety of sacred buffalo, but the most sacred kind of dairy can be attended either by Teivali men or by men of the Melgars clan, which occupies an intermediate position between the two main sections.
The lowest grade of Tarhrah dairy is called toareh. Its ritual is comparatively simple and is confined to the evening milking and churning, then the dairyman enters the dairy. If, however, he leaves and touches the threshold with his forehead, touches certain dairy vessels ceremonially, lights the lamp, and utters a prayer before the lighted lamp, he holds the churning-stick to his forehead, uttering the sacred syllable 'Ori. He then begins to dance, and thus prays the daily prayer of the dairyman.

The dairy next in order of sanctity differs in the possession of a bell (Oli). The dairyman is not allowed to put his food on the ground; both common as well as sacred are driven on the bench with the utterance of the sacred syllable; and the chieftain of the village, or the chief dairyman of this grade, neither sleeps or prays in the ordinary hut; but only on certain days of the week.

Ordinary people are not allowed to drink the milk of buffaloes tainted with milk of cows thus consecrated.

Certain villages have dairies with special features of ritual, character, and different uses. The Melgaro, for example, is the largest and most important of this class, and is so occupied, that the Melgaro, and in some cases the Melgaro dairy, is the only dairy of the village. The villagers are all allowed to wear working clothes only during the time of this occupation, as they are not allowed to touch or wear the clothes of the dairymen, who are always wearing a white robe or cloak, with a red sash and a staff. Some of the latter are also provided with a silver or golden staff, and a golden or silver mask, to be carried in procession.

The people of the dairy are divided into two classes: the Melgaro, and the others. The Melgaro are the chief dairymen, and are considered as the most sacred of all the dairymen. They are allowed to wear only white clothes, and are not allowed to touch or wear the clothes of the other dairymen. They are also not allowed to touch or wear the clothes of the women of the village, who are considered as the most sacred of all the inhabitants.

The village of the dairyman is the lowest grade, and is considered as the least sacred. The dairyman's house is the only one that is not occupied by the villagers, and is considered as the most sacred of all the dairymen's houses.

There are also certain ceremonies that are performed by the dairymen, such as the procession of the milk, the milking, and the churning. These ceremonies are performed by the dairymen, and are considered as the most sacred of all the ceremonies that are performed by the villagers.

There are also certain events that are considered as the most important of all the events of the village, such as the birth of a child, the marriage of a person, the death of a person, and the death of a cow. These events are considered as the most important of all the events of the village, and are performed by the dairymen, and are considered as the most sacred of all the events that are performed by the villagers.

There are also certain festivals that are performed by the villagers, such as the festival of the harvest, the festival of the rain, and the festival of the cows. These festivals are performed by the villagers, and are considered as the most important of all the festivals that are performed by the villagers.

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There are also certain feasts that are performed by the villagers, such as the feast of the harvest, the feast of the rain, and the feast of the cows. These feasts are performed by the villagers, and are considered as the most important of all the feasts that are performed by the villagers.
monies now to be described are more occasional and depend on the commission of some act which has offended the gods and thus brought illness or some other misfortune upon the offender. In these cases the central feature of the ceremony is an offering to the gods of either a buffalo or a buffalo-calf, a piece of the cloth worn by the more sacred dairymen, or a ring.

The simplest kind of offering, often made when someone is undergoing a minor illness, is to undertake not to kill or part with a buffalo, but allow it to die a natural death. In this case there is little ceremony, the donor simply stating that he is giving the buffalo to the gods while he salutes an elder. A more ceremonial offering of a buffalo-calf is made if a misfortune is ascribed to some serious offence against the dairy, such as stealing milk or its products, quarrelling in the dairy, or going to it in an improper state. In this case the calf is given by the offender to the people of the other kudr of his clan. All members of the kudr of the offender have to leave the village for a month, at the end of which, after purification with fasting, the calf is driven across certain ceremonial stones to be received by members of the other kudr. For minor offences a piece of cloth or a ring in a similar manner is being passed in every case from the kudr of the offender to the people of the other kudr of the clan. In all cases prayers are offered, which include in some cases supplications for the health of the people and their buffaloes.

4. Divination.—The offerings just described are made as the result of the finding of diviners called teul, or god-men. The decisions are given when the teul are in a state of frenzy and in a language which is said to be Malayalam. It is believed that they are the utterances of some of the gods. The diviners are often consulted at funerals, usually to discover the cause of death or illness either of men or of buffaloes, or the cause of any harm which has happened to a dairy or its contents. In the case of illness they usually find either that the patient has committed some offence against the dairy or that he is the victim of the sorcery of the Kurumbas.

5. Birth and childhood ceremonies.—Two ceremonies are performed during pregnancy; in the first the woman is undergoing seclusion, while the second ceremony is that already mentioned in which the presentation of a bow and arrow determines the fatherhood of the child. Various ceremonies occur at the end of pregnancy; but the most serious childbirth is that of the child. Until a child is three months old no one but the mother is allowed to see its face, and at that age a ceremony is performed in which the face is uncovered and the child is allowed to look at the sun. Ceremonies are also performed when the name is given, when the ears are pierced, and when a lock of hair is cut, the last ceremony only taking place on the day after the second funeral (see below) of a Tarthar man.

6. Death.—The funeral ceremonies are very elaborate and take place on two different occasions often separated by many months. At the first ceremony the body is cremated on a pyre, the orthodox position being face downwards. Several rites are performed before cremation, among them being one in which a cloth is given by a near relative to the relatives of the deceased, who is married into the family, the cloth being then placed on the corpse by the wives of these men. In the case of a man the cremation is preceded by a ceremony in which the head is broken, the skull being wrapped in a buffalo-calf by a Teivali dairymen at a Tarthar funeral and by the relatives if the dead man is one of the Teivali. In most Tarthar clans the body is placed before cremation in a special three-roomed dairy. Buffaloes are killed, varying in number in different clans. In each case the right hand of the dead man is made to clasp one of the horns, and lamentations are uttered in which each person addresses the dead buffalo by the name of the deceased, the body is consumed, a piece of the skull is recovered from the ashes and kept, wrapped with some of the hair in a cloak, for the second funeral ceremony. In the interval these relics are kept in a special village, where they are saluted by any Todas who visit the place. Formerly the body was smoke-dried, after it had been incinerated, if the cremation ceremony was delayed.

At the second funeral ceremony the earth-throwing rite is repeated. At a Tarthar funeral a ceremony is performed in which the relics are sprinkled with the blood of a buffalo mixed with the bark of the teul tree. This is done by a Teivali man, wearing the cloak in which the remains have been wrapped, after which he touches the remains with a bow and arrow. Buffaloes are killed, as at the first ceremony, and the men of the clan are allowed to take a piece of the skull obtained from Malabar. During the following night the final ceremony takes place, in which the relics together with a number of other objects are burned within a stone-circle. The ashes are interred at an opening in the circle, and the grave is covered with a stone. A bell is then rung and a new pot broken on the stone, after which all go away without turning back to look at the resting-place of the earth of the dead.

The dead are believed to go to a place called Amnord in the west and below the earth. The god On presides over this world of the dead, where the people live much the same kind of life as on earth. The dead travel to Amnord by a definite route, which differs in some respects for Tartharol and Teivali. In each case the dead perform acts on the way by which they lose their love of the earth and regain the vigour of health. They have also to cross a bridge of thread, running the risk of falling into a river full of leeches. Those Todas who have offended against the dairy are not allowed to have been in a temple or a village on their journey to Amnord. One of the Tarthar clans, that of Taradr, has an Amnord, distinct from the rest, at Perithi in the Wainad, where there are still some Toda settlements.

7. Sacred numbers.—Many Toda ceremonies must be performed on definite days of the week, and this is probably connected with an institution in which each clan has one or more days on which a large number of activities are forbidden. Thus, on the madnol, or village day, neither dairymen nor women are allowed to leave the village, and nothing may be sold or taken away. There are various restrictions on conduct, and funeral and other ceremonies may not be held. Among the Tartharol there are similar restrictions on days sacred to each kind of dairy, so that in a village which has dairies of several different kinds a few days of the week are left for the performance of the ordinary activities of life.

Sacred numbers are very prominent in the ritual, three and seven being the most important. Many ritual acts are connected with numbers, threefold rite being usually associated in the dairy ceremonial with the utterance of the sacred syllable "Oh." This number is also prominent in the funeral rites, especially in connection with the ceremonial throwing of earth and the swinging of the body over the pyre before it is burned. The sevenfold performance of ceremonial acts only occurs in the
dairy ritual and is especially prominent in the ordination ceremonies. Several of the most ancient lamps of the dairy are said to have had seven cavities, or sixom, the token when present.  

8. Sorcery.—Two kinds of sorcery are practised, in one of which an incantation is uttered over some hair, preferably that of the person it is designed to injure. This is done in the presence of the proposed victim's hut. In the other form the sorcerer uses a bone or lime, which is then buried near the village of the proposed victim. In each case the incantation resembles the ordinary form of prayer, but with less explicit reference to the gods. It consists mainly of an enumeration of the misfortunes which it is hoped may fall upon the victim. The trouble is removed or averted by a corresponding formula as the result of negotiations of the sorcerer with whom the misfortune has been ascribed by one of the diviners. There are many points of similarity between the ceremonial of the Todas and that of the Hindus, the sanctity of the milk-providing animal being an important feature common to both. There is reason to believe that the two main sections of the Todas differ and it is probable that the Teivalirol represent the earlier comers and that they mixed with an indigenous people who practised interment of the dead preceded by some kind of mumification. The Tartharol seem to be later comers, who either brought the practice of mumification or accentuated its importance. The complexity of the dairy ritual is probably due to their influence, and they seem to have adopted the practice, so frequent in India, of employing the earlier settlers as their priests.

A point of especial interest is the relation of the Todas to the stone-circles and other megalithic structures on the Nilgiri hills. People present take little interest in these monuments, and this is intelligible if they were erected by the older stratum of the population represented by the Teivalirol, whose beliefs have been put into the background by the greater influence of the purely pastoral Tartharol. Stones of various kinds enter into the ritual of the dairy. The burial of the ashes at the entrance to a stone-circle at the end of the feast is a popular method of preventing the earth into the buffalo-pen at both funeral rites suggest that the body was once interred in a buffalo-pen, and this is perhaps confirmed by the burial of the ashes at the entrance to a stone-circle. In the sanctification of this vessel with earth taken from this spot. These features of ritual point to the circular pens as part of the culture of the older people, and in this connexion it is noteworthy that the most ancient dairies are circular and afford characteristic examples of the round house with conical roof. It may also be noted that these dairies are surrounded by stone walls, in one case by two such walls.


TOHUNGANS.—See POLYNESIA.

TOKEN.—In its broadest sense a token is any portable object serving as a sign or proof of authenticity, or by which the issuer guarantees that the claims indicated by the token will be satisfied on its presentation in the proper place. In numismatics it signifies a coin-like piece of metal or other material representing money of much more than its intrinsic value, for which money the issuer undertakes to redeem the token when presented; it is also loosely applied to tickets admitting to certain privileges, such as the holy communion, or serving instead of letters of recommendation or other forms of credential.

1. Antiquity:—Many vague statements have been made as to the use of tokens or tesserae (symbola, symphonemata) for identifying persons who had been initiated into mysteries, but nothing of the kind has been authenticated. Tesserae were largely used in Roman times for giving admission to certain places or entitled to share in the distribution of grain (des- serra frumentaria), and some of these bear Christian symbols (one is extant in ivory bearing an anchor, two others and a fragment in Augsburg). Even among pagan tesserae, those relating to religious bodies are rare. A certain number are extant bearing the names of the magistri and other dignitaries of the archs and aetes who made distributions at festivals, such as the magistri Minerales; there are also tesserae inscribed Sacra(Lan)vinsa Inven(cula), which were used at the festival of the college of Leuves at Lanuvium.

As regards Byzantine times, a certain number of tesserae of churches, convents, confraternities, and other pious institutions have been described; they may be preserved, as in the Christian tesserae, distribution of alms and also for the control of various payments due to the personnel of churches and religious bodies. Such are, e.g., an anonymous bronze tessera with the busts of the Virgin and St. Demetrios, and another with God the Father (inscription ἐνθρόνιζεν ἀνθρώπους) and a bunch of grapes on the reverse, which, it has been suggested, may have been used for the remuneration of cantors. The pieces used for charitable distributions are inscribed (in Greek) with such texts as 'He that hath pity upon the poor lendeth unto the Lord,' 'Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy.'

2. Moneux.—The moneux of the church.—The token, or jeton de présence, issued to the clergy in collegiate churches as a record of their presence at mass, at the canonical hours, and at other offices, in order that they might claim the statutory payment for their services, was most commonly known as a moneux. The Latin word moneius (moneatis, moneatus, etc.) is of uncertain derivation. Other names met with are: plac (plate, platelet, platelet), plac (platelet), moneca caputul, sinodolum, etc. Many of these terms, signifying merely distribution-token, on the presentation of which a share in funds or privileges could be claimed, were not confined to the tokens of religious bodies, but extended to all kinds of corporations. The term moneaux was first introduced; the mention in a charter of the cathedral church of Tours (1216) of a distributio nummorum moneuariae does not necessarily refer to such moneux as in the present connexion. It is certain when moneaux capitulares were first introduced; the mention in a charter of the cathedral church of Tours (1216) of a distributio nummorum moneuariae does not necessarily refer to such moneaux as in the present connexion. It is certain when moneaux capitulares were first introduced; the mention in a charter of the cathedral church of Tours (1216) of a distributio nummorum moneuariae does not necessarily refer to such moneaux as in the present connexion. It is certain when moneaux capitulares were first introduced; the mention in a charter of the cathedral church of Tours (1216) of a distributio nummorum moneuariae does not necessarily refer to such moneaux as in the present connexion. It is certain when moneaux capitulares were first introduced; the mention in a charter of the cathedral church of Tours (1216) of a distributio nummorum moneuariae does not necessarily refer to such moneaux as in the present connexion.

1 Cf. the phrase of Tertullian, de Præscript. xx.: 'dam est illis [i.e. ecclesiis] communicacionis pascua, et appellatione fraternalis, et consociationis hospitialis.'
without any special connexion with religion. The earliest undoubted documentary reference to their use in churches seems to date from 1375, when Charles V. granted to the canons of the collegiate church of St. John at Lione the privilege of having "argent-méreaux" struck at the Royal Mint of St. Pourçain merellé for distribution to clerks and canons present at offices; they were to be of copper, lead, or tin, and to be carefully distinguished by their types, which are specified, from coin of the realm. None of these seems to have been identified. Next in date comes a reference in 1401. In a clause of his will Charles VI. ruled that the distributor of the Sainte Chapelle 'ne baille les méreaux jusqu'à la fin des heures de Notre Dame.' In a letter of 18th July 1401 he announces his intention of carrying out during his lifetime the new system outlined in his will; no one of the clergy who mishandled or absented himself was to receive "méreaux." A 15th cent. statute ordered that on every Saturday all the canons, chaplains, and clerks of the Sainte Chapelle should attend in the pay-room and bring their "méreaux" to show what each had earned. But there are extant church-"méreaux" which by their style must be earlier than the documents referred to, and the substitution of these for the custom just mentioned and observed at time, or for pricking in, or for tallies, may date from early in the 13th century. In 1557 the canons of Mâcon claimed that they had had for 'more than three or four centuries' the right of distribution of certain jetons for the payment of choristers and other clerks serving in the church; what foundation their claim possessed is not known. Nearly all the examples known come from France or the Low Countries, where "méreaux" were also used by abbeys, convenls, hospitals, infirmaries, parish churches, and confraternities. The popular English term 'abbey token' for what are really reckoning-counters must not be taken to prove the existence of the custom in England; there is no evidence for such use in this country. Such tokens were cashed from time to time by the receivers of the various funds on which they were issued; sometimes they could be exchanged by the cellarer for vienuels; and they often had a modified circulation. As long as this did not extend outside, so as to encroach on the currency of the realm, no objection was taken; but any body issuing such "méreaux." But, when it was the custom, as it was at Saint-Amé (Douai) or at Arras (where "méreaux" were used inscribed 'merellus mandati papam'), for the clergy to give away such tokens, entitling to portions of victuals, alms to the poor, it is easy to see how the circulation might extend outside. In 1577 the Cour des Monnaies had to forbid the use of "méreaux" issued by the chapter of Autun except for distributions to the clergy; they had got into circulation in the town. In the case of certain pieces, especially of places in the Low Countries, it is matter of dispute whether they are really church-"méreaux" or base coins, of which the circulation was enforced by local authorities; such are the lead deniers of the Abbesses of Manhez, which circulated throughout Hainault until they were forbidden in 1541, the copper deniers of Notre Dame de Tornemare, the 'yellow-money' of the chapter of Notre Dame de Cambrai. The rare "méreaux" of Carthusian foundations, such as the Certosa of Pavia or St. Mary Magdalen at Louvain, were struck not for the remuneration of the clergy, but for alms-giving. A similar subsidiary use of "méreaux" is illustrated by the custom at Lembke (near Eeclo, E. Flanders), where "méreaux" were struck for the distribution of alms under the foundation of G. Ker-

1 See, however, § 6 below.

were given to each of the poor who attended at catechism in preparation for communion, and of one patard to children who were zealous in preparation for their first communion.

The metal of which the "méreaux" are made is usually lead, copper, or brass; the ruder specimens in the baser metal may be cast in moulds, but a large proportion are struck from engraved dies. The slate moulds used for casting the "méreaux" of the parish of St. Martin, Paris, described in letters-patent of 1478, are still in existence. Non-metallic substances such as leather or paper could also be used, but specimens in such material, if they survive, are very rare; a find made in desolating a wall of the cathedral of Limoges seems to indicate that "méreaux" of leather were used there.

A few typical inscriptions and types found on "méreaux" may be mentioned. The St. Omer pieces are inscribed 'M(oneta) Ecclesiae' Santi Ando-

mari, 'with the arms of the chapter, and 'Presenti-

bus dabitur'; those of St. Martin des Champs read 'Distributio pro beneficiatia.' The series of the Ste. Chapelle, Paris, were earned after 1448 reads 'Capella Regi(ualis) Palacii Parisiensis.' An ordinance of that year shows that those used for pre-

bendaries and cantor bore a long cross with the letters 'IHS' and a crown; they were struck in tin, and clarks had a royal crown; other kinds then in use were ordered to be withdrawn: such were pieces marked with a cross, lance-head, and nail, repre-

senting relics in the chapel. Some series bear the name of the various offices for which they were used, as matines, prime, tierce, viesas, sexte, nonne, coeptes, complices. Dates do not appear before the 16th century. The value in money which the pieces represent is frequently expressed as 'VI. D. T.' ('six deniers tournois'). A series mentioned in the archives of St. Pierre d'Aire (Artois), and described by Rouyer, may be given as typical. There were (a) plombs des matines ou deniers Marchant, worth one denier Fauissi, distributed daily after matins, and paid from the fund known as du Marchant; these occur from 1414 to 1557; (b) plombs de la Croix or de la procession du vendredi et la plombs Lambert ou du trésorier; these represent particular foundations, and were of different values, given to canons, cantor, or other clergy; they are not men-

tioned after the 17th cent; (c) plombs oblates, i.e. moneta anniversariorum, given to those who assisted at anniversay obology services; (d) plombs des heures canoniales, Instituted 20th June 1555, and paid to each canon, each day, for the canonical hours; (e) plombs des restes, distributed in the 17th and 18th centuries at the masses said at the high altar to the canons who assisted at anniversy oboly services; (f) plombs des jours capitulaires, for ordinary meetings of chapter, term, or conference; (g) plomb de la confrérie, distributed in 1765, for chapters dealing specially with matters of cult; (h) plombs des vicaires, poor priests or clerks employed by canons to take care of their churches and chapels; (i) plomb de la confrérie de Notre Dame Paviére, or plomb de Solis, from about 1520 down to 1700, for offices at the confrer-

try.

Some specimens of the moneta anniversariorum have survived; one belonging to St. Pierre d'Aire has on the obverse a death's head, on the reverse a hone and a key in saltire between three stars. Another inscribed 'Moneta anniversarium' has a crowned A between two lilies; on the other side 'Requiescam in pace,' i.e. the form of a 1448 reads 'Obit solenel' and dated 1585; and there is a pair of 'méreaux' inscribed 'Orate Deum pro vivis' and 'Orate Deum pro defunctis' respectively.

A subsidiary use of tokens, more or less corre-

sponding to the use as communion passes, has at-

times prevailed in the Roman Catholic Church. There is a tradition that Cardinal Pole in Queen Mary's time had issued a number of such tokens, inscribed to distinguish those who conformed from those who did not. Communion certificates in the shape of tokens or tickets were given to those going to communion at St. Andrew's, Glasgow, from 1840.
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To 1850. At certain churches in Rome communicants at Easter receive them after they have been printed.

3. Tokens of the Reformed Church. — The earliest mention of méreux (marreux, marrons, marcois) in the Reformed Church abroad is in the registers of the Geneva Council; on 30th June 1590 Calvin advised their introduction, but there is no evidence that they were actually used at Geneva before 1605. On the other hand, the French Protestants immediately adopted Calvin's suggestion, and there are tokens of the Wallachia of the Church at Amsterdam as early as 1586. These tokens (which in the first Helvetic Confession are called tasseare) were used for quite a different purpose from that of the méreux of the Roman Catholic Church; they were certificates, issued to all persons considered after examination to be satisfactory in regard to religious knowledge and moral character, admitting them to partake of the sacrament of the Lord's Supper. In 1584, e.g., Mme. Duplessis-Mornay and all her household were refused tokens for communion at Montauban because she dressed her hair in the court fashion instead of the Protestant one. The extant specimens of these French Reformed Church tokens seem to be not earlier than the 17th cent.; they bear appropriate types, such as a chalice, or a shepherd holding a lamb, or the names of the churches, and sometimes dates; such inscriptions as 'Ne crains rien, petit troupeau' also occur. Copper méreux with an angel-shepherd, and the inscription, 'In unum concludam reliquum Israel. Mich. 2,' or 'Christ est le pain de vie,' of good 17th cent. workmanship, were probably made for Protestants in Paris. Another similar piece reads 'Christ habite en os nourris par fo,' and bears a flaunting heart transfixed by two arrows.

The first French church to employ this kind of méreux was at Nimes (before 1592). Except at Selan and Troyes (where it was introduced in 1594), none of the Reformed Churches of the East is known to have used it. It was especially popular in Polton, no fewer than 45 churches in that district being represented. Such pieces are commonest from 1740 to 1840, and are often very rude, being the handiwork of the elders themselves. The material is usually lead, tin, or a mixture, and they are most commonly cast. Five modern writers have found them at work in Scotland.

The French Reformed church at Erlangen in Bavaria began to use méreux in 1689, and the same mould has remained in use down to present times.

In England the books of St. Saviour's Church, Southwark, show that communion tokens were used as early as 1559. It was the custom at Southwark to collect Church dues by 'selling the communion'; thus, in 1596, 2000 tokens were sold at 2d. each; and a similar practice prevailed at St. Peter Mancroft, Norwich. At Durham and elsewhere in the 17th cent. it was the custom to take Easter reckonings of such people as partook of the holy communion, and account with them and deliver and receive tokens. The names of communicants were written down, and they received tokens which at the time of the administration of the sacrament were demanded again, so that it might be known who had paid their Easter offerings and who had failed to do so. The use of tokens in Presbyterian churches in England was derived from relations (even popish) with the Church of the 17th cent., but the earliest actually bearing a date is of 1724 (East). Tokens are known of the Established Church of Scotland, the Independent Presbyterian Church, the Free Church of Scotland. Printed cards have now, as in Scotland, generally ousted metallic tokens.

But it was in Scotland that the sacramental token was most generally used, and by almost all of the Church of Scotland, no one was permitted to come to the Lord's Supper unless he or she had been provided with a communion token, which was issued after examination had shown the would-be communicant to be of good character and properly instructed. The tokens were sometimes kept as certificates of character, serving the same purpose as ancient tasseare. The Scottish tokens were at first probably written or stamped cards; such 'tickets' were in use as early as 2nd May 1590 at St. Andrews, and continued often to be used after metal tokens were introduced; the word 'ticket' is frequently used indifferently of either. Written tickets were used as late as 1656. The date of the introduction of metal tokens has not been determined. The use of them has continued in both the Presbyterian Churches and in the Scottish Episcopal Church down to the present day, although in the larger towns they have been almost entirely superseded by printed cards.

Recently established denominations, such as the United Free Church and the Free Presbyterian Church, appear to use only the latter. The metallic tokens are most often made of lead, tin, or a mixture, but brass, iron, copper, and even leather (the last only at the Secession congregation at Ceres, 1743) have been employed; the Crown Court Chapel, London, and the Presbyterian Church at Charleston used silver tokens, and for the first Reformed Presbyterian Church of New York they were made of ivory. They are generally cast in stone moulds, but are sometimes struck from dies. The oldest extant dated piece is of 1648, but a dated one of 1589 is recorded (Glasgow). At first they were distinguished merely by the initials of the parish (and this occurs as late as 1806); later came the initials of the minister, with 'M.' prefixed. Incuse numerals sometimes indicate the date to which a communicant was admitted when the number was very large. Religious symbols (heart, burning bush, vine, lily, chalice and bread) appear towards the end of the 17th century. The Covenanters' venticole tokens bear simple text such as 'Holiness to the Lord,' without indication of parish or date; and texts are common from the beginning of the 19th century. The cross, which is common on Episcopalian tokens, also occurs on some Presbyterian origin.

In some large towns we find the burgh arms and the initials of the deans of gild. Views of churches first appear in the 18th century.

From Scotland the Presbyterians naturally carried the usage, not only to England, but to other countries such as Ireland, where the oldest dated token known to have been struck is that of the Old Presbyterian Congregation of Larn, of the year 1700. Stamps and moulds for many of these Irish tokens are illustrated by G. R. and D. Brick.1

4. Monnaies des innocens et des fous. — A curious phase of Church life is illustrated by satirical 'coins' issued by the bishops and other dignitaries (including archbishops, cardinals, and even popes) to the effect that ecclesiastical saturnalia known as the fêtes des innocens or fêtes des fous. Such festivals flourished, according to documentary evidence, from the 13th to the 17th cent., especially at Avignon, but also at other places such as Chartres, Reims, Lorraine.

1 See reference under Literature.
TOLERATION

Sonlis, St. Quentin, Roye, Péronne—cildytherefore in the north of France, but also as far south as Besançon. These dignitaries issued tokens struck in lead, bearing such inscriptions as 'John, Fournier ep.', 'M. J. Maclura', 'Stourton Pap(e)', 'Moneta ecq(oi) innocen-
(tium)', as well as texts such as 'Homo non in solo
pnone vidit(i)', 'Indica Domine nocentes me', 'Stor-
tulum infinitus est númerus.' These types are
something saints, as on John Fournier's piece just
mentioned, which was struck by the Augustinians
at Amiens and bear St. Augustine. Rebusse are also in common use. Most of these pieces come
from Amiens, and bear dates from 1490 to 1583.
The enstun of issuing tokens on these occasions
also prevailed at Théraonne, Lille, and perhaps
Aire, but in those places no attempt was made
at humour, and the types are religious or anti-

5. The boy-bishops. — The boy-bishops who were
selected at certain churches in England on St.
Nicholas' Day and held office for a week are also
supposed to have issued leaden coins. The extant
specimens, which seem all to come from Bury St.
Edmunds, all bear a head of St. Nicholas or a
figure and are modelled more or less on the graves
and effigies of the saint. In 1703 a less common
example was found, inscribed with an invocation to St. Nicholas on the
obverse; on the other side we find inscriptions
such as 'Ave rex gentis,' 'Ave rex gentis Angel.
Mile,' 'Ece nova facies quint, Ece reges Angel-
orum.' The words 'Ave rex gentis Angelorum
miles Regis angelorum' are the beginning of an
anthem for the Feast of St. Edmund. The con-
stant association of these pieces with St. Nicholas
suggests that they were issued by the boy-bishops.
On the other hand, it has been argued that they
were used for the same purpose as the métroix or
jetons de présence described in § 2. It would, it
true, be strange if such a method of distribution
were confined in this country to a single chapel
(that of the Hospital of St. Nicholas) in St.Edmunds;
but this argument cuts both ways. Another
Bury piece inscribed 'Sigillum Gilde Sci. Nicho-
ldii' round the bust of the saint on the
obverse, and on the reverse 'Congregacio Dioce.'
round the letters 'S T N,' appears to be connected
with the Guild of the Translation of St. Nicholas;
but it is probable that its inscription may perhaps
be a seal and not a token.

6. Church tokens of the Near East. — The right
of coinage by ecclesiastical authorities has always
existed in the Levant and is recorded in the periods of
Constantinople during the Russo-Turkish War the
churches and convents and the Jewish
communities of Constantinople issued much token-money
for small change. After the Peace of San Stefano
the Turkish authorities called in from the prov-
ced the metallic tokens, but many of these issues
took the form of small cardboard tickets of differ-
ent colours. Typical examples are the silver 'obol
of St. Irene' (from Smyrna), the copper of St.
George's (from Smyrna), dated 1775, and the card-
board pieces of the churches of Maronite (20, 10,
and 5 paras, 1891), of St. George at Apollonia
(Apollonia ad Rhynacum, 10 and 5 paras), of St.
Michael at Goulion near Apollonia (10 and 5 paras,
1828), and of the church of the Divine
Blessed Virgin at Uskub (1818), besides the
Seferite synagoge, the synagoge of Akrida, and
other Jewish communities are represented by both
copper and cardboard types.

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G. F. HILL.
2. Indian toleration.—It has been asserted that Hinduism is the most tolerant of religions. This may be true. For Hindus, because being entirely racial and hereditary, it cannot proselytize. Judaism is also racial and hereditary, but not exclusively so, because it can admit proselytes. Hinduism has no opening for such. Accordingly, it must tolerate alien faiths, unless, like Tibetan Buddhism, it forbids immigration. Assoka, the Constantine of Buddhism in India (3rd cent. B.C.), had monuments of his legislation cut in stone expressing his liberal treatment of religion as follows:

'The king, beloved of the god, honours every form of religious faith, but considers no gift or honour so much as the increase of the substance of religion, whereof this is the root—to reverence one's own faith and never revile that of others.'

The Muhammadan invasion put an end to toleration in India by introducing cruel persecution of Hinduism with a wholesale destruction of the temples; but this was intermittent, the incursions of Turks, etc., taking the form of raids, from the 11th till the 17th cent., when the Mughal empire was established in Delhi. Akbar, the most famous of the Mughal emperors, aimed at combining all the inhabitants of his religion in his own eclectic system. He held synods of Hindus, Buddhists, and Parsees expounded their views as freely as Muhammadans.

3. Greek toleration.—The toleration of the Greeks was the variety of religious beliefs may be attributed to their intellectual breadth, but also to the syncretism which admitted a plurality of deities into its pantheon. Accordingly, as Adam remarks:

'There was comparatively little persecution for religious beliefs in Greek antiquity. Religious institutions and ceremonies were carefully guarded; but in respect of dogma the limits of toleration were very wide. We may infer from a remark of the Platonic Socrates that the Athenians in general cared little what a man believed, so long as he did not attempt to proselytize.'

The Orphic believers, who, as the same authority states, were 'analogous to modern dissenters,' were tolerated since they showed no sign of abstaining from the religious services which the city ordained. The Pythagoreans, on the other hand, were attacked because they used their religious organization for political ends. The death of Socrates appears to have been due mainly to animosity against the philosopher on account of his friendship with proscribed leaders of political parties. He was in his forties years old at the time, and his daring teaching had long been tolerated without any interference on the part of the authorities.

4. Roman toleration.—It was a principle of Roman state policy to allow conquered nations to continue the practice of their indigenous religious rites ("Ocibus regio ejus religio"). The old Latin cults were not propagandist, and they admitted of alien rites for alien peoples. Nevertheless difficulties arose, imposing limits on this easy tolerance in several ways: (1) by provincials coming to Italy and even to Rome with a claim to bring their own religions with them; (2) by missionaries of these alien faiths propagating them and by Roman citizens adopting them; (3) by the enforcement of the new state worship of the emperor throughout the empire; (4) by the dread of dangerous magic and the suspicion of immoral and cruel proceedings among the adherents of the foreign cults; (5) by a notion that public calamities might have been caused by hisOWL of the worship of the old deities ('atheism').

But there were differences. The Twelve Tables had forbidden the introduction of new gods into Rome. Nevertheless, the Jews had a dispensation granted them to practise their religion in various parts of the empire, including the imperial city. But they were supposed to be confined to their own quarters in each location. In the case of the Christians, ideas, however, especially among women of the upper classes—in particular in Rome and Damascus, where it became the fashion to 'Sabratize.' At first the Christians obtained tolerance on account of their Jewish origin, and it was not till their separation from the Jews became marked that they were interfered with by the authorities; nor was it the case that once even then. The Acts of the Apostles shows us Christians protected by Roman magistrates and police when attacked by Jewish mobs. By the time of Nero, however, in Rome the distinction between the two communities had become evident, and then the Christians were no longer sheltered by the licence for Jews. Christianity was not a religio licita. It is true that many unlicensed cults were winked at, in particular the religions of Syria and Egypt—the worship of Mithra, the Dea Mater, Serapis, etc. This was due to their great popularity. Christianity was not popular; it was too new. The vices of pagsans and Jews. Raussey has shown reason for thinking that the tolerance of the Flavian emperors did not secure the protection of the Christians from local outbreaks. Nevertheless, on the whole, previous to the great Decian persecution the authorities were not disposed to initiate active measures against them. When Pliny wrote to Trajan expressing his perplexity at the Christianity of Bithynia and the consequent disruption of the pagan altars, the emperor replied ordering him (1) not to seek out the Christians, (2) to discourage informers, but (3) to punish convicted persons who had been brought before him for judgment. This rescript has been described by some as a persecuting order and by others as a decree for the easing of the case of the persecuted Christians. In fact it was both. Evidently Trajan was opposed to active persecution and favoured a policy of leniency; but his clear pronouncement requiring the punishment of definitely convicted Christians left no alternative but sentence of death for such people. This was the most formal order of the government. Previously Christianity was implicitly illegal; henceforth it was to be explicitly illegal. In this respect the rescript was a limitation on the Roman policy of toleration. The persecution which had been carried on with exceptional ferocity at Lyons and Vienne under the gentle Marcus Aurelius was stayed by his worthless son Commodus owing to the intercession of his concubine Marcia, who appears to have been a Christian catechumen. This act of toleration cannot be raised to the level of state policy. It was purely personal in its origin, and it emanated from an unprincipled character.

When the emperor Valerian was captured by the Persians, the persecution which he had instigated was brought to an end by his son Gallienus, who issued a rescript in A.D. 295. It has not been preserved. But Eusebius quotes a letter from this emperor to the bishops of Egypt written in the following year, in which he gives directions in accordance with his previous rescript in this case that he has issued an order throughout all the world encouraging all to come out of their religious retreats and ordering that no one may molest them. Eusebius adds that another ordinance addressed to other bishops in

2 See Adam, p. 555.
4 'HE' vii. 13.
which the emperor grants them permission to recover their cemeteries in which they worshipped (τά ἑρακέμορα). Galienus’s rescript has been claimed as the first Roman edict of toleration; but Ulrich von Bugenhagen has shown that Licinius was not so radical in his policy as was his predecessor. Nevertheless, although Christianity was still illegal, in point of fact, since it was not to be molested, this was a policy of toleration. It cannot be justified on grounds of consistency, but practical politics are often guilty of inconsistency and prove themselves all the more humane for their freedom from legal pedantry. In the line that Galienus was taking we see the exact opposite to his father’s calulating measures of repression, devised with the deliberate, but now hopeless, design of stamping out Christianity. Galienus’s mild policy by no means gave to the Christians the legal rights which could be expected. His edict of 311 was not an edict of freedom, but an edict of tolerance. They enjoyed in consequence a whole generation of immunity from attack; but all along this was in a condition of unstable equilibrium, since nothing had been done to settle it on a sound legal basis. We might compare the situation to that of the Stuart ‘Indulgences.’ Christianity was not yet a religio licita.

Legalized toleration did not appear till after the last and greatest persecution. It was then seen in two stages. The first of these was spasmodic, insincere, and illogical, but still definite and effective. Galerius, the fierce instigator of the persecution which bears the name of the senior emperor Diocletian, who had been his reluctant associate in it, seized with death-bed terrors, issued the most extraordinary decree ever conceived by a Roman emperor (April 311). Galerius first takes credit to himself for endeavouring to bring the Christians back to the ancient laws and discipline of the Romans, and, after a jibe at their divisions, for which he suggests he will be blamed in a future edition. He gives orders that his subjects may again be Christians (‘ut demo sint Christiani’) and hold their assemblies, ‘provided they do nothing contrary to the discipline of the Church’—Galerius copied the remarkable sentence, ‘and for this indulgence the Christians will make the prayers of loyal subjects to their god.’

Toleration was not yet the settled policy of the empire. Where it was practised, it was too much subject to the caprice of the individual ruler. Maxentius at Rome was openly anti-Christian and Maximin Daza elaborated subtle devices for the destruction of Christianity; even later, during part of his period of government, Licinius favoured the pagans to the detriment of the Christians. The final stage was reached in the Edict of Milan. That magnificent Magna Charta of religious liberty issued from a meeting of Constantine and Licinius at Milan towards the end of the year 312, after the defeat of Maxentius. Maximin’s evasion of the order of toleration granted by Galerius was the occasion which gave rise to the new edict. It was much more statesmanlike than its curious predecessor, resting on a broader basis, breathing a nobler spirit, and establishing a surer policy. It was issued throughout the whole empire in the year 313. The Edict of Milan is the work of the great emperor Constantine, who induced his colleague Licinius to join him in it.

There can be no doubt that Constantine was thoroughly convinced by the enlightened principles that it contains. His colleague’s assent must be ascribed to political necessity, and subsequent events have shown that Licinius was both willing to accept it under compulsion. Unfortunately the original rescript has been lost, but Licinius’s edition of it, sent out a few months later, has been preserved, both the original Latin by Laetantius, and a Greek translation, slightly different, with an introduction by Eusebius. The toleration granted is absolute and unconditional. It is expressly applied to the Christians, for whose benefit it clearly shows that it was primarily intended. It also includes devotees of all other religions. This went far beyond the spirit of the ancient world, and indeed only occasionally and in the teaching of exceptional and rare minds has such toleration reappeared until quite modern times, when it has been seen in Cavour’s dictum of ‘a free Church in a free State.’

Constantine did not live up to his own principle. No sooner did he adopt the new religion than he began to show a desire to stamp out all heresy. This was shown in his edict of 313. His patronage took a different turn from the protection accorded to the persicutees of Galerius. In his constitution he laid down a definition of the true faith. All who believed in one God, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, were thereby included. There can be no doubt that Constantine was not only absolutely sincere in his desire to check the spread of heresy, but that he believed in the divine authority of the Church. He was desirous of checking the schismatics, if in favour of heresy, as in the support of Arius, by Constantine and later by Valens, against the Catholics. Later emperors inherited in the Christians the policy of the Roman government towards the Jews; it was enforced at Rome under the decree of the prefect Licinius’s edition of 351, which was mainly directed against the Christians and the pagans. The procurator of Rome was enjoined to take the precaution of withdrawing the images of the gods from the temples. Nothing was done without this decree having been previously enacted by the Senate.

The Edict of Milan was based on the simple policy of tolerance, but the emperor was not entirely true to his profession.

5. Early Christian toleration.—The early Christian Fathers advocated toleration, not merely in self-defence, but on principle. Tertullian was most emphatic in asserting this principle: ‘Innumeral juris usurpationes potestates et contemptum potestatis, nec aliquot ab antiquo libertas religiosa nec religiosae et cunctae liberalitatem, nec autem mitigat, aut dispensat, debet, non vi; cum est atque libenter libenti expostulatorii.’ 1

1 De Morti Pers. 48. 2 H.S. x. 5. 3 Cf. Eusebius, Theophilus (Early Church). 4 Ad Scapiulam, 5. 5 See Dei. Inst. v. 20.
influence of the rites of the Church. But with the rise of the Inquisition in the 13th cent. a greater rigour of ecclesiastical discipline crushed out the spirit of tolerance.

The 2. Renaissance and the Reformation.—The irreligious and pagan habits that accompanied the Renaissance issued in an easy indiffERENCE which favoured an unprincipled toleration. But the Protestant Revolution showed how far it engendered went farther and gave rise to a reasoned doctrine of toleration. Sir Thomas More, while sanitoning persecution, admitted the abstract excellence of the opposite course. Montaigne's sceptical and liberal idea of life made for toleration. On higher grounds Erasmus laboured incessantly for the same end, combining inimitable wit with immense learning, exposing the folly as much as the wickedness of ignorant, narrow-minded persecution. The duty of absolute toleration was insisted on by Castellio, a Frenchman, who had been a friend of Calvin when the Reformer was a professor at Basel. Denouncing the execution of Servetus, he argued that, if the end of Christianity be the diffusion of a spirit of benevolence, persecution must be its extreme antithesis, and that, if persecution can be the essential element of salvation, that religion must be a curse to mankind.

Most of the Reformers were not advocates of universal toleration; but Zwingli regarded error as not inherently blameworthy and held that it should be tolerated. He went farther and showed a comprehensive appreciation of human excellency apart from religious differences.

Luther Socinus was a pronounced advocate of religious liberty, and a clear assertion of the principle is put forth in the Socinian Catechism of Rakow. The German Anabaptists and the Dutch Arminians also advocated this principle.

8. The German settlement. —The Peace of Augsburg (1555) was arranged between the Roman Catholics and the Lutherans; it excluded the Reformed Church, both Zwinglian and Calvinistic, as well as all the minor sects. Further, this arrangement left it to the princes of the several states to decide which of the two permissible types of religion should be adopted and imposed on their subjects. This led to a conflict between two parties concerned and the exclusion of the Reformed Churches led to the Thirty Years' War. This was concluded with the Peace of Westphalia (24th Oct. 1648), to which there were three parties—(1) the Emperor and the Lutherans, (2) the Reformers. It made provision for none of the minor sects. The princes were allowed to pass from one of the three religions to the other and to require their selected religion to be imposed on their subjects to the exclusion of all other religions, or to admit other religions, as they saw fit. This right was called the jus reformandi. It implied a limited and optional toleration.

Subsequently two influences arose to widen the conception of religious liberty: (1) pietsism, which, as both non-denominational and charitable, tended towards universal toleration; and (2) the enlightenment for freedom. From the latter it was maintained that no one should be compelled to embrace a given religion and hold it to be a fatal necessity that discussion should exist within the Church. This was the typical liberalist, basing the principle of religious liberty on his fundamental conception of law and liberty, which derives morality from law, on the ground that law is coercive while morality cannot be coerced. More is the case with religion. The difference between the spheres of the prince and the clergy is that it is the duty of the prince to coerce and the duty of the clergy to teach. The clergy of a state must be in harmony with its government by appealing to the secular arm. While urging these principles in all his writings, he treated the question primarily to the exclusion of the formulation, viz., the two 'Programmata,' Programma de tolerandia dissidentiis in controversia religiosis (1633) and Programma de tolerandia dissidentiis in controversiis religiosis (1638), and the more popular work in the vernacular entitled Das Ereicht evangelischer

9. England and America.—In the 16th cent., under the Tudors, the extreme Puritan party, which had shared with other Protestants in the persecutions of Roman Catholic times, did not obtain religious liberty. But the principle of toleration was maintained by the Baptists and the Congregationalists, although there were some limits to the applications of it. The early Congregationalists would exclude from its privileges both Unitarians and Roman Catholics, the latter as themselves a persecuting party and a danger to Protestant liberty. But John Robinson, a large-minded man, who sought to widen the sphere of the Pilgrim Fathers who sailed in the 'Mayflower' and founded New England. The first instrument of this covenant conferred equal civil and religious rights on every member of a congregation. A little later the colony of Maryland, founded by a charter from Charles I., granted toleration to Roman Catholics as well as to Protestants. Its first law runs as follows: 'No person professing to believe in Jesus Christ shall be in any way molested or discommoded for his or her religion, or in the free exercise thereof.' The Pilgrim Fathers, who had claimed liberty at home, have been blamed for the inconsistency of intolerance in their own colony when they were settled in America. The defence is that the exclusive theocracy that they established implied that they regarded themselves as a Church rather than as a State, and as such would refuse membership to unit persons in accordance with a fundamental Congregational principle. But they have not been held to be at fault in their relations with the Pilgrims, who fell into two parties. The latter were Presbyterians who had never adopted the principles of religious freedom. It was not until the separation from England that complete equality in religion was established in the United States.

10. The English problem.—In the 17th cent. neither the bulk of the Presbyterians nor the Episcopal party as a whole had any idea of toleration. Under the early Stuarts Laud and the High Church, having the upper hand, persecuted the Presbyterians. Under the Long Parliament the Presbyterians unfavourably accused of narrowness through a confusion of two different positions—that of the early settlers in New England who had come from John Robinson's church in Holland and were the real Congregationalist immigrants, and that of the Puritan settlers of the 1640s. The latter were Presbyterians who had never adopted the principles of religious freedom. It was not until the separation from England that complete equality in religion was established in the United States.
TOLeration

in composition, maintained the right of religious liberty.

Later, on the Presbyterian side, Richard Baxter laboured for large measures of comprehension, and John Goodwin, generally regarded as a Congregationalist, but by Raulin and Genet—"the rationalist Puritan," maintained that every religion, sect, or schism should be tolerated so long as there was no attempt to interfere with the security of the State. Milton, claimed by both Presbyterians and Congregationalists, was wholly committed to either party, in triumphantly vindicating the freedom of the press, pleased eloquently for religious toleration. In the Arminians, he showed that persecution was both unnecessary for the preservation of truth and a hindrance to the discovery of truth. He would tolerate all Protstants, including Socinians, Anabaptists, and Unitarians, but not Roman Catholics. On the Anglican side the more liberal-minded writers were in favour of toleration and comprehension. Chillingworth affirms that Protestants are inexcusable if they do violence to the consciences of others. He holds it to be a great sin to force on other people our own interpretations of Scripture, arguing that this was the cause of all the schisms and discord of Christianity. John Hales, in his "Defence and Preservation against Universal Conventicle and Schismatics" (1636). Jeremy Taylor, in his famous "Liber? Cornyn," (1646), was contending for freedom of speech against the tyranny of the Covenant under the Long Parliament.

The reaction at the Restoration and the passing of the Act of Uniformity (1662), followed by the Conventicle, Five Mile, and Test Acts, narrowed the State Church position and imposed great disabilities on nonconformists. These were so severe to some extent relieved a little later by James I.'s indulgences, but at the expense of the rights of Parliament. Legal toleration did not appear till the Revolution. In the Declaration of Breda Charles II. promised to respect tender consciences; but, when well established on the throne, he had not the moral courage to stand to his word.

William III. obtained his invitation to England mainly as the champion of religious liberty. His aim was to bring about an agreement between the Church of England and Protestant Dissenters. While in his own country, he had been profoundly affected by the ideas of the Dutch Dissenters. In England his most trusted adviser, Bishop Burnet, had adumbrated the policy which the king afterwards adopted in a "Modist and Free Conference between a Conformist and a Nonconformist" (1663). William first aimed at comprehension in "A Bill for Uniting their Majesties' Protestant Subjects." The failure of this measure to pass in the House of Commons necessitated another line of action.

11. The Act of Toleration.—The Act of Tol-eration, which was passed in the year 1689, gave relief to Nonconformists from their chief disabilities; but it did not grant complete religious liberty; neither did it establish religions equality in the eyes of the law. It exempted Nonconformists from the pains and penalties of the Act of Uniformity, the Conventicle Act, and the Five Mile Act; at the same time it required people who desired to avail themselves of it to promise to take the oaths of allegiance and supremacy and make a statutory declaration against Romish superstitions, and it ordered Nonconformist ministers to subscribe to the Articles of the Church of England with the exception of three—those referring to the traditions of the Church, to the homilies, and to the consecration of bishops and priests, a fourth exception, that is, the act of baptism on infants, was allowed for Baptist ministers. Further, it enacted that every Nonconformist place of worship should be certified by a bishop, an archdeacon, or a judge of the peace. Quakers were allowed in the declaration instead of taking the oaths and were required to declare their belief in the Trinity and in the inspiration of the Bible. Neither Roman Catholics nor Unitarians were included in the commissions allowed by this Act, and even orthodox Nonconformity was still illegal, the persecuting laws remaining on the statute-books, and only the exaction of their penalties being forbidden. While this measured toleration was in some respects practically serviceable as far as it went, it secured a considerable amount of toleration.

The same year (1689) saw Locke's first "Letter Concerning Toleration" published anonymously in Holland in Latin. It was translated into English immediately. A second and longer letter, and a third longer still, followed in reply to answering letters. Yet for a letter completes the series in Locke's work: this is not finished. The collection has become a literary classic on the subject of toleration. Locke bases his argument on the ground that the rightful sphere of the State is only confined to external evil, that it is not the concern of the State to干涉 to religion, which is internal. He holds that not only the doctrines and "articles of faith," but also "the outward form and rites of worship," are out of the province of the State to interfere with. Their position goes beyond toleration. Logically it involves disestablishment, because, if the State is not competent to deal with religious matters at all, it follows that it should not patronize or support a favoured religion any more than persecute a religion of which it disapproves. With regard to persecution, Locke holds that it is anti-Christian, since love of our fellow-men is of the essence of Christianity, and it cannot be maintained that persecutors are actuated by love to their victims in the cruelties which they perpetrate. But, while on these principles Locke would tolerate Jews as well as all Protestant sects, his toleration does not extend to Roman Catholics or atheists. With regard to the former, though he does not name them in his argument on the subject, he says:

"That church can have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate, which is constituted upon some principles of order; for all those who enter into it, do thereby, ipse facto, deliver themselves up to the protection and service of another prince."1

He would also exclude persons who hold views subversive of society and atheists, who, he considers, are to be included in that category.2 Thus he regards both these parties as obnoxious to the State and to be excluded from toleration, both on moral and political grounds, not for their religious views. Locke carries his idea of toleration beyond the political sphere to the ecclesiastical, arguing for liberty of thought within the Churches themselves. He writes:

1. What think you of St. Athanasius's Creed? Is the sense of that so obvious and exposed to every one who seeks it; which so many learned men have explained in so many ways, and which yet a great many profess they cannot understand? Or is it necessary to your or my salvation, that you or I should believe and pronounce all those damned who do not believe that creed, i.e. every proposition in it? which I fear would extend to not a few of the Articles of Religion. Hence we can think that people believe, i.e. assent to the truth of propositions they do not as at first understand. If ever a man is acquainted with a country parish, you must needs have a strange opinion of them, if you think all the ploughmen and milkmaids at the church understand all the propositions in Athanasian's Creed; it is more, truly, than I should be apt to think of any one of them; and yet I cannot say I believe everything, to be able to judge or pronounce them all damned; it is too bold an intraching on the perspetive of the Almighty; to their own Master they stand or fall. Under Queen Anne the toleration that had been obtained by the accession of William and Mary was threatened by the Schism Act, which made it illegal under heavy penalties for any one to keep a

2 Id. p. 410 f.
private school or teach in a seminary unless he signed a declaration of conformity to the liturgy of the Church of England and obtained a bishop's licence to teach on presentation of a certificate that he had taken the communion according to the rites of the Church of England during the preceding year. The queen's death stayed the execution of this statute. But in the colonies, it was revisited in the reign of her successor, George I. From this time onwards toleration with regard to religious views and practices was firmly established; but its limits were fixed, for the concessions of William and Mary to the Roman Catholics, whose relative freedom from persecution was the most striking feature of their reign, delimitated the test of loyalty and the limits of the liberty of conscience. The practice of toleration was now no longer allowed. But the negative policy of exclusion and prohibition led to a revival of grievances long unrelieved. Tolerance is far from religious equality. The very practice of it involves an exalted position of power enjoyed by the people who tolerate as opposed to an inferior position in which the tolerated are living. It is not inconsistent with the monopoly of privileges by the one class and the refusal of them to the other. If those privileges are rights of citizenship, toleration is even possible side by side with injustice. Tolerated may be denied political power, the parliamentary and municipal franchise, the opportunity of election as members of Parliament or of corporations, access to public office or to private society, for example, as pupils or as teachers, and a host of other national rights and privileges. So it was that under the Georges, and even throughout much of the 19th., Nonconformists, Roman Catholics, Unitarians, Jews, and others had endured various forms of exclusion. The abolition of the Corporation and Test Acts, Catholic Emancipation, the admission of Jews to Parliament, the permission to dispense with the member's oath extracted in order to meet the case of Mr. Bradlaugh, the throwing open of the universities to Nonconformists, the enlarged foundation of grammar schools, and the extension of popular education generally, irrespective of ecclesiastical distinctions, were all steps beyond mere toleration towards the goal of religious equality — a goal which in several directions its advocates have thought they completely attained.

12. TOLERATION IN FRANCE. — The fight for religious liberty which was waged principally in Germany, Switzerland, Holland, and England during the 16th and 17th centuries passed on to France in the 18th century. The Reign of Louis XIV (1661-1715) had cut off toleration for Protestants; the revocation of that Edict (1685) restored and aggravated persecuting intolerance. Bayle established the intellectual basis of toleration in his Dictionnaire and in a work entitled Commentaire philosophique sur ces paroles de Jésus-Christ : Contraire, les entret. — a refutation of the misuse of a text popular with persecutors from the time of Augustine. He holds it to be immoral to compel men to profess religion in which they do not believe, and also irrational, because it discourages the discovery of truth. No one, he maintains, has a right to claim such complete possession of truth as not to need to compare his ideas with those of other men. Montesquieu, in De l'Esprit des lois (1748), argues for religious liberty and exposes the futility of coercion. Rousseau, in his Contrat social, affirms the complete liberty of individual beliefs; nevertheless, holding that intolerance is inherent in Christian dogmas, he would abolish this and establish a civil peace on the foundations of the impersonal, well-organized social life, including that of the existence of God. But it was Voltaire who by his seething sarcasm did more than any other man in France during the 18th cent. to put an end to persecution and secure toleration for all Protestants.

The ideas of these champions of religious liberty powerfully moulded the course of the French Revolution in regard to religion and the universal principles of toleration that has since colored peace and good order under British rule. It is established in Japan and practically observed throughout the provinces of China. It is also practised in a general way in South America and Western Asia are still excluded from its privileges. The exclusiveness of Tibet is national rather than religious in character. Thus it is apparent that the policy of toleration has been adopted throughout the greater part of the civilized world.

Apart from the liberalizing of legislation, great progress has been made by means of Modernism in Roman Catholicism, and an expansion and spread of Christian charity, culture, knowledge of history, scientific methods of criticism, and the study of comparative religion, by the softening of barriers, by a new comprehensiveness and religious indifference, all tending to cool the ardour of the persecuting spirit and so to establish toleration. The champions of liberty now resent the use of the term as a synonym of licence, whether it is a part of the privileged and claim to go far beyond it in their demand for the abolition of all theological and ecclesiastical privileges and the establishment of absolute religious equality.


TOLERATION (Muhammadan). — Muslim toleration may be considered under two distinct aspects, with respect to (i) the faithful themselves, and (ii) non-Muslims.

(i) Within the circle of the Muslim Church the basis for toleration is found in the saying traditionally attributed to Muhammad: *Ikhailu 'ummati rahmatullah*; "Difference of opinion in my community is a matter of excitement, and in the case of difference with this principle, it has been possible for the four schools (madhab) of theologians and leis in to which the Sunnis are divided, viz. Hanafi, Hanbali, Shafi'i, and Maliki, to exist side by side, and for each of them to permit difference of opinion even in its own midst. There has been
abundance of controversy between these schools, but instances of open violence have been rare. 1 A similar basis for toleration was found in the traditional saying of the Prophet: "My community will be divided into seven sects, but if they differ among one another, no harm will come of it. 2" Men also differ from each other, and the duty of a ruler is to tolerate all possible the ample sectarian development in the Muslim world. Instances have occurred from time to time of the persecution of one sect by another, but the tolerant feature of the Muslim Church has been the freedom allowed to the exposition of religious doctrine, and the common sentiment of princes and people has generally condoned intolerance on the part of professed theologians. 3

3. The recognition of rival religious systems, as possessing a divine revelation, gave to Islam from the outset a theological basis for the toleration of non-Muslims. Judaism and Christianity are represented in the Qur'an as forms of the primitive faith given to man and taught by a series of prophets from Adam onwards:

"And among every nation are guides, whom We have sent down, to guide to Us. 4"

But Jewish and Christian teachers had corrupted the purity of this primitive faith, which Muhammad 5 "as the seal of the prophets" 6 came to proclaim anew.

This recognition of a common God is put forward in the Qur'an as the basis for friendly relations with the followers of rival creeds, in the following verses:

"Say to those who have been given the Book and to the ignorant, Do you accept Islam? Then, if they accept Islam, are they guided aright? But if they refuse, then their duty is to fear themselves. 7 Those who have inherited the Book after them, haveREF 8 to be fortified by the truth, that it might decide the disputes of men. 9"

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"Let there be no compulsion in religion, 12 and forcible conversion is condemned in the words:"

"But if the Lord had pleased, verily all who are in the world would have believed together. Will thou then compel men to become believers? No soul can believe but by the permission of God. 14"

TOLERATION (Muhammadan)

1 See RHR xxvi. (1899) 175.
2 See art. FEROSHIAN (Mohammad).
4 Ex. 35, 20.
5 II, 200.
6 Neh. 8-10.
7 II. 119.
8 II, 75, 95, 112, 175, 217.
9 Zoh. 34, 99, 107; cf. xvi. 84, xxiv. 53, xlix. 47, and xlv. 12.
10 LXX, 37.
11 II, 297.
12 Zoh. 34.
13 xxvi. 45.
14 xxvi. 46-67, ix. 6.
15 xxvi. 3.
16 II, 299.
17 309.
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intolerance towards their Hindu subjects, made grants of money to the monastery of Shringeri, one of the most famous shrines in India, then in the possession of the present Muhammadan states in India, such as Hyderabad and Mysore, which still assign revenues for the support of Hindu temples.

Even in such a barbarous country as Afghanistan the Hindus enjoyed religious toleration in consideration of their payment of jizyah. "They were free from persecution and molestation; in time of war, they were allowed to go to their protector or the headman for a fair hearing and a fair settlement, and if their women were captured their religion was tolerated; no one tampered with their customs." 2

The non-Muslim living under a Muhammadan government was styled a dhimmi (lit. 'one with whom a compact has been made'), and the conditions under which he was allowed to be regulated by the agreements made with the Muslim conquerors as they extended their dominion over various cities and districts. As an example of such an agreement, the conditions may be quoted that are said to have been drawn up when Jerusalem came under Muslim rule in A.D. 638:

"In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate! This is an agreement concluded between the upright, the just, and the com- mander of the faithful, the people of Alhil, and they, the people of Alhil. They have granted to the people of Alhil, all the goods, properties, and revenues which they had, and which they had the right to receive, and which had been given them by their enemies, or which had been made for them (i.e. a dhimmi) and lays on him a burden beyond his strength, I shall be his accuser; 7 whoever torments the dhimmis, torments me." A similar consideration for them was shown by the khilafah-Umar, who in his testament enjoined on his successor: I commend to your care the dhimmis of the Apostles of God; see that the agreement with them is kept, and that they be defended against their enemies, and that no burden be laid upon them beyond their strength. 7 Similarly, 'Ali, when he appointed Muhammad b. Abi Bakr governor of Egypt in 32 A.H., bade him do justice to all races. 8 In like spirit the treaty made by the Turkish code ordains that the dhimmis are not to be disturbed in the exercise of their religion. 9

The actual practice appears to have varied according to local conditions and the character of the local government; and by the 2nd cent. of the Hijra, when some codification was made of the law relating to the dhimmis, more harsh and intolerant regulations had come into force than those of earlier times. But in the first century of Arab rule the various Christian churches enjoyed a toleration and a freedom of religious life such as had been unknown for generations under the Byzantine government. We have the contemporary testimony of the Nestorian patriarch, Isha'yah Ibbar, III. (A.D. 650-660), who, writing to the primate of Persia, says:

1 Annual Report of the Mysore Archaeological Department for the Year 1903, Mysore, 1904, p. 51.
3 Cymangani Ir-hindu, 1911, vol. iv. (Calcutta, 1913), Babulchand, pt. i, p. 175.
4 Tahmir, i. 265.
5 Faliduri, p. 163; Yahya b. Adam, Kitab al-khawarij, Leyden, 1836, p. 544, ad fin.
6 Adil, Al-Hikayat, Islamic Sarcophagi, Leyden, 1835, p. 11.
7 Abi 'Uyayn, p. 71.
8 Tahmir, i. 267, line 1; cf. his instructions to Maccal b. Qasa, l. 3430, line 14.
9 M. J. O'Conor, Tableau general de l'Empire otoman, Paris, 1839, iii. 41.

'The Arabs, when to God at this time had given the empire of the world, behold, they are among you, as ye know; and yet they attack not the Christian faith, but, on the con- contrary, they favour our religion, do honour to our priests and the saints of the Lord, and confer benefits on churches and monasteries.'

Indeed, the Church to which this cedalistic- bended exhibited a remarkable ease under the Muhammadan rule. The agreements were sent from Persia to China and India, both of which were raised to the dignity of metropolitan sees in the 8th cent.; about the same period the Nestorians gained a footing in Egypt, and later spread the Christian faith right across Asia, and by the 11th cent. had gained many converts from among the Tatars. 2 But by the 2nd cent. of the Muhammadan era the condition of the Christians had become less tolerable. The victorious armies that established Arab rule over Syria and Persia appear to have been little swayed by religious considerations, and under the rule of the Umayyads the Christian and other non-Muslim religious communities seem to have been little regarded except as sources of revenue; but under the 'Abbasids a change in the attitude of the government made itself felt. The orthodox reaction which supported this dynasty and the union of the spiritual and temporal power which characterized it tended to make the administration of the existing laws more oppressive and to curtail the course of the faith, or shall any one of them be harmed.' 3

The theory was that the dhimmis, in return for tribute paid and in consideration of good behaviour, received protection from the Muslim government and immunity for life, property, and religion. Tradition attributed to the Prophet a warning against the disregard of this compact, 1 : Whoever wrongs one with whom a compact has been made (i.e. a dhimmi) and lays on him a burden beyond his strength, I shall be his accuser; 7 whoever torments the dhimmis, torments me. A similar consideration for them was shown by the khilafah Umar, who in his testament enjoined on his successor: 1 I commend to your care the dhimmis of the Apostles of God; see that the agreement with them is kept, and that they be defended against their enemies, and that no burden be laid upon them beyond their strength. Similarly, 'Ali, when he appointed Muhammad b. Abi Bakr governor of Egypt in 32 A.H., bade him do justice to all races. In like spirit the treaty made by the Turkish code ordains that the dhimmis are not to be disturbed in the exercise of their religion.

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1 'It is incumbent on the commander of the faithful (may God grant thee his aid!) that thou deal gently with those that have a covenant with thy Prophet and thy cousin, Muhammad (the peace and blessing of God be upon him), and that thou take care that the faithful are not wronged or ill-treated and that no burden be laid upon them beyond their strength, and that no part of their belongings be taken from them beyond what they are in duty bound to pay, if it is related of the Apostle of God (the peace and blessing of God be upon him) that he said, Whosoever wrongs one with whom a compact has been made (i.e. a dhimmi) or imposes a burden on him beyond his strength, I shall be his accuser on the day of judgment.'

Ibn Quttin, report of Wadi 'Uyayn (1512) maintains that the majority of Muslim jurists hold that the dhimmis must be treated with kindness and consideration and not with contempt, when he comes to pay the
jizyah. Commenting on this passage nearly two centuries later, al-Burjawi (†1694) enters a protest against such fanatical glosses on Qur'an, i.x. 29, as are referred to in art. Persecution, and holds that the phrase 'being humbled' implies only conformity to the regulations of Islam in regard to the dhimmis, and that these words give no justification for the rough treatment sometimes inflicted on a dhimmis when he paid jizyah—e.g., that he might be required to stand with his head in the dust and back before the collector of the tax, who should slap his face and pull his beard—for (as he rightly says) there is no evidence that the Prophet or any one of the khalifas acted in such a manner.1

A powerful influence in the direction of toleration in a period when feeling was acerbated against the Christians, and when the disorder in Muhammadan administration made their position more precarious and exposed them to the tyranny of local officials, was the extension of the religious orders, especially that of the Qadiriyya, and the popularizing of that mystic school of thought. The Qadiriyya was the offshoot of a movement of religious thought in which devout Muslims found consolation after the devastations of the Mongol conquests. 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani (†1166), the founder of the order referred to, entered into an mystical acquaintance with the essence of God, and his attitude and that of his followers towards the Christians was kindly and sympathetic.2 The tendency of Persian mysticism was opposed to any emphasizing of religious differences, and the teaching of the poets who wrote under the influence of this mystical movement often made for tolerance; a well-known example is the story of Abraham in Sadi's Badin, in which the poet rebukes God for refusing his charity to an aged fire-worshipper on the ground of his infidelity. But in the present article attention may rather be drawn to instances of toleration in contrast to the fanatical usage of legislation; e.g., though the so-called Pact of 'Umar forbade the building of new churches, there was considerable variation of opinion among the Muslim legislators themselves on this question, from the more liberal Hanafi doctrine, which declared that, though it was unlawful to build churches and synagogues in Muslim territory, those already existing could be repaired if they had fallen into decay, while in villages where the tokens of Islam were not apparent new churches and synagogues might be built, to the intolerant Hanbal ruling that they might neither be erected nor be restored when damaged or ruined. Some legislators held that the privileges varied according to treaty rights: in towns taken by force no new houses of prayer might be erected by dhimmis, but, if a special treaty had been made, the building of new churches and synagogues was allowed. But, like so many of the labors of the Christian legislists, these prescriptions bore but little relation to actual facts. Schools in the Muhammadan world might agree that the dhimmis could build no houses of prayer in a city of Muslim foundation, but the civil authority permitted the Copts to erect churches in the new capital of Cairo. The fact that 'Umar b. 'Abd al-Aziz (717-750) ordered the destruction of all recently constructed churches, and that more than a century later the fanatical al-Mutawakkil (847-861) had to repeat the same order, shows how little the prohibition of building new churches was put into force, whether by the government and both Christian and Muhammadan historians.

1 For example see Arnold, The Persecution of Islam, pp. 65-68.
2 Entchev, Annales, ed. L. Chekhov, Paris, 1900-02, ii. 82.
8 Arnold, op. cit., p. 146.
were applied.1 It is recorded of Khayr b. Nu‘aym, a judge in Egypt about the middle of the 8th cent., that, after hearing the cases of the Muslims inside the city, he would sit out on the steps outside the gate in the afternoon and hear the cases of the Christians and Jews, testing the value of the evidence of the witnesses by inquiring into their credibility among their co-religionists. The underlying principle is that the toleration of Muslim rule is the fact that persecuted Christian and other sects took refuge in Muhammadan lands, to enjoy there the undisturbed exercise of their several cults, the Byzantine emperor, Leo, in 714, instituted a persecution against the Montanists and the Jews, forcibly compelling them to submit to baptism, while some burnt themselves alive rather than suffer the loss of religious freedom, others fled for safety into the neighbouring Arab territory.2 The persecuted Spanish Jews at the end of the 15th cent. took refuge in Turkey in enormous numbers.3 The Calvists of Hungary and Transylvania and the Unitarians of the latter country long preferred to submit to the Turks rather than fall into the hands of the fanatical house of Hapsburg;4 and the Protestants of Spain, of whom some, looking eyes towards Turkey and would gladly have purchased religious freedom at the price of submission to Muslim rule,5 The Cossacks, who belonged to the several tribes of Don, those parts of Russia, and the Ukraine were persecuted by the Russian State Church in 1736, found in the dominions of the sultan the toleration which their Christian brethren denied them.6

1. Toleration in Muhammadan world generally may be said that it was more operative in the earlier centuries of the Hijra than in the days of the decline of the khilafate or the unhappy period of the Mongol conquests or in modern times when the pressure of Christian Powers exasperated Muslim feeling. The civil government has as a rule been more tolerant than the clergy, and the regulations of jurists have seldom been put into force with all their rigor; though practice has varied with time and place, the persecutions 8 that have occurred have been excited by some special and local circumstances rather than inspired by a settled principle of intolerance. The judgment of A.de Gobineau is on the whole justified by the facts of history:

Si l'on sépare la doctrine religieuse de la nécessité politique qui l'accompagne, on constate que le pouvoir religieux est moins tolérant, on pourrait presque dire plus indifférente sur la foi des hommes, que l'État. Cette opposition apparente est d'ailleurs une formidable force de cohésion, car elle a laissé aux enfants des royaumes de l'Islam une inaliénable prudence, et de respect pour la religion de leurs ancêtres. Il est donc impossible de parler de tolérance en appliquant le terme au royaume de l'Islam. Il y a eu des régimes religieux persécuteurs, mais il y avait des régimes persécuteurs chez les chrétiens, chez les jésuites, chez les protestants, chez les autres. Enfin, il y avait, comme partout, la crainte de l'influence que cela pouvait avoir sur les peuples. Le fait religieux n'y est invoqué que comme prétexte et, en réalité, il reste en dehors.1

To this sober conclusion of the historian may be added the eloquent outburst of one of the Spanish Muhammadans who was driven out of his native country on the occasion of the last expulsion of the Moriscos in 1610:

Did our victorious ancestors ever once attempt to extirpate Christianly out of Spain, when it was in their power? Did they not only most of them, at the same time that they were led, at the same time that they were loved? is not the


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— i. Early life and manhood.—Lev Nikolaievitch Tolstoy (1828-1910), novelist, social reformer, and religious mystic, was born on 28th Aug. (O.S.), 1828, at Yasnaya Polyana ('Bright Glade'), the home of the family, in the government of Tula, about 200 miles from Moscow. His eldest brother was the youngest of four sons. His mother having died when he was three, and his father five or six years later, the boy went in 1840 to the university town of Kazan in Siberia, under the charge of an aunt, whom he held in grateful remembrance. After two years' study he left the university without a degree. The blame is usually laid upon the professors, but some portion of it must be attributed to Tolstoy's own dissipated and irregular life. Returning to his estate, he interested himself in the life of his peasants, with the disappointing results recorded some years later in his A Landlord Proprietor, and The Inheritance—and planned The Cossacks, sold ten years later to pay a gambling debt.

Childhood (1832), Boyhood (1834), and Youth

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(1856) form an autobiographical fragment, thinly disguised under fictitious names. Here, as elsewhere, Tolstoy doubles himself, to bring out the dual nature, the natural and the spiritual man of which he was always conscious in himself. Irénée represents the lower nature, his friend Neklyudov the higher. The latter reappears in the Landlord Proprietor and in Resurrection, just as in War and Peace Pierre Bezukh, and in Anna Karenina Kitty. Tolstoy, in the struggle between flesh and spirit which ended only with life. There is truth in Leo Wiener’s statement that even the Christ of his religious writings is still the image of the author, and the real Christ is Christ-Tolstoy that becomes the final and lasting stage of his spiritual evolution. 1 This autobiographical fragment reveals Tolstoy as an awkward child, morbibly sensitive to his appearance; a boy, confessing frankly every shade of evil in his heart, such as the rise of sexual feeling; and a youth in search of an ideal, whose one faith was in the possibility of virtuous perfectibility. Beyond this, his father’s death, the crisis of the Orthodox Church, had become dust, ready to crumble at a touch. Yet we see the beginnings of many things which appear and reappear in his writings to the end—a shame of being rich while others want, a dejection of injustice, the clear poetic vision of Nature and her loneliness.

The Cosmocrata (1863) represents Tolstoy’s revulsion from the artificial and vicious Life of cities and his class. The natives and their vices, but they sinned naturally and frankly, and thus escaped the deeper corruption of hidden immorality. In contrast with their bold outdoor life, Tolstoy saw himself (the Ordinary of the Synod) as a degenerate refined being. Joining the army in 1851, Tolstoy commanded a battery at Sevastopol; and in his three sketches—Sevastopol in December, 1854, Sevastopol in May, 1855, Sevastopol in August, 1855—we find the seeds of thought that were to fructify in his War and Peace, and many an indignant denunciation of the violence by which nations are governed. The conviction of the sheer wickedness and brutality of war sank deep into his soul and grew with the years. The sketches probably saved his life; by the emperor’s orders the young man was removed to a place of safety. On the fall of Sevastopol in 1855 he was sent with dispatches to St. Petersberg, and returned to the Orenburg Cavalry.

Of this period, and up to his marriage in 1862, Tolstoy could never afterwards think without shame. Between 1857 and 1861 he travelled in Germany, France, Italy, Switzerland, England, and Belgium, to study their educational methods, wrote many books on education, and started schools for peasant children on his estate. Yet alongside this generous interest in ‘the people’ the ties of the passions of the natural man never ceased to flow. His own words in his My Confession 2 frankly reveal this moral duality:

1. I cannot recall these years without dread, loathing, and anguish of heart. I lived peaceably, and challenged to duel to my sword; I lost money at cards, wasting the labour of the peasants; I was a non-believer. Lying, stealing, acts of lust of every description, drunkenness, violence, murder—there was not a crime which I did not commit, and for all that I was praised, and contemporaries have regarded me as a comparatively moral man. Thus I lived for ten years.

On 23 September 1862 Tolstoy married Sofia, second daughter of Prince Behrs of Mordovia. Behrs of Mordovia bore him thirteen children, several of whom died in infancy. Fifteen years of unbroken domestic happiness followed. Tolstoy was busy with his schools, his work on the management of the estate, and, above all, the writing of his greatest novels, War and Peace (1869-94) and Anna Karenina (1877-79).

(1873-77), in which appear all the problems round which his mind never ceased to work—war, the peasants, the land and the serfs, education, the universal duty of manual labour, and, at the root of all, religion and the ethical duties flowing therefrom. There and to-day, at sixty, in the modern world, Tolstoy cast aside the art in which he was acknowledged the greatest living master, and devoted the remainder of his life to moral and religious work and to the reform of the Gospels, the Creed, and the foundations of violence on which he believed the entire system of civil government rested. His literary ambitions had been treason to the deepest convictions of his soul. The literary caste set up to teach what they did not know, and for the sake of his family he had shared their delusions:

The new conditions of my happy family life completely drew me away from all search for the general meaning of life. All my life during that time was centred in my family, my wife, my children, and, therefore, in care for the increase of the means of existence. The striving after perfection, which before had given way to the striving after perfection in general, after progress, now as an almost incomprehensible and as comfortable as possible for me and my family. Thus another fifteen years passed.

The struggle to break away from this treason to the higher life led to great family unhappiness, and ultimately to his mysterious and tragic end.

2. Ethical and religious ideas.—Tolstoy’s principal works after the Resurrection are The Kingdom of God is Within You (1893), What Is Art? (1897), and Resurrection (1899), his last great novel, in which he sums up his indictment of the Church and its methods, and the end of the idea of society. It is from this vast mass of literature that we must now attempt to deduce the religious and ethical convictions into which, with endless vacillations, Tolstoy finally settled.

(1) Tolstoy’s fundamental conviction is that the one purpose of life is to know God by bringing all relations of humanity into harmony with His will. In reply to the decree of the Holy Synod which excommunicated him in 1901 he states his creed:

1 I believe in God, whom I understand as Spirit, as love, as the beginning of everything. I believe that He is in me and I am in God. I believe that God’s will is most of all clearly and humbly expressed in the teaching of the man Christ, whom I understand to God and pray to consider the greatest blasphemy. I believe that the greatest true good of man is the fulfillment of God’s will, but His will is this, that men should love one another as God loves them. For the whole sequence of this causal situation is this: as they wish that others should treat them, as, indeed, it says in the Gospel that in this is all the law and the prophets. I believe that the meaning of the life of every man is, therefore, only in the augmentation of love in himself; that this augmentation of love leads the individual man in this life to a greater and ever greater good, and gives after death a greater good, the greater love is in man, and at the same time more than anything else contributes to the establishment of the kingdom of God in the world, that is, of an order of life with which the now existing discord, deception, and violence will give way to free agreement, trust, and brotherly love of men among themselves. I believe that there is but one means for success in love, and that is in war, not public prayer in temples, which is directly forbidden by Christ (Matt. v. 5-13), but such as Christ has given an example of, and by which he contributed to the establishment and strengthening in our consciousness of the meaning of our life and our independence of everything except God’s will.

(2) Tolstoy warns us that, when he calls God the Father’ and speaks of His ‘will,’ he is not to be understood as meaning that God is a personal being. He elaborates this, when he says that it is consistent with his doctrine of the impersonality of God: it is a necessity forced on him by the fact that he himself is a person. The doctrine of the Trinity is both blasphemous, Metaphysically, and it conceals God; nothing reveals Him but love in its

1 My Confession, ch. iii. (Works, xiii. 16).
2 Answer to the Decree of the Synod (Works, xii. 235).
application to human life. The fundamental idea of The Kingdom of God is within you is that God is, in every man, the revelation of life and the power by which man lives and acts upon the world. Whatever applies itself to the God within has divine sanction and right. Since God thus acts naturally through man, miracles are impossible.

(3) Tolstoy's conception of Christ passed through many fluctuations. In the Crimes he dreamed of a new Christianity 'purged of dogma and mysticism,' giving happiness here on earth. At his brother Nikolay's funeral he projected a Life of Christ as a Materialist. After reading a German work on the Gospels he inclined to agree with the Author that Christ never existed. In the end, while admitting his existence, he denied indignantly His divinity. 'To recognise Christ as God is to renounce God.' The theory of His divinity the Temptation becomes absurd—'God is tempted by God Himself.' The miraculous Birth is an invention to cover His mother's shame. The Resurrection is 'a trite, contemptible invention,' contrary to reason and needing the invention of other miracles to support it. He is 'the living Christ,' but the sense in which He lives on lies in the spirits of those who come after them. Jesus is grouped with other great religious teachers of the world, such as Confucius, Buddha, Lao-tse, Thales. The chosen of God was asserted with the earnestness: 'I am standing with one foot in the grave, and I have no need to fear.' The truth is that Tolstoy had almost a personal interest in thus establishing the human side of Christ: he found in it those elements of weirdness of which he was conscious in himself. The Temptation, the shrinking of His soul at the visit of the Greeks, the agony in the Garden, the cry 'My God, my God' on the Cross, seemed to bring Him nearer to his own weaknesses and vacillations. There was even a moment, he held, when Christ resolved to use violence against violence and advised His followers to sell their garments and buy swords; and it was only in the Garden that He was able to overcome the terrible temptation by prayer.

(4) Tolstoy's attitude to Scripture settled down into acceptance of nothing that did not commend itself to the God within himself. The OT is non-essential to Christianity. The Church doctrine of the infallibility of Scripture—myths, miracles, contradictions, immoral stories, and all—only commits the Church to the will of the Father. Of the OT stories and the Gospel parables as the highest form of art, taught them to the peasant children in his schools, and advocated that cheap unbridged copies be given them, not one word omitted:

'The book of the childhood of the race will always be the best book of the childhood of each man.... There is no book like the Bible to open up a new world to the pupil and to make him without knowledge love knowledge.'

After giving elaborate interpretations of the Four Gospels, he warns his readers against all interpretations: let each man read for himself in the spirit of a little child. To get nearer the original meaning he learned Greek; and he used his new-found instrument in the most uncritical and impartial way. For example: the words were the heart of the Bible; the Sonorn on the Mount was the heart of the Gospels; and a few sayings of Christ formed the heart of the Sermon. Whatever is written by which man lives and acts upon the world—his sayings and Tolstoy's vast 'private interpretation' of them was set aside without scruple as no part of the true original teaching; and, as one has said, it is no wonder that the disciples of the Church, he created others of his own.

absolutely to protect them by force. The worst that can happen by not resisting is death, whereas to resist is to act contrary to the law of Christ, which is worse than death. We need to stress that Tolstoy says that this carries the blame to the point of insanity. The natural instinct of a normal conscience is to protect the weak and the defenseless from a drunkard or a madman.

(5)  *Waige ne wert (Mt 24:45–48, Lk 12:42, 7—).* The five commandments are here elaborated into five wounding chapters. The first addresses the individual heart—harbour no anger; (2) man and woman, the family—avoid carnal lust; (3) private worldly relations with others—blind the conscience by oath or promise; (4) relations to the State—resist no evil by force; (5) the human race—regard no nation as orphans of God. Out it’s evil, do good, and wage war. It is absurd to say that Christ, who forsook anger and lust, and lead angry, and murder, which is the fruit of anger, to communities and nations.

From the Servostuk sketches, on *War and Peace, The Kingdom of God is Near at Hand,* and *etc.,* Tolstoy never ceased to strip war of its 'glory' and to hold up its naked falsity, cruelty, and bestiality. Under all its fine names its true purpose is murder. Three causes are named: (1) the unequal distribution of property, that is, the robbing of one class of people by another, (2) the existence of a military class, that is, of people educated and destined for murder, and (3) the false, for the most part consciously deceptive, religious teaching, in which the young generations are forcibly educated. 1

*Patriosism* is the chief war-criminal—a sentiment fostered by pamphlets which hypocritically the people into 'loyalty.' by alliances with or against other nations, based on an unequal love and a crooked patriotism. Under patriotism, the aim of all patriotism being that of 1 Deutschland unter Alles, to exalt our own nation over others, by violence if need be. It is this sentiment that puts into the hands of rebels a diabolic weapon, making possible military conscription and all the cruelties, and the 'chivalry' of war and battlefields. The one remedy is the substitution for love of country of love for man as man, and the refusal of individuals to submit to the misgovernment of officers, be the consequences what they may. Tolstoy had a profound distrust of peace congresses and courts of arbitration, because the decision of the court of arbitration against the military violence of the states will be executed by means of military violence.

(6) Following out his doctrine of human freedom, Tolstoy attacked all current forms of education as the forcible ruin of life and ethics. The schools on their estate were based on absolute freedom. The children came when they pleased, sat where they liked, ate what they liked, and had no homework, or no lessons to torture them. Yet the order and attention were perfect. The teaching included walks in the fields, explanations of natural sights and sounds, history, folk-tales, stories and parables from the Bible, by far the finest instrument of education. Tolstoy wrote a series of tales, which had a great success in Russian schools; but he held that it is better to correct children than teach them to write, not we them: they are nearer the original harmony of beauty, truth, and goodness than men, whose education has been a system of destroying that harmony. His views are summed up thus:

1 I am convinced that the school ought not to interfere in that part of the education which belongs to the family: that the school has no right and ought not to reward and punish; that the best police and administration of a school consist in giving full liberty to the pupils to study and settle their disputes as they know best. 2

2 He opposed 'popular education' because it was not popular, but compulsory, based on violence, and hated by both parents and children, who forgot its artificial results as quickly as they could.

3 Schools which are established from above and by force are not a shepherd for the flock, but a flock for the shepherd. 4

4 From the school to university the system was arbitrary, mechanical, and out of relation to life and its needs. To compel all child-natures to pass through a standardized system, without freedom of choice, is torture. In fine, education has become an elaborate system of demoralizing child-nature, which is good, in the interests of the world and its evils. At an early age it severs the natural bond of parent and child, and of the great mother, Nature herself, and it does so in a way which fosters lying, hypocrisy, and vice, and destroys individuality.

(7) In *What is Art?* Tolstoy sweeps aside with contempt all theories of mere aesthetics and 'art for art's sake,' and reduces the criteria of art to the following two: one, the artist's feeling from a genuine feeling in the artist; (2) this feeling must have the power of infecting others with the same emotion; (3) it must have the power of uniting men by this infection of a common hope, joy, love, or whatever else it may be. If this union is not widely it unites men, the more worthy is it of the name. 'Upper class art,' dependent on an artificial training, springs from no living emotions in the artist, who has to write, paint, etc., to please his rich patrons, who lead idle, artificial, and parasitic lives. Such art grows ever narrower in its appeal, and its patrons ever prouder of its exclusiveness, whereas 'great works of art are only great because they are accessible and comprehensible to everyone, like the story of Joseph and the parables of Christ. Whole generations of artists, singers, poets, players, artisans, workmen, who are practical, and not the theorists of an exclusive art—an art which is simply the expression of the pride, sensuality, and weariness of life of the men and women who pay them.

All good art springs from universal emotions which unify men by emotion. What these are is revealed by 'the religious perception' that all human good is contained in 'the fraternal life of all men, our love-union among ourselves.'

Hence 'the Christian art of our time can be and is of two kinds: (1) art transmitting feelings flowing from a religious perception of man's position in the world in relation to God and to his neighbour—religious art in the limited meaning of the term; and (2) art transmitting the simplest feelings of common life, but such, always, as are accessible to all men in the whole world—the art of common life—the art of a people—universal art. One of these two kinds of art can be considered good art in our time.' 1

The name of art is denied to emotions which divide men, as patriotism, or religious sectarianism, or the honour given for wealth, education, rank, or profession. The theory has met with much ridicule; but, making allowance for some exaggeration in Tolstoy's dislike of the conventional forms in which every art seeks expression, we may agree with Kropotkin that *What is Art?* is a much-needed protest against the over-artificiality into which modern art has drifted. 2

(8) Tolstoy's treatment of the future life may be described as a kind of pantheistic immortality. His novels overflow with studies of death and the process of dying. The higher ranks meet death with reluctance and complaining, the poor with cheerfulness and faith. Of Natalya, the old stewardess in the home of his childhood, he says: 'She executed the best and highest act of this life—she died without regrets or fear.' During the period of his life his thoughts of suicide became so strong that he had to hide a rope that hung in his dressing-room and could not trust himself to go out hunting with a gun. There was no meaning in his life and no end for his suffering. He was saved from suicide by the discovery that the end was God,God in whom he lived, and moved, and was. The fear of death is a 'superstition' due to the false notion that man lives in a state of ignorance of their own nature and of the world, and this the lower fragment of their carnal and personal being, instead of their rational consciousness in its relation to the sum of things. Art, which is given to be a ministry of life to the world, is given to leave nothing to the world, and is given to leave nothing to the world, and is given to leave nothing to the world. 3

1 What is Art?, ch. xvi., ir. Aylmer Maude, London, 1905 (of this ir. Tolstoy in a Preface says: 'I request all who are interested in my work, to read only to judge of its true value in its present shape.' The tr. is from the original MS, and is free from the mutilations of the Russian censor).

2 Childhod, ch. xxviii. (Works, i. 190).

3 On Popular Education (Works, iv. 15).

4 Concerning the Gospel of Peace (Works, xxiii. 149).

5 Concerning the Kingdom of God (Works, iv. 237).

6 Who is to Blame?, Letter on the Transvaal War (Works, xxil. 458).
intrigues, and when the old man of eighty-two was fast breaking up in both body and mind. At 3 o'clock on the 25th Oct. 1910 he left his home for ever, accompanied by his daughter Alexandra and his disciple Dr. Makoviovsky. His son Symon, in his Reflections on his father's life, puts the

it lasts just so long as this ministry is being ful-

filled. To cast it away in suicide when it becomes

unpleasant to us is sinful, partly because just the

same act committed as a public act, becomes a min-

istry truly begins. Moreover, it is in this life of universal

ministry that man finds the only true immortality.

Personal immortality is impossible, because true

life is in the animal, and since the animal's end

Resurrection and reincarnation would be nothing

better than a return to the carnal and personal

relations which are spiritual death. Life is an

ever-ending movement of reaching for the love,

and the only real death is to arrest the movement

at any given point. Live onward beyond the old

self, and life becomes a living part of the grow-

ning good of the world. This is the life eternal

and the only true immortality for man.

3. The last phase.—The life of the great Russian

ended in a mysterious tragedy of conscience. For

many years his life consisted of a struggle to bring

his practices into harmony with his principles by

escaping from his class, his wealth, his family.

In My Religion, written in his fifty-sixth year, he

lays down five conditions of human happiness:

(1) a man does not break with the Earth Nature

—the open sky, sunlight, fresh air, soil, plants,

animals; (2) work, physical labour, giving appetite

and sleep; (3) family life; (4) a free and living

inner life, with all the various moods of man-

kind; (5) health, and a natural and painless death.

These conditions are open most widely to the

peasant, and grow narrower the higher you rise

in the privileged classes: the Tsar, e.g., holding

interests, or the home but a few of his jailers.

Hence Tolstoy's later years were one long effort

to transform himself into a peasant; and the

asceticism which formed part of his strangely

conquered passion for the final strugle of a third

condition, the family life. He transferred to his

wife the responsibility of managing his estates,

and, although he continued to live in the family

mansion, it was, as far as possible, as a poor man

working with his hands. It was a compromise

which gave no peace of conscience. More than

once he left his home intending never to return,

but always found always drew him back. The

dramatic friction which resulted is portrayed in

the form of fiction in Walk in the Light, while ye

have Light (1888). One's sympathies are not

entirely on the husband's side; the countess had

much his own responsibility; she was burdened

with the children, the estates, and the publication of

his books was transferred to her shoulders. In spite

of a true affection between them, they drifted apart.

Tolstoy's actual departure from his home came about

through the question of the copyright of his works. From

1855–53 the countess, to counterbalance her husband's neglect

of the estate, because the publisher of his writings; and in

1851 she deposited in a public museum for safety large

quantities of his manuscripts, producing evidence afterwards

in 1874 that they were given by her Tolstoy. This was done, evidently,

to restrict herself from a deliberate attempt by one of his

disciples, V. G. Tchertkov, to deprive her of them and of all

control of their publication. In 1891 Tolstoy, having convinced

himself that to make money by his moral and religious

writings was sinful, made public announcement that any one was free to

publish his works written from 1851 to the time of his

death. About the same time he gave Tchertkov the right

of first publication, in Russian and in English, of his future

writings, and he was at that time published. Tchertkov was not

satisfied with it, and set about a long series of

intrigues to induce Tolstoy to make a will in his own favour.

and without the knowledge of the countess, on the ground

that only through him would his works be published in accord-

ance with his wishes. As a man of marked family

interests the aspect of the affair is that his youngest daughter, Alexandra, was in

the family, and many years later his daughter-in-law

will be drawn up and signed, a final one was made on 23rd

July, 1909, bequeathing all his productions and the manuscripts

he was at all times to be possessed of the full possession of


2 Banforth, For, Bl. 317, 375.

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TOLTECS.—I. Origins.—The beginnings of the

Toltec peoples are enveloped in the fog of mythology. Their origin is rather mysteriously

attributed to the acts of a certain hero-god, Quetzal-

coatl ("a twin"), compounded of two words quetzalli,

a plume of green feathers, and coatl, a serpent, in

other words, a plumed-serpent (-god). Some

wild speculations and pious conjectures have identified

him with St. Thomas, and others with the Messiah.

Another mysterious hero-god (personage) who has

been closely linked with Quetzalcoatl was Yotan, the

reputed founder of the civilization of the Maya,

for a time a contemporary and rival people with

the Toltecs.

In the pre-Toltec period of history in Mexico and

Central America the Nahua and the Maya were

the two adjoining civilizations. Quetzalcoatl, the

plumed-serpent divinity, was the creator of man,²

the founder of the new order of things among the

Nahua peoples. Like the Maya peoples of Yucatan

and Central Mexico, the Nahua were in the late

18th century.
their colonies or activities to any one area of territory, though their main settlement was on the plateau of Mexico. In the 6th and 7th centuries the Toltec Chichimec tribes, representing the Mazatlan Toltec, settled down on the Mexican plateau, in proximity to the wonderful lakes of that region. 1 Of the Nahua tribes who made their homes in this region the Toltecs were one of the prominent sections, the last being the third at the time. Their independent existence cannot be sharply ascertained. 2

2. History.—At the opening of historic times the Toltecs were in possession of Anahuac (a section of the plateau of Mexico) and ousting territory. While the civilization was old, the name Toltec was new, possibly derived from Tollan or Talon, the original capital of the empire. The boundary lines of the Toltec sovereignty cannot be fixed, though it probably did not exceed that of the Aztec domain of later times. It is thought to have extended so far west as to have covered Michoacan, which was never conquered by the Aztecs, and stretched eastward to cover their farthest extent, including also the Tonatoc territory of Vera Cruz. The many tribes and peoples of the Toltec empire was composed cannot be identified by name with accuracy. In the pre-Toltec period, the Toltec, as side the so-called Toltec empire, the peoples, particularly in the north, were regarded as barbarians and were popularly known as Chichimecs.

From the 7th to the 12th centuries, the Toltec empire was made rigid in the main rule by a confederacy which resembled the alliance of a later time between Mexico, Tezcuco, and Tlacopan with capitals at Culhuaucan, Otompan, and Tollan respectively. Each chief of the confederacy in turn became the dominant force in the confederacy. Tollan on the river Quetzaltzali is reputed to have reached the highest point in culture, splendour, and fame. It is now represented by the little village of Tula, about 30 miles north-west of the city of Mexico. Culhuaucan was the only one of the three capitals of the confederacy to survive by name the bloody revolution by which the empire was finally overthrown, and to maintain anything of her earlier greatness. The confusion and often contradiction between the numerous reports and records and manuscripts of the native and Spanish writers lays a heavy burden upon a historian, but he has endeavoured to be apparently faithful to the best evidence available in those writers. Let us make a survey of the history and constitution of the Toltec empire, so called, during its brilliant period of empire domination in the central plateau of Mexico, based on the representations of Bancroft and NadaiUc. 3

The pre-eminent personage in the beginnings of this new organization of tribes and peoples was Hueman the prophet. It was through his line that a powerful priesthood ruled the destinies of the Toltec empire from its inception to its downfall. The government was in reality a theocratic republic, in which each leader directed his own tribe both in war and in peace, but all were more or less subservient to his spiritual leader in all matters of national import. Seven years after the arrival of these peoples in Tollan the heads of families and chiefs met in assembly and composed their fate of government, and establish a monarchy, in order to consolidate their strength and prepare for the future challenge to a new monarchical people. On this advice of Hueman, the chiefs sent an embassy to the reigning king of the Chichimec to ask for a son or other relative to be a husband to his daughter. This was a provoking requirement of agreement on the part of the Chichimec king that the Toltecs should ever be a free and independent people, owing no allegiance whatever to the Chichimecs, although the two powers would enter into an alliance for mutual defence and aid. With conditions of this sort there was no such an opportunity, and sent with back the embassy his second son was sent with the promise to be married to the daughter of the Toltecs at Tollan under the royal name of Chichihuatl. 4

1 New v. ch. iii. 2 Pre-historic America, Engt. tr., new ed., London, 1895. 3 The Toltecs and accession to the throne took place about the first quarter of the 8th cent., between 719 and 720. 4 Immediately after his accession the young Toltec king, in accordance with the law that the time limit of a king should be 52 years, at the end of which he should abdicate in favour of his oldest son, to whom he would be succeeded, and that no king over 85 years of age could die before the time limit had been reached, the unexpired term should be filled by a selected successor. The immediate task of the king was to find a wife to provide an heir to the throne, so that the dynasty might be perpetuated. The ablest young king left his choice entirely to his subjects—the records say—to their joyous satisfaction. Their choice fell upon the danger-fraught princess, who was pronounced the candidate for the throne when it was proposed to found a kingdom. Two Nahua documents give a rival story of the beginnings of the monarchy, but the main features are not so widely different.

Chichihuatl Tatocac, the first Toltec king, died at the end of 52 years and was buried in the chief temple, about A.D. 771. His son and successor was Itzliocueuhuac. He had a peaceful and prosperous reign. The signal event of his reign, and near its conclusion, was a meeting of all the wise men under the direction of the old prophet Hueman. This assembly collected all the Toltec ancient and modern documents, and after a prolonged conference and careful investigation, compiled the Toltecozli, "book of God." On its pages they inscribed the Nahua annals from the creation down; also their religious rites, their governmental system, laws, and social customs; their methods of agriculture and science, and especially their history and astronomy; their methods of computing time and interpreting their writings. To these valuable pages was added a chapter on the forecast of the future events of the kingdom, including the disaster through which it was crushed and destroyed. The third king of Toltec, succeeded so reigned for 77 years. The fourth king, Tocetep, sometimes given as the second king of Culhuaucan, continued the Toltec's dynasty. He stretched and banded it down at the same time limit to his son Nanacue, the fifth king at Tayan, who was succeeded by Najuyihi, or Min. This sixth was succeeded over 100 years, during which these six reigns there was great advance made in building new cities, beautifying old, erecting magnificent temples, and especially magnificent at Quauhtnahuac and another at Tollan rivalling even the Temple of the Sun at Teotihuacan, a city which surpassed in extent and in grandeur the most famous of all empires. More than 800 years saw the Toltec empire well and prosperous established over a large territory and many centuries.

Looking back at some of the details of those reigns, we gather a few significant facts. The annals of Culhuaucan mention Tocetep (the fourth Toltec king) as the second king of that city. He waged several successful wars, not notably, but the province of Huitznahuac, where he found, conquered, and married a princess Chimalmaro, who bore him an heir named Cenecatl Quetzalcotlli. This notable scion of the royal family succeeded in establishing certain laws of succession which prevailed down to the end of the empire; but the most far-reaching act was the conclusion of an alliance between the crowns of Culhuaucan, Otompan, and Tollan. Each king was to be independent of the other, but in affairs of general interest the three rulers were to constitute a council, in which the king of Culhuaucan was to rank first, with a title almost equivalent to that of other. The next rank and Tollan the third. The date of the formation of this confederacy or empire was about A.D. 856.

After Quetzalcotlli had ruled in Culhuaucan about ten years, he met obstinate opposition to his authority from his enemies. He was a radical reformer whose ideas ran counter to those of the reigning pontiffs. He modified much of the religious ritual and art and introduced new ideas. He sacrificed had had a first place from pre-Toltec times at Teotihuacan, and more or less general acceptance in Culhuaucan and Tollan. He absolutely prohibited them in the temples of Tollan, and so stirred up the envy and hatred of the nobility of Teotihuacan and Otompan and Culhuaucan. The nobility of Tollan also, who represented the curbing of their religious liberties, became jealous of their brothers of equal rank among the people. A new order of priests, called the Chichimecs, was established, and the result was the establishment of the cult of Tollan. Nevertheless, Tollan became the metropolis of the confederacy. In the magnificence of her palaces and temples, in the skill and fame of her artists, if in her popularity Tollan was surmounted by any city on the plateau. This was too much for the other centres, and active aggressive opposition, political, 1 New v. 244 f. 2 Ibid. v. 246-250.
magical, and religious, raised its weapons of warn-
ing. Quetzalcoatl’s aversion to the shedding of
blood is said to have caused the abandonment of
his throne, against the ardent wishes of his more
warlike friends, and his crossing over to the eastern
part of the plateau, to succor the Chichimec. A
successor in Toluan, Nachaxoc, known under several
other names, was the fifth king of the Toltecs.

The reign of Nauyotl, or Miti, the sixth king of

The Toltecs were once a great and powerful race,
peace. His entire energy and strength were
devoted to the promotion of the glory of his city,
where he re-affirmed and carried out the reforms
of his predecessor. Cholula, a rival sacred city,
really stirred him to vigorous action, in building
greater temples and more attractive shrines to
prevent pilgrimages from Toluan to the rival city.
He also built superb temples in other provinces to
the south outside the boundaries of Anahuac.

Nauyotl, or Miti, at his death, was succeeded by his
queen, Xiuhtlaltzin, who reigned four years. She showed wonderful
wisdom and piety and direction of public affairs, and her death
was greatly lamented by her subjects. Her son and successor
was Matococztli, whose reign covered 969 to 973; he was
replaced by Teopanzolco, who reigned from 973 to 1015, and who
was followed by Tecapalcantli. The records of this period
are abundant, and the reigns of the Toltec sovereigns were
successively described in Tecahuitlapan (1015), and the latter
in 985 by Tepetehu, the second king of that name.

Even the apparatus for the descending of the Toltec
empire was an indication of the severity of the annals
of this period. The battle at Cholula was fought in
the year 969. The allies of Xiuhtlaltzin were
led by the Chichimec, and the war was

Spanish writers still speak of Toluan as the empire, but Nahua
documents found in that city the occurrences which caused the
destruction of the Toltec power. Whether this is the truth or
not, it seems that a battle was fought between the Toltecs
and Chichimec, and the war was continued for a number of years.
The annals of this period are scarce and the history of the Toltec
empire is confused and confused. The extensive records of the period of
the downfall of the Toltec empire are confused and confused.

They abound with tales of marvels and mystery, as
intending to throw dust into the eyes of the reader.

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TONGANS

I. Introduction.—Tonga—or at least the Tonga of this article—is the name of a group of islands in the Western Pacific, lying to the north of New Zealand, the east of New Caledonia, and south of Fiji. They are sometimes known as the Friendly Isles, the name given by Captain Cook. The Tongans who inhabit this group are a tiny nation of the Polynesian race. Although few in number—about 20,000 only—their nationality is clearly marked, and they can easily be distinguished from their neighbours the Fijians and Samoans. Typical Tongans are tall, long-limbed, of a light coffee colour, with upright forehead and straight hair; but a little acquaintance with them shows that there has been an admixture with a race that was short and had receding foreheads. This agrees with their traditions, which state that, when the Tongans came to the group, some five or six centuries ago, it was already occupied by an aboriginal race. Traces of these have been found in one of the volcanic islands, but the vestiges have not been scientifically examined. Still it is clear that the Tongans, and Polynesians generally, have emigrated from a distance; and the most probable theory is that of Fornander, that they came from the Moluccas or the Gulf of Tadjoura.

Old navigators used to speak of the 'Tonga as 'the most splendid savages in existence,' and they were certainly the terror of the neighbouring groups, all of which are said to have been once conquered by them. They acknowledge themselves to be mentally inferior to the European; but it cannot be said that they come very far behind; and occasionally students at Tahiti College have achieved results that could be equalled only by the best pupils in English schools. A fair measure of the size of their brains may surely be found in their language, which contains, it is estimated, at least 10,000 words in use. The verbs have about 20 voices, and the pronouns are developed to such an amazing extent that there are more than 100 ways of saying 'our,' against two in English. The adjectives and the adverbs, too, have many degrees of comparison, and there are more than two articles, shades of meaning can be produced to an almost infinite extent. That the Bible translates well into a language like this is not surprising; but geometric treatises, and such works as Milton's Paradise Lost, can also be well rendered. Physically, then, and mentally, the Tongans stand high; and it comes as a surprise that their spiritual development, as represented by their old religion, was low. Their pantheon was a medley, and their ceremonial unenlightened, giving any gleams of philosophy as in the religion of India.

2. The gods of Tonga may be divided into three classes.

(1) In common with other parts of Polynesia, their gods comprise the two groups of the Tangaloa and the Maui (pronounced Motu;—Motu is now). The Tangaloa were the earlier group, and consisted of Tangaloa 'Eiki ("Lord Tangaloa," or "Tangaloa the Old Tangaloa"), the gods of the sea; and Tangaloa 'Atulongolo ("Tangaloa the Sender-forth-of-sound"). The Maui group consisted of two sons: Maui Motu'a ("Old Maui," or "Maui the Father"), Maui Los ("Maui the Tall"), Maui Buku ("Maui the Short"), and Maui Atlangata ("Maui the Vigorous Planter"). This last had a son called Maui Kikijiki (pronounced Kitakika;—Maui the Violent, the Miscellaneous), who was, of course, the grandson of Maui Motu'a. There were, however, older gods than any of these. One called Tama—boe Tama ("Junior Tama") was known to the Tongans as 'Son-of-the-Darkness-that-can-have-a-dawn.' Some accounts represent him as the original deity. Another of the primitive gods was 'Eitu-matub'a ('Einu-of-the-oldest-time'). He is sometimes spoken of as the father of the Tongan people. Another of these gods was Hikule'o, the Tongan Satan. Hikule'o means 'the echo,' and there is no doubt that this was the original signification of the name; but as it might mean 'Watching Tail,' the legend grew up that the tail of this deity was so long that when he, the god, went about, the tail kept watch at home. But even now the Tongans, when they hear an echo, say it is Hikule'o walking in the woods; and the other explanation was evidently an afterthought. These with others were the original gods of Tonga. By and by a division of departments took place. To the Tangaloa was assigned the Sky (or Heaven); to the Maui group the Underworld; and to Hikule'o the World and Bulotu (Hades). But in order to keep Hikule'o in his place, as he was a god that delighted in mischief, a cord was attached to him, one end of which was held by Tangaloa in the sky, and the other by a Maui in the underworld, to prevent his leaving Bulotu to damage the world. This division was effected by an old god than any of the Maui, Taufahi ("Father- Upsetter-of-the-land"), who also assigned the sea to Hemoana, and the woods and dry land generally to Lube (the Dove). Hemoana's name is sometimes pronounced Heimoana, and the present writer believes that Tangavaileva spoke of him as Hea-Moana, though he is unable to speak positively on that point. Hea-Moana would signify 'Hea-of-the-deep-sea'; Hemoana would be simply 'the Deep Sea,'—Oceanus. His shrine was the banded sea-snake. These were the Olympian gods of Tonga; but, with the exception of Hikule'o, they were rarely worshipped, and few if any temples were erected in their honour. The exception is due to the fact that Hikule'o was a mischievous god, and must therefore be propitiated.

(2) The second class of gods were an inferior race, who had their shrines in animals, birds, fishes, trees, whales' teeth, clubs, and even stones. Yet these were the gods worshipped by the people, and their temples were to be found in every village.

Here are a few of them: "Tutu蒂 Tutu of 'Ahanu,' whose shrine was a volcanic stone of peculiar shape; Tu'i Lulotonga ('King of Raro-tonga,' or perhaps of the world below Tonga), whose shrine was the dragon-fly; Tali'ai Tubon (the god of the reigning dynasty while yet heathen),
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whose shrine was a shark. [Mariner renders Talivi Tabou by ‘Wait there, Tabou,’ which is certainly incorrect; it is likely the name of a deity, rather than of a person, or a place, or a king); Bulahe Katao (the Pleroma of the Spirit World, who presided over hurricanes, and agriculture), whose shrine, we think, was a tree at Kasamisen. Mariner renders Bulahe Katao by the generic writer has never heard of: Toubon Toutai (‘Toubon the Mariner’); Toubon is the familiar designation of the king, and one of his family is usually called Toubon Toutai); Bulahe Matau (‘Eight Ways’); Vatuho (‘Alowana’), the god of the wind and weather, rain, harvest, and vegetation; Tu’i Buloto (‘King of the Spirit World’). Other gods resided in the turtle, the cuttle-fish, the kingfisher, etc. Fonokitangata’s shrine was a war-club. These, so to speak, the private gods of the people, and the shrine of each was tabu to its worshippers. Thus the people of Tonga, who are not inconsistent, would be expected to resent the present being the shrine of their god. In the neighbouring villages, however, it would be freely worshiped. In Nunnuka one particular family were thus debarred from eating turtle, while the rest of the town were from eating fowl, of that delicacy.

(3) In addition to those there were a number of supernatural beings whose position in the Tongan pantheon is not clear. They were looked upon as gods, but no term expressive of divinity or spiritual deity was applied to them; but they were never worshipped, nor were temples built to them. On the contrary, they were looked upon with contempt, and their follies freely portrayed and laughed at. It is curious to see these ascriptions of high divinity and expressions of contempt standing side by side. Is it that these were the gods of the inferior race with whom the Tongans found in the group when they landed?

Take an instance or two. Jiff and Palga were two goddesses in this class, who had set their affection on a Tongan of great mass and beauty called Bajikole. His, like their attentions pulsed two large baskets of cocoa-nut leaves, put one goddess in each, and, shoulderling them like a chimpanian, conveyed them into the bush, and hung them on the branch of a tree, and left them there for two years, until the baskets rotted, and they fell to the ground. They made another attempt on his affections, and he finally got rid of them by inveigling them into his fish traps, and leaving them at the bottom of the sea, where they lay until Tongaloo took pity on them, and sent a god to release them. Take another instance. In this case also it was two goddesses who fell in love with a mortal lover. Bulahe Matau, one of them, was a mortal lover. While waiting for him, they took off their heads to dress their hair as a sign of sorrow. They were heard by a hurry of the gods, and got rid of again; but in the hurry one of them put hers on behind; and when she attempted to move, her face went one side a bit, and another. It is characteristic of the natives to meet with tales like these, referring to those to whom the titles of highest deity are given; and yet, after all, they do but recall the vagaries of the Olympian deities as described by Homer, when

‘Unexpectingih laughter shook the skies.’

On the subject of ancestor-worship, Mariner speaks positively (vol. ii. p. 97): ‘That there are other Hotoaos or gods, viz. the souls of all deceased notables and materiales. The present writer was disposed to agree with him at first, especially as it was a custom of the people to go to the cemeteries to pray, even after a sacrifice had been presented at the temple. But further inquiry has convinced him that they did so because they fancied themselves nearer the spirit-world in such places. Intelligent chiefs like Valu, who were acquainted with heathenism, are equally positive in the other direction, and deny that they looked upon the spirits of deceased chiefs as gods. We think the truth lies between the two statements. Mariner has himself given us a key to the solution of the question. In vol. i. p. 376, he speaks of Feenow as being frequently invoked by the spirit of Mumi (a late king of Tonga). Now we can readily understand that in such circumstances Mariner might have supposed the meaning of the word to be ‘missing’ (hala), and one of the gods would join him; so that in time Mumi would be looked upon as a god. This would account for such gods as Tu’i Laotonga, Tu’i Ahau, Talai Honga, Tu’i Buloto, and Tubou being the names of deceased chiefs, and enable the writer negative the assertion that the spirits of chiefs as a general thing became gods. We may then look upon the gods of the first class as primitive, brought up by the gods from their original home, and the third class as the gods of the aboriginals whom they conquered. The second class contained also some primitive gods, but were recruited from among the first, i.e. the spirits of certain deceased chiefs by whom kings and notable personages fancied themselves to have been possessed.

The other point the present writer made special inquiries about was whether the Tongans worshipped the clubs, whales’ teeth, animals, trees, stones, etc., before which they placed their offerings, or the god who was supposed to be temporarily residing in them. The answer was decisive. The clubs, trees, etc., were simply the vaka, the god itself was spiritual. Vaka signifies a ‘mode of conveyance,’ usually a canoe, but also a carriage, or anything by which one is conveyed from place to place.

Probably we may see here a development of their spiritual ideas. The oldest class—Tangaloa, Mani, Hemoa, Heketa—in all probability undoubtedly certain individuals performed all the functions of human bodies, and they were inflamed with human passions. But the Tongans had long ceased to pray to them, and scarcely any vestiges of their worship remained when the missionaries came. The third class of gods, too, were corporeal, but there are no signs of worship being paid them at any time. These two classes existed side by side; but long before the introduction of Christianity had been discarded as objects of worship, which was paid only to the second class. In other words, the Tongans had worked out a theology, which had, at any rate, this noble foundation, that God was a spirit, and that they worship Him must worship Him in spirit.

The general Tongan term for supernatural beings is fa’ataheke. This is often shortened into fa’otou, and when the adjective hoa ‘great’ is added, fa’otahoi—the idea conveyed is that of full deity. Fa’otahoi signifies properly ‘a party, a side’ (as in cricket); or it may be short for fa’otahoi ‘a kind, a class, race, species, genus.’ Ehe =‘other’ (ehe, not Mōno), so fa’otahoi is ‘different folk,’ ‘other kind of people.’ The usual word for ‘God’ is Otona. Mariner says: ‘It is very probable, but not very likely, that the whole inverted comma represents a guttural, a half y, which is one of the difficulties of the dialect. It seems to be the name of the god of the sea, and is also used as a general name for all the Arin in Hebrew which is applied to all the peoples of Polynesia and its derived name for the wind. The Tongan name has failed to find any derivation for Otona, or meaning other than ‘God,’ and believes it to be a primitive Polynesian word.

The other great word is IE’u (‘Lord’). which is used in English for both earthly and heavenly gods. Hence it is not so high a term as Otona. Indeed it seems sometimes to mean only ‘supernatural.’ Thus a corpse is called ha mea i’u fa’otikī, which apparently signifies ‘ a thing belonging to the spirit world.’ Probably Mariner was thinking of this when he said (vol. ii. p. 130): ‘The human soul after its separation from the body is termed holo ʻa, i.e. a god or spirit.’ He is certainly wrong in that statement. It is clear that I’u was not the original form of the word, which the laws of the language point out to have been ʻΈu. We must not pass over the fact that the members of one of the dynasties of kings were regarded as gods. This was the earliest line of kings, and their title was Tu’i Tonga (‘King of Tonga’). They were certainly looked upon as in some sense divine beings; and instances are on record of prayers being offered to them. Words applied only to the gods were used in addressing them; such as ‘Ei, already referred to, hece, and ʻafio, used of the movement of the wind. The title of the ‘King of Tonga’ was termed the ‘sky,’ and to inquire the presence of the representative of the gods, were presented the ‘first-fruits.’ This ceremony, called the imai, or portion, is described by Mariner (vol. ii. p. 193). When a Tu’i Tonga died, his body was placed on a bed, and other gods would join him; so that in time Mumi would be
of steps. This was called a *lenj*, or 'heaven'; and many of them remain in tolerable preservation, and excite the wonder of the visitor by the huge size of many of the stones, some of which measure over 20 ft. in length.

Many, probably most, of the names of the Tu'i Tonga have been preserved, and their history curiously reminds us of the story of the Carolinians and Morovians in France. One of the Tu'i Tonga, called Takalaua, was murdered, and his son and successor Kau'ulufonuafekai, from weariness or fear, devoted the duties of government on his younger brother, reserving to himself the honours and emoluments of the office. His brother assumed the title of Tu'i Ha'a Takalaua ('King of the Takalaumas'), and soon got all the power into his hands, the Tu'i Tonga becoming a *roi fainant*. After a few generations, however, the Tu'i Ha'a Takalaua became effete, and the government was handed over to another branch, called the Tu'i Kanokula ('King of Kanokula'). This is the title of the present dynasty. Representatives of the two other lines, however, still exist, but the titles are not used. The representative, however, although being killed on the day now set apart as a quasi-sacred position, and is still addressed as the gods used to be; and words sacred to deity are used for all his movements.

Mariner mentions another of these person called the Veschi. This part of his narrative is very perplexing, as neither Veeon nor Thomas nor any of the modern chiefs knows anything about him.

The word used all over Polynesia for 'religion,' 'worship,' 'prayer,' etc., is *lotu*. Fortunately this has a meaning in Tongan, and signifies 'a seeking for something that is hard to find.' Thus when famine prevailed, the people *lotu kai*, i.e. go all over the land looking for food. It is also used for the restlessness of a caged animal seeking an outlet, and for the cry of an animal for its mate or companions. This is not the only word common to Polynesia which finds its meaning in Tongan. *Tabu* (or *taulo*), now of world-wide use, signifies in Tongan that something which might be opened is closed. These and other considerations lead one to think that the Tongan language comes nearer than most of the dialects to the original Polynesian tongue.

3. The religious rites of the Tongans were few. There was nothing in their religion corresponding to our idea of worship. If they wanted something—rain, fair winds, good crops, successful fishing—or anything else, they would seek for it by prayer—such as sickness, death, hurricanes, war—they would seek the favour of a god, would offer sacrifice and pray. But to come into his temple, to worship, to sing his praises, to dwell upon his attributes—this was a foreign idea altogether. Hence there was very little in the Tongan religion to cultivate the conscience, or to control the passions, or to elevate the thoughts. Mariner thinks otherwise, and we would gladly believe his favourable report of the Tongan character. But all our information—and much of it goes back to Mariner's time—contradicts his statements. He even contradicts himself. The Testament is highly esteemed, as the minister of iniquity; and there is no doubt that for centuries theft, murder, lust, treachery, and almost everything in the catalogue of evil, have been rife in Tonga. Not one of the property, and no woman's honour, was safe for a day.

They never went to their gods empty-handed; a piece of kava root for making the native drink was *sine gnaun*. Baskets of food, too, were usually brought in addition, and presented to the god or his priest. One of the party would then state the object of their visit, and implore the deity to grant their request, or use his influence with the gods of Bulotu in their favour. Sometimes the priest would remain silent; at other times he would object that their gifts were too small. If he spoke at all, he would speak as the oracular Tonga, supposed to be dictated by the god at the moment. John Thomas says (Farmer's Tonga, 128): 'Often there was another person present, the friend of the god, who acted as mediator, and addressed the priest on behalf of the god. Thomas, in the same writer, is described to the present writer how she and others would take baskets of food to the door of Talaii Tubon's temple in Nuku'alofa, and, bowing down, would implore the god (or *sio*foot) to be protruded from beneath a curtain, which they would kiss and then retire. If their object was to deprecate a calamity, as in a case of sickness, the rite assumed a darker hue. Fingers were cut off, wrapped in banana leaves, and presented; or children were strangled, and their bodies brought as a sacrifice. When prayers were offered to Fonokitangata, the sacrifice was always an animal. God, if doubt, was the community was hunted down and killed, and his body brought in a basket and laid before the priest; but Mariner speaks of a chief of rank being killed instead, and his body dressed in old and dirty mats, and wearing necklaces of chestnut leaves, would squat on the ground at a distance, and weep and beat his breasts, while the priest, kneeling in his hand, would kneel in the shrine of the god, would listen to their prayers with his eyes fixed upon the club or upon the ground. Sometimes he would reply in his ordinary voice, but more often in unnatural tones, as if some one were speaking in him; and frequently he would begin to shake as if in a fit, and to roll about and foam at the mouth. Any words he might utter whilst in this condition were eagerly caught up as the direct utterances of the god.

After a while the shaking would cease, and the priest, striking the ground with the club, would announce that the god had departed. Mariner (vol. i. p. 160) has a good description of this kind of possession; and he evidently thought that the phenomena were not altogether voluntary, but that a real possession of some kind took place—a belief which was shared by some of the earlier missionaries.

4. The Tongans believed in the immortality of the soul. Mariner, Veeon, and Thomas are agreed on this point.

Veeon says (Farmer's Tonga, p. 131): 'One day they were conversing about a person who was lately dead, and said, "He goes to the island through the sky." "How can he be," said I, "in that place, his body is dead, and his bones are buried? How can he not bury him some moons ago?" But all they answered was, "But he is still alive." And one took hold of my hand, and, squeezing it, said, "This will die, but the life that is within you will never die"—with his other hand pointing to my heart.'

Mariner and Veeon, too, agree in stating that this immortality is enjoyed only by the upper classes: the souls of the Tu'a's, or common people, die with their bodies. This, as a doubt, was the belief of the upper classes, who looked down upon the Tu'a's as little better than animals; but it is no evidence of the belief of the Tu'a's themselves. Thomas says there was truth in the belief of the common people there was no certainty.'

The 'island' referred to was called Bulotu, and 'through the sky' meant 'over the horizon.' Bulotu is, the present writer thinks, a primitive Polynesian word, and is the name for Paradise in all the dialects. It was situated west of Tonga, and could be reached by sea. At least the ballads speak of canoes touching there; but how this was done is not stated. Mariner tells us (vol. ii. p. 101) that Bulotu was believed by the Tongans to be a large island, stocked with all kinds of useful and
ornamental plants in a state of high perfection, and that when these were plucked others would immediately occupy their place. The whole atmosphere was fragrant as of incense from a temple. There were also beautiful birds of all kinds, and abundance of hogs—all of which were immortal unless killed to provide food for the gods. At the moment a bird or a hog was killed, another living bird or hog took its place. Existence according to him gives another account of Bulotu brought by a canoe which touched there:

'The crew landed, and proceeded to plant some breadfruit; but to their great annoyance, they could find no place for the trees to take root, and to their still greater annoyance, they could not find any water, or at least no water which could be drunk. They walked through the woods and forests, and passed through the vegetation of the island without feeling any resistance. They at length saw some of the gods, who passed through the substance of their bodies as if there was nothing there. The gods were supposed to have no canoes, not requiring them; for if they wished to be anywhere, there they are the moment the wish is felt.

Now, is this again a development? For the ballads, which date from a time long antecedent to the visit of Mariner, give a very different description of the landscape of the island of Bulotu was material. Its entrance was guarded by a woman with eight tongues. There was a large canoe for the gods to voyage in, which was called Langotanga (the 'human-roller'), because it was built of human beings and dog rollers, each being a human being. The same trees grew as on earth: cocoa-nuts, breadfruit, yams, etc.; and provision was made for the favourite pastimes of chiefs. There were eminences for netting wood-pigeons, reefs for shark-catching, 'tilua to be fished, and gigantic clams to be dived for. Ovens of food were cooked as on earth, and houses were prepared and drunk. The houses had solid posts, and the roofs were constructed in the usual way. One of the halls in Bulotu was panelled with the pupils of men's eyes 'which spake to each other'; and the ground was lined with mirrors—a veritable crystal palace.

There was a Vaiola, or Fountain of Life, whose waters were so potent that a child plunged into it grew up to manhood in a few days. There was also a Vaiola-tafoafoa, or Fountain of Perfumery, and other delights of women (see 'Voyage of Faimalise,' Tubou College Magazine, vol. iii. p. 39).

5. Cosmogony.—The earliest chapters of Tonga are the production of an old chief who was well versed in the science of botany and the laws of nature. He lived at the time of the decay of the great plantation Ma'ulagi, and was instructed by one of the 'beautiful men' who accompanied Tongaloa from the内地. He was a very sagacious and philosophical person.

Some seaweed and slime clung together, and were carried away by the sea, and washed up on the island of Totai in Bulotu, where they grew and made them a large metallic stone called Towa-Tutuna ('Frequent-ownder-turner-of-the-land'). The next was a girl called Hotolotolopupa ('Lately-wanderer').

The second pair had a girl called Vele Lahi, and the third pair a girl called Vele Jifi. ('Vele signifies 'having' or 'desire'; Vele Lahi=Desire of the Elder, Vele Jifi=Desire of the Younger')

Stickly and Slimy created a new land called Tonga Mamo's ('His land') where they built a town on it Taufaila and Taufaila-tafoa-Tauil.] The next incident is unprintable, but is a realistic setting of the theory of the world. Gapatua and his wife, and his wife, and were not ashamed.' They were ignorant even of the sexual function, which they discovered only by accident. The result was a boy called Hiko'io ('The Echo,' the Tongan Satan: see above).

The Tongans said to Vele Lahi and Vele Jifi, 'Come and name your brothers as I have done, for there is no man for you.' They did so, and Vele Lahi gave birth to the Tongolele, and Vele Jifi to the Tongoselala family. They divided the heaven and earth as stated above.

The inhabitants dwelt in an old red-Tangledonga "Atolongongonga to go down and see in what condition the world was. So he entered into the Kiu ('Sea-lark'), and went down, and flew in all directions, but could not see any land, only shallows. Then went in a very large vessel and reported to Tongaloa who said there was no land, only something that looked like shallows. Said the host that he would set out another day, and he went home, and again came to see; so Tongaloa 'Atolongongonga remained seven days in the sky, and then went down to look at the shallows. The bottom being full of water coming up, and by a bit of land, there he saw, to his astonishment, 'It looks like a reef.' He said also, 'I can find nothing to stand on there.' So they said, 'Go to the Smith, and let him throw down the dust of the jemice he sharpens his axes with.' So Tongaloa Tufufinga did so, and they rowed with all their might and grindstone, and produced a great wave of 'Eua. On this being reported, Tongaloa was sent down to stand there and be drowned, and by a bit of land, it become dry, and ultimately a large land grew up, which consisted, however, only of sand. Taungaloa reported, 'My land is large, but nothing was grown on it.' Then said Lord Tongaloa, 'Take this seed, and set it in the land you have discovered.' It was a fish's father; and so he set it, and it is now to come land. Then said he, 'There is vegetation enough, but no people; and Lord Tongaloa and the other heavenly chiefs replied, 'Go and split the root of the tree.' He did so, and it rooted and produced a grub. So he reported to the sky, 'A great thing is taking place in the leaves of the tree of life (Vono). By and by to call the head Kohal ('Who is it?') and the tail Koaun ('It is I'). He did so, and both parts became men; so did also a little piece that had adhered to his back. This was named Mono ('Little Bit'); and he with the other two were the first men.

Now at that time Maui the Elder ordered his family to go on board a canoe, and sail out to land. There were two Canoes in the land: Maui Lioa, Mau, Mauk, and Maui. 'Atalanga with his son Maui Kijikijii; and they took their mother Vele with them.

She was the eldest daughter of the great chief Manuka, a part of Samoa that was already above the waters. And Maui Kijikijii, a plant had already grown, and sprang, as the wise man ordered him, When the chief's wife, he ravished her; and she, taking kindly to him, revealed her husband's secret, that the magic fish-boat, which would carry them to the earth, was only a real one, but an old and rusty hook, stuck in the reeding. So they got the hook, and because it successively necessary to sharpen it bodily, and pulled up Tongas and many other groups of islands. When they came to 'Eua, and saw the three men, they asked whether they could get any of their own on their land. They went and fetched three, so that they might have one each. At that time the fish was very low, and an abundance of fish that stood in Tonga reached quite up to heaven. So 'Eku-Matsubu's was went to climb down, and visit the earth; and, cohabiting with a woman, had a son named Mau-Atalanga.

Now the Maui dwelt in the under world, but one of them, Maui 'Atalanga, was his brother. He have no objection to my living on the earth, if you visit your old home again.' And they said, 'No.' So Atalanga went up to the earth, taking his young son, and married him. He went to the Father of the earth, married a mortal wife. Now Maui 'Atalanga did not plant in Vava'u; for the purpose was not to plant, but to make life possible; so he had his plantation in the under world. He kept this, however, a secret from his son Kijikijii, for he was such a mischiefs. But Maui Kijikijii tracked his father by his footprints, and, seeing him lift a bush and descend into the earth, waited a while and followed him. Many tricks did he play, until one day his father sent him to Maui the Elder to get a fire-stick. Kijikijii kept quenching the fire and going back for more. At last Old Mau told him to take the whole log. This was of enormous size, but the young Maui took it up easily. Old Mau, who had not recognized his grandson, perceiving that he was a superhuman being, challenged him to wrestle—with the result that the elder Maui was thrown and left for dead.

'Atalanga, hearing of it, strikes his son with his spade and nearly kills him. On going, however, to see how his father was faring, he finds the old man unharmed and rather pleased with the defeat by his grandson, and angry with his son for having killed him. They apply, however, the leaves of the tree of life, and Maui Kijikijii was saved. Old Mau was then told that he, the Father of the earth, was in the under world to earth, in spite of the efforts of his father to prevent it; and they then devoted themselves to making life possible, with and destroying the mournful animals that infested the world—a huge rat, a gigantic cock, and the Moa, a lizard, and some carnivores. Maui 'Atalanga was favored by a huge dog that lived in a magic cave which opened and closed automatically, and was able to please Maui the Elder, and take the grief for his father, etc.

PRELUDE.—The principal authorities on the state of Tonga in early times are not difficult to find, as, among others, William M. Gaskell, in 'The Valleys of the Tonga Islands,' London, 1855; G. Veron's 'Abbeatique Navigations,' Fours Years Residence, and Later Voyages, London, 1818; S. S. Farmer, Tonga and the Friendly Islands, vol. 355. (Mariner's is a valuable work. He gives evidence
of being possessed of no common ability, and of an excellent memory; and, if the present writer has ventured to differ from him, (1) the following reasons: (1) the "Mariner" stayed only 4 years; (2) his obvious want of acquaintance with the niceties of the language; (3) the considerable time that elapsed between his going and the writing down of his reminiscences; (4) the fact that the present writer's acquaintance with the facts and legends over a period of 21 years; (5) that most of his information was taken down from the lips of the "last of the Bards", a once heathen chief called Tongvalaveho, who was the history of their folklore and beliefs; (6) that he has had access to the unpublished journals of the Rev. John Thomson, which were written in 1625, and was the first missionary to make a lengthened stay.

J. EGAN MOUTH.

TONGKING.—Ethnographically Tongking is divided into two parts: South Tongking, the special domain of the Annamese race, and North Tongking, bounded on the north by the Annamese-Chinese frontier, on the east by the sea, on the west by the range where the waters separate into the Red and Black Rivers (Song-Kol and Song-Bo), and on the south by a line bisecting the provinces of Kwang-Yen, Bao-Giang, Thai-Nguyen, Tuyen-Kwan, and 2.—Day. This Upper Tongking has an area of 54,700 square kilometres, and a population of 374,528, belonging to 26 different ethnic groups. There are no Annamese or Chinese except officials and merchants; the country is peopled chiefly by Tai, Mu, Nung, Laotians, Mong, and a very small number of representatives of far more ancient ethnic groups, such as the La-teh (La-ti) and the Kent-Lao.

TONGKING.—The Tai are strong and of a lively disposition, careless, fond of pleasure and play, and extraordinarily indulgent. This race seems to be on the decrease; there are few births, and infant mortality is very high. They are not absolutely averse to mixed marriages; their daughters may marry Chinese or Annamese if they choose, and their sons take wives from any variety of the race whatever, even from the Man; these mixed marriages produce a stronger and more provident race than pure Tai.

The Tai live in the plains and low valleys by preference. Their houses, as a rule, built on piles, on the ground-floor being reserved for live-stock and poultry, the upper story for the habitation of several tribes distantly connected with the Chinese; the rest of the Tai follow the Annamese fashion, but wear much brighter colours—indigo blue is almost universal—silk and Chinese brocades. Rice is the staple food. The Tai also use beans, sweet potatoes, and gourds; pork in their most usual dishes. Annual festival is the "nine days", at the end of which they also eat fish. Tea is their chief beverage, though they sometimes drink too much wine or spirit made from fermented grain. The use of tea and betel is practically universal among them; opium is confined to the rich.

The Tai are essentially farmers. They cultivate rice, maize, buck-wheat, beans, peas, sweet potatoes, and sesamum. Industry and commerce are practically non-existent owing to the indolence of the race. They can, however, distil alcohol, weave cloths, make rich embroidery, and do fine basket-work. The Tho even spin a little silk. 3.

2. Religion.—On their original animism the Tai have superimposed a confused mixture of Taoist, Buddhist, Confucian ideas, derived from the Chinese and Annamese. A few priests or lectors-men have a vague knowledge of the cosmic system of the di-kinh.

They believe that the primordial principle of nature gave birth to the male and female principles, from which issued everything and every being. The male principle is the sun, the sky, the intellectual soul of men; the female is the dark earth, the unconscious and second soul of men. The sun has three subtle souls, or hien, which emanate from the male principle, and seven or nine (according as the sex is male or female) vaginae or egg-vessels or yoni. At death these vest return to the earth whence they came, while the hien go to the infernal regions. This doctrine of the transmigration of souls and their purification by punishment. After undergoing the punishments which they have merited, they may approach the throne of the emperor of jade, the supreme Tai idol.

The great majority of the people, a most superstitious race, confines themselves to the worship of the evil spirits which infest the air and lie in wait for men in every insignificant actions of their life. They have a great many thought and offerings, and especially by the help of more powerful good spirits which are rendered propitiation by devotion worship. Among the good spirits the deities of the hearth and the sanctuary of the village are held in the highest honours of the evil spirits, which have different names in the various Tai groups, the most dreaded are the spirits of people who have died a violent death and the chicken-spirits that insinuate themselves into people, especially women, and give them the evil eye. Of course the Tai believe in white and black magic, spells, lots, and philtres.

Their priests are chiefly sorcerers, who earn their living by offering sacrifices to the spirits, exorcising the sick, and warding off all the evils invoked against man. They also choose the material with which to build villages, houses, the propitiatory, or for beginning any work, etc. Among the Tai they are nearly all connected with an official cult, but there are independent sorcerers and sorceresses.

The only couples that the Tai possess are small rustic pagodas, nearly always dedicated to the tutelary genius of the locality.

Their religious festivals are borrowed from the Annamese; but among certain tribes, particularly the White and Black Tai, there are some festivals which seem peculiar to the race. (1) Kin lao moe (‘drink,’ ‘alcohol,’ ‘drunk’) takes place in September. All the inhabitants of the village meet in one of their houses for a banquet, which is followed after sunset by music and singing. The feast lasts three days, during which no one may enter or leave the village. (2) Keo pong (‘to eat bread’) takes place in January. It is characterized by round dances to the accompaniment of chants. Among the White Tai it is the women who dance, among the Black Tai the men. (3) Kin tra (‘to eat coined money’) takes place in December in honour of the dead. It lasts three days, with banquets, dancing, and singing. Both men and women take part.

Ancestor-worship exists among the Tai, but only a more or less slavish imitation of Annamite ritualism. It is practised chiefly among the Tho, who preserve the names of their ancestors to the fourth generation, make offerings at prescribed times, and exhume and then children to honour the dead as the protectors of the hearth. Only those who have died a natural death have a place on the family altar; those who have died a violent death, out of doors, have only a small outside altar, usually built in the garden. 3.

3. Myths and legends.—Among all the Tai is found the tradition of a universal deluge, from which the god of the earth saved only a brother and a sister—a poor but pious couple — who shut themselves at his command inside a hollow pumpkin, with some rice for provision. After the subsidence of the waters the present-day races were born from the union of this couple.

4. Medicine.—The Tai regard nearly every illness as the work of evil spirits, and the best medicine is the sorcerer; the more enlightened members of the race sometimes admit that there are natural remedies, which they treat with simples and mineral products borrowed from the Chinese pharmacopoeia.

It should be noticed that the Tai know nothing of the profession of vowed men, nor do they tie by calling Ancestor festivals, the doctrine of the transmigration of souls, the idea of the patrimony reserved to meet the expense of the cult of the dead and the upkeep of the tombs. As a rule after a few months, at most after four years, the Tai have nothing more to do with the tombs.
5. Marriage. — Although the manners of the Tai are not so free and easy as those of the Laotians, youths and maidens meet freely to sing and dance and to make amorous allusions to each other; all that Tai morality requires is that there be no tangible proofs of these relations, and hence recourse is had to abrasive measures or the suppression of children.

The father is the unquestioned head of the family, yet it is only among the highly Ammonitized Tai that he chooses a mate for his child; among the Tai of the right bank of the Red River the parents have a free hand in the choice of their young, only that the proposal is made by a go-between; the young man pays a dowry, and the engagement is settled after a sorcerer has compared the genealogical forecasts of the couple, in order to see whether any super-

natural influence opposes their union. The engagement is generally long—from three months to three years—and is rather expensive for the fiancé, who is expected to give a great number of presents. The engaged couple are bound to observe the strictest reserve; they are not allowed to take any notice of each other until the wedding-day, while they have complete liberty in their relations with other persons of both sexes.

The marriage-ceremony itself is borrowed from the Annamese.

The outstanding characteristic of marriage among the Tai is the giving of the Thô in the west, the Nung, and the Thô-Ti—is the quaint custom of separating husband and wife after the celebration of their union; among some tribes the wife spends a fortnight with her parents and a fortnight with her husband; among others she cannot go to her husband except when invited.

This state of affairs comes to an end with the appearance of pregnancy, or, in cases of sterility, at the end of the fourth year of married life, when the wife takes her place at the family hearth. As the separated husband and wife retain complete liberty of behaviour outside with people of their own age, Tai morality suffers some strange drawbacks from this custom. The Tai youths marry usually between twenty-three and twenty-five, the girls between sixteen and eighteen.

The Thô of the west and some other tribes practise marriage by adoption and marriage by contract also. A poor young man can enter a rich family without paying the usual dowry, on condition that he takes his father-in-law's name, and lives, as far as possible, for his father-in-law. Should he wish later to live apart with his wife, he is liable to pay an indemnity to his father-in-law. A young man can also marry without paying a dowry and without changing his name, by under-

taking a contract to serve his wife in her father's house for a stated number of years—from four to seven. If he dies before the contract has expired, his widow is responsible for his debt. These two forms of marriage, which are not held in high esteem, entail no long engagements and no costly wedding-feasts.

Polygamy is allowed by the Tai, but seldom practised; the number of wives is usually limited to two, only the first having honour and authority at the hearth, the other being practically her servant. Among the White Tai, however, the daughter of a chief has the rights of first wife, no matter when she is married. The Tai woman, though she enjoys a life of perfect freedom in her youth, becomes after marriage a sort of beast-of-

burden, and the hardships in the fields and in the house fall on her. She has no real individuality till she becomes a mother. Divorce is rare; by right only the husband can seek it; in actual life it is the wife who applies for it. Repudiation is still more rare and is nearly always due to sterility.

6. Birth. — The house of the mother is forbidden to strangers during and for a certain time after confinement. If they did enter, they might themselves be attracted by the beauty of the child. The confinement is made known to those outside by a branch of shaddock and a piece of coal among the Thô of the west, by a piece of wood, a knife, or a green branch among the Thô of the east, fastened to the ladder of the house. The first visitors to enter the house of the mother have to pass over a burning brand or a pail of water, into which red-hot iron is plunged. The Tai woman is not allowed to take a sitting position, holding on to ropes with her hands. The eastern Thô alone light a brazier on the camp-

bed whither she is afterwards carried. The placenta is secretly buried by the midwife. The birth is announced with libations to the ancestors by the head of the family. A propitious day is chosen for putting the child in the sack that does duty as swaddling. The choice of a name is sur-

rounded with the same superstitions as are found among the Annamese, and the same unpleasant designations are chosen.

7. Death and disposal of the dead. — The Tai originally buried their dead in the earth and still do so for certain chiefs. As a rule they have now adopted burial. Funeral honours are paid only to men over 18 years of age and to married women. The remains of children are burned, and the ashes poured into the river or the sea, after a ceremonial obsequy preceding the funeral. The medicine-man determines the position of the coffin and the situation of the grave. The deceased is dressed in his best clothes and a pair of new sandals, and is put into a coffin containing about 10 kilogrammes of ashes. On the bier are placed some duck-feathers to help him to ford the rivers of the other world, and a pencil and paper for him to make his wishes known. On the day of burial—usually the third after death—the corpse is placed on a paper catafalque and taken to the ceremonies with great ceremony. The one idea at this juncture is to prevent the dead from returning to torment the survivors at home and at the same time to protect him from evil spirits. It is for this purpose that the medicine-man is employed; he brandishes his sword at intervals round the coffin and the mourners, who stroll the road with gold and silver paper in order to tempt the evil spirits to stop and gather it up. The coffin is then put into the grave under the protection of the medicine-man's sword; food is placed on the tomb, near which a bottle full of water should contain the dead in the other world. Among the Chong-

Kia Tai, when the coffin has to cross a river, the children stretch a piece of cloth from side to side for the souls of the dead to keep them from wandering. Commemorative rites are not observed regularly by the Tai, except where they are very much under Annamese influence.

8. Tabu. — There seems to be only one kind of tabu among the Tai, viz. the entering or leaving a village during a local festival. Strangers are warned to turn back by notices placed outside the villages.

II. MAN. — This Chinese name, which means 'barbarous,' ' rude,' is applied in Tongking to the ethnic group of the children of Pan-Hú or Phien-

Hú, who claim to be descended from the union of the dog Pan-Hú with the daughter of the emperor of China, whose inveterate enemy had been van-

quished by Pan-Hú. The Man, or Yao, probably inhabit the high parts forming the bosom of the two basins of the Li-Kiang and the Pan-Hú, which reserves a number in N. Tongking and much more numerous in the west than in the east. Their various groups have been classified in six great families issuing, they say, from the six sons of Pan-Hú: the Man Thô, or termed Man; the Thô-Ti, or ....
Man, the Man Lan-Tien, or ‘indigo-tinted Man’; the Man Quan Trang, or ‘blue-trousered Man’; the Man Quoc Coe, or ‘short-trousered Man’; and the Man Cao Lu, or ‘great rainbow Man.’ The Man Coe, most numerous and most important, live in the middle parts of the country. Lower down are the Man Thien; the Lan-Tien hardly ever are found at a greater altitude than 300 metres; the others follow by various stages to the borders of the delta plains. By a rule, they all find life in the valleys uncongenial.

1. Physical characteristics.—The Man are not so tall as the Tai, but are more robust, more intelligent, and much more active. As they have no rice, their staple food is maize, vegetables, and yams. They eat meat sparingly, chiefly pork, rarely buffalo or ox, never the fish for which this is rich country. They do not chew betel, but both men and women smoke tobacco and the rich consume opium.

Their houses are built sometimes on the ground, sometimes on piles, and sometimes half-and-half. A random group of these houses forms a village, and the village is scarcely ever surrounded by a wall. The Man borrow their style of dress from either the Chinese or the Annamese according to their locality. Women are embroidered on the skirts, facings, neck, and sleeves with bright red and blue designs to intricate and elaborate that it takes three years to embroider one costume. Their hair-dressing is also elaborate, and is nearly always finished off with a large barban having coloured edges and embroidery.

The Man are essentially agriculturists; but they are also good hunters, blacksmiths, and, to some extent, even their women use, and also paper from bamboo-fibre. They are good fishermen and hunters.

2. Religion.—Their beliefs are like those of the Tai, but very much absorbed—certain notions from the three great religions of China; but the mass of the people are animists, though not quite so superstitious as the Tai. Ancestor-worship is held in great honour amongst them. They have the same flood legend as the Tai. The Man have only a few pagodas dedicated to the tutelary deity of the village. They are nearly always built against a fruit-tree. They have medicine-men who present offerings, exorcise devils, and perform magical cures. The reputation of these sorcerers varies with the Man Coe according to whether they have or have not received initial initiation to the third degree. Among the other tribes initiation generally comprises only one degree. The Man worship consists in sacrifices, songs, and dances. They observe the Chinese feasts with varying regularity. They have also two curious local feasts celebrated with great festivity by the Man Coe. The first one takes place every three years in certain tribes, every five years in others, and commemorates the rescue of the Man race when—so long ago as to be in the region of hypothesis—it was shipwrecked in sight of the Chinese coast on its way from an island in the east. The second feast, called ‘the great feast,’ comprises five days of extraordinary pomp, and occurs only once in ninety years. We have no data of any value on its origin or symbolic meaning.

3. Medicine.—Their medicine comes from the Chinese, but the Man would not believe in the efficacy of any medicine that is not accompanied by incantations and exorcisms.

4. Metamorphosis.—The Man believe that their neighbours, the Mao, have a third cutting of teeth in their old age, and after death escape from their graves and reappear as tigers.

5. Marriage.—The Man do not attach much importance to virginity. When a child is born before marriage, it is suppressed without a thought of the laws regarding a bastard a child born in the wrong season. Violence is also punished by a fine. The young people themselves, and not their parents, arrange their marriages. The young man makes his choice of a girl, and the girl’s parents and all make proposals to the parents of the girl. After examining the genealogical forecasts, the go-between may, at a second visit, dismiss the amount of the dowry and the presents to be offered by the suitor. The engagement is concluded when the young man himself brings all or some of the presents. All intercourse between the engaged couple is strict until all the wedding rite is over, and the rite is signalized by the customary banquets; the couple drink a cup of rice-wine together and prostrate themselves before the ancestral aitar.

They live together after the marriage ceremony. The daughter-in-law must scrupulously avoid touching her husband’s parents, though she serves her father-in-law at table.

The Man are also familiar with marriage by adoption and contract. Among the Man Cao Lu the newly-married couple do not live together until two or three months after the marriage ceremony. Among the Man Quan Trang the marriage is preceded by a term of three years spent by the young man in his future father-in-law’s house, the girl being usually about thirteen or fourteen at this time. The youth may marry her at the beginning of the third year, or if, as is more usual, at the end of the third year, he marries her, but without so much as an invitation or receiving anything; if he is dismissed, he can claim an indemnity for the service rendered. After marriage the couple serve seven years in the parent’s home of the husband.

Polygamy is practised among the Man; the number of wives is usually restricted to two, the first alone having authority in the house. The Man Quan Trang allow polygamy only in exceptional cases. The material status of woman is high among the Man, the men doing all the heavy work; her legal status is different: she is the property of her husband, who can give her away and repudiate her. She, on the other hand, is not allowed to leave him. In cases of adultery the husband has the right to send his wife back to her parents and reclaim the dowry that he paid for her; if he keeps her, he can claim damages.

6. Birth.—From the third month of pregnancy sexual relations cease, and the woman abstains from fat, green vegetables, and garlic. She is not allowed to sew or embroider except outside her house. The first child is delivered by the Man Coe. They believe that, if a pregnant woman were the first to cross a new bridge, it would fall; that the touch of such a woman spoils rice and alcohol; the Man Quan Trang, on the other hand, believe that the man should buy the things for her own sake, in case they should cause miscarriage. The birth is announced to outsiders by a bunch of grass hung on the door among the Man Coe, by threads stretched across the door among the Quan Trang; no announcement is made among the Lan-Tien. The Man woman is delivered sitting on a little stool. No fire is put under the bed after delivery. The placenta is taken far away and hidden in a hole in a tree; or it is buried under the mother’s bed among the Man Lan-Tien; if eaten by an animal, it would bring misfortune on the child. Children born out of wedlock among the Quan Trang belong to the mother; but the father, if known, is liable to pay a fine and give two months’ service free in the house of the mother’s parents to repay them for the loss of work caused by the birth. They practice adoption freely and willingly into their families many Annamese children as their own.

7. Death and disposal of the dead.—The Man Coe used to burn their dead, and this custom survives west of the baron river. The Lan-Tien nearest the delta buried only those over fifty; the Quan Trang buried all the heads of families. The burial rites are copied from the
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Annamese. The Man Coe do not make 'the white silk soul' or catalaqua; a sorcerer of the second degree excoriates the tree from which the coffin is to be made so that the tree-spirit may not come to torment the dead.

III. PA-TENG.—The Pa-Teng, about 200 in number, live near the Man on the heights separating the Red River and the Clear River (Song-Ks). They are somewhat beard-like, but are of small size, and are really separate linguistically. Their beliefs and customs are practically those of the Man.

IV. ME0.—The Meo, or 'eats,' numbering 21,000, live in Thay-Ho, Cao-Lac, Lao-Ky, and Coe-Len as well as in the provinces of Thai-Nguyen and yen-Bay. They claim to have come originally from the Chinese provinces of Yen-Nan, Kwei-Chu, and Tse-Chuen. Their last invasion into Tonking, in 1860, was very violent.

1. Physical characteristics.—The Meo are little and squat, very vigorous on their short legs; brave, hardy, and independent; they can be very abominable, but are inclined to eat and drink heavily. Maize is their staple food; they eat very little meat, and drink a great deal of alcohol; hot tobacco is not used and betel is unknown among them. Their rusty huts, of palm or mud, are dirty to repulsiveness.

2. Religion.—Their traditional beliefs are borrowed from the Mand and are very unprepossessing and wavering. They dread evil spirits.—among others, the souls of beheaded people and of the unburied dead. A vague form of ancestor-worship is practised, in the prayers and offerings of food, which are quickly consumed by the survivors. They are familiar with the flood-legend of the couple saved in the hollow pumpkin. Their priests are sorcerers.

3. Marriage.—Paternal authority is not strong. The young people make their own choice of mates, and marriage is accomplished through a go-between. In some districts the suitor has both to pay a dowry and to serve his future parents-in-law for two years before marriage. The Meo marry freely with other ethnic groups. Marriages are always accompanied by dances, songs, and games; if the bridgroom cannot afford the expense, he may leave it for his father-in-law to bear, on condition that he and his wife give so many years' work in payment. Marriage by capture is also found, women being caught by the girl who has not been denied him, and he atones for his offence by paying a heavy dowry. Polygamy is allowed, but is not practised except when the first wife has no children. In adultery the husband has the right to kill the adulteress but as a rule is content with repudiating his wife and taking back the dowry.

4. Birth.—There is nothing to mark the house on the occasion of a birth; the mother is delivered sitting and remains indoors for 33 days. The placenta is buried in front of the house, if the child is a boy; under the fire-place, if it is a girl.

5. Death and disposal of the dead.—The Meo bury their dead. The watch by the corpse consists of three days' feasting and dancing; the children of the deceased invite him to join in the banquets, and even slip a piece of food between his teeth. By the side of the corpse, which is dressed in new clothes and fixed in an upright position to a wall of the hut, a dead dog, killed for the purpose, is placed. The two are bound together by a strip of paper going from the dog's mouth to the dead man's wrist. The dog's duty is to guide his master in the other world. The coffin and the body are taken to the grave separately; the body is carried on a litter and is followed by the sorcerer, the latter points with a stick to frighten the evil spirits. When the grave is filled in, the litter is broken over it, some food (which must be renewed for several days) is placed on the tomb, and the funeral-procession returns to a banquet at the deceased's house.

V. LOLO.—The Lolo, a people almost certainly originating in the Brahmaputra valley, are about 2500 in number in Tonking; and live chiefly in the region of Hao-Lac.

1. Physical characteristics.—Of medium height, uncomely and well built, with fine regular features and a copper complexion, they compare with the Westerns mind the Bohemians of Europe. They are luxurious and indolent, marrying only among themselves; but their race is degenerating through the use of opium, which is cheaper than rice, and meat, and goods, meat being reserved for festivals. They make alcohol from fermented maize. They use no betel and very little tobacco, but indulge in opium to excess.

Their houses are built on piles in the rich villages; in poor villages they are built in Cao-Lac on holes. The dress the Lolo resemble the Chinese or the Tho according to locality, but the garments (those of the women in particular) are shorter and much more elaborately embroidered. The Lolo are great agriculturists and hunt and fish a little.

2. Religion.—Their beliefs and psychological life vary according as their villages are next a Tai, Man, or Mee clan. Their chief cult appears to be that of evil spirits, and they countenance ancestor-worship, theoretically. They also have the story of the flood and the survival of their ancestors in a pumpkin.

3. Marriage. —Marriage, which takes place during the night, comprises no religious ceremonies, but simplygo-between and payment of a bride price. The wife lives only two or three nights with her husband, and then returns to her parents until pregnancy privileges her to take her place in her husband's household. If the marriage is not practised, the captord paying a double dowry. Adultery is punished by the death of both offenders. Polygamy exists only in theory.

4. Birth. —Birth rites connected with birth have no peculiarities among the Lolo. Adoption is of frequent occurrence, either by free consent or as the result of a bargain, and is the occasion of great festivities.

5. Death and disposal of the dead. —Burial takes place, without ceremony and in presence of relatives only, three days after death. For nine days in the ease of a man, eight for a woman, and six for a child, the family keep a fire burning on the tomb, and after that take no more trouble. Certain tribes exhume the dead, after one or three years, with great pomp, and put the head or all the bones into a little wooden box, which is then placed on a neighbouring rock, where the survivors can see it while at work. Their ancestor-worship is very crude. The place of the tablet is often taken by a representation of the dead made from an orchid stem and leaves; or a needle against a partition or between the wall and the roof of the hut.

6. Tabu. —Women after puberty are forbidden to eat pork, chicken, duck, or dog, and must not even cook their food in dishes which have been used for preparing these foods; hence the necessity of two fire-places and two utensils in a Lolo house.

VI. MUONG OR MON. —The Muong or Mon are an ethnic group centring in the province of Hao-Binh. They are of uncertain origin, but appear to be closely connected with the Annamese; among whom they resemble strongly in physical type, dress, and customs. Their no survivors can see it while at work. Their ancestor-worship is very crude. The place of the tablet is often taken by a representation of the dead made from an orchid stem and leaves; or a needle against a partition or between the wall and the roof of the hut.

6. Tabu. —Women after puberty are forbidden to eat pork, chicken, duck, or dog, and must not even cook their food in dishes which have been used for preparing these foods; hence the necessity of two fire-places and two utensils in a Lolo house.
same way as among the Annamese. The placenta is in the mouth, and the whole body is laid beside it. The dead are buried in accordance with the Annamese rites. The corpse is placed in a coffin made from a hollow tree-trunk and set up in front of one of the doors of the hut. Outside, and facing it, there stands on a tripod a lamp containing a little black dog killed for the purpose, some rice, alcohol, and incense-sticks. A special cord binds the tripod to the coffin. After the coffin has been let down and the grave filled in, the mouth of the jar is emptied near the stone which marks the position of the dead man's head; and, if rain-water comes and fills this jar again, it shows that the grave has been well chosen and it brings a thousand blessings to the survivors. The bodies of the quan-long (village chiefs) are kept, it appears, for three years before burial in the ancestral altar; a long bamboo tube leading from the hermetically-sealed coffin right up beyond the roof of the hut preserves the hut from mephitic vapours.

VII. KEU-LAO.—The Keu-Laou, of whose origin and customs we know next to nothing, form an ethnic group of seven families in the neighbourhood of Dong-Vaú.

VIII. LA-TEH.—The La-teh or La-Ti are about twenty in number and live in the village of Chau Long near the upper valley of the Long-Chai. Though resembling the Annamese of the delta in physical type, they claim to be aboriginals. They are very little known and seem to live like the Mio. Their characteristic trait is their abstention from pork, which is contrary to the custom of the Tonkin, La-tchi and Montagnards.

Antoine CABATON.

TONGUE.—I. Physiology.—The essential organ of taste is the mucous membrane which covers the tongue, especially its back part, and the hinder part of the palate.1 Here are found certain cells, arranged in groups which are known as taste-buds and are connected with two cranial nerves. Sensations of taste are intermingled with accompanying sensations of touch, and often of smell.

There appear to be distinct terminal organs for bitter tastes, for sweet tastes, for acid tastes, for salt tastes, and possibly for other tastes, all differing from the terminal organs for tactile sensations, and from the structures, whatever they may be, which are concerned in general sensibility.2 Modern knowledge of the physiology of taste began (1655) with Malpighi (1628–94), who employed the newly invented microscope.3 The sense of taste was grouped by Aristotle under that of touch, both operating only through immediate contact. Pliny notes that the human palate also possesses the sense of taste, and he gives many details about the variety in the tongues of animals.4 An Anglo-Saxon leech-book, in prescribing 'for men in whom the string under the tongue is badly swollen,' says that 'through the string first every disorder cometh on the man.'5 But the chief significance of the tongue for primitive thought is obviously in regard to the faculty of speech, to which it is related together with the throat and lips, in the modulation of the voice. That vibration of the vocal cords which is called 'voice' is modified by the varying shape of the resonant chamber formed by the mouth. The tongue, however, is much more than a mere organ of speech. Huxley refers to a case in which conversation remained quite intelligible though the tongue had been completely amputated.

2. Localization of the Physiological Function.—This characteristic of primitive thought concerning the physical organs1 is frequently illustrated by primitive practices in regard to the tongue. Since the nerves of the tongue and the minuter structures of the tissues were unknown to the ancients, the tongue was thought to possess an inherent faculty of speech, as something residing in it, so that the faculty and its special qualities could be transferred by acquisition. The operation of the tongues of specially gifted animals or men.

Thus, among the Tingits of Alaska, the chief of the spirits sends the candidate for cannibalism a river-otter in contact of which an animal is supposed to be the whole power and secret of shamanism. . . . If, however, the spirits do not visit the would-be shaman and give him any opportunity to cut the otter-tongue as described above, the neophyte visits the tomb of a dead shaman and is supped an awful sight, looking as if his mouth filled with the fingers of the dead man or one of his teeth! This constrains the spirits very powerfully to send the necessary otter.16 In Korea the tongue of a native is cut from the living animal on St. George's Eve and placed under a person's tongue to secure the gift of eloquence. In the North American Indian thought that brandy must be a decotion of hearts and tongues, "because," said he, 'after drinking it I fear nothing, and I talk wonderfully!' In S.E. Australia 'one of the Wodjebora was observed to take the tongues out of a certain grey and white huntsman called Bungo, and give it to his little son, a child of about thirteen months old, and gave as a reason for doing so that after eating the tongue his child would soon be able to talk.'17

3. Ordeals.—The idea of the localization of psychical function and its ethical qualities underlies different forms of the tongue-ordeal.

Lady Anne Boleyn, recording an interesting case in connexion with a dispute as to the parentage of a child: 'The matter, as all such matters are in the desert, was referred to arbitration, and the mother's assertion was put to the test by a live coal being placed upon her tongue.'18 Here the original thought seems to have been that the truth would be elicited when the inherent falsehood of the tongue was, if necessary, burnt out. Similarly, in case of theft among certain W. African tribes, use is made of a needle which the operator ' thrusts through the tongue of each member of the household in succession, to discover the thief, it being believed that it will fail to pierce the tongue of the person who committed the theft.'19

Reference to the tongue-ordeal among E. African nates was recently made in the British House of Commons. A native chief was investigating a case of cattle theft in the presence of

3 G. P., v. 8, Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild, ii. 270.
4 F. H., 1. 147.
5 Howitt, p. 409.
7 L. I. 507.
8 E. Crawley, The Mystic Rose, London, 1902, p. 111. The throbbing out of the tongue in derision or contempt (Is 574; Lvy, vii. 15; G. P., v. 66) is a characteristic feature of a concentrated cure.
9 G. P., v. Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild, ii. 208 f., where numerous examples and parallels will be found.
the District Commissioner, Mr. Dundas. The chief called on the "March to the Cross" and, after going through the native form of the ordeal by fire, by licking a hot wire. Mr. Dundas did not prohibit this procedure, but took care that the knife was not afterwards used for cutting the woman's tongue, which is considered as an ordeal of a different kind is undergone by the medicine-men in certain parts of New South Wales and Australia. The tongue is mysteriously mutilated, and remains throughout life perforated in the centre with a hole large enough to admit the little finger. 2 But the ordinance of the ceremony in some cases is the permanent practice of mutilating an organ before its usual place in order to be used in the circumcision, and to permit the application of a second dressing.

4. Religious usages. - The tongue is not often named in a separate offering in the rites of sacrifice. The Homeric Greeks concluded a feast by casting the tongues of the victims upon the fire, over which they poured the drink-offering. 3 According to some accounts, the tongues of the victims were assigned by the Greeks to Hermes, as the god of speech, or to his human representatives, the heralds. 4 The Tukot made a special sacrifice, for a sick man's recovery, of tongue, heart, liver, consuming the rest of the meat themselves. 5 In the horse-sacrifice of the shamanists of N. Asia the tongue of the sacrificed animal is torn out (in order to make its spirit dumb under the shaman's control). 6

Honey was placed on the tongue of one who was being initiated into Mithraism, as was the custom with newly-born infants; 7 we may compare with this the ceremonial tasting of milk and honey by those being baptized into the Christian faith. 8 In this connexion may be noticed the miracle of the Homeric warrior, Melanippus of Thessaly, who anointed the tongue of a dumb girl with oil after exorcism. 9 The wide-spread rule of silence (q. v.) during particular religious ceremonies falls beyond the scope of this article, but the idea of the localization of the voice is probably underlies the Indian usage recorded by Devendrashan Tagore:

"On another elephant sat the Rajpur (religious preceptor of the god of war) in the Homeric acrostic's bright-colored robe, and silent. He had his tongue encaised in wood, lest he should speak." 10

5. Penalties. - In the light of these illustrations of the fundamental idea of localized function (or "differential consciousness"), we may better understand certain barbarous mutilations widely practised by way of penalty or revenge. These have often survived into times relatively more civil than those of their origin, when the idea that first prompted them has been lost, viz. the idea of penalizing the guilty organ in which the original evil resides.

The Laws of Hammurabi enacted that in certain cases an accused denying his new parent was to have his tongue cut out. 11 According to 2 Mac., when the seven brethren were being tried by the High Priest, "he commanded the tongue of him that had been their spokesman" (Ch. Judas Macaeonos, "cutting out the tongue of the impious Nasiocor, that he would do no harm to his brethren") (59). Maximus and two other opponents of Monothelitism were dragged from Rome to Constantinople by their tongues and right hands were cut off, before they were driven into exile. 12 Blasphemy for the fifth time was punished by excision of the tongue, according to a law (1247) of Philip of VALois (1505-1550). Evagriusocrates of the heretic Nestorius: "I learned from one who wrote an account of his demise, that when his tongue had been eaten through with worms, he departed to the greater and everlasting judgment which awaited him." 13 The instinct which doubtless

1 As reported in the Manchester Guardian of 6th May 1914.
2 Spencer Gifford, ibid., p. 523-525, with accompanying photographs. A Hebrew name for an enchancer is 'a master of the tongue' (Ex. 21. 24).
3 Od. Il. 333-341.
4 QPA, pt. v., Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild, ii. 270, where reference will be found.
6 W. Radloff, Aa Slavierina, Leipzig, 1893, p. 112.
7 R.P., p. 523-525.
12 P. B. N. Nicolai, Hist. des orgonies, superstitions, sarvres, usages et coutumes (along the plan of D'Abbeville), Paris, 1902, i. 305 (numerous other examples given).
13 H.B., vol. i. 2. vol. xi. -25

TONSURE - See CHORISMATA.

TONSURE. - Tonsure is the shaving or cutting of the hair after a particular fashion as a sign of reception into the clerical order and to the privileges pertaining thereto, one of the modes of ordination, as it extends to the reception of holy orders, and is administered by the bishop or by a mitred abbot or by certain privileged priests in whom its administration has been vested by the pope. At first it was part of the ceremony of ordination, but was separated from it towards the end of the 7th century. The origin of the tonsure is obscure, but from passages in the Fathers it is clear that long hair in men was considered effeminate or worse, and this was particularly true in the case of monks. Epiphanius enumerates some Mesopotamian monks for their long hair against the rule of the Church, and such excesses is partly responsible for the Custom at the custom. 4 A monk's hair had thus to be cut short, though not shaven, as this was the custom with the priests of Isis. 5 The earliest tonsure was probably putting the hair into a close coiffure or braid of the entire head, though this may have become a shaving of the whole head after the manner of the 6. 'Figurative' usages. - The selected evidence already given will prepare us to recognize a deeper meaning in certain phrases of incident literature which the modern mind is apt to dismiss as simply figurative and poetical. The Biblical usages will sufficiently illustrate this. The quality of ' backbiting' is called ' an idle tongue' as ' an angry countenance' (Pr 25:25); a lying tongue hates those that it wounds (25:29); the tongue devises wickedness, like a sharp razor (Ps 52:2); Job asks more literally than most readers suppose, ' Is there injustice on my tongue?' (6:9). The Servant of Jahweh declares that his Master has given to him the disciple's tongue, that he may know how to help the weary by his word (Is 50:20). In the Messianic future the tongue of the prophet of justice will be prompt to speak plainly (32:12), the tongue of the enemies of Israel will consume away in their mouth (Zec 14:19); the tongue is not named in the well-known narrative of Isaiah's call (Is 6), but the cleansing of his lips by the live coal illustrates the principle of the localization of psychological function. So in the NT, when the tongue is said to delute the whole body, as a restless evil, the gift of the Holy Spirit there is a hidden intensity of meaning derived from primitive thought. The importance of this is seen in regard to such a phenomenon as "a shaman's tongue," which implies that the local and quasi-independent organ has been taken possession of by the Spirit of God. This is more difficult for the modern mind to conceive sympathetically than it was for the ancient, largely because we have lost touch with the idea of the localization of psychological function and ethical attributes, and have replaced it by that of the cerebral centralization of consciousness.

LITERATURE. - J. G. Frazer, Q.P., pt. v., Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild, London, 1912, ii. 321 (where a number of primitive practices in regard to the tongue are collected in a long footnote); J. B. Mayer, The Epistle of James, id. 270, 1910, pp. 219-231, discusses the ethical aspects of the use and abuse of the tongue. See also H. Wheeler Robinson, ed. 'Tongue' in DAC.

H. WHEELER ROBINSON.

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the Nazarites and those under a vow (Nu 6, Ac 21).

There is no mention of tonsure, and no regulation as to the method to which it was to be adopted. It may be remarked that the tonsure adopted by the Benedictines, in the 227 original rules of the Buddhist order of monks, in the Khandhaka, or collection of subsidiary and supplemental rules, completed at the end of the Pali canon, and written after Buddh’s death, we find the following paragraphs:

1. You are not, O Bhikkhus, to wear long hair. Whosoever does so, shall be guilty of a minor breach of the regulations (i.e., of a dukkha). I allow you, O Bhikkhus, hair that is two months old, or two inches long.

2. You are not, O Bhikkhus, to smooth the hair with a comb, or with a snake’s head (i.e., with an ivory instrument so shaped), or with the hand held in that shape, or with pomade, or with hair-oils.

3. I allow you, O Bhikkhus, the use of razors, of a bone to sharpen the razor, of powder, so as to prevent them rusting, of a sheath to hold them in, and of all the apparatus of a barber.

4. You are not, O Bhikkhus, to have the hair of your heads or on your face cut by barbers, nor to let it grow long.

5. You are not, O Bhikkhus, to have your hair cut off with a knife.

We should not draw, from the fact of these paragraphs being found among the subsidiary rules, any conclusion that they belong to a later time than the original rules. The subsidiary rules refer quite often to what were evidently older customs in the order, and only legalize and give authority to practices already followed, though not mentioned in the older rules. But we should notice in the first place that there is no mention of scissors. The reason of this is curious; scissors had not then been invented. This is confirmed by an exception to rule 5 above, in which you may cut a sore on the head, and the hair round it could not be removed by a razor, then a knife might be used.

In this case no doubt, if scissors had been
then known in the Ganges valley, their use would have been allowed, at least as an alternative.

The mother of the child, however, was not to be shaved not only on the face, but all over the head; and the shaving had to be performed, not by a barber, but by fellow-members. Why was this the rule? Undoubtedly because this was the custom most followed by the majority belonging to the other orders that we know to have been older than the Buddha's time. It was only natural that men who had devoted themselves to the higher life of the monk were the first to learn by heart and the repetition of texts dealing with the higher life as they conceived it, should have thought it becoming to themselves to avoid, not only the use of fashionable clothing, but also the elaborate hair dressing then habitually used by men of the world. The medallions carved in bas-relief on the stone railings round the Bharhat tope may serve as illustrations of their turban-like arrangements, in which strips of brocaded cloth are intertwined with the hair (left long), the faces being clean shaven. 2 Though the sculptures are later in date, earlier texts confirm the story, and by description ambiguous without the help of such illustrations.

There is one passage in a very early text, about the same age as the five paragraphs, which confirms the above statement. If those paragraphs only gave us the earliest customs as to shaving followed in the order. That is Digha, i. 90, in the Ambattha Sattanta, where a Brahman, reviving the adherents of the new movement, and in fact referring to the Buddha himself, calls them 'shavedings, shorn friars, the off-shewing of our kinsman's heels.' 3 It is clear that, in the view of the compilers of this passage, the members of the order had their heads shaved. Another such passage is preserved in the popular anthology called Dhammapada, 264, which says: 'Not by his shaven crown is one a samana' (a member of any order of religious, a 'religious'), if he be irreligious. It should be noticed that the technical word used is not bhikkhu (a member of the Buddhist order), but samana, which included non-Buddhist orders also.

In the much later legend of the Great Renunciation—it is at least about seven centuries later than the event which it purports to relate—we are told that the first act of the future Buddha after he had 'gone forth' was:

'Shavedings, in his right hand, and holding the plaited tresses of his hair, and its twisted decoration with his left, he cut them off. So his hair became two inches long, and lay close to his head, emerging from the nape, and so remained his life-long; and his beard the same.' 4

Now the oldest representations of the Buddha that we possess— the so-called Greek-Buddhist bas-reliefs and statues—are an endeavour to reproduce the coifure thus described. This story, therefore, as to the imperfect form of the tonsure habitually followed by the Buddha himself, must have been credited, incredible as it seems to us, at the date of those sculptures, not only in the Ganges valley, but also beyond the present frontiers of India, in the extreme north-west. In the second place, the inventors of the story ascribe to the Buddha the belief that every religious—not only Buddhists, for there were none then—should have the hair cut quite short. In other words, they claim a pre-Buddhist origin for the custom followed in the Buddhist order. Perhaps the whole episode is merely invented as a popular explanation of the odd rule as to two inches in Digha, ii. 134, Tr. Dhammavat. Texts, ii. 190. 5

The whole episode is translated in Rhys Davids, Dialogues of the Buddha, i. 112 ff.

Jātaka-nidāna, p. 64 (Vol. i. of the Jātakas, ed. Fausboll).

At the present time the bhikkhus in Burma, Siam, and Ceylon hold theoretically to the two-inch rule, but practically never appear in public without the head and face clean shaven. The numerous sects of Buddhists in Tibet and Mongolia, China, and Japan have long ago forgotten, if they ever knew, the ancient rule. But we have no exact particulars as to when and where they have enacted and carried out any newer rules of their own.


TONGSERS (Chinese).—1. Confiacian.—Confucianism, being a system of ethics, has no priests or monks. The tonsure is therefore unknown in it.

2. Buddhists.—(a) Monks.—The Buddhist tonsure was brought into China by monks from India. The whole head is shaved once a month or oftener. With boys brought up in monasteries, being either dedicated by their parents to a religious life or bought by the monks for that purpose, the tonsure takes place when they are between eighteen and twenty. At the reception of a novice the liturgy directs that the introducer of the candidate shall ask the chapter assembled that the tonsure may be granted. This acceded to, the vows are taken. 6 A rite which is apparently a constant sequel of the tonsure consists of the binding of the head with from three to eighteen small circular spots. In spite of one or more fingers is also sometimes undergone. An explanation of the Buddhist tonsure given by some of the Chinese is that it indicates the 'desire to put away... everything of the world, so that the monk does not claim as his own even his hair.'

(b) Nuns.—Aspirants are received at the age of ten into the nunneries, and their novitiate continues till they are sixteen. During these years only the front part of the head is shaved, but all the hair is shaved when they become nuns. A woman desiring to become a nun must obtain the consent of parents, husband, or guardians.

1 Of these must act as sponsor for her at the time of initiation and monastic vows. To be employed in shaving her head to the Prior who is to perform the ceremony.

3 Taoist.—(c) Monks.—Taoist monks shave all about the head, and cut the rest of their hair. They may suffer it to grow long and is gathered together into a top-knot fastened by a wooden article like the back of a tortoise. 

4 In some cases all the hair is allowed to grow.

(b) Nuns.—Taoist nuns do not shave their heads, but have their hair done up on the top of their heads.

4 Dislike of the tonsure.—Though Buddhism has benefited largely in the past from the favour of emperors, the tonsure has often been very obnoxious to the governing classes in China, who doubtless took it as the outward sign of the celibate priesthood, which separated its connexion with the family, entirely against Chinese ideas of the paramount importance of domestic life. Monks become a schism against it. The following are instances of this.

1 L. Wieser, Buddhismische chinesische, Hs Kian Fu, 1910, i. 151.


3 China's Record on Buddhism, Shanghai, 1877. 150 ff.

4 J. Poulton, Life of Buddha (1889, in. 241).

5 The monk's work in China, vii. (1893).


7 Poulton, ii. 395.

8 L. Gray, Chinese Buddhism, London, 1878, i. 104.
Tonsure (Hindu)—Tophet

8. Tonsure—(Hindu).—Chaddh, 'tonsure,' is the name of an ancient rite in India, also called chaddakarvana or chaddakarvam, claustration, which is performed on boys, sometimes on girls also, and derives its name from the tuft of hair left on the top of the boy's head (chadda). According to the ancient rule, this rite is to be performed when the boy is three years old, or, in the lower castes, in his fifth or seventh year. The boy is dressed in new clothes, and placed on his mother's lap. A barber cuts his hair with a razor, while sacred verses from the Vedas are recited. The hair is then thrown on a heap of cow-dung, and afterwards dug into the ground (see Hillebrandt, Ritualliteratur, Strassburg, 1897). It is interesting to note that this rite, as pointed out in Gerini's monograph on the tonsure to be found in Siam, has spread into Siam, together with other Brahmanical institutions. In India it has been invested with some legal importance, the Sanskrit law-books stating that a boy on whom the ceremony of tonsure has been performed is no longer a member of his family or of his sect, and no longer liable of being affiliated to another person (see Jolly, Tagore Law Lectures, Calcutta, 1885). The tonsure rite is carefully kept by many castes of the present day, though the time of its performance differs. Thus the Kanok Brahman of Poono perform the rite when a boy is from six months to two years old; the Lingayatras, after a year; the Vanis, at any time from six months to five is seen to be the usual period. Sometimes the child is taken to the village temple for the ceremony, or after its performance (see the Bombay Gazetteer, passim; Bai Bahadur L. B. Nath, Hinduism, Meerut, 1899). The tonsure rite is supposed to belong to the common heathenism of Indo-European nations, because similar rites and superstitions occur in the Areves of the Zorastrians, and, particularly, among some Slavie nations, such as the Servians and Bulgarians.

Literature.—J. Kirste, 'Indogermanische Germaenheirn beim Haarschneiden,' Anthologia Graccnica, Graz, 1890; Potanski, Die Corannsche der Haarschneiden bei den Slawen, in Gesammten der Germanischen, Cracow, 1896.

J. JOLLY.

Tophet.—Although the OT references to Tophet, the scene of the Moloch sacrifices in the Valley of Hinnom, leave no doubt as to its great importance in the popular religion of Judah in the period before the reformation under Josiah, the place itself is mentioned only in the following places: 2 K 23:10, Is 30:8, Jer 7:19. 11-12, 13-14. The similar word in Job 17:18 is clearly not to be understood in this connexion. The original pronunciation of the word, which is transliterated in the LXX Taepi or (p), is unknown, the Masoretic pronunciation in this case, as in others, being due to the substitution of the vowels of p, 'shame.' Moreover the etymology of the word is quite uncertain, and it cannot be determined whether the final t is radical or is merely the feminine ending. In Is 30:8 indeed the form is 'p, which, if the text could be trusted, would be evidence of the former alternative, unless the word should be understood as having a double feminine ending such as p. (P's 3). But against this supposition is the fact that the word is construed as masculine in its immediate context. In any case, since, with the exception of Is 30:8, it always has the definite article or is capable of being so pointed, it is evident that it is not strictly a proper name. We may reasonably infer that there were several Tophets, although we know only of the one which was situated in the Valley of Hinnom.

Robertson Smith, arguing from the fact that 'at the time when the word first appears in Hebrew, the chief foreign influence in Judean religion was that of Damascus (2 K 16),' sought to connect the word with the Aramaic Šiwa, which means a 'stand or tripod set upon a fire,' of which we might, according to known analogies, have an Aramaic variant Šiwa. The corresponding Hebrew word is 'p (for šfath), which means an ashpit or dung-hill, but primarily must have denoted the fireplace.' But this explanation is superseded by the account of an Aramaic religious rite which takes for granted that the cult practised at the tophet, or at any rate the precise ritual of the cult, was a comparatively new-fangled thing in the 7th cent. B.C., and there were grave difficulties in such an account. Even if Ahaz did bring from Damascus a new connotation for burning the children's bodies, why should it have kept in Hebrew its Aramaic name, when the Hebrew language itself possesses the same word with the ordinary dialectical difference? When the same king introduced in Jerusalem the innova-

1 The Religion of the Semites, p. 371.
tion of a great stone altar, it was called by the Hebrews 'mahal,' or altar, but by the Canaanites, 'athar. Moreover, it is extremely improbable that such a practice as the sacrifice of the first-born should have been suddenly introduced into Jerusalem as late as the 5th cent. B.C. When it is considered how hard debased superstitions have died in our own country—if indeed they are dead—we can understand the survival or even the recrudescence in the religious superstitions, but not the adoption of so terrible a rite as the sacrifice by a people who had reached an altogether higher level of religion. The OT is unintelligible unless it is recognized that the population of Palestine in the days of the kings of Judah and Israel was not so homogeneous as later writers imagined it to have been, and that the true-born Israelites were in a minority. In a fusion of races there is, no doubt, a tendency for the higher to be drawn down to the level of the lower. When a man of fairly good intelligence, but not possessed of any strong religious convictions, marries a thoroughly supersti- tious woman, it is the wife's superstition rather than the husband's intellect that will be the dominant factor in the household. And that the sacrifice of the first-born was a deeply-rooted Canaanite cult is proved not only by the excavations at Gezer and Megiddo, but also by the evidence of one passage in the OT. It is most significant that the document of the Pentateuch represents God as commanding Abraham to sacrifice Isaac (Gen 22), and that the same document in its legislation (Ex 22:23) puts the first-born of men and cattle on exactly the same level, not requiring the redemption of the former as is ordered in Ex 34:19. And that a law allowing, if not requiring, the sacrifice of the first-born was at one time issued in Jahweh's name is evident not only from Ezek 22:29, but also from Jeremiah's protest (7:4; cf. 19) that Jahweh had never commanded or contemplated any such cult. Although Ahaz is the first king of Judah of whom it is definitely stated that he sacrificed his first-born, it would be unsafe to conclude that he was the first who actually did so; for what had been done by earlier kings unhEEDED may well have called forth a vehement protest in the days of Isaiah. Certainly, if the stories of David recorded in the books of Samuel are based on a somewhat similar and not necessarily what later prophets of the non-reforming party thought David must have done, there would be no diffi- culty in supposing that even David had presided over the Molech cult at the tophet in the Valley of Hinnom. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that, as the story of the Rechabites proves, certain strata of the population remained till a late period aloof from and unaccompanied by the Canaanite elements, and it is doubtless these non-Canaanite elements that we ought to credit with the attempts made from time to time to abolish the worst of the pre-Israelite superstitions which threatened to swamp the religion of Jahweh. There is no reason to question the statements in the book of Kings that reforms were attempted in the days of Asa and of Jehoshaphat.

While it is not improbable that the method of burning the bodies at the tophet in the Valley of Hinnom was the same as that adopted elsewhere, it is by no means clear that either the place or its ritual came from Damascus. It must not be overlooked that the tophet, or at any rate the place of the tophet, is called in Jer 19:1-32 the 'high place of the Baal.' The point of Jer 7:31 that in the massacres which may have accompanied the expected corpses not slain in sacrifice will be buried at the tophet—proof of the impotence of the tophet sacri- fices to avert the divine wrath, is a naive and misinformed statement. In discussing the meaning of Is 30:3, writes as follows:

'It appears that Tophet means a pyre, such as is prepared for a king. But the Hebrews themselves did not burn their dead, unless in very exceptional cases, and burial was equally the rule among their Phoenician neighbours, as is plain from researches in their cemeteries, and apparently among all the Semites. Thus, when the prophet describes the deep and wide pyre "prepared for the king," he does not draw his figure from ordinary life, nor is it conceivable that he is thinking of the human sacrifices in the valley of Hinnom, a reference which would bring an utterly discordant strain into the imagery. What he does refer to is a rite well known to Semitic religion, which would not be lost to those that may be expected to have a large audience among the Semites. The tophet, the place of sacrifices, would have suggested the ritual of the Valley of Hinnom; the prophet declares with grim Hebrew irony that a tophet has indeed been pre- pared for a king; only in this case the king will be the victim, not the victim of the sacrifice. Thus the tophet-a name which appears to be secondary, and, even if Josiah tried to put a stop to the cult, there may have been a recrudescence of it after his death; and beyond the limits of his diminutive kingdom it probably continued considerably later. It is diffi- cult to see why Jeremiah should have published his denunciation of the tophet in the fourth year of Jehoakim, if it had been abolished once for all in the eighteenth year of Josiah. And it, as seems probable, Deuteronomy is to be dated at the 6th cent. B.C., it is evident that as late as that time it was still necessary, at least in some parts of Palestine, to protest against the sacrifice of children (Dt 18:10). Moreover, the prophecy in Is 30, though based on a genuine utterance of Isaiah, bears many evidences of having been modified long after the date, and, if further, as in 11:13 and 15:20 (cf. Ezr 6), means the Seleucid empire, the king referred to in the present form of the passage may be Antiochus Epiphanes. It is certainly not impossible that in some outlying districts of Palestine, such as Ammon, Moab, or Edom, the cult associated with the tophets held its own until the 2nd cent. B.C.


TORAH. See Law.

TORCH. (Greek and Roman).—In common with other races, the Greeks and Romans held many festivals at night, when torchlight was a practical 1 The human holocaust is not burned on an altar, but on a pyre or fire-pit constructed for the occasion. This appears both in the north-west, the Pilos and Hercules and in actual usage. At Ermanno of the Romans, the fire is erected yearly for the burning of heretics; in the Carthaginian sacrifice of boys the victims fall into a pit of fire; and lastly, in the Roman sacrifice the victim is fastened to a grating placed over a vault filled with burning fuel; finally, in the Topheth, some other device is adopted filled with wood exactly like the tery trench in which, according to Arabic tradition, the victims of 'Amr b. Hind and the

1. Who author is this text?
necessity, and need have no particular religious significance. But the torch was also important in various ceremonies where its presence was not merely utilized as an aid to vision, but may have been originally used for merely practical purposes it acquired a sacred or symbolic meaning. In agricultural festivals, e.g., the use of fire is a well-recognized symbol of fertility; and in many ancient agricultural festivities it may be doubted that the torches were used merely in a practical capacity. Marthardt and Frazer have collected a large number of customs which illustrate fire-ritual as a means of promoting the growth of crops and animals.\(^1\) The underlying idea may sometimes be a belief that earthy fire represents the sun; and torches, carried over the fields, may be the means, by sympathetic magic, of 'making sunshine.' It is more probable, however, that the fertility which the use of fire is believed to cause is to be explained by its purifying power.

In Greek myth and ritual the torch is specially connected with Demeter. According to the Homeric hymn to Demeter,\(^2\) Persephone, with lighted torches in her hands, rushed wildly in search of her daughter. The hymn deals with the Eleusinian mysteries, and it is probable that the actual rites originally initiated by the goddess were inspired by the example of the torches. The Eleusis\(^3\) included a 'torch-day' (lampadun dies), where the mothers roamed along the shore with torches. They supposed themselves to be imitating the wanderings of Demeter; but the original meaning of the rite was doubtless to purify the land and ward off pestilence from the crops. In the same way the early Eleusinians seem to have purified their children by making them pass over the fire, as the myth of Deuophoon, in the same hymn, appears to indicate.\(^4\) The most solemn ceremonies at Eleusis took place at night, when the hall of the mysteries (mysteries δύσω) was lit by torches. One of the chief officials was called the 'torch-bearer' (φαρδως), and a priest bearing the same title took part in another festival (the Lemeis), and assisted at a rite of purification or atonement of sin.\(^5\) Juvenal\(^6\) speaks of the torch as the special emblem of the Eleusinian priest.

The torch is an attribute of various Greek deities besides Demeter. Persophone bears the same emblem as her mother. In literature and art we find the torch regularly associated with Hecate, perhaps as a moon-goddess.\(^7\) Artemis is also commonly represented with a torch in literature\(^8\) and in art from the 4th cent. B.C. Here the torch may be understood as a weapon of the goddess; but in the lines of Virgil and of Statius,\(^9\) who hold that Artemis was originally an earth-goddess, thinks that it belongs to her as a deity of vegetation. The torches which in art are a frequent attribute of the Muses are perhaps best explained by reference to their nocturnal festivals. Finally, Ares sometimes carries a torch, an appropriate emblem for the god of war.\(^9\)

In Greek custom the most conspicuous example of the use of torches is in the torch-race (λαμπαδικάρια, λαμπαδιορία, or, most often, simply λαμπάρδα). This competition is best known as Athenian; but it is also recorded for other Greek states, and Alexander included it in most of the festivals which he established in various cities. In Athens the torch-race was a feature of various festivals, in honour of Prometheus, Athene (in the Panathenaic), Hephaestus, Pan, Bendis, Hermes, and Theseus. It was carried on for many years and is still kept up.\(^10\) The date of its institution is unknown, but it was first held in honour of Prometheus, the fire-bringer, at whose altar the competitors lit their torches. At the festival of Pan, we know that the race was instituted after the battle of Marathon. At the Bendides it was run on horseback, and was a novelty in the reign of Socrates; elsewhere the race was on foot. The competitors were apparently chosen from the several Attic tribes. The torch was passed from one member of a team to another, at fixed intervals along the course, and the victory rested with the team whose lighted torch first reached the goal—an altar on which fire was kindled with the torch. This procedure gave rise to the famous simile of Lucretius ('et, quos curseros, vitalis ignis, laudabilis / summus / corsque est / ignis imitator') and the name which is found in Plato.\(^11\) An equally famous line in Æschylus\(^12\) also refers to the torch, although the exact point is doubtful.

Æschylus might perhaps have meant that all the runners in the winning team have an equal share in the victory, the last no less than the first; but more probably he refers to the fact that the winning torch was handed in by the last man in the team. This man would be first in relation to the rival teams, but last in relation to his own.

The Greeks themselves explained the torch-race as a commemoration of the gift of fire by Prometheus;\(^13\) but the original motive must have been something more than a mere commemoration. The essential feature seems to lie in the transference of fire from one altar to another at the greatest possible speed. It is probable, therefore, that the underlying idea is the need of carrying fire from a pure source to take the place of a polluted fire. At Athens all fires were extinguished before the race began (at least in the Promethea), and were rekindled from the new fire. A belief in the pollution of fire is shown in the Argive custom of extinguishing fire after a death, and rekindling it from another source by μεταφέρεσιν.\(^14\) Similarly the fires at Platea were defiled by the presence of barbarians, and new fire was brought from the sacred hearth of Delphi. The attraction of such a rite to the cults of Prometheus and Hephaestus needs no explanation. Athens, too, might well have adopted a torch-race, as being the patron of handicrafts and metal-working, for which fire was a necessity; but there is no proof that the Athenians made such a rite the supreme head of the city. The race seems less appropriate to the other gods, with the possible exception of Pan. The theory that he was a sun-god cannot be accepted; but fire certainly played a part in his ritual, and an ever-burning lamp was maintained in his cave under the Acropolis. Most probably, however, the Athenians instituted the race in his honour to commemorate his appearance to the Greeks at Thermopylae after the battle of Marathon. Once established, the race became popular, and was attached to other festivals without any special religious fitness. The Romans had no torch-race, and the torch was less prominent in their ritual than in Greek religion. But the same ideas can be traced in Italy as appear in Greek fire. And although it is not always possible to distinguish the indigenous from the borrowed element; e.g., the festival of Diana at Aricia (Nemi) no doubt belongs to a primitive Italian stratum, but it is impossible to say how far Greek influence may have modified its

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4. xv. 149.
5. See also Aristophanes, Lysistrata, lines 192, 197, and 198; also 1408 f.; but see also C.G.S. ii. 509 f.
7. C.G.S. iii. 499.
9. C.G.S. ii. 509.
11. Plutarch, Mor. 7, 1096, 7; see also C.G.S. ii. 590 f.
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details. In this festival women whose prayers before child-birth the goddess favourably heard bore lighted torches to her shrine. It is difficult to say whether this custom is a survival of a purificatory rite (Diana representing a forest deity of the goddess of agriculture) or whether the torch is only a symbol of the moon-goddess, who was the natural patron of women in child-birth.

In Greek and Roman private life the torch was an important feature in marriage, as the bridal procession took place at night or towards evening. As early as Homer there is mention of this torch-light procession. It was the duty of the bride's mother to light the nuptial torch. In Italy the bride was also escorted to her new home by torch-light, under the protection of Juno Domitaca or Iterdona. Hence the god of love, both in Greece and in Rome, is often represented with a torch—an idea no doubt assisted by the common conception of love as a 'fire.'

The torch had also funeral associations to the Romans, being used to light the pile on which the corpse was burned. Those who applied the torch averted their faces. The 'two torches' of marriage and death) are mentioned by Propertius and Ovid.

LITERATURE.—The Aeneidopoeia has been frequently discussed, by A. Mommsen, Heidelberg, 1854, p. 256; P. Foucart, in Revue de Phil. xxiv. (1889) 118; N. W. de Groot, in Arch. v. 417; N. S. Saggiolo, 'Tuoapolidromia'; J. R. S. Sartest, in Byz. 4xvii. (1901) 203.

E. E. SIKES.

TORRES STRAITS.—See NEW GUINEA.

TORT. —See DELICT.

TORTOISE.—See ANIMALS.

TORTURE.—Quassio, said baldus de Periglis, an interpreter of that word of dire significance in Roman law, 'is a certain kind of inquisition made for the purpose of tearing out the truth (' cruciame veritas') by torments and bodily pain.' Few institutions have more signally failed even to afford rational excuse for their evil existence as a method of extracting evidence. Starting from a deep instinct of violence, it consistently made manifest its inherent viciousness, which no fundamentally good intention in its origin and no humane after-thought of qualification and exception could withhold from pernicious and cruel consequences. Unlike the ordeal (p. 341), which was in some measure an appeal to divine authority, torture was without even the negative virtue of offering a percentage of probabilities of right and truth in its results. It is difficult to think of any principle which could make it really assist in evoking truth from reluctant witnesses or reliable confessions from accused persons. The one point of affinity to ordeal was the resort to torture when there was a deficiency of direct legal evidence. Its basis in injustice is shown not only in its penalizing the innocent and unconvicted, but in the fact that its applicability was long confined in both Greece and Rome to slaves—significant of its palpable unfitness for freemen. It was universal, though in ancient use among Assyrians, Egyptians, Moslems, and Japanese; it does not appear in the early laws of Chinese, Hindus, or Jews. There is no mention of it in the OT record. The metaphoric leaping of coals of fire on the head probably refers to torture, as appears from a Muhammedan penalty of a live coal laid on a lascivious pulm. From a remote age torture prevailed in Greece for slaves, and, actually, freemen were generally exempt, the exemption was overborne in cases of conspiracy and murder. Slaves in Athens were subject to torture in cases civil as well as criminal. At times the actions were determined by balancing the testimonies of the slaves of the opposing litigants put to the torch; thus the ladder, the rack, or the burning tile. Greek practice has not transmitted any code; that was reserved for Roman law, which unfortunately hardened in permanence in the crude tradition of force which it shared with Greece.

In this exposition we are not dealing with torture as a method of punishment, to which some speculations give an earlier place than belongs to the torture of witnesses or accused persons. It is as a process for obtaining testimony or confession, chiefly in cases criminal, that torture has historically played its most unreasoned and baseful part. In the Roman Republic it had wide currency in spite of sharply delimited restrictions which instructively exhibit the efforts, too tardily made and not thoroughly going enough, to modify and restrain an institution for which ablation was the only remedy. And yet credit must be given to the insight and humanity of some of the distinctions made. The exemption of freemen gave way under imperial impulses which less majesty was retained. The general safeguard that there must be velent presumptions of guilt before resort to the torture was clear enough in theory, but was widely ignored in practice. Most curious fact of all perhaps is the frankness of the authorities grouped in the Digest on the primary desirability of doing without torture, on the frailty and peril of the method as an engine for ascertaining facts, on the delusive character of confessions induced by modes which were tests not of truthfulness but of physical endurance, and on the danger to third parties from the allegations wrung from men willing to say anything to save themselves. Evidence of slaves under torture was declared inadmissible against their masters, but there were exceptions of some intricacy. The apostle Paul (Ac 22:28) pleaded with success his right as a Roman freeman as a protection from examination under the scourge. Mainly used only in cases criminal, the institution made good its footing in some civil causes also. Exemptions of minors, patricians, priests, and pregnant women, and charges of treason were made. The direction of Antoninus Pius that torture was not to be used to secure betrayal of alleged accomplices was as wise as it was law, but the very thought of getting at other culprits came ultimately to be a main occasion of its employment. The provisions of the Digest and the Code systematize several contradictory doctrines 'de questionibus' illustrative of a considerable development. The emperors were not long in discovering what Dante was to illustrate by extreme examples, that treason was the worst of crimes. This was the creed too of Anglo-Saxon as well as of later feudal criminal law, and it encouraged violent processes of detection. In Rome the kind of torture with widest currency was that of the cynodeus, or rack, which passed on as perhaps the worst legacy of Roman law to medi eval Europe.

The abolition of the barbarian ordeal by the Lateran Council of 1215 left a vacuum which was partly filled by a still worse expedient—the Roman method of 'tearing out the truth,' Under the Salic law ordeal and torture had co existed, but the latter for slaves only, the provisions obviously echoing Roman precedents. The Frankish code apparently courtained ordeal alone. The re-
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France and italy it seems to have re-established itself during the 16th century by the Inquisition. The tortures cited by Du Cange1 gave exemption from torture. Its French name, gecken, was fit enough. There were many names — the brodopus, the estrapado, the chevalier—all used in the question préparatoire, preliminarily in the trial, and in the definitive question préparatoire after conviction to disclose accomplices. In England, though without place in the common law, it was practised as an alternative to the inquisitorial methods, and in King John's process of extracting treasure from the Jews. The peine forte et dure, however, or torture by pressure of weights to compel a prisoner to put himself 'upon the country' or 'verdict of a jury', appears about 1300. Under Edward II, in 1311 papal inquisitors in the trial of the Templars applied torture admittedly never legally countenanced in England before. Though long without regular sanction in the courts for crime, the practice of torture crept in with what may be called council government under the Tudors. As always, secret courts favoured secret methods, and torture loved the darkness. With Shakespeare and other Elizabethan dramatists 'rack' and 'strappado' were household words. Coke might excommunicate the institution from the law. As Coke and Bacon alike countenanced it in practice when the scent of treason was strong.

In Scotland the law and practice appear to have nearly paralleled the state of things in England. Isolated examples of torture, such as that given by way of punishment to the murderer of James I., may have been preceded, as one annalist asserts, by judicial torture at his trial. So late as 1542 the inquisitors were established in Scotland, and the confession procured by torture was null. George Buchanan, in spite of the risks that he himself had run from the Inquisition, recognized without censure the obtaining of proofs by torture. The deplorable insanities resulting from the witch-craze, nurtured in Scotland by the sapience of the demonologist James VI., and absolutely paralleled by the like frenzy in England and France, were a distressing combination of the mischiefs of torture with a recrudescence of the ordeal. The victims were often old, miserable, and insane; the pitiful and pitiless mania, however, was not merely a British and a European disease. Its creed and its State on the Continent was of one context with that in Britain; everywhere the witch-finders used the same methods of pain. It was the last stage of a sort of common law of torture, although the variety of local usage shows a wide range of divergence in detail. In the Covenant a last outbreak of persecuting zeal revived the decadent engine of violence. A dubious tradition traces the thumiblins in Scotland to a Russian origin.2 Museums of torture such as those of Nuremberg, the Hague, and the Tower of London—competitions in horror as they are—unite in a kind of commonplace of malignancy. Authorities on torture in like manner dwell with the same tedious insistence on the indicia, or preliminary evidences needed to justify torture, and on the conditions of its infliction. The Summa Anglica, a great cyclopedia of instruction to confessors, enjoins the interrogations to judges in confession whether they had put people to torture without sufficient indicia, which was very rightly classified as a deadly sin. Now and again the crude and common law and practice of torture, such as that of Paulus Grillandus, breaks away from its companions in the great folio vol. xi. of Zilettus (1834) by its superior realism. Grillandus


distinguishes with grim precision the five degrees of torture: a succession of torture, the placage on the rack for the space only of an Ave Maria or a Pater noster, now a graver suspension for the space of a Misereere, now for a period which might reach into hours, and, last degree of all, where the victim's limbs, weighted down, were jerked and twisted till the agony was greater than the amputation of the hand. It is marvellous how men endured such tortures, but that they did so is attested by occasional judicial and legal records or assessments of court who wrote the treatises. Grillandus, e.g., drawing upon his experience at Pisa and at Rome, registers the wonderful case of a most cunning thief whose absolute impassiveness was ascribed to certain words that he whispered when the torture was applied until a slip of paper was found bearing as a charm the Scriptural text (well known for its use in amulets) "Jesus autem transiens." Finally, however, with the charm removed altogether, this stout malefactor defied the torture again by his whispered invocation so that it was necessary to abandon the torture. And still greater cases, the commentator concludes, were seen at Milan and Rome when certain words touching the milk of the Virgin enabled the victim to go through the torment as if he slept. This particular word of charm was less effective as a counter-charm, but Grillandus shows no faith in its potency as an aid to the prosecutor.

An unfortunate feature of torture was its adoption by the inquisitorial courts of the Church for the investigation of charges of blasphemy, heresy, and the like. Was persecution not, like the Inquisition itself, a confusion of a secular with a sacred function, in which the analogy of treason to an earthly potentate carrying priests of religion to extremes not compatible with the conception of a majesty which, though wounded, was divine? Whatever of error lurked in the concept itself, the tribunal which was its executive of vindication added to the wrong in principle by a series of false directions of the practice in prosecution. It surely was a blander worse than a crime to adopt methods which doubtly branded with public odium courts which were designed by processes of barbarism to repress the freedom of the human mind. The fact that already by the middle of the 13th cent. papal dispensation of torture was admitted as a matter of regularity in the use of torture casts a lurid light on the procedure. No safeguard of institutions is so sound as publicity—the liberty of moderate criticism, the freedom of defence, and the avoidance of the abuses which wait upon invisible dungeons and courts. Sorely inevitably means tyranny and obscurantism. The refusal of counsel for the accused was a fundamental and far-reaching error in a 'court of inquisition into heretical depravity,' which by its very object tended to unite the zeal and interest of both prosecutor and judge against the heretic. The double sanction of royal and ecclesiastical authority sometimes enabled the machinery against heresy to be used for political rather than spiritual ends. The most notorious persecution of the 16th cent. was in the Netherlands, and torture was the keynote of its procedure. The Renaissance had not wholly escaped the persecutions which rose to their evil eminence during the transition period in which the swaying boundary-line came to stand between Lutheran reform and Roman orthodoxy. In 1536 the Confederation of Charles V. codified for Germany a system which incorporated torture among the fundamentals of procedure. His establishment of the Inquisition in 1550 inaugurated a period of steel worse than any other in human history. Philip II. of Spain found in the Duke of Alva a spirit of
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TETEISM.—I. Introductory. — The word 'tomet' is derived from otoetum, which in the Ojibwa and cognate Algonquian dialects means his brother-sister kin. Its grammatical stem, meaning the consanguine kinship between uterine brothers and sisters, the group of persons recognized as by birth or adoption collectively related together as uterine brothers and sisters who cannot intermarry, is never used alone. The word was introduced into the English language by J. Long in the form of tometh. This word was wrongly defined as a new one, and savages (Chippewa or Ojibwa) is a mark on him from the savages

This totem they conceive assumes the shape of some beast or other, and therefore they never kill, hunt, or eat the animal whose form they think this totem bears.

The totemism as exemplified in N. America and Australia, where it has been found in the fullest development, is a form of society distinguished by the following characteristics: (1) it is composed of clans or bands of men each united among themselves by kinship real or fictitious, a kinship frequently extending beyond the limits of the local tribe; (2) the clan is distinguished by the name of some species of animal or plant, or more rarely of some other natural phenomenon, such as the sun, rain, etc.; (3) the species or object which gives its name to the clan is conceived as related to the clan, and to every member of it, in some mystic way, often genetically; and in this case every individual specimen of this object, where it is an animal or plant, is regarded as belonging to the clan; (4) such species or object is usually the subject of a religious or quasi-religious emotion, and every individual of the species is the subject of tabus or prohibitions: subject to certain limitations, ceremonial or in self-defence, it may not be injured or killed, or (where edible) eaten; (5) more generally, and in all societies organized on the basis of kinship, the members of the clan are entitled to mutual defence, protection, and resentment of injuries. They may not marry or have sexual intercourse within the clan.

These characteristics are general, but they vary to some extent not merely from area to area, but from tribe to tribe. After detailing a few typical examples, it will be necessary to mention others where totemism seems to be decadent, and then to consider whether it has ever prevailed among peoples where it is not now to be found, and lastly to inquire into its origin. Various influences tending to modify, submerge, or destroy it will then be indicated from time to time in the course of the article.

3. Typical examples.—(a) American.—Some what fuller accounts than that of Peter Jones are now available on the totemism of the Ojibwas. They were divided into about 40 exogamous totemic clans, of which those of the Crane, Catfish, Loon, Bear, Marten, and Wolf were the principal ones. All have been the original. The other clans are said to have been formed by the segmentation of these. Nearly all the clans are named from animals of either land or water. Members of a totem-clan were held to be closely related to all other persons of the same totem, even though belonging to different tribes. We have no information whether the Ojibwa clans regarded themselves as having descended from the totemic names their forefathers bore, but the clans of some other Algouinian tribes claim such descent. Thus, among the Delawares or Lenape the Tortoise, Turkey, and Wolf clans (the three chief clans of the tribe), among the Sunks the Fox, Eagle, Bear, Beaver, Fish, Antelope, and Raccoon clans, among the Menomini the Bear, Golden Eagle, Wolf, and other clans, and among the Ottawas the Carp clan, are specified as tracing their lineage to the animals after which they are named; and in the last-mentioned tribe the Bear clan ascribed its origin to a bear's paw without explaining the precise nature of the relationship. However this may be, we may consider the Ojibwa to hold to resemble the bear, its totem, in disposition. The members were surly and pugnacious, the acknowledged war-chiefs and fighting men of the community; the war-club and war-club were committed to their custody. The Crane clan took its name (Bus-in-as-see, 'Echo-maker') from the loud, clear, ringing cry of the crane; members of the clan were thought to possess naturally a loud ringing voice, and they were the acknowledged orators of the tribe.

(b) European.—We are not informed whether in their personal appearance, dress, or ornaments the Ojibwa totem-clans were ordinarily in the habit of imitating the totem-animals, as some other tribes do. The Abenaki, also an Algouinian tribe, painted their totems on their arms, breasts, and legs. An Ojibwa sometimes had the figure tattooed on him, or carried some

1 J. G. Fraser, Totemism and Esquimaux, iii. 46ff., citing various authorities.
7 Hoffman, p. 65 n., quoting J. A. Manuesne, Hist. des Abenaki, Quebec, 1866, p. 25.

4 New ser., v. (1890) 607 ff., 562 ff., vi. (1897) 104 ff.
other token by which his totem might be known.1
Unfortunately our reports are chiefly confined to the social aspects of the Ojibwa organization, so that we have little or no information as to the religious outlook. Religion is inextricably mingled with other aspects of savage life; hence we may be sure that it reacted upon social and political life. Among their neighbours, the Sanks or Musquakies, dances in honour of the totems were held. Of these or religious exercises—
those who partook were covered with masks and
dresses to resemble the totemic animals, so dreadful—
that the women were seriously frightened, and
the old women were therefore destroyed and milder
ones substituted.2 Special ceremonies were per-
formed by the Bear clan of the Ottawas to soothe
a bear when they killed it, including an offering
to the dead animal of its own flesh. When a
member of that clan or of the Carp clan died, he
was buried, whereas by command of the totem a
member of the Great Hare clan was cremated—
least, whenever he died at a distance from home.3 Among the Menomini a member of the
Bear clan who, when hunting, met a bear would
apologize and ask forgiveness before killing it;
and no member of the clan could eat the meat
(though members of other clans might do so)
except if the bear was killed by the person who
was permitted to eat of the paws and head, the bones of the head
being carefully preserved in a place of honour in
the wigwam as a relic of the totem-animal to which
due reverence must be paid.4 The Ojibwa reckoned
descent and kinship through the father only;
but there is some evidence that they formerly reckoned
through the mother only—a change possibly
accelerated by white, and particularly missionary
influence. Such a change is known to have occurred elsewhere.5

The Iroquois, a confederacy of six tribes in what
is now the state of New York, on the other hand,
were matrilineal. They were organized in totemic
clans, of which all of them possessed three—the
Bear, Wolf, and Turtle—some of them eight.
There is some reason to think that the larger
numbers were derived by segmentation from the
three original clans, though it is possible that, in
some of the cases at all events, the number of the
clan may have been augmented by the absorption
of members from other clans which formerly formed
separate clans. The clans were exogamic, but in
the eight-clan tribes they were formed into two
phratries. The members of the clans were not allowed to marry indiscriminately into any other
clan; they marry only into a clan of the opposite
phratry, the phratrie thus becoming the exogamic unit in place of the clan. On the social
side of Iroquoian totemism we have fairly full
information. The members of a clan were united
for mutual defence and the resettlement of injuries;
and the phratries, where the tribe was organized in phratries, had certain important functions at
the death of a chief and the election of his
successor.6 On the religious aspect, however,
our information is sadly deficient. There is one
account by a chance traveller, in which the
Iroquois were stated to believe in their descent
from the turtle (or tortoise), the bear, and the wolf—their three chief totems; and among their
mythologies one has been preserved by a scientific
inquirer relating how the turtle became a man
and the progenitor of the Turtle clan.7 But
neither L. H. Morgan nor Horatio Hale, to whom
we are indebted for nearly all that we know of
the organization of the Iroquois, has told us any-
thing concerning the intimate relations between
the totem and its clan, or the aspect in which the
totem was regarded by the clan, or the members
by one another.

The Iroquois, however, had one custom common to a number of N. American tribes. Each clan had a stock of personal names appropriated to it,58 which other clan of the same name were not permitted to use, so that, if a person’s name was known, it was possible to say to what clan he belonged. To such a length was this custom carried by some tribes that, when the clan organization began to decay, a child could be assigned to another clan. When the
child was born, by the simple process of giving him one of
the personal names belonging to the latter clan—all events
if the clan recognized the child and thereby confirmed the
choice.2 The clans of some of the N. American tribes per-
formed ceremonies for the control of their totems for the
common good of the tribe. This was the practice, e.g., among
the Oimus.3 But its utmost development is found in the south-
west of the United States among the various tribes of Pueblo Indians.4

(8) Australia.—In Australia totemism has been
crossed, and among some tribes superseded, for
exogamic purposes by a system of marriage-classes.6
The consequent variation in the social arrange-
ments of the different tribes introduced a confusing factor into the totemic organization.
Among those tribes whose organization has been
least affected is the Dieri, inhabiting part of the
Lake Eyre basin in S. Australia. They possess a
number of a totem which of the names 57 are
known. Their totems belong chiefly to the animal
world; but the list includes some vegetable totems
and such objects as rain and red ochre. It seems
to be common to all the tribes in the Lake Eyre
basin, though it is not ascertained whether all the
totems are recognized by every tribe. Each tribe, like some of the Iroquois tribes, is divided into
two modifying or phratries, some of the clans be-
longing to one phratry and the rest to the other.
These phratries are called by the Dieri Kararun
and Matteri respectively; and, as among the
Iroquois, not only the clan but also the phratry is
exogamous. Thus a woman must marry a Dieri
woman, and conversely a Matteri woman a Kararun
man; but within the limits of the opposite phratry
the mate may belong to any clan. Both the clan
and the phratry descend in the female line, so that
the children in all cases taking those of the mother.8
The Dieri clans do not claim their totemic animals
or plants as ancestors. More than one legend
accounts for these.

According to one story, the totems (murdurh, properly madurh)
came out in an unfinished condition from the earth in the midst
of Lake Permigini and lay on the sandbanks around the lake
until the warmth of the sun strengthened and raised them up
as human beings, wherever they separated in all directions.
Hence the madurh (totemic clans) are now scattered all over the
country. According to another story, a salamander or mudurh,
{or supernaturally being, was killed by the people for his misdeeds,
but came to life again. He followed footprints, and, finding
the people busy fishing, opened his mouth and swallowed
water, fish, and men. Some escaped, running off in all direc-
tions, and to every one as they ran he gave a name. In proof of
the story, rocks are pointed out which are said to be the body of
the mudurh in question, and his teeth.9

If we may trust one account, the Dieri do not
regard the animal or plant which is their totem as
sacred, but will kill or eat it.10 It is not, however,
certain that we can rely on this statement. Its
author, for a long time a mounted constable in the
district, and hence brought much into contact with
his kinsmen, is untrustworthy,11

1 Fraser, p. 90, quoting Edwin James, Narrative of the
Captivity and Adventures of John Tanner, London, 1830.


fr. Fraser, ill. 58; cf. also the derivation of ‘totem’ at the
beginning of this chapter.

4 L. H. Morgan, Ancient Society, London, 1877, pp. 78-86,
London, 1881, pp. 174-176; H. H. Hare, The Iroquois Book of Rites, Philadelphia, 1886, pp. 49-53. These are all summarized by Fraser, ill. 58.


6 Morgan, Ancient Soc., p. 78; Hartland, pp. 49, 50. See, on the
organization of Iroquoian clans, Amer. Anthrop. xiii. (1917)
392ff.; also Horatio Hale, pp. 18, 47. The Iroquoian New

7 Fraser, p. 61.
8 See below, p. 137.

9 Fry, The Natural History of Mammals in Australia, 1834, p. 129.

10 Howitt, p. 90ff.

11 Mos, pp. 760-781.

12 JAL xxiv. (1865) 168.
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may probably assume that they are.

Whether these ceremonies are ideologically magical is a question of terminology, though it seems certain that the performers are under the influence of emotional excitement such as we usually connect with religious rites.

Little is known about the relations of the clansmen in Australia among themselves. From vague references by Howitt and others it would seem that they enjoyed mutual defence and responsibility. But offences were brought before a ceremonial court by whose decision blood-revenge was purged in a quasi-legal manner and, if resisted, ultimately involved the whole tribe in the blood-feud.

(e) Africa.—Another area in which totemism has been found is that large portion of Africa which is occupied by the Negro and Bantu races. Of the totemism of some of these peoples, particularly of the Negroes, our information is fragmentary. Concerning the Tsni-speaking Negroes of the Gold Coast we have on the whole most information. They are divided into totemic clans, or 'families,' of which the principal are twelve in number, viz., Leopard, Parrot, Palm-oil-Grove, Abadzi, and Dumina or Dwinina. The meaning of the names of the last two clans is uncertain. The last is probably to be considered a variant of one or other of the names, Naonna, or Bush-Cat, clan, and, according to some accounts, Abadzi, which may mean 'cannibal,' is another name of the Ntwa, or Dog, clan. About certain of the clans little or nothing beyond the name is known, and questions of identity arise on some of them. These difficulties are incidental to traditional lore where we are dependent upon natives who are not familiar with all the clans about which they have been made. The Red-tailed clan or leopard is sacred, though members of it are reported now to abstain from the flesh of all the felidae. No man may kill a leopard; if he were to do so by accident, he would exclaim, 'I have killed my brother,' and would put palm-oil on the wounds. If he sees a dead leopard, he must scatter shreds of white cloth upon it and anoint the muzzle with palm-oil, as a sign of respect and sorrow. If a dead leopard is brought into the town, the members of the clan smear themselves with chalk (a sign of mourning) and bury the body. If on a journey a member of the clan were to meet a leopard, he would turn back, but on the return of Bush-Cat, Dog, and Parrot clans abstain from eating the totem-animal. The Bush-Cat clan, it is said, abstains from killing not only a bush-cat, but also a crow, under penalty of sores on their bodies. Formerly, if they found a crow or a bush-cat dead, they would bury it, and with the crow a piece of white cloth, with the bush-cat a piece of speckled cloth. The traditional accounts which have reached us of the origin of these clans do not generally claim genetic descent from the totem.

One account states that 'people originally came from the earth, sky, sea, mountains, and the animals, etc., that came with them are their totems'; e.g., the Parrot clan came with the parrots on their heads; the Dog clan came from a river with a bough and with a dog carrying fire.

Other clans, fewer in numbers and conjectured to be of more recent origin, claim that they are descended from an actual animal which possessed the power of assuming human shape at will. In the case of two such clans tales belonging to the Swan Maiden type are told to account for them. The totem-animal is represented as 'grandfather,' a title of respect used in addressing the kings of Ashanti. It is supposed to help the clansmen in various ways; and restraint is said to be placed upon them to correspond to the great wishes of the tribe. There are no marks or devices distinguishing the clans; but, when a member of


1 Howitt, p. 147.
2 Ib. p. 241.
4 Ib. p. 149.
5 Ib. p. 141.
6 Ib. p. 117.
8 Howitt, p. 147.
the Leopard clan dies, the mourners (clansmen) make spots on their bodies with red, white, and black clay to represent a leopard, and scrape the figure of a leopard on the wall of the house and on the coffin. The Nsonna clan in the like case put white clay or white cloth round their necks, because the crow which the clan respects has a white neck. There is always a matrilineal and exogamous; and it has a common burial-place. There is said to be a belief that at death a clansman becomes or transmigrates into an animal of the totemic species, and, further, every clansman’s life is bound up with one such individual, so that, if it dies, he will also die.¹

The Bantu have for the most part advanced from maternal to patrilineal descent, though among some tribes we find an intermediate stage. This has not been without its effect upon their totemism, which in several ways varies from the pattern of true matrilineal totemism. The Bechuana, who occupy the centre of S. Africa, are divided into a number of independent ‘tribes’ generally called by totemic names and having totemic practices and beliefs. In many cases, however, these ‘tribes’ are not distinguished. The life always goes to reside with her husband, the result of the change to patrilineal descent is to collect the members of the clan together, instead of distributing them among individuals. The clan tends to be re-admitted to the geographical and political tribe. Every Bechuana tribe is ruled by a chief, whose totem is recognized as that of the tribe. The political conditions were such that before the European occupation the country was divided into tribes (probably 100) of Crocodile and Lion.¹

The Bechuana word for ‘totem’ is siboko, which has led Van Gennep to propose the name ‘sibokism’ to distinguish the S. African variety of totemism from that of the Bechuana.¹

Thus the Banok, ‘they of the perceptus,’ are reported to ‘sing,’ ‘eat, worship or revere’ that animal. ‘When they see any one maltreat that animal, they afflict themselves, grieve, collect with religious care the quills, if it has been killed, spit upon them and rub their eyebrows with them, saying: “They have slain our brother, our master, one of ours, him when we sing.” They fear that they will die if they eat the flesh of one.’ Yet they doctor a newborn child with it, mixed with the juice of certain plants.¹

The Bakusu, ‘they of the crocodile,’ call the animal their father; ‘they celebrate its festivals, they swear by it, and make an incision in the ears of their cattle, by which they distinguish them from others.’ They call it ‘one of them, their master, their father.’ Similar practices are recorded of other clans. ‘No one dares eat the flesh or clothes his hide with the skin of the animal the name of which he bears. If this animal is hurtful, as the lion, for instance, it is not killed without great precautions being made to it and its pardon being asked. Purification is necessary after the commission of such a sacrilege.’¹

The Ntata, ‘they of the lion,’ carefully abstain from touching his flesh as other people do; for how could one think of eating his ancestor? No one wears the chief dare to wear, like other chiefs, a lion’s skin by way of royal mantle.¹

2. J. C. Brown, F. D. James, Narrative of an Exploratory Tour to the N.E. of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, tr. J. C. Brown, Cape Town, 1840, pp. 176 ff.

But totemism is decadent among the Bechuana, and has been so for a period which probably dates from the coming of the European, due partly to the change to patrilineal descent, partly to the political conditions, and partly to the keeping of hordes of cattle, a custom that seems to have been adopted from the Hottentots.

America, Australia and New Zealand are the three chief areas in which totemism has been found widely spread and fully developed. It will be perceived that each of them has its own type, though with an overlapping in detail among the tribes and peoples. The remaining areas are India and Melanesia.

(d) India.—In India totemism is found only among the non-Aryan tribes, and chiefly among the Dravidians. Of these we may take the Orâons on the plateau of Chotâ Nagpur in Bengal as representing the type. Though they have to a great extent emerged from the hunting and pastoral stages of culture, totemism still forms the fundamental feature of their social organization in so far as kinship, marriage, and relations of the sexes are concerned.¹ They are divided into a number of exogamous tribes, or clans, each tribe is supplied by ‘the fauna and flora of their past and present habitats’; and to these, with the acquisition of a knowledge of agriculture and the use of metals, a few totems, or clans, have been added.¹ The animal and vegetable names amount in number to 62. There are also (probable of more recent origin) two mineral totems, those of Iron and Salt; two which may be called place totems, viz. Bandh, an embanked reservoir of water, and Jabb, a marsh or surface-spring; and two which belong to a class known elsewhere, called ‘split-totems’ as involving tabus of a portion only of an animal or vegetable, and frequently known by the name of that portion. Among the Orâons these split-totems are Anvim (rice-soup) and Kispôtâ (pig’s entrails). Sexual union within the totem-clan is reckoned incestuous, though at the present day, if a marriage takes place in which the rule is infringed wittingly or unwittingly, the offending pair, after paying a fine and giving a feast to the clansmen by analogy with the usual caste penalties in India, are formally re-admitted to the tribe and their union is thus legalized. The remaining ordinary totemic tabus are observed. ‘An Orâon must abstain from eating or otherwise using, domestico eating, killing, destroying, and the like, of any animal, plant, or other object regarded with fear and reverence.’¹

Thus members of the Faddy clan abstain only from eating the thin scum on the surface of rice-soup when left standing in a cool place; members of the Salt clan abstain only from taking salt; the taboo not extending to food or drink in which salt is an ingredient or flavour; members of the Iron clan abstain only from touching iron with their lips or tongue; members of the Fig clan are forbidden only to eat the head of the fig, and members of the Salt clan, if the fig clan is the totem, may eat the fruit whole, but not by dividing it in two.

On the other hand, the tabus of some clans have been extended to objects having a real or fancied resemblance to the totem or bearing the same or a similar name.¹

Thus members of the Tiger clan not only have to observe various tabus in connection with the tiger, and to refrain from eating the tiger’s flesh, skin, and so on, but also must abstain from eating the squirrel’s flesh, since the squirrel is striped like the tiger, and they must not cut trees in the month of Magh (December-January) because the name Magh rhymes with bâga, the Hindi word for ‘tiger.’¹

In this case the foreign word *touch* points to a late and highly artificial origin for such a tabu, which is obviously due to the timidity of superstition. Aveding a tabu is one that has been suggested to be due to the fusion of clans, just as some "split-totems" may have arisen from the opposite process of the division of clans.

The general attitude of an Orono to his clan-totem is that of a man to his equal—to his friend and ally,' though some periodical practices seem to indicate a more religious regard—at any rate for its efficacy. But totemism is now in decay, as it is over the rest of India. An unintentional breach of a tabu is no longer believed to entail any serious consequences, though looked upon with social disapproval. There is no difference between the clans in personal dress or adornment, nor is a man supposed to partake of the qualities of the totem. There are very few traditions of the origin of totem-names. Such as there are do not reveal any belief in the descent of the clan from the totem, but rather in some other relation between the totem and the human ancestor of the clan. The Orons are patrilineal.

*(c) Melanesia.*—In Melanesia (including New Guinea and the islands of the Torres Straits) there is a tendency to associate with the principal totem of a clan a number of subordinate totems which have been called "secondary," "subsidiary," or "linked" totemisms. The western islands of the Torres Straits have for many years been the scene of successful missionary enterprise. Under this influence the totemism which formerly existed among the people has almost disappeared. But twenty years ago there was a London Missionary Society Expedition, and a Cambridge Anthropological Expedition, who spent some time on the islands, were able to recover very definite evidence of its existence. The population was divided into a number of exogamous totemic clans. As a rule each clan had subsidiary totems in addition to its chief totem. ‘In some cases two or more clans might have the same chief totem, while differing in their subsidiary totems’—which looks like the fusion of an original clan. Members of a clan were distinguished by wearing an emblem of the totem, or more rarely bearing it in circlets or koloids on the flesh. Personal belongings also, it is said, were adorned with a representation of the owner’s totem. Descent was reckoned in the male line; but adoption seems to have been practised. In conformity with patrilineal reckoning there was a general and widespread division of the islands.

This, however, was apt to result in quarrelling; and the missionaries had accordingly succeeded in inducing the people, at all events of one of the islands, to abandon the localization of the clans.

"The solidarity of the totem-clan was a marked feature in the social life of the people, and it took precedence of all other considerations; yet still, there was an intimate relationship between all members of the same totem (clan) irrespective of the island or locality to which they might belong and even warfare did not affect the friendship of totem-brethren. Any man who visited another island would be looked after and entertained as a matter of course by the residents who belonged to the same totem as himself." 13

The clans were grouped in two classes or phratries. On the island of Malabing those two phratries were respectively known as 'the children or people of the Great Totem' and 'the children or people of the Little Totem.' The former comprised the Crocodile, Cassowary, Snake, and Dog clans, and the latter the Dugong, Shovelled Skate, Wolf, Sparrow, and Green Turtle clans (all water animals). On this island there is no sufficient evidence that the phratries regulated marriage during recent times; but there is reason to think that they were exogamous on some other islands. An Orono authority has been suggested as the first dugong or turtle caught, but might partake of those subsequently caught. They performed ceremonies to entice the animals to the island and ensure their continued presence. They could, on the other hand, by magical rites with the contrary intention, prevent them from coming. A mysterious relation was held to subsist between the totem and the clan. He was said to be 'all same as relation, he belong same family.' The Cassowary, Crocodile, Snake, Shark, and Hammer-headed Shark clans were reputed to be truculent and to like fighting. The peaceable clans were the Shovelled Skate, Ray, and Sucker-fish; while the Dog clan was sometimes peaceable and at other times quarrelsome—all like the totem-animal. Certain of the clans, possibly all, had formulae which they repeated in totemistic invocation. These might be either magical or in the nature of invocations to the totem. The prayer is in some stages of civilization near akin to the spell.

4. *Decadence of totemism.*—The foregoing examples will sufficiently indicate the chief characteristics of totemism in the five great areas in which it has been found. It is apparent that in each area totemism was by no means a new phenomenon. It arises in a low condition of savagery and is connected in its typical forms with patrilineal descent. But, even before contact with Europeans, it had begun to assume forms very divergent from what we understand by normal totemism, leading in some cases to degeneration and disintegration.

*(d) America.*—Among the discoveries found in N. America those of the coast-dwellers of the north-west are the most remarkable. The Tlingit, inhabiting S. Alaska, are divided into two exogamous phratries or classes, called after the raven and the wolf respectively; and two such phratries are again divided into a number of totemic clans. The members of a clan are believed to be related to one another more closely than to those of other clans even of the same phratrie. They reckon descent through the female line; but children are not gathered at one place, but distributed as social groups and not geographical. Yet each clan usually derived its origin (and most of them, at the present day, their names) from some village or camp which it once occupied. They seem, however, to have had alternative names (if F. Boas's account is correct) derived from the animal, or one of the animals, which they claimed as a badge. In point of fact the emblems or representations on the north-western coast, generally called totems, are rather badges or crests. The clans of each phratrie, indeed, all use the totem of the phratrie; they also use a number of other badges, some of which are the special property of the clan, or of some sub-clan, and are guarded with much jealousy. They carve and paint the badge on the so-called totem-poles erected in front of the dwelling-house, or on grave-logs. These poles are, however, less frequently erected by the Tlingit than by some of their neighbours. The badge is also exhibited on many other articles of property, worn on a mask or vase used as a dish, as a shoulder-patch, potlatches, and funeral ceremonies, and painted

1 Haddon and Rivers, op. cit., p. 151-152.
4 J. B. Swanton, *Rd REW* [1909], p. 407, suggests that these two phratries may have had a racial origin.
on the faces of the clansmen. It is not now held that the clan or phratry is descended from the totem or animal represented, though it may be suspected that in former times this was believed. At present stories are told by the clan or sub-clan claiming a badge of its acquisition by an ancestor through an adventure with the animal in question. Such animal being often conceived as of superhuman power.

As Frager points out, many of these tales have the true totemic character of the old folk-tales. The story of the totem is one narrative of saying that the present people are supposed to be descended from the totemic animals.1

Thus the wolf gene will pray to the wolves. "We are your good canny, don't hurt us!" But notwithstanding this fact they will hunt wolves without hesitation.2

The truth is that the more or less permanent settlement of all the tribes along the coast—at least from the Tlingit to the Kwakwktl—in villages and their increasing civilization, have led to the division of the population into ranks or castes and to a continually higher value being set on the crests or badges as marks of rank and wealth, and as symbols, if not guarantees, of descent from a distinguished ancestor. This has resulted in an accumulation of crests, some clans or sub-clans obtaining a larger number than others; and some of these crests are used by more than one clan.

The great majority of Tlingit personal names referred to some animal, especially that animal whose emblem was particularly valued by the clan to which the bearer belonged.3

Of these names many seem to have been peculiar to one or other of the clans. The solidarity ordinarily subsisting between members of a clan is found even among the Tlingit, rather between the numbers of a phratry.4

According to the unwritten Tlingit law it was incumbent upon everyone belonging to a phratry to house and feed any other animal and a member of its clan is considered related to him from how great a distance he might come; and it was a mark of regard in the community, therefore of high caste, not to abuse such hospitality.5

Any serious collision at a potlatch arising out of the rivalry of opposing parties of dancers was avoided or stayed by the hosts' people, who rushed between them bearing the emblem of their phratry or making the call of the animal whose name was that of the phratry. When a man died, the funeral ceremonies were conducted by the opposite phratry, who were afterwards entertained at a mourning feast by the relatives of the deceased. On the whole it may be conjectured that the two phratries represent original totem-clans, out of which the existing clans or groups, whether social or local, have developed. There was also reckoned among the Tlingit population a small group at Sanya, called the Nevaldi ('People of Aaw'; a creek in the neighbourhood), who stood outside both phratries and might marry into both. They bore the Eagle crest or badge and had personal names having reference to the eagle. They were doubtless a small intrusive population, which Swanton, the latest investigator of the Tlingit, suggests as perhaps of Athapaskan derivation.6

Coming down from north to south along the coast and islands of Alaska and British Columbia, we find a similar organization, differing however in detail, among the various peoples, with an increasing emphasis laid on rank and the possession of crests, until we reach the Kwakiuti. The totemic groups (Southern Kwakiuti), as they are often called to distinguish them from the Heiltsuk, their northern congener, are organized in tribes, which in turn are subdivided into

1 Report of 50th Meeting of British Assoc. 1898, p. 819.
3 T. B. W., pp. 256-419.

exogamic groups distinguished not, as a rule, by ethnic or totemic marks, but by the name claimed as that of an ancestor, by geographical names, or by 'names of honour.' The evidence seems to show that they are neither definitely patrilineal nor matrilineal in descent, but in a state of transition, since a child may belong to any 'clan' or exogamic group to which one of its ancestors belonged at the arbitrary discretion of its parents. Each exogamic group, like the ordinary kinship or social order of the tribes east of the Rocky Mountains, had a number of personal names appropriated to it; and to assign a child to such a group it was enough to give it one of these names. In this way it appears to have become ipso facto a member of the group; it might even belong to more than one at the same time. What was more important in Kwakiuti society was the possession of crests and the privileges that they carried. These were obtained in three several ways: (1) they might be inherited by direct patrilineal descent from an ancestor who acquired them through an adventure in the course of which he obtained the protection and guidance of a monasie, or spiritual helper, for himself and his descendants; direct inheritance of this kind, however, was comparatively rare; (2) more usually they were obtained by purchase; the payment of a price secured not only the bride, but also the right of membership in her 'clan' or exogamous group, the crest and privileges of the bride's father, and a good deal of other property; (3) the third method was to obtain them by killing the owner, as in the case of the position and privileges of the King of the Wood of Nemi. The privileges include not only the use of the crest but also the right to the membership in certain societies and the ownership and exclusive right to practise certain dances connected with the ceremonials of the societies. They are, however, not acquired for the benefit of the son-in-law in the case of marriage, but for his successor, whoever he may be. Seeing, moreover, that the number of noldmen is fixed, and there is only one person at a time who personates the ancestor and has his rank and privileges, the person entitled must wait for a vacancy before he can be admitted to them. He may wait in vain; for before a vacancy occurs the owner may change his mind, or even after the person entitled has obtained the privileges he may change them and confer them upon some other successor.

This is manifestly not totemism, for the societies operate only during the winter, when they dominate the social organization to the exclusion of the kinship and local groups. It may have been influenced by true totemic conceptions, from which it may even have sprung. But its cause must be sought in the increasing power of wealth, the consequent development of rank, and the desire for display.1

The transformation that thus seems to have overtaken totemism among the Kwakiuti is in process also among the Pueblo tribes of New Mexico and Arizona. Here the case is different. In these tribes, originally organized in totemic clans and phratries with matrilineal descent, the struggle for existence in an arid country has evolved a sense of dependence upon the supernatural powers and a religious ritual and elaborate ceremonies, partly religious and partly magical, for the protection of man and womankind. At first these ceremonials appear to have been performed by the appropriate clans, as we have found in other areas. In some cases they are still, as among the latter, but sided and supported by the priests of the various deities. In other cases
as among the Hopi, the Snake clan has been superseded for this purpose by an 'order' or society, the members of which are probably at the beginning recruited exclusively by the clan. The rule is not somewhat less strict, embracing others besides members of the clan, though the members of the society are limited. In fact the latest inquiries appear to show that the societies or fraternities hold inwardly away a totem quite independent of the clan organization.  

(b) Australia.—Turning to Australia, we find that among the Central tribes the totemic clans have been divided by a religious division of labour, so that complete conversion into societies performing magico-religious rites, the object of which is the multiplication of the totemic animal or plant. The Warramunga hold that the totem-clans originated each from a single ancestor, half-beast, or half-plant, from whose body emanated a number of spirit-children; and the descendants of the clan are all animated by these spirit-children. The ceremonies are here performed by the clan in a definite order, representing in dramatic fashion the traditional history of the clan. The Warramunga and the tribes to the north of them are definitely patriarchal and exogamous, the male members of the clan in every generation are believed to be continual reincarnations of deceased ancestors. The Arunta, on the other hand, have ceased to regulate their marriages by totemic exogamy and now regulate them solely by class-divisions consisting of the pristine moieties of the tribe, which have been doubly subdivided, so that they are now eight in number. There are various places in the territory of these tribes which are centres believed to be haunted by the spirit-children of the original ancestors. One of these spirit-children is held to have entered the body of every pregnant woman, according to the totemic centre near or at which she first felt herself pregnant. In this way the 'clan' of the child is ascertained, and in no case does it depend upon that of the father or mother. The resulting group passing under a totemic name is clearly no true clan.

There is no such thing as the members of one totem group being bound together in such a way that they must combine to fight on behalf of a member of the totem group to which they belong.

Inasmuch as every death is supposed to be due to witchcraft the body has to be taken by somebody. Normally this duty would fall on the nearest kinsman of the deceased. But among the Arunta it would seem to be the members of the local group who undertake it.

In fact," say Spencer and Gillen, summing up the subject, 'it is perfectly easy to spend a considerable time amongst the Arunta tribe without ever being aware that each individual has a totemic name; but the fact of his belonging to one or other of the divisions governing marriage is soon apparent. These groups thus passing under totemic names perform under the direction of their respective headmen from time to time, as the headman concerned decides, the ceremonies known as intichiam. These ceremonies are not, like those of the Warrumunga, the property of the entire group, but each of them belongs to a specific individual, who alone has the right of performing it or of requesting others to do so. One consequence of this is that they are not performed in a definite season; they are fragments and may be given in any arbitrary order. They have ceased to be a representation of the traditional history of the group; they have become mere magical rites. Further, in some tribes both south and north of the Central group, consisting of the Arunta and their immediate neighbours, a man is forbidden to kill, injure, or eat his totem. In some of the tribes, although pathologically it applies more or less absolutely to the totem of the clan-man's mother—probably a relic of an older matrilineal condition. Among the Arunta, however, there is no such prohibition. Indeed the members of a totem-group are expected to eat of the totem during the ceremonies; and they have liberty to do so at other times, though only sparingly. The conclusion from these and other facts is irresistible that the Central tribes of Australia are finding their way out of normal totemism, and that of these tribes the Arunta and their immediate neighbours to the north (the Kaitish, Unmalja, and others) are the farthest advanced in the road. Their totemic organization is not merely decadent; it is obsolete. Such remains of it as persist are preserved only as societies held together for the performance of certain magical or religious rites and as the carriers of certain religious traditions, but no longer as organic social groups.  

But decadent totemism often takes another course in its transformation. In most totemic systems the customary process of initi- 

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1 The various minutely detailed accounts of the Pueblo Indians and their ceremonies have been admirably summarized by Frazer, Ill. 100 ff.

19 Spencer-Gillen, pp. 34, 131-327, 167-211, 467-473; Spencer- Gillen, pp. 142-235.  
by the women and other non-initiated that they are put to death and brought to life again. They are instructed in the religious, personal and moral rules to which they must in future conform. Various prohibitions are enforced during and after their retirement. If approved for the purpose, they may become fetish-votaries or medicine-men; otherwise they become simply adult men, ready to take part in public life. This is obviously little more than the puberty rites of ordinary totemic societies. There is reason to think that the Nkima tends to become more marked in its purified view. Those who have passed through it have acquired a character in some degree sacred and mysterious; a special tie is established between them; they regard one another as brothers and render mutual aid. Another society called Ndenbo, often confounded with the Nkima, exists on the Congo.

A Ndenbo is not held periodically, but once is established whenever the elders of the village direct. It appears to have a specially sexual aim: men and women are admitted, and sexual licence is said to be encouraged in the camp; and to such a length is the comedy of death and resurrection carried that, on returning after the conclusion of the ceremonies, those who have been subjected to them pretend to have lost all remembrance of their previous life, act in the most foolish manner, and are only gradually recalled to the sacred and sacred objects. The object of the Ndenbo appears moreover to be more specialized, more definitely magical, than that of the Nkima. It seems probable that at least some secret societies have been developed from, or at least deeply influenced by, the initiatory rites of totemic tribes.

The Herero of S.W. Africa, who have been massacred and almost entirely destroyed by the Germans, offer a peculiarly difficult problem, not yet entirely solved. They were divided into clans called enada (plur. omwanda) reckoning descent exclusively through the female line.

A tradition of their origin is related, deriving it from a pair who emerged from the trunk of an omborobonga tree in the far North, whose children were all daughters fructified by contact in some way or other with various objects of the external world. These objects became the totems of their descendants. Among them may be enumerated the sun, rain, the tree, the marmot, the koodoo, the chameleon, becoming or assumed by them in whatever way the names in dispute. The members of an enada called themselves brothers-in-law (not brothers) of the totem. The blood-feud attached to the enada, which moreover, like the enada itself, was exogamous. Side by side with the enada stands another organization, apparently of more recent origin, the oruo (plur. oruwo). The oruo descends exclusively in the paternal line. It is also totemic; and among the totems appear the chameleon, the sun, the koodoo, rag, necklace of beads. The members of an oruwo are distinguished by the mode of dressing their hair, by their food-tabs, and by special locational regulations. The colour and shape of the horns of the cattle which an oruwo possesses also differ from those of every other oruwo. The institution of the oruwo is attributed to the medicine-men; and there can be little doubt that it is special religious organization for the maintenance of the sacred fire of the family and the worship of ancestors. All cattle belong to the oruwo, for the Herero are a pastoral people, and a cattle constitutes of cattle until the Germans deprived them of their stock. The cattle never descended to or through females, at all events if there was a male descendant to it. The food tabs of the Herero are probably not all totemic badges or signs. The totemism prevalent among them is thus widely divergent from the African type. Its twofold organization is manifestly the result of a conflict between matrilineal and patrilineal institutions. How that conflict originated is obscure; but it is obviously not unconnected with the growth of ancestor-worship and the introduction of cattle among a hunting and perhaps rudely agricultural people, and the consequent changes of mode of life and social arrangements. The country which they now inhabit is semi-desert, almost desert, and quite unsuitable for agriculture. After the rains there is for a time an abundant pasture, which at other seasons must be sought in the deep and sheltered dales with which the land is intersected. The change to pastoralism may be supposed to have occurred when or shortly before they penetrated to their present possessions, not probably more than five or six centuries ago. The consequent development of their institutions is even yet incompleteness.

At the other extremity of the area occupied by the Bantu are found the Baganda, the most highly civilized of the race. They were governed by kings probably descended from a Hamite stock which conquered the country seven centuries ago.

'The Baganda are divided into a large number of totemic clans, the members of which observe the two fundamental customs of non-consanguineous marriage and not to injure their totem and from marrying a woman of the same clan.' Each clan has a principal and a secondary totem, and takes its name from the former. 'Both totems are sacred to members of the clan, who may neither kill nor destroy them. Other people, notably the nomadic tribes, have no connection with these objects, or even of such a purpose, without hurting the feelings of members of the clan.'

The Baganda trace their lineage in the male line; but a woman's children were taught in infancy to respect her totem and to avoid them. When they grew up, they adopted their father's totems and ceased to regard those of their mother. Yet they were forbidden to marry into their mother's clan. For these and other reasons it seems clear that descent had originally been reckoned in the maternal line, and that, as in the case of the Herero, though on different lines, the transition had been recently and incompletely effected. Like the clans of certain American tribes, each clan had special names appropriated to its children; hence the clan to which a man belonged was recognized by his name. The king had a large harem. His children, however, especially his daughters, were regarded as the property of their mother; and it was naturally deemed an honour for a clan to give a king to the realm by means of the union of one of its female members with the king. From this homogeneity, the earlier races were excluded for reasons which are now unknown. To obviate this some of the excluded clans joined more favoured clans, so that their daughters might marry the king and have children who might be in the succession to the throne. Another reason for the union of clans was to better the position of a despised clan. Clans so associated obtained the right to use the totem of the more honourable clan; yet they were so little regarded as relations by the members of the latter that intermarriage between members of the two clans was not forbidden. The French king, and (least of all) was also in an exceptional position in that it is in the institution not subject to the rule of exogamy. The totems are usually some species of animal. A few species of trees and other vegetables are found as totems, besides certain other objects. The Baganda, like the other Baganda, are a pastoral people, and their articles of commerce are cattle until the Germans deprived them of their stock. The cattle never descended to or through females, at all events if there was a male descendant to it. The food tabs of the Herero are probably not all totemic badges or signs. The totemism prevalent among them is thus widely divergent from the African type. Its twofold organization is manifestly the result of a conflict between matrilineal and patrilineal institutions. How that conflict originated is obscure; but it is obviously not unconnected with the growth of ancestor-worship and the introduction of cattle among a hunting and perhaps rudely agricultural people, and the consequent changes of mode of life and social arrangements. The country which they now inhabit is semi-desert, almost desert, and quite unsuitable for agriculture. After the rains there is for a time an abundant pasture, which at other seasons must be sought in the deep and sheltered dales with which the land is intersected. The change to pastoralism may be supposed to have occurred when or shortly before they penetrated to their present possessions, not probably more than five or six centuries ago. The consequent development of their institutions is even yet incompleteness.

1 E. de Jonque, Les Sociétés secrètes au Bia-Congo, Bruxelles, 1907, p. 152.
2 Totemism, 401
3 Vol. XI., p. 26
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faeture; and 'split-totems' and other anomalous totems (as a tailless or a spotted cow, and rain-water from roofs) are not unknown. Notwithstanding the existence of a system of law and administration of justice, the sense of clan-solidarity remained strong. The blood-covenant was practised and was considered more binding than common oaths. Murder was rare; but cases of murder and theft, when they occurred, were taken up by the clan. The clan of a murdered man might accept and share a fine, instead of insisting on the punishment of death; and, on the other hand, the clan of the wrong-doer contributed to the payment. 'When a member of a clan wished to buy a wife, it was the duty of all the other members to help him to do so'; when a person got into debt, or was fined, the clan combined to assist him to pay the debt or fine. Thus the totemism of the Baganda, while preserving many, if not most, of the essential features normally present, departs widely from more typical totemism. The religious, the sense of clan, the sense of not quite absent, has fallen into the background before polytheism and the cult of the dead. The kingship and the organization of the kingdom have been imposed by a non-Bantu conquering people, which has broken all of the old totemic class, into groups assimilated by the bulk of the people when the English occupation took place. This people probably introduced domestic animals, some of which have become totems; and its influence is perhaps also to be traced in the 'split-totems.' Secondary totems are met with elsewhere, as we have seen.

Totemism is decadent also among the tribes of the Congo. If there manifests itself chieftainry in tabus, though totemic tabus are only a few of the tabus observed. Among the Bangala of the Upper Congo the totem-animal may not be killed or eaten. A woman after marriage observes her husband's totem as well as her own. A child born to them takes the totems of both parents, until a council of both families determines which totem it is to take permanently—usually the father's. The Bangala are patrilineal.4

(d) India.—In continental India the decadence of totemism has been caused chiefly by the spread of Hinduism, and with it the extension of the caste system. The origin of caste has not yet been entirely cleared up. Within the Hindu caste system it is largely, if not mainly, occupational. As applied to the Dravidian and other races of the peninsula, it is transforming, or has transformed, independent tribes and castes, and by the mixing of some of them doubtless consciously forged to manufacture claims, these tribes have succeeded in gaining religious and often strongly contested admission as castes into the Hindu social hierarchy. The Reddi or Kupu, the largest caste in the Madras Presidency, are probably descended from a Dravidian tribe which in the early centuries of our era was powerful in India. They are now a great caste of cultivators, farmers, and squatters in the Telugu country and rank next to the Brâhmans in Hindu society there. They are divided into a number of sections, for whose names fanciful etymologies have been found, and for some of them legends have been invented. One of these sections, the Panta Kâpuss, are again severed into two endogamous divisions. But they are said also to have true totemic septs, of which the following are examples:

1. Magili (Pandanus fascicularius): the women of this sept do not, like those of other castes, adorn themselves with the flowers of this tree. This habit is said to have come down to refuse to purchase some bamboo mats, because they were tied with the fibre of this plant; (2) patur (Cassia tora): this tree and its products must not be touched by members of the sept; (3) Pachulis (Scrophularia): these seeds may not be used or touched by members of the sept; (4) Ficus (water-melon): the fruit may not be eaten by members of the sept.

Moreover, the names of various exogamous Kâpân septs are suggestive of totemism, such as the Cow, Grain, Buffalo, Sheep, Fowl, Goat, Elephant, as well as various other plants of common occurrence such as Cart, Army, Hut, Harrow, Woman's Skirt, Plough, are more doubtful. This is not an uncommon type of caste. It suggests that the caste is in question is an exogamous tribe, and that the restrictions of the caste originate from totemic clans, many of which retain their totemic names and some of their tabus, though other subdivisions have forgotten them or originated in a different manner. The Kângars are a low caste of village watchmen and deer-hunters in the Central Provinces, almost certainly of non-Aryan origin. They are divided into numerous exogamous septs, all of which are said to be totemic. The members of the sept usually show veneration to the object from which the sept has taken its name. Thus the Bâra sept is named from bâra, 'pig'; this sept worshipping the pig; the Chini from chiya, 'bird,' this sept revering sparrows; the Giygoti from giper, 'horse,' towards which the members practise certain observances; the Kasgogot from kusus, 'bel-meta,' which is tabooed by the sept; the San from san, 'hemp,' pieces of which are placed by the sept near the dwelling place of the god. The Hanumã sept is so called from the monkey-god, and the Vâgu sept from Vâgu, 'god,' worshipped by it.

In the United Provinces there are also many tribes and castes, probably of Dravidian origin, among whom totemism is traceable. Such are the Agariya of Mirzapur, who have seven septs, all totemic and apparently of totemic origin; the Mâkâmân named from the tortoise, which the members will not kill or eat; the Gôrôt from a certain tree which they will not eat; the Parawâm from a tree (Butea frondosa) which they will not cut and whose leaves they will not use for platters; the Sanwâm from hemp (sân), which they will not sow or use; the Barâgâr from a tree (Ficus indica) which they will not cut or climb and from the leaves of which they will not eat; the Bûnjakâr, said to be named from bûnj, 'frog,' which the members of the sept will not kill or eat; and the Gihîb, the members of which will not kill or even throw a stone at a vulture (gihî). The Agariya are patrilineal; and they have been deeply influenced in other ways by Hinduism. Indeed they call themselves Hindus in religion, though they worship none of the regular Hindu deities. There are, however, traces of a previous matrilineal condition. They practise tattuing, and many of the marks inscribed on their bodies are probably totemic in origin, but the real meaning has now been forgotten, and their impression is now more as charms to resist disease and other misfortunes, and for the purpose of mere ornament. The social and political conditions of India are such that almost the only possible relics of totemism consist in the names of the septs and the prohibitions of marriage within the clan and of eating, killing, or using the totem. Hindu influence leads to the exorcism of descent to human beings rather than to animals or plants, concerning which tales are told to account for the totemic name and observances. The organization of the tribe or caste by means of a council and the police regulations render it unnecessary for the union to continue for mutual protection. Hence, and owing to the universal tendency of caste to subdivision, the sense of solidarity is greatly weakened and is daily decreasing.

1 E. Thurston, Castes and Tribes of S. India, Madras, 1899, II, 323 ff.
3 W. Crooke, Tribes and Castes of the N.W. Provinces and Oudh, Calcutta, 1890, 317.
4 See H. H. Risley, The People of India, ed. W. Crooke, London, 1915, for a general account of some of the evidence; and, for the evidence itself, also his Tribes and Castes of Bengal, 2 vols., Calcutta, 1891-92, passim; Crooke;

Mancham (ct.): members of this sept avoid sleeping on cote; (1) Arigala (Passerubulum scrobiculatum): members of this sept do not use this grass for thatching; (2) Chintangaij (Pueraria tomentosa): these seeds may not be used or touched by members of the sept; (6) Pachulis (water-melon): the fruit may not be eaten by members of the sept.

1 Roosce, p. 125 ff.
2 Ib. p. 306.
(e) Melanesia.—There are signs that totemism was developing in the islands of Torres Straits into an anthropomorphic cult. Traditions are found of culture-heroes associated with various clans. Sigai and Maiau of the island of Yam appeared first in the likeness of a hammer-headed shark and a crocodile respectively. For each of them a shrine was erected, the essential feature of which was the stone representing either a hammer-headed shark or a crocodile; under each of these was a stone in which the spirit, the so-called augud (‘totem’), resided.

Unmarried persons were not allowed to visit these shrines, nor did they know what they contained; they were aware of Sigai and Maian, but they did not know that the former was a hammer-headed shark and the latter a crocodile; this mystery was too sacred to be imparted to uninitiates. When the heroes were addressed it was always by their human names, and not by their animal totem names. "Each was associated in his animal form with one of the two piranhas or groups of totem-clans. When before going to battle prayed to them. Totem-dance was also performed. Both in the exterior and in the interior of each to which they belonged. On Mabuig and Muralug the hero was Kwoiam, a warrior-hero, who himself was called an augud. In the Muralug group of islands he was the big augud and the augud of every one in the island."

He is said to have made and worn two crescentic objects of turtle-shell, which blazed with light when he wore them at night-time, and from which he nourished the children of cooked fish. These objects were termed augud;... and they became the insignia of the two piranhas into which the old totem-clans of Mabuig were grouped. "When attacking an enemy the warriors formed into two columns, each of which was led by a head-man who wore the Kwoiam emblems." Like Sigai and Maian, he possessed a sacred shrine. It was situated on the island of Fohn; there his crescentic emblems were kept, and these they were taken with certain ceremonies to be borne before the appropriate phratry in war. "A similar evolution has been observed in Fiji..."

‘The people of the interior of the island [of Viti Levu] form a number of independent communities which may probably be regarded as tribes, and each of these has a number of divisions and subdivisions, which in the relatively high development of Fijian society have departed widely from the character of the separate tribe. The Polynesian-aboriginal community is replaced. The animals from which descent is traced, and whose flesh is prohibited as food, are usually associated with the larger groups which therefore tend to replace the former. The divisions of the tribe often have sacred animals or plants peculiar to themselves in addition to those which are tabu to them as members of the tribe."

Rivers goes on to give examples. The tabued animal of the people of Cawana is an aquatic creature called the dra-nara, from which they believe themselves descended; and none of the divisions have restrictions peculiar to themselves. The sacred animal of the Nodrau or Navuta people is the kigilaga; some of its divisions have restrictions peculiar to themselves, the Wallawa division eating neither the dog nor a fish called daban, the Kalivui respecting the snake. Other animals were held sacred in other parts of the island, the people wearing in their dresses wigs formed from the tabu animal of the tribe, sometimes from that of the smaller subgroups. Marriage is regulated by kinship alone, and there is no evidence of any system of totemic exogamy. Of the most significant that this kind of totemism is widely divergent from what is usually reckoned normal totemism. Nor is this to be wondered at, seeing how far Fijian civilization has progressed. Yet it presents "the three characteristic features of the institution: belief in descent from the totem, prohibition of the totem as an article of food, and the connection of the totem with a definite unit of the social organization."

Tribes and Cities of W. X. Provinces and Osth. papua; and the other objects referred to in Crooker’s collection of totemic observations. Cf. also Crooker’s observations in P.R.G ii. 148-155.


2 P. 134.


... among these hill-tribes ‘that the sacred animals had become gods, which had, however, retained their animal form definitely.’ Certain rules of totemism are due to the Nadians of Viti Levu. They would not eat porpoises. They regarded the kigilaga showed an early stage in the evolution of a god from the totem-animal. In the kivas in the low country things had gone further, for the ordinary and sunken, a name which usually showed no sign of an animal origin, has become impregnated with notions of the totem clans, and the name of the totem-animal is passed along and turned into the skins of the animal. Thus the people of Lasakau, who descended from a totem-clan which was impressed with the idea of catching a bird called toe. ‘The bird could not be eaten, and, as in the hills, it was clear that the restrictions were imposed on the whole people and was not limited to either of the two divisions of which the Lasakau people were composed.’ These are the only cases which he mentions; but they are probably enough to render the evolution plain.

It is almost unnecessary to remark that totemism may decay, especially when it comes under European influence, by simple neglect.

Thus the Winnebago, a Siouan tribe of N. America, tracing their descent from animals which were transformed into human beings and became ancestors of the various clans, treat the totem-animal in no way differently from other animals, hunting it and eating it, feeding it, and protecting it, and used always to take a name of his father’s clan; but this is falling into desuetude. The reckoning of descent has become irregular; and the relation between the division of the clan and the division to which it passes out of clan-possession.

Thus, in the Descent of the clans was all totemic. Descent is paternal. Clan exogamy is still observed by many of the clans, but not by all. Some, like the Blue Wild-Cat clan, regard the totem-animal as brother. But many of the clan names have ceased to be totemic, and the clans have become, or are becoming, numerous groups. The clan name is no longer taken as a personal or family surname under modern conditions.

Such cases may be found elsewhere than in America.

Traces of totemism among non-totemic peoples.—Over a large area of the globe, embracing Europe, the greater part of Asia, S. America, and Polynesia, the north of Africa, and the extreme north of N. America, inhabited by the Eskimo, totemism is now unknown. But among many of the peoples of these regions certain beliefs and practices have been reported which seem to bear traces of a former prevalence.

(a) Polyneis.—Rivers’ discoveries, just referred to, in Melanesia find their analogies in Tonga and Tikopia.

In the former he learned that ‘each family had its otsa (a Polynesian word for a written or unwritten totem). It was the name of an “ancestor”, some of which were animals and some stones, and while a man might have a name derived from one of these with the otsa the turo, the flying fox, and the pigeon... An animal was never eaten by those whose otsa it was, and I was told: he says, that this is the definite totem of the family and of the animal.” Similarly on the island of Tikopia he found a number of animals which were the totem of the tribe. These animals belong to the whole community and may be eaten by no one on the island; others belong to one or other of the four sections into which the people are divided. Thus the totem of the eighth is the iau of the Rakia; but it is forbidden as food not only to them but also to the whole people. The Tasmano may not eat the seal or a bird called rupe—prohibitions limited to this division of the people. The Fangieule may not catch an eel. The Tatau may not eat the fresh-water eel, the flying fox, or the turtle, the two latter “being also prohibited as food to the whole community, though regarded as especially sacred to the Tatau.” There was also evidence that the Rakia were believed to be descended from the octopus, the Tasmano from the seal, the Tatau from the flying fox, and it was believed that one man of this division became after death a fresh-water eel, while two men of the Fangieule became the one an octopus, the other a moke bird. There are also plant and vegetable autes, to which corresponding restrictions attached.

Thus there is evidence that this totemism had at one time existed and had left traces attributable to no other cause. Elsewhere in Polynesia there are relics more or less distinct of the same condition.

(b) Egypt.—We are naturally reminded of Egypt. The origin and early development of Egyptian religion are obscure. What we find is that in the earliest period known to us by the
monuments each nome or district had its own peculiar object of adoration in some animal, which was regarded with indifference or, in consequence of local quarrels, with hostility in the adjacent nomes. Moreover (in spite of changes during the country's long history) in spite of the evolution into higher polytheism and of the syncretism which gradually won its way, at all events among the educated classes), the same attitude towards these animals corresponded to the end. One nome venerated the ibis, one the crocodile, one the cat, one the gnat, one the ram, one the oxoryxynchos fish, and so on. Some of these are domesticated animals; in the earliest period, however, domesticated animals do not appear. The monarchy seems to have been introduced by a people which invaded Egypt and conquered the aborigines. The invaders carried the standard of a falcon, from the name of which (heru) that of Horus, later regarded as the last of the gods who reigned over Egypt, is derived. When the objects of adoration took human form, becoming anthropomorphic gods, these were also domesticated, and are represented on the monuments with the heads of the appropriate animals. The animals remained sacred, as their numerous mummies attest; and various legends were told to account for their relations to the protective gods, in which case the cat was venerated, the goddess Bast had her seat; Ombos, where the crocodile was honoured, was the sacred town of the crocodile-headed god, Sebek; the ram-headed god, Khnum, or Ammon-Ra, was worshipped at Thebes, and there precisely was the place where the sheep was revered. As a result of the unification of the country under the kings, syncretism in theology spread, and the various gods tended to be identified with one another and with the animals honoured in the different towns. At length the myth and worship of the culture-hero, Osiris, prevailed throughout the land; and his myth included a story of how the various gods fied, 'disguised in brutish forms,' from the rage of his enemy Typhon. In short, all sorts of devices are adopted to account for the local gods and animals venerated in the different cities and districts and to unify the religion. These devices were probably known to, or at least accepted by, the educated classes only. All the other classes remained attached to the old gods. The evidence points to the prevalence at one time in the valley of the Nile of a form of totemism, which possibly included various trees and other vegetables (for these, though less prominent than animals, are not unknown in Egyptian religion), and which by a series of steps was slowly merged and elevated into a polytheistic worship tending ever in the minds of the educated more and more to monothelism.1

Of the original social organization, however, we know little beyond the fact that it was monarchical. The woman was mistress of the house; the husband on marriage was received as a guest or went to reside with her. Those men who could afford it kept harem, the members of which were under the governance of the chief wife. It is a probable conjecture from the available information that society was constituted of clans, in later ages directly or indirectly giving birth to trading and other guilds. The custom of the husband going to reside with his wife secured the local concentration of the population, and facilitated the reformation of the clan-settlement into the nome and the dominance of a single animal-totem in each nome.2

All this was doubtless the result of the agricultural occupations of the people. What were the relations of the members of the clan to one another or to the totem we are not informed.

(c) Greece.—Scientific controversy has raged over the question whether totemism is directly or indirectly observable in ancient Greece. Salomon Reinach, Touxan, and Van Gennep have been the protagonists. Andrew Lang pointed out the various kinds of totemistic relations in various peoples;—in Thessaly the Myrmidons claiming descent from the ant and revering ants; in the Trood and the islands the mice sacred to Apollo Smintheus and a tribe referred to by an oracle as mice; the adoration of the wolf at Delphi and Athens and of the sheep on Samos; the descent of Tenes, the hero of Tenedos, from a swan; the invocation of Hecate as a dog and the sacrifice to her of a dog;3 the Arati of Arcadia, identified with Calliste, a nymph who is fabled to have been metamorphosed into a she-bear, from which the Arcadians claimed descent; the similar tale of the Brauronia of Athens, where little girls called bears, dancing with the gait of bears and probably in archaic times wearing bear-skins; and a hundred other such myths, rituals, and metaphors.4 Nor has he been alone in discerning that such types of primitive totemism have been outgrown and misconstrued before the dawn of authentic history. The social organization of Athens has also been examined. The ἀγάπατοι and ἀγάπηται have been pronounced parallel in all essentials with the organization of the Australian totemic clan and phratry.5 There are good reasons for suspecting that originally matrilinial descent was the rule, of which vestiges subsisted down to historical times.6 Though this view has been challenged,7 and it is undoubtedly agnostic descent prevailed in historical times, the suspicion is not without solid foundation. Probably the pre-historic population of the period called the Mycenean age was matrilinial and was conquered by a patrilinial military people from the north, who formed the dominant classes in the Homeric age, and under whom Greek society was transformed and reorganized. On the whole we are justified in accepting with L. R. Farnell the theory that various remarkable cults—the Arcadian worship of Zeus Lyceus and of Artemis Calliste, the Athenian worship of Athena nike, the Attic worship of Theseus, and some others—can be explained only by a survival of what is in effect totemism.8 But, if so, then other cults and myths of which the connecting links have been lost may with the more likelihood be assigned to the same origin.

(d) Ireland.—Over the rest of Europe the traces of totemism are still more uncertain. They will be found, as in Greece, if at all, on the side of belief and practices which may be called quasi-religious rather than in social observances such as marriage restrictions; or under the dominance of Christianity and the social ideas, Hebrew and Roman, carried with it. History has been shaped for two millennia. In Connemara and the islands off the west coast of Ireland persons bearing the name of Conneely, who are descended from the clan Conneely, an old family of In-Connaght, claim 'that they have seal's blood in them, and that is why they are such good swimmers.'9 A story is told of some members of the clan who at a distant period went out into sea and claimed that the clan Conneely can kill a seal without afterwards having had luck.

3 Myth, Ritual and Religion, l. 277.
4 A. W. Register and L. H. Vivian, JAF xix. (1906) 324.
6 L. R. Farnell, ARM vii. (1904) 70; H. J. Rose, FL xxii. (1927) 577 ff.
7 [1904] 481.
8 Cott, Oxford, 1896-1900, I. 41, 58, 91, ii. 434, 441 (cf. ib. 116, 196; and J. E. Harrison, Thesmophoria, Cambridge, 1912, passim, esp. ch. v.)
Sole is said to be regarded with profound veneration. They are called Conneelys, and are said to be the souls of departed friends. We are told that "in some places the body has its name, or a part of it, cut off from the body."

Both in Ireland and in the Scottish isles are stories of clanns which pets which pertain to an extinct totemism as the best explanation; and the same explanation has been offered, with more or less probability, of various beliefs and practices in Wales and England as well as in other European countries.

(e) W. China.—In W. China among the Lolois, an aboriginal mountain people of Szechwan, there is something more than traces of totemism.

Their "surnames always signify the name of a tree or animal, or both tree and animal," and "these are considered as the ancestors of the family bearing the name. This name is often arithmic. Thus the surname Bu-luh-buh is explained as follows—Bu-luh is said to be an ancient name for the citron, which is now known as bu-luh. The common way of asking a person what his surname is, is to inquire "What is it you don't touch?" and a person of the surname just mentioned would reply "We do not touch the bu-luh or citron." People cannot eat or touch in any way the plant or animal, or both, which enters into their surname. The plant or animal is not, however, worshipped in any way.

People of the same surname may marry if there is no obvious relationship on the part of either to any other person of the same or three surnames amongst whom intermarriage is forbidden; and no explanation of this is given. There are also groups of three surnames who are called comrades, and intermarriage amongst them is favoured.

The Chinese themselves are on a higher plane of civilization and totemism is unknown. But from sundry prohibitions its existence has been suspected. Among some other peoples of S.W. Asia and various islands of the Indian Archipelago totemism has been either found or suspected. In Madagascar and in the Polynesian islands a number of superstitious have a sanctioned with more or less probability to an original totemism no longer forming part of the social organization.

(f) America.—In Central and South America totemism is unknown. But from sundry prohibitions its existence has been suspected. Among some other peoples of S.W. Asia and various islands of the Indian Archipelago totemism has been either found or suspected. In Madagascar and in the Polynesian islands a number of superstitious have a sanctioned with more or less probability to an original totemism no longer forming part of the social organization.

Central and S. America is known under the name of nagualism (Quicke, *nagual*, 'the knowing one,' or 'sorcerer'), in which some natural object, commonly an animal, is believed to have a parallel relation with a human being, so that for well-being, good health, or for the protection of the dead, it is necessary to have an acquaintance with or a knowledge of the meaning of the animal. Thus the *nagual* is a purely personal acquisition and is not inherited like the *sulitla*. It should, however, be pointed out that neither the belief of the Bororo nor the *nagual* or *nunali* of other tribes has the marks of true totemism. It has no relation to a clan, nor is it in any way related to the social organization: where the *nunali* descends, it is only to the children of remoter issue of the original possessor, and in such case the descent has only been taken place under the influence of patrilineal kinship.

(q) Australia.—In Australia among the Kurkuri and some other tribes of the south-east the two sexes have animals respectively regarded as their protectors, with whom the life of individual members of the sex is supposed to be bound up. Fights between the sexes occur to a lesser extent than between the sexes of other tribes, and the result of such fights is usually to the advantage of the male. The same animals are often called, as a rule, or alternately, by a common name, and the two sexes are not exclusively associated with the same animal. There are, however, certain animals which are peculiar to the male sex and certain to the female sex. These animals are supposed to have been adopted by the men of the tribe, either for the sake of the food or for the sake of the fruit of the tree or plant associated with the animal. It is believed that by eating the food of the animal or the fruit of the tree associated with the animal the men will be enabled to become successful in the hunt or to become strong in body and spirit. But it is also believed that by eating the food of the animal or the fruit of the tree associated with the animal, the women will be enabled to become successful in the hunt or to become strong in body and spirit.

6. Origin.—The origin of totemism has been the subject of much discussion and speculation among anthropologists. It is only necessary here to refer to a few of the hypotheses offered. That which is identified with the name of Hill-Tout has already been incidentally dealt with. Though accepted by some American anthropologists, it has not generally formulated on either side of the Atlantic. Frazer, having previously adopted the theory that the totemic clan was in its primitive form and purpose a society for the multiplication by magical ceremonies of the vegetable, and so ensuring a continuance of provision for the food and prosperity of the community, so far as the totem-animals and vegetables were edible or otherwise available for use, has relinquished that hypothesis. Instead, in his latest conjecture he is now inclined to the opinion, suggested by observation on the part of Spencer and Gillen of the peoples of Central Australia, and on the part of other travelers and explorers in other parts of the world, that totemism originated in a primitive explanation of conception and child birth. The latter people hold that their mothers were impregnated by the entrance into their wombs of spirit-animals or spirit-fruits, and that they themselves are severally nothing but the particular animal or fruit which effected a lodgment in the mother and that in due time was born into the world as a human being. Hence they partake of the character of the animal or fruit in question and refuse to eat all such animals and fruits. The supposition is that these beliefs become in particular cases hereditary and result in the evolution of clans or groups on either side of the Atlantic. Frazer, having previously adopted the theory that the totemic clan was in its primitive form and purpose a society for the multiplication by magical ceremonies of the vegetable, and so ensuring a continuance of provision for the food and prosperity of the community, so far as the totem-animals and vegetables were edible or otherwise available for use, has relinquished that hypothesis. Instead, in his latest conjecture he is now inclined to the opinion, suggested by observation on the part of Spencer and Gillen of the peoples of Central Australia, and on the part of other travelers and explorers in other parts of the world, that totemism originated in a primitive explanation of conception and child birth. The latter people hold that their mothers were impregnated by the entrance into their wombs of spirit-animals or spirit-fruits, and that they themselves are severally nothing but the particular animal or fruit which effected a lodgment in the mother and that in due time was born into the world as a human being. Hence they partake of the character of the animal or fruit in question and refuse to eat all such animals and fruits. The supposition is that these beliefs become in particular cases hereditary and result in the evolution of clans or groups on either side of the Atlantic. Frazer, having previously adopted the theory that the totemic clan was in its primitive form and purpose a society for the multiplication by magical ceremonies of the vegetable, and so ensuring a continuance of provision for the food and prosperity of the community, so far as the totem-animals and vegetables were edible or otherwise available for use, has relinquished that hypothesis. Instead, in his latest conjecture he is now inclined to the opinion, suggested by observation on the part of Spencer and Gillen of the peoples of Central Australia, and on the part of other travelers and explorers in other parts of the world, that totemism originated in a primitive explanation of conception and child birth. The latter people hold that their mothers were impregnated by the entrance into their wombs of spirit-animals or spirit-fruits, and that they themselves are severally nothing but the particular animal or fruit which effected a lodgment in the mother and that in due time was born into the world as a human being. Hence they partake of the character of the animal or fruit in question and refuse to eat all such animals and fruits. The supposition is that these beliefs become in particular cases hereditary and result in the evolution of clans or groups on either side of the Atlantic.
external soul, that is, in the belief that living people may deposit their souls for safe keeping outside of themselves in some secure place, where the precious deposit will be less exposed to the assaults of disease and to violence than while it remained in the body of its owner.1 This hypothesis, though founded on a widely spread practice, is not, and has not, be

It but the The or external frankly remained German names, existence toerate having themselves with topics appears to be insufficient to justify us in regarding it as the source of the whole institution.

Another, towards the close of his life, was led to emphasize the social aspect of totemism. He advocated a theory similar to that first pronounced by Herbert Spencer, and adopted by the German scholar, J. Fricker,2 that the origin is to be sought in names. According to this theory, bands of men, having been given names from outside, either by way of distinction or as nicknames, accepted these names and came to fancy that they themselves were in a mystical connexion with them, or rather with the things signified by the names, and then the course of social organization, from one cause or another, led first to the preference for wives of another band having a different name, and subsequently to a positive prohibition to marry a woman of the same band and necessarily having the same name—in other words, to clan-exogamy.4 The influence of names, and the instinct which regards a name as a real objective existence belonging to and having a mystical connec

tion with the person or thing signified by it, are practically universal in the lower culture. But why these names were appropriated and accepted by the various bands is left unexplained. Lang apparently agrees with Frazer that the institution of exogamy is distinct from totemism, and that totemism is a fact of which exogamy is a consequence.5 It certainly is universal, but not quite invariable, accompaniment of it. Lang indeed offers explanations of the origin of exogamy, but it cannot be said that his speculations are more satisfactory than those of previous inquirers.

A. C. Haddon sometime ago hazarded a suggestion of the 'possible origin of one aspect of totemism.' It is that there were numerous small human groups in favourable areas, each occupying a restricted range in which a certain animal or plant or group of animals or plants might be specially abundant, and that they consequently utilized these as a food-supply and for other purposes, the superfluity of which should be bartered for the superfluities of other groups. Thus 'the group that lived mainly on crabs and occasionally traded in crabs might well be spoken of as the "crab-men" by all the groups with whom they came in direct or indirect contact. The same would hold good for the group that dealt in clams or in tarle, and reciprocally there might be sage-men, hambo-men, and so forth.' It is obvious that the men who persistently collected or hunted a particular group of animals would understand the habits of those animal better than other people, and a personal regard for these animals would naturally arise. Thus from the very beginning there would be a distinct relationship between a group of individuals and a group of animals or plants, a relationship that primitively was based, not on even the most elementary of psychic concepts, but on the most deeply seated and urgent of human cravings, hunger.6

Here Haddon agrees with Lang that the name of the group usually bears its devotees with it and is adopted by the group thus named. Once accepted, the name and the regard for the animal, or whatever was the object signified by the name, would result in a mystical connexion being held to exist between the object and the human group which might issue in the object being tabued instead of used as originally, and, on the other hand, in magic being worked to secure a continuous supply of it with the object. As part of the tabu, not incident to it, exogamy, originating in a prefer-

ence for women of contiguous groups, might be developed.1

E. Durkheim, envisaging chiefly the Australian evidence, considers totemism as a religious institution. According to him, it is the religion of a sort of anonymous and impersonal force manifested in various animals, men, and emblems, none of which possesses it entirely, but all of which participate in it. It is the god adored in all totemic cults; but such a god is an invariant god without name or history, immanent in the world, diffused in an innumerable multitude of things. It is, in short, mana (q.e.) or orenda. It is not, however, represented under its abstract form, but as conceived of a species of animal or vegetable—in a word, under a sensible form—each group of men taking for ensign the animal or vegetable diffused most plentifully in the neighbourhood of the place where the group was accustomed to assemble. The totem is really only the material form under which this immanent substance, this energy diffused through all sorts of heterogeneous beings (which is the sole object of the cult), is represented to the imagination. It is the symbol not only of the impersonal totemic principle or god, but also of the definite society, the clan, of which it is the totem. It is the standard, the emblem, by which all the totemistic relations of others, the visible sign of its personality, the mark borne by every one that makes part of the clan, whether men, beasts, or anything else. All are sacred in varying degrees; but most sacred of all—are more even than the totem-animal or other object itself—is the artificial standard or emblem of the clan. Since all who communicate in the same totemic principle are related, the totem is the symbol of the morality of the clan, and all are morally bound to one another, with definite duties towards one another of help, vendetta, and so forth. The totem is thus not only a material but a moral force, which may easily transform itself into a divinity properly so called.

Totemism therefore is bound up with the organization of society. It is practically assumed as the earliest form of religion and of society everywhere.4 In the striking work of which the main thesis is here imperfectly summarized Durkheim elaborates this thesis with infinite pains and abundance of illustrations. But everything rests on the assumption of primitive universalism, which is in turn made to depend on the failure of the large spaces of the world, however, remain in which totemism has never yet been found. More or less probable traces of it may, indeed, be discerned in these areas; or they may be bereft of discovery. Moreover, the Durkheim's theory remains a brilliant conjecture, and nothing more.

In its insistence on an attitude towards nature and on a psychology different from that of civilized mankind it avoids the rock on which most of the hypotheses heretofore considered have split. This was also emphatically laid down, as the condition of success in solving the question of the origin of totemism, by Reret, a Swedish scholar, in an article which appeared almost contemporaneously with Durkheim's work. This article is an extension of part of a previous essay by the same author published in 1898. He urges that totemism is connected with an impersonal conception of life. A group of men are allied with a group of animals. There is nothing personal, nothing individual, in their union, but only an association, an association of the primitive mode of thought, which does not compare one thing with another: if it finds likeness between them, it identifies them. For primitive man the indistinguishable being; the group or the species is

3. ibid. p. 55.
everything. Man did not picture himself as lord of creation. He did not sever himself in thought from other living creatures; he was only a part of a host of living things. He felt himself uniquely united with a kind of animal living in his neighbourhood and coming in touch with him. It was no accident that he associated himself with one or other species. This association is instinctive, magical, and social. These were in the origin undistinguishable from one another. The distinction between them came later, with the development of individualism and analysis.

In this way Reutenkild would explain the origin of totemism. Without saying that he has completely solved the question, the opinion may be expressed that he has realized the conditions of primitive life and thought sufficiently to define at all events some of the conditions to be fulfilled and so lead to a solution. In endeavouring to explain the attitude towards nature of the tribes of Central Brazil Von den Steinen not only says that they draw no strict line of demarcation between man and brute; he uses the emphatic expression that, to understand it, we must think the boundary is not absolutely everywhere. There is thus no impediment to the man's sympathy with the animal. The Bororo, as we have seen, that they are red arras, not that they will become arras after death, nor that they were arras in the past. There is an opposition between the two arras here and now. From this attitude of mind we can see how it follows that in their stories human modes of life and thought are attributed to the lower animals, and, indeed, as frequently in savage tales, it is often impossible to say whether the actors are human or brute; it follows also that marriages between the former and the latter are in the tales contemplated without aversion or are even regarded as natural, and that interchanges of shape are quite ordinary incidents. It is no question of naming. Totemism is founded on something deeper than that. It assumes a community of nature between man and other creatures; and the existence of the individual is ignored, except as a small and subordinate part of a group, thought of as a whole. It was part of the organization of society which is bound up with the general concept of the world indicated above—a concept by no means confined to totemic peoples, but not always issuing in the same type of organization. How or why particular totems were chosen is a difficult question, but, however interesting, relatively unimportant.

In strict acceptation of the term totemism is not a religion. The respect of the clan for its totem arises out of the attitude of mind just explained. The relation of the clan to its totem assumes a mystical aspect and generates an intense feeling of kinship. This frequently is expressed in the belief that they are descended from the totem-species. As civilization evolves, this belief becomes modified into the shape of a story of the adventure of a human ancestor with the totem-species. Although regarded with reverence and looked to for help, the totem is never, where totemism is not decadent, prayed to as a god or a person with powers which we call supernatural. In fact, in that stage of culture totemism usually co-exists with the cult of the dead and often with the worship of other spirits and gods accurately so called. Its connexion with the social organization, on the other hand, is very intimate. Probably beginning in a type of protection of kinship, it develops the clan-feeling and the clan-organization and by means of clan-exogamy binds the whole tribe together. Whether exogamy actually precedes totemism in point of time or not, there can be no doubt that the interaction of the two strengths and develops itself, until exogamy is seen as an essential element of totemism in its full force. When, in the course of evolving civilization, totemism begins to decay, exogamy may and often does continue independently. And the cases are numerous where the clan-system and exogamy have arisen and existed for long periods without any other element of totemism, so far as we know. So various are the forms of totemism that it has been maintained with plausibility that they are due to a fortuitous concurrence of causes which has united elements originally diverse but tending to converge into a system on the whole marvellously similar wherever it obtains, just as the disintegration, and in many cases the dissolution, of the system have historically been due to a concurrence or a sequence of causes of the opposite kind.


E. SIDNEY HARTLAND.
across the Atlantic to America. It pervades the whole world of intelligent white labour, but England was its cradle.

Attempts have been made to trace its descent from chartists (q.v.) of the Middle Ages, but those institutions are to be regarded as associations of masters rather than of men, and there is little or no evidence of the existence of permanent associations between employers and workmen before the 18th century. It was then that the differentiation between employer and employed became more and more marked until a great gulf was finally set between them by the transformation of industry effected by the introduction of machinery and the institution of the modern factory system of production on a large scale. The trade union movement was a direct response to the change of conditions.

In the early part of the 19th cent. continuous associations of wage-earners generally took the form of friendly societies, with sick and funeral funds attached; but, as the century wore on, and the results of the industrial revolution, in divorcing the worker from the instruments of production and degrading his position, became more apparent, they inevitably assumed a different character. The meetings of the clubs afforded opportunities for talk of wages and conditions of labour, and we find Adam Smith writing:

'People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and conversation, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public—and in some contrivance to raise prices.'

This was what the early trade unions appeared to be to the governing classes of those days—'a conspiracy against the public'—and they were only taking the same view as had been taken by the governing classes long before. Combinations of workmen were held to constitute a danger to the State, and from early times a series of statutes had been directed against them. The earliest of these appears to have been the statute 33 Edw. I. c. 1 (1365).

It stamp as conspirators1 all who do confeder or bind themselves by oath, covenant or other alliance, as relates or extends to combinations or conspiracies of workmen or other persons to obtain an advance of, or fix the rate of, wages, or to lessen or alter the hours or duration of the time of working, or to decrease the prices of goods, wares or commodities, or to prevent, or restrain the use of carrying on any manufacture, trade, or business, or the managing thereof.'

From this it may be seen that labour questions, including the limitation of output, were much the same in the first part of the 14th cent. as they are to-day. The statute goes on to declare 'combinations and confederacies of masters, or of masters and workmen, or of workmen and others' to be equally illegal; they too were regarded as constituting a danger to the State; and the principle that all combinations, whether of masters or of men, should be suppressed in the interest of the public may be said to underlie most of our earlier industrial legislation. But, as time went on, the tendency was for the laws against labour to be rigidly enforced, while those in favour were poorly administered or allowed to fall into oblivion.

The Act of Edward I. was followed by a series of others of the same nature. In the 18th cent. they became more and more frequent with the rise of the new associations. At least fifteen were enacted in the reign of George III. before the year 1800. That year marks an epoch. The whole of the existing Combination Acts were consolidated, in a new law which made all associations of workmen (and of employers) illegal, and membership of such an association a criminal offence (39 and 40 Geo. III. c. 106).

The position of the workers now was that, while no attempt was made to extend already existing State regulations as to wages, hours, and condi-

1 Wealth of Nations, bk. 1, ch. 10.

tions of employment so as to apply them to the altered circumstances of the times—and many of them had become practically inoperable—they were debarred by statute from what seemed the only chance they had of associating for their own protection. But, in spite of this, associations were formed, some of which, as the direct result of this repressive legislation, took the form of secret societies with a code of law which, in 1810, and the next twenty-five years were full of trouble and discontent. Eventually by the Acts 5 Geo. IV. c. 95 (1824) and 6 Geo. IV. c. 129 (1825) the Combination Laws were repealed and association for the purpose of regulating wages or hours of labour was expressly legalized.

The position of the trade unions was now secure. Some forty-five were discovered in 1824 to have managed to maintain a precarious existence in spite of the Combination Laws, but, when the laws were repealed, trade unions sprang into life all over the country. The next few years were a period of great fluctuation. As work of organization was taken in hand in earnest. It was also a time of great political activity, and soon after the passing of the Reform Act of 1832 we find that the unions had already accumulated members and funds sufficient to give them a distinct power in politics. They threw themselves heartily into the movement initiated by Robert Owen—the membership of his 'Grand National Consolidated Trades Union' in 1834 has been estimated at half a million—but on the whole they stood aloof from the Chartist movement which played such an important part in the history of the working classes between 1837 and 1848. Between 1850 and 1860 trade unionism made rapid strides on the old lines, and then there was a marked increase of political interest with the Reform Bill of 1867 as its centre.

The Trade Union Act of 1871 marked another stage. Though the repeal of the Combination Laws had left the workers free to combine, all combinations 'in restraint of trade' were still illegal. The funds of any such society therefore did not enjoy the protection of the law, but were at the mercy of any official who had access to them. As a matter of fact the trust had been very seldom abused, but the position was unsatisfactory, and the Act remedied it, and also strengthened the position of the unions in other respects. In 1875 a further Act recognized employers and workmen (they were no longer called master and servant) as equals and equal, with a right to a day's notice, and 'peaceful picketing' during a strike was expressly permitted. Thus 'collective bargaining, with all its necessary accompaniments, was after fifty years of legislative struggle finally recognized by the law of the land.'

Ten years later the movement entered upon a new phase. The leading spirits were no longer content to proceed steadily upon the old lines, and John Burns and Tom Mann became the apostles of a more militant and aggressive creed. A 'new unionism' came into existence which was inspired by the doctrines of socialism (q.v.). Its spirit was manifested in the labour unrest of 1889-90. This has been in its turn outpaced by the old newer unionism of the 20th cent., which is syndicalist instead of socialist and regards the general strike as its weapon. But, at all events up to the outbreak of the war in 1914, the great bulk of trade unionists seem to have been content, as Joseph Clayton has said,

1 Webb, History of Trade Unionism, p. 375.
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On these two broad general grounds—that it has pointed the way to the establishment of a new industrial order, and that it has recalled us to a sense of the other side of our social nature—may be said that the trade union movement has abundantly justified itself. We shall now proceed to consider some of the special manifestations of its activity which have been at different times the subject of criticism.

(c) Strikes.—The strike (q.v.) has always been the trade unionist's most effective weapon. He can do much to protect himself by the method of mutual insurance or collective bargaining, but the strike gives him the power of bringing pressure to bear if he desires to enforce an agreement or to secure an improvement in wages or conditions of labour. The question whether it is a fair weapon is therefore fundamental. At present the right to strike has been practically acknowledged by the law, but the concession has only been gradual. At first all strikes were regarded as conspiracies and illegal; then there came a stage at which the right to strike was tacitly acknowledged, but the courts condemned them on the ground of assumed 'malicious intent'; next attempts were made to discriminate between one kind of strike and another, and now the tendency seems to be to uphold the right to strike as such.

The relation between employer and employed has been regarded in law since 1875 as a civil contract between two theoretically free and equal individuals. It is in some cases a contract of very short duration, but it does not differ in nature from longer contracts, e.g., weekly-wage-earner and employer, in this respect in the same position as a highly placed salaried official. He therefore has the right to terminate his contract when he pleases, so long as he does not contravene the law. The essence of a strike is that it is the simultaneous termination of many contracts, and it derives its power from the fact that it is inconvenient or even harmful to the employer, and generally meant to be so. Now no one would deny that any worker where wages are inadequate or conditions intolerable has the right to say to an employer, 'I will not work for you for such wages or under such conditions.' Nor will it be denied that many of the workers have a right to say this simultaneously as a joint protest. Finally, it is hard to see how they would be wrong in endeavoring to prevent any other holding similar views. If these three points are conceded, the right to strike is established in principle.

The strike then, regarded as a protest, is a lawful weapon, but the days are long past when strikes were simply protests. To-day in the majority of cases they are used as weapons of offence. Even as such they are doubtless often justifiable, but weapons of offence are used to threaten or to inflict injury; that is what they are for; and, if it is conceded that the use of such weapons is allowable in industrial warfare, there would seem to be need of some controlling power to see that they are used fairly. A strike may be simply an instrument of tyranny and oppression.

Moreover, the whole question has assumed a new aspect in recent years as the result of closer association between different classes of men and the enormous increase of power which the strike has derived from their simultaneous action. A strike on a large scale is no longer a mere matter between employers and employed: the whole nation may be affected. An wrongful strike, if recent strikes have been the frank admission by their promoters that it was their deliberate intention to cause such general inconvenience and even injury as would force a settlement in their favour, simply to put an end to them. Such
action is narrow and selfish and is condemned by public opinion. In no civilized country can any one body of men be allowed to hold the nation to ransom at their pleasure. The State is greater than any of its component parts, and is morally bound to take measures to protect the nation as a whole from exploitation by any section of it.

The question of picketing is closely connected with that of strikes. A strike really is a device to extend the principle of trade unionism beyond the scope of the shop into the home. A house is the home of the worker, and the absence of the worker from his work place has as many effects as the absence of the worker from the shop. The trade union is founded on the completeness with which his supplies of labour can be cut off. It is therefore of the first importance to the strikers to see that no one else takes their place, and that none of the workers continue their work. Hence the elaborate system of sentries and pickets. There is nothing to be urged against 'peaceful persuasion,' but it is obvious that, at a time when strong emotions are aroused, such a practice needs careful watching if the persuasion is not to be allowed to degenerate into intimidation or even violence.

The Act of 1875 rendered liable to a fine or imprisonment 'every person who, with a view to compel any person to abstain from doing or to do any act which such other person has a legal right to do or abstain from doing, wrongfully and without just excuse threatens or endeavour to prevent or endeavour to prevent any other person from doing or abstaining from doing any act where such other person resides or works'; but declared that attending at or near the house or place 'in order merely to obtain or communicate information' shall not be deemed watching or besetting.

(b) The limitation of output.—There are some things about trade unionism which will never be understood unless they are regarded as projected against a background of injustice and petty tyranny. The deliberate limitation of output is one of them. It has been, and is still, the practice of some unions not to allow their members to do more than a given amount of work in a given time. A bricklayer, e.g., may not lay more than a given number of bricks in a day. This practice is unjustifiable, because the economic point of view, because the object of industry is production, the worker who systematically produces less or worse work than he is not true to his trade. It is also morally unjustifiable because every one is bound in honour to accomplish to the best of his ability the task which he has taken in hand. And intelligent labour is ready to admit this. On what grounds then is it defended? On the ground, that it is to be only just that what can be devised for the weak against the lowering of the rate of wages by an unscrupulous employer. It was found that an employer who had already agreed to a certain piece-rate, on finding that the best of his men were earning wages which seemed to him in his short-sightedness preposterous, went back upon his word and proceeded to cut the rate, with the result that the slow or weak among the workers were no longer able to earn the weekly wage which he himself had considered as fair when he fixed the original piece-rate. Labour, in order to remove any such excuse for a lowering of wages, resolved that no member of the trade, whatever his strength or speed, should be allowed to outpace the rest. The best workers were called upon to make a sacrifice, but it was made readily and it rested upon altruistic motives. It is an anomaly, and it is injurious to industry. As the progressive organization of industry proceeds, the need of it will probably disappear. Meanwhile it remains, not without a touch of pathos, as an indication of the iron hand which invests the eyes of the employers with a sort of authority which the workers a practice which they would not really defend with the sanction of self-sacrifice.

(c) 'Ce n'est pas.'—The policy of limitation of output is universally acknowledged as indefensible, almost on all grounds. We do not refer to those cases in which a man does less than he might, or as little as he can contrive, out of personal resentment towards an employer or as a protest against a system which he believes to be unjust. Such cases are not uncommon, but it is doubtless whether any union would deliberately support them with its formal sanction. But many unionists believe that there is only a certain amount of work to be done, and that there will not be enough to go round if the standard of production per man is too high. This ' lump-of-labour ' doctrine of the worker is the old idea of the capitalist, the ' new trade unionists' of the 19th cent., who believed that there was only a certain sum available for wages, and that, if one set of workmen got more, it meant that of necessity another set would get less. Both were equally fallacious. There is neither a fixed amount of work nor a fixed sum available for wages; both are elastic. The way to increased wages lies through increased production, for it is out of the value of the product that wages, like salaries and the cost of raw materials, are paid. To limit production is to lessen the fund out of which wages are paid. There is also a belief that, if the best workmen are allowed to force the pace, the result will be a subtle reduction of the standard of earnings of the average worker—a 'bell-wether' is regarded as an abomination—and the best protection against such conditions is held to be a sort of standardization of output comparable to the standardization of hours and wages in which the workers have found protection and safety. But it seems indisputable that, if the best workers in a trade are circumscribed and shackled, the whole trade must be the worse for it, workers included.

(d) It is difficult to estimate the truth of the charges of tyranny, intimidation, and violence which have often been brought against the trade unions. There have doubtless been many cases of such things in the industrial history of the last 150 years. Violence has been used against employers; intimidation and violence have been used against other workers who failed to come into line. What we want to know, and what is very difficult to find out, is to what extent, if at all, the unions have condoned such action. We should be safe, however, in asserting that violence forms no part of the trade union programme, and we may go further and say that with the growth of trade unionism there was an improvement in the conduct of strikes. Violence and bloodshed are certainly less common now than they were.

(e) It has been said that the organization of labour on modern lines is an idea which we owe to the trade unions. Has this organization in some cases been carried too far? Employers often complain that they find themselves fettered and obstructed by trade union regulations which seem to them to be merely meticulous and vexations. There is probably some truth in this. Trade unionism, on its defensive side, has surrounded itself with an elaborate system of barriers against every conceivable possibility of an attack. These regulations are not arbitrary; the initiated know that they are applications in detail of some principle which the workers regard as important. They are born of mistrust, and they will not disappear until employers and employed learn to understand one another better and feel that they are co-partners in the same enterprise. But it should be realized that industry cannot work in chains.

Trade unions are an inevitable product of modern economic life. They are now almost universally recognized, and are defended on the ground that they are based upon the fact that the conditions of labour are now group conditions and that the worker who forms a simple unit of a large group is powerless.
to bargain successfully with an employer. The employer occupies a superior strategic position, and the worker's only hope is in association. It is only when such associations of industrial units are formed, there is a danger of tyrannical action, and the larger the association, the greater the danger; but it is equally undeniable that the circumstances of the time seem to call for such associations, and the danger should be confronted. The advantages to be gained are great, and the danger can be met with the assistance of the legislature and the law-courts.


**TRADITION.**—The word 'tradition' means, etymologically, 'handing over.' The conception of tradition, therefore, implies (a) a 'deposit' which is handed over, and (b) 'depositories,' i.e. persons who are in possession of the deposit, and are commissioned to preserve it and transmit it to successors. At all special claims to be within themselves a deposit, consisting of ceremonial, myth, dogma, or ethic, or of some of these elements, revealed by some ultimate divine or quasi-divine author. It must be handed down to posterity by a succession of duly qualified trustees. This article discusses the part which the principle of tradition has played in the history of Christianity.

1. Christ and Jewish tradition.—There is not much uncertainty regarding the attitude of the Founder of Christianity towards the Jewish tradition which He found already in existence. He was familiar with rabbinical learning, and disclaimed any idea of being a rebel against it; 'Think not that I came to destroy the law or the prophets: I came not to destroy, but to fulfil.' (Mt 5:17) It would be generally agreed that His object was, not to abolish the traditional Mosaic deposit or to annihilate the depositary society—the 'congregation of the Lord,' the 'Israel of God'—but rather to develop and expand the then existing Jewish Ecclesia into the 'Kingdom of God' and to reform and purify the deposit by blending it with the gospel, or 'good news,' of a glorious age to come. In regard to the reform of the deposit, He indicated His scheme of renewal only in the most general terms. It seems that the classical passage for this is, of course, the famous saying about Corban (Mt 15:20, Mk 7:22), with the affirmation, which follows, that it is not the things which go into a man, but those which come out of the man, that defile the man. This may appear, at first sight, to challenge in principle the whole conception of the ceremonial deposit and brusquely to deny any spiritual value to outward observances. It certainly claims an infinitely higher place for ethical values as compared with ceremonial precepts; it might be taken, further, to imply that the sole seat of religious authority for a pious Jew lay in the written Word, the Torah, and that the oral tradition of the Rabbis was comparatively worthless. An even stronger implication as to the transitory nature of the Rabbinical tradition is contained in the saying about the 'new wine' and the 'old wine-skins' (Mk 2:21, Mt 9:38), though it is to be noted that Luke (5:37) appends a saying which may seem to point in the other direction— the opposite.

It may perhaps be said also that, to a certain extent, Christ demanded the re-intellectualization of the deposit. The authority of tradition is subordinated, not merely to that of the moral law embodied in the written Word, but to that of common sense. This is illustrated by His various sayings on the subject of the Sabbath. The impression which we gain from a review of the teaching of Christ, is that His attitude towards the Rabbinical tradition was simultaneously both reverential and critical, both conservative and progressive. There are two kinds of evidence which should be considered in this connection. One points directly to the amount of historical value which should be assigned to the Fourth Gospel; but it is to be presumed that the exceedingly hostile attitude assumed by the Johannean Church towards the Jews' is at least based upon genuine reminiscences of one side of the teaching of Jesus; and the declaration that the worship of the future was to be conducted neither on Mount Gerizim nor at Jerusalem, but throughout the whole earth, 'in spirit and in truth,' represents an attitude as anti-Rabbinical as it is possible to conceive. On the other hand, sayings recorded by 'Matthew,' the specifically Jewish evangelist, seem to represent Jesus as a whole-hearted supporter of tradition, though a severe critic of the moral shortcomings of its depositaries. 'Not one iota or one verbal point shall pass away from the Law till all be fulfilled.' (Mt 5:18) is a passage in which the characteristic Jewish doctrine of the eternity of the Torah seems to be proclaimed; He adds that, unless the things of the Law are observed down to posterity by a succession of duly qualified trustees. This article discusses the part which the principle of tradition has played in the history of Christianity.
deposition, a body of dogmatic and ethical truth revealed by Himself for the first time? Did He mean to found a society as the guardian of this deposit and its authorized expounder? Did He intend to convey to His Church, as His representative, power to decide as to its true contents in cases of dispute? Or did He mean to make a complete break, in theory and principle, with the grand institutions and traditionary powers that had been historically grown up, and to propagate, not so much an organized religion as a philosophical point of view or a mode of emotional feeling? In other words—Is Christianity to be regarded as the perfect traditional religion, the crown and flower of that whole process of traditional evolution which may be traced down the centuries, possessing a deposit of immutable truth and authentic, life-giving sacraments, and preserved by a majestic, supernatual society, a Kingdom which is in this world, yet not of it? Or was Christianity, as designed by its Founder, meant to involve a complete break with the past, and an entirely fresh start upon non-dogmatic, non-sacramental, non-ecclesiastical lines?

3. The ‘Catholic’ view of tradition.—It is a well-known fact that at the present day three-quarters of the world's inhabitants of Christian faith are not members of the Church or Body of Christ. This is the meaning of the well-known fragment or depositum first formulated by Tertullian (2d cent.), and which was to be the depositaries of the Church. This fragment was taken by the Catholic Church and made the basis of the whole system of Dogma. The ‘Catholic’ view of tradition maintains that the deposit of faith (depositum fidelis) was partly taken over by Christ from the existing Jewish Church and partly revealed by Him to His apostles and other hearers during His earthly life and especially during the ‘great forty days,’ which, according to St. Luke (Acts 1), intervened between His resurrection and ascension, and during which He took from them, as He took from the apostles, the deposit of the ‘things pertaining to the Kingdom of God.’ He thus committed Himself to them—for a fullness of doctrine and inspiration to be possessed by the Church only after the descent of the Paraclete, who would guide its members into all truth (John 16). These promises are interpreted by ‘Catholics’ as guaranteeing the ‘infallibility’ of the Church in the interpretation and definition of the authentic contents of the deposit. It is, further, believed that within the Church the special task of preserving (and, when need should arise, of defining) the deposit was committed by Christ to the twelve apostles and to their successors, the bishops.

According to this view, therefore, all that Christ intended to entrust to His Church (no doubt embodied at first in a way of life, rather than in an exactly formulated creed, and expressed, so far as it was verbally expressed at all, in pictorial rather than

logical or metaphysical terms), and (2) a depositary class, consisting of the twelve men whom He had designated, in apocalyptic language, as the scribes of the future Kingdom. It would be hardly correct to speak of His Church as the actual successor of the body of the Church, inasmuch as this was conceived of as being, not a new society, but the only orthodox remnant of the old Jewish Church. But the doctrine of infallibility began the development of a magnificent development was given. The living force of the Christian tradition spontaneously generated the same complex mechanism for its own preservation and perpetuation as may be seen, endeavouring to struggle into existence, in the fields of Zoroastrianism and Buddhism. The first element in this apparatus to appear was the canon of Scripture. At first the only Scriptures which the Christian Church possessed were those of the Jewish Church, or, rather, of the Jewish Church as it existed outside Palestine. The Bible recognized in most parts of the earliest Christian Church was that of the Jews, that of the Old Testament. The books now called Apocrypha; so that, from the first, the oral tradition, vested in living depositaries (the apostles and their successors), was, to a certain extent, controlled by the existence of these writings, believed documents, some at least of the main constituents of the deposit. The Marcionite controversy of the 2d cent. compelled the Church to form a collection of apostolic writings for the purpose of demonstrating the identity of the deposit, as she maintained it, with that committed by Christ to the original depositaries, and refuting the Gnostic claim to possess a secret tradition other than Christ's. The ecclesiastical tradition. This apostolic collection became canonized as ‘the New Testament’ of equal authority and inspiration with the original Scriptures, the ‘Old Testament’ of the Jewish Church.1 In the 2d cent., too, we observe the first beginnings of the baptismal creeds, brief formulæ whose threecold structure was derived from the threefold invocation of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost in the solemn words of baptism, and intended to summarize the essentials of the orthodox faith in a form which could be committed to memory by persons of the weakest intellectual capacity.2 The canon of Scripture and the baptismal creeds were thus the two great contributions of the 2d cent. to the organization whereby the Catholic deposit was perpetuated and safeguarded against any essential change of content. The last great development of the apparatus of the authority and authenticity of the deposit is to be found in the institution of ecumenical councils—the characteristic invention of the 4th century.3 In the 2d and 3d centuries it had been possible for Hippolytus, Ireneus, and Tertullian to appeal to the unbroken succession of the bishops and to point to their unanimous consent as a proof of the authenticity of the ecclesiastical tradition, as against the alleged secret traditions of the various Gnostic sects. But towards the end of the period of persecution, it came to be realized that the bishops themselves, the chief depositaries of the faith, might disagree as to its content; and these disagreements could only be resolved, in Christianity as in Buddhism, by the expedient of summoning a council representing, in theory or in fact, the complete body of chief depositaries, i.e. the total episcopate of the world. The object of a council was not so much to discover fresh truth as to determine what, as a matter of fact, was the doctrine which had been believed in the Church from the beginning. Hence, though each bishop

1 See art. Bible in the Church, I, i.
2 See art. Confessions, B.
3 See art. Councils (Christian): Early, to A.D. 360.
had, in theory, the right to put before the council that version of the faith which he had received from his predecessors and which had been handed down to his local church from its first founder, the grand master. This was restated and added to the testimony of the great 'apostolic sees.' Complete unanimity in the acceptance of one particular version of the faith would, of course, have stamped it in the minds of Catholic Christians as unquestionably authentic and apostolic; but, if complete unanimity had been possible of attainment, it would probably have been unnecessary to summon councils. The principle was, therefore, arrived at that an overwhelming majority of the depositaries, especially if it included the occupants of one or more of the great apostolic sees, had the same authority to express as St. Vincent of Lérins when he says, or implies, that the consensus of 'psene omnes' is as good as that of 'omnes [sacredotes].'

Hence it follows that if a small minority of the depositaries, in contrast with the remaining majority of the depositaries, had the same authority as the majority, necessarily becomes schismatic. Another famous expression of the right of a majority among the depositaries to decide what is and is not the Christian faith is to be found in St. Augustine's celebrated aphorism: 'Securus indicat orbis terrarum, bonus non esse, qui se dissidunt ab orbis terrarum in quacunque parte tertium.'

It is true that most of the so-called ecumenical councils were not actually representative of the total episcopate of the world. There were one or two of acceptance, immediate or gradual, by the majority of bishops. We are here concerned solely with theory, and need not go into the question as to how far theological controversies during the first thousand years of Christianity were merely the reflection of political, national, or racial antagonisms. It is sufficient to note that each of the great decisive doctrinal formulations of the first millennium, in general, was followed by a struggle between the majority, which accepted, and the minority, which rejected it. Thus, after Nicaea and Constantinople, a separate, 'non-juring,' Arian Church came into existence among the Goths and other barbarians; after Ephesus a 'non-juring' Nestorian Church was constituted in Syria and Persia; after Chalcedon the Monophysite Church, which still includes most of the Christians of Egypt and Armenia, split off from the rest of Christendom. But, whilst shedding, so to speak, these dissentious bodies round its periphery, the 'great Church,' the Church of the majority of the depositaries, the Church of the Greco-Roman Empire, the 'Molka' or 'Imperial' Church, as it was derisively called by the Eastern schismatics, held together round the imperial throne and the great apostolic see of Rome, maintaining its majestic unity unbroken, with the help of its authority, its jurisdiction, and the Zonarist schism, for over a thousand years. In the 'Great' or 'Molka' Church, as it stood on the eve of the Great Schism of 1054, the fourfold structure of the Church, the bishops who come after the Apostles, the Petrine supremacy, the Roman See, and the Zonarist schism had been plinyly grooming their way, had become thoroughly rooted, mature, and considerate, in the most imposing and magnificent form which has ever existed upon earth. The Church, the hierarchy, the canon of Scripture, and the ecumenical councils are all there, each fulfilling its harmonious part in the task of preserving, elucidating, and developing the apostolic deposit. This principle is expressed as well as good as that of 'omnes [sacredotes].'

1. The Reformation and tradition. The Reformation (q.v.) was, in essence and in its earlier stages, a revolt not so much against the authority of the deposit or of its founder as against the fact of the existence of a hierarchal class in Western Europe—a revolt occasioned by the corruption and reactions of the pope and the hierarchy. In the first fervor of indignation against the vices of the clergy, it seemed necessary to deny the whole principle of a body of men divinely commissioned to safeguard the Christian revelation. The mental outlook and Weltanschauung of the early Reformers was just as scholastic as that of the medieval theologians, and demanded, just as imperiously, a clear-cut body of dogmatic theology as an essential element in religion. Hence, on the one hand, the Reformation movement in the deposit was attended by the rejection of the hierarchal; and a new basis of authority had to be found for the Christian tradition. This basis was found in 'the Bible, and the Bible only.' We have noted that, for Catholic Christians, the structure of the orthodox faith was regarded as the oral tradition of the Church and the Scriptures. The logical effect of the Reformation was to knock away the first of these pillars, leaving the second standing; and so adamantane was (and is) the cohesion and solidarity of orthodox Christianity that for three hundred years it was able to remain practically intact throughout Protestant Europe, but without that supporting pillar. The last hundred years have witnessed the gradual erosion of this pillar, through the continual dropping of the rains of biblical criticism, and the consequent collapse in those regions of the super-incumbent structure. This result, however, could not then have been foreseen. The great orthodox Protestant theologians of the 16th and 17th centuries only designed to modify the Catholic theory of authority in the following sense: 'We quite agree with the Catholic in holding that there is a changeless deposit of eternal truth, and that this was imparted by God by his word to the apostles and their successors, during His earthly life and the great forty days; but we deny that the word was thus imparted to be transmitted, or transmitted, to them by any successors. Their functions as guardians of the truth were purely temporary and ended at their death. Therefore, however, divinely inspired to write the New Testament, in which, together with the prophecy of the Old Testament, it is sufficiently and sufficiently sufficiently contained. This, therefore, the sole authority for the content of revealed truth was and is to be found in the written Word of God; and we have no authority other than that which may attach to the piet and learning of mere men.'

It would, perhaps, be unfair to assert that this doctrine of the Bible, isolated and abstracted from the life of the teaching Church, as the sole fount of religious truth, necessarily presupposes the mechanical theories of 'verbal inspiration' which prevailed during the era of Protestant scholasticism, though it certainly did much to encourage them. Two difficulties, however, at once made themselves felt: (1) If the authority of the Church is practically nil, how do we know what 'the Bible' is, i.e., what books ought to be included in the canon and what not? Because, hitherto, it has only been on the authority of the Church that we have believed in the canonicity and inspiration of these particular books. (2) As some parts of the Bible are admittedly written in an obscure style, how are the unlearned to decide what the true sense is? It is possible, then, that the Catholic theologians of the counter-Reformation were not slow in pressing upon their opponents, at once raised the question of the canonicy of the Apocalypse, books which were uncanonical to the Reformers because of the passage (2 Mac 12:3-5) commending prayers for the dead. A similar difficulty was created for many Protestant Christians by the prima facie incompleteness of the Epistle of St. James with Lutheran solidarism—an fact which caused Luther to describe it as an 'epistle of straw.' The second was emphasized by the fissiparous tendencies which immediately began to manifest themselves in reformed Christendom, converting it into a chaos of sects, which ranged from the high scholastic orthodoxies of Luther and Calvin down to the Arminianism of Socinus and the various extravagances of the Anabaptists. The patent contradiction between the Protestant theory of the simplicity and obviousness of the meaning of Scripture and the infinite diversity of opinions held by those who professed to accord it an infallible authority for the outlines of the Christian deposit was satirized in the celebrated couplet of Wenerwels of Basel: *Hic liber est in quo quaeris suum dogmatica quaeque inveniet et partier dogmata quaeque solent.
To the former of these objections the Reformers replied by taking the short Palestinian canon of the OT, as now held by the Jewish Church, on the ground that (as Jerome had urged) the Jews must surely themselves know what their own Scriptures were (their abandoning the tradition of the primitive Christian tradition which had taken over the longer, Septuagintal canon from the Hellenistic Jew) and by affirming that, so far as the NT Scriptures were concerned, their authority was manifest on the face of them, in virtue of the sublimity and elevation of their style and doctrines. This reply obviously settled nothing as to the disputed case of the Epistle of St. James, inasmuch as the question at issue between Luther and his opponents on the subject of this book was precisely this—Were its doctrines to be called 'sublime' or pernicious? To the second question, also, no very satisfactory reply was ever given. In logic the orthodox Protestant divines were compelled to maintain, and did in fact maintain, that the whole system of Nicene and Chalcedonian doctrine could be deduced with unwavering certainty from the text of the NT, given a prayerful and reverent spirit on the part of its readers. But the 'subordinationistic' passages in St. Paul's Epistles (cf. 1 Co 11:18 sqq. etc.) and those in which the Logos and the Spirit are joint 'bearers of the Word' (cf. 2 Co 3:17, 18 sq.), together with the patent fact that Socinus and his followers regarded themselves as 'prayerful' and 'reverent', must have made the orthodox Protestant's doubt in their inmost hearts whether the matter really was as simple as this; and hence they sometimes show signs of being, unwillingly, driven back upon the conception of a teaching Church as the authorized interpreter of Holy Writ. The Thirty-Nine Articles characteristically take up a position which may be interpreted as consistent either with the Catholic view of tradition and Scripture as joint authorities for the truth of the deposit or with the Protestant conception of the book of the Scriptures as the sole authority, independent of any living exponent. So we are told that 'Holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to salvation,' that the three creeds are apparently only to be believed 'because they may be proved by most certain warrants of Holy Scripture,' that 'General Councils may have erred or been deceived,' that 'Scriptures and Analecta must be shown as more entitled to our belief than any derived therefrom by human reason.' On the other hand, 'the Church . . . hath authority in matters of faith' and is 'a witness and a keeper of Holy Writ.' So far as a coherent conception of the relations of tradition to Scripture can be wrought out from these statements, it has been attained by Hooker, whose Eclesiastical Polity appears to be based on the now antiquated assumption that the Chalcedonian theology can be deduced from the text of the NT as directly and irresistibly as the movement of the heavenly bodies can be deduced from a set of astronomical tables. A characteristic and explicit expression of the thoroughly-going Catholic viewpoint within the Anglican Communion is to be found in Hooker's declaration that an indispensable mark of the true Church is the teaching of that word and that ministering of the sacraments which the tradition of the whole Church confideth the sense of the Scriptures to intend. It is clear that the Protestant endeavour of the settlement would go much farther than the old in its attack upon the Catholic tradition, and that it would in fact dispute not merely the authority of the depositaries, but that of the deposit itself and the Founder Himself. Its contentions may be summed up under two headings: (1) philosophical and (2) historical. (1)

Philosophical.—Starting from Calv.'s denial of the validity of the categories of the understanding within the contemplum sphericum, Bishops (q.v.) and his followers would deny the possibility of a deposit of tradition as intrinsically so far transcendent as to avoid the creatively limitations of man's understanding, and -intercourse with God's creation. Christianity could conduct not, of strictly intellectual apprehension. (2) Historical.—It is admitted that the essence of the Catholic deposit and of the traditional understanding of Christianity was a result from the ecclesiastical councils, through the sub-apostolic writers, into the NT itself; but the Protestant divines so far in difficulty in allowing their natural sense to such passages as Acts 9:32; 'Stand forth now therefore (via metaphysic)' which were taught, whether by word, or by letter of purer; 8: 'Withdraw yourselves from every brother that walketh disorderly, and nei-ther take the tradition which he teacheth you'; and notably to the Pauline, or deutero-Pauline, injunction, τον ευθύγραμμον διάλογον (1 Th 5,9), in which 'the deposit' is expressly mentioned.

It would now be conceded that St. Paul regarded Christianity as a dogmatic deposit of a kind (as the Nicene and Chalcedonian declarations were, in a general sense, the depositaries. But it is contended that in this respect there is an absolute gap between the teaching of Jesus and that of Paul; that Jesus regarded Himself merely as a teacher of ethics, or as the prophet of a new eschatological enthusiasm; that the movement which He initiated was of a purely emotional kind, though fraught with an Interimistic validity only for the very brief period of time which, in His view, remained before the collapse of the existing world-order and the inauguration of the New Kingdom; and that, as Jesus believed in the appearance of this kingdom, He would have had no idea of promulgating a deposit or constituting a depository class. But this is in Paul it is Paul's view of the Christian Church as the real founder of Catholic Christianity. He was he who trans- formed the vague and formless apocalypse enthusiasm of the first Christian generation into a definite, firm, working sacraments; it was he who taught Christendom to deduce the Presbyterianism with which the modern day and age of Reason and Stic metaphysic, thereby laying the foundations upon which later ages were to build the elaborate structure of Trini- tarian and Christological dogmas. It is Paul who educates successors who taught primitive Christian to regard themselves as members of a more or less institutionally binding group, the new Ecclesia or Congregation of God, thereby institutionalizing Christianity as a Church and a hierarchy. It is obvious that this view, if it can be historically demonstrated, would be a sure triumph of the traditional conception of Christianity by severing the connection between the deposit itself, and its absolute authority, the history of Christianity then becomes exactly analogous to the history of Judaism and of Buddhism. It is the history of the gradual overgrowth of the teachings of the founder by dogmatic, sacramental, mystical, and hierarchical integuments derived from other religions; 'Catholicism' is thus a sort of Christian Judaism what Lamasism is to primitive Buddhism. The classical expression of this view is still, perhaps, Harnack's great History of Doxology, in which the majestic present of Church history is exhibited as a gradual working out of that 'acute secularization' of Christianity initiated by the well-meaning, though mistaken, desire of St. Paul to commend the new religious movement to persons who had grown up in the atmosphere of the Hellenistic world. It follows from this view that the whole of the 'Catholic' deposit, including the central doctrines of the Trinity and the Atonement, must be discarded, and not merely those comparatively peripheral portions of it which were dropped by the great 16th century Reformers; Doxology, in other words, is an essential part of Catholic Christianity; and Catholic Christianity will disappear entirely, and institutionalism will be reduced to the minimum consistent with the notion of the Church. Despite the many conscious or unconscious attempts that have been made to break the ice, this question, Is the Catholic deposit in toto substantially what was promul- gated by Christ, or is it a vast mass of Greco-Roman accretion which nothing whatever to do with His authentic teaching, is the primary and crucial question that lies before the religious thought of Europe at present, and will probably have to be answered decisively, in one sense or the other, before one hundred years are over.

5. Recent developments.—Within the sphere of traditional Christianity three additional developments deserve brief mention. These are all that may be observed, confined to the Western or Latin Church, as in the East the era of petrifaction, which set in with the death of St. John of Damascus and the beginning of the great epoch of the East, still holds sway. (1) The first of these is analogous to what may be noticed in the case of Lamasism, viz., the tendency to concentrate upon the functions of the deposition of the single chief depository or supreme pontiff. So, within the Roman Church, the pope was declared by the Vatican Council of 1870 to be endowed, when performing his office, with that of the teacher of Christians, with the same infallibility (q.v.) as that which Catholic traditionalism attributes to the Church; and this belief is consis-
summed up in the '1 am tradition' of Pius IX. — a remark in which an unfriendly critic might discern an echo of the old priest-king idea. (2) The second development is the theory that was analogous to what we see in Judaism, with its attempts to form 'a hedge around the Law,' to protect the real deposit by surrounding it with a kind of secondary deposit; that is, an armour. In the Pius IX, this protective armour or integument was supplied by the edicts of the Rabbis. In Latin Catholicism the opinions of theologians have, in practice, come to assume the character of dogmas. Over the nucleus of the deposit, consisting of doctrines which are strictly de fide, there is a fringe, or penumbra, of 'plures opinions' which are prosumt fidei, based, not upon the decrees of ecclesiastical councils, but upon the consensus theologorum. To deny these opinions is not indeed heretical, but may be censured as 'temerarious' or 'offensive to pious ears.' In practice the distinction between the dogmas of the primary deposit and the pluses opinions of the secondary does not appear to be very clear; and even local traditions regarding the authenticity and sanction of particular holy places and objects of devotion, however a matter of ordinary human evidence, are sometimes treated with as much respect — and criticism of them is as much resented — as though they belonged to the inner nucleus of the faith. The third development represents a reaction against the former two, and is popularly called 'Modernism.'

In its extreme French and Italian forms, Modernism (1919) is logically identical with the extreme Ritschlian Protestantism of Schleiermacher. It denies that Christ meant to promulgate a deposit, or would have had any authority to do so if He had so meant; and regards Him rather as a religious genius, not exempt from the errors and limitations of His age and country, who merely gave the first impulse to a wave of emotional feeling, which has reverberated down the centuries and is still affecting myriad sinners. This view is, of course, entirely destructive of Catholic traditionalism as described above. In England, Germany, and America, however, the Modernist movement has taken a more moderate form; and within the Anglican Church, the corresponding movement has raised a very interesting problem — that of the relation between the spiritual contents of the deposit, which the Anglican Modernist would not deny, and the Church tradition, and the forms borrowed by the early Fathers and councils from Greek metaphysic to contain it. Whilst the Anglo-Catholic would maintain that the Church was divinely inspired to choose the right conceptual forms, and that these, having received eccumenical sanction, cannot be discarded by the individual believer, the Anglo-Moderne regards the forms as having no more than a purely human authority, and as capable from time to time of variation or even of supersession. The question of the depositary class does not seem to have been directly raised in these discussions, but it is probable that the Anglo-Moderne would regard the whole Church or Christian people, and not any specialized class within it, as being the depositary.


W. Sandys and N. P. Williams, Form and Content in the Christian Tradition, 1916. The English Catholic point of view may be studied in J. B. Franzelin, De divina traditione et scripturis, Rome, 1873; L. de San, De divina traditione et scripturis, Lyons, 1897; J. V. Balmers, De traditione et scripturis, Paris, 1905.

TRAGEDY.—See DRAMA.

TRAINING (Religious).—Religion is an attitude towards God. It expresses itself in acts of appreciation of values by individuals and groups. These acts are rooted in the human psyche. They may be few and irregular; they may be gross expressions of wild passion; or they may be refined and well-disciplined reactions of the whole personality in the presence of eternal values. The differences are determined chiefly by training the inner life to react consistently to higher ideals and motives, and by training conduct to habitual and adequate expression of appreciation.

There is a broad sense in which religious training is a feature of all forms of religion, from primitive animism with favourite incantations up to the cultured forms of ritual, all transmitted by religious institutions by imitation and other educative processes. But this article deals only with the specific types of religious training now practised or proposed in the English-speaking world.

By religious training is meant a systematic effort to preserve, improve, propagate, and transmit religious life, by methods commonly used in education, such as imitation, instruction, discipline, and inspirational and moral forces, in correlation with other means of promoting religion. It goes even farther in some minds; and not without justification the claim is made that educational training, no matter how secular or technical, is not complete or adequately motivated unless in its aim and spirit it leads up to that social purpose which is the chief part of religion (Herbert, Calm).

I. Background.—The types of religious training which now prevail have arisen by connected development (1) out of a long and diversified history of maladjustment between childhood and the Christian Church, (2) out of numerous artificial theologies and individualistic theories of religion, and (3) out of an utter lack, until recently, of any psychology of religion or of childhood.

(1) The child's brief pre-conceptual religious training may be found (a) in the stereotyped forms of worship and religious expression handed down to successive generations through church and family life; (b) in the catechism and confirmation class, where formal drill and authoritative doctrine and precept have long produced educational results of some importance in religious life. (c) A nearer background exists in the modern Sunday schools, first with their memorized Bible lessons, and since 1870 with their uniform lessons taught by rather feeble hortatory methods.

(2) The theoretical background is found in an individualistic theology. The corner-stones of this theology were the natural sinfulness of every man, the impending judgment of punishment therefor, and the miraculous atonement of Jesus Christ, which made possible the repentance and pardon of the individual sinner. The supernatural factor was magnified; the human conditions and means of salvation were subordinated, and the ethical discrepancies passed unnoticed. The process was conceived as judicial on the basis of a retributive penology now discarded in the best judicial practice. The instruction given was not regarded primarily as educative, but rather as dogmatic; it was mystical, and by far the most important significance was attached to the teachings of Jesus about the growth of the spiritual
life or the conditions of the ground into which the seed shall fall.

The social gospel lately found to be so conspicu-ous in the teaching and life of Jesus was unknown. For the lack of salutary growth it is essentially self-regarding, which is doubtless the main reason why Christianity has been so long and slow in making its way in the world. When the era of modern moralism, three things had happened. (a) The individual gospel was proclaimed from social and really Christian motives, and the result was good so far as it went, but incommensurate with the effort expended. (b) Actual conditions in mission fields and the emergence of social ideals at home forced an expansion of missionary aims so as to include social service—a gospel which was not always well correlated with the other. (c) As soon as this social gospel had time to reveal its character and possibilities, results became overwhelming; and the missionary prayer is no longer for the opening of doors, as it was a half-century ago, but for teaching, doctors, nurses, farmers, and skilled workmen, by hundreds, to carry a full-orbed Christian civilization into all the lands whose Maccabean calls are coming un-sought and unbidden.

(3) Until the last quarter of the 19th cent., psychology was a thing remote from religion. It had not then as now stressed the unity of the self, as against a number of more or less independent 'faculties' bearing little relation to religion. Nor had child psychology made known the extent to which the mind is at first rudimentary, and subject to the continuous and slow changes which the long human infancy makes possible. Psychology and social and educational science have found no place in the theory of religion until the last generation, and even yet there are those in every religious body who shudder at the thought of applying scientific methods to the propagation of religion. But it is out of these diverse conditions ancient and modern that a theory and practice of religious education is now rapidly taking shape.

2. Theory and aim.—There is a type of religious education which perpetuates the theoretical back-ground of intellectualism and individualism. Its propositions are arranged in logical order, and not in the order in which they arise in human experience. They are held to be authoritative, and are taught in dogmatic form. Under this theory the service which education renders to religion is to make these formulse known, and here the service ends.

Under the other type the service rendered by education to religion is much broader. The know-ledge to be imparted is not dogmatic but inspira-tional; not an end, but a means to spiritual values; not generalized and abstract, but presented concretely and made illuminating to the pupil's present life. This type of religious training includes habits of worship, attitudes toward the natural world, ideals of life, deeds of service, the relations sustained to the smaller and larger groups of one's fellow-men, and, in fact, every form of useful expression which can be given to inner spiritual life.

(1) The theory on which any adequate plan for religious training is based includes the following fundamental ideas as to the development of religion. (a) The presence of the religious life is felt not only in worship and in the conventional forms of religi-ous expression, but especially in character and in social purpose, which subordinates all interests to those of life. (b) The religious life is a continuous growth, not a thing produced artifi-cially, or judicially instituted at the moment of a passing experience. (c) This growth involves not a special organ or faculty, but the whole person-

ality. It involves even the group of persons, and it tends to realize in them their oneness with the larger whole of society and of the world in God. (d) Finally, the growth of the religious life is against the normal, vigorous, and fundamental development. The true nature is understood, as favourable conditions for its growth are provided, and as consistent work and painstaking devotion are given to its cultiva-
tion.

(2) The following educational facts and principles are also involved in the theory of religious training. (a) The subject of an educative process is a person with all his inherited equipment of race instincts and family traits, as well as his unde-
veloped mental, moral, and religious powers. It is the business of education, not to eradicate or sup-
plant any of these, but to develop and cultivate them, and subordinate them to the highest ends. (b) Education is more than instruction. It not only builds up many and rich concepts, which shall serve as a basis for judgment and action by a mem-
er of society; but it also takes measures to estab-
lish desirable habits, and to create ideals of com-
manding dignity and emotional power. (c) Edu-
cation uses concrete materials for this purpose. It selects for the task of these human conditions best fitted in character and grade to accomplish the particular purpose in view. The treasures of the race have become very rich in such material, so that the selection and preparation of it is a task demanding the skill of educational experts.

(3) The thing that is aimed at in religious edu-
cation is (a) to put one as early and as completely as possible in possession of that rich treasure of experience which has come down from the past, and has been gathered from the ends of the earth, especially those parts of it which are richest in their meanings for a man's life in the world with other people and as a worker with God. (b) A further aim is to turn the full force of that experi-
ence, in the form of socialized ideals and purposes, as a motive power upon conduct and upon the ordering of the programme of life. This is an individual aim, but it is far more. It enlists churches, homes, and communities in this motiva-
tion of conduct for the well-being of society at large. (c) It is believed that the instruction to be derived from the parable of the soils (Mc 4:20) is a lesson of education, in which the minds mellowed by long processes of nurture are those which respond quickly and whole-heartedly to the evan-
gel. Such nurture would seem therefore to be the most direct and effective way of preparing one with the Spirit of God for the evangelization of the world.

3. Content.—Since religion and its promotion are understood to be, to some extent at least, an enterprise in education, it is necessary to choose for such instruction that material which will be most fruitful religiously. Rather vague ideas prevail on this subject, due to lack of critical analysis of the values to be sought, and to incomplete know-
ledge of how to produce and conserve those values. The educational reformers of a century ago estab-
lished the principle of gradation of material—i.e., that the ability of children to understand and master material changes as they grow older. The material must therefore be chosen with reference to this changing ability; e.g., the incident of a boy holding a bird's nest can be understood and remem-
bered by a five-year-old child, but the moral inter-
pretation of the same incident is better suited for a mind several years older.

The fallacy of catechetical instruction is partly a pedagogical one. It consists in presenting adult abstraction to children in offering strong meat instead of milk to babes. A similar

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has been most complete in nearly every curriculum thus far proposed for religious training.

(3) While it helps to provide a knowledge of science and general education to develop in youth a conception of the causal connectedness of the world and of its unity, consistency, and organization under natural law, it is a well-known fact that this is not generally done, for the reasons given above. But the education of youth is not more frequently connected with religion than elsewhere, and it is proper that religious education should provide in place of discarded cosmologies a better instruction which can serve the common people as a credible philosophy of nature. Nothing can do more to disintegrate religious faith and moral integrity than lack of a believable philosophy of the world. Such a philosophy is entirely within the mental compass of enlightened youths; and they have a right to it as a support for their faith and as a part of their education. Indeed they will have it. The only uncertainty is as to how good or how poor a philosophy they shall work out for themselves if wise help is withheld from them.

For the few but important lessons on this subject the creation stories and a few other portions of Scripture will serve as occasion for wise and modern instruction. A few of the great chapters in the history of science are required. These need not be correlated with the traditional creeds or systems of philosophy; they can make known a few of the landmarks of religious history, at least by their names and by some characteristic incidents associated with those names.

In selecting and grading the materials for religious education there are a number of considerations to be provided for.

(1) The language of religion must be acquired. As in any field of human experience, the language and the thought develop together. Some terms are advanced and technical, but many are elementary. The existing and practice of religion, the reading of the Bible, and the social environment offered by a religious community can make familiar to children, nurtured in such an atmosphere, all the elementary concepts of religion, and the words and expressions to which they refer. Only they can make known a few of the landmarks of religious history, at least by their names and by some characteristic incidents associated with those names.

A properly graded curriculum therefore provides for young children a selection of simple Bible incidents on subjects within their experience, or a like class of subjects taken from biography, literature, history, or the sciences which are the stories about children, animals, natural objects, and the things familiar to childhood, especially those which contain some of the language and forms of religion, but none of the generalizations and abstract principles in which religious teaching is so often couched.

(2) The child inherits certain capacities for a moral and religious life. But each individual must shape his concepts of that life from the examples of other experiences seen and heard by him. His education consists in becoming acquainted with the examples of others; in reading of other persons, meaning into them, and in shaping his own habits, judgments, and ideals, with reference to the experiences so set before him. This formation of concepts represents a later stage of religious development than the elementary social facts already mentioned above, but the later mingles with the earlier stage, and they move forward together. A class of more meaningful experiences is chosen for this purpose, such as the parables of Jesus, tales of moral heroism, events in which service and sacrifice are exemplified, the revelations of motives and of character and of loyalty to persons and to ideals, and the superiority of moral and spiritual values over those values which are chiefly carnal and commercial.

It is therefore the business of religious education to bring into the life of youth an abundance of human incidents rich in moral and religious meaning; to present these experiences with sufficient detail and pedagogical skill to assure them an atmosphere, an emotional vitality, and some permanence which the other subjects mentioned above, but the later mingles with the earlier stage, and they move forward together. A class of more meaningful experiences is chosen for this purpose, such as the parables of Jesus, tales of moral heroism, events in which service and sacrifice are exemplified, the revelations of motives and of character and of loyalty to persons and to ideals, and the superiority of moral and spiritual values over those values which are chiefly carnal and commercial.

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their meanings interpreted. Such issues were drawn in OT times by the prophets against royal and ecclesiastical dignitaries. Jesus defined an issue between the Pharisees and the new religion of common people. Every teacher, every prophet, every reform, every moral and spiritual achievement from that day to this, can be of great service to those whose motives and ideals are forming. They have been drawn as a background to the tasks and problems of to-day, as a guide in defining and discovering present and future issues, and as an inspiration to loyalty in trying situations. Here will appear biographies of men and women who have caught visions of an improved world and have helped to realize these visions. Here also belong the rise and fall of institutions in response to the changing needs of the world. Out of such rich and varied sources are being selected the graded and sifted materials for a curriculum of religious training.

4. Method and Organization.—While the history of pedagogy has been progressive, and general educational aims have reflected that tendency, religious training has been slow to take up improved methods. Memorizer catechetical teaching is still common. Hortatory and semi-expository teaching of the Bible is quite general in church schools, but it is often being evangelistic and not primarily educative.

There is a marked tendency to reconstruct, not only the curriculum in ways already indicated, but also the method and organization. In method these changes consist in a larger use of direct narrative in connexion with concrete story material used in the lower grades; the immediate oral reproduction by pupils of the narrative so presented; the increased use of pictorial and graphic representation, and the tendency to substitute for the leaflet, pamphlet, or bare Bible specially prepared text-books of a more permanent and attractive character.

But the most important tendency is towards things to be done, as an expression in real life of the moral and religious impulses, as they awaken in childhood and youth. Daily conduct, positions taken on moral questions before associates, missionary work, community betterment, neighbourly and charitable work, and worthy social activities in general, offer a welcome field for religious training in this growing aspect. Only of such activities arise deeper and truer thinking and finer emotional responses than any didactic method can produce.

Institution of church organization provide for a department of religious training in the local church. This department is free to adopt methods in harmony with improved educational and religious ideas, and to introduce a curriculum something like that outlined above. Only in those local churches where the broad full meaning of religious education has been discussed and appreciated has the reconstruction taken place. But the nature of the process is impressing; they are profiting by experience; and their results are watched and reported.

In several American communions, notably the Protestant Episcopal, the Congregational, and the Presbyterian, important steps have been taken to reconstruct the denominational material for the use of denominational Bibles. Numerical facts are employed to propagate the principles and ideals of religious training in the local churches, and to aid in the installation of similar systems. These methods are especially successful in missionary fields, (1) because there the need is more obvious, and (2) because the methods of prayer have been turned to antiquated methods as many of the churches are.

While the prospect for the future of religious education is best in the direction of denominational organization, there is also a distinct movement on foot for community organization disregarding ecclesiastical divisions, or at least bringing them into co-operation. This plan calls for a local board and a superintendent, who shall inaugurate a school system parallel to the other system or systems in the same community. Less time would be required in the religious training of the general and vocational schools; yet the effect of the training cannot be estimated by the time spent. In addition to the direct values of such training the material of general education is re-interpreted and given a meaning and direction present and future issues, and as an inspiration to loyalty in trying situations. Here will appear biographies of men and women who have caught visions of an improved world and have helped to realize these visions. Here also belong the rise and fall of institutions in response to the changing needs of the world. Out of such rich and varied sources are being selected the graded and sifted materials for a curriculum of religious training.

In Britain and in some other European countries the schools supported at public expense are expected to furnish some instruction of a religious nature. Recognition is made of denominational preferences, and teachers are assigned to groups with this in mind. In France religious instruction is entirely excluded from all public and private schools of general education, and the members of religious orders are disqualified as teachers. This of course does not prevent the teaching of religion in the churches. In the United States of America religion is excluded by the laws of the States from the public schools; but entire freedom is given for this instruction under church or community supervision. In some States the pupils are released for one session each week from required attendance at a public school on the condition of attending religious instruction under approved religious instruction, proportionate credit being given if such work is satisfactorily done.

In general it may be said that the ideals and content of religious education have been reconstructed in accordance with modern ideas. The realization of the better ideals has been achieved in a limited degree, and every year marks distinct gains. But the program is retarded (1) by conservative traditions among earnest religious people, who have not seen the spiritual values in a religious life conceived developmentally and socially; (2) by inadequate conceptions of and facilities for training in religious activity and self-expression, and (3) by lack of united and trained leadership in the re-organization of religious education in local communities. It seems to be the task of Christian colleges to raise up a generation of men and women who have the religious and educational ideals and the ability and enthusiasm to organize them into the life of our time.

A good central organization for the study of religious education, for the comparison of results, and for the promotion of this large interest in the life and thought of the world exists in the Religious Education Association (Henry F. Cope, Secretary, 1440 East 57th Street, Chicago, Ill.). It was founded in 1903 by representatives of all religious faiths. It has held important annual conventions, mostly in American cities. These conventions have done much to shape thought, guide effort, and stimulate experiment. The volumes of the bi-monthly magazine of the Association entitled Religious Education furnish much material in the history and discussion of this subject.

Other related articles in this Encyclopedia may be referred to as follows: Education (Moral), Christianity, Church, Confirmation, Catechisms, Bible, Sunday School.


WILLIAM JAMES MUNCH.

TRANSCENDENCE.—See Immanence.

1 W. S. Athearn, Religious Education and American Democracy, Boston and Chicago, 1917.
TRANSCENDENTALISM. — The term 'transcendental' plays an important part in Kant's Critique of the Pure Reason—'transcendental logic,' 'transcendental metaphysics,' etc.—and through the influence of the critical philosophy the term has become familiar in modern thinking and even in popular literature. Kant did not originate the term, but he gave it new vigour and a new orientation.

1. Pre-Kantian transcendentalism. — (1) Use of the term in scholastic logic.—Before Kant's time 'transcendental' and 'transcendence' were familiar terms in the scholastic logic and were practically equivalent in meaning, although he sharply distinguished between them. To the scholastic logicians these terms were used of those most general notions that could not be subsumed under the ten Aristotelian categories. They rose beyond or transcended them. Spinoza uses 'transcendent' in this sense of the most general notions and gives his view of how psychologically they originate. 1 Strictly speaking, these 'transcendentalia' or 'transcendentia' belonged to a realm above ordinary categorical logical thinking and as such were beyond the province of logic proper. Various enumerations of these transcendent notions are given. Albertus Magnus gives ens, unum, bonum, et verum; and very generally these, along with res and aliquid, make up the list in the scholastic literature. Their interrelations are stated and various subtleties regarding them introduced by different schoolmen. Ens was as a rule regarded as super-transcendental, the root being passions or modifications of being (passiones entis). This category in scholastic philosophy was pretty much what the 'Absolute' is in modern philosophy.

(2) Use of the term in theology.—To the schoolmen, however, logic was only the handmaiden of theology, and so we find these terms more or less always moving into the area of theological speculation. These transcendental notions had their reality in the mind of God, who is transcendent per excellents. The passage in Augustine 2 where he posits the transcendental ideas in the divine mind became classical and is quoted by all the great medivalists. It is in his transanalistic interpretation of Greek thought with Christian experience. Plato speaks of the good (τὸ ἀγαθόν) as transcending being (ἐξωτερικὸν τὸ ὀνόματι), 3 and Plotinus uses the concept of transcendence in the Latin equivalent of ἐξωτερικόν, 'beyond.' At times this tendency became extreme, as in the case of Eligens and the mystics who speak of God as above all predicates—ἐν πάσῃ θλίψει, ἐν πάσῃ φόβῳ, ἐν πάσῃ ἀδικίᾳ, 'above truth,' 'above wisdom,' 'above eternity.'

Transcendentalism in theology, then, means the position that God's knowledge and character are perfect, absolute as distinct from man's knowledge, which is imperfect, and from man's virtue, which is immaterial; as such it is part of the very essence of theology and the unmovable conviction of religion. But it may become falsified through overemphasis and dangerous through over-refinement of subtlety. Ordinary living religious experience speaks of the divine in plain speech, ascribing to God's organs, powers, movement, change, purposes, and this is done without any feeling of incongruity—even when the divine spirituality is clearly recognized. Transcendentalism becomes over-subtle when it objects to this, and it is usually confronted with religious skepticism—when religion is a low ebb and beset by foes that this form of transcendentalism gains a hearing. Even in the OT, as Schultze points out, 4 we have the beginning of reflective transcendentalism. It is more evident in the Septuagint, in Philo and in the later scholastic Jewish literature, and it operates dominantly in Philo until God becomes the Great Unknown.

In the history of Christian theology we find the superimposition of this metaphysical and mystical transcendentalism on the direct religious thought of the NT. Edwin Hatch, in his famous Hibbert Lectures, 2 maintains that the great creeds of Christendom buried religion under this metaphysics; and in his zeal he has overstated the case; for transcendentalism in the sense of God's absoluteness is an integral part of religion and of theology, but, when it makes this a mode of throwing discredit on man's knowledge and of undermining man's notions of right and wrong, when it empties God of feeling, purpose, and initiation, then it becomes false and dangerous.

It is better to idealize the sense of transcendentalism in this sense, before discussing the Kantian and post-Kantian usage of the term, as these forms of thinking have their roots deep in a soil different from that of the generally and dominantly under the influence of Kant.

2. Extra-Kantian transcendentalism. — Transcendentalism in the theological and philosophical sphere means, in a general way, the recognition of God as exalted in thought and character above man and sensible objects. It is thus contrasted with phenomenalism, naturalism, and materialism, one may say, also agnosticism, for, although the agnostic may grant the existence of such a Being, the concession is of no value either for knowledge or for morality. In this sense every religious view of the world is transcendental. When, however, we ask what the relation between man's knowledge and virtue and God's is, the real problem of transcendentalism emerges, and, according to the answer given, thinkers fall into two main classes, which for purposes of clarity may be distinguished as follows.

(1) Extreme transcendentalism.—Those who hold that God is utterly incomprehensible to us, and that all knowledge of divine virtue in Him are quite different, not only in quantity but in quality, from what we mean by these terms, are extreme transcendentalists in the sphere of ontology. Modern examples are Hamilton and Mansel, who, borrowing a Kantian distinction, maintained that our predicated knowledge of God is regulative not speculative truth, that it was given, not to satisfy the reason, but to guide the practice of man, not to tell us what God is in His absolute nature, but what He wills us to think of Him in our present conditioned state. This phase of transcendentalism arose as a protest against what Hamilton calls 'the scheme of pantheistic omniscience so prevalent among the sequacious thinkers of the day.' Speculative theologians have always had leanings towards this mode of reasoning regarding the divine, and its influence can be traced in theology from the days of Origen. While the ordinary religious consciousness speaks of God as wise and good, and cannot help so doing, yet these terms in reality do not apply to Him, and are to be understood not in a metaphysical sense as designed

1 Etibio, pt. ii. prop. xl. schol. 1.
3 De Divinis Quaestionibus, i. 40.
4 Rep. 302 B.
5 E.g., Zenon, v. 1, 6, where God is described as εξωτερικός, 'beyond all things.'
6 OT, Theology, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1852, pp. 114.
7 The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Church, ed. A. M. Fairbairn, London, 1839, ch. iv.
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From the plane of intelligence, according to Beethius, all the contradictions of the ordinary experience are reconcilable. Thus to God they harmonize, and to us as far as we look at them from this point of view from this plane. Here is a striking parallelism, viz. forgetting of the truth that man is made in the image of God, and forgetting that thinkers are apt to cut apart God and man, and thereby religion and reason alike become unreal and untrustworthy. Under this illusion religious men fall back on an authority which has no basis in our rational or moral nature, or on some occult faculty apart from reason; and others, strictly adhering to the working of the understanding, leave the transcendental sphere of Being alone. Outside the small circle illuminated by the understanding there may be Something, but to us it is unknown and unknowable. Agnosticism as regards ultimate reality is the result of this attitude.

(2) Religious transcendentalism.—Others, again, maintain also God's transcendental character, but they hold that man's knowledge is accurate as far as it goes, that in quality, though not in quantity, it is the same as God's, and that morality in man can not be different in essence from what it is in the divine, that the pathway of true knowledge and of true goodness are related. The pure heart is certainly an accommodation, but this accommodation itself is an education of man by God, progressing from less to more and conserving in its more perfect stages continuity with the earlier, and besides the process is self-correcting. J. B. Mozley gives a very fair view of this position as regards the OT. God dealt with men as they were, but in such a way as to lead them onwards and upwards. Man makes God in his own image, but it is because God first made man in His image. Augustine, who often speaks of God as incomprehensible—as indeed every religious mind must do, so that Hamilton has no difficulty in compiling a catena of such passages from various writers—yet maintains that our intellectual and moral strivings are but a returning to the Source whence intelligence and goodness spring. The human mind and heart participate in transcendental knowledge and goodness, and the aim of theology is to ascend by this road to God; only to man the grace of the Holy Spirit is necessary to initiate and guide. The method here is not so much that of negation as of eminence (via eminention), and it differs from pure philosophical or epistemological transcendentalism both in its inception on the need of grace and in its proper valuation of other aspects of experience besides the pure intellect. It is this that 'Rabbi' Duncan has in view when he defines transcendentalism as 'the denial of that which renders man's knowledge an inferior kind of knowledge,' and it is in this sense that F. D. Maurice is a transcendentalist when in somewhat exaggerated fashion he fathers on Mansel's theory such frightful consequences.

(3) Epistemological transcendentalism.—Distinct from this again is what one may call pure epistemological transcendentalism, according to which the highest knowledge in man becomes identical with, and indistinguishable from, the divine knowledge. Thus Beethius:

'Sense judges figure clothed in material substance. Imagination figures alone without matter. Thought transcends this and deals in contemplating. The pure mind considers the type itself which is contained in the individual. The eye of imagination is more exalted, for it seeks of the universe nothing but absolute form itself by the pure power of the mind's vision.'

1 Beethius, 'Epistle to Dr. R. H. James, London, 1807, p. 189.
2 "Reflections on the Views of the Late Mrs. Godwin," 1807, p. 189.
4 "Reflections on the Views of the Late Mrs. Godwin," 1807, p. 189.
5 "Reflections on the Views of the Late Mrs. Godwin," 1807, p. 189.
6 "Reflections on the Views of the Late Mrs. Godwin," 1807, p. 189.
7 "Reflections on the Views of the Late Mrs. Godwin," 1807, p. 189.
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12 "Reflections on the Views of the Late Mrs. Godwin," 1807, p. 189.
13 "Reflections on the Views of the Late Mrs. Godwin," 1807, p. 189.
14 "Reflections on the Views of the Late Mrs. Godwin," 1807, p. 189.
15 "Reflections on the Views of the Late Mrs. Godwin," 1807, p. 189.
of valid knowledge, and a transcendental inquiry, such as his own critical method, 'concerns itself, not so much with objects, but with the way in which we know objects in so far as this may be possible,' 1 which renders the aim of all analysis of the mode of our knowing the object. 2 What really matters is not be the aim of the critical philosophy to determine, but to find out that element in knowledge which makes it valid and to guard knowledge against the two extremes of empiricism and noumenism. The understanding can reach in dealing with phenomena from the side of the receptivity of mind, just as 'the transcendental unity of apperception' is the limit on the side of the mind's synthesizing activity. No other claim has any relevance for the understanding, for it knows nothing of noumena. 3 If one were to regard this only as Kantianism, the first review of the Kritik—that of Christian Garve of Breslau, 'which was also canonized in one way or another Anzeigen' of 19th Jan. 1782—might have forces:

'This work . . . is a system of the higher or transcendental idealism—an idealism which embraces both fact and matter, transforms the world and ourselves into ideas, and represents the objective world as derived from appearances which the understanding combines in the interdependent whole of experience, . . . The cause of these ideas is to us unknown and unknowable. 4

But what pure reason cannot attain to, practical reason can. Morality needs transcendental realities as postulates, and, because the sphere of morality is to Kant more real than, or as real as, the sphere of knowledge, this postulation is necessarily but valid. The transcendental of knowledge becomes the transcendental of morality. God, the world, the soul, freedom, and immortality become real here. We do not prove their existence or discuss them, by cognitive methods, but they are imperatively demanded by the facts of the moral life, of which facts he had no doubt.

4. Post-Kantian transcendentalism. — Kant's system was profound in its effects, different thinkers adopting those parts of it which served their turn, so that the complexion of their transcendentalism is determined by their point of contact with his view. His influence touched the English-speaking world at first largely through the works of Coleridge, Carlyle, and Emerson.

(1) The teaching of Coleridge, Carlyle, and Emerson.—Kant's philosophical function may be defined by saying that through him was transmitted an opportune suffusion of Kant and Schelling into England as of light softened through a stained-glass medium, and that into this suffusion he also resumed whatever of Anglo-Platonism had been floating long neglected in the works of old English Divines. 5 Thus the distinction between the 'reason' and the 'understanding' became familiar, and 'transcendental philosophy' acclimatized in English speech. The reason could overcome the impotence of the understanding and get hold of unseen realities.

1 As the elder Romberg distinguished their northern provinces into Cis-Alpine and Trans-Alpine, so we may divide all the objects of human knowledge into those which are known to us by the senses on the other side of the spontaneous consciousness: cibra et transcendentam communem. The latter is exclusivist the domain of pure philosophy, and the former, which is called the transcendental, in order to discriminate it at once, both from mere reflection and re-presentation on the one hand, and on the other from those few lights of self-speculation which, abandoned by all distinct consciousness, because transcending the bounds and purposes of our intellectual faculties, are justly condemned, as transcendental. 6

It is clear that Coleridge has no interest in accurately reproducing Kant. To him transcendentalism is just emphasis on the spiritual side of man's nature, and this is the meaning also to Carlyle:

'The grand unparalleled peculiarity of Teutofrech is, that with all this transcendentalism, he combines a Transcendentalism, no less superstitious whereby if on one hand he degrades man beneath animals, except the Cows, and the God's Cows, he, on the other, exalts him beyond the visible Heavens, almost to an equality with the Gods.'
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transcendentalism came to mean the recognition of
super sensible realities, and the spiritual nature of
man—that man was more than 'an omnivorous
biped that wears breeches.' A passage from Cole-
ridge shows the influence of this attitude in the
sphere of interpretation:

'...the intelligible forms of ancient poets,
the fair humanities of old religion,
the sublime reaches of historicity,
and the mystery
That had their haunt in dales, or piny mountain,
Or forest, by slow stream, or pebbly spring.
Or in the dark and watery depths: all these have vanished;
They live no longer in the faith of reason.
But all the better need a language.'

The faith in 'the light that never was on sea
or land,' 'the vision and the faculty divine,'
the fight against a crude interpretation of man's
spirit as ultimately matter, and the protest
against literalism in all its forms, characterize
transcendentalism at this stage; and this is still
the sense of the word in extra-philosophical
literature. In New England Emerson and others,
rebelling against an orthodoxy that tended to
make men wholly sinful and corrupt and the will
of man necessarily in bondage, and impatient
of dogmas derived from a revelation confined to one
book, initiated a movement that got the name
'transcendentalism' more in name than in
honour, but the term was accepted, and the claim
made that all the best in the world's thought
was here included. Carlyle, who, in spite of his
sympathy with Emerson, saw in this movement
an extravagant disregard of facts and an enthusi-
astic eclecticism, warned Emerson against the
dangers ahead:

'You seem to me in danger of dividing yourselves from the
Past of the Universe, in which alone ugly as it is I can find any
anchorage.'

James Martineau—himself a transcendentalist in
the Carlylean sense, whose intellectual history is
a pilgrimage from the bondage of empiricism—
does not take Emerson seriously. No doubt New
England transcendentalism became extravagant,
welcoming the raving of the Swedenborgian and
of the unregulated mystical as possible revelations,
yet it never became a system, and its airy optimism
is explicable and defensible as a protest and a
reaction; yet to its influence is largely due the
fact that to many, if not to all, in our day
transcendentalism means hopeless and unwarranted
idealism—unworkable dreaming. It was not
patient enough to be lasting, and, with all its
bombardeed insouciance, was blind to the facts
that gave the old orthodoxy its seriousness
and its power of rejuvenescence. On the other
hand, it was a refreshing and liberalizing
movement.

(2) Science and transcendentalism. Kant's
influence was felt in a very different quarter—among
those whose interests were devoted to science.
Thus Lange, the historian of materialism, inter-
preting Kant, as he thought, confines man's
knowledge of reality to the results of science,
but contends for a world above this created by
our moral and spiritual needs—an unsubstantial
world of ideas. A transcendentalism which is like
a painted cloud; and this attitude has more or
less existed since, differing according to the amount
of reality the individual thinker gives to this
beautiful but airy realm. It is found in the
historian Buckle, and has been well described
as a 'consultory private transcendentalism.'

Herbert Spencer's magnanimous handing over of
the Unknowable to religion is an example of this
'private transcendentalism.' It is due to a one-
sided exploitation of Kant without regard to
Kant's moral certainty. To Kant the moral
nature of man planted man in an intelligible real
world, although knowledge left him only in the
phenomenal, with just a glimmer of the noumenal
breaking through, but this truth, which, as in Lange's case, pretends to be its law-
ful heir finds the phenomenal the real, and the
transcendental the vague and the shadowy.

Others more alive to the reality of rationalism have sought to push transcendentalism side by side
with scientific results, while conscious all the time
of the hostility between the two. Thus W. H.
Mallock1 attempts to hold by the results of
science and yet to allow the demands of religion
validity; and this attitude was prevalent in the
past century.

In psychology the theory of psycho-physical parallelism
exhibits the same tendency—a species of cleavage between
phenomenalism and transcendentalism. The results of science
are accepted; its principles are unquestioned, and
these same facts are explained as if nothing but psychological data
were involved. It is a truce born of perplexity—a compact that
real issues will not be raised on either side. It is not difficult to see
how closely related to Kant these tendencies are, for it may not
unfairly be said that he himself adapted without question
the results of science and also the deliverances of a spiritual
philosophy due to religion and held them both without con-
sistently uniting them.

Paulsen, one of Kant's most faithful modern disciples, contents that science will never give up its
claim to explain everything mechanistically; yet
metaphysics must give to this realm of science
an idealistic interpretation. One may be the most
rigid materialist at one moment, and yet be wholly
transcendentalist as a philosopher at another.
The scientist will never admit any supernatural
agent, and the only way of preserving his claim;
yet somehow to transform all into spiritual
reality is the task of the philosopher. It is because
of this felt dualism that transcendentalism in its
pure form as absolutism claims for him the
true heir and rightful corrector and interpreter of
Kant.

(3) Absolute transcendentalism. — 'Transcen-
dentalism' in modern philosophy is used quite
world-wide known at times as absolutism, objective
idealism, neo-Hegelianism, or rationalism.
The term 'transcendentalism' traces this system
historically to Kant's theory of knowledge. As
we saw above, it is a compromise between at
least two things: (a) Those principles in know-
ledge which in the nature of the case did not
originate in sense-experience are transcendent.
In this sense the term Kantianism is not really itself,
with that degree of gravity in British thought which rec-
ognized a priori or original data both in know-
ledge and in morality—what may be generally
named intuitionism. Leibniz's famous revision
of the empirical formula may be taken as the
watchword of this school: 'Nihil est in intellectu
quod non prius fuerit in sensu nisi ipsa intellectus.'
The controversy between Hume and Reid, between
Mill and Hamilton, is one between psychological
empiricism and psychological transcendentalism,
just as the controversy between hedonism and
intuitionism is a phase in the same of the
sphere of ethics. This was the outstanding question in
British philosophy for many a day. Masson in
his Recent British Philosophy gives a readable
account of the state of matters in his time, and
'transcendentalism' is used by him of those
systems which recognize in the mind more than
sense-data. Spencer considers it one of the merits
of evolution that it supplied a means of reconcil-
ation between these opposing views. According
to him, what we now regard as two the
individual was

1 Religions as a Credible Doctrine, London, 1902.
2 See § 3.
3 Masson, p. 240.
dentism. (6) But 'transcendental' meant to Kant constitutive of knowledge—those principles which, though not due to experience, yet made experience itself coherent, above all, the unity of all the content of knowledge came from experience, but the form of it made knowledge possible. Besides, reason had as regulative principles the ideas of the self, the world, and God, and in its practical working reason got into touch with them. And Richard Price-Kant's teaching that issued in transcendentalism, as it came to be understood in English-speaking countries, in the first half of the 19th century. Hamilton welcomed the Kantian system chiefly because he found it in harmony with the limits of our knowledge as propounded by himself, but others welcomed it because in their view it taught that man by his reason was more than a mere creature of the senses. Thus Carlyle, in his paper on Novalis, 1 points out that German transcendentalism denies the absolute existence of matter, that it makes space and time forms of the understanding; therefore to God 'Time and Space are not laws of His being but only of ours,' and so He is omnipresent and eternal; and 'the black Spectre, Atheism . . . melts into nothingness.' Again the transcendentalists of all these three faculties of understanding—viz., reason. Thus the invisible world is brought near us, and we feel in every thought that in God 'we live, and move, and have our being.' It was in this way that transcendentalism also at first became known in America. 2

The transcendental unity of the self which Kant understood of the individual knower, and which by theoretical reason gave him no substantial subject or soul, was raised by his successors in Germany to the level of a universal principle and an active subject, and thus knowledge was made adequate to grasp all reality. Reality now became subject and object; transcendentology became ontology. The transcendent of Kant vanished completely; it became immanent in knowledge. Fichte laid stress on the creative activity of the self in such a way that the object, the world, was called into being by the subject. Schelling, whose views changed considerably on one stage in his history to another, regarded the Absolute as the background of subject and object alike, he himself a neutrum—form, presence, and he made intellectual intuition the eye by which intelligence grasped this whole. Hegel tried to do equal justice to both subject and object: 'the real, and the rational is the real,' and Absolute Spirit is the whole, which becomes conscious of itself through a dialectical process. For some time this mode of thinking, through its novelty and obscurity, was unintelligible and obnoxious to English thinkers, but, when it did take a hold in Britain, it was with such force that it conquered the philosophical chairs in our universities with few exceptions, and exercised an orthodox tyranny against which it was difficult to contend. To Hamilton, 4 who viewed with extreme repugnance the philosophy of the Absolute, must be attributed the revival of philosophical speculation in Britain, and his pupils were able to understand the German philosophy which then was an enigma and a puzzle to others who in Britain interested themselves in speculation.

(4) Modern developments. —Ferreir's Institutes of Metaphysics 1 was perhaps the first systematic exposition of transcendentalism in our tongue, although others had by that time acquainted themselves with that branch of its varied expositions in Germany—some especially of John Cairns, 2 others enthusiastic in their advocacy (e.g., Hutcheson Stirling, whose Secret of Hegel was an elaborate attempt to make Hegel intelligible to English readers). But was, however, through the teaching and writings of Thomas Hill Green (q.v.) that transcendentalism became a philosophical force in Britain. Evolutionism, while it spread through the universities, along with materialism and idealism, did so from below, by trying to relate man's knowledge and man's morality with animal life and animal activity in general. Transcendentalism, while acknowledging that in one sense man is a part of nature, yet explained knowledge and morality from above. Knowledge, according to this view, is explicable as the reproduction in man of the eternal self-announcements of God, and morality as the realization of the immanent Eternal. The following passage from William James describes the spread of this movement in Britain:

'For many years [this] movement had thought too much. They had deeply interested the British public by their writings. Almost more important than their writings was the fact that they have occupied philosophical chairs in almost every university in this country. . . . It follows from their position of academic authority, and the fact that this movement exercised an influence not easily measured upon the youth of the nation —upon those, that is, who from the educational opportunities they enjoy are finally expected to become the leaders of the nation's thought and practice. . . . Carlyle introduced it, bringing it, as far as Chelsea. Then Storr and William Hill Green, and William Wallace and Lewis Trelawney, and Arnold Toynbee and David Ritchie—to mention only those professors whose voices are now silent—guided the waters into those upper reaches known locally as the Isie. John and Edward Cairns, their father and son, brought them up to the Clyde. Hutcheson Stirling up the Firth of Forth. They have passed up the Mersey and up the Severn and Dee and Don. They pollute the bay of St. Andrews and swell the waters of the Dan and have somehow crept overland into Birmingham. The stream of German Idealism has been diffused over the academical world of Great Britain. The disaster is universal. 5

'Transcendentalism' came to be used of this new movement, although the term was not a favourite with the idealists themselves. It was used by Henry Sidgwick 6 especially of the teaching of Green; by A. J. Balfour, 7 who contributes a chapter of criticism, and who even could say

'In English-speaking countries it is within the narrow circle of professors, perhaps the dominant mood of thought which is restricted to this circle does not seem to be regarded by as totally ignored. 8

William James used it of all objective idealists, however these may differ among themselves, while, just as it has been used by Bosanquet's teaching in his Principles of Logic which he describes as 'the last striking output of British transcendentalism or absolutism.' 9

(5) Neo-Hegelianism and Christianity. —What gave this philosophy its vogue, to begin with at any rate, in Britain was undoubtedly the fact that to many minds it appeared as a defense fides. It seemed to supply an answer to materialism and empiricism, which were to some extent competitive with and agnostic on the other. It could be preached, and was preached often, by men who adopted the familiar phrases of sacrosanct religious thinking which were associated in the popular mind with Christian values, and thus its true value to be regarded

1 Edinburgh, 1854.
3 'Isaac's Philosophy of the Unconditioned' (Discussions on Philosophy, p. 113). (1865) 4 He ascribes the theory of Schelling and Hegel to Cardinal de Ferras—a sufficient indication of the value he placed on it.
4 J. A. Fichte, 1866.
5 J. A. Fichte, 1866.
7 A. F. of Thrall, Universal (III.), London, 1900, p. 631.
9 'The First and Second Belief', London, 1850.
TRANSCENDENTALISM

as a type of Christian philosophy. Hutchinson Stirling found in Hegelianism a new version of Calvinism. Green used it to demolish the traditional English sensationalism and hedonism, and amidst the scepticism which prevailed regarding the historical element of Christianity, used it to rear a Christianity of ideas and ideals, from which dualism we are still suffering—witness the controversies concerning the historic Jesus and the divinity of Christ. Charles S. Pattison, in 1883, said of the inroads of Spencerian and Manelian scepticism and Huxley's agnosticism, found in Hegel's teaching an ark of refuge and a citadel of defence. It was thus a movement of deliverance, of reform, and of religion. Not a few of its most zealous advocates were men destined for theology who found here a more congenial home. But, as time went on and this system began to be developed, the difficulties, tendencies, and obscurities inherent in it, as well as the dangers, revealed themselves. Just as in Germany Hegel's system allied itself at first with orthodox theology and then the historic Rother, so swung back to practical atheism and materialism, so also in our own country time has made it plain that this system is no guarantee of Christian faith or morals. Green speaks with philosophic sorrow of this development in a college or university, with the satisfaction for their ideals and aspirations, though they harbour scientific views which contradict these. He is sorry because such people do not proceed to frame or adopt a coherent philosophical system; forgetting that what gave transcendentalism its interest and vitality among the educated was not its speculative scheme—that was always a puzzle more or less—but the idea that this philosophy conserved spiritual values, and that what is fast loosening its hold on this class to-day is the feeling, rightly or wrongly entertained, that these interests are being betrayed or disregarded in the interests of the coherence of the system itself. To begin with, it is widely felt that transcendentalism speaks too confidently of its own power to present a perfectly explicable view of the world—to exhibit all reality in thought categories. Its manner is apt to strike the observer as being haughty and supercilious, and its language would lead one to think that a claim to something like omniscience is arrogated—a claim so contrary to the nature of idealism and so opposed to that humility which serious thinkers have always regarded as the fitting attitude for all searchers of truth.

(6) Faith and knowledge. No one has done more among our professional philosophers to abate this soaring gnosticism than Campbell Fraser, with his insistence on the function of faith as lying at the very basis of knowledge itself, as accompanying and regulating its advance along all its operations. Reality is richer than thought, nor is it possible to factorize reality into thought terms. The limits of human knowledge are obvious even in the most liberal scheme of formalism, and philosophy has again to face the problem of the relation between faith and reason. Again, it is felt that transcendentalism does not do justice to the reality of the external world. To it the external world is only an object for a subject, and the tendency of all idealistic schemes is to lapse into solipsism. This solipsism may be of the personal, or of the social, or of the Supreme Subject, but in essence it is the same. Sidgwick suggested the term 'mentality' as a more adequate description of this tendency. Whatever term we use, the tendency itself is undeniable, and the reaction is seen in the movement known as neo-realism, but the tendency is only felt by reasonable idealists, as, e.g., by A. S. Pringle-Pattison; yet one wonders if his own view of creation is not just a residue of this old heaven of mentalism which his own purge of his system. He has no difficulty in regard to the creation of souls, which, if it means anything, means something new, but he cannot admit the creation of matter. Yet, if it existed in His fullness before any person now living or existing— if such an assumption is tolerable—why should creation as applied to matter be considered incredible? It is futile to try to explain matter as thought-elements, either in the mind of man or in the mind of God. When a philosopher arrives at such a view, it is surely the same course for him to examine his reasoning again.

(7) The problem of personality. The personality of man in this system, as we see from its modern developments, becomes insecure, or, if that danger is avoided, it is at the price of God's personality that man's is safeguarded. Thus there are those who, like Bosanquet, lay stress on In-Sentient Personality or Individuality, and tend to make men but aspects of this Being's life. Others lay stress on man and make God the totality of men—of the community or society of men ante as well as a parte post. To conceive of God as a perfect personality, above and apart from men and the world, and yet originating and sustaining both, seems an absurdity to this scheme of thinking.

1 History is the biography of the Absolute; science the natural history of the Absolute; philosophy the self-consciousness of the Absolute, recalling and arranging its past being in unconsciousness, and discovering thereby the laws of its own thought.

2 The outcome is seen in a book like Bradley's Appearance and Reality, in which the Absolute is everything—God, men, nature, spirits good and evil—and yet somehow it is all that in the bliss of an absolutely consistent whole. Personal idealism, pragmatism, and, above all, theism, will never take such a theory seriously.

5 The task of philosophy. The modern world is alive to the fact that the intellect alone is not man, and that reality is not to be construed solely by its means. Emphasis is now laid on the will and the emotions as well, with the result that the moral life—moral idealism—has a new place. When this is recognized, then it becomes clear that reality is not a perfection which the mind has to mirror, but an ideal which has to be achieved. Nothing is more deadening and more untrue than to think of reality from man's point of view as a perfect 'is'; for the moral life at any rate reality is in ideals—'the best is yet to be.' Thus only can man's freedom be saved from the cloudland of illusion, and thus only can evil and sin—the root of all our intellectual as well as of all our moral problems—be faced as our moral nature imperatively calls on us to face them. Our duty is in regard to these, unless our whole nature be itself a delusion, is not so much to explain them as to abolish them. To tell us 'this very presence of ill in the temporal order is the condition of the perfection of the eternal order' is to treat man's moral nature with insincerity. Transcendentalism has no eschatology, because to it the Absolute—i.e. all that is—is already perfect. One can no more say that philosophy or a religion without an eschatology offers nothing to man's needs, imposes a yoke on man's passion for reformation, and does away with

1 See art. REFEHE.
2 The term 'mentality' or 'immaterialism' is also used by James S. Ferrer.
3 Cairns, in Life, by MacEwen, p. 163.
his felt need of redemption. These are some of the difficulties that most modern thinking men feel in regard to modern transcendentalism, and the recognition of them has led to a very general revolt. It is possible within the philosophic world itself. Pragmatism, neo-realism, neo-Kantianism, personal idealism, are but some of the phases of this revolt. It cannot be said that these views, any or all of them, are free from difficulties; and at the present moment it is impossible to say what the future may have in store for philosophy. The best we can wish for is that it free itself from the tyranny of phrases and become intelligible and interesting; that it may have the humility to attempt to solve real problems that perplex men; that it be freed from its disdain regarding men's abiding convictions; that it abstain from any language which would throw doubt on the great ideals and values of life; and that it realize the necessity of satisfying the heart as well as the head. God, nature, man—these are the realities. Transcendentalism tends to forget the second, and to make the first and third coequal; pragmatism forgets the first, and naturalism the first and third. The task of philosophy is concerning these three, and transcendentalism is valuable when it constrains man to become exorbitant; but it must not, without becoming false, succumb either to humanism on the one hand or to pantheism on the other.

LITERATURE.—The EBD gives an idea of the variety of meaning attached to the word 'transcendental,' and R. Eisler, Wörterbuch der philosoph. Begriffe, 3 vol., Berlin, 1910, gives the philosophic usage. For the pre-Kantian logical usage and the mediaval, the letterpress phrase the History of Philosophy of the Journal of Speculative Philosophy of Theology must be consulted. For New England transcendentalism see art. Emerson. Joseph Cook, Transcendentalism, Boston, U.S.A., 1900, gives a valuable survey of the movement in the interests of orthodoxy. The literature under art. COUSINO and CARLYLE is instructive for the early influence of German transcendentalism in a popular form in Britain.


D. MACKENZIE.

TRANSFORMATION.—See Metamorphosis.

TRANSMIGRATION.


Buddhist (M. Anesaki), p. 429.

Celtic (G. Dottin), p. 430.

Egyptian (W. M. Flinders Petrie), p. 431.

TRANSMIGRATION (Introductory and Primitive).—Reincarnation is the passage of the soul from one body to another, usually of the same species, among higher races often with ethical implications, the lot of the soul on earth being determined by its behavior in former life. Transmigration, metempsychosis, and other terms are often used in an almost identical sense, but also in a vaguer way, implying at times that the soul itself, besides its animal form, becomes permanently, sometimes only as a prelude to another reincarnation or to final destruction or absorption. Somewhat different is the creed which may be termed 'alternation of existences'; it involves the belief that man is double, a counterpart in another world corresponding to the earthly body or embodied soul in this world and taking the place of the latter when its turn comes to quit this world. Separate existence, reincarnation, annihilation, and transmigration are the possibilities that present themselves to the primitive mind when it inquires into the fate of the soul. We may say, one belief rather than another has been adopted in any specific instance; but it is clear that the resemblance of children to parents (or other relatives) has played some part, especially in W. Africa. The complex of beliefs is therefore to some extent a semi-scientific creed, taking the place of a biological account of heredity, and based on reasoning that we can follow. It seems equally certain that the widespread belief that when the animal body (or change of bodily form) during life must have had its effect on eschatological doctrine; and here the creed goes back to what must be some of the most archaic elements of human speculation. Those two factors are, however, at times to some extent combined, when a rise or fall in the scale of existence is put down to the merit or demerit of previous births. Both in reincarnation and in transmigration doctrines the life or lives that succeed the human life on earth are seen as forms in a purer life. The area of existence is sometimes as indefinitely prolonged; where some accident interferes with the due course of reincarnation, the lot of the soul may be a kind of third state, neither reincarnation nor absorption (or absorption), but separate existence (as an evil spirit). Many widely distributed customs appear to be connected with the belief in reincarnation. Thus, in Africa and America children are buried by the wayside, near the mother, under the caves, or in other situations that would in the eyes of the natives facilitate reincarnation; in parts of Central Australia and in Africa people are buried in the place of their birth. But it must be recalled that, generally speaking, the common feeling that it is well to be buried with one's own people implies no more than the view that this is necessary to ensure the solidarity of the family in the future life. The custom of killing the first-born has been explained for some areas by the belief that this child is, in special measure, an embodiment of the father or grandfather; and the abolition of a king, as in Tahiti, in favour of one who has been put down to the same cause. The belief in transmigration again in certain areas has led to the sacro-sanctity of certain species, and the totemism (q.v.) of some regions, such as S. Africa and Oceania, has been referred to this origin.

1 See art. DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Introductory and Primitive), 1 vili. 3 (6).

2 See art. FIRST-BORN (Introductory and Primitive), 3.
A well-developed scheme of reincarnation or transmigration of the soul is found in the case of the Central African tribes, as to whose real belief there is some doubt, is generally found only among peoples who either have attained a certain stage of culture, as in India, or have almost certainly been influenced by it; but it is found in the higher culture, as among W. African tribes. The W. African tribes among which a reincarnation creed has been recorded in more or less detail are the Mandingo, the Ebo, and the Ewe. This belief is also known among the Yoruba, who lie geographically between the Ewe and the Ebo; but details of their ideas on the subject are lacking.

According to Delafosse, every living being and every natural phenomenon depends for its nature on a *niama*, "dynamic spirit"; the word niama is applied to a genius, *niama* to a spirit, which may be a genius or a human being, an object, an animal, a rock, etc. The *niama* of a dead man can reside where there is a place where his name, his object, is the body of a living being whose *niama* is absent. Certain magicians attribute their powers to the possession of the *niama* of a genius or a human being. The chief task of the seer is to find out what the *niama* of a dead man is, in order to find out what the *niama* of a person is for whom the rite rite has not been performed may reincarnate itself in a solitary animal, or in a human being, who goes mad. It is therefore clear that, though the *niama* may be reincarnated, it is by no means invariably the case, and, where reincarnation takes place, it is in kind from the reincarnation in which the more easily the belief (see below). Side by side with the notion of the *niama* or the *soul*, it passes into a new death into another being; it is not the object of any cult; it is found only in living beings and passes only into another being of the same species, save on the rare occasions when it animates the body of a totem. This belief is, in form, on all fours with those of other Negro tribes; but it is hardly possible to speak of reincarnation, which implies some degree of identity, some measure of personality.

According to Montell, the Khasoneke believe that *dye* is soul, force, or shadow, while ni means breath; if this is correct, the meanings are just the reverse of what they are in the foregoing account of Mandingo beliefs, and it seems clear either that we are in the presence of a far-going disintegration of creed or that, as has probably happened further east, the belief has come from without and has been worked up by each tribe in its own fashion. If this is the case, it seems improper to generalize an account of the beliefs of a mass of tribes if such varied views have to be regarded as identical.

According to A. with the Ewe belief, every man has two souls—a *luwo agbedo*, or life-soul, and a *luwo kuto*, or death-soul; the former is visible when a man casts a short shadow, the latter when he casts a long shadow. The death-soul accompanies a man into the grave and then goes to the land of the dead; the life-soul leaves the body at death and goes sighing mournfully and seeking for a resting-place; each man has also a breath-soul. That the shadow-soul is more than a shadow is clear from the fact that sleep is attributed to the absence of the shadow-soul, waking to its return, and dreams to its activity outside the body.

The land of the dead appears to be the same as Amedzowe, the place of man's origin—a land not on earth, but in heaven, where everything corresponds more or less closely to the things of this life. Here there is a life of plants, concomitant forms, and all that surrounds a man in this life, not, however, in bodily form, but spiritually, so to speak; and the human inhabitants of Amedzowe live and think in the same form in which they lived in the world. In Amedzowe, however, is more than a duplication of this world; for, when a child dies soon after birth, a priest may declare that it was a great king in Arthe and has died in order to return to the scene of its former glories. Conversely, the fate of the world may influence the course of events in Amedzowe; a man who is too far away from the other world, he will fall ill, for the dwellers there prepare to break down his hut; and, to save him, his associates in this world must each bring a blade of grass to be placed on the roof of his house, as a symbol of the re-roofing of his spiritual house. In Amedzowe a man has a spiritual sun (*tasi*) and other relatives; from here he must obtain, if he can, a blade of grass to send to the spirits and come to the world of men. Some of those who come to this world are so dearly loved by their spiritual relatives that they have to give a promise, called *ghetsi*, to return after a short time; these are the children who die young; this promise has been personified and is regarded as in some measure an evil genius, for it invites men who break it to evil deeds and especially to suicide or to acts that will bring about a violent death.

Generally speaking, the lot of a man in this life and his abilities are determined by the fate announced to him by his *tasi*; but here, as elsewhere, there is a flexibility. The idea of the creed of the Ewe, for, as will be seen below, the *akloma*, or genius, is also held responsible for a man's lot in this life.

Side by side with this curiously untheological creed we find the belief that Mawu, the supreme god, is a dweller in Amedzowe and is the king who sits in judgment on the departing soul before it takes up its abode in this world. Not only so, but we find also the view that the lot of a man, or at least his term of life, is determined, if not by Mawu, at any rate by Mawu's interference with Death, whom he begets to spare one of his earthly children. If, as appears to be the case, the Ewe beliefs are the result of syncretism, there can be no doubt as to which are the older elements in their creed; for the god of death, Ogwu, is found also among the Edo, from whom they were separated by the Yoruba influx, and whose views as to reincarnation at the present day come much closer to those of the Ibo, their neighbours on the east.

There is, however, another side to the Ewe beliefs; this is the *akloma*, *kla*, or, in the language of the neighbouring Twi, *okra*; it is often identified with *iwu*, but an older and more correct conception seems to be that it is a genius or tutelary spirit. Another authority states that *kra* is the collective name for *inwu*, all the spiritual beings that surround a man, whether they be evil or good, human or demonic. Westernmann compares the word *akloma* with Eik *akbema*, a promise to return to the other world. If this derivation is correct, the conception of *akloma* as a tutelary spirit has arisen in the same way as that of its counterpart, *ghetsi*, by the personification of a promise, but Eik is a member of a different group of languages and topographically remote; the derivation must therefore be received with caution; it is none the less possible that both words are derived from the same root or form, especially if it should be the case that the reincarnation idea has been introduced from without or fostered in its growth by foreign influence.

Every man has a *kla*, or, perhaps, properly speaking, one or more, for the *akloma* figures worshipped by a man are often in dupliicate, male and female, in any case with only a single arm, as an indication of the identity of the same spirit being. Children sometimes carry an *akloma*.

1 It is perhaps not without significance that the *tasi* is the father's sister; for the Ewe are matrilineal, or at most in a transitional stage; the culture can hardly have been secured by a sister who has normally such influence in the family; the belief in question therefore either must be young or, more probably, has come to them from without.
TRANSMIGRATION (Introductory and Primate) 427

figure on their backs, and, in the case of twins, each carries the figure of the other; it is not without importance that these twin figurines are found in Sierra Leone, such as Sigg, where the reintegration belief is not found, at any rate at the present day. One name for these figurines is ame wuwo, ‘the soul of a man’—a phrase which makes distinctly in the present day a marked confusion between luwo and aklama. The aklama lives in Mawu, probably the same as Amedzowa, till Mawu gives it permission to enter a man, which it does before birth; the child to which it is assigned is known in advance, however; for the priest can interrogate the aklama as to the future lot of the unborn child. In some places the klo receives offerings annually, probably on the birthday of the child, for the klo is named from the day of the birth and is also known as the younger brother of Mawu. The aklama seeks only the welfare of his ward, so long as the latter fulfils his obligations; otherwise he may punish him with disease, madness, or other ills, or, more properly, may allow him to fall a victim to them. The obligations just mentioned include abstention from certain foods, generally, or for a period, or on certain days. In some cases the aklama is associated with a man by virtue of his being made by Mawu out of certain earth; or, when a thief has a thievish son, it is said that Mawu formed both of the same earth, and that the thief and the thief were alike. A man comes to the world with his character formed once for all, and it seems in reality to be that of his aklama; a man’s nature (dzoghe) is said to leave him at death, and, though it is believed to be conditioned by his aklama, it seems difficult to distinguish them.

So far as we have gone, there has been some confusion of luwo and aklama, and through of after death this confusion is increased. The images of the aklama are broken in pieces or thrown away, for their owner needs them no longer. The aklama seems now, like the luwo, to be termed sodi ‘ghost’ or ‘spirit’ and is questioned a few days after death to find out who was responsible for his death. The final destination of the sodi is Tise or Agume, the place under the earth, the road to which passes through Tsi; Kutiane is the ferryman, and his fee is twelve cowries. Another account says that the dead man meets Liahbe at the entrance of a town, and she questions him about his doings; when he has a great wound, which he must lick; and, though this is a detail on which we have no other information, it seems highly probable that Liahbe should be identified with the spiritual aunt (tosi).

Native beliefs are rarely clear and unambiguous as a written account commonly assumes them to be; but it is impossible to study the foregoing summary without feeling that syncretism must be reckoned with as a possible explanation. A knowledge of the beliefs of the peoples to the east of the Ewe can only strengthen the probability of this explanation; for here too we find diverse ideas combined, and some of them agree so closely with the Ewe creed that any possibility of separate origin must be rejected; at the same time, the general balance of the elements of the creed is so different, and the terminology so different (except where the creeds agree, as noted above), that we can hardly accept the theory of a common origin of the whole complex as the explanation of the points of agreement, which are not relatively numerous.

(c) Edo.—The Ewe language is closely akin to the Edo and forms a member of the group of languages named from the best known member, which is spoken in Benin and in the neighbourhood. It is somewhat surprising that as regards the subject of this article the terminology differs in toto from that of the Ewe, as is made clear by the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ewe</th>
<th>Edo</th>
<th>Ibo</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Noun</td>
<td>Noun</td>
<td>Noun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genius</td>
<td>aklama</td>
<td>ch, chosi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shadow</td>
<td>luwo</td>
<td>edo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breath</td>
<td>dzoghe</td>
<td>edo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spirit</td>
<td>soti</td>
<td>edo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ward</td>
<td>edome or</td>
<td>edo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other words</td>
<td>Amedzowa</td>
<td>Elimi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Promise</th>
<th>okolo</th>
<th>Omore</th>
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</table>

Broadly speaking, ch correponds to our idea of soul, for the ego is said to disappear on the day that a man’s body is put into the grave; in the Kurukuru country there are traces of belief in a breath-soul (ofo), which does not, however, correspond to the ch, for ofo is said to take a man’s soul to Elimi, where it turns into a man with a body (i.e. ch). Two ch are usually distinguished, chiki (chinorum) and chikori being identified with choki, sometimes with choye, the ch of a childless person. Some say that chikori lives in Elimi, while chinorum is on the back of a man’s neck; others say that chinorum is the shadow in Elimi. Some say chikori is on the top of a man’s head; the latter statement was qualified by the addition that wherever the house of chinorum is associated that chinorum comes to earth when a man dies, thus reproducing the idea of alternation already found among the Ewe, others that chinorum returns, is recognized and comes to earth when a man dies. It is also said that chinorum goes at death to Elimi and returns for sacrifices and offerings, and in Elimi the ch may lay claim to a woman for whom his earthly counterpart paid bride-price without being able to secure her as a wife. Some say that chinorum is carried by oru to animate the dead, and sometimes conceived, that it brings a child to a man, others again that it ‘does things for a man,’ i.e. is his genius. Chinorum’s functions are equally a matter of opinion; it is on the back of a man’s neck, or is the servant of chinorum and takes sacrifice to Elimi in Elimi, or lives in Elimi and comes to earth when a dead dies, or is a man’s shadow in Elimi, where chinorum is also, or corresponds to Elimi in Elimi, and may be summoned (perhaps, rather, evil spirit), to whom he sacrifices on the road.

We reach a somewhat different cycle of ideas when we find chinorum regarded as a ‘bush soul,’ injury to which means sickness of the human being. It is also said to be the ‘king of the bush’ and to be richer than chinorum; when it receives a sacrifice, it is satisfied and turns its back. The prevailing view is undoubtedly that chinorum brings a child from Elimi but is not identified with the ch; for ofo is said that the dead go to Elimi, simi and in Elimi before it comes to this world. Omo (god) is said to take a man’s soul to Elimi, where it turns into a man with a body (i.e. ch). Two ch are usually distinguished, chiki (chinorum) and chikori being identified with choki, sometimes with choye, the ch of a childless person. Some say that chikori lives in Elimi, while chinorum is on the back of a man’s neck; others say that chinorum is the shadow in Elimi. Some say chikori is on the top of a man’s head; the latter statement was qualified by the addition that wherever the house of chinorum is associated that chinorum comes to earth when a man dies, thus reproducing the idea of alternation already found among the Ewe, others that chinorum returns, is recognized and comes to earth when a man dies. It is also said that chinorum goes at death to Elimi and returns for sacrifices and offerings, and in Elimi the ch may lay claim to a woman for whom his earthly counterpart paid bride-price without being able to secure her as a wife. Some say that chinorum is carried by oru to animate the dead, and sometimes conceived, that it brings a child to a man, others again that it ‘does things for a man,’ i.e. is his genius. Chinorum’s functions are equally a matter of opinion; it is on the back of a man’s neck, or is the servant of chinorum and takes sacrifice to Elimi in Elimi, or lives in Elimi and comes to earth when a dead dies, or is a man’s shadow in Elimi, where chinorum is also, or corresponds to Elimi in Elimi, and may be summoned (perhaps, rather, evil spirit), to whom he sacrifices on the road.

(d) Ibo.—Among the Ibo, who number several millions, there is much diversity of view; but only a small percentage of the tribes have been adequately investigated; the following summary relates to the Awka and Asaba districts. West of the Niger the belief is that an entity known as ch, sometimes identified with ch, sends the new being to Elimi; the reincarnated person and the reincarnation are known respectively as agwog and niwag. The ch is normally a dead person, but in some areas may be the father or mother of the child. East of the Niger the ch is in the man, Eliko akamia is the personal protective deity, with only slight traces of a connexion with the reincarnation belief; there is no explicit statement that the ch sends a child into the world. The chog may perhaps be identified with the ch or chok of the Ewe, as seems probable, it is etymologically connected with Eliko akamia, the promise to return to the other world. The Ibo are quite clear in their belief that the new child is reincarnated in his (or her) own family, at any rate if he has been buried with his fathers; children of tender years will assure the inquirer with the utmost solemnity

1 a personal protective spirit.
2 a protective spirit.
that they are their deceased grandfathers or grandparents; and the identity of the ancestor is determined by divination. A child that speaks before it opens its eyes is said to be relating what it saw in Owamwo and at once exposed in the ajofia; it is also asserted that a man who has been unlucky in one existence may decide, on opening his eyes for the first time in a new life, that it is the same world in which he was unhappy before, and resolve to give up the struggle, whereupon the new-born child dies on the spot.

The relation between či and ago, west of the Niger, may be compared with that of godchild and godparent; the relation sets up a bar to marriage, and a man may not even marry into the umunna (sept) of his či; two people who have the same či may not marry, nor yet may their children, though apparently a man may marry the fellow ọwọgọ of his sister. There is a saying that the child who is one's ago (ọwọgọ) should have been the child of a man's own loins; both must be of the same quarter; if the či has no heir of his own, the ago inherits the property. Curiously enough, the owner of the companionship, the other, who is sent into the world by the (living) či, and who ought by analogy to stand to the child in a closer relation than the či, is in point of fact regarded as a comparative stranger; he may come from another ebo (quarter) or from a different tribe altogether, and his ritual prohibitions do not concern the child, who has to observe those of his či.

There are traces of the view that či and ọwọgọ form two links in a continuous chain, and at any rate where the či is not a living person, the ọwọgọ of one generation being the či of the next; and this affords a satisfactory explanation of the views as to prohibitions. At the same time, it must be remembered that the či is properly a personal protective deity, in fact a personal alose, and that the facts are, in other directions, best accounted for on this hypothesis; it must not, however, be forgotten that east of the Niger an alose may be the či, or, according to another account, may itself be reincarnated. East of the Niger also we sometimes find the view that the ago goes to the next world with a dead man, while the ogbasa pegs that represent it are thrown away; so that here the ago is regarded as the či; it is, at any rate for a time, to some extent represented by the ndieje, or ancestral figurines. Curiously enough, the umunna of the companionship, the other, who is sent into the world by the (living) či, and who ought by analogy to stand to the child in a closer relation than the či, is in point of fact regarded as a comparative stranger; he may come from another ebo (quarter) or from a different tribe altogether, and his ritual prohibitions do not concern the child, who has to observe those of his či.

2. South Africa.—In many parts of S. Africa, and sporadically in other parts of Africa, there is a belief that the dead are transformed into certain species of animals, or at any rate that they assume this form to appear to the survivors; it has been maintained, not quite convincingly, that some Bantu tribes assume themselves to be transformed at death into their totems. This belief is, however, definitely reported from the west coast, among the Sienna and the Twi, as well as in the north-east of the Congo Free State. Among the Zulu the transformation is supposed to be into a species of serpent.

3. Madagascar.—In Madagascar the belief in transformation is also found, though here doubtless of Indonesian origin; and we see a different lot in the future state. The future state is divided into three grades; this is of course a common feature of eschatological doctrine not connected with the theory of moral retribution.

4. Central Australia.—According to Spencer and Gillen, the tribes of Central Australia believe that children are reincarnations of their ancestors (totems) and are continually reborn; but the testimony of Strehlow, a witness well acquainted with the language of the Arunta tribe, is in certain cases it is believed that a totem-ancestor is himself reborn, but after this reincarnation he does not return.

1 See art. DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Egyptian).
2 In modern Egyptian folklore the quarda, counseled by Seligman with the ka, is held to be the spiritual counterpart of a man, which has to do with his incarnate body, and which plays the part of a good or bad angel. It is of course possible that this resemblance to present-day W. African beliefs is due to coincidence; it can hardly assume that people in the same town would have had ideas of and aklama are are from the same root; for la and no may well be alternative forms of a suffix, and the transition from koda to klan is a well-established phonetic change in W. Africa. The only reason for supposing that the original idea is that of a promise, though in Ewe the term gbetsi is now used in that sense, while aklama has become a genius; but further research is needed in other areas before any definite pronouncement can be made. It is tempting to connect the root kala with the Egyptian kaf, which was a double of the man and believed to be after death, with the mummy, a denizen of the tomb; but, though there are clear traces of mumification in W. Africa, probably due to Egyptian influence, and though nothing is more probable than that Egyptian ideas in traversing the continent would have undergone fundamental changes, there is no positive evidence to connect any of the beliefs mentioned above with any article of the Egyptian creed. The possibility of an Egyptian influence is not, I think, at all important, for Egyptologists appear to accept the evidence produced by L. Frobenius as to Egyptian influence in the present Yoruba area in the 6th cent. B.C. That the terms of the Yoruba language show some connexion with those cited above is not improbable, for there can be little doubt that the Yoruba tribe has come down from the north and may not have been in occupation of the area in question, if indeed it existed, at the period in question.

It has been pointed out that the words akeba and theking are both probability connected etymologically; it is by no means certain that akeba and aklama are from the same root; for la and no may well be alternative forms of a suffix, and the transition from koda to klan is a well-established phonetic change in W. Africa. The only reason for supposing that the original idea is that of a promise, though in Ewe the term gbetsi is now used in that sense, while aklama has become a genius; but further research is needed in other areas before any definite pronouncement can be made. It is tempting to connect the root kala with the Egyptian kaf, which was a double of the man and believed to be after death, with the mummy, a denizen of the tomb; but, though there are clear traces of mumification in W. Africa, probably due to Egyptian influence, and though nothing is more probable than that Egyptian ideas in traversing the continent would have undergone fundamental changes, there is no positive evidence to connect any of the beliefs mentioned above with any article of the Egyptian creed. The possibility of an Egyptian influence is not, I think, at all important, for Egyptologists appear to accept the evidence produced by L. Frobenius as to Egyptian influence in the present Yoruba area in the 6th cent. B.C. That the terms of the Yoruba language show some connexion with those cited above is not improbable, for there can be little doubt that the Yoruba tribe has come down from the north and may not have been in occupation of the area in question, if indeed it existed, at the period in question.

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TRANSMIGRATION (Buddhist)

Strehlow's account of Aranda (Arunta) belief is as follows:

The totem-ancestors dropped some of their offspring, which were transformed into toad, rattle, rock, etc. from which proceed rats: these are completely formed boys and girls of reddish color, with body and soul equivalent to ordinary mortals. When a woman passes a spot (kunsikala) where the transformed body of the totem-ancestor is, and subsequently the same one is associated with that spot, she is consequently the child born to the totem of the ancestor associated with the spot.

There is a second method by which an ancestor impregnates a woman, but this does not seem to imply any kind of reincarnation, though the ancestor is called in both cases the inmunus of the child. The ancestor is said to come out of the earth and throw a small tiller (kunmunye) at a suitable woman, in whose body it takes human form.

Both kinds of impregnation are said to be equally frequent, and the difference is recognized in the face of the child, which is narrow in the first, broad in the second kind.

An outgroup can also, very rarely, enter a woman's body in person; and a child thus originated has light hair; in such a case the soul goes at death like other souls to the life of the Dead, and is annihilated by a flash of lightning. There is therefore no question of repeated reincarnations, and only in the third case can we really speak of an actual belief in the doctrine, so far as can be seen from Strehlow's narrative.

This account agrees with much of what is reported by Spencer and Gillen, though these authors speak of reincarnations of ancestors, they really mean an incarnation of spirit-children left behind by the totem-ancestors. And even among the Aranda we hear of the totem-ancestors living in water holes.

Perhaps it is most probable that large local variations of belief account best for the differences between Strehlow and the English authors. In this connexion the account of K. H. Mathews is of interest, though it must be remembered that he is probably relying on information derived from others. Some of the Chingali believe in repeated reincarnations of ancestors, and a change of sex occurs, as in the Aranda, but again, other tribes say they pass into other birds. The avanna is kept as a pet and murdered at death, though the wild bird may be killed for its feathers; yet the Bororo say, 'We are avanna.' According to von den Steinen, the earliest form of the belief was that the native said, 'I have a bird, not 'I am a bird,' which flies at night and which remains as the natural form of the person when a magician or other evil-disposed being binds his return to human form (i.e., death). But it is only in parts of Australia and W. Africa that these forms of eschatological creed are an element of real importance.


1 Spencer-Gillen, p. 156 L., 161.
2 See ibid., p. 160.
5 See ibid., p. 147.
6 See ibid., p. 151.


N. W. THOMAS.

TRANSMIGRATION (Buddhist).—Theoretically Buddhist teaching allows a wide scope for the soul or its transmigration, but insists on the revolution, or 'stream' (saivatara), of existences. In its practical influence on the popular mind, however, the doctrine amounted to much the same as any other doctrine of transmigration, being gamagam everywhere with the animistic conception of the soul, whether human or other; it inspired the people with the feeling of a certain continuity of life-relationships through various existences; it impressed the popular mind with a degree of fatalism—the belief that every event in one's life was the result of past deeds. The doctrine, when formulated, contained more or less sensuous descriptions of the better lives in the heavens, besides horrifying details of purgatorial existences; and these aspects of the teaching resulted in the growth of a respectable volume of visionary literature during the course of the history of the religion in various countries. Thus, in spite of the higher doctrine of the ideal Buddhist perfection in nirvâna, and in spite of the psychological and metaphysical formulations of the teaching of Karma, the Buddhist conception of transmigration may be treated in the same category as other doctrines of the same kind.

According to the regular teaching, the saivatara consists in an indefinite revolution of renewed existences produced and prolonged according to the qualities of the karma (q.v.), which is the matrix as well as the vehicle of the enduring existences. It is said repeatedly:

'No beginning is known of the eternal revolution (saivatara) of the beings, streaming and flowing to and fro in the ocean of births and deaths. The majority are covered by ignorance (avijñâ), and fettered in thirst (tâpas).

In this vast ocean of renewed births there are innumerable streams of existences, conditioned by their respective deeds and retractions, flowing uninterruptedly not only in the continuity of the individual being but also in the solidarity of a group of existences. Now the groups of existences are classified under five headings or 'ways of life')—the heavenly life, the human life, the animal life, the ghostly life, and the purgatorial (or hellish) life; or into six, by adding the aura (or furious) life, and the life of the bhava ('being') or lokas ('realm,' the cosmic installation of beings) into three— the formless heavens, the heavens with forms, and the material worlds with desires and greed. In this connexion it is to be noted that the Buddhist doctrine of transmigration emphasized the affinity and solidarity of the karma and all its consequences within a group of existences, whether a specific world in the cosmic system, the local division of the abode, or the class division in social life; in short, any and every link, material, physical, moral, emotional, intellectual, or social, is the cause and a manifestation of the solidarity of existences; it is the same karma. The principle of the solid
TRANSMIGRATION (Celtic)

arity is the karma, and its manifestation is the bhuta or dhātu, the latter of which means the characteristics (common to the beings within a group), the specific circle of existence, community, common destiny.

How the different dhātu are produced; what are the reciprocal actions and reactions of the psychical factors and environmental factors in the process of the development of karma, what are the conditions, etc., are evidenced by the individual karma being attracted to and incorporated into the common dhātu—these and associated ideas have arisen to varied speculation in the Buddhist schools, the whole forming a web of subtle argument and grotesque fancy, in which are mingled Buddhist cosmology, psychology, and ethics. This is a subject which awaits further investigation.

The practical effects of the Buddhist doctrine of saṃsāra were a deepening and broadening of the feeling of the continuity of life. Though often vulgarized through its amalgamation with animistic beliefs, the effect of the doctrine was to extend affection and attachment in human relationships to the former and coming lives, even to animal and plant life, which was held to be continuous and closely associated with human life, and to elaborate those sentiments through the idea of a deeper, more remote connection, and wider aspects of being than those of the present life.

This point can be illustrated from the folk-lore and literature of the ancients. The People, and one of the most ancient of all the Romantic literature—the Japanese Literature of the 11th cent.—is dominated by this sentiment of continuity. There the delicate yet strong feeling of the common European idea of continuity through lives beyond death, as well as with the idea of the death of the soul by physical separation and their changes. Unfortunately both W. G. Aston and Kari Florence, in their histories of Japanese literature, hardly touch this point.

Another point in the effect of the teaching of the doctrine of precision of his words; if the latter, it must be admitted that, according to the belief of the Celts, the passage of the soul into another body does not follow immediately upon death, but that, while the soul awaits reincarnation, it continues to live, though under conditions which are not those of the life on earth. This interpretation would make it possible to reconcile the passages in Cæsar and Dio (the evidence of the two writers who have transmitted Celtic conceptions regarding the future life in which the idea of metempsychosis does not occur.

Diodorus goes on to say:

'Therefore, during the funeral of the dead, they throw into the funeral pyre letters written to the dead relatives in the expectation that the dead will read them. It seems, therefore, that the man whose body was burned acted as a messenger between the living and the ancestors whom he was about to meet again in the other world. It is the idea of the immortality of the soul and of another world that is emphasized by the Latin writers.'

Valerius Maximus (II. vi. 10) tells that there was an ancient custom among the Gauls of sending each other sums which were repaying to the other world, so that they might personify the immortality of the soul. Pomponius Mela (ii. 2), after stating that, according to the druids, the soul is eternal and that there is a second life among the demons, adds that they bury along with the dead things which are useful to the living, and that, formerly, they postoned the settlement of business affairs and debts until the time when debtors and creditors would meet in the lower world; there were even people who voluntarily cast themselves into the funeral pyre of their kindred in the expectation that they would rejoin them in the new life. The idea of a new life after death and before reincarnation was thus one of the most cherished and deep-seated beliefs of the ancient Celts. As to where that new life was spent, Valerius Maximus and Pomponius Mela employ the ordinary terms of Roman mythology for the other world (inferors, manes); but Lucret is not content with that superficial assimilation:

'You assure us, Druids, that it is not the silent dwellings of Erebos nor the cold kingdon of Dei who inhabits the depths, at which the souls arrive; the same breadth directs their members in another world (orbe allo), and, with your song, declares what is known, death is in the heart of a long life' (Pharsalia, I. 440-456).

There has been an endeavour to fix the meaning of this word, but the result of their training in folk-lore and legends of the Celts are full of instances, and a noteworthy point in them is that many of those endowed persons are children, whose remembrance of their own former lives is mostly said to lose its vividness as they grow older.

LITERATURE.—See arts. COSMOGONY and COSMOLOGY (Buddhist), JAYARA, KARMA, and the literature cited there.

M. ANESAKI.

TRANSMIGRATION (Celtic).—I. There are two passages which clearly assert the belief in metempsychosis among the ancient Celts. Caesar (de Bell. Gall. vi. 14) tells us that the principal point in the teaching of the druids is that the soul does not perish, but, after death, passes from one body into another. Diodorus completes the evidence by attaching only a relative importance to the

1 C. Chabaud-Brazier, ib. 140-177, and artt. ABHARAKA KÖNA and YAŚIŚṬA, COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Buddhist).

2 See also D. T. Laidlaw, Grammar in Buddhism and India (Boston and New York, 1897, ob. x.; H. Fielding, The Soul of a People, London, 1898, pp. 324-345.


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TRANSMIGRATION (Egyptian)

The field of the so-called transmigration, or reincarnation, of the human soul, is one of those themes that has been studied by many authors and that has involved many aspects of human thought and belief. It is a subject that has been the subject of much speculation and debate, and it has been the subject of much controversy.

The concept of transmigration is a central theme in the ancient Egyptian religion, and it is believed that the soul of a person who has died will be reborn in another body. This concept is based on the belief that the soul is immortal and that it will continue to exist after the death of the physical body.

The concept of transmigration is also found in other ancient cultures, such as the Greeks, Romans, and Hindus. In the ancient Greek religion, it was believed that the soul of a person who had died would be reborn in another body, and that this process would continue until the soul had reached perfection.

In the ancient Roman religion, it was believed that the soul of a person who had died would be reborn in another body, and that this process would continue until the soul had reached perfection.

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TRANSMIGRATION (Greek and Roman).

an earth-worm, or a crocodile; and lastly the power of being united to its own body. The following examples are parts of chs. 86, 89, and all of 88:

1. I am the Swallow; I am the Swallow. I am the Scorpion-bird (or white bird), the daughter of E3. And that which I went in order to ascertain, I am come to tell. Come, let em enwrap it with my own mission. And, I am a scrupulous ascender who consest forth through that gate of the Invisible one, I purify myself at that great stream, where my limbs are made to cease, and that which is wrong in me is pardoned, and the spots which were on my body upon earth are effaced. Here am I, and the Heart. Perchance I may overwear myself upon earth, though my dead body be buried (58). 'For I am the Ciel of the Place; this is the way that I am the Crocodile god in the form of man. I am he who carrieth off with violence. I am the smugly Fish in Sanskrit. I am the Lord to whom one bendeth down in Sechem' (60). 'Oh, thou who bringest; oh, thou runner who dwellest in thy Keep, thou great god; grant that my soul may come to me from whatsoever place wherein it abideth. Let my soul (he) be caught and the spirit (hims) which is with it, wherever it abideth. Track out among the things in heaven and upon earth that soul of mine, wherever it abideth... (69).


TRANSMIGRATION (Greek and Roman).—I. GREEK.—The notion of transmigration (περιγένεσία), i.e. the passage after death of the human or animal soul from the mortal body to a new incarnation in another body of the same or another species, necessarily rests upon a belief that the soul itself is immortal, or at any rate more lasting than the body. Theoricae, who was beloved by the Greeks R.C. and is regarded as one of the teacher of Pythagoras which does not necessarily mean more than that he was earlier in time—is said to have been the first to introduce the doctrine. On the other hand, Herodotus declared that the invention of the doctrine was derived from them by those Greeks who adopted it, and whose names, though he knew them, he declined to mention. It has been recognized that this is an allusion, at least in part, to Empedocles; for Herodotus would have had no scruple in giving the names of the Pythagoreans and Pythagoracs, who were already dead. It is, however, impossible to accept Herodotus' account, because (1) the chief authorities for the doctrine are derived from them by those Greeks who adopted it, and whose names, though he knew them, he declined to mention. It has been recognized that this is an allusion, at least in part, to Empedocles; for Herodotus would have had no scruple in giving the names of the Pythagoreans and Pythagoracs, who were already dead. It is, however, impossible to accept Herodotus' account, because (1) the chief authorities for the doctrine are derived from them by those Greeks who adopted it, and whose names, though he knew them, he declined to mention. It has been recognized that this is an allusion, at least in part, to Empedocles; for Herodotus would have had no scruple in giving the names of the Pythagoreans and Pythagoracs, who were already dead. 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It is true that to be a belief in the transmigration of human souls into other bodies after death was a relic inherited from the primitive or savage ancestors of the European peoples. It is expressly attributed to the Gauls, and less explicitly to the Thracians and Scythians. In fact it must have developed independently in many parts of the world, without direct transmission from place to place, especially in connexion with the idea that the limited supply of individual earthly bodies necessitates the reappearance of the same soul in various earthly bodies. Thus in popular tales the change of a man into a beast involves the assumption that, though the body is different, the soul remains the same; e.g., in the metamorphosis of Odysses' companions into swine whose intelligence remained unaffected. Not that this popular tradition ever became widely effective: except for one not very clear example, stone inscriptions show no trace of a belief in transmigration, while Euripides refers to a second incarnation as an actual impossibility, whose realization might have been welcome as a divine instrument of discrimination between the good and the bad. But, although there is nothing to show that the belief struck deep, or was cherished outside certain particular circles, it was brought into prominence by the religious upheaval which undoubtedly took place in the 8th. century, and became associated with the worship of Dionysus and the Orphic cults. Thus the notion that the soul after death passes to another body as in a dungeon is attributed by Plato and his commentators to the Orphic mystics. Two famous passages in Findor presuppose the doctrine of transmigration. In one of these Persephone sends the souls back to earth in the year when they have been purified from their ancient sorrow; and in the other those who have thrice made their abode on either side of death are destined at last to reach the islands of the blest. It seems more likely that Findor derived this doctrine from the Orphic mysteries than indirectly through the Pythagoracs. The prevalence of this mystical belief and its religious importance are illustrated with remarkable clearness in certain inscriptions on golden tablets found in S. Italy, near Rome, and in Crete, which are chiefly attributed to the 4th or 5th centuries B.C. and published as an Appendix to J. E. Harrison's Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion, Cambridge, 1903, p. 660 ff. One of these contains some words which form part of the appeal of the purified soul: 'I have flown out of the sorrowful weary Wheel; I have passed with eager feet to the Circle desired.' This refers to the mystical Wheel of Fortune which in its revolutions symbolizes the cycle of successive lives necessary to be traversed by the harrowed soul before its final release. This specific cycle of progress, as well as the more general conception of a khetos in human affairs, is traditionally attributed to the Orphic-Pythagorean sphere of thought. In the Orphic hymns this has so far developed as to include a statement that an exact reproduction of the movements characteristic of the present world-era may be expected when the revolving wheel shall come round to the same point again; but it is not easy to reconcile this with the opportunity which, as we have seen, is given to particular souls to obtain their release. Aristotle's reference to the Orphic poems as an authority for the opinion that the soul enters the body from outside in the process of respiration accords well enough with the doctrine now under discussion. Further, the Orphic prohibition of a diet of animal flesh, evidenced by Euripides and Aristophanes, points in the same direction.

In popular estimation transmigration is particularly associated with the name of Pythagoracs. Much of what has been established as belonging to the Orphics, the imprisonment of the soul in the body as a retribution for past ill-deeds, the undeviating recurrence of the cycle of existence, the prospect offered of ultimate salvation by the abstinence the flesh diet—limited, however, by the reservation that it did not apply to the flesh of such animals as are
sacrifice to the Olympian gods— is established for the Pythagoreans by not less convincing testimony. It would seem, therefore, that, when founding his brotherhood, Pythagoras adopted the doctrine of reincarnation for 30,000 years, and of the wretchedness of the wandering spirit which is har- assed by its weary passage through air and sea and earth: "Ere now have I been a youth and a maiden, a bush and a dumb fish in the sea. A discrimination of the peculiarities of the religious concept is involved in the assignment of the less base souls to the higher forms of animal or plant life: these inhabit the bodies of lions among beasts or appear as bay trees in the world of vegetation. The best of them become prophets, bards, physicians, and chieftains, and at last return as divine beings to the company of the gods. As a consequence of this doctrine, Empedocles, like the Pythagoreans, prohibited the eating of flesh and the slaughter of animals, which he stigmatized as the shedding of kindred blood, the murder of a son by his father or of a father by his son.

In several of his dialogues, particularly in the Phaedo, Phaedrus, Republic, and Timaeus, Plato associates the doctrines of the immortality and pre-existence of the soul with its transmigration. The variation in the treatment of this theme is not of serious nature and may not do of being discussed in detail.

According to the Phaedo, those who in this life have failed to emancipate themselves from the bounds of the corporeal element cannot rise to the purer element above, but, being dragged down to the visible world, reappear on earth as ghostly apparitions until they are again imprisoned in another body. Of these the sensual become asses or similar animals, the violent and rapacious become wolves or vipers, he who was guilty of the most revolting misdeeds are permitted to be born of the earth. The souls of the dead are punished or otherwise treated according to the measure of their human actions for 1000 years, until the period of reincarnation arrives, when they are allowed a limited area of choice, so that it often happens that the soul of a man comes into life as a beast, and that of a beast which had formerly been human again enters into the body of a man. A much more elaborate account is given in the myth of Er the son of Arion, how a great variety of choice comprising the lives of every animal and of men in every condition is offered to the allottee whose time for reincarnation has arrived. The order of choice is determined by ballot, but even the soul which drew the last lot had plenty of opportunities for selection left. The narrator of the myth was a witness of the choices made by some of the famous heroes of antiquity; how Orpheus chose to be a swan, Thamyris a nightingale, how a lion, Agamemnon an adder, how Diomed a monkey, while Odyssœus, who drew the last lot, wished of his former animal life to return as a horse. But Zeus had this choice available for him the life of an ordinary man free from all anxiety. In the Timaeus the creator fashions as many souls as there are stars, and distributes one to each star. In order that later, after a period of contemplation, they may be embodied in human form. If during the time of probation the soul lived well, he would return to his ethical habitation; but, if he failed, he would suffer a new incarnation as a beast; and, if his wickedness continued, he would sink down among the beasts until his corporeal talons had been thoroughly purged away. In the same dialogue Plato explains the evolution of birds and other animals as arising from the deterioration of human souls. Birds, with a father and mother, are beings composed of man and woman, and thus heathenized the revolution in the dead, but followed the impulses of those particular combinations that were most favorable.

Critics have not been entirely agreed as to how far Plato was a serious believer in transmigration, some holding that the entire description was purely a play of fancy, and others that, though he may have credited the successive reincarnations of Empedocles is somewhat less explicit than is sometimes represented, logical justification is still to seek for his pronouncement concerning the punishment of guilty souls in a purgatory lasting for 30,000 years, and that the doctrine of reincarnation which had been the belief that was long maintained is not one of contemporary religious asceticism. Nevertheless the reincarnation of various bodily shapes is so closely associated with the person of Pythagoras that he must be held to have inculcated it with personal authority. If so, it may be held that the Pythagorean idea of the transmigration of the souls of men is generally traceable to the authority of Heraclides Ponticus. To this source we owe the famous story that it was permitted to Pythagoras to retain the memory of his previous reincarnations, and that he established his credulity on the occasion of a visit to the Hermæ at Argos by identifying as his own, in his seeing the inscription, the shield of Euphorbus, son of Panthus, which he was bearing when slain by Menelaus before the walls of Troy. Heraclides was also responsible for the statement that Pythagoras claimed to have lived as Ethalides, the son of Heroes and herald of the Argonauts, before he became Euphorbus, that as Ethalides he obtained from his father Hermes the offer of any gift he might choose save immortality, and that he received a present of re-membering his previous fortune while on the earth and in Hades. After Euphorbus died, he became Hermes, and subsequently Pyrhus, the Delian fisherman, before his final re-birth as Pythagoras. Further, Pythagoras declared that after the lapse of 300 years his soul returned in the body of a fish. Accordingly, if the birth of Pythagoras is placed in 572, the date of the Argonauts, he would have been 1400.

There is, however, much better evidence than these fables that Pythagoras seriously taught the doctrine in the almost contemporary verses of Xenophanes; they say that once, as he was passing by, he plied a dog that was being beaten and explained: "Beat him no more; for his soul is my friend's, as I recognized when I heard his voice." It was therefore his belief that the same soul could dwell in another as in a man, and that there is a universal kinship between all living things. He did not hesitate to ascribe reasonable souls to animals, holding that the activity of their reason was an exercise of the same nature as in their exercise of their organs. Aristotle describes the possibility of any soul taken at random passing into any body as a Pythagorean fable. The punishment of souls for their misdeeds by successive incarnations in corporeal dungeons was a theme developed by the Pythagoreans in a manner hardly to be separated from the Orphic, and the results of their joint influence are to be found in the Orphic myths.

Empedocles in his poem entitled 'Purifications' (καθάρσεως) took over the doctrine of transmigration from the Orphic-Pythagorean school without making any effort to connect it with his philosophic system. Indeed it is difficult to see how it was possible for him to advocate the immortality of the soul consistently with his doctrine that the vitality of the soul is the result of an aggregation of corporeal substances. Thought and consciousness are concentrated in the blood which envelops the heart. Aristotle's assertion that, according to Empedocles, the soul is compacted from the embryo, and that the vitality of the soul is similarly misleading; but, even if the materialism of Parmenides and Pythagoras is accepted, as a rule, the possibility of making the prohibition apply only to the ram and the plough ox makes the prohibition apply only to the ram and the plough ox.

5 Paulus-Wessow, viii. 476.
6 See Or. i. xviii. 19; *Or. Met. x. 160 ff.; *schol. Hom. ii. xvii. 23.
9 *Diog. Laer. 15.
10 *Philo, Pyth. Path. 19.
12 De Anima ii. 4. 307 23.
13 For an attempt to distinguish Pythagoreanism from Orphicism, see Hearne, *Diog. Laer. viii. 30.
14 De Anima. i. 4. 307 23.
15 De Anima i. 1. 406 11.

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of human souls, he cannot have extended his belief to their pluralism. It should, therefore, be noted that all these descriptions, if not actually parts of a myth, have a mythical colouring, and must be read subject to the warn-
ing, given by the Platonic Socraites in the Phaedo; 1

1 No sensible man will affirm that these matters took place exactly in the way that I have described. But to hold that events such as those did actually happen, in spite of refer-
tion to our souls and their habits, appears to me, now that the soul has been shown to be immaterial, to be an unreasonable or unworthy view of the facts.

So long as this limitation is borne in mind, there is no valid reason for mistrusting Plato’s sincerity.

Transmigration does not cohere with the Stoic doctrine of materialism, but there are grounds for thinking that Posidonius held the pre-existence and immortality of the soul in the limited sense in which it was possible for a Stoic to accept.3 But neither Posidonius nor any of the Stoics believed in a series of successive incarnations within the limits of the current world-period is, notwithstanding the isolated stray statements of some of their doxographical sources,4 open to very grave doubt.5

According to Plotinus, the future destiny of the soul depends on the use it has made of its several functions and capacities during each particular incarnation. Hence we should constantly strive upward, not yielding to the images of sense or carnal cravings. Thus he who has exercised his human capacities again becomes a man, but those who have lived by sensation alone become animals. If, without yielding to active passion, he has remained immersed in sluggish pleasure, they may even become plants.6 There is always retribution for an ill-spent life; the bad master becomes a dog, the good master becomes a cat, a woman a poor man; the man who has murdered his mother becomes a woman and is murdered by a son.7 On the other hand, those souls which are pure and have lost their attraction to the corporeal will cease to be dependent upon body. So detached, they will pass to the region of being and the divinity, which cannot be apprehended by a human vision as if it were akin to the corporeal.8

II. ROMAN.—There is no evidence among the Romans of an indigenous belief in transmigration, but several of their poets acknowledged the influence of Greek speculation, and of Plato and Pythagoras in particular. Horace mentions the 10 Pythagorean streams of Elysia, and speaks of the same idea as if it were the poetical fancy of a later and more learned age, that their soul had once inhabited the body of Homer and earlier that of a peacock.9 Vergil, in a famous passage,10 takes more serious notice of Pythagoreanism, when he describes the purification of souls in the upper world, and their return to human bodies after the completion of the cycle of 1600 years. Ovid 11 introduces Pythagoras himself, seeming an eloquent plea against the slaughter of animal life, based upon the identity of the soul-substance which permeates our bodies and theirs.

Romans—the best sources of information are the works of E. Rohde, T. Gomperz, and E. Zeller mentioned above. For Pythagoras see art. PYTHAGORAS; also A. E. Chajnetzky, Pythagoras et in philosophiae pythagoricienae, 3 vols., Paris, 1873; and for Plato J. A. Stewart, Myths of Plato, Oxford, 1911; and Ch. S. Thompson’s ed. of Plato, Metaphren, 1907, pp. 556-557. A. C. PEARSON.

TRANSMIGRATION (Indian).—The doctrine of the transmigration of souls is in India the pre-
the Aryans of India the theory, as it meets us for the first time in the literature, appears already fully formed in the shape of belief in a permanently continued but ever-changing existence. And the different forms under which the individual lives are in their rank, and the measure of happiness or misery which they experience is regarded as dependent on moral conduct. At the basis of the Indian belief, from the root of death lies the unmerited conviction that there is no unmerited happiness and no unmerited misery, that each man shapes his own fortune down to the smallest details. This conviction has given to the Indian people a power to endure suffering which has often enough excited the wonder of foreign observers.

Since the Indian recognized that no explanation of the apportionment of happiness and misery, of joy and sorrow, by the moral state of the individual was to be found in the present life, he concluded that man's fate is determined by his good and evil deeds in a former existence. A moral qualification, therefore, according to this view, attaches to the soul; and this corresponds exactly to the sum of its good and evil deeds, and demands reward or punishment in the next existence, if not in the present.

Granted, then, that we endure in the present life the effects of our own deeds, even beyond the present, the conditions must have been precisely the same in the previous existence; the joy and sorrow that we experienced therein were again the consequences of our own actions in a preceding life, and so on without end. For that part of the individual, therefore, which was involved in the cycle of existences no beginning could be assigned. It was thus that quite early in India the theory of the endless pre-existence of the soul was developed; and the doctrine of the soul's eternal duration in the future was inferred according to the law that the kind of existence one had in the beginning is also endless and in accordance with the ancient popular view of the permanence of personal existence in heaven. The belief in the eternity of soul was followed by belief in the eternal existence of the universe.

Life for the case-loving Indian was overshadowed by the belief in transmigration. The thought of wandering perpetually through the bodies of men, animals, and plants, of being compelled in each existence to experience more joy than pain, and perpetually to renew the pangs of death, occasionally sojourning for a time in hell—this thought must have been dreadful for the Indian. Nor was it sufficiently compensated by the prospect of being able to gain heaven by his merit, and to raise himself to divine honours. For with the very ascent to divine honours no more than a transitory success has been gained. Even the gods, according to the transmigration theory, are involved in the cycle of existence, the saṁyata, and must again descend to lower forms of life when their time comes round, that is, when the power of former merit is exhausted through the enjoyment of divine position and honours. The popular gods, therefore, have ceased to be eternal and omnipotent beings, as they were in Vedic times.

According to this view, therefore, the wheel of existence rolls on without rest or intermission, and hurries living creatures perpetually to renewed suffering and renewed death. Naturally, then, the belief was born that there is no deliverance, no release, from the constantly renewed existence upon earth.

The hypothesis that once in the course of time the previous deeds of a living being may meet with the misunderstanding and punishment, or unmerited and unmerited, that, therefore, the basis for a re-birth may and will disappear, was not made in India. According to the Indian view, when a living being dies there always remains a remnant of merit and guilt still unrewarded and un punished, from which is derived the germ of a new existence. Even sacrifice and deeds of piety or asceticism cannot deliver from the necessity of renewed birth and death. In the Satapatha Brahmana it is said that the motive of death which pursues men from one existence to another may be appeased by sacrificial offerings, and that by such offerings release may be obtained from the cycle of death. This thought, however, is soon abandoned, and unmerited conviction that no sacrifices can do more than secure temporary happiness in higher forms of existence.

Since, then, in India it had become the supreme aim of spiritual endeavour to find this release, the issue could not fail to be the conviction that success had been attained; not by the way which had been previously followed and which no longer afforded inward satisfaction, but by the way of knowledge, which, in fact, might be trodden only by a few. In the knowledge of the essential nature of things, which is veiled from ordinary sight, was found the means of deliverance from the pressure of worldly existence. This saving knowledge removes 'ignorance,' i.e. the empirical view of the universe which is natural to man, but is mistaken and perversely perverted. With the possession of desire, which fetters man to existence, and is the cause of all action; as, on the other hand, successful resistance to the desires of the senses promotes the entrance of knowledge. Saving knowledge has the power—to use the technical Indian expression—of 'consuming the seed of works,' and so making impossible for all future time a continuation of migration.

The entire course of thought as hitherto developed is already contained in substance in the ancient Upaniṣads (q.v.). For them saving knowledge consists in the recognition of the sole existence of the Brahma, the soul of the universe, of the illusory nature of the phenomenal world, and especially of the identity of the individual soul, the ātman, with the Brahma. In what way the saving knowledge is conceived in Buddhism, in the religion of the Jains, and in the philosophical system of the Brahmans (Sāṅkhyā, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta, Vaisēṣika, Nyāya), must be ascertained from the respective articles. Cf. also art. MOKSA.


R. GARRE.

TRANSMIGRATION (Jewish).—Metempsychosis, or the migration of the soul (Heb. גַּלְוָא, 'rotation' or 'cycle'), is a doctrine which forms part of a system of esoteric mysticism tolerated rather than approved or furthered by Judaism. Its beginnings are difficult to trace. Whether they were Egyptian or Indian—probably through Gnostic or Manichean intermediaries—this doctrine, no doubt, had to accommodate itself to other Jewish conceptions before it could be assimilated and adopted; and it had to undergo such a profound modification as to give to Jewish metempsychosis a character of its own.

The belief in the migration of the soul presupposes the conception of the soul as an independent system about the creation of the soul, and the conception of sin and redemption, are the fundamental principles upon which such a doctrine must rest. The relation between spirit and matter, soul and body, man's spiritual nature and his temporal condition, the question of pre-existence as well as that of the finality of soul and body. An attempt will here be made to do justice to these problems, however succinctly. The questions of punishment and reward, of God's
justice and mercy are also involved. It must be borne in mind that, however any theory, if it was to be accepted by Jews, had to be subjected to a process of close adaptation to the fundamental principles of Judaism, and must not run counter to the Law. Now, in the light of the soul is continually being accepted as a part of philosophic speculation concerning sin and redemption, it has to formulate its theory in accordance with Judaism.

1. Creation of souls.—God is the creator of everything; but souls are His creation. But, does God continue His act of creation? Does He continually create souls as soon as any human being is on the point of being born? The answer of the believer in metempsychosis is that He does not. His creation came to an end with the close of the sixth day. At the beginning the souls were created. The power of God is thus limited to what He had done on that occasion. Before creating Adam, God had finished the creation of all the souls of man, but, His work of creation being overtaken by the end of the sixth day, He did not continue it, and produced only those evil spirits which have been arising to the divine pantheistic fluid; they are conceived as having an individual existence; they live separately and fully conscious of their individuality; they dwell in the heavenly halls or in Paradise in rapt contemplation of the divine glory; thither they are allowed to return at the end of their peregrination through the lower world. The souls of the born and the unborn, of those who have already been in the sublunar world and of those who have not yet been in that world, are dwelling together in the heavenly halls, or in the treasury of God (Dt 32:9). No clear distinction is made between these two categories of souls. It is not possible to draw a distinction between the souls of the good and the souls of the wicked. The line is not easily drawn, even if it is not so, the existence of the human soul being acknowledged, as already stated, not in a material form but as a spiritual and immaterial substance.

2. Incarnation of souls.—The souls have been created for a specific use; they must enter human bodies; but the choice is not left to them, either of the bodies to be selected or of the time and manner of entry. As soon as a woman conceives (see art. Birth [Jewish]), an angel appears before God with the sperm, and God decrees the future life of the yet unborn babe. Its whole life is thereby determined—whether it will be rich or poor, high-stationed or lowly, wise or foolish, long-lived or short-lived, good or bad, pious or wicked; even its future helpmate is proclaimed in heaven to the joy and satisfaction of the heavenly hosts. In order to obviate too glaring a contradiction in a later version of this legend of the 'Creation of the Child' (see Gastor, Jerakhim, ix. 19 f.), the moral qualifications of the future man and woman have been omitted. The soul, which is very reluctant to give up its heavenly abode and enter the human body, especially if the latter is born into a wicked family, is frequently rejected by the angel and carried through the bliss of heaven and the agony of hell, to see the reward for good actions and the punishment for evil deeds. Although the soul forgets its entry into this world, yet a dim recollection remains, a subconscious image, which is the guiding principle in elementary recognition of good and evil. Every man has within himself a standard of right and wrong given to his soul in its premundane existence. Another version (Zohár, ii. 965 ff.) describes the incarnation of the soul in the following manner:

God created all the souls from the beginning, in the very form in which they would afterwards appear in this world. He beheld them and saw that some of them would be wicked. At the time when the soul is to descend, the Lord says, 'Go to such a place.' The soul replies, 'Let me remain here and not be defiled in that other world.' The Lord answers, 'From the beginning thou hast been created for the purpose of getting into this world.' Then the soul submits, and descends according to will. The Law runs, 'Let every soul go to it.' See how the Lord had mercy on you. He has given you His precious pearl (the Law) to help you in this world, so that ye may redeem your soul. Hence, every soul must obtain purification so as not to be delivered to Gehinnom; for two rows of angels are waiting at the gate of Gehinnom to do good to lead to Eison and the evil spirits to Gehinnom; and to be saved from punishment the soul migrates from body to body.

3. Life of the soul on earth; migration; defeat of evil spirits.—Now the soul begins its course upon earth. It must endeavour to obtain the
absolute mastery over the body and not to become its slave. In the first entry the soul is absolutely pure and without blemish. It is not met by the obstacle of 'original sin.' The principle upheld throughout is that 'each man dies for his own sin' (Ezk 18:20). But the weakness inherent in matter soon makes itself felt, and, moreover, there are the temptations placed in its way through the evil spirits (messagodim), who, though they partake of some spiritual character, are imperfect compared with the pure soul, and are anxious to drag it down to their own level. For at the outset of this attempt of the evil spirits to lead the pure soul away—a desire to frustrate by the means of sin and transgression the divine plan of creation. God has created the world and man in it for His glory. Through trial and trouble man must win the crown of eternal bliss. The finite number of souls forms part of this divine plan. A term is thereby set for man’s spiritualization, for an infinite number of souls might make an end impossible of being reached. But, as there is a limited number, it is obvious that the desired consummation would set in as soon as the last soul had entered the body. It, however, is not the case, for, in this, there was, after all, a subtle way out of the difficulty, and it was not quite free from a possible reproach of selfishness. The goodness of the soul or the purity of life obtained for that individual soul alone happiness and bliss. No one else was directly benefited by it, except perhaps that such a good and pious man served as an example to others. But the world in general apparently had nothing to do with him, and his virtuous life led nowhere except to his own exaltation. Not so with the belief in the migration of the soul. Here, upon earth, in the sight of all, the sinner—whosoever he might be—had to expiate his sins. Here he had to suffer for the wrong committed, and here obtain, as it were, the pass for the heavenly regions. By this slow purification and reunion with the other purified souls, more often a cycle was completed, at the end of which the Messianic period would begin. By his actions the whole world would benefit, and the general progress and welfare of mankind would be hastened and consummated.

Thus the soul of Adam, because he had sinned, had to begin a period of migration through other bodies and thus pass through various stages of existence, and the soul which he had shared with the wife of Uriah, impeded the complete purification of Adam’s soul. But, by its final entry into the last descendant, the Messiah would be brought about the design of the divine plan when Adam, the first man, was created. The soul of Adam, passed into Moses, or, according to another theory, the soul of Adam passed into Moses, who sinned at the rock, and then into David, who sinned with Uriah’s wife, and, finally, into the Messiah, thus linking the first with the last.

There are, as it were, successive incarnations of the pre-existing soul, and for their sakes the world has been created. There cannot be any doubt that these views are extremely old. Simon Magnus raises the claim of former existences, his soul passing through many bodies before it reaches that known as Simon. The Samaritan doctrine of the taqib teaches the same doctrine of a pre-existing soul which was given to Adam, but which, through successive ‘incarnations’ in Seth, Noah, and Abraham, reached Moses, for whom it was originally formed and for whose sake the world has been created. The element which is absent here is that of migration for the purpose of purification. The latter gives to ‘migration of souls’ a peculiar character. Not only is the world perfected there-by (tiqqun), but the sinner passes through it in his world in the new existence in which his soul re-appears. It may enter the body of a pious man, and by his good deeds he will cleanse the dust still adhering to the soul and facilitate its ascent.
on high. If the pious suffer, it is only and solely for sins committed in a previous existence, and thus suffering is not a punishment for sins now committed, but a 'purgatory' for evil deeds of a former life. The explanation of the prosperous sinner is not quite so clear. Here use has been made of the other doctrine of punishment and reward after death. The sinner benefits from the good deeds that he had performed in a previous existence, the reward has been eaten up by him in this world, and nothing but punishment and tortures is reserved for him in the life after death. This presupposes that the soul of the wicked is beyond 'rejuvenation' in this world, and is sent to Gehinnom for punishment.

This seems to be the view taken by 'the Saba' in the Zohar in the passage quoted above (§2). The cycle of the soul is thus broken. It is not made quite clear how it is to be completed; but it seems that, according to some, a soul which has just sunk to this lowest level of contamination, instead of being sent to Gehinnom, becomes an evil spirit in this world, which is anxious to enter living bodies for torment or for that punishment which starts from the lowest rung of the ladder and is to lead up to the highest without recourse to punishment, even in the soul world.

To exorcize it, to free it from this temporary existence as quickly as possible, and thus hasten the next cycle of evolution, is a meritorious deed, a real tikkun, an 'improvement' and perfection.

No attempt is made to reconcile these two separate systems of punishment and reward; they are often mentioned side by side in the Zohar and other kabbalistic treatises. In the Targum to Ee 6 the suffering of the pious and the wicked have already been explained in a somewhat similar manner, inasmuch as the pious suffer for small sins in order to enter afterwards directly into heaven, and the sinner enjoys the fruit of some good deeds here, so that hereafter he is to go straight to torment and punishment.

(b) Kabbalistic theory.—The kabbalists, however, adds and superimposes the new theory of suffering and happiness, not for sins and good deeds performed in the person's lifetime, but for sins done during previous existences. The punishment was expected to fit the crime. Thus, if a man had sinned before his birth, he would be held to suffer with his eyes, and, similarly, every other part of the body would then be affected by the sin committed through that part in the previous existence. Moral sins would have to be expiated in a similar way, and, in fact, the old kabbalists and most accredited teachers, transmigration is not limited to that from one human body to another human body. The soul of the wicked passes also into animal bodies corresponding with the character of the sin.

In later schools the transmigration has been extended also to plants, stones, and metals. As an example of the former it may be stated that the soul of an adulterer passes into the body of a female stork, for it is believed that the storks punish adultery with death.1 Thus an explanation was found for the prohibition of mixing various kinds of seeds and the cross-breeding of animals, for they disturbed the normal laws of nature and caused great suffering to the souls of such mixed products. Similarly, the peculiar command of marrying the deceased brother's wife (yibbum) is explained by the legend of the joyful position in this doctrine of migration. The soul of the childless man cannot return to its source, for the soul has remained barren and is cut short in its earthly career before it has been able to pass through all the stages of purification. Hence the reason why the child born was to be called 'in the name' of the deceased, though it does not follow that it must bear the same name. In fact, the child of Ruth, which was a 'restorer of souls' to Naomi, did not bear the name of Ruth's dead husband. The new-born babe would receive the soul of the dead and continue his earthly life.

5. Number of migrations.—There is a difference of opinion among kabbalists concerning the number of souls that would migrate before it had run its entire course. The majority of kabbalists incline to the opinion that no soul migrates through more than three bodies. The real course is that in which the soul has performed the whole of the 613 commandments of the Law, by which alone perfection is attained. For the shortcomings in one existence the soul is punished in the next, and then also performs some good deeds. Others think that the soul passes through a greater number of changes. It is held that the fate of the soul of the sinner is decided after three migrations, at the end of which a thoroughly good soul becomes an evil spirit—a demon—while that of the pious may be reincarnated times without number. In this case the ascent of the soul from the lower to the higher degrees of power and parts is called a dibbuq. Similarly, the thoroughly wicked section were changed into demons. The change of the body of Nebuchadrezzar into a wild animal, as told by Daniel (Dn 439), lent further countenance to the possibility of a human soul dwelling in an animal body. The rules for slaughtering special animals and for the blessing by which the cutting is accompanied rest upon the same principle of thereby possibly saving a penitent soul from dwelling too long in the body of an animal. It is liberated by a religious act which assists it in its further migration. All this forms part of the tikkun, the tikkun of the soul. In the world, the preparation for the Messianic rule. The covenant before Mt. Sinai was made by God with all the souls which He had created: 'Neither with you only do I make this covenant and this oath; but with all the offspring of the children of Israel, who are present here this day before the Lord our God, and also with him that is not here with us this day' (Dt 2946), for He did not speak only to those who were there, but also to those who were not there on that day, in their material form, i.e. in human bodies.

By this migration of good souls to good men and contaminated souls to sinners and evil-doers a certain affinity of souls was established, which led to the identification of such souls in the various stages. As mentioned before, the soul of Abel or of Adam was that of Moses, and the souls of the ten brothers of Joseph became the souls of the ten martyrs whom the legend described as contemporaries. In fact, this tendency of recognizing the older souls in more recent bodies developed in the later schools of kabbalistic speculations established by R. Isaac Kalir, and, although it is not binding in the Jewish regular system. Lists have been drawn up and books have been compiled (Sepher hog-Gilgolim, Frankfort, 1854), in which the reincarnations of the good and the evil of previous ages are recorded. Such spiritual genealogies—if we may use such a term—have found their way even into bibliographical and historical compilations. In

1 The Heb. name for stork is blbdh, which, by a popular etymology, may be explained to mean 'the chase' or 'the pious.'
addition to the complete reincarnation, there came the notion of partial reincarnation (Neo-Tiqqumm). The soul of a good man is sometimes not strong enough to fight successfully the temptations of the world, and another soul is temporarily grafted upon that which he already possesses, so that it is made available for future tests. The following runs through the spiritual forces of man are regularly heightened on Sabbath eve by the temporary addition of a new soul, which departs with the close of the Sabbath. This is the Sin Grafted temporarily on to the pious man. The object of all this is to hasten the perfection of the world and the advent of the Messiah. By means of migration the soul has fulfilled the object of its creation—to pass through man and to lift man higher and to bring him nearer the divine. This doctrine, being a justification of God's ways with men, is, at the same time, a source of comfort to the pious, and a source of terror to the sinner. It reconciles man to suffering and trials, and at the same time explains the hidden meaning of many a law and ceremony which seem obscure. It is a vindication of the divine character of the Law, for its ultimate result is to be the rule of heaven upon earth.

7. Date and origin.—This doctrine of migration is already found systematically developed wherever it occurs, it is tacitly assumed as well known, and no explanation is given in detail. It has, therefore, been placed together and reconstructed by the present writer mostly from the Zoharistic literature, viz. the Zohar, the Zohar Hadash, and the Tiqqumim, which represents a more or less homogeneous view on migration, whenever it is referred to. While these are by far the best and most complete writings, they are by no means the oldest. This brings us to the question of the date and probable origin of this doctrine among the Jews.

All the beginnings of esoteric teachings are lost in the mist of antiquity, and, when such doctrines finally see the light of day, they have, as a rule, a long history behind them. It is, therefore, a fallacy to date the origin of metempsychosis among the Jews from the time when it becomes known publicly in the 9th or 10th century. The masters of the occult science never doubted its Jewish character. We find no parts of that heavenly mystery handed down from Adam on through all the great men of the past? With great ingenuity they endeavoured to find proofs for it in the Scriptures by means of an exegesis which was fantastic in the extreme. A few examples will suffice. They are taken at random from the Zohar, and they are found in large numbers in Manasseh ben Israel, Nishmat Hayytn, bk. iv. chs. 8-10.

'Till thou return unto the ground' (Gen 3:19) is interpreted to mean that the body alone returns to the ground; the spirit, however, is reborn. 'Nakol shall I return thither' (Job 17:12) is interpreted literally as meaning 'to the womb,' i.e. being reborn. 'The word which he commanded to a thousand generations' (Ps 105:15) is interpreted to mean that it refers to the same soul passing through innumerable generations, for God's command has been given once to all the souls, and therefore souls are reincarnated over and over again.

One generation goeth, and another generation cometh (Ec 10). The fact that the passing away of the generation is mentioned first is a proof that this must have existed before; otherwise the present generation would have to read 'one generation goeth and another generation goeth.'

'Which are already dead more than the living which are yet alive' (Ec 4:9) is interpreted to mean that the living are still uncertain as to the future fate of the migration of their souls. That regeneration, or at least the addition of a soul, is also deduced from the following verse: 'Ye shall therefore separate holy gifts, holy things (hebrew and of the uncircumcision, etc. (Le 27:30), meaning that a clean soul shall be added, not an unclean. Shall flesh and blood, therefore, the soul for them, suffer them?' etc. (Nu 11:23), is taken to mean the addition of a soul to Adam, the God of the spirits of all flesh,' etc. (Nu 16:2), means also those that are added to strengthen them 'should one man sin' whose soul proved too weak for the life of the Adama (Gn 2:17, 'Doth God set before one soul?') (Dr 115) means that a man attaches another soul to himself.

The letters of the name of Ad(ama) have been taken as the initials for Adam, David, Moses, and 'Messias' respectively. It was suggested that the spiritual value of the letters of the names of the ten tribes corresponds to the numerical value of the names of the reputed ten sages who suffered martyrdom. These examples could easily be multiplied from later kabbalistic literature, but they all follow the same line of argument. There cannot, however, be the slightest doubt that the doctrine of metempsychosis was borrowed from other religious systems, and is not Jewish at all. It will remain an open question whether the denial of the resurrection of the dead attributed by Josephus (Ant. XVIII. i. 4 [16]) to the Sadducees implies denial also of reward and punishment, or whether it extended only to the life beyond the grave, and that they believed in the reward and punishment in this world. His allegation that they believed that the soul not only died with the body but was also saved, is, as he says, a common belief among the orthodox. The vindication of God's justice would most easily be found if it means that the soul migrates from one body to another, as they did not deny the divine origin of the soul. Whatever the remotest origin of it may be, it cannot be gainsaid that the atmosphere of Palestine was saturated with mystical and esoteric teachings of every kind, one among them being that of metempsychosis. The Gnostics and Manicheans held fast to it; Neo-Platonism did not deny its possibility, and thus almost insensibly it crept into Judaism. The Palestinian Targumim show traces of it, insomuch as in some places they speak of a second death (so Dt 33), which can only mean at least a life twice repeated upon earth; this is possible only if the soul migrates from one body to another (so also Bahya, ad loc.; cf. also Targum to Is 22[4]). Saadya Gaon (+ 942) in the 10th century inveighs against such tenets, held, as he says, by a certain Karaitse sect, although it was probably rather a mystical view of the doctrine held by Jews who believed also in the migration of souls. A few centuries later Abraham ben Adereth (1280), a rationalist philosopher, in his letter to R. Solomon ben Adreth, no. 8, protested against this doctrine; but they were the only opponents, for the wave of mysticism was rising steadily with the narrowing of the political outlook and the change of social conditions. With the appearance of the Zohar the old kabbalistic literature was pushed into the background, and many an ancient mystical treatise was forgotten, unless it became embedded in the Zohar—the e.g., the treatise by 'the Saba,' the venerable (i.e. R. Haiunna), in the form of a commentary on the Biblical section 1 Mishpatim,' Ex 22, which is found now in the Zohar Ex 94[4]-114[4]. In older writings, Qana and Bahir, and in those of R. Manasseh ben Israel, Zohar, and ben Adereth (c. 1300), and Isaac of Aki (c. 1350), faint traces of this doctrine can be detected. They show that in these mystic schools echoes of the older theory of metempsychosis had been heard and received. Whenever referred to, it is always an ancient tradition. Since the 11th century, the Zohar has swayed the mind of the larger section of a Jewry despondent and broken by ruthless persecution.

The dark Middle Ages began for the Jews when they came to an end for the other nations in Europe. The writings of R. Rekanati (14th cent.)
and Babya (14th cent.) prepared the way for the development.

Palestine—in a lesser degree the adjoining Babylon—seems to have been throughout the centre of mystical speculations. Thither Nahmanides had gone, and a great school flourished in Akko for some years. From the 12th century the flow of the Spanish emigrants at the end of the 16th cent. was also towards Palestine. In Safed there arose the school of Luria (1534-72); commonly known by the initials of his name Arl-Ḥaṭam (Isaac Ashkenazi), Vital Kalabrese, Zerovero, Poppers, and others. Among other doctrines, they developed, in the writings KabbaleS, Ez Ḥoyin, etc., much further the tenets of metempsychosis as a punishment for the wicked and an exalted reincarnation for the pious. The tigguin, or improvement of the world by delivering souls from the chain of migration, became one of the prominent features, which led to that of the Hasidim. Remarkable legends of such deliverance are henceforth told. Every pious and great kabalist performed them, none, however, so effectively as the master Luria himself. The history of the rise of the Lurian doctrine in Safed is one of the most vivid autobiographies of a 'wandering soul' (first published in the Emeg ham-Melekh of Naphtali Herz, Amsterdam, 1618). The belief that certain persons are the guylfeid of other persons who had lived before them is still strongly held by those to whom the Zohar is an inspired book and the teaching of divine revelation. This belief strengthens in them the concept of God's righteousness, and the conviction that, if the time were hastened for all the created souls to pass through the human body, the advent of the Messiah and the Kingdom of God upon earth would be hastened.

LITERATURE.—The books mentioned in the course of this attempt at a synthetic exposition of the doctrine of metempsychosis—the first of which remains the only literature than can profitably be mentioned. Mannaas ben Israel, Nakhmat Ḥagam, ib. iv., treats it apologetically. A. Franck, La KabaleS, Paris, 1862; A. Jellinek, Reise zur Gesch. der Kabalah, Leipzig, 1853-62; D. H. Joel, Sokar, Leipzig, 1849, have incidentally, of course, referred briefly also to this apparently unimportant section of kaballistic Zoharistic speculation. See also literature to art. Kabala.

M. GASTLER.

TRANSFIGURATION (Teutonic).—It is clear that the doctrine of metempsychosis was held by the early Teutonic peoples, though the amount of evidence is small and dated from a time when heathen beliefs, if not forgotten, were at least misunderstood. Such evidence as exists is chiefly derived from Scandinavian records. The only reference in early poetry is to be found in Sigurdarkvida hin Skemna, 45, where Hogni refuses to hold Brynhild back from self-destruction:

'Let no man stay her from the long journey, and may she never be born again (aptr forb.)'

More striking evidence for the belief is furnished by the prose passages contained in Helgakvida Hrormarsonar and Helgakvida Hundingsbana, ii. At the end of the former it is said that Helgi and Sváva, the hero and heroine, were born again (endborin); in the latter we are told that the heroine Sigdrún was Sváva reincarnate, and later the hero himself Shiftshjóll. Helgi and Sváva were born again as Kára and Helgi Haddingjaskati. A reference is given to Káraljóð, a poem now unfortunately lost, which dealt with the adventures of these persons. Moreover, in the twenty-sixth stanza of that poem is a reference to the hero as an endborin jofunn, a 'giant' reincarnate; his grandfather Starkaður is said to have been a jofunn (c. ili.).

With the introduction of Christianity metempsychosis came at last to be regarded as an old wives' tale. For a time it still survived among the half-heathen population: to his horror St. Olaf found himself regarded as the reincarnation of a legendary king, one Olaf Geirstaðarfr (Flateyjarbók, i. 135).

It is not to be overlooked that in all these cases the men—thither not to the women—occurred in the same names in each incarnation. As among certain primitive peoples of the present day, the name is regarded as something more than a mere label; it is intimately connected with the soul of its possessor, so that a child inheriting the name of a dead person necessarily inherits the soul as well. An interesting reference to this belief may be cited from Flateyjarbók, i. 255: Thorstein Úxafót, a follower of Olaf Tryggvason, is visited in a dream by the ghost of a man called Brynjarr; it bestows a treasure on him and asks in return that one of Thorstein's children should be baptized under the name Brynjarr, since it desires a Christian reincarnation for its heathen soul.

In the Islandsinga Saga there are no actual references to metempsychosis, though the practice of naming children after lately deceased kinsmen (Nyta Saga, ii. 42), or of giving to a child names appropriated to the deceased (La Laxdæla Saga, chs. 36, 56) points to the existence of some such belief. But the passage in Sturlunga Saga, i. 42—'bote inum na Kolbeinn apr koninok at endborinum' is no true instance of this kind, since Thorgils Boßvarson, referred to here, was born in 1226, nineteen years before the death of Kolbeinn Arnorsson, of whom he seemed to be the reincarnation. To the present day, however, it is believed in Norway and Iceland that, if a ghost appears to a pregnant woman in her sleep, it is seeking a namesake (gaar etter Navnet); and accordingly the child is baptized with the name of the dead person (cf. K. Maurer, Zeitgeschicht des Vereins für Volkskunde, v. 99). Sophus Bugge, moreover, states that he had heard reis upp atte ('raise up again') used in the west part of Iceland with reference to the naming of a child after a dead person (Home of the Eidic Poems, London, 1899, p. 333).

Among the other Teutonic peoples the evidence for anything in the nature of metempsychosis is very meagre. An Anglo-Saxon charm (T. O. Cookayne, Leechdoms, Wortcunning, and Starcraft of Early England, London, 1864-66, iii. 66 ff.; C. W. M. Grein, Bibliothek der angelsächs. Poesie, Göttingen, 1847, li. 35 ff.; 116 ff.) cannot bring forth a child to step thrice over the grave of a dead man, using an incantation for the safe delivery of her offspring. It is a question much in need of investigation whether the same idea can be traced in certain usages said to be practised in connexion with burial-places of the heathen age in various parts of Northern Europe.

It may be mentioned in conclusion that Appian (Hist. Rom. iv., ' de Rebus Gallicis, 3) describes the Germans who followed Ariovistus as 'scorning death because of their hope of rebirth' (Tharouxs karapovmosb b'i Orusia dudraurou). In view of what is said of the Gauls by Diodorus, v. 23, and by Lucan, Pharsalia, i. 454 ff. (with the scholia), it is not unlikely that the reference here is to a belief in metempsychosis, though one cannot deny the possibility that Appian's statement may be due to a misunderstanding of the Valhalla doctrine.


BRUCE DICKINSON.

TRANSUBSTANTIATION.—See EUCHARIST.
TRAPPISTS—TRAVANCORE

TRAPPISTS—Trappists is the popular name for the Reformed Cistercians, or Recollets, of the Strict Observance, now the chief division of the order.

The art. MONASTICISM outlines the successive reforms of the Cistercians, from St. Bernard to St. Benedict. By 1600 the Cisterciansthere themselves had yielded to the spirit of luxury, despite the restoration in Spain promoted by Martino de Vargas. Though Richelieu and Mazarin furthered many attempts to return to the austere life of their own order, and though their centralized constitution might have facilitated this, a general reform was refused. Here and there a few abbeys did return to the ideals of St. Stephen Harding, the Jansenist reform of St. Cyr and of Port Royal being well known. Armand-Jean Le Bouthillier de Rancé (1626-1700), abbot in commendam of La Trappe from the age of ten, abandoned court life in 1662 and entered one of the reformed abbeys as a novice. Two years later, having again professed, he came to take charge of his own inaccessible Norman abbey. Finding that the few monks who had not shared his example would not share his ideals, he pensioned them off and colonized the place from other reformed abbeys. The community improved on the original austerities, taking only one vegetable meal daily, abstaining from literature and from speech except for urgent purposes.

The ideals were published by de Rancé in his Traité de la sainteté et des devoirs de la vie monastique (1683), and in his posthumous Règlemens généraux de l'abbaye de la Trappe (1701); but only a single community of nuns and two Italian monasteries adopted them. For a century they were unimportant, though other Reformed Cistercians undertook missions to Africa which had some temporary success.

The French Revolution broke up the home; the abbey was suppressed, and the premises were converted into a foundry for cannon. This was the real birth of the order. In 1791 Dom Augustin de Lestrage, master of the novices, took a score of monks to Val Sainte, Switzerland, imposing a rule stricter than ever; postulants flocked in; colonies were sent to many lands; a congregation was formed, and Dom Augustin was appointed father abbot. When the Trappists were hunted to Poland, Germany, and Italy, the ideal only increased. A new abbey was formed at Staplehill near Wimborne; a party of monks that wandered through Pennsylvania, Kentucky, Missouri, and Illinois returned to France on the fall of Napoleon, occupying La Trappe and Belle Fontaine; presently five priories were established in France, and a great college at Soligny. Before his death in 1827 Dom Augustine saw abbeys grow up in Belgium and Italy, besides two more in France. One was founded at Coalville in Leicestershore and named after the great Bernard. The soul of his friend Alberic was taken in 1848 by an expedition from La Meilleraye in Brittany, which settled in Kentuck at an abbey named Gethsemani. Mount Melleray in Ireland sent another colony to Dubuque in Iowa, and both establishments thrive, though all the fathers are aliens. A second Irish abbey arose at Roscrea in Co. Tipperary.

Outward disasters again intensified the spiritual life. La Trappe was destroyed by fire in Aug. 1871; 1450 fathers and brothers were again expelled from France in 1880; but the austere ideals were embraced by nearly all Cistercians outside Austria-Hungary. After two constitutional changes they were formally recognized in 1892 as the order of Red Cloths, with an abbot-general at Rome; and this success was crowned six years later by the purchase of the original premises of Citeaux.

1 In 1893 they were expelled from the United States, two communities went to Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, one to Oregon, one to Brazil; two tiny groups have taken refuge near Kingsbridge and Hambrook. Soligny, which had endeavoured to uphold the agricultural ideals of St. Benedict, especially by its Canadian offshoots at La Trappe, where the Ottawa joins the St. Lawrence, at Lake St. John, and in Manitoba. No establishment in the world is more unique, and though the partial observer has anything to say as to results.

Attached to each of the 71 monasteries and annexes is a body of brothers who do the rougher field work; in all there are about 2000 of these, and 1600 sisters. The only priories contain 2000 nuns and lay sisters. Three Italian monasteries still follow the rule of de Rancé as once used at La Trappe, but do not belong to the Reformed Cistercians; they have only 50 members.


TRAVANCORE.—Travancore (Malayalam Tiruvittankár, 'place where the goddess of prosperity resides'), a native state in the south-west of the Indian peninsula, takes its name from Tiruvankod, 30 miles south of the capital, Trivandrum.

'Travancore is said to have formed part of the ancient kingdom of Kerala. During the 12th cent. A.D. it was conquered by the Cholas; in the 13th cent. it was invaded by the Pandyas of Madura. A descendant of the Travancore foundation was found in the first half of the 14th cent. by Márthán Varma, and in 1795 it became a protected state under the British Government. Since then it has enjoyed prosperity under a well-regulated government, and it has been conspicuous for the maintenance of order, religious toleration, and encouragement of education.

2. Area and population.—The area of the state is 7703 sq. miles, and the total population at the census of 1911 was 3,428,975, of whom 93.8% are rural and 6.2% urban. The density of the population is high: 452 per sq. mile for the whole area, and 880 per sq. mile in the 2000 most populous towns, lakes, and

1 J. L. Allen, Century Magazine, new ser., iv. 454.

2 1691 xiv. 2l.\)
included. The people are of the usual S. Indian Dravidian type, and they preserve many characteristic usages, in particular the matrarchical forms of the system of marriage and family:

Among the Marma-Kakasayam [Malayalam maruri, 'next,' 'other,' maadhu, 'children,' tayam, 'portion'] Hindus the husband is, according to the law, the eldest male member of the family, but in the female line only the eldest male member has no place. It may happen, however, that a Karanavan ['originator'], number of the Hindu Reformed, or at least a member of the male members, will be able to continue single after the lifetime of the parent, especially if the father's son divides and go and live in separate households with the children, the mother residing with one of the sons in the original household. The married sons, if any, usually live with the mother. In regard to the Nampuleti Brahmanas, however, the eldest son alone marries, the other sons living with him in the family. 1

The chief castes are the Nayan [q.v.] honorific, and of Nyaks; Skt. madhyama, numbering 692,655, best known on account of their peculiar marriage customs. 2 The Ilhuvans or Ilavans, who take their name from Izham, the Malayalam name of Ceylon, are immigrants from that island, cultivate coco-nut and palmyra palms, make the drink known as toddy (Skr. tala, 'the palmyra tree'), and distil country spirits; they number 56,053. The Pulamans (Malayalam taravdtu, 'today') numbering 185,314, are agricultural labourers. The Channans or Shabnel (Tamil shabu, 'today') cultivate the palmyra palm and make coarse sugar. Brahman number 55,643; among them the most respectable are the Namkuri, Namkuri, or Nam- buri (Malayalam nambu, 'the Veda'; oahu, 'to teach'; tier, Skr. dhi, 'holy'), who aim at following the original Vedic rites and practise elaborate rules of purification, while they allow the younger sons of the family to enter into polyandrous relations with Nayan women.

3. Religion.—Classified by religion, the population consists of Hindus, 2,982,617, 69-57 %; Christians, 908,868, 29-36 %; Muhammadans, 226,617, 6-61 %; animists, 15,177, 46 %; Jews, Buddhists, and Jains, 100.

(a) Hindus.—Of the triad, Br diagrams, Visnu, Siva, the last is most popular; in the form of Ananda Padmanabha ('the endless, from whose naval springs the lotus') he is the patron deity of the state, with a famous temple at the capital Trivandrum, which is visited by crowds of pilgrims. Among the minor deities the following are the chief: Vrthnasvāra ('obstacle Lord'), the Ganeṣa or Ganapati of other parts of India; Subhramayya, Skanda, Kārttikeya, or Veluayya, like Ganesa a son of Siva, but this demon, who can drive the helpless and punishes the wicked—a cult special to the Tamil and Malayāḷa peoples; Śtāta ('ruler'), Aiyanapp or Aiyanār ('honourable father'), the most popular, and minor deity, chief of the household (bhata), who rides over the land mounted on a horse or elephant, sword in hand, to disperse all obnoxious spirits. Besides these the lower classes worship goliards or minor spirits, male and female, the females attendants of the goddess Bhadrakāli, the males classed as followers of Siva.


(b) Christians.—These show a notable increase, from 498,542 in 1881 to 908,868 in 1911. The Hindu compiler of the Traveancore Census Report for 1911 stated that the Christian feeling in the state has developed in the last forty years, and the census officers were under orders, in their visits, to make a special effort to secure converts. The churches were represented as having achieved great success in the evangelization of the backward classes and the increase of the Christian population is attributed in part to the increase of the number of missionary schools and in part to the rise of the educational system supported by the state. The Traveancore Census Report for 1911 states that the Christian population is distributed in the following manner: Catholic, 725,816; Brahmo, 15,550; Protestant, 107,502.

The following are the details of the Christian population: Syro-Roman, 280,407; Syrian Jacobites, 202,699; Roman Catholic, 175,724; Congregationalists, 81,573; Reformed Syrian, 74,869; Anglican, 56,251; Salvationist, 16,794. The Church Missionary Society commenced work in 1816, the London Missionary Society in 1806, the Salvation Army in 1808.

(c) Muslims.—Muhammadan missionarions are said to have visited Malabar as early as A.D. 710, and the story of the conversion of the last of the Perumals suggests that traders from Arabia arrived as early as the 9th century A.D. 3 The Muhammadans have been a determined people, a constant menace to the Perumals; they are solders, merchants, and their converts. The Perumnans (Skr. Tarashaka, 'Turk') belong to the immigrant class.

2 Th. p. 104.

TREATIES

1. Their place in international law and ethics.—The history of treaties, as formal agreements between nations, ratified by the respective governments, throws some light on the development of international ethics; and the formalities and ceremonies connected with the sanctions employed at various times, to give validity to the pact, are of interest to the historian of religion. Throughout the whole of antiquity the gods presided over all treaty-making, and the oath was a predominant factor; the transition from ancient to modern times is marked by a steady decline of this religious element. For the present purpose the juristic aspect of treaties may be ignored. But it is necessary to define their general position in regard to law. They belong to the sphere of what is known as 'international law'; but the rules known as international ethics lie on the extreme frontier of law, and it is only more convenient, not necessarily more correct, to treat them as a branch of law rather than of morals. The difficulty is greatly regressed when it is recognized that 'international law lies in the fact that there is no fixed authority (unless it be a universal League of Nations) that can lay down and enforce these rules as between nations, and the rules are liable to be broken with impunity by any nation that has the power and the will to defy them. No pact between two nations can bind a third which was not a consenting party. But treaties, which are one of the most important means by which 'international law is laid down, are valuable as a record of the development of morality, for the very reason that they express national opinion in a peculiarly deliberate and aU ahuman manner.

The history of treaties accordingly illustrates the growing sense of nations—which, by a legal fiction or a bold metaphor, are moral persons—for morality in international relations. It also illustrates the constant struggle to discover some means of enforcing the observance of pacts.

Upon a scrupulous fidelity in the observation of Treaties, not merely in their letter but in their spirit, obviously depends the universal good of the world. Pacta sunt servanda is the prevailing maxim of International, as it was of Roman Law.

In the earliest times of which we have record this fidelity was reinforced by religious ceremonials, calling of the gods to witness, with oaths and imprecations. In modern times these religious aspects, as also the giving of hostages, are thrown into the case of treaties with savages, and the observance of treaties has been left to the conscience of the parties; but, as this could no more be relied upon than when it required to be fortified by oaths, one of the chief objects of treaties in modern times has been the establishment of a balance of power in order to make the violation of them a risky undertaking. Finally, the impossibility of obtaining permanent equilibrium between groups of nations has raised the question of a universal League of Nations, which, in turn, has assumed the Treaty of Versailles of 1919, may be regarded as the highest development that the treaty has so far reached, since, by creating a determinate authority capable of enforcing the rules, it seeks to merge international law and (so far as law can make men trustworthy) international morality in one.

Previously to this treaty, little had been done in this direction beyond the general recognition that promises and signatures are futile, and that the only security lies in the establishment of just and stable order. But how to ensure that the wrongdoer who, feeling himself strong enough, wantonly violates his word and destroys the peace of the world or breaks the laws of war shall be punished, has meant an insoluble problem, since his very act implies an assurance of impunity. W. G. F. Phillipmore suggested that each state that is a party to a treaty should contract with each other, in the event of war between it and any other state that is a party to the treaty, it will observe towards the state with which it is at war all the agreed rules of the laws of war, and, if the rules are violated, then any other state party to the treaty may consider it an offence against itself that the law has been violated, such violation being considered an indirect injury, by reason of the lowering of the standard of conduct. The weak point of this arrangement is that interference on the side of law and order is merely permissive; it requires to be made imperative, and extended to cover the maintenance of the peace of nations, and not merely the observance of the laws of war.

It is generally agreed that 'international morality—if not international law—calls upon every State to use every means at its disposal, without giving offence—for example, friendly suggestion—to prevent the outbreak of war, or, when it has begun, to help the contending parties to compose their differences. A war between two nations directed or indirectly concerns all nations in a degree more or less of the international community. There is not and there cannot be any principle of law, of ethics or of religion, prohibiting peaceful States from doing their utmost to bring about a cessation of carnage and devastation.

The League of Nations converts this negative into a positive injunction to interpose, and removes the offence from the most forcible methods of doing so. For art. 16 of the Covenant of the League declares that 'any nation, not being a member of the League, will be entitled to the assistance of the League in any case of armed attack against it, in any case of war or threat of war, and in any case of conflict of interests which might lead to a breach of the peace'; the League, it is obvious, that even this machinery will not suffice to suppress the ambitions of a state that feels itself strong enough to defy the greater part of the world; but it is equally obvious that such a state will be less ready to take the plunge than it would be if no such machinery existed.

Although the experience of the Great War of 1914-18 dashed the high hopes which were entertained as a result of the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, it is unreasonable to regard those proceedings as a mere 'misprint in the world's history. They were attended by the representatives of nations so numerous and so important that it was possible to say that in the result of their deliberations we have what may be regarded as the common judgment of mankind expressed in the most solemn manner in which an international engagement between nations is capable of expression on such vital questions as the desirability of substituting arbitration for war. For the first time, too, an international court was established.

2. ib. p. 69.
5. See art. OAEV.
to give effect to the principle agreed upon by the conference. Now it is true that this solemn judgment was abrogated by the wanton action of a single one among the signatories, and the whole foundation of the international relations thus formed became void. But the foundation remains, to which The Hague Conferences contributed certain elements of solidity, if only by producing unanimity among a greater number than was to be found in the treaty before being parties to a treaty. Such unanimity was secured again among an even greater number, and, when a fresh start was made in 1919, the problem of securing adequate sanction for the engagements between the nations by means of a League of Nations was attacked with the more insight and chance of success, because it was known wherein the old conferences had failed.

Among the reasons for the failure of treaties to preserve the peace the misconception of their object as the termination of war merely, and not also the establishment of permanent peace, and the lack of elasticity in their terms, are clearly drawn merely to set out the objections outstanding at the time, without care being taken not to sow the seeds of fresh conflict by imposing harsh conditions, restraining projects of liberty and ignoring claims of special peoples concerned, they do little more than temporarily suppress forces which break out with the greater violence at the first opportunity. For the same reason, they should not be rigidly drawn as to occasion consideration in the light of new conditions, and should include the necessary machinery for such reconsideration.

Antiquity. — (a) The earliest treaties of which we have any detailed record relate to the two cities of Lagash and Umma, on either side of the Shatt el-Hai in Babylonia.1 Etemenna, pater of Lagash (about 2500 n.c.), records an arbitration of earlier date in the time of Mesilim, king of Akkad. The actual patrons of Lagash and Umma are not named; the dispute is settled by the gods; the god Enlil presides over the conference and invites the parties to make the treaty; the boundary is fixed by his command by Ningirsu, god of Lagash, and by the city-god of Umma; even Mesilim acts only at the command of his goddess Kali. This is obviously an extreme instance of the religious sanction of the treaty (it is supposed to live and move and have their being entirely in their hosts' hands). A second treaty between the same two cities was made about 2400 B.C. by Ennatum, pater and king of Lagash, and Enkidu, pater of Umma. A great boundary-ditch was dug, and the plain of Gud-gul, which was in dispute, was restored to Ninisura. But the gods erected along the new frontier beside the pillars of definition, and the gods of the parties facing each other at the altars of these shrines that the gods took oaths in ratifying the treaty: 'On the men of Umma have I, Ennatum, cast the great net of Enlil. I have wrought the oath, and the men of Umma have sworn the oath to Ennatum.' He invokes the vengeance of Enlil on the men of Umma if they alter this word. He also invokes other gods, to whom he has made suitable offerings, to enforce the treaty.

In the third treaty, the terms of which were imposed on Umma by Etemenna of Lagash (about 2500 B.C.), we have a similar impression: 'If the men of Umma ever violate the boundary-ditch of Ningirsu or that of Ninisura, in order to lay violent hands on the territory of Lagash ... then may Enlil destroy them, and may Ningirsu cast over them his dice, and set his hand and foot upon them.' The imprecations recall those of the second treaty, with a sharp sting smeared the blood on seven stones, and invoked Orotal (Dionysus) and Allat (Arina).8 The locus classicus is Tac. Ann. xii. 47 (the Aramaeans cut off the blood of innocent men, and flayed the corpse of a victim, to cut a covenant being rather parallel to ἰπαρανθείναι and ταρασσεῖν ἐρριμπάρες or παραμετρίαν to refer to the cutting down of the victim, however, seems uncertain.

(b) The famous treaty between Rameses II. and Hethertumet (the Hittite king of KhaItu, about 1300 B.C.), is recorded in three copies, of which two are hieroglyphic, at Karnak and in the Ramesseum, while the third is the Hittite-Babylonian version, on the tablets excavated at Boghaz Keui.2 Two Hittite envos brought the

blood-covenant was also in use, and treaties were continued by oath and ceremony and ended by the sacrifice of an ox. In a treaty of 544 B.C. the formula is: § May the gods of the earth, the gods of the seas, the gods of the rivers, the gods of the emperors and the gods of the sun, and the ancestors of our seven tribes and twelve States watch over its fulfillment. If any one prove unfaithful he may not escape unless his gods smile him, so that his people shall forswear him, his life be lost, and his posterity cut off."1

c) Coming to the Western nations, we find that the international relations depicted in the Homeric poems were primitive, including the making of truces, with oaths, for the burning of the dead;2 oaths, invocation of the gods, imprecation on the treaty-breaker, with sacrifice and feasting, also accompanied a treaty between Greeks and Trojans.3 In the historical period in Greece we find certain primitive survivals, as when Aristides administered the oath to the Greeks and took it himself on behalf of the Athenians, throwing pieces of hot iron (μύθους) into the sea. But as a rule the oaths are the ordinary ones (νόμιμος δρόκος) in the name of the chief gods (δρόκοι); or, as in the alliance between Athens, Argos, Mantinea, and Elis (425 B.C.), the instruction is that each party should swear its most binding national oath over perfect victims (τῶν εὐτύχων δρόκον τῶν μέγατον κατὰ λείψεων). The tendency is to increase the number of gods invoked, in the hope of increasing the force of the oath.

In a treaty between Carthage and Philip v.4 in 216 B.C. the following deities are invoked: Zeus, Hera, Apollo, the Genius (Sicilian) of Carthage, the Carrthaginians, Hiero, Ithobolus, Ares, Triton, Poseidon, the gods of the army (θεοὶ τοῦ πολεμουργοῦ), the Sun, Moon, and Earth, the rivers, harbours, and waters, all the gods who rule Carthage, all the gods who rule Macedon and the rest of Greece, all the gods who preside over the camp (επορεύγοντες). The Macedonians in allying themselves with Smyrna (mid. 3rd cent. B.C.) swear by Zeus, Earth, Sun, Ares, Athena Arela, Artemis Tauropolos, the Sisyphus Mother, Apollo 6 in Φασάλης, all the other gods and goddesses, and the Good Fortune of King Seleucus. The Smyrniotics made an alliance with Anbrodotus Stratokhos for Apollo and omit the Good Fortune of the king.

The inscriptions frequently omit the instructions as to the gods in whose names the oaths are to be taken, p. presuming merely the nature of the undertaking, as:

"I will fight for the Bottians who enter into the pact, and will keep the alliance with them faithfully and without guile, showing all zeal according to the pact; and I will bear no ill will of what has happened in the past."5

Formule of imprecation frequently accompany the oath; in the simplest form (as in the alliance between Athens and Coreya in 375 B.C.) it is:

Τύδας-τυδα, εἰτι εὐ σώμενον ὁ θεός, τὸν θεόν, τὰς θεότητας, τὰς κάτω τῆς θεότητος, τὰς θεοθείας, τὰς θεοθεοθείας, τὰς θεοθεοθεοθείας, τὰς θεοθεοθεοθεοθείας, τὰς θεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθείας, τὰς θεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθείας, τὰς θεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθείας, τὰς θεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθείας, τὰς θεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθείας, τὰς θεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθείας, τὰς θεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθείας, τὰς θεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθείας, τὰς θεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθείας, τὰς θεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθείας, τὰς θεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθείας, τὰς θεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθεοθ
TREATIES

against Rome in 91–88 B.C. 1 When Livy 2 describes a similar ceremonial among the Carthaginians, substituting a lamb for a pig, he is perhaps only attempting to fit Roman customs to theirs. Livy is careful to distinguish, saying that the Carthaginians swear by their own gods, while the Romans perform the ceremony evidently regarded as peculiar to themselves. After the ceremony the envoys wrote out the text and brought it to Rome, and the whole college pledged itself to secure that it should be duly observed. It is hardly too much to say that the account given of the functions of the fetials reveals as highly organized a system, and as dignified a conception of the legal essence of the treaty, as has ever been realized. But it is a mistake to suppose that this organization is the expression of a high ethical standard. 3

3. Middle Ages and modern times.—(a) The Pax Romana makes records of treaties during the empire scanty. 4 The swearing of oaths fingers on into the modern period.

In the treaty between Justinian and Choezores (A.D. 561) the 12th article contains the invocation of God and the prayer that God may be compassionate to him who keeps the peace and becomes the adversary of the deceitful man who seeks to overflow the pact. The oath taken by the envoys of the clergy of Burgundy, and Childebert, king of Austrasia (A.D. 557), is 'by the name of Almighty God and the indivisible Trinity, and all the holy and godly creatures of God, the king of the Low and High, Italy, and Germany and Charles of France swear 'per Dominum sempiterne, Dei virtutem sempiterne, sanctae Dei Religionis quaam pascem,' 5— bona fide servavimus et etque fraudem Sic Deus nos auditet, et hac Sancta Dei Evangelia.' The formula 'perer en son âme,' 'furrie en animam suaum,' appears frequent in treaties between England and France or the Low Countries. Excommunication was the logical sequel to the violation of a treaty-oath (as specified, e.g., in the truce of the renewal of the Truce Domini at the Council of Noyon, 1094). Gradually the oath fades away into the promise.

In the treaty of commerce between Henry vii. and Philip, Duke of Burgundy (1453), the commissioners, in a declaratio to all faithful Christians . . . Eternal Greeting in the Lord,' 6 bona fide promise and oblige themselves, on the pledge and obligation of all their goods present and future, to give to the observance of the treaty; these obligations are to be delivered not only to the parties present, but also to the Virgin Mary at Cahors. The king's undertaking to ratify the agreements by his commissioners is given 'bona fide et de suum cordis et de suae voluntatis arcimo et en the word of a Prince.' In the treaty of 1604 between Philip ii. and James i. of England the gradual obsolescence of the oath is markedly visible in the clause: 'They shall make a like promise on the word of a King and Prince, and even swear on the Holy Gospels, if they are thereby required by the other party.'

The most modern example of an oath is said to be that taken in the cathedral of Soleuré in the alliance between France and Switzerland in 1777. Thus finally disappeared that element which was, 'in a certain sense, the underlying basis of the whole body of the ancient laws of nations.' It was not uncommon for a party to a treaty to obtain absolution from his oath.

Thus Maximilian 1., a few months before the League of Cambrai (1508), had made a treaty with Venice; one of the articles of the League summoned him by a papal brief to the

1 H. A. Gruber, Oeufs of the Roman Republic in the British Museum, London, 1910, ii. 56, 88, 339, etc.
2 2 Livy, vii. 25.
4 For treaties before Charlemagne see Barbeyeau's Supplement to Dumon's Charles le Grand et les Trattats.—Charlemagne ownds Dumont's work itself, and for the modern period the various collections, especially Marten's.
5 6 Phillipson, Int. Law and Custom of Cane. Gr. and Rome, i. 330.

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5 6 Phillipson, Int. Law and Custom of Cane. Gr. and Rome, i. 330.
from doing so 'by the forms of the British constitution,' 1

(c) Apart from professions of this sort, the actual protection of religious freedom of peoples involved in a settlement by treaty has often formed the subject of special articles. 2

An early and remarkable instance is in the treaty between Justinian and Persia in 561, in which a special article provided that Christians in Persia should enjoy freedom of worship, and should have their own patriarch, and should attempt to make proselytes among the Magi. In modern times the Treaty of Westphalia marked an advance in religious toleration. The Treaty of Tordesillas (1529), recognizing the sovereignty of Canada, made special provision for liberty to the New Roman Catholic subjects of the king of Spain, to follow their own religious worship. The Treaty of Oliva in 1600 (between Poland and Sweden) protected the co-religionists of either power in the territory of the other. In 1667, when Russia ceded Alaska to the United States, it was provided that the civilized inhabitants should not be interfered with in their religion. And in 1901, by the Treaty of Constantiopolis, Muslims resident in Bulgarian territory were guaranteed the enjoyment of religious liberty, and the name of the sultan as khalif was to continue to be pronounced in their public prayers. 'It is incumbent on the acquiring sovereign to allow to the inhabitants of the annexed territory the free exercise of their religion when it is not incompatible with good order and the fundamental dictates of morality.' This provision is not a legal one, but its sanction is rooted more deeply than that of positive enactment. Hence the necessity of actual stipulations, such as those enumerated, is not usually felt.

(d) Of more importance, as indicating moral progress, than professions relating to religious principles is the provision for freedom of conscience. From the time that provisions for religious freedom, is the degree of solictude shown by the contracting parties for the general interests of the people. W. G. F. Phillimore 3 remarks that, except in the matter of religious toleration, the Treaty of Westphalia paid scant regard to the interests of the people. From 1648 to the recognition of American independence in 1783 the chief consideration was given to the religious teaching of the next or other days, to the rights and interests of sovereigns and reigning families. In the next period, down to 1859, there is increased recognition of the rights of states. Still, by the General Act of the Congress of Vienna, e.g., states and populations were trafficked in, with absolute disregard of the peoples concerned, who might as well have been slaves or cattle. Since 1859 4 little regard is paid to the supposed rights and interests of individual sovereigns or reigning families, and a new principle has arisen, viz. the rights of nationalities. 5

4. Conclusion.—Certain moral considerations which stand with treatymaking and treaty-breaking may be stated, though no solution is necessarily offered of the questions involved.

(a) The constraining of treaties is a matter of equity. They are made about facts, and are not therefore to be technically construe.

1 'Discrimen actuum bona fide et stricti juris, quatenus ex juro est Romano, ad jus gentium non pertinent.' The principle of the De jure, 'voluntatem potius quam verba spectari pons,' applies with especial force. 7 'There is no place for the refinements of the courts in the rough jurisprudence of nations.' 6

In antiquity a famous instance of the breach of this principle was the murder of Hippasia by Paches. 8 The classical example in modern writers, however, is the action of the French who, having disregarded the formalities of Dunkirk in accordance with the Treaty of Utrecht, proceeded to construct a still stronger place at Mardick, a few miles away. The principle by which a provision may be 'extended' so as to include a case to which the same article applies as applied to the case originally envisaged, or may be 'restricted,' so that an ally excludes the application of a provision to a case obviously improper (as when, having promised to aid an ally in all its wars, it is asked to join in an unjust war)—this principle of extensive or restrictive interpretation assists contracting parties in adhering to the spirit rather than the letter of a treaty. 9

(b) Since governments are representatives of justice, morality, and religion, it is assumed 2 that a treaty containing an engagement to do or allow that which is opposed to justice, morality, or religion is invalid. Pacta, quae turpem causam continent, non sunt observanda. 3 Since a large number of treaties are forcibly imposed on a conquered by a conquering state, it is obvious that this principle provides innumerable opportunities for dispute and repudiation, under the next heading.

(c) How far is a treaty invalidated by the employment of force on the part of one of the parties? To this it is generally agreed to answer that there is no force in the plea that one of the parties consented through fear, or in face of superior force, such as would invalidate a private contract, since such treaties are only a way of terminating war, which is entirely determined by force. 4 'No inequality of advantage, no lesion, can invalidate a Treaty. But it is equally clearly held that treachery or perfidy, inferior to that of a nation, or even of a state, does not in the nature of the case absolve the people or the government of the state, or the collective representative of a state amply justifies the repudiation of a treaty. The classical instance is Napoleon's ex- termination of terms from Ferdinand vii. at Bayonne.

(d) Fraud may also clearly hold to invalidate a treaty. And there is no real freedom of the will on the part of the deceived party. 5 The distinction is sometimes a little delicate between positive fraud and suppressio verb. In the negotiations for the Webster-Ashburton Treaty (1849) Webster suppressed a map which was favourable to the British cause. The map could have been found, as Greville admitted, if the British authorities had caused proper search to be made, and Lord Ashburton agreed that he had no legal cause for complaint. 6 Yet it is to such cases as this that the remark of Hall 7 may be applied: 'It is recognized that there is an international morality distinct from law, violation of which gives no formal ground of complaint, however odious the action of the ill-doer may be.'

(e) The question of how far a party can liberate itself from obligations has been brought into special prominence by Germany's repudiation of its pledge to Belgium in 1914. To the doctrine that 'necessity, when real and bona fide, overrules the obligation of the promise' R. J. Phillimore 8 replies:

'it is manifest that the State, like the Individual, which takes advantage of the change of affairs to disengage itself from the obligations of a solemn covenant, weakens the foundations of that good faith on which the peace of the world depends.'

So too Hall. 8

'\text{Modern writers, it would seem, are more struck by the impossibility of looking at international contracts as perpetually binding, than by the necessity of insisting upon that good faith between States without which the world has only before it the alternatives of armed suspense or open war, and they too often lay down canons of such perils looseness, that if its doctrine is to be accepted, an unscrupulous State need never be in want of a plausible excuse for repudiating an inconvenient obligation.}'

Pedants such as those on whom Frederick the Great relied to justify his acts are to be found in all ages of treaties. The Conference of London (1871) made the declaration:

'It is an essential principle of the law of nations that no Power can liberate itself from the engagements of a treaty, or modify the same, whence it results that the Party, by breach of which the contracting Powers by means of an amicable arrangement.'

This declaration, which was signed by all the

1 Oakes-Nowat, p. 51.
3 Phillipson, loc. cit.
4 Four Centuries, p. 14.
5 The De jure, 'voluntatem potius quam verba spectari pons,' applies with especial force.
6 'There is no place for the refinements of the courts in the rough jurisprudence of nations.'
7 'Discrimen actuum bona fide et stricti juris, quatenus ex juro est Romano, ad jus gentium non pertinent.'
8 Phillimore, Comm. ii. 70.
9 Dig. 11. xiv. 71. 4.
10 J. F. Bevan, in Comm. ii. 96 f.
11 Ibid. ii. 64 and 131.
12 Dig. ii. xiv. 77. 4.
14 Hall, p. 342.
16 P. 15.
17 Comm. ii. 100.
18 P. 306.
leading Powers of Europe, was provoked by Russia's attempt to evade its obligations under the Treaty of Paris of 1856, on the ground that lapse of time had changed the conditions. Although no mention of the same effect appears to be included in the covenant of the League of Nations or in the treaty with Germany, the case seems to be covered by article 16, which provides for the prevention or punishment of breaches of any of its obligations.

(f) How far does honour demand the intervention of one of the guarantors, in the case of a collective guarantee, when agreement is not reached between all parties? Bluntschli holds that each guarantor is bound to act separately in such a case. Lord Derby (in connexion with the Luxembourg Convention of 1867) held that honour (but not legal obligation) compelled each guarantor, in concert with the others, to maintain the engagements; but that, if concerted action was not obtainable, then a guarantor would have the right, but not necessarily the legal obligation, to act. It is obvious that this difficulty could be avoided by care in drafting, and that, unless Bluntschli's view be accepted, the collective guarantee is not likely to be very valuable until we have reached a higher stage of social and historic development at the present time. The covenant of the League of Nations meets the case by making joint intervention obligatory on all its members.


G. F. Hill.

TREES AND PLANTS.—I. Introductory.

All plants are sacred. This principle of the followers of Zoroaster lies at the root of all plant-life, all tree-cults. All plants possess the gifts of immortality and health. 2 The subject enters into our every thought, as the germ of the religious. And all the emotions are traceable in different aspects and degrees from the tree of life to the May-pole. It rests on the earliest conceptions of the unity of life in nature, in the sense of communion and fellowship with the divine centre of life. The oak of Manre, the ash Yggdrasil, the ashéhri, the oak of Dodona, the Ficus ruminalis, the Bodhi-tree, the pine-cones, and the seven-branched candlestick, even the modern Christmas-tree with its lights and its fruit and its fillets, are instances of the vast area in folk-lore, tradition, and social custom which has been influenced by early reverence for the sacred tree.

The sacred tree is thus deeply rooted in the primitive religious ideas of the human race. The spring, the rock, the tree are all visible manifestations of the divine spirit. They are found associated in the most ancient sanctuaries as different symbols of life; and this life, in earth or water or tree, is one with human life. The same divine spirit lives and works in all and manifests itself in each and all. The secret of religion is the recognition of this life as divine; its duty is the obligation of fellowship and worship which comes of this recognition.

In the earliest stage the sacred tree is more than a symbol. It is instinct with divine life, aglow with divine light. It is at once the tree of life and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. This animistic stage is traceable in folk-lore and myth, in traditional survivals in later ritual, and in savage cults in more recent and even modern times. In the history of religious development it lies behind the more evolved symbolic prevalences at the present time. The covenant of the League of Nations meets the case by making joint intervention obligatory on all its members.

In the second stage the sacred tree is planted in holy ground. It is representative of the deity. It is the dwelling-place of the deity. The priest-king is its champion, and is himself the embodiment or incarnation of the god. 3 It is as priest-king at Manre that Abraham arms his trained servants and leads them against the Kings of the earth. It is an archaic survival in an archaic fragment (Gn 14:14-16). The champion of the tree-god must be consecrated by the planting of the sacred tree, though not always of the same tree. The oak-Zeus of Dodona adopted under certain conditions the white poplar and the plane. Abraham, the champion of the oak or terebinth of Manre, planted a grove, i.e. a tamarisk, at Beersheba. Agamemnon, as guardian of a sacred tree, and himself enjoying the divine title ἀξιόν ἄρδεων and worshipped as a chthonian Zeus in Laconia, planted a plane tree at Lacedaemon in the grove of Poseidon at Caphyre in Arcadia. 4 These plantations are examples of the second, or representative, stage of tree-worship.

The third is the symbolic stage. The 'grove,' or ashéhri, the common adjunct of the Canaanite shrine, is the most familiar example of this stage. It was a wooden pillar, representative like the living tree of the deity, 'the token of the deity's presence or a magnet for attracting it.' 5 There are traces of it in the sanctuaries at Samaria (2 K 13:9), at Bethel (23:14), and even in the Temple at Jerusalem (23:9). The differentiation of the one deity into the 'gods many and lords many' of local and national cults led to the iconic representation of the tree-god. The stump takes human shape. The Herme, wooden or stone pillars swelling towards the top, were crowned with the head of Hermes. The rude figure of Priapus as protector of gardens was of a similar character. The caduceus of Hermes, a wand with a triple serpent, may refer also to his own office as a tree-god. 6 Silverus is represented in a similar form, with his sacred pine and also with the caduceus as a symbol. And in this connexion the statement of Pausanias 7

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1 Hall, p. 360.
2 EGG II. 506.
3 L. B. Farwell, REB VI. 3075.
5 A. H. Cook, CIV, 1907, 70.
6 L. B. Farwell, REB VI. 3075.
and Pliny is significant, that in ancient times the images of the gods were made of wood. And with the differentiation of the deity into the gods of the nations there came the differentiation of the tree into the trees sacred to the several gods. The oak was specially sacred to Zeus. The Ficus ruminalis of the Palatine was originally the sacred tree of Roman Jupiter. Moreover, and associated with the oak on the Capitoline Hill. The cult, in early times as wide as the world, was narrowed when no sanctuary could be dedicated to Apollo which was favourable to the growth of his sacred laurel.

Primitive worship was essentially an act of fellowship and communion with the deity. The vestment of the worshippers was the sheep-skin or the goat-skin specially sacred to the deity worshipped, as the white robe of righteousness is the symbolic vestment of the Christian worshipper. This is generally traceable in theriomorphic cults, as in the Imperials. It is traceable also in tree-worship. The victor in the Olympic games was treated as the human representative of the tree-god. He was decked with olive and crowned with oak or goat-skin and carried to the centre of the sacred tree. The English Jack-in-the-Green of the old May-day sports and the Kentish Holly-boy and Ivy-girl of the Shrove-tide revels are remnants of this worship.

Sacramento and worship are closely linked together. In the arcaic tradition of Abraham (Gn 14:19) Melchizedek, king of Salem, brought forth hallowed wine and he was "priest of the most high God" (El Elyon). Sacramental communion with the deity is the essence of the mysteries, and the mysteries belong to the primitive stages of religion: "I fasted; I drank the kykeon; I took from the basket." This was the touching of the σκέρα, the sacramental core of the mysteries of Eleusis. They were rites sacred to Demeter the Earth-Mother. She is the Mountain-Mother (g.v.), the mother of the gods, represented with her pillar-shrine, the pillar of her sacred tree. She may be compared not only with Isis, but with Hathor and her sacred sycamore. Hathor nourished the wandering souls in the cemeteries of Egypt with food and drink. The Cretan Demeter in her mysteries nourished her mystics in life. The mysteries of Dionysus belong to the same cycle of ideas. Dionysus combated in human form the terrors of the beer-god, the Minotaur, god of Thanes, and of the mystery-god Zagreus of Crete. The ονομα of the Persians, the soma of the Hindus, the ambrosia of the Olympian gods, were all means of sacramental communion, a partaking of the tree of life.

The sacred tree, instinct with the divine life, is vocal with the word and the will of the deity. A prominent feature of the Zeus-cult of Dodona was its oracle. "And the giving of oracles was a chthonian prerogative." David is to consult the oracle of the mulberry-trees before he attacks the Philistines (2 S 5:5). God called unto Moses from the midst of the bush in Horeb (Ex 3:4). The sacred tree is alight with the wisdom of God. To partake of the acorns of Zeus was to acquire wisdom and knowledge. The burning bush points to the symbolic meaning of the seven-branched candlestick in the Temple. It is a budding and blossoming almond (Ex 37:19-24). The imagery of the rod out of the stem of Jesse, and the Branch growing out of his root, the setting of the sevenfold gift of wisdom, is another illustration of the same truth (Is 11:1-9; cf. LXX). And this again illustrates the meaning of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil (Gn 3:7). It is the oracle of the God of righteousness, as the seven lamps are "the eyes of the Lord... beholding the evil and the good" (Ps 19:2; cf. Zec 4:6, 2 Ch 16). The tree of knowledge is the oracle of religious and moral wisdom.

2. The animistic stage in tree-worship.—The tracing of this stage in its original simplicity is almost as difficult as its subsequent development. In pre-historic times it was already being absorbed in higher religious conceptions and revelations, in the higher physical and religious and ethical development of the human race. Jahweh 'finally triumphed over the brālūm, not by avoiding them, or by destroying them, but by absorbing them.' This is the principle in all religious development. The burning bush was not merely the oracle of Horeb; it was the dwelling-place of Jahweh (Dt 33:2). The fable of the trees and the Bramble king was spoken 'by the plain [oak or terebinth] of the pillar that was in Shechem' (Jg 9:6). It is a survival of the ancient tree-worship, an apologue or parable familiar in early tree-worship.

The story of the thistle and the cedar is another 0 K 14:9). 'Tree-worship pure and simple, where the tree is in all respects treated as a god, is attested for Arabia... in the case of the sacred oaks of Najran. It was accorded the annual feast, and it was all hung with fine clothes and women's ornaments.'

The sacred cedrus in the temple of Asis at Byblos was said to have grown round the body of Osiris. It was a stump wrapped in a linen cloth and anointed with myrrh. It represented the dead god. It is suggested that this explains the mystery of the draping of the odakriw (2 K 23:4). There are similar survivals in Greek ritual. Incense was burned and the tree was decked with fillets and honoured with burnt offerings. Mrs. Philpot gives an illustration of a fruit-tree dressed as Dionysus—another example of draping as part of this early ritual. Cook in his exhaustive monograph on the cult of the oak-Zeus has traced it through all the earliest sanctuaries of the Mediterranean area, especially in Dodona and Crete, and has given his conclusion as follows: Zeus was at each of these cult-centres conceived as a triple divinity (sky-god, earth-god, sea-god). He was an oak and served by a priestly-king, who was regarded as an incarnation of Zeus himself and whose duty it was to maintain the son's head during the season.

The Minotaur, the οπόδεν horns of consecration, and the axe are also features in this ancient ritual. This survey of the primitive cult of the sacred tree, not only in Celtic folk-lore and Gaulish sculpture, but in the survivals of pagan worship. E. Clodd gives a study of the 'primitive pagans' of S. Nigeria which sums up the animistic conception of tree-worship.

A recent traveler among the "primitive pagans" of Southern Nigeria reports this speech from a native: "Yes, we say, this is our life—the big tree. When any of us dies his spirit does not go to another country, but into the big tree; and this is why we will not have it cut. When a man is sick or a woman wants a child, we sacrifice to the big tree, and unless Osowo wants the sick man, our request is granted. Osowo lives in the big tree and is the big god. When he dies away from this place, his spirit returns to the big tree." Among the Hamitic tribes the crude animus has developed into sort of polytheism with the highest god, Neb. He is the big god of the big tree of Nigeria.
The tree-cult of the aboriginal Africans is today largely associated with ancestor-worship. Trees planted round the graves of their ancestors acquire a sacred character. The great tree on the very spot of a dead man's house became thus the shrine of his spirit. And it is held that the highly-developed tree-cult of the Hereros is a direct offshoot of ancestor-worship. One tree is hailed with the word 'a'sare'; our only word for tree, 'the', in the Semitic language; it must be accepted, but the inference may be questioned. The polytheism and the ancestor-worship are both to be traced to the more primitive forms of animism represented in the African evidence as the cult of the Great Spirit or the oak-Zeus. They are both due to the principle of differentiation in the development of religious conceptions.

Anthropomorphism is in some cases preceded by thermorphism, but theriomorphism is never generated out of anthropomorphism.1

All life in primitive ages is one, and in its movement inspires fear, not only the fear of God, but the 'fear' of Isaac (Gen 31:4). It is Jacob who 'sware by the fear of his father Isaac' (31:2). And Jacob by his wrestling attained the title of Israel (32:28). Abraham was the priest-king of Manna, Melchizedek the priest-king of Salem. At Olympia and probably at Dodona thechallenge of the priestly king gave rise to a regular athletic contest.2 Milton represents the religious king of Cnossus as an ancient limited duration. He was king for a period of nine years, when he withdrew to the Idaean cave to hold converse with Zeus.3 Theseus, by his victory over Minos under the guise of Taurus, succeeded to the sun-king's rights as champion of the oak-Zeus.4 Is it not evident that, behind and prior to the hero-worship of Theseus and the veneration for Israel, there is the ritual and there are the sacred trees in the city, whether Zeus Elyon or Jahveh, the Great Spirit of primitive animism? 3. The sacred plantation. — The planting of the sacred tree or grove is a further step in the development of tree-worship. The primitive priest-king does it as champion of the tree-spirit, under the conscious guidance of God. Eden is the most familiar example of a sacred plantation (Gen 2:9). The practice of primitive religious colours the language of poetry and prose of the Cilician Homer (22:24). Ps 104:31, Is 61:10. The riddle and parable of Ezekiel has new meaning when read in the light of early ritual:

1 A great eagle... came unto Lebanon, and took the greatest branch of the cedar: He cropped off the top of his young twigs, and carried it into a land of traffic; he set it in a city of numbers. And there the wind panted upon it, and it was not cut down... he placed it by great waters, and set it as a willow tree. And it grew, and became a spreading vine of low stature (Ezek 17:4; cf. v12-24).

4 In Egyptian art the living tree is represented sometimes singly, sometimes in groups of three, or in groves. It is at times close to an altar, or even growing from it; in one case the goddess sits under it. The palm-tree, the fig, and the cypress are most frequent; but the pine, the plane, and the fir also appear. It may even spring from the bucrania, or horns of consecration, which themselves represent the sacred bull, the theriomorphic representation of the oak-Zeus.

At Athens the original cult was that of the oak:

Nomoi Larnacou erat; longueque descensum
Tempora cingebat de quibus arbor Phoebus.5
There are in the Caryatides, or nut-maidens, traces of a nut-grove, the nuts themselves being known as the acorns of Zeus. Later, after this first stage of substitution, 'Zeus took over the olive.'6

1 ERB I. 169.
2 Ib. I. 579.
3 Od. xix. 179; Strabo, 476.
4 See Cook, CIR xviii. 411.
5 ERB II. 142-144; cf. Cook, CIR xvii. 407.
6 Or. Mt. L. 493; cf. Cook, CIR xvii. 54: Drymas, Ageus, Codrus.
7 Cook, CIR xviii. 56.
8 Abbai, or nurses of Zeus, gave their name to the city, and later to the goddess whose cult overflowed that of Zeus on the Aeropagus.1 In the Academy at Athens there were twelve sacred olives in the precinct of Athene.2 Demeter had her sacred oaks, and the boy who pronounced the Eleusinian formula at Athenian weddings, ἐφορὸν καθό, φῶςφορ ἀνεμον, was wreathed with oak and corn.3 There was a great oak at Delphi, dedicated to Demeter at Dodium by the Pelagians before they migrated from Thessaly to Cilicia. And Ovid, telling the story of the judgment on Erysielthon, speaks of the tree of Demeter as an oak, adorned with fillets and talbots by the people.4

These plantings are wide-spread, and traceable to the earliest sites. Hercules planted two oaks at Herakle Ponticus in Bithynia.5 Ages planted a huge oak-tree, lopped and decked as a trophy, on the tomb of Mezentius the Etruscan. The crown of golden oak-leaves from Vulci implies that the Etruscan kings were representatives or guardians of the oak-Zeus. The tree planted by Ages was itself identified with the king: 'mansi-buscus meus Mezentius hic est.'6 The identification of tree, god, and king is general. Romulus and Remus were worshipped in the Comitium under a sapling planted at the summit of the Palatine. The Bodhi-tree of Amurâdhapura, long the capital of Ceylon, is over 2000 years old. It was planted by Tissa—a brand of the original Bodhi-tree, at Gayâ in India.7 The sanctuary of 'Uzzâ at Nabla near Mecca consisted of three trees,— another link with the wide-spread cult of a triple tree-god, as sky-god, water-god, and earth-god in one.

The chain of evidence is unbroken from East to West; the triple-headed gods of Gaul, sitting cross-legged on their throne as in India, point to closer contact with the neolithic age than even Greece and Syria. The sacred flint of the temple of Jupiter Feretrius on the Capitoline Hill at Rome, the 'anticum Jovis scisma,' the home of Jupiter Lapis, has been regarded as an unhafted neolithic cell, preserved among the aborigines of Latium from an immemorial past.8

The sacred tree, the sacred plantation, was the seat of authority, the seat of judgment. The Romans meet for council in an acacêleu of the Galatia. statue met at a place called Δρωψινος, doubtless sacred to their national cult; κελτος εφορων μεν Δια, εγαλα δι διω κελτων κελπνη δρων.9 Deborah the prophetess 'dwelt under the palm tree of the ass' (Judg. x. 1). The children of Israel came up to her for judgment' (Jg 4:5; cf. I S 22:24, Jg 6:1). In 458 B.C. the Roman envoys were sent to complain that the Αξιλι had broken a treaty concluded in 459. They were bidden to make their complaint to a huge oak on Mount Aligidas under the shadow of whose branches the Ευκanian commander had his quarters.10 The πρωτοτροχος under the sacred oak is certainly a primitive trait.11 A sacred rowan-tree in Ireland derived its origin from the rowan of Dubhros, the Black Forest, in Co. Sligo.

The tree had grown from a quicken-berry dropped by the Thudth Dé Dannann, who had brought it from the Land of Promise. It was guarded by a giant named Seachrán, who could only be slain by a blow from his own club, and had a single broad fiery eye in the middle of his black forehead. He was overcome by Darmanin, the culture-hero of Irish folk-lore.12

1 Cook, CIR xvii. 86. 2 ERB I. 594. 3 CIR xvii. 86. 4 Ib. p. 76; Or. Met. viii. 728 ff. 5 Ib. p. 79. 6 Verg. Aen. vi. 516; CIR xvii. 586. 7 ERB I. 597. 8 Ib. 609. 9 CIR xvii. 395. 10 Max. Tyrc. Diurn. v. 8; cf. CIR xvii. 79, 395. 11 Livy, ii. 25. 12 Rhye, Cuthe Heathemdon, p. 360 ff.
The sacred stump.—The Lion Gate at Mycenae is one of the earliest antemonic representations of the worship of the sacred tree. The pillar of which the lions are the supporters tapers downwards like the ancient Horn. The subject has been very fully treated in art. POLIES AND POSTS; but some further links may be added.

The pillar-shrine of Cyanaus with its sacred doves is recognized by Cook as a 'conventionalized but still aniconic form of a triple tree-Zeus.' The Lydian cult of Zeus *apropaios* was connected with the oak. The Cappadocians represent him as 'a bearded god crowned with rays and standing between two oak-trees, on each of which is a bird.' In the same city there was a cult of Aphroditos *apropaion*. This cult gave its name to the city of Aphrodisias.

The coins of this city 'show the leafless trunk of a tree with three branches. The two of these branches rise separately from an entwined trilobate work. Sometimes they spring from a single trunk, on either side of which is a naked man wearing a Phrygian cap; the one on the left wears a double-axe; the one on the right kneels or runs away, turning his back upon the tree [a frequent motif preserved in folk-lore]. Sometimes . . . the branches are flanked by two lighted altars.'

The priest of the Cappadocian cult of Bellona at Rome is represented with a branch in one hand and the two-headed axe in the other—a further link with the oak-cult of Crete.

Amid the early rites of Etruria and the *sacra* of Rome there are further associations with this cult. Hermes is represented in a fragment of Aristophanes as *rhopalos*; so also is Janus on a coin of Hadrian. Janus is also represented with a spear; and his title Quirinus is understood in reference to the oak-god. The Sabine *turris*, the oak-spear, the Quirites, the men of the oak-spear, are thus related to Janus Quirinus or Jupiter Quirinus. The spear is a variation of the sacred stump. The tree-god is often represented by a post, sceptre, or spear.

The *trigylia* associated with Juno Sororia and Janus Carialis is a symbol of this triple Janus. It consisted of two vertical beams and a cross-bar, the rude form of a cross. The 'yoke' under which the conquered were forced to march was of three staves or spears, and is also traced to the cult of Janus Quirinus. The door-posts (*pinnæ*) were sacred to him, as the threshold was to the Earth-Mother.

The sprinkling of the blood on the door-posts in Hebrew ritual (Ex 12, Ex 40) and the shaking of the threshold in the vision of Isaiah (Is 6 RV) are examples of the same cycle of ideas—the sacredness of the posts and the threshold as tokens of the Deity.

The *caucacus* is another variation of the sacred rod. It consisted of a triple shoot, the central shoot forming the handle, the two side shoots being folded back into a double knot. The chief lends its name to its opposite shoots, and the tree is tabu in the folk-lore of the West. It is not likely to burn it. Judas hanged himself from an elder bush. The *litus* of the augur is another variation of the sacred rod. So also the mysterious twisted rods used in what is probably a funeral procession in the decoration of Etruscan tombs at Norchia and Tarquinii. In the fresco at Tarquinii, while most of the figures have the *litus* of the Etruscan Hades, 'one of the leading figures has the *litus*, and prominent among these is the hammer borne aloft,' 'a frequent emblem of supernatural aid.' The figure of the god with the hammer is frequently met with on Celtic monuments.

The Y cross with its mystic Pythagorean meaning has also some ancient link with these Etruscan rods. A hazel twig of this stump is in use as the divining-rod for tracing water. The Etruscan *lucumones*, or kings, were representatives of Jupiter. Their crown was of golden oak-leaves, with thorns, gams, and fillets. They acted as vice-gerents of the oak-god. Their golden *bullas* was the symbol of the sun-god—another link with the oak-Zeus. They used a sceptre with an eagle, and were preceded by the lictor bearing the axe with the handle of rods. Cook suggests that these may be a conventional substitute for the trees of the tree-god.

These were all part of the royal insignia of the ancient king. Is it not possible to trace the origin of the English regalia to the same source?

In the inventory of 1640 are enumerated the 'large staff with a dove on the top wherein it is thought to be an ancient trial. . . . found to be lower part wood within and silver-gilt without; the "small staff with a file of bees on the top . . . found to be tree within and silver-gilt without; a staff of black and white ivory with a dove on the top; and the two sceptres with a hammer on each end.' These are all symbols of authority, such as are found in the *sacra* of the ancient races of Europe. The sceptre with the cross, the wooden rod with the dove, the rod with the 'fluree de leece' may be compared with the 'dean-corne,' the 'lancee,' the *lanceolae,* and the dove-pillars of the Etruscan and *Aegae* cults. The rods laid up before the Lord in the tent, 'one for each father's house' (Nu 17 RV), may point to similar associations on Semitic soil. And the cross with its *spolia opima* was the most honoured sign of Jupiter Perseus at Rome. The *furuta* form, which he took his name, was the lopped trunk of the ancient oak, venerated by the shepherds of old, forming a wooden cross to which votive armour was attached. The cross in the folk-lore of Rome was a sign of the oak-cult—the presence of the oak-king, a shrine for the offering of the trophy of right to the oak-god. Was Plato altogether unconscious of this when he said: 'What I have written I have written' (jn 17)? And was St. Paul too in his 'foolishness of preaching,' and in his witness to the power of the Cross and of Christ crucified, unconscious of the other tradition of the power of the cross, when he wrote:

1 Unto the Jews a stumbling-block, and unto the Greeks foolishness; but unto them which are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God (1 Co 1:23).

5. Trees many and gods many.—The sacred tree signified universally in primitive ages the presence of the deity. The one tree with its nursery-grove was the shrine of the one God. But east and west, in hill or in valley, in north aspect or in south, the tree varied. And, as the tree varied in species, the god varied in name. Then the tree and the god of the clan grew to be the tree and the god of
The district, and in turn the tree and god of the nation. The, pre-eminence of the bramble-bug (dr. 90°)* is true to the fact. The olive, the fig, the vine had established their fame and their rule; they would not submit to another; the bramble had ambition to rival even them. Treas many led on to gods many. 1 The oak-zeus at Athens took over the olive. Apollo remained true to his sacred laurel. This development is most marked in Greek art and Roman verse:

1. Populus, Althea graminea, varia heraclea 2 .
2. Ficus, myrtus Veneri, sua laures Phoebo. 3

The Semitic nations stand apart from this tendency to assign a particular tree to a particular god, 4 whether from reason to monotheim or from adherence to the primitive conception of the oneness of the divine spirit. They had sacred trees in great number, but they were all sacred to one god localized in village, clan, or nation. In India each Buddha had his own tree, and Gautama himself, after having passed through 43 incarnations as a tree-spirit, eventually found wisdom under the sacred tree of Brahma, the pipal-tree, or Ficus religiosa. 5

This triad of the gods over the nations and the consequent interlacing of the tree-cults, sometimes by expansion, sometimes by absorption, remained in many cases in the domain of the tree-gods and tree-demons. As the jinn or genii of the Arabs were gods out of touch with men, outlaws, dehumanized, "abominations of Moab and Ammon," the wood-demons of the German forest or the Polynesian islanders were the foes and the dread of their conquerors—or their neighbours. And in the controversy between the Supporters of ancestor-worship and the supporters of animism -Ancestor-worship was not in nature the divine spirit, this wide-spread belief in wood-demons and unlycky trees is in favour of the latter. In an age when "every valley had its king," 6 and every hill its shrine and its sacred tree, as in these islands in Celtic times, and when fews were frequent between clan and clan, the jealousy of the clan would separate between god and god, and between tree and tree, and people the forest-clad hills with every form of terror and danger. The only bond of safety was in the nation's god and in the king as the champion of his rights. All around was danger and death: "for I the Lord thy God am a jealous God,' [Deut. 5:29] cf. 2 Cor. 11:3. The language of religion, not the language of ancestor-worship; and it may be traced in tree-worship and demon-lore from earliest times.

A blasted or stricken oak might be the messenger of misfortune:

1. De coelo tactas semini praediciere quaeve. 6

The Abors in Assam regarded the rubber-tree as the abode of two malignant spirits; another haunted the plantain and sting-nettle. 7 The satyrs and devils of the OT, the jinn of the Arabian stories, the centaurs and cyclopes, fauns and dryads of Greek and Latin mythology, the wood-maids, wild men, and elves, the wild women of the Pyrol, and the green-ladies of Neufchâtel, in their different degrees of mischief or malignicious, were haunting terrors of the old world. 8 The Neraides of Macedonian folk-lore are tree-spirits. It is not well to be blown down in the shade of a tree, for it is there that the tree-demons appear. At this day the country-folk avoid especially the plane, the poplar, and the fig—tree-lore for these are favourite haunts of fairies. 9

In Ireland ghosts and apparitions haunt isolated thorn-bushes. 10 To call up the Tolcarne toll near Newlyn, an incantation was necessary, and three dried leaves must be held in the hand, 'one of the ash, one of the oak, and one of the thorn.' 2

Tresi Sing Oak, and Ash of Lemba, and Thorn, good Sirs, (All of a Midsummer morn)! England shall ride till Judgment Day, by Oke, and Ash, and Thorn. 3

The creation myth of the Tanganorr natives in Australia holds that Punjab fashionable man out of the bark of a tree. Another tree was tabu, and haunted by a bat; the tabu was broken; the tree was violated; the bat flew away, and death came into the world. 4 Daphne is the name both of the laurel and of the spirit within it. The name of a palm-tree is not called Tamar, but Ba'al Tamar. The former conception is Indo-European, the latter Semitic.

"The Indo-European could never free himself from the identification of his gods with nature ... The Semite, on the other hand, was accustomed from the earliest times to distinguish between the object and its food."

Among the peoples were Philryla, the linden, Rhums, the pomegranate, Helike, the willow, and Daphne, the laurel. Mrs. Philpot notes:

"In later times an attempt was made in some cases (e.g., Daphne in Laurier, Letum, Dryas, Cercis) to explain the connection by metamorphosis ... but it is extremely probable that this was an inversion of the primitive nexus."

The classic passages for the oak of Dodona are Hom. Od. xiv. 327 f., xix. 296 f. In Hom. II. xvi. 223 f. the oracle is mentioned; Vergil refers to it in Georg. ii. 15 f. The oak was also sacred to Ceres; before harvest worship must be rendered to her, and the worshipper must be crowned with a wreath of oak. 9 The willow is associated with Hera at Samos, and with Artemis in nature the divine spirit, the willow was the goddess of the nut-tree and the cedar in Arcadia, of the laurel and the myrtle in Laconia. 10 The laurel is sacred to Apollo; the priest-king Anius is guardian of the tree and the shrine. 11 The olive is specially connected with the cult of Athene at Athens. The pine is associated with Pan and Silvanus, the cedar with the Accadian deity Ea, the sycamore with the Egyptian goddess Nuit ( Hathor). The cypress was sacred among the Persians, and in the West, together with the poplar, it belongs to the cthonian deities. The vine and the ivy were closely connected with the rites of Dionysus. 22 The ash and the elm appear in Scandinavian mythology as the first man (Yggdrasil) and the first woman (Umbila), and the ash Yggdrasil is connected with the court of the gods. 23

Celtic folk-lore in must parts of contact with the ancient oak-cult of the Mediterranean area, with variations due to local developments under northern conditions. The drumgonos of Dodona, the acyrpauiuos, or poplar-fellers, at Athens, the xerorougos at Phlius, 14 have their representative in the tree-felling god Eaus on the Paris monument. 15 The ancient axe-rite of Dodona, Crete, and Etruria appears in the sculptures of Siculoelos and other deities in Celtic lands. 16 On the Trier monument the deity is felling an oak-tree on which are three cranes. The Tarvos triganus, the bull, before the oak-tree, with two cranes on the back and one between the horns, is another variation of the Paris altar. 17

2. 1b. p. 175.
5. 1b. p. 259.
8. Philpot, passim.
11. *Chambers's English, new ed., Edinburgh, 1854 a. e. 'Ash.'
12. Panh. xii. 251.
15. 1b. p. 165.
The cult of Cernunnos supplies another link. He is represented in the Cluny Museum with stag's horns, on the ring each horn referring to the sun. In the silver bowl from Gundestrup in Denmark he is shown with griffin's head, with stag's horns, and on his right a stag and a bull. In a wax tablet at Pesth he is called Jupiter Cernenus; on a Rheims monument he is with a stag and an ox, and the Salamonicus tablet of Jupiter Cernenus has also an echo in a modern dance—a horned figure among the mummers of Mohoas on the Danube.

The oak also entered into the ritual of invoking Zeus as a rain-god. On the Lycean mountain of Arcadia was a shrine sacred to Zeus, in which was a spring to which the priest went in time of drought. He touched the water with a sprig of oak; this would rise into a fruitful shower over the land. In Brittany the fountain of Barantin in the Forest of Brezilien served the same purpose. Water was thrown on a slab near the spring, and rain would then fall in abundance, accompanied by thunder and lightning.

The well was near the fabled shrine of Merlin, one of the Celtic types of the sun-hero, and it was overshadowed by a mighty tree. Bhys suggests that the spring, the tomb, the slab, and the tree 'all belonged to the Celtic Zeus.' There is a similar story connected with the Snowdenian tarn Duly, the Bleew Lake, where the slab was called the Altar. The stag-horn of Jupiter Cernenus has also an echo in a modern dance—a horned figure among the mummers of Mohoas on the Danube.

In the parish of Borrisokane, Co. Tipperary, there was in 1833 a huge ash called the Big Bell tree. The name is derived from the word 'Billa,' which occurs in Maghie, 'the plain of the old tree,' the present Moville. This name has been connected with Windisch with bile or 'Bell,' king of Hades, the consort of Dan. This Bell represents Crones in his darker character as Death, and suggests the idea that the big ash-trees of Irish folk-lore were ash-trees sacred to the Celtic Cronos. The ash was also sacred to the Celtic Silvanus: 'Silvan sacra semicilium fraxino.' He presided over woodlands, clearings, arborescent copses.

The white-thorn has also its sacred associations. It is unlucky to cut it down. A 'lone thorn' is regarded with special veneration. Christianity took over its sanctity. The Crown of Thorns was placed on his head. Buddah-worship skillfully adapted the sacred thorn near Tainaholy, Co. Wicklow, is still called 'Sheagh Padrig,' or 'Patrick's book.' In Britain the 'holy thorn' of Glastonbury has similar venerable associations. The thorn appears in Thomas 'a la romance as the tree of knowledge. The yew among the Druids was a symbol of immortality. Celtic folk-lore has many traditions of tree-worship. The first man sprang from an elder, the first woman from a mountain-ash. The berries of the rowan are a charm against all disease. There are also trees which were inauguration trees. One, an old yew tree in Coolemonen in the parish of Killadown, is called the 'honey-tree.' A tree in the parish of Kilmasteigh is called the 'fern-tree,' i.e. the elder.

5. conventional hornings and tree-rites.—The cult of the sacred tree had its offerings and its rites. There are even survivals of the offering of the highest sacrifices. The natives of the Vindhyam uplands of India until lately offered human sacrifices to trees. In pre-Christian Arabia the incense and the worship is vocal. At the close of the bar festival the head of the bear is set up on a pole, called 'the pole for sending away,' and the skulls of the other animals which are hung up with it are called 'divine preservers' and are at times worshipped. This is a link with the buccania which form so integral a part in the sacrificial tokens of the Arvyan world. Plutarch states that Theseus, on his return from Crete put in at Delos, and instituted a dance in imitation of the mazes of the labyrinth.

'The danced round the altar Keraton which was built entirely of these animals which are hung up with it as a dance in imitation of the mazes of the labyrinth.' It is a circle, which together with the swastika, or conventionally the Swastika, is symbolic of the sun-cult. The dance around the May-pole and the Jack-in-the-Green festivities within our own memory in May Fair, London, are survivals of the same rites. The grilling in Assyria and Asia, in their attitude of devotion, has a counterpart in the vision of the Temple in Ezekiel.

'And it was made with cherubims and palm trees, so that a palm tree was set round about the cherub, and a cherub was set to the one side of the cherub.' In a Mexican MS the tree breaks into two branches in the shape of a tau-cross, each branch with three blossoms; the tree is surmounted by a parrot, and is supported by two men, standing, each with his right hand raised in the attitude of devotion.

Trees were hung with votive offerings. In India the sacred banyan-tree is represented with six elephants in the act of worship. In Egypt it is the same animal with jaws and fruit, and the worshipper before it has the right hand raised. Elsewhere it is a tree sacred to Artemis, hung with the weapons of the chase. Wreaths were worn and garlands were carried in various Greek rites; and this use of wreaths points to some analogy with tree-worship in the two pillars before the Temple at Jerusalem. Robertson Smith gives a coin from Paphos with similar detached pillars before a temple, each is surmounted above the other by a dove as in the rude pillar-shrine of Crete. Whether

1 Grupp, p. 164.
2 Lb. p. 258.
3 Lb. p. 164.
4 Shakespeare, The Merry Wives of Windsor, iv. iv. 29.
8 Bhys, Celtic Heidenthron, p. 472.
9 Lb. p. 65.
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They were called oaks or not, they were worshipped in Japan.

On the eastern gateway of the Buddhist temple at Sanchi the sacred tree is represented with worshippers. It divides into two main branches, like that in Mexico, and there are two trees on either side of the road. Central tree is being worshipped in garlands. The Bodhi-tree of Kanakamuni breaks into three branches and is hung with festoons. This custom still survives in the present. Rhyas has collected recent evidence from Glenarmshire of holy wells overshadowed by thorn or other trees, on which rags were fastened. And the present writer some thirty years ago saw a bush hung with red rags in one of the islands of Aran off Galway. It is one of the last relics of the cult of the sacred tree, like the practice of 'touching wood' to avert a change of 'luck', still in use in this country.

The tree is also a trophy of victory. As late as the 4th cent. of the Christian era a pear-tree at Auxerre was hung with trophies of the chase and venerated as a god. The 'Stock-im-Eisen' in the centre of Vienna is the stump of a larch, now studded with bits of iron, in the last remains of a trophy with which it was originally hung. The Irmensul had a similar origin. Romulus celebrated his victory over the Cenennenses by his institution of the spolia opima in honour of Jupiter Feretrius:—

'He cut down a great oak that grew in the camp, and hewed it into pieces. He put on either side of a trophy: to this he fastened Acron's whole suit of armour, disposed in its proper form. Then he put on his own robes, and wearing a crown of laurel on his head, his hair gracefully flowing, he took the trophy erect upon his right shoulder, and so marched on, singing of victory before his troops. This procession was the origin and mould of future triumphs.'

The 6th cent. Gallican poet Venantius Fortunatus, author of the Virginia regia, who lived when the honour of the sacred tree was still valued by the Gauls than the shame of the Cross, lifts up the old faith in his great hymn of the Passion:

'Pange lingua gloriosum proelium certaminis
Re super crusta troppo dis tribuum nobilium,
Quiliter redemptor orbis Immutabilis victor.'

Coxe fidèlis inter omnes auro una nobilis
Nulla tamen alia protens frons, idonea saepe
animo ducis, dulci dulce pendens sustinet.

The tree of life.—The sacred tree was the source and the sustenance of life. Worship, sacrifice, and mystic charm are closely linked together. The sacred oaks, balsams, and birches are the sacred food of the gods in Asia, and corresponds to the ambrosia of the Greek world. The Vedic amicē or soma had in it the principle of life and was withheld from ordinary men: it was, however, to be taken by the initiated.

In Sparta, in early times, the dead were laid upon palm branches and leaves of the olive. In the forest land of northern Europe hollowed oaks were used in the burial of the dead. The practice among the Oddfellows of each member dropping a sprig of sweet herbs on the coffin in the grave is a survival of the same early rites. In Abyssinia the branches and twigs of the grape-tree are used by the pagan Kunamas as a protection against sorcery and as charms and amulets at child-birth and death. In Babylonia the idea is more strictly developed. The god-gifted ziz is 'master of the tree of life.' In time of drought the priest of the Lycean Zeus lets down an oak-branch to the suppliants of the water. Codrus, when he devoted his life to his country, dressed as a woodman. Cook notes:

'If the last of the Athenian kings on so solemn an occasion appeared as an oak-tree armed with an ax, it is clear that this was no more disgraceful but the ancient ritual costume of the king.'

The cult of the sacred tree embraces the highest rites in life and in death. The rite of tree-worship in India in its surviving forms is mainly conventional. The idea of reincarnation may in some cases explain it, but the rites are purely a point to other and more primitive ideas. The Agarî, a Dravidian tribe of Châtâ Nagarî, have a special regard for the sil-tree, which is used at their marriages. The bâli, or tree, system prohibited marriage between those who have the same totem. Among the Marathas the deôak, or marriage-guardians, though they no longer form a bar to the union of two worshippers of one deôak, still have some share in the marriage-rite.

The deôak is usually some common tree such as the bâli, banyan, or the sami. In its commonest form it is the leaves of five trees, of which one, as the original deôak of the sacrifice, is held specially sacred. It is worshipped chiefly at the time of marriage.

It has already been suggested that in primitive ages every valley, as Elton says, had its own king. Each king would be the champion and priest of the sacred tree, and this tree worship as indicated by the above spirit would be sacramentally united in all rites of initiation or other social sacra with the tribe or clan. The five leaves represent a pentapolis, or group of five states, one or other, as in ancient Rome, choosing the common priest-king of the five, preference therefore being given to the leaf which represented his sacred tree. Similar customs banning all marriage within a totem-clan have been observed among the Bantu tribes of S. Africa. The mushroom totem of the Awemba is an example of a vegetable totem.

Again, it would appear that the root-idea in the animistic cult of the sacred tree is religion rather than totemism or ancestor-worship; these are perhaps only relics of the primitive age—results of anthropomorphic development and differentiation, degenerate conceptions of the earlier animistic principle of the unity of the divine spirit or life.

The mistletoe-bough in the Christmas feast and 'kissing under the mistletoe' are relics not only of the oak-cult of the Druids, but of its connexion with primitive marriage rites. They are based on the authority of Pliny, and the special virtues ascribed to mistletoe are also referred to by him. Cook has some valuable notes on the mistletoe, which give support to Frazer's conjecture that the sun's fire was regarded as an emanation of the mistletoe. Cook bases his argument on the cult of 1Σετoκ Ανάκλαω at Ixnus in Rhodes, a town named after the mistletoe. The cult is not definitely referred to in connexion with the oak, but 'it is probable, because the Rhodians regarded the oak as the sun-god's tree.' In the story of the punishment of Ixnus there is, he suggests, another link between the mistletoe and the sun-cult. Ixnus was the father of Parithos, whose constant associate was Dryas.

'The relation thus established between 1Σετoκ the mistletoe and 1Σετoκ kai ὁ οἶκος is sorely fortuitous.'

A scholion on Euripides, Phæn. 1185, reads:

'Zeus in his anger bound Ixnus to a winged wheel and cast it spinning through the air... others say that Zeus hurled him into Tartarus. Others again that the wheel was made of fire. This flaming spin-wheel has been commonly understood as the sun-god.' Cook concludes:

1 CUF viii. 83; PAUL. viii. xxix. 33.
2 CUF. viii. 34; ERE viii. 431.
3 ib. i. 180; cf. i. 233.
4 ib. ii. 339.
5 ib. i. 180; cf. i. 233.
6 ib. ii. 339.
7 ERE ii. 342.4
8 ERE iv. 44; ERE iii. 295.
9 GEF iii. 456; CUF vii. 420.
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'it has not, however, been hitherto observed that iuxtea is found in a derived tree-life and that the mistletoe was on Greeks soil thus intimately associated with the sun-god.'

An old Staffordshire custom of keeping the mistletoe-bough throughout the year and then burning it in the fire under the Christmas pudding probably rests on some tradition of the perpetuation of the fertility of the mistletoe represented during the winter the sap of the oak,2 and this formal burning of it, like the feeding of the sacred fire of Vesta from the oak-grove of the Palatine slopes, expresses the principle of life. It has not been customary to use mistletoe in the decoration of churches at Christmas; but W. Stukeley reports a curious custom from York:

On the 14th of Christmas Day they carry mistletoe to the high altar of the Cathedral and proclaim a public and universal liberty, pardon, and freedom to all sorts of inferior and even wicked people at the gates of the city, towards the four quarters of Heaven.'

There was in Flintshire's a shrine of Fortuna Viscata at the Capitol on Rome. This may be the Fortuna Viscata of Agrippa near the temple of Jupiter, where stood the oak of Jupiter Pererius.

The rota Fortunata survived till lately at Douai, when about the garden in which the mistletoe was carried in procession a wicker-work giant known as the grand Guyant, and other figures called les enfants de Guyant. There were the wicker boughs over the shrines, whose colosal images of wicker-work are described by Caesar.3: *All images of the same simulacrum; Personae divinity, arbos nubibus membra vivos hominibus compit; quibus succussis, circumvinti funeri examinantur homines.4*

The mistletoe-bough and the various customs connected with it are all survivals of the solar cult, and, with the wreaths, axes, spears, cranes, and doves, point to the true meaning of the worship of the sacred tree. The mistletoe-bough is mentioned in the type of the Golden Bough:

Quale solis spinul fratres vacui
Frondus virrei nova, quod non sua semen arbore,
Et croceo fetes terrae circundate
Talis creat species aut frondentes opaca.

The yew was also regarded as a symbol of immortality.5 The name eburus, mid-Irish iheor (Taza),6 enters into place-names and clan-names—e.g., Ebrarun (York), Ebarunun (Yverdon), Ebunones. The last-named is an instance of a tribe or clan taking its name from a tree-deity.

There was a yew in Belach Mughna in the west of Leinster—"a great sacred tree, and its top was as broad as the whole plain. Twice a year it did bear fruit: it remained hidden from the time of the Deluge until the night on which Con of the housing of Mughna was born, and then was made manifest. Thirty cubits was the girth of that tree, and He height was three hundred cubics. However, Ninthe the poet felled that tree.'

Cell-oe in the Martyrology of Gorman is the 'church of yews.' And there is an ancient hollow site in Staffordshire, with only the memory left of its All Saint's dedication, the New Year festival of the Celts, which is now marked by the Hanchurch Yews. The churchyard yew is an ancient symbol of the tree of life.

In the story of Eden the command went forth: *Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat: but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it: for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die' (Gen 2:9).

No ban is put on the tree of life till the command is broken. It was the broken hickey like the yew of Mugha which was the only initiation and instructed, as in the quest of the Golden Bough? It stood in the midst of the garden:

2. FRR III. 2958.
5. De top. Gall. vill. 16.
7. De ritu Gall. vill. 16.

'That arbor opus
Aureus et foliis et lento videmus virendam
Junoni inferiore dictus sacer: haec tegit omnis
Locum, et obscurae claudunt convivibus umbrae.'

Was it so thin and so shadowed that it could not be found? Is there anything parallel in the imagery to that of the Cretan labyrinth?

It has been suggested that in an earlier version of the Eden story there was but one tree, the tree of life, and it is to be noted that in Gen 3 the tree with its forbidden fruit is described as being 'in the midst of the garden,' as the tree of life in 27. And in most of the myths of paradise there is the conception of the central tree as of immortality.

The Norse Yggdrasil in its complexity is the central tree of the universe: 'The chief and most holy seat of the gods is by the ash Yggdrasil. There are in it the most ornate and in it the most splendid. It is the greatest and best of all trees, its branches spread over all the world and reach above heaven.'

The garden reached by the Chinese king in quest of the stones of paradise had 'a wondrous tree in its midst, and a fountain of immortality, from which four rivers, flowing to the four corners of the earth, took their rise.' The central tree with its fruit in the old willow pattern dish is a familiar illustration:

'The Chinese temple, there it stands
And there's the tree of many lands'
In other words, the universe-tree of China.

Heracles, in his search for the golden apples, 'conquered the protecting dragon and secured the golden non-fruits from the central tree.'

A tree of India combined the wondrous powers of five wondrous trees, the chief of which was the paradajja, 'the flower of which preserved its freshness throughout the year, contained in itself every fruit and vegetable, and which is eaten on demand. It was, moreover, a test of virtue, losing its splendour in the hour of the sinful, and preserving it for him who followed duty.'

It was but a step in the development of myth to differentiate between the tree of life and the tree of knowledge; and it was a step in the revelation of truth. The tree of life has the promise of immortality and bliss.

The sacred books of the Parthian state that 'the original human pair, Maschima and Areta, sprang from a tree in Heden, a delightful spot where grew homes or hamas, the marvellous tree of life whose fruit imparted vigour and immortality. The sacred book of man at the temple of Ahirvan, the spirit of every guise of a serpent, gave her husband fruit to eat and so led to their ruin.'

The story of Eden ends in ruin, but it is ruin which has the promise of regeneration (Gen 3:11). There is the way of the tree of life, and Christian mysticism found it in the way of the holy Cross.

The drama of religion closes with the vision of the holy city, New Jerusalem, and the throne of God and of the Lamb:

'the tree of the life of the nations: and the leaves of the tree were for the healing of the nations' (Gen 3:12).

Ethics and religion have each their part in keeping 'the way of the tree of life' (Gen 3:11): they are the supporters of the wheeling sword, the whirligig flinging circle of the solar disk, the most sacred symbol of the Sun of Righteousness.

9. The tree of knowledge.—The oracle is an integral part of tree-worship.

Joshua at Shechem 'took a great stone, and set it up there under an oak, that was by the sanctuary of the Lord. And Joshua said unto all the people, Behold, this stone shall be a witness unto us; for it hath heard all the words of the Lord which he spake unto us' (Josh 24:26).

It was a witness in the hand of Shechem. The 'plain of Esromim' is the 'trench of the diviners (Jg 9:3). In Africa the trees planted round the ancestral graves were tended by women whose oracles were listened to in times of crisis. Tree-divination was practised by the Ainu. The oracle of the sacred tree of Doilona was assigned to the depths of its root.'

The oracle was

1. Verg., Ec. vi. 136-139.
5. Philpot, p. 129.
6. Philpot, p. 129.
7. Philpot, p. 443.
on his secret and sacred quest.1 As the care-tree it has been taken over by the Church in the rhyme:

"Care Sunday, care away, 
Care Sunday is Passion Sunday, the Sunday before Palm Sunday.2"

Care Sunday is Passion Sunday, the Sunday before Palm Sunday.3

The holly is the Irish entlenn, the Welsh cadwyn, the O.E. holken; it is not a variant of 'holy.' The persistence of its red berries in winter and its Christmas associations give it a high place among the trees of the north. It enters into the ritual names of Ireland, as in Druinn Cullim, now Drumulin, barony of English, King's County. More noticeable is its occurrence as a personal name, Mace Cullin, bishop of Lusk.4 The effigy of the Holly-boy in the Kentish Shrove-tide revels may be regarded as a substitute for the oak with its ancient religious association. At the close of the revels it was burned.5 The Christmas burning of the Yule-log is another link in the same chain, as the burning of the mulberry-bough is the evidence of the continuity of the sacred fire. The Christmas blossoming of the Glastonbury thorn and the Christmas-tree (of late introduction in England), with its lights and flowers and fruits, have been associated with the "strange blossoming power of nature connected with St. Andrew's Day" (30th Nov.). These were transferred in the Middle Ages to the Christmas festival.6

The ritual names of Ireland were given to the memory of Adam and Eve, and this led to the paradise-plays which formed a prelude to the Nativity-plays. The Cross of Christ was held in ancient legend to have been made of this wood, and this was the "blessing of the Tree of Knowledge."7 In the Paradise-play this tree was brought in laden with apples and decked with ribbons.8 The lights form an integral part of the earlier ideas of this tree-ritual.

In old Icelandic legend there is the story of a mountain-ash at Mauthrull which on Christmas Eve was covered with lights that the strongest gale could not extinguish. These lights were its blossoms. In French legend, Perceval comes across a tree illuminated with a thousand candles; and in another story Durmals le Galois twice saw a magnificent tree covered with lights from top to bottom.9

In Icelandic folk-lore lights are seen in the rowan-tree, and in Celtic folk-lore the scarlet berries of the rowan-tree are the source of wisdom. Is there not here a link between the light of wisdom and the bright fruit belonging to the tree of knowledge? The flammes were the scarlet tufts in their caps.8

"Simonides tells us that it was not a white wall which aegus gave, but a scarlet one, dyed with the juice of a fruit of a very flourishing holly-tree, and that this was to be the signal that all was well.9"

The story of aegus and Theseus has its parallel in the sign of the 'scarlet thread' at Jericho (Jos 2:9).

The rod of Aaron was the rod of the priesthood, and the priest's lips were to keep knowledge (Mal 2:7).

At the return from Captivity 'the Thanthas said unto them, that they should not eat of the most holy things, till there stood up a priest in Exodus and Ezra Thanninim' (Eze 29).

The breath of judgment contained these sacred loll (Ex 29).

The sacred berries are in the charge of the priest: 'for he is the messenger of the Lord of hosts' (Mal 2).

The rod was the token of this authority; and the rod of Aaron was a rod of almon. The Hebrew word for 'almon' is shoshphed, connected with the root 'to watch.' It is the tree of watchfulness, the tree of light. Jeremiah of the priests of Anathoth, in the opening of his prophecies, sees the vision of an almon-rod. It is the token of the watchfulness of God.10

1 Verg. Georg. ii. 290—292. 2 Philpot, p. 92. 3 Philpot, p. 311. 4 Philpot, p. 311. 5 Philpot, p. 311. 6 Philpot, p. 311. 7 Philpot, p. 311. 8 Philpot, p. 311. 9 Philpot, p. 311. 10 Philpot, p. 311.
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‘Then said the Lord unto me, Thou hast well seen; for I will hasten my word to perform it’ (Job 19:16).

And the vision of death it would seem that the blossoming of the almond-tree symbolizes the light of the presence of God (Ec 12:3), the light of wisdom and knowledge: ‘Because the preaching thereof is wise, he still taught the people knowledge’ (12:1). The early cult of the sacred tree among the Jews left its mark in the Temple of Jerusalem. R. G. Collingwood notes that, as the two pillars, Jachin and Boaz, so also the golden candlestick had associations with this ancient cult. The pillars were wreathed with pomegranates; the candlestick was a budding and blossoming almond.

If the former witness to the tree of life, the latter witnesses to the tree of knowledge.

Light was the first of the gifts of life; and it is in the light alone that religion can fulfill the duties of life. A Babylonian seal figured by Mrs. Philpot shows the sacred tree with seven branches, three on the right and four on the left, with a fruiting branch drooping on either side. On the right is a figure sitting with outstretched hand, the head crowned with the horns of a bull; on the left is another figure sitting, without the bull-mask, but with a snake behind it. It recalls in some points the story of Eden; but it is also a link in the development of the seven-branched candlestick of the Temple.

The sacred twig, the sacred fire, the priest-king who is guardian and champion of both, and who is also the representative of the majesty of the sun, each and all witness ‘at sundry times and in divers manners’ to the religious fellowship and communion which man enjoys with the divine spirit. Silent adoration is called for in the presence of the tree of life. The tree of the knowledge of good and evil is vocal in the light of divine wisdom:

1. And I turned to see the voice that spake with me. And being turned, I saw seven golden candlesticks; and in the midst of the seven candlesticks one like unto the Son of man, and his voice as the sound of many waters (Rev 1:15).

This voice is the voice of divine wisdom, vocal at Dodona and Cnossus and Delphi, vocal in the burning bush, and vocal to-day in the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and ghostly strength, the spirit of knowledge and true godliness, and the spirit of God’s holy fear. This fruit of the Holy Spirit is the fruit of the thumbed tree:

2. And there shall come forth a rod out of the stem of Jesse, and a Branch shall grow out of his roots: And the spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him (Is 11:1).

It is true to-day, as in the earliest ages of animistic religion, that ‘the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom’ (Ps 111:10).

LITERATURE.—The authorities are quoted in the footnotes.

THOMAS BARNES.

TREE OF KNOWLEDGE, TREE OF LIFE.—See Trees and Plants.

TRIADS.—See TRIMÜRTI, TRINITY.

TRIMÜRTI.—Though the Rigveda does not contain the conception of a separate spirit mani- fested in three forms (trimürti), which is the Hindu doctrine of the Trinity, it contains elements which have contributed to form that belief. In the first place, Agni as the god of fire has three forms: he is the sun in the sky, lightning in the aerial waters, and fire on earth. On this idea is based much of the mysticism of the Vedic period, and it is reflected in the ritual by the threefold character of the sacrifice. Thus Agni, whom R. H. Thompson calls ‘May’, Surya protect us from the sky, Vata from the air, Agni from the earthly regions,1 appears a tendency to reduce all the gods to manifestations of three chief deities, each representative of one of the three divisions, sky, air, and earth. Yásaka 2 tells us that his predecessors in Vedic interpretation held that all the gods could be reduced to three, Agni, Vāyu or Indra, and Sūrya, though he himself does not adopt this view. A further step towards the amalgamation of the gods is seen in the Mātriyāṇi Samhitā,3 which holds that Agni, Vāyu, and Sūrya are all sons of Prajāpati, the creator god.

The further development of the doctrine occurs only in the later Upanisads as the outcome of the adoption of the principle of the absolute (brahman or sthūla). In the Tattvarūpa Arācī prakṛti, the self, Mahānāryāṇa Upaniṣad the highest self (paramātmā) is identified with Brahman (by which Brahām is probably meant), Sīva, Hari, and Indra; the identification with Hari is probably a later interpolation, as it spoils the metre, but it is doubtless an old change in the text. In the Mātriyāṇi Upaniṣad4 Brahām, Rudra, and Vīṣṇu appear as forms (tānaṇāti) of the absolute, which itself is incorporeal, and again6 are declared to correspond respectively with the rojas, tamas, and sattva aspects of the absolute. The same triad is found in other texts such as the Prāyāg- niśkotra,5 the Mimāṃsākāṇi,6 the Rāmōttarapārniya Upaniṣad,7 and the Hindu System, which holds that three are the three states of Prajāpati.

This is the classical form of the doctrine which is repeated in the Harīvānaṇa, in Kālidāsa’s Kumāranātha, and not purely in the later literature. The personality of the trinity is varied slightly according to sectarian preferences; thus in the Saiva view8 the absolute, which is Śiva, is manifested as Brahma, Viṣṇu, and Bhava, the last a personal form of Śiva; the Nimbarka and other sects9 identify Kṛṣṇa with the absolute, distinguishing him from Viṣṇu as one of the trinity. There is some uncertainty whether the conception of the definite trinity was preceded by the conception of Viṣṇu and Śiva as merged in a unity, as appears in the term Harīvānaṇa, this view, however, is rendered probable by the fact that the epic appears to have identified Viṣṇu and Śiva as equals before it combined Brahma with them as their peer. A characteristically late idea recognizes a trinity of the Saktis, or personifications of the power of the three gods: Vāch or Sarasvatī as that of Brahma; Śrī, Lakṣmī, or Rādā as that of Viṣṇu; and Umā, Durgā, or Kāli as that of Śiva. For this there is no Vedic parallel, though in the ērgī hymns of the Rigveda a triad of sacrificial goddesses is found in Sarasvatī, Idā, and Bhārātī.

Serving as it does to reconcile rival monotheisms with one another and with the philosophic doctrine of the absolute, the theory of the three forms presents no such close similarity to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity as to render derivation from Christian influences either necessary or probable, though chronologically the existence of such influence is probable.

1. P. 467 f.
2. P. 130.
3. Book of Common Prayer, Order of Confirmation; cf. Is 11:3-5; LXX.
5. 5. 3. 10. v. 2.
6. ii. cclxvii. 46—an interpolation, according to E. W. Hopkins, The Zendavesta, no. 3, 287; India, New York, 1889.
7. I. 7. 1; xviii. 12.
TRINITY

quite possible. It is, however, conceivable that the idea developed under the influence of Mahāyāna Buddhism, which possesses the notable trinity of Buddha, Dhyani-buddha, and Dhyani-bodhisattva on the one hand, and Dharma, Dharmakaya, and Sambhoga-kāyas of a Buddha on the other. The Buddhist art of Gandhāra, followed by that of Tibet, China, and Japan, is prone to depict groups of Buddhas with three elements, with which the idea of the Trinity is, and it is to this influence that we may assign the existence of such sculptures as that from the cave of Elephanta, Bombay, which presents the three gods in one statue, and affords the inspiration for the old triostrata trinity deity of the Matya Purānas, if a passage often wrongly interpreted to mean 'One God and three persons.'


A. BERKELEY KEITH.

TRINITARIANISM — See TRINITY, RELIGIOUS ORDERS (Christian).

TRINITY. — I. The term and concept. — (a) The term 'Trinity' (from Lat. trinitas) appears to have first been used by Tertullian, while the corresponding Greek term 'Triad' (τριάδα) appears to have been first used by Theophilus the Christian apologist, an older contemporary of Tertullian. In Tertullian, as in the subsequent usage, the term designates the Christian doctrine of God as Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.

(b) Although the notion of a divine Triad or Trinity is characteristic of the Christian religion, it is by no means peculiar to it. In Indian religion, e.g., we meet with the trinitarian group of Dvala, Siva, and Puru, and in Egyptian religion with the trinitarian group of Osiris, Isis, and Horus, constituting a divine family, like the Father, Mother, and Son in medieval Christian pictures. Nor is it only in historical religions that we find God viewed as a Trinity. One recalls in particular the Neo-Platonic view of the Supreme or Ultimate Reality, which was suggested by Plato in the Timaeus, e.g., in the philosophy of Plotinus the principal of the Ancient Neoplatonists (apex caloris et geni), which are triadically regarded as the Good or (in numerical symbol) the One, the Intelligence or the One-Many, and the World-Soul or the One and Many. The religious Trinity of the ancient religions of Christianity, if somewhat loosely, with Comte's philosophy might also be cited here: the cultus of humanity as the Great Being, of space as the Great Medium, and of the earth as the Great Father.

(c) What lends a special character to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity is its close association with the distinctive Christian view of divine incarnation. In other religions and religious philosophies we meet with the idea of divine incarnation, but it may be claimed that nowhere is the union of God and man so concrete and definite, and so universal in its import, as in the Christian religion. As Augustine said, if in the book of the Trinitarians it was to be found that 'in the beginning was the Word,' it was not found there that 'the Word became flesh and dwelt among us.' It is the very central truth of Christianity that God was historically manifest in Christ, and that He is the union of the Supreme Being and of the Church or community of Christ's founding. This Christian faith in the incarnation of the divine Word (Logos, Logos,ῥηθαν) in the man Christ Jesus, and of the latter being united through the fellowship of the Holy Spirit, constitutes the distinctive basis of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity.

2. The development of the doctrine. — The limits of this article preclude any attempt to trace in detail the development of the Trinitarian idea from its beginnings in the Bible to its final formulation in the orthodox creeds. In various articles of this Encyclopedia this ground is traversed, such as the comprehensive art. God; the art. on particular developments of ancient Christian thought like the Alexandrian, Antiochen, and Cappadocian Theology; the art. on individual Christian theologies like Athanasian and Augustinian; the art. on heretical phases of Christological and Trinitarian belief like Adoptionism, Arianism, Monophysitism, Nestorianism. It will be convenient, however, to take here a general conception of the development in question.

(a) The Old Testament could hardly be expected to furnish the doctrine of the Trinity, if belief in the Trinity is grounded (as stated above) upon belief in the incarnation of God in Christ and upon the experience of spiritual redemption and renewal through Christ. It is exegesis of a mischievous, if pious, sort that would discover the doctrine in the natural form, 'Fathers,' of the Deity's name, in the recorded appearance of three angels to Abraham, or, even in the tor sanctus of the prophecies of Isaiah. It may be allowed, however, that the OT ideas of the Word of God and the Wisdom of God are adumbrations of the doctrine, as recognizing the truth of a various selfrevealing activity in the one God.

(b) In the New Testament we do not find the doctrine of the Trinity in anything like its developed form, not even in the Pauline and Johannine theology, although ample witness is borne to the religious experience from which the doctrine springs. None the less Christian is it seen, for instance, in the eternal Son of God and the supreme revelation of the Father, and the quickening Spirit of life is acknowledged to be derived from on high. And so, when the early Christians would describe their conception of God, all the three elements — God, Christ, and the Spirit — enter into the description, and the one God is found to be revealed in a threefold way. This is seen in the baptismal formula, in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, which at least reflects the usage of the apostolic Church, and in which the members of the Trinity are already all three associated together, as 'Trinity,' or the Deity's name, in the familiar words of St. Paul, the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Ghost. This last has been called, and justly so, the great Trinitarian text of the NT, as being one of the few NT passages, and the earliest of them, in which the three elements of the Trinity are set alongside of each other in a single sentence. If the passage contains no formulation of the conception of the Trinity, it is yet of great significance as showing that, less than thirty years after the death of Christ, His name and the name of the Holy Spirit could be employed in conjunction with the name of God Himself. Truly, if the doctrine of the Trinity appeared so.

1 Jn 11;
2 Jn 14;
somewhat late in theology, it must have lived very early in devotion. (c) The story of the Trinity in ecclesiastical history is the story of the transition from the Trinity of concepts, which God revealed to the Father as the Creator and Legislator, the Son or Redeemer, and the Spirit or Sanctifier, to the Trinity of dogma, in which the threefold self-disclosure of God is built within the realm of the human mind, there to form a threefold distinction within the divine Nature itself. With the transition from the Trinity of experience to the Trinity of dogma the theological statement tends to lose touch with the gracious figure of the historical Christ. In the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed, in which the Eastern development of the doctrine of the Trinity culminated, the dogma still retains its connexion with its positive ground and basis in the incarnate life of Christ; but in the Athanasian Creed, which represents the form which the dogma finally assumed in the West, it appears to have lost the connexion altogether, and to move entirely in the transcendent realm.

Five stages in the dogmatic development may be distinguished.1 (1) The formal identification of the Logos or Son (hitherto regarded primarily as the cosmic principle of revelation and not therefore co-eternal with God). This doctrine, due to Origen, which may be expressed in other words as the classical subordinationism within the Athanasian theology. Formulated in the interests of the divinity of Christ, it conserved also—as against Sabellian views—the distinction between the Father and the Son. (2) The doctrine of the eternal generation of the Logos or Son (hitherto regarded primarily as the cosmological principle of revelation and not therefore co-eternal with God). This doctrine, due to Origen, which may be expressed in other words as the classical subordinationism within the Athanasian theology. Formulated in the interests of the divinity of Christ, it conserved also—as against Sabellian views—the distinction between the Father and the Son. (3) The doctrine of the conceptuality of the Son as a creature, especially after the Origenist theory of eternal creation (which enabled Origen himself to regard the Son as still primarily a cosmological principle) had been abandoned. (4) The doctrine of the hypostatic union of the Son within the divine Nature, according to the formula of 'three Hypostases in one Ousia or Substance' (τρεις ὑπόστασις, μία οὐσία) of their Persons.2 (4) The doctrine of eternal distinctions within the divine Nature, according to the formula of 'three Hypostases in one Ousia or Substance' (τρεις ὑπόστασις, μία οὐσία). To the Cappadocians, Gregory of Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa we owe the final settlement, for which this formula stands, of the dogmatic terminology. In distinguishing between hypostasis and ousia, the former denoting a real principle of distinction within the divine Nature and the latter the divine Substance or Nature (σύνεσις) itself, they sought to lift the orthodox doctrine out of the Sabellian modalism which recognized no distinction in reality between the Father and the Son, so impairing the significance of the historical Christ, and at the same time to vindicate it against the opposite error of heathen polytheism (tritheism), of which it was so often accused. Moreover, the Cappadocians gave to the third member of the Trinity, the Holy Spirit, the definite place and character which He now possesses in the Eastern orthodox, as being also a hypostasis (from the Greek *ὑπόστασις*), distinct from the Father, and proceeding from the Father through the Son. (5) The doctrine of the double procession from the Father and the Son (the filioque clause, added to the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed on canonically indefensible grounds)3—a doctrine which represents the difference between Western orthodoxy and Eastern (with its view of procession as from the Father alone, the unitary source of deity)4; which was conceived, in the interests of the divine unity, as counteractive of the subordinationism contained in the Eastern formulas; and which under Augustinian influence found its way into the Athanasian Creed. Curiously enough, the Athanasian Creed (so called) thus differs theologically from the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed in its original Eastern form on a point on which all ancient Western and Eastern churches would have lain with the Eastern symbol. The Greek (Athanasian) theology found the divine unity in the Father, the one fountain-head of deity, so that, as some say, the Father is the first of Father and Son and the Spirit as subordinate to the Father. The Roman (Augustinian) theology found the divine unity in the divine Nature or Substance, with the result that, as the distinction between the three Hypostases has become weakened under the doctrine of the co-inherence, so attractive to the non-metaphysical Westerns,5 there remained no proper foothold—so to speak—for the doctrine of subordination.

3. The statement of the doctrine. (a) The ecclesiastical doctrine whose stages of development have been indicated may be briefly stated as follows, and the form of statement would commend itself as a whole alike to the Western or Roman Catholic and the Protestant Church. For, although the doctrine of the Trinity was the subject of much discussion, dogmatic speculation, in the Middle Ages and at the Protestant Reformation, and has been since, it has been formulated all along on the lines of the Niceno-Constantinopolitan and Athanasian Creeds. Both Roman Catholics and Protestants have so far the three Persons (Hypostases) or real distinctions in the unity of the divine Nature or Substance, which is Love. The Persons are co-equal, inasmuch as in each of them the divine Nature is one and undivided, and by each the collective divine attributes are shared. As a 'person' in Trinitarian usage is more than a mere aspect of being, being a real ground of experience and function, each divine Person, while less than a separate complete self, is in a sense a hypostatic character or characteristic property (διάταξις). The hypostatic characters of the Persons may be viewed from an internal and an external standpoint, i.e. with reference to the inner constitution of the Godhead or to the Godhead as related to the cosmos or world of manifestation. Viewed ab intra, the hypostatic character of the Father is the personal (Θεότης, the Son and the Spirit procession: wherefore, 'the Father is of none, neither begotten nor proceeding'; the Son is

2 C. F. J. 1733.
3 See further, art. Trinitarian, 3.
4 Strong, p. 170.
5 Strong, p. 164 ff.
eternally begetten of the Father; the Holy Ghost eternally proceeding from the Father and the Son.1 Viewed ab extra (for Love functions externally as well as internally, is centrifugal as well as centripetal2), the hypostatic character of the Father is made manifest in creation, whereby the world is provided for beings who should be capable of experiencing fellowship with the holy Love; the hypostatic character of the Son in redemption, whereby the alluring power of sin is overcome; and the hypostatic character of the Spirit in sanctification, whereby human nature is quickened and renewed and shaped to the divine likeness. Yet, while this is said, as there is no separation in the unity of the Godhead, so the one God is manifested in the threefold work of creation, redemption, and sanctification; moreover, each of the Persons as sharing the divine attributes is active in the threefold work, if with varying stress of function. Verily the doctrine of the Trinity exit in mysterium.

(c) It should, perhaps, be emphasized that the Trinitarian statement is never tritheistic, in the sense of affirming three persons, self-existent and self-determining individualities in the Godhead. When it is affirmed that there are three Persons in one God, the word 'person' is used archaically, and not in the modern sense of a self-determining personality. It was a word employed by Tertullian3 as on the whole the best word by which to convey the idea of an inner principle of distinction or individuality; and it was a good enough word when it bore a vaguer and more flexible meaning than it bears nowadays in Western Europe. To say that there are three separate personalities in the Godhead would be polytheism. To say that there are three eternal principles of distinction or modes of subsistence in the Godhead is not polytheism—although in the speculative construction of the Trinity it might lead, and has sometimes led, to a theoretical pluralism or polytheism.

4. The speculative construction of the doctrine.

(a) Although the Christian Church soon came to look upon the Trinity as an incomprehensible mystery of revelation, which reason might not probe, her theologians have not refrained whether in ancient or in modern times from speculation upon the doctrine. In medieval times, indeed, the doctrine was often on the high school of logic and dialectic.4 Then, as before and since, recourse was often made to the principle of analogy, in order to throw light upon the mysterious notion of tri-personality in the Godhead. It is a principle that has received classical treatment at the hands of Augustine, who employed in particular the analogies of the human self-consciousness and of the relationship of love. It is not pretended, however, that by such analogies the doctrine of the Trinity may be rationalized. And, clearly, such analogies fail on one side or the other to satisfy the conception of 'three Persons in one Nature.' On the one hand, the psychological analogy of the self-consciousness does justice to the unity of the Nature, but not to the distinction of the Persons. This is as true, it has been remarked,5 of Dornern's construction founded upon Hegel's 'being in itself, being for itself, being in and for itself,'6 as of Augustine's 'memory, understanding, and will'7 (in each of which he found the whole rational nature expressed), or, as we might add, of his

'mind, self-knowledge, and self-love.'8 On the other hand, the social analogy of love does justice more or less, to the distinction of the Persons, but not to the unity of the Nature. In this case the three elements of the analogy are the loving subject, the loved object, and the love which unites them. The subject and the object possess, to be sure, more than sufficient independence for the purpose in view, but it is difficult to see how the love which unites may be accepted as a distinct person, even in the vaguest sense of that term. The application of the psychological analogy may be regarded as an attempt to satisfy the theological interest attaching to the traditional dogma for which the Logos-conception stands, namely, the explanation of the relations of God and the world. On the assumption that the human individual is a microcosm, bearing traces of the divine Personality upon him, it would seek to make more intelligible the unity in diversity, or more precisely the unity in trinity, affirmed in the orthodox view of the Godhead. Again, the construction of the Trinity which is founded upon the social analogy of love appears to satisfy the practical interest attaching to the traditional dogma, namely, the vindication of the truly divine character of the Person and Work of Jesus Christ, and the existence of the created social unit is the real microcosm, it would make more intelligible the trinity in unity which is also affirmed in the orthodox view of the Godhead. Perhaps the social analogy has been the more influential of the two. It certainly offers a picture of the inner constitution of the Godhead that corresponds to the Christian Gospel: 'The love of the Eternal Father is for ever satisfied in the Eternal Son; and the Father and the Son are for ever bound together in the Holy Spirit, who is the bond of the Divine Love.'9

(b) In modern constructions of the doctrine of the Trinity there is a tendency to make much of the microcosm of human personality as carrying traces of macrocosmic Reality. God is to be interpreted, it is said, according to the teleological principle of the highest, and human personality is the highest thing we know. The result is that, as C. C. J. Webb10 has indicated, we hear a good deal nowadays, even in non-Unitarian Christianity, of 'the Personality of God,' whereas the historical doctrine is that of 'the Personality in God.'11 This raises the question whether the future of Christianity lies in its associating itself with the modern philosophical movement of personalism or in the renewal of its old alliance with Platonism. Into such a question we may not enter, but we would cite a recent instance of a discussion of the Trinity in which human personality figures as the key to the mystery of the Godhead. It is S. A. McDowall's12 contention that there is more than analogy between human and divine personality, there is also identity in their nature. The Trinity within us is more than suggestive of the truth that in God personality is also triune. If we might borrow the language of Julian of Norwich, the 'made Trinity' actually points to 'the unmade blessed Trinity. If the Godhead be a Personality, it must indeed be a unity, but the unity—like the unity of human personality—is composed of three persons, which, although not self-existent but completely interpenetrating, are differentiated from each other by the stress of their individual functioning.13 Personality, whether in God or in

1 Westminster Confession, II, 3.
3 Ibid., 1913, p. 112.
4 Harbach, Hist. of Dogma, vi, 153.
6 Memorabilia, intelligenitia, volutans; cf. de Tris. IX.-XV.
8 Strong, p. 106.
9 Strong and Personality, lect. iii.
10 Pp. 95 ff., 96.
12 McDowall, p. 108.
man, could not really exist if it did not thus involve an internal manifold.\(^1\) For the elaboration of these positions reference must be made to the backgrounds and implications of Trinitarian doctrine.\(^2\) To illustrate a recent tendency in the application, in Trinitarian speculations, of the principle of analogy.

5. Economic and essential trinity.—(a) The transition from the Trinity of experience to the Trinity of the Word of God is evident here only as illustrating a recent tendency in the application, in Trinitarian speculations, of the principle of analogy.

(b) It should be observed that there is no real cleavage or antithesis between the doctrines of the economic and the essential Trinity, and naturally so. The Trinity represents the effort to think out the Trinity, and so to afford it a reasonable basis.\(^3\) The first Christians had St. Paul's saving experience of the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and of the love of God, and of the communion of the Holy Ghost; and the theologians of the ancient Church, who sought to think out the Christos-Trinity, found the Christos-Trinity in logical terms of effort. In the effort they were led, inevitably, to effect an alliance between the gospel of their salvation and the speculative philosophy, and more especially the Platonism, in which they had been trained, while, in making room for the Christian gospel within the world—not altogether hospitable—of the Greek philosophy, they found themselves translating their empirical knowledge of God—the God and Father of the Lord Jesus Christ—into a doctrine of diversity or multiplicity, as distinguished from merely abstract unity, within the divine Nature itself. Other tendencies, in thinking out the Trinity, they arrived at the Trinity. None the less the greatest and most influential of the Christian Fathers, Origen, Athanasius, Basil and the Gregory, Augustine, all acknowledged that, for all the light thrown upon it in the Biblical revelation, the divine Nature remained for them a mystery transcending reason.\(^4\)

(c) It is claimed, however, especially by Catholic thinkers, that, logical mystery as the Trinity undoubtedly is, it not only conserves the spiritual values of the dogma, but more to the sublime and exalted the Athanasian Creed, \(e.g.,\) is declared to be in effect a sublime and magnificent hyan of the Christian faith, having a power all its own to stir and uplift the souls of believers with the greatest of the divine recompensation in Jesus Christ. That being so, it may be allowed that there is justice in the contention that acceptance of the Trinity does not commit one to the adoption of all the obsolete modes of thought, but only to acceptance of the authoritative Christian tradition which the terms of the Greek philosophy served to symbolize, and with which continued vitality they have become invested.\(^5\)

(b) In consequence of a wide-spread failure, especially within the Protestant Church, to appreciate the symbolism in which the traditional Christian convolutions are embodied, and to recognize in the doctrine of the Trinity of Three in One many more than a sacred mysterious formula, modern Christian theology is thrown back more and more upon the historical revelation in Jesus Christ and the inward experience of God. It is not at this modern level of practical ground and basis of Trinitarian doctrine, being less concerned with what God is in Himself than with what He has shown Himself to be—less concerned with the Substance or nature of God, than with the Trinity of manifestation. It is part of the modern empirical movement in theology, chiefly associated with the names of Schleiermacher and Ritschl. When thus employed, the Trinity is largely interpreted as NT. [Note: The text is cut off at this point, making it difficult to continue the analysis.]


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TRITHEISM


TRITHEISM.—1. Definition.—Tritheism (Gr. τρικλήσις, 'three,' and ἄτεχος, 'God') is the belief in three Gods. As such, it is a form of polytheism, defined as the belief in many Gods or in more Gods than one.

2. Christianity and tritheism.—So far as the present writer is aware, no historical religion may properly be called tritheistic. Where divine triads or trinities are found, they are not distinguished from other divinities or from human beings. (1) On the other hand, the charge of being tritheistic has often been preferred against the Christian religion, as presented in the doctrine of the Trinity. (2) The Christian Church has, however, expressly dissociated itself from trinitarian views tending to tritheism. (3) Moreover, liability to the charge of tritheism is regarded as sufficiently damaging also to speculative constructions of the Trinity. In what follows the writer would expound these three statements one by one.

3. The charge of tritheism.—(a) The accusation of being tritheistic, which has often been made against Christianity, is, in a sense justified. For undoubtedly the doctrine of the Trinity has been, and is still, conceived among simple uneducated Christians in a naively tritheistic way. Sometimes also a naïve tritheism is found even in theological statement, as when in so-called transactional theories the Atonement is represented as the result of a bargain between the first and second Persons of the Trinity. (b) But the Christian religion, like other historical religions, must be judged by the affirmations of its best and most representative minds, and not by the crudities of the uninstructed or the aridities of theological pedantry. It is affirmed by the representative minds of Christianity that the accusation of tritheism is unjustified, being largely founded upon misunderstanding of the theological terms in which the Trinity is formulated. They would insist that there is a world of difference between the formula, 'There are three Gods,' or even the formula, 'There are three distinct or separate individuals in the class known as God,' and the formula in which the orthodox doctrine may be summarized, 'There are three Persons in one God.' In fact the Trinity is declared to be at bottom an assertion of the divine unity. If in the light of the Christian revelation we are led to affirm three eternal distinctions in the Godhead, we must still hold fast to the old faith of Israel's prophets and say, 'These three are one.' Admittedly, however, the English and American tritheistic constructions tend to mislead in the Trinitarian terminology. In particular, the ambiguity of the word 'person' is allowed to be a source of much misunderstanding. To set forth the doctrine of the tritheist, however, enough, it would be added, to vindicate the doctrine of the Trinity against a charge so obnoxious as that of tritheism. We are

reminded in this connexion of how the early Christian thinkers abhored the suggestion even that in affirming the Trinity they were reinstating human formulae on the Trinity.

It should be remembered that there was no word 'person' in the vocabulary of the Greek-speaking theologians, who always expressed the essence of the Trinity in the declarative form it assumed in the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed. ‘Person’ (Latin persona) as a term, however, in the Affirmative Creed, did represent the Greek Λογος. New 'hypothesis' ('soulment' or 'soulship', lit. 'standing under or from the things used about the beginning of the Christian era to signify a real concrete existence or actuality in contradistinction to a mere appearance having nothing solid or permanent underlying it, such as a count in comparison with a rainbow. Through Origen's influence it came to be employed in the theological terminology as the designation of a member of the Trinity, as in the Capadonian formula, 'Three Hypostases of the Father', 'hypothesis', and still is, though the term 'hypostasis' as applied to the members of the divine Trinity supported an independence or individuality of too complete a sort, as though the Father, Son, and Spirit were as separate in the class God as Peter, John, and Paul in the class men.2 but this suggestion was corrected, at least for speculative minds, by the Lege-Christology deriving from St. John and St. Paul, in which the idea of immanent distinctions in the unity of the Godhead received recognition. On the other hand, the tritheistic tendency was accounted for the Latin-speaking theologians by the selection, due probably to Tertullian, of a term (A. 'person' as the designation of an 'essence'. Though persona, as its original meaning might show, implied only a temporary and superficial kind of individuality, it was employed by the Latin writers under the lit. 'face', by which person was often rendered in the later Greek theological literature, and thereby the dignity and a rational nature. A 'person' in the early centuries of the Latin Church was an individual viewed in a legal aspect (the word often meant a litigant or a party to a contract as well as a player) as the subject of rights and duties, if not as yet in the philosophical sense of an independent and self-determining Ego—a sense which has attached itself to the word in modern times. Yet even the ancient legal and real associations of 'person' would impart ambiguity to its theological usage, especially in popular thought, and the ambiguity would tend to increase in鸡蛋, the more so as the distinction between the modern philosophical sense of personality. So it is not surprising that there has been a 'strong tendency to tritheism in Western theology, especially among the people; and that non-Christian thinkers, notably Jewish and Muhammadan, have taken the doctrine of tri-personality in God as virtual or veiled tritheism.

4. Tritheism as a heresy of dogmas.—(a) Although aberrations from the orthodox dogmas were in the East towards a modalistic Monarchianism (Sabellianism) rather than tritheism, it was in the East—among the Greek-speaking theologians—the birthplace of tritheism, and it was a doctrine that found a home and a soul within the tritheistic tendency. The movement in question illustrates the reaction of Christological discussion and controversy upon the doctrine of the Trinity. Christology in the heart of the Monarchian (tritheistic) school, the development of Christology naturally led to a revision of the dogmatic terms.

(b) As a definite phase in the history of Christology, tritheism appeared c. A.D. 530 in Monophysite circles, being associated chiefly with the names of John Askusnages and John Phillopus. The latter, an Alexandrian philosopher and a distinguished philologist, was a considerable work entitled Μαγιας important fragments have been preserved in the writings of John of Damascus, appears to have been the most influential of the school. As a Monophysite John Phillopus was opposed to the Chalcedonian declaration of the Person of Christ as consisting of 'one person in two natures' (διὰ τὸ ψυχων ου μία ψυχων τε δύο φωνες), and contended that Christ's was a single nature composed of the two divine. This is to say, in Christology φως or ωλια and κτορτυκας were to be viewed as synonymous terms.

(c) When this Christological position is applied to the doctrine of the Trinity, it is once raised to as whether the orthodox fomula of three Hypostases in one Substance can be maintained. If one ωλια, is there not but one ωλια also? If three ωλια are, there are not three ωλια? Thus, if the five to the literary form leads to a form of Unitarianism, the affirmative to the second to a form of tritheism.

(d) John Phillopus started from the consideration of the three Personages and reached a tritheistic conclusion as to the divine ωλια as φως: τρεις φωςις λεγες ἤμας ἐπὶ τίς ἀγίας ἐμαραθέομεν. So he and his followers were named by their opponents 'tritheists' (τριδειης), although we are told 2 that they would not actually have confessed themselves as believers in three Gods. If theirs was a theoretical, it was not also a practical, tritheism, like the Trinitarian notions of the Socinian theorists mentioned above (which amusingly justified the protest of the earlier Unitarians). It appears, however, that John Phillopus admitted the notion of a common Nature (ωλια κας), if holding in their belief; the tritheist had maintained a nominal sense; but Damian 3 (578-605), the Monophysite patriarch of Constantinople, held in pronouncenly realistic a view of the one Substance, but not the separate persons. He was the first in the East to regard the three Persons as true reals or separate individualities, that, like Peter the Lombard in a later day, he was accused of teaching a Quaternity rather than a Trinity, and his followers were labelled 'trideterminists' (τριοπτικας). The tritheists were definitely opposed in the name of the orthodox dogmas by John of Damascus, who in seeking to emphasize as against them the unity of the Godhead gave— as Augustine did—a modistic flavour to his theological exposition. 4

5. Tritheism as an error of speculation.—It has been remarked 5 that in the tritheistic movement (so called) and the counter-movements it evoked we may find the roots of the medieval controversy between nominalism and realism. The remark is illustrated by the case of Roscellin, the best-known representative of the older nominalism. According to Roscellin, universals were not reals, but merely subjective conceptions (Ratus vocis). And, if this principle holds of the nature or Sub- stance of the Person of the Trinity, the Person formula must be regarded as distinct self-consciousnesses, and the unity of the Godhead as but a nominal and generic unity. Thus on philo- sophical principles Roscellin reached a theoretical tritheism, which, however, at Anselm's instance, was condemned at Soissons in 1092.7 And over and over again, from the beginnings of Christian theology down to the present, speculative con- structions of the doctrine of the Trinity have led to encounter—sometimes in the irony of things—the damaging charge of being tritheistic. In the ancient Church, as Culliustus accused Hippolytus of dythorism, so Dionysius—maintaining the Roman tradition of unspeculative adherence to the

2 Timothy, de Exempla Heresiormum (PO xxxvi. 1, col. 60).
3 Ib. col. 61.
5 In de Fide orthodoxa. For summary discussions of tricheism as a teaching of the Church, see the works of 'Johannes Askusnages, 'Johannes Phillopus,' in P.R.S. lix. and the art. 'Tricheismic Church' in P.R.S. xxvii.
7 Cf. Anselm, De Fide pr. trin. 2., Ep. 3, 35, 41.
8 Roscellin and the nominalists were dubbed Anselm Abbot heresiarches (de Fide pr. trin. 2); cf. P. Lons, Lettres sur l'histoire de la religion du Moyen Age, 2 vols., Halle, 1850, 1, 69, 4.
TRUST.

unity of the Godhead—preferred the accusation of tritheism against Origen's teaching. Yet Origen's doctrine of the eternal generation of the Logos or Son entered into the orthodox formulas, and a follower of Origen, Gregory Thaumaturgos, mildly championed the unity of the Godhead against the polytheists (tritheists). Again, in the medieval Church even Abelard was suspected of tritheism, and yet it was Abelard's aim and endeavor, in his dissertation against tritheism like Roscellin's and pure modalism, and his sympathies lay with modalism rather than tritheism. Once again, if it is not invidious to select so modern an instance, W. Adams Brown comments as follows on the theological part of tritheism:

"It is hard to see how these "centres of conciseness life and activity" can be distinguished from separate personalities." And yet W. N. Clarke 5 so emphasizes the Trinity of manifestation, as distinguished from the Trinity of essence, as to be far away indeed from tritheism. It all illustrates the fact that, while the doctrine of tritheism, as the Nicene-Constantinopolitan and Athanasian Creeds, will have no traffic with tritheism, it is difficult in the theological exposition of the dogma to steer a safe course between tritheism and modalism (in which the Father, Son, and Spirit are merely three modes or aspects of the one God)—which serves to give point to Augustine's famous remark that tritheism is an alternative to the affirmation of the three Persons is silence: 'dictum est tres personae, nunc ut illdum diceretur, sed ne taceretur.' 6

TRUST.—In the wide sense of confidence in a supernatural Power on which man feels himself dependent, trust enters as an element into practically all religions from the lowest up to the highest. Man, as the children of God, rely on their faith to bring them success in the chase, and other peoples on their national god to give them victory in war. But such trust possesses no ethical quality and need not further detain us. Only when the superior and supernatural Power is conceived in more or less ethical fashion can a trust emerge that has ethical and religious value. Religious trust, in the only sense worth considering, is confidence in and reliance upon the eternal Power or force which we hang, as one that is working towards a worldly end and guiding the course of events in wisdom and goodness. It is the trust that comes to expression in Ps. cxlii, 1:

'Thy lovingkindness, O Lord, is in the heavens; thy faithfulness reacheth unto the skies. Thy righteousness is like the mountains of God; And the children of men take refuge under the shadow of thy wings.'

Were the facts of life uniformly of a kind to render the moral purpose and control of God obvious and unmistakable, the exercise of trust would make no particular demand on our energies. Since, however, they are far from being so, the world not seldom seeming to ride roughshod over man and his valiant trust, it is easy to see why the idea of a triumph over difficulties. In the Epistle to the Hebrews it is presented in the light of an act of heroism: 'He endured, as seeing him who is invisible.' Trust of this kind is not of course to be looked for in the religion of primitive races or in religions that are merely national. Nor does it emerge with any distinctness in the pantheistic religions of India. The Indian conception of the world-order as governed by the principles of karma and anātīdrāta 7

1 Cf. Harrack, ii. 90, 93. 2 I b. iii. 101 f. 3 Acts xi. 19. 4 Christian Theology in Outline, Edinburgh, 1897, p. 192. 5 In his Outline of Christian Theology, Edinburgh, 1898, and more especially in his Christian Doctrine of God, 1906. 6 De Trinit. v. 9. 7 (transmigration) is not at bottom ethereal, and the corresponding piety consists not in submission to that order as something good, but in the desire to escape from it, and in the exercises through which the goal of absorption in Brahman is attained. Bhagavatism, it is tritheistic, acknowledges a single God who is personal and gracious; and in its conception of bhakti, or devotional faith, as the way of deliverance from the wheel of birth and rebirth, a respect of tritheism appears, if not as a transference of at least as a fruit. But bhakti is far less ethical trust than a mystical 'abiding' in the 'Adorable,' and the piety of Bhagavatism as mirrored in the Bhāgavad-Gīta, intense though it is, for the most part of the usual Indian type.

In the religion of the Greek dramatists, of Plato, and of the later Stoics, trust holds an assured though not a prominent place. Sophocles expresses the conviction that, however things may seem to us in our short-sightedness, if we could only see the purposes of the gods in their totality, we should know them to be good, and that 'nothing to which the Canadian man is base.' Of the just man Plato declares: 8

1 Even when he is in poverty or sickness, or any other seeming misfortune, all things will in the end work together for good to him in life and in death. Of the gods, one whose desire is to become just and to be like God, as far as man can attain the divine likeness, by the very essence of his nature.

Even more striking are the words of Epictetus: 'So do with me what thou wilt: my will is thy will: I appeal not against thy judgments.' 9 In the Epinomis, a dialogue wrongly ascribed to Plato, it is said: 'Pray to the gods with trust.' 10 And of Socrates Xenophon says that he must have believed in the gods, since he trusted them: 'πνεύμα μόνον τα θεῖα εἰς τὸν άνθρώπον ἵππον ἀνακούνειν.'

But, though the higher Greek religion trust had a firm basis provided for it and secured a certain amount of recognition, its full significance was far from being realized. Nowhere do we find it put forward as a central element in piety or a spring of strength and goodness. It was in the Hebrew prophets and their spiritual successors that it first really came into its own. Everywhere in the Bible we are met by utterances of fervent and steadfast trust in God. And its religious importance is clearly recognized. Isaiah sees in it the only source of safety: 'If ye will not trust, ye shall not be established' (7). Jeremiah speaks to the same effect: 'Cursed is the man that trusteth in his own heart, and maketh his flesh his arm, and whose heart turns aside from Jehovah. . . . Blessed is the man who trusts in Jehovah and whose confidence Jehovah is' (17). To trust in Jehovah and do good is presented in Ps 37 as the sum of religion. In the NT the idea of trust, deepened by a new feeling for God's care for the individual, occupies a position of still greater prominence. Outside the Synoptic Gospels, however, it is to a large extent merging in the idea of faith (q.v.). It is faith in the sense of belief that is established as the condition of salvation. This change of emphasis—as we shall see, it amounts to nothing more—is intelligible when we remember that the gospel was preached as, in the first place at least, a message to be received. None the less it created for the Church a serious problem and one that had to wait long for a satisfactory solution. The problem has to do with the mutual relations of trust and faith. By St. Paul, 1 and also in the Epistle to the Hebrews, faith

8 See art. Brutwood.
9 I Cor. x. 13 (Gr. ἑξέτασις, Dialogues of Plato, Oxford, 1897, iii. 290).
12 Memorabilia, i. 5.
13 E.g., Rom. 4.
is conceived in a way that makes the two practically identical. But what if its object is thought of as a doctrine which must first be assented to before trust can enter? In that case faith, while including the will in addition a purely intellectual element, either intellectual submission, if the doctrine is authoritatively given, or intellectual insight, if it is the product of a rational process. Adopting the first alternative, the Protestant anthropologists in their analysis of faith established *notitia* and *ascensus* as the necessary preliminaries to *fiducia*. The vice of this solution is that it destroys the independence of faith—in other words, of religion—by binding it to an act external to it and without moral quality. The faith described by Paul as trust in God is presented as at bottom subjection to the Church or the Bible as the guarantor of religious truth. And its independence is equally subverted if, adopting the second alternative, we regard it as receiving its object from philosophical reflection. The true solution of the problem lies in the recognition that in faith itself there is a cognitive element, and that its object is given not in the form of a doctrine, but in the form of an ideal value. Face to face with the great values that are supremely embodied in the little life and in the earth, if we are summed up in the conception of a kingdom of the god, we affirm them on the ground of their worth as the manifestation of the eternal Power that works at the heart of things, the eternal Reality on which the universe no less than our human life is founded. Faith is nothing else than just this feeling for the ideal and, above all, the moral values and this affirmation of their cosmic significance. So interpreted, it is one and the same thing with trust in God, for what is trust in God but trust in the good as the central might on which we and the whole universe hang? If there is a difference, it is that in the idea of faith the emphasis falls on the cognitive aspect, and in the idea of trust on the volitional.

Literature.—See the works referred to in the footnotes and those given in art. Faith (Christian). W. Morgan.

TRUSTS.—See Economics.

TRUTH.—See Error and Truth.

TSHI-SPEAKING TRIBES.—See Negroes and W. Africa.

Tsimshian.—The Tsimshian belong to the northern group of coast Indians, but differ markedly from the Haida and Tlingit (qq.v.) in language. Their social organization is also somewhat divergent, since instead of two phratries they have four—Eagle, Wolf, Canhada, and Gypisawaduwa—each embracing many small local groups or clans. There are three chief Tsimshian divisions: the Tsimshian proper, living on the lower Skeena River and the coast to the south, the Niska of Nass River, and the Kitskan of the upper Skeena. The last does not border on the coast and is intermediate between the coast tribes proper and the true inland tribes of Athapascan lineage. Most of the information that we possess regarding Tsimshian religion is from the Niska, but there seems to have been little difference between their beliefs and those of the other divisions.

1. Cosmological beliefs.—The earth was believed to be flat and circular. It was supported by a man named Amala ('smoke hole'), who lay on his back in the water up to his shoulders on the slope of the horn of the mountain-goat. This was filled with grease, and in it stood a pole, on which the earth rested. When he became tired, he lifted the pole, and the earth shook. The pole, with the earth on it, was turning round in the bowl of the spoon, the grease in which served to make it revolve easily. Sun, moon, and stars belonged to the sky and did not turn with the earth. This reference to the turning of the earth with seeming constancy is an example of how the universe revolving, but the association of grease with the being under the earth is paralleled by something related of the Haida Atlas, Sacred—one-standing-and-moving, and probably genuine aboriginal.

2. Supernatural beings.—The supernatural beings, so far as we are acquainted with them, were much the same as those among the Haida (q.v.). They had a supreme heaven-god called Lalin ("the air"), a perfect counterpart of the Haida Power-of-the-shining-heavens. From the information regarding him gathered by Boas, however, it seems that he approached much nearer to the monotheistic idea of a supreme being.

'Heaven is the great deity who has a number of mediators called Negoq. . . . Heaven rules the destinies of mankind; heaven taught man to distinguish between good and evil and gave the religious laws and institutions. Heaven is glorified by the mere existence of man. He is worshipped by offerings and prayer, the smoke rising from face being especially acceptable to him. Murderers, adulterers, and those who behave foolishly, take a spell by force, and making him angry, are especially hateful to him. He loves those who take pity upon the poor, who do not try to become rich by selling at high prices what is just and fair prices and are sumptuous. He, like the moon, must be treated with respect. Men make themselves agreeable to him and maintain their cleanliness. They also bathe and wash their whole bodies before praying. For the same reason they take a vowitive when they wish to please the deity well. They fast and abstain from touching their wives if they desire their prayers to be successful. They offer everything that is considered valuable—eagle-down, log, cedar bark, good elk-skin lines, etc. The offering is burnt.'

The ethics of this, especially in the matter of acquiring wealth, seems so different from the aboriginal code found elsewhere that it is probable that the native informant's statements were tinged with missionary teaching, and that Heaven, or Laha, was elevated to a position above that which he occupied in earlier days. There can be no doubt, however, as to the existence of a sky-god 'first among equals.'

The Tsimshian prayed less often to their heaven-god than to the minor deities, or 'mediators,' whom they generally asked for food and fair weather. Sometimes they prayed to the supernatural beings collectively. The most important 'mediators' are stated to have been the sun and moon, spirits having in the shape of lightning, thunder, and animals. The Raven, also called Kismem, was believed in and had the same functions and general character as among the Tlingit and Haida. They also believed in the sea grizzly bear, or Hagulak, which may have been originally a Haida conception, since his home was called Helahadek ('near the Haida country'). In his house he had four kittens called Lukwaxam, Warm, Hot, and Boiling. The killer-whales seem to have been his servants, since they were known as ' Hagulak's men.' There was also a one-legged man similar to the Master-hopper of the Haida. Besides praying to the deities, a person could force them to grant his desires by rigid fasting. He had to abstain from food and from seeing his wife for seven days, lying in bed motionless all that time. Then he might rise, wash himself, comb the right side of his head, and paint the right side of his face, after which he might look at his wife. A less rigid form of fasting extended over four days only. To make the wife conceive a man's wife must join him, but, if the wife should be untruly to her husband, the effect of the fasting would be destroyed. What ever twins wished was believed to be fulfilled, and they were especially asked to especially to controul the
weather and bring eulachon and salmon. Numbers of tabas governed hunting and fishing, particularly in the fishing. That which required great numbers and were, or were, a principal source of wealth to the people. The first of these fish to be caught were roasted on a peculiarly-shaped frame made of elder brushwood and the spiritual ceremonies, the man who handled it prayed

3. The dead.—The principal world of the dead was reached by following a trail and crossing a river. According to him, his body was

4. Shamanism.—Nothing is known of Tsisbsbians shamanistic beliefs, though any distinction is made

5. Witchcraft.—The wizard cast his spell by speaking some article taken from the victim into a box containing portions of a human body. Strings were fastened inside this box, and, if the wizard wished his victim to die, he said the spell, and then threw the object some distance above the body, but, if he
desired him to perish at once, he cut the string, thereby precipitating the object upon the body. Afterwards he had to go round the house in which he had killed a witchcraft was laying, and later he had to walk round his grave and rub himself, pretending to cry all the time.

Unless he observed these rules, he would himself perish as well. If it happened that a person had been killed by witchcraft, the Tsisbians would take out his heart and lay a red-hot stone against it, wishing at the same time that the wizard might die. If the heart burst, it was expected that their wish would be fulfilled; if not, it was a sign that their suspicions were unfounded.

LITERATURE.—Nearly all the available Tsisbian material is contained in K. Boe, report v. on the Western Tribes of Australia, in Report of the British Association for the Advance-

TUKARAM.—In Tukaram there culminates an important section of the bhakti school 1 and his verses have all the authority of a 'Veda' for most of the twenty million Marathi-speaking people of one of India’s noblest races, among whom are to be found some of the greatest Indian reformers of all time. Both for his poetical genius and for his unique place in the people’s heart he is happily described as ‘the Robert Burns of India’ who marks the era of the efflorescence of Maharashtra’s people. 2

1. Sources. (a) Biographical. Two serious difficulties confront the modern biographer of Tukaram. (1) All the Marathi Lives of Tukaram are drawn almost exclusively from a single authority, the poet-saint Mahatpl (1712–90), whose accounts in the Bhakti Vipasa (chs. xiv–ix.) and the Bhakti Lalita (chs. xiv–xv.) are quoted as early as 1774 respectively, more than a century after Tukaram’s end in 1660, ‘long enough for legends to grow.’ (2) We have ‘no authentic and properly sealed account of his life,’ but only a mass of legends and traditions that have gathered round Tukaram 3 and show a distinct ‘tendency towards idealisation.’ Moreover, ‘at least some facts of historical accuracy to start with, and Mahatpl’s “detailed legends ... seen in every way as deserving of belief.”’

A few sources earlier than Mahatpl have been indicated recently by V. L. Bhawe. Besides (1) Tukaram’s autobiographical poems (see below) and (3) the abhatkas of Ramchandra Bhagat, the leading disciple of Tukaram, there are two other poems by Tukaram by his grandson, Gopil Buwa, (4) the autobiography of Rama, another disciple of Tukaram, which gives the names of some of Tukaram’s contemporaries who figure prominently both in Mahatpl and in Tukaram’s own poetry, and (5) a biography of Tukaram by Banwarilal, a contemporary of Mahatpl, a work written by one named Krishnadass Itragi on Krishna Chaitanya Ramnayya, which gives the important ‘summary’ of Tukaram’s success and helps us to settle important dates in his life, this work being quoted by name and its facts given by one Niranjana A.N. Patwardhan has added a sixth authority, a biography of Tukaram, in Marathi Mulin, author of Bhaktakshara, but it cannot be pronounced utterly trustworthy, though he was followed by a few Marathi authors. 4

The investigation concerning biographical material has gone enough to clear away some confused unimportant tradition, ‘miracle and wonder-working,’ Mahatpl’s account has a solid substratum of historical accuracy. Moreover, he uses his sources with discrimination, rejecting what he discovers to be unreliable. 5

(b) Autobiographical. The true text of Tukaram’s writings has not yet been critically ascertained, and between the several collections there is a wide difference as to the number of poems included, ranging from 422 in the edition generally accepted 6 to 854 in one 7 described by E. G. Bhandarkar as ‘ethnically

1 See art. BHATI-MAROJ, MYSTICISM (Hindu).


7 Ib. p. 190, note 1. 8 Ib. p. 371. 9 Indis Prabha, Bombay, 1898, now out of print.

10 By Tukaram himself.

11 See art. KAKARPUR.

12 His wife Rama, being ‘constitutionally asthmatic,’ he married another, Dhibai or Anu, daughter of a well-to-do Poona merchant.

A great famine in 1629, during which his elder wife 11 died crying for bread, was the last in a succession of sorrows which led him to give up all business and worldly attachment. Siting on the river bank with his younger brother Kanhoba, he threw into the stream his half of the business papers and handed over the remainder to Kanhoba, while he dedicated himself wholly to Viphoba. The spirit of poverty, of a life of poverty, commanding him to complete the unfinished task

1 See Bhakti Vipasa, chs. 49, 299.


6 Indis Prabha, Bombay, 1898, now out of print.

7 By Tukaram himself.


10 See art. KAKARPUR.

11 His wife Rama, being ‘constitutionally asthmatic,’ he married another, Dhibai or Anu, daughter of a well-to-do Poona merchant.
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of his great predecessor Nanud, bhakta and poet. In another dream he received his all-important gurú-mentra — Rama-Krishna-Hari, the secret mystic formula which finally initiated him as a Hindu bhakta. In this way he arrived at the sanctuaries of one of the Babaji Chaitanya of the land of Ragha Chaitanya and Keshav Chaitanya—a possible indication that Tukaram had some connexion with the Chaitanya sect. The V��ies of events setting forth his dealings with Brahmans point out the most important part of his life-narrative.

One such story provides an interesting Hindu parallel to the Quaker saying, "Every soul is of equal significance to every meal.

A Chinchowl Brahman, Chitthinam Dev, had invited Tukaram to dine with him, and, the Brahman's plate having been laid the usual distance from the Brahman, Tukaram made the strange request that two more be laid, one for his own god and another for Nabat, shiped by his host, in explanation of an autobiographical poem being: 'If you enjoy a meal in faith, God sits down to dine with you.' Another event, one of the most critical in his life, demonstrates Tukaram's reverence for Brahmans, even at the height of his renown. Ramshwar Bhai, a Brahman scholar jealous of the Brahman's fame, has not only moved the pujas authorities against him but had personally enjoined silence upon him. But 'what of the poems already written,' asked their decile authority 'when your heart is in the river,' was the cruel reply, and into the river the whole bundle was cast. Tukaram thus is, at its darkest hour, but, to the astonishment of all, several days later the sheets were seen floating on the river and were taken unharmed. Ramshwar's expediency followed. He was not replying in gentle verse: 'If your mind is pure your enemies will be your friends. And it was true enough in this case, for Ramshwar became his lifelong disciple.

Of the many incidents illustrating Tukaram's religious views one is of his own Brahman who persistently, heading this Vairgavite bhakta a pantheistic treatise to which Tukaram agreed, was given his life on condition that he be covered with a blanket. When the blanket was lifted after an hour's reading, Tukaram was found seated with his fingers in his ears, his defence being that he could not listen to the Advaite doctrine that God and His worshippers were the same.

The miraculous is found interwoven throughout Tukaram's life even in his birth. His birth was born as an incarnation. He performs many miracles to help the poor. Vithoba miraculously intervenes at every point to vindicate and deliver his faithful devotee. In this, Tukaram's youth is to be included, unquestionably, the account of Tukaram's 'ascension' on which Mahpati has expended all his powers, giving rise to the popular Hindu belief that Tukaram was carried away to Vaikuntha (the Hindu heaven) in the car of Vishnu. The probability is, as suggested by P. B. Bhandarkar, that he met his death by drowning, in the holy river of his own village, in 1550, whether by what is called jala-sood, drowning by the case of some other Indian solhna, or whether the constant expectation of God's coming to fetch him away produced an illusion, and in obeying a fancéed call from the opposite bank he ran him into the river and was drowned, it is very difficult to say. The various traditions concerning Tukaram's influence after death must also be regarded as legendary.

5. Autobiography.—Though there is as yet no critical edition of Tukaram's abhakta in existence, his autobiographical poems are generally accepted, and his self-revelations give the impression of being sincere and genuine. Of his kindness and unselfishness for others, on which Mahpati dwells so often, he himself tells us nothing, his autobiographical verses being wholly concerned with the personal and spiritual side of things. It is his own religious life that occupies his song. The abhakta classified as 'autobiographical' in the English translations of the poems by J. N. Fraser and K. B. Marathe² number over 500, and there are many hundreds more given up to confession, invocation, and asyria. He tells us but little of his life in the world, though he often dwells on his guilt and misery. The poems of self-acquiescence, at about 350, are, more than anything else, the theme of which depth is rare in Hindu literature, though his relation to God is personal and pantheistic by turns.

Fallen of fallen, three fallen am I' (314). 'I am a fallen soul, my friends, it is witness to my sin. I am redeemed' (310). This conviction of sin is often closely associated with extreme mental or physical falseness: 'False is my mind, false is my life, false is my faith. He speaks falsehood to the false' (318). Sorrow, resulting from the death of parents or from other causes, is a theme of some depth in these poems, from business failures, clearly led him to his self-dedication: 'It is well, O God, that I became a bankrupt, and was crushed by the wind.' Thenceforward he is a banker, and his dedication was complete: 'Bank, race, colour, creed and caste—all are gone' (279).

Patwardhan has made a tentative effort to depict Tukaram's long inward struggle. That this earnest pilgrim reached some worthy goal would appear from the poems, about 80 in number, under the heading Triumphant Happiness in Fraser and Marathá.

I have found a sea of love, an inexhaustible flood. I have opened a treasure of spiritual knowledge. I have the bustre of a million sons arisen in thy worshippers' souls' (613).

This, however, is by no means his habitual mood, which is rather one of despising his own self-complacency. He has a passionate desire to help and serve those around, and in the end of his days is far too kind for the open society, sometimes to the point of coarseness, yet he has something to say of constructive worth to his age and people. And it is chiefly as a preacher that he views himself. Though he lays no emphasis on Vedic lore, he has nevertheless a message invested with authority.

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'For the sake of bhakti.—To fathom Tukaram's deepest secret we need to explore his experience of bhakti, the clinging affection of the heart for a personal God, though the god in Tukaram's case was a village-idol, surrounded by Puranic gross mythology and superstitions. The idol he worshiped was even one 'stained with blood of Krsna and Siva,' but whether Tukaram recognized this plurality of gods at Pandharpur we cannot say. In this unpromising soil Tukaram's bhakti grows, with pantheism and idolatry as twin-stems on the same tree. And, though his bhakti is too often a mere emotion, fugitive and fleeting, with more of longing than of satisfaction, it is yet free from those sensual extravagances that have degraded some forms of Indian bhakti. In Tukaram we probably see Indian bhakti at its best.

If it be asked in what Tukaram's bhakti experience consisted, the answer might be given in the words of the Nārada-bhakti-sitra: 'surrendering all actions to God and feeling the greatest misery in forgetting God.'

'Tuk has his house in the Inconceivable' (176). 'Wherever I go, there is the company of compassion; then take me by the hand and guidest me. As I walk along, I lean on thee' (310).

'So particular time is necessary,' says Tukaram, 'for the contemplation of God, it should be done always.' 4 And again: 'God is ours, certainly ours, and is the soul of all souls. God is near, certainly near, above, and inside.'

His deep sense of sin offered a serious obstacle to the quest of his soul.

² Two Masters: Jesus and Tukaram, Bombay, 1905, p. 11.
³ J. N. Fraser, Religious Literature of India, London, 1919, p. 293.
⁴ The Poems of Tukārām, 3 vols., Madras, 1900-15; the references by simple figures below are to this useful work.
The Endless is beyond, and between him and me there are the lofty mountains of desire and anger. I am not able to ascend them, nor do I find any pass. (994)

*I know not how to cleanse me of sin, so I have relented thy feels. . . If thou dost take a thing in hand, what is impossible? (3055) The meeting of the young girl and the maiden, many a sorrowful, many a sinfull, Tukar dwaile at thy feet; preserve him, O God! (1964) There is no prayer I can put to thee! But now, I feel sure that some of my service had been accepted. Now nothing but the service is left; I see no sign of assurance in him who stands hand on hip! \textit{Vipoh\textipa{2}} (5010). (Though I made myself ceremonially pure, some imperity would still cling to me)? (2965).

Inward purity thus becomes the prime necessity. (925)

What I delight in is purity of heart? (2023) What you need is a clean heart and a spirit at peace? (2969) Blessed are the poor, for their heart is pure. . . . Their hearts are filled with devoted love? (854).

The urgent question therefore comes to be: How shall this purity be realized? Ceremonies are unavailing, as are also pilgrimages. Tukar\textipa{1} has full confidence that God can fulfill His child's desire, and to the crucial question how the divine blessing is obtained the answer comes repetitively: 'It is bhakta' (312).

My single-minded bhakta has put an end to pilgrimage and to tre? (2773). 'God comes quickly and stands where he finds me' (2876). This is called the meaning of salvation (2925?). Without bhakta and bhakti, there is no salvation in this modern trend? 2 Lay reasoning or learning aside in a bundle, for here bhakta is the one great criterion.

What is bhakta? His modern interpreters are not always clear. Bhandarkar says that it is 'faith, love, or the pure heart'; and also that it has different meanings in different contexts. Sometimes bhakta is that heart-religion which is guaranteed the vision of God withal we are to effort, a parallel being found in the \textit{Svadist\textipa{n}\textipa{r}ta Upanisad} reference to 'those who by the heart know the Supreme Spirit who dwells within.'

Bhakta, therefore, as experienced by Tukar\textipa{1}, seems to have concerned itself chiefly with realizing a change of heart. The great precept of religion is to hear God in the heart?' (812). And, with a change of heart, he longs for some assurance of the change: 'Whether I am indeed God's child, truly accepted by him, how am I to know? How shall I know of a certainty that my heart is purer, my mind less tainted with anger? For if love be not in my heart how has my heart been changed?' 'Fortunate, indeed, is he who has a secret weapon.' (1479)

Three lines of solution appeared to Tukar\textipa{1}: concentrated personal meditation on God and His saints, persistent self-examination that shall root out self-esteem, and such utter self-abandonment to God that no voice shall be desired but His. Deep humility, simple faith in the divine protection, and complete abandonment of self to God comprise another triple secret of bhakta. Tukar\textipa{1} had travelled a long rough road in quest of peace. Yoga he had found unavailing, as well as mantras, austerities, and the five fires. On the summit of bhakta he found three graces whose fragrance reaches us in his pages: pity, pardon, peace.

He who gives to God simple-hearted devotion. . . . within his heart are these three: pity, pardon, peace. (1432) There is no Saviour of the needy save God alone: In Him are pity, pardon, peace. (1432) Where pity, pardon, peace abide there God dwells. (1432) Thither He runs and makes His home . . . . and where these graces have free play He tarries. (1432)

1 Bhandarkar's \textit{Tr., Vaishnavism}, p. 96.
2 Ib. p. 18.
3 Bhandarkar's \textit{Tr., Marath\textipa{r}i Writings}, Bombay, 1919, p. 223.
5 \textit{Marathi Writings}, p. 157.
6 Ib. p. 187.
7 Bhandarkar's \textit{Tr., Vaishnavism}, p. 97.
9 Ib. p. 431 f.
10 Ib. p. 435.
11 Ib. p. 585 f.

5. Teaching.—Tukar\textipa{1} never systematized in his psychology, his theology, or his ethics. He oscillates between a Dvaitist and an Advaitist view of God and the world, leaning now to a pantheistic scheme of things, now to a distinctly providential one. He does not formulate a system. He says little or nothing of cosmogony, and, according to him, God realizes Himself in the devotion of His worshippers. Likewise, faith is essential to their realization of Him: 'It is our faith that makes these offerings.' (1479) He said, 'I am His Vihoba?.' On the other hand, God makes Himself accessible to man's feeble apprehension by means of visibility, the idol thus becoming a proof of divine cosmopolitanism: 'He has embodied himself in forms to suit our pleasure?' (1753). Man is a child of God. Indeed, the figure of childhood is pressed sometimes so far as to sacrifice reverence and dignity, the same applying to Tukar\textipa{1}'s view of God as Mother, though in the latter he finds a solution of many perplexities. All this deals with man's 'natural' state, but separation has entered, sin being viewed variously. It is sometimes a mere breaking of caste rules, and sometimes a breach of morality, and again, and very often, it is \textit{mipana}, a word often on his lips and perhaps best rendered by 'self-centredness,' though this is inadequate, to have separate ends, the sacred and the profane, of sin and what means of salvation were disclosed to him. Brahmanical or mystic intuition and verbal theology were deprecated as much as austerities. Men should waste no time in argument, but throw themselves at God's feet. Specific hindrances to salvation are found in the above \textit{mipana}, in indulgence of desire, fear of ridicule, learning, and disputation. What the religions life means to him has already been seen. More re-nunciation leads to nothing, and indeed everything is worthless save a personal experience of religion. Tukar\textipa{1}'s 'good man' must possess humility, peaceableness, kindness, truthfulness, contentment, and simplicity.

He is mostly despondent of his fellow-men: 'I am sick of mankind?' (994); and for relief he turns to 'the saints,' about whom he has hundreds of verses, setting forth their calling and their service to mankind. At the other end of the scale of creation animals call forth his real sympathy. Whether he held to \textit{ahimsa} is not quite clear. A very feeble hint is given here and there, but there is no real indication of a belief in the sacredness of life. Reincarnation he seems to allow, he is not opposed to the idea of rebirth, as to whether to prefer mortal rebirth, for the power of God's name could break his \textit{karma}. Conscious communion on earth was far preferable to being merged in the unconsciousness of Brahman.

Pata\textit{n\textipa{r}\textipa{r}\textipa{n}\textipa{a}} has shown that Tukar\textipa{1}'s \textit{doctrine of bhakta} comprised a conception of the Divine Motherhood which gave Tukar\textipa{1} a God of love and tenderness, a sense of human inadequacy which led to conflict between faith and the flesh, devotion thus being frustrated by human frailties, and a defeative view of life 'that was at best one-sided. His end was individual, the peace and solace and beatific rest of his own restless soul. . . . Tukar\textipa{1} was a painfilled in regard to this world. . . . The \textit{bhakta} of the future ought to be broader based, fuller veined, and larger sonied.\textit{A defect sometimes pointed out is that the claim of human need is a rare mood and very seldom expressed in his poems}' and that 'there are but few traces of the passion of winning others. It is a defect, however, very largely repaired by his self-forgetting service as set forth in the pages of \textit{Mahapal}.'

6. Relation to Hinduism.—Tukar\textipa{1} acquiesced in the greater part of the conventional Hinduism of his day while himself living on a loftier plane. Often therefore he speaks with two voices. Temple ceremonies he does not condemn, but his heart aspire to something higher. Among Vihoba?; however, there is no kind of ambiguity, for, as an incarnation of \textit{Kr\textipa{n}\textipa{a}} or \textit{Vish\textipa{n}}, Vihoba? was the bigger half of Tukar\textipa{1}'s spiritual life,
though again faith was always the channel. Inwardly he experienced the living God, though outwardly it was an idol he worshipped.

In some verses he indeed holds that the stone idol was a mere stone, neither embodying nor symbolizing the divine. The inconsistency of such a position, on the one hand, to have realized, but on the other not to solve it. Hence the millions in the Deccan who follow him in idolatrous practices and the thousands who share his theistic aspirations have both much to support them. Hence too a theistic society like the Prarthana Samaj \(^2\) so recently as 20th June 1920 failed to pass a resolution that "any member who performs a domestic or any other ceremony with idolatrous rites or worships any idols while performing such rites will ipso facto cease to be a member of the Bombay Prarthana Samaj." \(^3\)

A similar anomaly exists in his references to caste and holy places. Caste was accepted by Tukaram as an institution of the Hindu world, and he did not carry to its logical conclusion his conviction that God does not consider a man's caste, all Hindus, his equals spiritually. He pointed to Him (1977). In personal inward religion Tukaram was democratic enough, but he was too much of the 'mild Hindu' to fight the battle of religious rights and privileges.

Tukaram was in no sense a 'reformer,' as the word is commonly understood: he was a sage with lofty principles in a degenerate time, a sage who for lack of courage, conviction, or inspiration allowed his protest to lapse after he had uttered them.

7. Influence.—Tukaram has quite a unique place in the inner life of his own people. Besides the Varkarls, a pilgrim sect devoted to him, every member of which visits Pandharipur not only at the two annual festivities but on other ekadasis, or 'monthly-elevens,' named varis, and whose preachings of equality and disregard of caste have been a valuable counterpoise to Brahman domina-
cering, \(^4\) there are some fifteen million Deccan peasants of all castes and creeds who sing his verses in the fields by day and in companies around flickering lamps at night. These renderings form a section of the hymn-book of the Prarthana Samaj (q.v.) of Western India, now in its eleventh edition and containing 900 of his abhangs. His terms 'Vithoba, Paudurang,' etc., being un-
acceptable to ekadarsi (non-theists), the simple term 'God' has been substituted. \(^5\) That Tukaram has exercised a great nationalizing and democratizing influence among the people of the only Indian nation that has ever ruled over any consider-
able portion of India can hardly be doubted. His moralizing force cannot be said to have been so great, in view of idolatrous conditions in the Deccan to-day. But the Vithobli of Tukaram still inspires a phenotypical type of devotion in his devotees. From as far distant as Madras, women have been known to make at Vithoba's shrine the hair-offering called venukund ('vini = braid; kund = gift') by having their heads shaved as by Brahman women at Gaya, and all Pandharipur pilgrims have such an affection for their god that no darshan is complete without the pilgrim's head touching

Vithoba's feet. No fewer than 140,000 people take this darshan at a single festival, at the rate of 12,000 daily. Some of them accomplish the 100 miles journey by protrasting their form at every step in honour of Vithoba, some thus rolling along for more than 40 miles; \(^6\) one case is known of a man rolling like a log from Nagpur, hundreds of miles away, at the rate of two miles a day, the journey lasted two years. \(^7\) Tukaram's moving verse has done not a little to inspire this tragic devotion in men and women alike.

All attempts to classify Tukaram have failed. He was neither an orthodox Hindu nor a Hindu Protestant. He lived according to the rules of a gigantic religious system with much of which he disagreed while enjoying an inward experience transcending the system, for spiritual intercourse with God and His 'saints' was the sum and substance of Tukaram's religion. He belongs therefore to none of the stereotyped forms, and, to be understood and appreciated at his proper worth, he must be approached without the dogmatic prejudice, whether Hindu or Christian. Those who have no definite creed and who follow no organized system find in him a kindred spirit. He cannot be classed as a mystic, for he had no extraordinary visions, and he followed Hindu rules of living. We may regard him as a devoted theist living his own inward life amid idolatrous surroundings.

'You can find much in Tukaram's poetry that runs parallel with the teachings of Christ, save its principles and spirit. These latter, obviously easily read into his words, and when they cannot do so they put them there. Tukaram was one of the greatest Protestant's, and, as such he did not hesitate to take such a religion as is still influencing the devotional trend of his own people. In the case of us Christians he is one of the most powerful of sidelights, a few weeks ago he threw me into the very arms of my Lord.' \(^8\)

At the close of an examination into 'The Alleged Indeliberatedness of Indian Theism to Christianity' the conclusion is reached:

'Certainly either Tukaram was actually in contact with Christian teaching, which is by no means improbable, or he was a remarkable instance of a man naturaller Christian.' \(^9\)

Of these two alternatives we incline to the second, as there has been no evidence adduced as yet pointing to Tukaram ever having been 'in contact with Christian teaching,' and, while he has much kinship with the NT writers, none of the fundamental doctrines of the Christian Church, with the possible exception of faith, can be traced in his poems. His chief influence is indeed so close that a knowledge of his poems, at least in their English translation, should be regarded as an indispensable preparation for missionary work among his people. That nearly three centuries ago Tukaram should have proclaimed so clearly the inefficacy of all merely external rites and should have insisted so constantly on inward experience as the one essential of true religion offers to the Christian evangelist a most useful point of contact with the people of India.

LITRERATURE.—This has been indicated in the footnotes. For a fuller treatment of the subject see J. N. Farquhar, Tukaram, Madras, the press. J. F. Edwards, Life and Teaching of Tukaram, Madras, the press.

TULASI-DASA.—1. Life.—Little is certainly known about the life of Tulasi-Dasa (commonly pronounced Tulasi Dasa), the greatest Vaishnav in Northern India, beyond two or three dates and a few accidental particulars mentioned in his writings.

A life of the poet is said to have been written by his friend and companion, Vrindavan Dasa. It is referred to by Siva

1 Gupt, p. 209.
2 Bla Alexandar, J. W. S., Th. 75. 247-472.
3 Rau, J. F., The J. F. Edwards, Life and Teaching of Tukaram, Madras, the press.
4 V. Tapasr, see also Tulasi-Dasa, Life and Teaching of Tukaram, Madras, the press.
5 G. E. V. Farquhar, Tukaram, Madras, p. 95.
TULASI-DASA

Situna, who wrote in the latter half of the 16th cent., but no copy of it is now known to exist. We have two personal documents relating to the poet— a deed of 1596, and an entire book of the Rāmacarita-mānasā, both in his own handwriting.

There are numerous traditions concerning him, some of which may be accepted with considerable confidence. He is said to have been born at Rājāpur, in the present United Provinces of Bāndā, about A.D. 1552, and to have been a Sarvarā ḍitā, known by the name of Tūlasi-Dāsa. His father's name was Atmārāma, and his mother's Hulasā, his own name being Rāma Bālā. In one of his verses he tells us that he was abandoned by his parents immediately after his birth, and with great probability it is assumed from this that he was one of those unfortunate children known as abhukta-vanā, born under the beginning of the currency of the asterism Mula. Such a child is said to be destined to destroy his father, and the only remedy is to abandon it on its birth, or, at best, so to arrange that its parents shall not look upon its face during the first eight years of its existence. He lived for some time in the service of the Sādhu, who, in token of the sacred leaf used in the ceremony of purification of the infant, re-named him Tulasī-Dāsa (Servant of the tulasi-plant), and gave him this name he was henceforth known. To this Sādhu, who was probably also his guru, or spiritual preceptor, Narahāli-Dāsa, he wandered all over Northern India. From his guru he learnt the story of Rāma, but owing to his ignorance (of Sanskrit) he could not at first grasp its importance. At length, after frequent hearings, he learnt it so far as his intelligence would allow, and then determined to write it in the vernacular for his own benefit and for that of others similarly situated. When he grew up, he lived as a householder, and married a girl named Ratnāvalī, the daughter of one Dīnāndānī Pā-thaka, by whom he had a son named Tāraka, who died at an early age. He was devoted to his wife and could not bear to be separated from her. She was a firm Vaishnava, and on one occasion, when she had gone out in a visit to a person of her own level, he reproached him for following her and not showing equal affection to Rāma. Struck with remorse, Tulasī at once left her and took to an ascetic life. He is said to have seen her only once again in after-years, and then not to have recognized her. With his new life he went to the region of the Āranyakas, and subsequently in Benares, he made long journeys over Northern India preaching the gospel of Rāma. At first he met with considerable opposition, but his life and attractive personality conquered all obstacles, and, even in Benares, the head-quarters of Siva-worship, he won universal respect. His fame as a poet spread far and wide, and gathered him many friends and followers, the most famous of whom were Rājā Māna-sūhā (Māha Singh of Amber († 1614) and the celebréted 'Abdu 'r-Rājīm Ḫānāna (1560-1627). A wealthy landowner of Benares named Tōdar Māl (which is to be distinguished from the more attractive personally named Tōdar Māl which was one of his closest friends, and a touching poem which Tulasī-Dāsa wrote on his death has survived among his most cherished verses. After Tōdar Māl's death his heirs quarrelled as to the disposal of the property, and referred the matter to Tulasī-Dāsa as arbitrator. The deed of arbitration in his handwriting is still in existence and gives a strikingly attractive personally characterized, of the disposal of the property, and referred the matter to Tulasī-Dāsa as arbitrator. The deed of arbitration in his handwriting is still in existence and gives a strikingly attractive personally characterized account of the arbitration.

Bubonic plague appeared in India in 1616, and lasted for eight years. The poet seems to have been attacked by it, for one of his minor works, the Hamsanām Bāthaka, describes his sufferings from such a disease. After temporary relief he had a relapse and died in Benares in A.D. 1623.

2. Works.—More than twenty formal works, besides numerous short poems, have been attributed to Tulasī-Dāsa, but some of these are certainly apocryphal, and others are of doubtful authenticity. The most generally accepted list mentions twelve, viz. six minor and six major. The minor works are the following:— (1) Rāma-lōli-Nahachakha, (2) Vairāgya-sandipīni, (3) Barowai-Rāmāyaṇa, (4) Jānakī-mangala, (5) Pārvati-mangala, (6) Rāmāyaṇa. The six major works are:— (7) Kṛṣṇa-sandhyā (8) Vina-sandhiprākāsa, (9) Gītāvān, (10) Kevatlata, (11) Dōdhdhā, and (12) Rāmacarita-mānasā.

Tulasī-Dāsa was a Smārta Vaishnava; i.e., while a worshipper of Rāma-chandra, he also adhered to the tradition (concerning the dvaita (or the organised sect) Kāśika, who was a dedicated worshipper of Śiva, but who also followed the general religious customs of his caste. This involved, among other things, the worship of the god Śiva and the practice of eating his meals at a distance. But in this respect he differed from the more thorough Vaiśānaka Śivas, who had abandoned tradition, and who worshipped only Viṣṇu in one or other of his incarnations and ate in company. During his stay in Ayodhya he associated with these Vaishnavaśvetas and there composed the first three cantos of the Rāmacarita-mānasā. Subsequently, being unable to agree with them on points of discipline, he migrated to Benares and there compiled the rest of this work.

His devotion to Rāma-chandra as an incarnation of the Supreme is illustrated by the above list of works. With two exceptions (nos. 5 and 7) they all deal directly or indirectly with that deity. No. 7 is a collection of hymns in praise of Kṛṣṇa, another incarnation of Viṣṇu. No. 5 is a short poem describing Śiva's marriage with Pārvati, a subject also treated at some length as an episode in the Rāmacarita-mānasā. As already stated, Tulasī-Dāsa paid special reverence to Śiva as a great and kindly god, although by no means on a level with Rāma-chandra. It was Śiva who, out of love for the world, communicated Rāma's history to Pārvati and thereby saved humanity from the mudra of death. A brief notice of each of the works named above will suffice.

(1) Rāma-lōli-Nahachakha.—The genuineness of this is disputed. It is a short poem describing the 'nailed' ceremony at the investiture of Rāma-chandra with the sacred caste-thread. This ceremony is a village rite still kept up on such occasions and at weddings in Oudh and Bahar, and the whole poem is in rural style and in rural metre.

(2) Vairāgya-sandipīni ('Kindling of Quietism') describes the true nature of holiness. It advocates vairāgya (absence of passion), and the description of the perfect man, and the surrender to the Deity is not without poetic beauty.

(3) The Barowai Rāmāyaṇa is a summary of the history of Rāma-chandra in the Barawai metre. It is very short and, as we have it, probably incomplete. It is rejected by some authorities.

(4) Jānakī-mangala and (5) Pārvati-mangala.—These are two poems, probably composed in celebration of the marriages of Siṭā to Rāma-chandra and of Pārvatī to Śiva respectively. The authenticity of both is doubtful. In no. 4 the order of events differs from that given by the poet in his more important works. The

1 No fewer than four places claim the honour of being his birthplace. The claim of Rājāpur is that best established. His caste has been a subject of dispute. According to some authorities, he was a Kāśika Brahma.
2 Vinay-prakāsa, 227, 2.
3 Asta, 1, 50.
4 He was never a good Sanskrit scholar, and some of his few verses in that language contain grammatical blunders.

2 The whole has been translated by G. A. Grierson in J. ASI, 1896.
The petition experiences with narrative style fervour have one harassed is not Ramachandra spoils well ary (==A.D. main Parvatl-mahgcda chandra the most faithful thatigion

The most brothers. poet, have not, again is the present writer's opinion, and, if it is correct, the final recension must have been sufficiently long after the composition of the Räma Satrai for the latter to have become recognized as the last of the fifth chapter gives in great detail what purports to be the poet's doctrine regarding works as opposed to faith.3 The difficulty in the way of accepting the work now called the Dihāsī is that it is largely composed of verses already occurring in the Rāma-charita-mānas, the Rāmājī, and the Rāma Satrai itself. Out of a total of 572 verses no fewer than 258 have been so identified, and there are quite possibly more. If genuine, there must have been a nucleus of original verses to which subsequent admirers have added others, so as to compile a kind of anthology of the poet's best delhi. This is the present writer's opinion, and, if it is correct, the final recension must have been sufficiently long after the composition of the Räma Satrai for the latter to have become recognized as that of the fifth chapter.

(10) The Rāma-charita-mānas ('Lake of the Gestes of Rāma') is commonly called the Tulsāi-kyta Rāmāyaṇa. This epic, the poet's greatest achievement, and also, in point of time, probably his first, was begun in A.D. 1574, when its author was about 43 years of age, and upon its fame chiefly rests. It has been described as the Bible of ninety millions of people, and is certainly more familiar to every Hindu of Northern India than our Bible is to the average English peasant. There is not a Hindu of Hindostan proper, whether prince or cottar, who does not know its most famous verses and whose conversation is not coloured by it. Its similes have entered even into the language of Indian Muslims, some of whose most ordinary idioms, though they know it not, made their first appearance. The life of Ramachandra, considered as an incarnation of the Supreme, is here dealt with in a formal epic. The subject is the same as that of the celebrated Sanskrit Rāmāyaṇa of Valmiki, but the epic of Tulasī-Dāsa is in no way a sinpli-
tion of that work. We have an independent story, but in both, the treatment, the world for itself.

The author himself states that he has taken his account from many different sources, and it has been shown that the part of Vālimikī's work, the Adhyāgītā Rāmaśāna (a section of the Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa), the Bhūṣaṇa Rāmaśāna, the Vasūṭa Saṁhitā, and the Prāṣasanṇa-Rāgaṇī attributed to Jayādeva, have been included.

But what is interesting in the estimation in which the work is held in India, the following very popular legend may be quoted. Rāmaśāna denoted his approval of Vālimikī's epic by appending his signature to a copy of it. Thereupon the monkey-god Hanumāna, with his nails, wrote another Rāmaśāna upon a rock, and tossed it to Rāma. The latter approved of it also, but said that, as he had already signed Vālimikī's copy, he could not sign another; he had better show it to that poet. He did so, and, as Vālimikī saw that it would eclipse his own work, by a stratagem he induced Hanumāna to sling it into the sea. Hanumānas is, in fact, expressing a prophet-like sentiment. The poet would himself inspire a Brāhmaṇa named Tulasi, who would recite his (Hanumāna's) poem in the tongue of the common people and destroy the fame of Vālimikī's epic.

There can be no doubt that its reputation is well deserved. The Rāmaśāra-śāna is one of the great epics. It has its proximities and its episodes that are not so closely related that one can read it without being impressed by its high poetic merit. The various characters are vividly and consistently described, and live and move with all the dignity of a heroic age. The style is less inflated than that of the Bhāratīya Ramāyaṇa, but it follows the infinite pathos of the passage describing Rāma's farewell to his mother; the rugged, harsh language telling of the horrors of the battlefield; whenever occasion demands. It is a thoroughly poetic and didactic method of dealing with narrative, teeming with similes drawn not from the traditions of the schools, but from nature herself; and, suffusing all, a life-giving atmosphere of divinity pervades. Tulasi is able to cast them and plead that the end justifies the means. Or, again, the foulest treachery, such as that of Vibhīṣaṇa towards his brothers, is extolled because the traitor is suspected and rewarded by the hero. But this is one of the obligations of the story and of the author's view of the divinity of Rāma. The human characters are to our ideas far more sympathetic. There are those whom the poet has tried to make attractive: Lakṣmaṇa, the ideal of an Indian wife and mother; Bharata, constant and tender, the model of the true bhakt; and Rāvaṇa—the Satan of the epic—destined to failure, and fighting with all his demon forces against his fate.

One of the most striking features of the poem is the writer's capacity for conveying the message. Even of other literature, Indian poetry has its stock similes—the lotus, the water-lily, the bee, the moon, and so on. Even the best Sanskrit poets often give the impression of being largely the work of the closet, not of the open air. Tulasi-Dasa employed the same old similes—he would not have been Indian if he had avoided them—but thousands of others are his own. Little expressions—the turn of a sentence or an apt epithet—show how he had seen and studied the world for himself.

It would be a great mistake to look upon him merely as an ascetic. He was a man that had lived. He had been a householder—a word that means to an Indian that he was enjoying the pleasures of a wedded life, the joy of clasping an infant son to his bosom, and that he had all the duties and responsibilities that such a step had attained his prime. He appealed not to scholars, but to his countrymen as a whole, the people whom he knew. He had mixed with them, begged from them, prayed with them, shared their pleasures and their yearnings, and, on the other hand, had contracted intimate friendships with the emperor's court. All this we find reflected in the pages of his writings.

His works have suffered the fate which has befallen other famous Indian authors. Imitators have written poems which they have passed off as his, and numerous kēpitas or apocryphal additions, have been inserted in his epic. He has suffered too from the attention of commentators without end, most of whom have wasted energy in discovering hidden meanings in the simplest passages, while they discreetly avoid the real difficulties. Finally, his epic has actually been translated into Sanskrit, and there are critics who have maintained that the translation is the original, and that the Rāmaśāra-śāna is an empty shell of nothing but a prefixed fragment.

3. Religious ideas. The religious ideas of the poet are of great importance in the history of India. Seventh in descent of teacher and pupil from the great Rāmaśāna (q.v.), he was a thorough Vaishnava and follower of the Bhakti-Márta (q.v.). He taught that there is but one Supreme Being; and that man is by nature sinful and unworthy of salvation. Nevertheless the Supreme, in His infinite mercy, became incarnate in the person of Rāmaśāna to relieve the world from sin. Rāma has returned to heaven, where, besides being the ineffable Supreme, he is still Rāma, and whose miracles, in consequence, we have now a God who is not only infinitely merciful, but who knows by actual experience how great are man's infirmities and temptations, and who, through Himself incapable of sin, is ever ready to extend His help to the sinful being who calls upon Him. On all this follows, as a corollary, the doctrine of the universal brotherhood of man, and the duty which man owes to his neighbour. His definition of sin is that which is contrary to the will of Rāma, and it is only by acknowledging this, and by abandoning himself to utter loving faith in Rāma's power to save him from its thraldom, that a man can escape from the weary and tedious process of the fatherhood of God and of the necessity of bhakti, or devotional faith, had long been known. In Northern India Rāmaśāna had been its great exponent, and Tulasi-Dasa put forward no novelty. His claim for consideration is that his teaching was successful. His own pure life and the magic of his poetry have done for the Bhakti-Márta what the eloquence of hundreds of other teachers failed to do. The fact that he was a Śārīta Vaishnava must not be forgotten. He belonged to no sect, and founded no sect, but was an ordinary Hindu, accepting all the Hindu mythological machine. He was the Supreme, he paid adoration to Śiva and the other gods. His attitude to them was much the same as that of the official teaching of one branch of the Christian Church: to Rāma he offered hārpeya, to the others ājñyā, to Śiva uṣṇa-vaśya. A few words must be devoted to the poet's use of the word māṇya. Occasionally he refers to it in terms that can only be interpreted as meaning that which hides Brāhma from the soul—the māṇya of the Śiva-worshiping Vedāntins, to whose doctrines he was strongly opposed. But all his
TUNGUS.—I. Area, distribution, number, and history.—The name Tungus is usually derived from the word Tung-hung ('Eastern barbarians'), by which these people were known to the ancient Chinese. They call themselves Aranilk (sing. Aravanki) or Tanguts. The Tungus are one of the most widely distributed of all the native tribes of Siberia; they live in small groups all over Siberia as far west as the river Yez, as far east as the island of Sakhalin, as far north as the Arctic shore, and as far south as the middle of Manchuria. In spite of this distribution, the language and social anthropology of these tribes are the least known of all the Siberian peoples, the Samojed, Turkic and Mongolic tribes, and Koryak and Chukchi, even the Gilyak and the Ainu, having had more space given to them in anthropological literature than the Tungus. As a reason for this may be cited the fact that the Tungus usually live in the interior of the continent, in places difficult of access and, with the exception of the Lamut, far away from the coast. The total number of Tungus belonging to the various tribes was 76,504 in 1897, while in 1911 there were only 75,204.

The Tungusic tribes are usually divided into Northern Tungusic and Southern Tungusic. Of these the former is the Tungusic of (1) Samogir, (2) Nigidal, (3) Olehi, (4) Oroki, (5) Maganu, (6) Tungus proper (including Lamut and Orochen). The Southern Tungusic group comprises: (1) Manchu, (2) Daur, (3) Solon, (4) Gold, (5) Oroche.

The Northern Tungus are at the stage of reindeer culture like the Magadelenian man in Europe, though at the same time they know the use of iron, which they brought from their more southern home. They belong to the Neo-Siberian group. The Southern Tungus are horse nomads, cattle-breeders, and fishermen, and in some places also agriculturists, and in the ten tribes of the Seka cul-ture the Upper India has been saved from this by Tulasi-Dasa.

LITERATURE.—G. A. Grierson, ‘Notes on Tulasi Das,’ I A 23, 1913, xxv. (This is the only complete account in English of the poet’s life and works; a few errors in it have been corrected in the preceding pages). Tulasi-Dasa, Poems and Folk-tales, ed. and tr. by G. A. Grierson, 1897, pp. 1-417. (A general history of Tungusic literature in the same language).

Numerous ed’s of all the poet’s works have been published in India, but few of them possess critical value. Two excellent ed’s of the Rama-charita-mahabharata have been published, viz. that issued in 1893 by the Kaj-Falvi-vidhan Press in Ranipur and that issued in 1907 by the Kani Nagari-pracharak Sahib of Benares. Both are critically edited and have elaborate intro-ductory matter on the poet’s life and works. For those not familiar with the language the writer can recommend a good ed., with a line-for-line Hindi commentary and much general information concerning the poet, by Rama-ionday Bhagab, Nirguna-sarga Press, Bombay, 1904. The same editor has issued a good ed. of the Alhamab-dish, which in the similar ed. of the Vishnu-patricha, this can be recommended to students. It is believed that it is intended to issue all the poet’s works in this series.

A good, if somewhat literal, Eng. tr. of the Rama-charita-mahabharata is that by C. Grant, with an Introd. by F. S. Thunberg, ed. by A. B. Ghosh, Alhamab, 1890-93. It has been several times reprinted in India.

G. A. GRIERSON

1 For a full account see Rima, vii. 106 ff., Benares edition.
2 Eng., the divine saint Niranga (Rima, l. 102 ff., Ben. ed.).
4 See Rima, vii. 106 and following chahal.
TUNGUS

There are several peoples mentioned by the Chinese who can with probability be considered to be Tungus. These are (1) the Usschen, who lived north of the Lia-Tung peninsula and paid tribute in arrows and arrowheads to the emperors of the Tang dynasty; (2) the Manchu; (3) the Keta and Mixi, who occupied an important strategic position in the Korea and north of China before the Manchu; (4) the Yenisei and Gitzhelen, who were the peoples who helped to cause the movement of the Hsiung-nung westward, who in their turn pushed the Yueh-chi (Turks) to the west; (5) the Mian or Buyrj (Turks) who emigrated from the Usschen, the Jen-Deen (Zhu Zhu) rose to power, but they are named not in the 6th., but the 7th. cent., when the Yenisei and Buyrj (Turks) emigrated from the Jen-Deen yoke; (6) the Tung, who in the 5th cent. entered the Usschen; (7) the Khitans, who in the 7th cent. inhabited the valley of Sungari and who were the ancestors of the state of Pohul; (8) the Ilkhan, who in 925 overthrew this dynasty and founded the Liao (iron) dynasty; (9) the Niu-chi (Yueh-chi), who in their turn overthrew the Liao dynasty in 1032; (10) the Mokho (Ukhi); (11) the Altai, who in the 10th cent. inhabited the valley, and who in 1294, the Chinghiz (Golden) Khan subdued them in 1294, but in the 14th. cent. the Altai reasserted themselves and founded the Manchu dynasty, which in 1644 occupied the throne of China after the Ming dynasty and reigned till 1912.

There are certain characteristics and customs common to many of these Tungus, and so we can use the term Tungus for such an extensive use of the bow and arrows with iron or stone blades. The Tungus are divided into four groups: (1) the Usschen-Tungus mix-ture, (2) the best-known and most famous of the Tungus, (3) the Buyrj or Chinghiz (Golden) Khan, and (4) the Altai. (1) Linguistic and ethnological. The Tungus tongue has been considered to be related to Mongolian and Chinese, as also to the Korean. The Tungus tongue is perhaps a most probable, and can be used as the surest means of tracing the existence of Tungus peoples in any given region. In many places the Tungus use another language as well as their own.

As in language, so also in social anthropology and shamanistic religion. We can see a certain connexion between them all the Tungus peoples. But the preservation of their own language is not necessarily an indication of the preservation of their physical characteristics.

3. Physical type.—As has been said, there has been contact between the Chinese, the Mongols, and the Tungus-Manchus since the 11th cent. B.C. and probably earlier, but it was based chiefly on conquest and on intermarriage among members of the royal families. Migrations en masse did not begin, as far as is known, till the 7th cent. and during the time of Chinghiz Khan. It is probable that the Manchus have had some contacts with the Tungus, and that the Tungus have played a greater rôle than is known in the formation of the modern Japanese nation.

The Tungus peoples are often described as being of medium to tall stature, round and low-headed, while the Northern type approaches the type of the Eastern Palaeo-Siberians (low stature, intermediate or long-headed, and horse-riding). This mixture of the Southern Tungus with other neighboring tribes has been going on so long that it is very difficult to make any record of it, and the Manchus and the Chinese are probably the result of the mixture of the population of north-east China, the Northern Tungus, specifically those isolated in the Arctic region, are comparatively unmixed, or in any case it is easy to tell them apart. This is especially true in the case of the Tungus between the Lena and the Yenisei, who live in thoroughly Tungus or Tungus-Yakut land, while the Tungus between the Lena and the Obkhoek Sea live scattered among the Palaeo-Siberians (Koryak, Chukchi, and Yakaghir). The latter were the secondary object of study of the Jesup Expedition of the U.S.A. some ten years ago, while the Tungus between the Yenisei and the Lena were studied by the Oxford-Philadelphian Expedition in 1914—15. The only racial admixture that has to be considered in the case of the Arctic Tungus between the Yenisei and the Lena is with the Yakut.

With the help of the genealogical method in dealing with the social anthropology of the North-Western Tungus (in North Central Siberia) it is possible to distinguish the following grades of Tungus metisiation.

(A) The Tungus, whose genealogical table, as far back as can be traced, shows no admixture of Mongolic or Palaeo-Siberian, is the Tungus-Yakut, who call themselves Tungush, and are such linguistically and socially, but who have begun in the last two generations to intermarry with the Yakuts, who, who were Tungus, but who for a long time have intermarried with the Yakut, and have consequently, physically and linguistically a new type; they consider themselves to be a separate nation, their language approaches more nearly to the Yakut, and in physique they look more like the Tungus; (9) the Tungusi-Siberian Yakut, who live in the western part of the Yakutsk territory, and the eastern part of the Turukhan country, all on the Tungus land; the other Yakut call them Tungus (Tungus); they are a minority among the Tungus.

The Tungus-Yakut approach in their stature, and head and facial forms, to the Yakut (q.v.), who, on the whole, are of a more Mongolic type than the Northern Tungus, while the Dolgan, though they stand further from the pure Tungus than the Tungus-Yakut do, are yet in all these three aspects more like the Tungus than like the Yakut, or we might say, they return to the physical type of the Tungus.

1. Technique.—Most of the Siberian Tungus are at the stage of reindeer-culture, though they differ from such as these reindeer-breede as the Lapps or the Eskimo in that their technique is not so highly specialized and their curvings and draings on reindeer-bone or mammoth-ivory are not so perfect; very few of them have any knowledge of making half-ground huts, most of them still having fur tents similar in structure to those in their original southern home. In spite of centuries spent in a land where there are no horses, or only small Siberian ponies which are used for driving but not for riding, they still preserve their old habits of horse-riding, exchanging the horse for the reindeer. In mythology and religion also their southern origin is apparent from time to time. Thus on the grave of a deceased shaman must be placed drift-wood figures of a goat, a horse, or a dromedary—animals which have not been known to them for many generations.

The Tungus who do not live in the tundra as reindeer-breeders, hunt the forest, are mostly hunters and occasionally horse-cattle-breeder. Only in the Amur and Baikal region do we find stationary groups.

Among the Northern Tungus iron is much more used than among the Samoyeds. Until quite
recently tainting was common among the Tungus of the Yenisei, charcoal alone being used as colouring matter, and no bright colours.

One of the most characteristical features of the original Tungus costume is the beautifully decorated apron, which has in some places degenerated into a small covering for the sexual organs. Birch-bark is not used in the same way as among the Ostyak, but the typical Tungus canoes are made of birch-bark sewn into shape. The Tungus ornaments are typical of a migratory people. They have been borrowed from the people among whom they lived, and have been grouped into one form or another, either the conventionalized zoological-anatomical figures of the Samoyed or the rich ornamental designs of plant form so often met with among the neighbouring tribe of Yakut. Yet in their mode of life the Tungus exhibit more neatness, more cleanliness, and more reserve than any other tribe of Northern Asia, and probably this was the reason for the classic name that Cæsæn gave them, however few he saw. He called them 'the gentry of the Siberian aborigines.'

5. Sociology.—The original Tungus social division was into clans, named after the clan-ancestor by whose river they dwelt. At the present time the remnants of the clans are grouped together into local groups, with local river and other names. This arrangement was followed by the Russian government, and is the basis of their internal organization and government, as far as it goes, rests with their council of elders and a prince, elected for three years and re-elected as many times as they wish. Langa, a Hukachar prince, and a great shaman of the Limipsk Tungus of the Yenisei tundra, has been prince for twenty-five years.

Married people are always known as the 'father of So-and-so' or 'the mother of So-and-so,' even if the Russian Christian name is used—e.g., Ivan's father.

(a) Marriage.—Marriage restrictions are very numerous. Not only are blood-relations and clan-relations debarred from marrying, but two brothers of one family may not marry two sisters of another family. The exchange of children in marriage is not allowed, except among the Panka-gir Tungus. The terminology connected with relationship by marriage is regulated by the age-classes. Thus kynnie would be the name used by the husband for the father, elder brother, and on of a less intimate character, and kynnie for her elder female relatives, while for his wife's younger male relatives he would use the term kuttie, and for her younger female relatives katnie. In marriage there is a special relationship, called bally, between two men who have married sisters. The reindeer which plays a part in the marriage ceremony, i.e. on which the bride rides to the bridegroom's home, is called Havakin (from the god Havaki) among the Yenisei Tungus and Savakin among the Tungus of the Okhotsk region. This reindeer is never used for any work, and is never searched for if he gets lost. When he grows ill or old, he is killed, but not eaten. He might be called the reindeer of the bride's individual spirit. The most important feature of the match-making is the settlement of the kodyu (wicfe).

(b) Birth.—At childbirth the woman is considered unclean, and is obliged to go away from the tent for confinement. After three or four days she returns from her seclusion and is purified by juniper berries. The child is not born until three times (through the kanaiia, Hiekche) says that the placenta is eaten. Among the Tungus of the Yenisei-Lena region the placenta is usually hung on a tree or a pole in a skin bag. On the whole, the Yenisei Tungus gives birth to her child very easily. If, however, there are any complications, the Tungus and also the Yakut woman is placed in a kneeling posture, with her hand fixed to the tent poles, followed by a forcible massage with a log of wood by the woman who attends her. To help his wife, the Tungus husband cuts down a tree and drives a wooden wedge into it. If this has no effect, a shaman is summoned.

(c) Burial.—All the belongings of the dead man are placed near his body. The classical way of burying a man was to dig a grave under the body and put it in a coffin standing on four high poles or on a high platform, while a woman was buried on the ground and covered over with stones. Among the sea and river tribes the dead were often buried in a tent like that of the Russian mode of burial in the ground prevails, except where the ground is frozen. The shaman (tent) where the death occurred is promptly removed, and left. On leaving the place where a dead person had been buried, his relatives used, in olden times, to let fly two or three arrows towards him.

(d) Invocation of a shaman.—A young shaman (haoemsh), who has shown signs of devotion, wisdom, and nervous sensibility, is prepared for his office by an old shaman, who teaches him the secrets of the shaman's art, and who by magic, totemism, or more of frequent intercourse with the young shaman, the old shaman gives him the shaman's coat and drum. The shaman's chief spirits are: kiteg, in the form of a long-serpent, who has power over epidemics and makes the shaman's tent stay put; sissaam, in human form, with eagle's wings, on which he carries the shaman from place to place, who also protects animals from diseases; onkung, a prophet-spirit; and lesser spirits such as khaminy, miryada, torungu.

The shaman's coat (homahok) must be made of wild reindeer hide. His cap (karden) is an iron circle with representations of wild reindeer antlers. His boots are called kanye tuta kypuri, and his belt angapaphun. Hanged from the lower edge of his coat he has a fringe of reindeer or fox-skin, called kiarukta. A fringe at the back, longer than the others, and with a bell at the end, is called virgina. Projecting from his shoulder is the tuut talk eaul of the shaman (karnina). On the gilde (iron circles attached near the ankles at the back) hang pieces of iron (bustler), which are the shaman's arrows against koryi (malevolent spirits). In the middle of the back of the shaman's coat are hung representations of the sun and moon. The shaman is considered the most important feature of his costume, and the sun is often sewn on a piece of skin taken from the skin of a bear's head. His coat (kDONE) at the back, and ukang, the diver, on the front of the coat. Gieh, a fish (sturgeon) frequently met with, is also represented there, and so too, the long eaul, 'the shaman's duck.' On his apron (bamun kahou) there are also representations of the sun and moon, and the shaman's staff (kamun kynnie) has a human face (of an ancestor) and bear's feet. Sometimes a human face is found on the sun which is hung on the skin from the bear's head. All these accessories suggest ancestor-mand-bear-worship, as also do the traditions. All the objects used by the shaman have their special names; the shaman's cap, e.g., is designated by a different word from that used for an ordinary cap, and, if a common term is used, the word kahou is prefixed. The shaman's drum is oval in shape, and the drumstick, gicho, is long and narrow, with jingles.

6. Gods and spirits.—Animism is highly developed in the Tungus religion. The spirits living everywhere in nature have to be propitiated. They are more or less independent of the highest god, Havaki. The mischievous spirits in folklore are called kushady, and these creatures use a special 'bad language,' which occurs in the tales and is understood by the shaman. The malevolent spirits are called korvi. The Tungus of the Lena live in the village of Tsiga (tsigah) of the north. He has enormous eyes placed outside his face and a flat nose, and the black hair on his head and face is like the tsiga after a storm. He can assume the form of an enormous bear, a wolf, or 1 the wind. The Tungus...
and Yakutsk districts call the kurji spirits buni; to the buni of the water they give the name garan, and to the buni of the earth that of dorokhi. The stronger the influence of Christianity, the worse become the shaman's techniques. Even there are other spirits, the spirit-owners of flies, of various animals, and even of thieves, shuro.

The chief god, Havaki, is anthropomorphic, but is connected with the sun. Sometimes the sun with the face of a man in E is supposed to represent him. Among the Tungus of the present generation the conception of the highest god is very vague, though the conception of spirits living everywhere in nature still has a strong hold on them all, Christian and non-Christian.

7. Sacrifices.—Private sacrifices of food are offered without any special preparations, but the sacrifices to the spirits connected with fertility are more important and must therefore be performed in the presence of a shaman, who knows the method of procedure. Thus the spirit-owner of wild reindeer is propitiated by an offering of the head of a mountain-shoulder. The head of this spirit, according to the Yenisei Tungus, is on the rock Hulgardzakiit, between the Upper Kurkeika and Lake Chirinda. The spirit-owner of lake-fishes is the Hulardzakiit of the east of Lake Chirinda, and at the beginning of the fishing season ceremonies are held to propitiate him. To ensure success in trapping, the Tungus will use in the construction of the traps at least one piece of wood which has been used by a shaman during his shamanistic performances. But the tura, or stick, which is the tree on which the shaman climbs to the sky, is never used for this purpose, being too sacred. It is too koyara—a word used to express an idea similar to that of Melanesian mana.

8. Animal worship.—The veneration of the bear is especially highly developed. When a bear is killed and brought home, a ceremony called buk is held. The heart and liver of the bear are cut into pieces, cooked, and divided among those present (exclusively males). Each person, before eating his piece, bows before the bear and assures him that it was the Russians who killed him, and not the Avankil (Tungus). Another remnant of a ceremonial bear-dance is tkotnedzegyem ('we are simply robbers'). The bear is then hung just as they are in a bag, and hung on a tree. If one bone is lost, the spirit of the bear will hold the hunter responsible for it.

The eagle is also treated with great veneration, and is always carried on horseback in order to kill him. For beyond these animals the Tungus use that adjective which they also use in speaking of heroes, i.e. hoona.

To all other animals which are not especially venerated the Tungus always behave, as they say, 'carefully,' lest the animal should become extinct. When a silt is made in the ear of the reindeer for purposes of identification, the hair that is cut off must not be thrown away, but must be hung on a tree or put in some safe place. The heads and feet of the wild reindeer must not be thrown away; a special platform is sometimes erected for their reception, while the teeth of the wild reindeer are kept as amulets. Moreover, a fox custom which drives the procurers of fox-skins to despair. After the fox has been trapped, his muzzle is cut off and carefully preserved. The skin may then be sold, but the must be placed safely on a platform.


M. A. Czaplicka.

TUNIS.—See Africa, Berbers and N. Africa.

TUPI-GUARANI.—See Brazil.

TURKS.—I. ETHNOLOGY.—1. Origin of the name.—The terms 'Turk,' 'Turkish,' and 'Turke' are used in two different senses: to designate either those peoples belonging to the Turke linguistic family or those peoples from Asia who appear from the 9th century to the present time. The first name 'Tur' is much wider than the term 'Turk' and in any case is not synonymous with it. It must be noted that, while we hear of the Turks under that name in S. Russia even in the 1st cent. A.D., they only established themselves in Turkestan ('Land of the Turks'), the country named after them, in the 4th cent. A.D. Before that the country was known as Iran or Iranistan ('Land of the Iranians') and stretched farther west into the present Iran. Thus one must be careful not to confuse the archeology of Turkestan relating to the Iranian period with that which can be ascribed to the Turks.

The earliest information about the Turks, to be found in the Chinese annals from 2356 B.C. onwards, alludes to them under the name of Hsiung-nung, or slaves of the Hsiung, while the name Tu-Kiu, or Tu-Kiu, or Turks, becomes prominent in the 6th cent. A.D. only when a prince of the Assaya dynasty, Tinmen, rose to power. But we hear of the name Tark in connexion with the Turkish invaders of Europe in the pre-Christian era. Pompomius Mela in the 1st cent. A.D. calls them 'Turkes' and Pliny the Elder in the same century uses the name Tyrcae of a people in the neighbourhood of the Don. Though the various Turkic invaders of Eastern and Western Europe were chiefly known by the names of their leaders (Kipchak, Nogai, Seljuk, Osmanli), the name Turk as a generic term for the whole race is that most frequently used up to the present day. The Turks themselves with the exception of some Anatolian Turks call themselves by a dynastic or clan name.

2. Origin of the race.—The Chinese annals refer to the Hsiung-nung as their north-western barbarian neighbours, and make a distinction between them and their north-eastern neighbours, the Tung-hung, afterwards the Tungus. The third Central Asiatic race, the Mongols, do not seem to have been a pedigree, and it is possible that they form a branch of the Tungus or the Turks, or are a combination of both left behind and isolated on the steppes. This may be said of Qassim that the Turks and Tungus are two independent races which entered into the composition of the sub-races of Japan, China, and Tibet. The analysis of the funda-
mental types of both these races shows striking differences, but in comparison with the North and South Asiatic type they may both be called Mongoloid. Even assuming that the Tungus and Turks, and the Mongols, are the ethnological descendants of the original homo Asiaticus, yet, when they first appear in history, the two races differ widely in language, physical type, and culture. If the remains of the type in the upper Yenisei valley with burial masks, some of which are prominently Aryan in character, can be definitely ascribed to the early Turks, who knows whether their Mongoloid type was not after all an acquired character due to their mixture with the Mongoloids? So much for the anthropological evidence as to the origin of the Turks. Not less important from the point of view of the folklorist is the origin of the race as explained by tradition. Perhaps the most wide-spread is the legend (found also among the Mongols) of a she-wolf, or white she-wolf, who found and reared an abandoned boy, subsequently the founder of the Turkish race. This she-wolf, Ak-biuri, saved the little boy from the bad god Erik and brought him to Altun-dagh (‘Golden Mountains’) to an Altun-kii (‘Golden Cave’). The boy began to work for his mother and six days later he began to call her father. De Guignes suggests that this is merely a version of the Roman tradition brought back by the Huns after they returned from their invasion of Europe. But as a matter of fact the story might have travelled in the opposite direction, or the origin might have been independent, for the Chinese describe the shields of the Turks as having representations of a wolf before the approximate date of the Roman story. Then almost as widely spread is the legend of their first ancestor being the eldest son of Japheth, son of Noah. It is hard to determine whether the legend relating to still another ancestor, the son of the virgin-widow, Alanqua, has also a Biblical background.

3. Cradle of the race.—There are several hypotheses as to the geographical position of the original home of the Turks. H. H. Howorth seeks it in the southern parts of the Altai (Altun-dagh). Richthofen considers the region of the Amur, Lena, and Selenga their problematical original home. Parker suggests not the Altai Golden Mountains but some other mountains of the same name in the present Chinese province of Kin-Shan. Recent archaeological discoveries in the Altai-Sayan region as well as of aborigines at the present of these mountains support Howorth’s theory. While it is still difficult to know with certainty to whom to attribute the bronze remains of the Minusinsk, called by the Russians by the vague name of ‘Chud’ remains (Chajoi, ‘stranger’), there is no reason not to suppose that the country was inhabited always by the Turks, who were influenced in their bronze culture by some Iranian people from Central Asia, though also by the Chinese. The investigation of the bronze culture in the region of Kaban (N. Caucasus) will probably throw light on this question. This Kaban culture is found to be more similar to the Minusinsk than to the other bronze

This is important as throwing light on the puzzle of the origin of the Scythians, though no one can doubt now the kinship, if not identity, of the Eastern Scythians and the Turks. If the cradle of the Turks is to be sought in the forest of the Altai, it is clear that the Turks are a sedentary and agricultural mode of life—and the steppes and valleys between the Altai and Baikal are full of evidence of the sedentary culture of this people—it is still true that in comparison with the old Chinese, the Turks, especially their eastern branches, must be considered barbarians. Besides, there never has been a uniform culture spread over the various Turkic nations, nor did they ever live in a mass undisguised by foreign races. This is why it is difficult to be certain whether some of the clans mentioned first by the Chinese and then by the Arab writers can be considered Turks. It is much easier to make this distinction among the contemporary Turks, even though they appear also under various names of Tatar, Tula, or Osmanli.

A few words must be said about the term 'Tatar.' R. G. Latham 1 points out that the term we use the term Tatar or Tartar, the sounder will be our etymology. He also calls attention to the mistake of coupling the Manchus and their dynasty to the Tartars. With the Tatars as the name of the empire, the word 'Tatars' is found in the old Turkish inscriptions of the Orkhon ascribed to Rilge-Khan.2 About this time (8th cent.) the 'Otuz-Tatar' ('Thirty Tatars') lived to the east and south-east of Baikal and were dependent on the Turkish confederacy. Chinese history does not mention them till the 9th century. According to N. A. Aristoff, 3 the Otuz-Tatars were originally Turks, while the Mongolian settlers from Siberia, Bichurin is inclined to call them Mongols. In the same inscription on the Orkhon is a mention of the 'Tokuz-Tatars' ('Nine Tatars').

The term 'Tatar' is closely connected with the term 'Tatan.' 4 The people living in the present Khalka from the 9th cent. were called Tatan. They were divided into many aiinad, or unions of clans. The strongest of these were the Mongol, Taigut, Kere, and Tatar. 5 These were divided into clans, but all of them used the tribal name of Tatan. The Mongols successfully fought the Nunci (Tungus) in the middle of the 12th cent., and towards 1206 the old name in S. Siberia of the Tatan, as used by the Chinese and Arab historical mentions, ties the Turks to the Black Forest of the Altai mountains, from which they spread at an early date over the Yenisei and Ob, no archæological remains can be ascribed to the Samoyed, and no ethnological evidence supports the theory of Cœраст.

The relationship between the Samoyed and Finnic races is still an open question, but in any case historical and archæological evidence of early Finnish culture does not go further east than the Urat (term). By dismissing, therefore, the Samoyed-Altaic theory, one dismisses also the claim of the Finns to an Altai-Sayan cradle. Possibly further archeological discoveries may reveal still earlier Turkic inscriptions in the Bosporus of the Yenisei, but they can only be found more to the south, since the inscriptions to the east of the Yenisei, i.e. the Orkhon, are one or more hundred years later. The relation between the Mongols and the early Finnic and archæological remains of the steppes of the Black Sea attributed to the Scythians has been recently studied carefully, and a close resemblance was found. 6

The relation between the Mansi and the early Finnic and archæological remains of the steppes of the Black Sea attributed to the Scythians has been recently studied carefully, and a close resemblance was found. 6

1 Descriptive Ethnology, 3 vols., London, 1839, i. 295.


4 J. Bichurin, Notes on Mongolia (Russ.). St. Petersburg, 1852.

5 Ib. i. 239, 231-237.
von Klaproth,1 confuse the two names Tatan and Tatar.

The first people to call all Mongols Tatars were probably the Russians, and they gave this name among the tribes which had settled along the Volga, and who see not even to have been Tatan but various Turks brought within the Mongol-Tatar army, who after the death of Jenghiz Khan were called the ‘hus’s, (2) their own name, (3) the Turks, (4) part of the Turkmans, (5) part of the Uzbegs. The village- and town-dwellers are; (6) Sarts, (7) Taranehli, (8) most of the Uzbegs (with the Kipekzak Turks), (9) the Turks, and (10) the Kirgis, and Karagass. The most genuine Turks are those ‘Tatars’ who inhabit the region of the Altai forests—the ‘Chern Tatara’.

II. CENTRAL ASIATIC TURKS.—The Central Asiatic Turks, all of whom are Mahommedans, can be divided according to their mode of life into (a) steppe nomads, and (b) village- or town-dwellers. The steppe nomads are; (1) the Kirgis or Kazak, (2) the Kirgiz, (3) the Tukshu, (4) part of the Turkmans, (5) part of the Uzbegs. The village- and town-dwellers are; (6) Sarts, (7) Taranehli, (8) most of the Uzbegs (with the Kipekzak Turks), and (9) the Kirgis. The Kirgis live in the northern and eastern part of the Aral-Caspien basin, and in the Orenburg steppos, so they are lowlanders. The Tatar-Kirgis live on the slopes of Pamir, Altai, and Tien Shan. They are mountain-take. There are, however, other Kirgis, to whom this name may be applied historically and ethnologically, who lived from the 6th century A.D. in the Yenisei valley and migrated to Semirechie, forced forward by the advances of the Russians in the 18th century. They are often identified with the ‘Khaks’ (Castrens, Klaproth, K. Radowoff), and the inscriptions found in the valley of S. Yenisei are attributed to them. The Kirgis-Kazak call themselves Kazak, kaz meaning ‘goose,’ zog meaning ‘crow,’ i.e. the steppe birds, and the steppe. The Russians call them Kirgis-Kazak to distinguish them from their own Cossacks (Kazak). The Kirgis-Kazak derive themselves from the Uzbeg, and they derive the Kara-Kirgis from dogs. But the Kara-Kirgis call themselves brothers of the Kirgis-Kazak, and in fact are probably one of their branches. Out of 47 millions of these Kazak only about 400,000 are Kara-Kirgis.

The Kirgis-Kazak were divided into three groups, called orda—the southern, or great orda, ‘Ulus-dschus,’ the little orda, ‘Klihi-dschus,’ to the west, towards European Russia, and the middle orda, ‘Orta-dschus,’ in the typical steppe country. But, when they began to mix with one another and to increase in numbers, they divided into clans, and each clan had its own tanga, or clan symbol, with which the horses and dromedaries were marked. The heads of the clans were called Sultans, while the nobility was called Tiuri or Ak-sneu, ‘White Bones.’ They trace their ancestry from Jenghiz Khan, notwithstanding their standing of the Kirgis-Kazak, in the district, and the other people were called Kara-Sneu, ‘Black Bones.’ Lately, however, marriage prohibitions between these castes have been withdrawn, and the social division is based on material considerations.

The felt hut of the Kirgis is called yurta, and a group of yurta is called aul. Herds of sheep, horses, and dromedaries are their chief form of property. In sharp contrast to their lightly-bred houses their graves, especially among the Turkestan and Semirechie Kirgis. They look like small towers and are made of bricks and clay. The subjugation of the Kirgis by the Russians began in 1734 and took more years than during the Great War some groups of Kirgis considered themselves independent.

2. KARA-KALPAK.—The Kara-Kalpak, or ‘Black Caps,’ and akin to the Kirgis-Kazak, live in Turkestan, especially in the Syr-Daria district, where they form half of the population. They number about 134,000 (1911). They seem to be taller than the other Kirgis, and lead half-sedenarian, living part of their days being agriculturists. Some 20,000 of them live in Khiva.

3. SARTS.—The Sarts (1,847,000 in 1911) were originally a mixture of the original Iranian inhabitants, the Tajik, with their Tatarian conquerors,
TURKS

The Usbeg. They busy themselves with commerce, but occasionally take to agriculture and cotton-growing, in which they are not as successful as the Tajiks, though they know the use of the arida, irrigation channels. All the Sarts speak Turkish, and are Muhammadans (Sunnite); they have made some Persian terms and a few words of this language, and a physical type they approach nearer to the Iranians.

4. Taranchi.—The Taranchi are very like the Sarts. They also live in winter in villages, biskak, and their summer homes are called akalk. They migrated to Russian Turkistan from Kuldja at the same time as the Dungan after Kuldja passed to China. They number about 83,000 (1911) and live in the Semirechie country, in the II basin, and partly in the Transcaspian country. They are agriculturists, especially busying themselves with vegetable gardens, but prefer commerce. They are Muhammadans, but their women do not cover their faces as the Sart women do.

Besides the Taranchi there are various Turkish tribes on the Eastern slopes of the Tian-Shan, in Kashgar, Yarkand, and Khotan, who are the supposed descendants of the Uigur. Their language is called Tush and it is possible that one of the oldest types of Turkish. They form the most easterly branch of the Central Asiatic Turks, and probably remained behind when the other races moved westwards. They ruled it in Kashgaria from the 10th to the 12th century. Though in time they became Muhammadans, early Nestorian teaching has left its traces; they still use the Syriac alphabet and possess a book of the 11th cent. in this writing, called Kudatun Bilkik. They are a 'free self-governing people.' Some of them have been to Mecca (800 miles to the Siberian Railway), then through Odessa to Astrakhan and the Transcaspian Railway, and have been to Samarkand and the Sinkiang districts.

The Kirei of N.W. Mongolia are supposed to have come from the source of the Amur. In the 11th and 12th centuries the Kirei were an important power, and were probably of Nestorian creeds. Whether the mystical Prosor John (a Christian priest who reigned in some Christian Asiatic kingdom) was their king it is difficult to say. They are not heard of for a long period after the flight of the Khan to the Dungan from the Buddhist Mongols in being Muhammadans.

They live on the banks of the Upper or Black Irkut and the greater part of the Western Altai pastures and the Jungaria plains as far as Lake Zaisan. They train hawks, falcons, and golden eagles for hunting such game as gazelles, foxes, and even wolves. Like the Kazak, they claim Jenghiz Khan (a Mongol) as their ancestor.

5. Usbeg.—The Usbeg (about 800,000 in 1911; including Kipekchak, about 660,000) form the majority of the inhabitants of the Samarkand district and parts of Fergana and Syr-Daria districts. In Bokhara and Khiva, they are the ruling people, like the Osmanli in Turkey. Their name is probably derived from Usbeg Khan of the Golden Horde (1312-40); in the 16th cent. they founded in Turkestan the Khanates of Khiva and Bokhara. Their language is divided into three varieties: Turks, Iranians, and Mongols. The Turkish element is probably predominant, though in the case of the Usbeg of Khiva it is the Iranian type that prevails; the Usbeg have been considered nomad life for a sedentary one, their customary law, adat, has lost ground, and is being replaced by written law, shari-iat. Father-right is very strong, but the position of women is on the whole better than among the Sarts and Tajiks. Though the Usbeg now imitate the Sarts in making huts covered with clay, and live in small villages encircled by walls of fortresses, here and there the old felt yurt is still found.

6. Turkomans of Transcaspia.—The Turkomans live to the number of about 600,000 in the Transcaspian territories of Persia, Khiva, and Bukhara. Until the Russian occupation of Merv they were nomad horse-breeders. Although some of them were subjected to Persia, their boast has been that 'not one Persian could cross their frontier with as strong a force as to turn his face.' In the event, the Russians destroyed their power by capturing their principal fortress, Gok-Teppe, and their slave trade has been suppressed. They now live in clay or raw brick houses, and, in some places, in Russian wooden houses. They are Muhammadans, but follow the unwritten customary law. The clan division is still strong, and all migrations are made in clan groups. Endogamy is enforced. As the male population is abundant, the kolybas for the wife is very high, and in some places the unmarried men form 27 per cent of the population. On the whole they seem to be a democratic people.

The chief tribes are the Usbeg (Chaushak), the Irtish (Chaushur), in the north-west part of Us-Turi and the Karakorgol Gulf; (b) the Yomouts and Yomouts, extending from Khiva across the Oxus and along the south bank of the Oxus to Persia; (c) the Golden or Goliks, settled in the Persian province of Ispahan; (d) the Turks, friendly and like the Usbeg of the Turcoman; (e) the Tekkes (Taka), who were the most important tribe when the Russians conquered Transcaspia, and whom the Russians have been the most likely to imitate in their nomadic life, but were driven out by the Kasimkho in 1718 and subsequently occupied the Akko and Merv oases; the Russians inflicted a crushing defeat on them at Gok-Teppe in 1811; (f) the Sarts (Sarjaks) were found in the neighborhood of Panis and Yulistan; (g) the Salar (Salors), an old and important tribe, suffered much in the course of fights with the Tekkes, and in 1857 migrated to Zarabad in Persian territory near the Hari- rud; (h) the Ersats (Ersaks) are now found chiefly near Khogja Shuk; they were once a very important tribe on the upper Oxus.

The Central Asiatic territories, which belong to Persia, have a total population of from five to six millions, of which at least from four to five millions are Turks. Eastern or Chinese Turkistan has a population of about two millions, excluding Kulja and Jungaria. Jungaria has about 600,000 and Kulja 120,000, the overwhelming majority in all these three provinces being Turks. Besides the Turks of the north we find some Mongols, and in the east and south Tibetans.

I. TURKISH TURKS.

1. Kazan Tatars.—The Kazan Tatars number more than a million, and their centre is in the government of Kazan, though they extend on both banks of the Volga as far as the government of Saratov.

2. Astrakhan Tatars.—The Astrakhan Tatars, to the number of some 50,000, live at the mouth of the Volga. Some of the Volga Tatars, such as the Cheremiss, Chuvash, and other middle Volga tribes, and the Buriats, who emigrated in large numbers from the Urals, have Ugrian origin, but they are now Turks in speech and Muhammadans in creed and social life. Numerism was introduced among the Volga Turks in the 15th century.

3. The Bashkir. The government of Orenburg
is a great district for the Mordvis and the Bashkir. The latter are also found in Ufa, Perm, Samara, and Kazan. The former, says that the Bashkir are as entirely Turks in language and features as are the Kirgis. They are shepherds, herdsmen, but above all bee-masters. After the battle of 1532, when the power of the Tartars of the Caspian and the Crimea was subdued, they submitted themselves to Russia, against whom they have not ceased to rebel. Their number is about 392,000.

4. Teptya.—A typical mixture of races, something like that of peoples of Siberia, where it is difficult to define which racial element predominates, are the Teptya. When the Khanate of Kazan fell, a mixed population of Turks, Tchernomis, Tovatch, Chuvashes, and Mordvis fled to the east of Ural; out of these has arisen a population which the other Turkish tribes call Teptya; they are partly shamanistic, partly Muhammadan.

iv. The Fontus or Crimean and Nogai Tartars.—The Khanate of the Crimea, originally Nogai (a political division of Tartars similar to the Kipchak who came there in the 13th cent.), was by the middle of the 16th cent. more or less Osmanli politically. In 1778 they became independent, but in 1874 became subject to Russia. They are known as excellent agriculturists and growers of grapes and tobacco.

The Nogais became the Crimean Tartars who migrated there before the Nogai in the 11th or 12th cent. from Asia Minor, and are probably a branch of the Seljuk, are shepherds. The culture of the Crimean Tartars is more like that of Kazan and Astrakhan Tartars, though a part of the Dagestanes. Their total number is about 300,000. The same Nogai Tartars are to be found in Lithuania and Rumania to the number of 5000. They are now mostly Christian, and mixed with the local population.

Another branch of the Nogai occupied the country between the Tobol and the Yakai rivers at the beginning of the 17th cent. They were transplanted by Peter the Great to the banks of the Kuma and Kuban, but a small group remained behind at the mouth of the Volga and are called Kandar Tartars.

The Nogais are very Mongol in physiognomy. Some pay tribute to them the tamul of the Orenburg government.

v. Western Turks.—1. Turks of the Caucasus.

The Turks of the Caucasus—properly speaking, the majority of the aboriginals of the province of which Tabriz is the capital. They number about two millions. They seem to be Turks speaking a Yagatai dialect, which invaded Persia during the Seljuk period (11th cent.). They are also called iliketi, i.e., tribes or clans. Each clan has its own ilkhani, appointed by the Shah.

Some of these clans are: (a) the Kajars, near Astarabad; the present dynasty of Persian Shahs comes from this tribe; (b) the Aybars of Azarbaijan province (a group of these immigrants to Anatolia and live now in anti-Turks); (c) the Shokaks; (d) the Karakynnyu; (e) the Karagamili; (f) the Babila; (g) the Imunlu; (h) the Kishakhal, who probably arrived at Herat before the Persians.

Azarbaijan Tartars are mixed with the Persians; other Turks of the Caucasus, living in the mountains along the upper parts of the rivers Chechek, Hakina, and Aklan, are mixed with the natives of the Caucasus and are physically of local type.

2. Turks of Anatolia.—(a) Osmanli and Seljuk.

The term Osmani or Ottoman, used in a strict sense, is a descendant of Osman, the chief who gathered round him a nation at the end of the 13th and beginning of the 14th cent. Recent researches have proved that the Osmani Turks (Anatolians) were the native race of the plains of Eastern Europe never called themselves Turks, but always

Osmani (a tribe of Turks who lived in Persia for a considerable time before they moved to Asia Minor. It was probably as refugees before the advance of the army of Jenghiz Khan that they appeared in the 13th cent. and with the permission of the Seljuks of Konia settled on the Asiatic remnants of the Byzantine empire. As the Osmanli had written their name in the capture of Constantinople, all that we know about their early history is founded on tradition. Their clan is supposed to be descended from Khorsan, and they are known to have been a branch of the Tartars. They soon took to the war, and by the end of the 15th cent., stopped but for a very short time the success of the Osmanli in Europe. If we consider that the Osmanli were originally only a small clan, and that the Seljuk and other Turks came to them, and that they were dealt with them, we must conclude that the bulk of the Osmanli nation was recruited from some race other than the Turkis. Recently the name Osmani became also the fighting name of the modern Ottomans. It was the political unrest in Europe that helped the descendants of Osman to conquer all the Balkan Peninsula and Byzantium. The invasion of Asia Minor by Timur at the beginning of the 15th cent. stopped but for a very short time the success of the Osmanli in Europe. If we consider that the Osmanli were originally only a small clan, and that the Seljuk and other Turks came to them, and that they were dealt with them, we must conclude that the bulk of the Osmanli nation was recruited from some race other than the Turkis. Recently the name Osmani became also the fighting name of the modern Ottomans.

Many of the Turks of the old Byzantium who belonged to the Osmanli empire were not Osmanli in the strict sense. Thus the supposed remnants of the Seljuk of the 11th cent. are called Konots. It is interesting to note that Byzantine authors mention a Turkish colony which settled in Macedonia on the river Vardar in the 9th cent. and mixed with the local population.

(b) Turkormans.—The Turkormans of Anatolia are spread all over Anatolia, but are specially numerous in the central part and in E. Taurs. They are more Mongolian in type than the Osmanli or Seljuk. They are nomads, but not to the same extent as the Yuruk. Their summer residences (yalı) are close to their winter houses (kışhâ). Some of them are Shārans, others Sunnites. They seem to have been first heard of in Anatolia in the 12th cent. and are mentioned by the historians Nicetas and Anna Comnenus as "Turcomans." They were opposing both Seljuk and Ottoman rule and probably migrated from C. Asia under their own political régime.

(c) Yuruka.—The Yuraks live chiefly in the mountains, but also in the plains from Smyrna to Mo E. Taurs. They are typical nomads.

Old ethnologists sometimes mistook the religious communities of the Muslimated sects for Turkish nationhood. In Turkey, the Kızıl-Bash (q.v.), or Red Heads, living in the Angora region of Asia Minor, Persia, Afghanistan, and the Caucasus.

III. Religion.—We shall deal only with the religion of the Turks before they accepted Muslimahmânism; it has persisted up till now among some Turks of Central Asia and Siberia. There is evidence (the Buddhist writings in Uigur character that some of the Central Asiatic Turks were followers of Buddha about the 8th cent. Still more has been heard about Christian Nestorian influences. In fact, there is a permanent sign of these in the form of Uigur written characters modelled probably on the Sogdian. The Arals captured the Samanid and the Turkmundan in Central Asia was introduced later, and to some extent it is still spreading. The original religion of the Turks is a shamanism of
assist at the ceremony, which is held on the top of a mountain of sacred birch spiny. The old
fire (suyu' ol) is made, and after many incantations
a new fire is lighted from the old one. It is pro-
tected by the shamans lest it should go out, which
would mean a catastrophe for the tribe. A be-
gost or a ram is sacrificed, but no blood must be
shed and no cry heard from the sacrificial animal.
During the sacrifice to Yulgen among the
Altaians similar precautions are taken, and the
whole fire-keepers of the kitchen fire boiled on
the 'old fire,' while the hind-quarters are boiled
on the new fire. During both ceremonies each head of
a family attaches a thread of flax to the sacred
birches—that is the path for their wishes to go to
the high being—and eagle feathers attached to the
threads carry them farther up. The meat boiled
on the old fire is then taken round in the direction
of the sun and burnt on the same fire. If the
smoke goes up in a straight line, the sacrifice is
accepted. Then only a feast is held, and

the choicest meat is offered to the kori shaman, or
medicine-man. Among the Kirgiz he is called
baka, if belonging to the same clan, or dama, if
belonging to another clan. The meat prepared
on the new fire is consumed, while remnants of
the feast together with the implements used are burnt
again on the old fire.

The birch is held in a very important role in all
Turkic ceremonies, and, whether the Turks live in
steps or tundras, birches are either brought from
the forest regions or are symbolized by driftwood
decorations. This as well as veneration of forest animals
and birds (and not steppe or tundra animals) seems
to point again to the forest origin of the race.

The summer sacrifice to Yulgen (called also Bai-
Yulgen) lasts for two or three days, and it is usually
on the second day that the shamanistic perfor-
mations are held. The kori is preparing for a
journey to the various spirits and gods living in
the skies above. He ceremonially feels various
spirits represented on his drum. While the
company eats the offered meat, the kori sings:

Accept this, O Kaira Khan!
Master of the drum with six horns
Draw near with the sound of the bell!
When I cry 'Chokh!' make obeisance,
When I cry 'Me!' accept this gift.

Then he offers a garment to Yulgen with a song:

Gifts that no horse can carry—
Ah! Ah! Ah! Ah!
Gifts that no man can lift—
Ah! Ah! Ah! Ah!
Garments with triple coils,
Turn them three before thine eyes,
Let them be a cover for the steeds,
Ah! Ah! Ah! Ah!
Prince Yulgen, full of gladness,
Ah! Ah! Ah! Ah!

Then only the shaman summons all the spirit
assistants represented on the drum to enter it.
He sings and then is silent for a while, and a
noise of various birds and animals, whom he is
initiating, is heard. Then he begins to beat his
drum and to dance round the people, touching
them occasionally with his drum or drumstick.
The fire is extinct, the shaman's voice becomes
weaker, and the sound of the cracking of the
birch in the corner of the room indicates that the
shaman has fled to the skies. Sometimes the kori
gives an account of what he sees while he travels,
sometimes only after coming back. In the sixth
sky he encounters the moon, in the seventh the
sun, and from the highest sky he can reach—only
a few koris reach the ninth sky—he prays to

Yulgen:

1 Lord, to whom three stars are low;
2 Father, begetter of three; bearer of three.
3 The Blue vault that has appeared,
4 The sky that shows itself,
5 The blue cloud that whirls, among

75-76.
TUSHESES AND OTHER PAGAN TRIBES OF THE CAUCASUS

The Tushes, or Tushos, are a people of the Caucasus, who inhabit the region between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. They are a semi-pagan people, who have preserved many of their ancient traditions and customs. They are known for their hospitality and their love of music and dance. They are also known for their use of herbs and natural remedies in their daily lives. They have a rich oral tradition, which is passed down from generation to generation. They are a peaceful people, who have lived in harmony with their environment for centuries.

The Tushes have a strong connection to the natural world, and this is reflected in their art and literature. They are known for their beautiful textiles, which are often decorated with patterns that depict their myths and legends. They also have a rich tradition of storytelling, which is passed down from generation to generation.

The Tushes are a proud people, who have a deep respect for their ancestors and their history. They are a people of great spiritual strength, and this is reflected in their devotion to their sacred animal, the Tushes. They believe that the Tushes are a symbol of their connection to the divine, and they honor them in their daily lives.

The Tushes are a people of great beauty, both in their natural surroundings and in their people. They are a people who are proud of their heritage, and they are always ready to share their culture with others. They are a people who are deeply connected to their land, and they are always ready to defend it against those who would seek to take it away from them.
tushes and other pegan tribes of the caucasus

chosen by the khvaz from the community, either for a definite period or for an individual feast. Their name is the same as that of the dasturi, but in the Iranian priesthood the dasturs occupy the highest rank. The duties of the Khevsur dasturs are to receive the barley from the shultas, prepare the fermentation, obtain the wild hops (cultivated hops may not be used), and brew the sacred beer. During this process they must be barefooted, bareheaded, and ungiroted, may not leave the sanctuary, and are forbidden to speak.

While the shultas are all equal in rank, there are various degrees among the dasturs according to the periods for which they are chosen; and, together with the shultas, they administer the finances of the khati.

The real priest of the khati is the khvaz, who is chosen, not by the community, but by the soothsayer (kadogi) or seeress (vakitkhav). A future khvaz is usually a man of standing, the most popular, the best beloved; the only proper servants of the khati may prepare; and darbazi-dwellings and assembly-places are provided for the ministers of the shrine. The sacred vessels (mostly of silver and often bearing Christian symbols) are jealously guarded against profanation or theft; and at high festivals the worshippers drink from them the sacred beer.

As the throne of the celestial khati, the khati, in its aspect of place of prayer and sacrifice, serves as means of communication between heaven and earth, so that in each crisis of life it is visited for prayer to the divinity dwelling there. While almost every village has its own khati, three, all dedicated to St. George (see below [d]), possess special sanctity—those in the villages of Gudani and Khakhmachi, and the khati of Karatsiv. The former is the holiest in Khevsuria, and all three enjoy large estates.

The khati of Gudani is called 'leader of God's hosts' and contains the chief drosha of the Khevsurs. It possesses great power against all evil spirits (hence it is intrinsically) and against disease, insanity, and sterility. The khati of Khakhmachi is the special patron of hunters and thieves, and has peculiar power over the clouds. The khati of Karatsiv is particularly potent against all evil spirits, which appear in the form of hedgehogs, swine, etc.; and his sacrifice, in case of misfortune, is a goat, which, it should be noted, is offered only to evil spirits. In the village of Atake is a khati dedicated to St. Kvirik, lord of the mainland, whom all angels obey, and who has his throne next to God.

Priests.—Some uncertainty prevails concerning the various orders of the priesthood. The lowest rank is that of the shultas, of whom each khati has an annual chosen annual contingent from the community by the khvaz and the dekansosi. The shultas's duties are to guard the property of the sanctuary, to supervise and assist the agricultural work on the land belonging to the khati, and to see that the beaches are guarded. Like the other ministers of the khati, they must lead a blameless life, and for several weeks before each feast intercourse with women is forbidden. They may not enter the dasturi, this privilege being reserved for the higher functionaries.

The next in ascending rank are the dasturs, 1

1 Cf. art. BANNOUS. 2 The emphasis laid on the sacred beer may be a reminiscence of the Indo-Iranian soma-homa rite (see art. HAMA, SOMA), despite the widespread custom of drinking intoxicants in connection with sacred ceremonies (see REL. V. 70).

1 art. PARIS, PERSIAN (Iranian), 2 the Fredericksen speech (ed. also below, p. 457) looks very like a survival of Zoroastrianism (see SBE v. [1850] 169, 226-227, xvill. [1850] 125, xxv. [1850] 283); but, on the other hand, to go barefoot and ungirted are heinous sins in Mandala (SBE v. 461, 257).

2 art. INCANTATION, in which this dreaming is really a form.

3 The khvaz, dekansosi, dasturs, and shultas roughly correspond respectively to the fourfold hierarchy of bishop, priest,
A somewhat fantastic figure in the hierarchy is the khevis-beri (‘valley-elder’). It seems, on the whole, that he was originally the political or spirit leader of the khati, the latter being the bearer of the droska and the leader of the army. In this manner he naturally became protector of the khati, and so developed by degrees into the god of the countryside, as his older political importance steadily diminished. Traces of this, however, yet remain. He is still the one who uplifts the droska at certain feasts; and, unlike the khevi, dekanosri, dasturi, and khalas, he inherits his dignity; and it is only in the case of extinction of a family in which the office of khevis-beri is hereditary that he is chosen by the khusi. He is the faithful transmitter of ancient ritual; but his precise relation to the khusi is uncertain.

(c) Sorcerers.—Among the Khevsur sorcerers and priests co-operate. The kadogi is chosen at New Year by khusi and dekanosri. Usually he is neuter, and he delivers his messages in the characteristic manner of shamans. He is the mouth-piece of the khati and is consulted in all important events of life, especially in cases of illness, when he designates the particular offering necessary to propitiate the deity whose anger caused the affliction. In certain khatis, as in Khakhabo, the kadogi even has the right to carry the droska.

The female counterpart of the kadogi is the khabalo; but it is often a hybride. In Derbent, however, the restrictions imposed on all other Khevsur women, the mkikhvouri holds rank equal to that of the kadogi. The mkikhvouri divine by means of water, grains of corn, etc.; and, if they declare that the cause of an illness is a deity’s desire to obtain the person afflicted, the latter is clad in white, and a vow is taken that his hair shall be uncot for three years, etc.

There is another class of sorceresses, the mesulri—women and girls who sustain a peculiar close relation to the supernatural world. To approach the spirits of the departed, the mesulri lies upon the ground, grows pale, and falls into deep slumber, often broken by a gentle murmuring, which is regarded as converse with the dead. Since, however, too much speech regarding the other world is dangerous for the mesultr, and her speech is in a language which is intentionally obscure. If a child falls ill before reaching the age of two years, the mesulri is consulted. She tells from what departed spirit the illness comes; and the child is cleansed with that of the deceased in the same worded question (in similar illness of an older child the aid of the kadogi, not the mesulri, is sought).

(d) Deities.—Reminiscences of Christianity are so numerous that it is not always easy to say exactly what is essentially the religion of the Khevsurs and kindred tribes. The supreme deity is Morigi, creator and omnipotent, who dwells in the seventh heaven and is the god of the living, whereas Christ is the divinity of the dead. The Trinity, occasionally invoked in prayers, is regarded as three angels; the Blessed Virgin receives honour as one of the chief angels; and SS. Peter and Paul are the angels of wealth and abundance. Morigi leaves the actual administration of the world to his delegates, the khatis, each of whom has his special function and is aided by two deacons and a subdeacon of the Orthodox, Roman, and Anglican Churches. Be, however, the last is less likely. It is known, they are reminiscences of the sarathoripterand, andarapvet, representing the Saorastitution (for whom see Ar. Pnintat, Parsamrosi [Iranian]).

1 Cf. the divergent opinions cited by Merzbacher, ii. SS.
2 A single example is that of the Karabakh Kashek in Ossetia (Merzbacher, i. 545–553) and Elburz, the latter being called On. The pilgrimage bn the Feast of the Lady 200 to 3000 sheep and 20 to 40 cattle being offered at Khakhabi alone, and the quota of each family being at least five sheep. The priests receive the skin and half of the flesh. This is commein keep the meat being cooked by the dasturi and eaten by the assembly, together with bread and abundant beer. This beer is solemnly blessed by khusi and dekanosri, after which the dasturi presents it first in the sacred silver vessels to these priests and then to the laity; but it is consumed so generously that the festival frequently degenerates into a drunken revel. Women are not admitted to the feasts and may not pass beyond a certain line in the khati, where they receive their share of beer and viands. Near a khati on a hill in the village of Arkhoti is a special nishi (place where a saint has performed a miracle) for children, and this to are brought leaves baked expressly for them.

2 This explains the function of the mesulri in healing infants.
3 Steiner, in Wettar and Welte, Kirchenbezirke, Friebur, 1892–1901, and also A. S., April, iii. 392 ff. However, Georgia is probably derived from Pers. Gurgutjan, the name of the land in question (Adeney, p. 344, note).
4 Cf. the remarks on the Khevsurs, the last is less likely. It is known, that such are reminiscences of the sarathoripterand, andarapvet, representing the Saorastitution (for whom see Ar. Pnintat, Parsamrosi [Iranian]).
5 The seven heavens represent Jewish Talmudic tradition (seeḲeṭaṭ, 106:4, 5); and, for Georgi as such, see 229; and the concept of Christ as god of the dead is probably borrowed from the doctrine of His descent into Hades (I P 199).
(f) Status of women.—Until a daughter-in-law has entered the household, a Khvessar woman’s life is not considered normal; she is only one of the tribe working in the fields and tending the cattle, but must also mow and thresh, bring wood and water, cook food, make clothing, etc. When her son brings her into his household, however, a woman enters whose status law becomes the administrative head of the house, and nothing may be done without her approval.

(g) Marriage and divorce.—Betrothal frequently takes place in advance of the marriage, while the girl is still a child; and in such a case the boy’s father is obliged, until the girl reaches maturity, to send annual presents to the bride’s father, while at New Year a brother or sister of the groom takes the girl to the house. Of course, a girl’s personal property, remotely akin to the skin, is strictly forbidden, with the result that, since all the inhabitants of a village belong to a single family, men and women of the same community very seldom wed.

On the first day of the wedding, all those present send to the bride’s father, by two men of standing, two sheep, one of which is killed at the khati, the other in the bride’s house. The girl’s marriage is solemnized by the large festival held among all the maidens of the village escort the bride, with her parents and kinsfolk, to the end of the village, where one of the khatis is eaten. The bride’s escort now return home, while the bride, with some of her more distant relatives, follows the two men sent to the bride’s father, all but the last of whom is mounted on horseback. During this journey the second khati is eaten, and when she reaches the village which is to be her future home, the bride is met by all its inhabitants, the distance which they come to greet her being proportionate to the respect shown her. Arrived at the groom’s house, the bride is entertained in a separate room by the women of the family, while her escort are conducted to the stable; meanwhile the groom hides till summoned by the feasters; and he then receives the place of honor, but may share in neither banquet, song, nor dance, being permitted to drink only a single glass of brandy. The women likewise are delirious from the men’s feast and dance, this being probably a Muhammadan survival, since no such restriction exists among the Christian Karthvelians. This revol usually lasts three days, during which the groom may not come near his bride; and she is solemnly carried off to her new home where a similar feast is given. The groom now goes back to his own village, and remains an entire year. If he visits even the village of the bride, the only exception being when the groom has no parents, in which case his bride remains with her own family; or if he returns too soon, after one year has expired, the groom sends his nearest kinsman to fetch the lad, and has himself excused by some of his relatives. The dekhaml and khetsi-berti are now summoned, and the former sews together the garments of the bridal pair in taken of their union, while the girl’s mother prepares the nuptial bed, to which she leads the wedded pair. After the first three nights, the groom no longer shares this bed, but seeks his bride only by stealth; and it is not until the birth of their first child that the pair live together openly. The conjugal act involves ritual defilement for three days.

Despite the absence of outward manifestations of affection, and notwithstanding the life of toil imposed upon the married woman, she occupies a position of great respect. Except for very rare instances, she guards her fidelity to her husband with extreme care; and if convicted of adultery, she takes her life. Her symbol of wifehood is her kerchief (mannditi); and if she throws this between two men, or any of her relations, she must at once desist from their quarrel.

The older form of wedding among these tribes was marriage by capture, which is still frequent, usually only with users of the same tribe. This is regarded as an insult to the kinsmen of the man to whom she was betrothed, and the robber’s relatives must pay them a fine of 16–30 cows and make rich presents to the girl’s father. In addition to this, the elders and consorts of the girl insult the robber by ‘jumping on the roof’ (lozna shekhtoma) of his house until he slaughters a sheep and gives them a young ox and copper plate. If, however, the girl is carried off against her will, a deadly feud arises between the kinsmen of the robber and those of the intended bride and groom, often resulting in destruction of property and life, which the former seeks an opportunity to escape to her chosen husband.

Polygamy is permitted, but is rare unless the wife is sickly, aged prematurely, or bears only boy children; but if the second wife is taken, the husband must give five cows to the family of the first.

The bride brings a dowry with her, but the groom has no claim upon it, whereas the wife has the right to make herself a new dress annually at her husband’s expense. The property of husband and wife is kept separate, and neither may be the other’s heir. Sons alone may inherit; if the marriage is childless, or only girls are born, the village is the heir.

Divorce is rare, for, even if a wife is thus dismission for laziness, barrenness, or sickness, her husband must pay her 16 cows for the marriage and one cow for her maintenance. An unmarried and wedded life except the first and the last. A divorced wife may marry again, and is still entitled to a new dress each year at her first husband’s expense. On the other hand, any children of the the first marriage belonging to their father and, although a temporary exception is made in the case of an unwed infant, this child also goes to its father as soon as it is grown. A man is deeply disgraced if his wife leaves him; and in such a case she must promise never to marry another man, a violation of this pledge formerly involving the death both of the woman and of her second husband.

Under no circumstances may a man ill-treat his wife—a rule which is enforced by the entire community. Since the family (vqjkhli) is strictly subordinated to the community (tamoba), so that ostracism involves entire forfeiture of communal protection, rights to communal pastureage, etc., the ruling of the tamoba is one of much effect in all departments of life in the individual household.

Death and disposal of the dead.—Death being believed to defile the house, the mourners are carried into the open air, and there breathe their last, surrounded by the members of their household. Since the corpse is deemed a source of uncleanness, its place of rest is in the open air, and the resting-place of the duty of young, unmarried persons (lads for males, and girls for females) called nareveli (‘defiled’), who shear the head of the corpse (if it be male), clothe it in a shroud of white and red, and dig for it a long, narrow, shallow, stone-lined grave, in which it is laid uncoffined. Contact with nareveli entails defilement; and they may not enter their own houses until (after five or six days) they have taken repeated cleansing baths. For a year the kinmen of the deceased let their beards grow, wear old clothes turned inside out (thus hiding the usual adornments of dress), and carry no weapons or less a child, who is unwept) is formally bewailed, the men lamenting silently, the women aloud; and one of the order to the incantations of the deceased, the others joining in the refrain. A funeral feast is prepared and blessed by the khami, who also recites an ancient prayer containing reminiscences of the Old and New Testaments.

The corpse is buried at daybreak. This is considered as an insult to the kinsmen of the kinmen and other male residents of the community stand weeping softly at the boundary of the village. Of the family only the widower and the body to the grave, and she leads the dead man’s completely caparisoned horse,

1 CL the (see Merzlachet, ii 97, note 5);
2 For minor variations see Merzlachet, ii 97, note 5;
3 In certain regions wooden coffins are coming into use.
which bears his clothes and weapons, as well as food and drink for his journey to the other world. Arrived at the grave, the stringed instrument is played, and the deceased is instructed to see that his shadow is properly engaged in the life after death.

Within several days of the death, the corpse is removed from the house and is exposed on the field. This exposure is intended to harden the body, so that it will be easier to identify in the next world. During this period, the relatives and neighbors gather around the corpse, and the house is respected as a sacred space for the deceased.

During the four days that the corpse remains on the field, various rituals are performed. These include offerings of food and drink, prayers, and the laying of flowers and incense. The relatives and neighbors also gather to perform the final rites, and the body is finally laid to rest in a cemetery or a nearby place.

The burial is performed in a simple manner. The corpse is placed in a shallow grave, and the grave is covered with a few stones or a small mound. The family and friends then gather around the grave and perform the final prayers and rituals. The grave is then left undisturbed, and the family returns to their daily lives.

The burial of the dead is an important ritual in the Caucasian tribes, and it is performed with great respect and care. The burial process is intended to ensure the deceased a proper place in the next world, and to provide a means for the family to honor and remember their loved ones.
TUTELARY GODS AND SPIRITS

eism of the sun, which can avert it only by paying the amount demanded, killing a sheep, and sharing it with his opponent and with invited witnesses, after which 'the souls are set free.'

2. Samtani. The Samtanis, numbering about 10,000 in 1912, are the modern representatives of the Sanois or Sunni of Strabo and Pliny. Their religion is by no means so interesting as that of the Khersusis, etc., and primitive elements are far from prominent. From Iranism they retained a sort of prayer to the sun and moon; from Christianity a form of anointing a child by its mother in lieu of baptism, and a veneration for Natrun, the Virgin, and St. George; from Judaism a reverence for Elijah; and they still abstain from work on the three Sabbaths—Friday of the Mammansaders, Saturday of the Jews, and Sunday of the Christians. They practise the strictest endogamy, only residents of the same village being permitted to wed—possibly (though by no means certainly) an Iranian survival. Superluous female children were formerly sacrificed as soon as born. Bara might take place only in clear weather, rain (in view of the great precipitation) being regarded as ill-omened; and food was laid on the grave for the soul's journey to the Other World.

3. Empire of Caucasus religion. —The rather scanty fragments of paganism found in the Caucasus are of more interest than appears on the surface. The Kartvelian stock seems to have had its original home much farther to the south in Asia Minor and to have been driven steadily northward by the invaders who established their empires in Mesopotamia. Thus they found an abode in eastern Cappadocia, Pontus, Armenia, the Caucasus; but under pressure of Armenians from the west, and of Iranians from the south, they had reached, by the time of Strabo, a territory extending from the lower course of the Kekkil Irakam to that of the Kura, and thence to Lenkoran on the Caspian, the northern boundary being the Caucasus range. The Kartvelian group thus represents the descendants of the ancient Colchidians, Samanes, Hetri, and Althani, the latter corresponding to the Kheureus, Palavas, Tushes, and kindred tribes.

If this theory is correct, from the modern paganism of these three Kartvelian tribes we may infer that the national character of the religion of a once considerable part of eastern Asia Minor. But perhaps we may go a step farther. We then have a knowledge that in Asia Minor there were at the Christian era certain characteristic religious phenomena represented by an orgiastic nature-cult, shown by the worship of Cybele and Attis (q.v.) in the west and north; the second exemplified by the developed polytheism of the Hittites (q.e.) in the centre and south; and the third characterized by a primitive type of the religion, mixed with shamanism, in the east. The enthusiasm of the orgy appealed to the decaying faiths of Greece and Rome; the polytheism, with a high degree of civilization, yielded only slowly to its foes; but the primitive savagery, with a low grade of civilization, was driven by the barbarians of higher type to the recesses of the Caucasus, where it still lingers, commingled with reminiscences and influences of the nobler religions of Zoroastrianism, Christianity, and Muhammadanism.

LITERATURE.—The principal literature on the paganism of the Caucasian tribes (chiefly in Russian) has been summarized by G. Merzbacher, Die Hethiter (Die Hethiter des eossen) und Hethiterlands des eossen, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1901 (esp. ch. xiii. for the Samtanis, and ch. xiv. for the Althani, Hetra, and Tushes). Nothing of importance on this subject has appeared since; or earlier literature not specified by Merzbacher, mention may be made of M. Kozlovich, 'Om dyrkan af fordradis hos de kavassiska folkem,' in Ymer, 1889, pp. 111-122. For the scanty classical accounts of the Caucasus and its inhabitants see: B. Latzey, Sogdica et Caucasus a veteribus scriptoribus Graecis et Latinis, 2 vols., Petrograd, 1896-1906. For ethnology and ancient history see esp. E. Chastour, Recherches anthropologiques dans le Caucas, 4 vols., Paris, 1885-87; J. de Morgan, Mission scientifique au Caucase, 2 vols., du 1000 au 1800, Zaborowski, 'Le Caucas et les Caucasiens,' in Revues anthropologiques, xiv. (1914) 121-133.

LOUIS H. GRAY.

TUTELARY GODS AND SPIRITS.—The conception of a tutelary guardian genius or guiding spirit believed to protect and watch over certain persons and objects appears to have been derived from the powers of observation and generalization are sufficiently developed to bring about a systematized scheme by which natural phenomena come to be divided into classes and assigned to particular departments of knowledge and application. Of these the high gods are associated with special functions—e.g., in Mexico, where Tlaloc is regarded as the god of rain and water, and therefore has the special care of the office of fertility, it is the numerous spirits by which primitive man supposes himself to be surrounded that become the patrons or guardians of individual men. Any extraordinary event that demands the help of an intervening agent produces the idea of a tutelary spirit, more deeply into the nature of the supernatural powers and to establish a more intimate alliance with them. Thus, to the primitive mind, the constant motion of water is controlled not by natural law but by some supernatural agency resident within the stream. At first it appears simply as a mystical impersonal force, but, as the mind becomes capable of more definite ideas, the conception of a spiritual being having personality is evolved.

The Trojans, e.g., originally regarded a sacred river as containing mana (q.e.), and, in consequence, sacrificed a bull to the stream by laying it on the bank of the river to be consumed. In later times, when they had reached the animistic stage, an altar was set up on the side of the river, and when a sacrifice of a bull was offered, the belief being that the spirit in the water came out and consumed the essence of the sacrifice.

As soon as the notion of a local spirit allied to a natural object is developed, the desire to seek the aid of the supernatural being speedily follows. The Iroquois at their festivals thank the good spirits and every object that ministers to their wants for the assistance rendered by them. In process of time a tutelary guardian genius is assigned to every individual, whose special function it is to guide, protect, and warn the man under his care. This guardian spirit may be acquired in various ways and take different forms. It may reveal itself at birth, or may await the 'crisis' reached at puberty. It may be the spirit of some ancestor or great chief or mighty magician; or it may belong to a deity whose dwelling is not with men. From these spirits the personal name and even the nature of an individual are frequently received, and to them men naturally looks for guidance and protection.

1 I. H. Bancelot, NF XII 334.
3 E. B. Tyler, P.C.S. ii. 335.
1. Forms of guardian spirits.—(a) Placenta.—

Among the Koobos, a primitive tribe of Sumatra, the navel- string is frequently cut off after birth and given to the child for good luck. The Esquisse is a sort of guardian angel of the man who came into the world with them and who lives in the house. They are said to guard the child from all evil. Hence it is that the Koobos always think of his navel-string and afterbirth before he goes to sleep or to work, or undertakes a joung[1]ney. The belief is that one would deprive himself of their care. The Butts, another tribe of Sumatra, believe that the soul of their deceased relations, in addition to an internal weight, had two invisible guardian spirits (his ends and end) who help him to keep out of great danger; one is the seed by which he was begotten, the other is the signal he calls to himself his elder and his younger brother.1

Among tribes of Central Australia the navel-string is frequently cut off with a stone knife and, after the afterbirth has been removed, they leave it around the child's neck until the blood is dried. It might not be thrown away over the open sky, lest demons should get hold of it and work the child harm thereby.2 If it were buried under the threshold where the mother stepped over it when she rose from bed, the child in after life had a guardian spirit in the shape of a bear, eagle, wolf, ox, or boat.3

(b) Association.—The one or few guardian spirits of an individual—son or daughter—are thought to manifest itself under the form of an animal.

Among the Ibans or Sea Dayaks of Borneo the spurong, or spirit-helper, is a form in which a dream appears, and makes himself known in the likeness of an animal. On the day after such a dream the Iban wanders through the jungle looking for signs which may recognize his spurong, and if an animal behoves in a manner at all unusual, if a startled deer does not run off in a hurry, if a bird of rapine, or a fish, or a chipmunk shows itself, or if a gibbon gambols about persistently in the trees near him, if he comes upon a bright quartz-crystal or a strangely contorted root or creeper, that animal or object is held to be full of a mysterious significance and is the abode of his "Nyong."5 It does not follow however, that every spurong takes on an animal form, all individuals of that species be objects of special regard to the Iban, and he will not, of course, kill or eat any such animal. Even if the spurong changes its form, he will continue to respect the species in which it first appeared. The cult may spread through the whole family, the children and grandchildren being under an obligation to respect the animal represented by their guardian spirit.

Among the Omaha Indians an animal as a guardian spirit is assigned to every man at puberty, and so close is the bond under which this supposed man is subjected to, that the qualities of the creature is that of his guardian. If, in the vision which defines the animal, he has one foot, he will be lame; if two, he will be a ke. The belief is that if, on the other hand, there is a bear that appears to him, he will be slow and clumsy and therefore likely to be killed. This belief is held that the man acquires the nature of the animal that is his guardian, has the Thompson Indians of British Columbia have a similar tradition in this connection. In his battle form a mimic battle before setting out on the warpath, in which every man portrays his body and imitates the sounds of his guardian animal.6 Similarly in W. Africa, when a man is initiated into a secret society, the animal that he sees in his dream forms his guardian spirit or patron.7

In Central America nagualism8 is one of the ancient forms of worship which still flourish. It consists in choosing an animal as the tutelary divinity of a child. The choice is said to be so closely connected with it, that the life of one depends on that of the other. The animal is selected in one of three ways—(1) by priestly divination; (2) by the father and friends drawing animal figures on the floor of a hut at the mother's confinement, the spirits of the animals appearing at the threshold near the being the guardian; (3) by noticing the bird or beast first seen by the watchers after the confinement.9 Sometimes a child's nagual is discovered by means of a calendar, in which all the names, places, and important facts of the child's birth, and the things that are recorded. Some of these horoscopes have a wheel painted on them; others are surrounded by the naguals in the form of various animals.10 The good luck of the animal is calculated from formulas and calculations based on a written document—is obviously a later development in the same lines.

Among the Algonquins of N. America the tutelary genius is known as the guardian totem or spirit-helper, associated usually with streams, cataracts, rocks, mountains, and forests. In nearly every case it manifests itself under the form of a beast, bird, or reptile of unusual size or appearance, although the animals have human proportions. At the age of puberty youths are made to retire to a cure where they will undergo a period of fasting. The first thing that appears in a dream to the novice is regarded as his guardian spirit, to whom he looks in after life for guidance and protection. The man destined to be a warrior will have a vision of an eagle or a bear, a serpent will appear to the future medicine-man, a wolf to the hunter. To complete the bond, a porportion of the guardian is worn about the person, which is regarded as rather an embodiment than as a representative of a supernatural power. It therefore seems that the guardian spirit is only one of a large class of spirits to which the common name of nagual or guardian is given.3 The same belief is found among the Iroquois and Hurons, the genii being called okias or okoms instead of naguals.

2. Functions of guardian spirits. — (a) The relation of guardian spirits to totems.—Among some of the Algonquin tribes a man's guardian is identical with his clan totem, but, since the former belongs solely to an individual, while the latter is the inheritor of the clan, a distinction is observed between the clan, the tutelary genius cannot be explained in terms of totemism.2 The similarity between the clan totem and the guardian spirit has led several anthropologists to believe that the human form, with which the species' comprehension under the name of Nycroty. Similarly when all the members of a man's family and all his descendants, and, if he be a chief, all the members of the community over which he rules, come to share in the benefits conferred by his Nyong, and in the feeling of respect and for it and in the performance of rites in honour of the species of animal in one individual of which it is supposed to reside. In such cases the species approaches very closely the clan-totem in some of its varieties. Un fortunately, however, for this theory, the authors' own evidence that there are no signs of clan totemism in Borneo.4

For support of this view of the origin of totemism (p.v.) their advocates are driven to various American theories such as those of F. Boas, who thinks that the totem is the symbol of the family, or that the Columbia have been developed from the personal manitou; and of Alice C. Fisher, who is led to a similar conclusion by a study of the totem of the Onaha tribe.6 It should be remembered that, while it is perfectly true that guardian spirits are occasionally inherited among certain N. American tribes, and not acquired for each individual separately, and therefore in process of time may become the totems of the clans, yet, since inherited guardian spirits are usually regarded as less powerful than those acquired by individuals,3 they are hardly likely to be taken over as the providers of the clan. Moreover, there is no evidence forthcoming that a totemic

clan has actually grown up in this way either in America or elsewhere. Where the original condition is that of a common totemic or clan spirit, it is not then a matter of fact that the totem spirit is preserved in America and the Pacific, as compared with Australasia, we are dealing with a relatively advanced, not to say degenerate, form of totemism. The fact is that in the majority of cases, the origin of the institution rests entirely upon a few cases derived from the N. American Indians. In Australia, where the custom is seen in a much more primitive form, there is no evidence of guardian spirits becoming clan totems, while in Africa examples are also wanting. We therefore conclude that the theory which seeks the origin of totemism in the personal guardian spirits of individuals is devoid of proof, at any rate in the present state of our knowledge.

(5) Guardian spirits of houses and villages.—In most of the W. African tribes there is a class of ancestral spirits known as the 'house-spirits,' which are supposed to protect and benefit their particular village or family, acting in conjunction with the 'family-spirits' or ancestral totems. It is often supposed that the spirit of a man lingers about a house some time after his death, and, although it is able to injure the children and often causes them illness, it is thought that it is in the best possible way of keeping off evil spirits.1

The Bundu recognizes a minor deity called Baal Atoy, which protects the house against sickness and attack, and is called upon in cases of madness to expel the evil spirit possessing the patient. The 'seven children of Him the Great' are supposed to lead the same way leading to the house from the river's brink; it holds a spear in the right hand, a shield in the left, and carries about its neck a fringed collar made of knotted strips of ratten; the head of each room is tied on such one strip, making it a knob, the symbol of the housekeeper of his household. Another god, Basa Uone, brings prosperity to the house.4

Even an evergreen tree may choose its guardian spirits, often in the form of an animal, as a dog, tiger, cat, or serpent, 'although occasionally a human being is selected.5 The Rhonds have titular deity es of house, village, groves, etc., which survive in the later Hindustan. The Rigveda recognizes Vashataptra, the lord of the house, to whom the lord's orders obligations to be made. This Vedic divinity is associated by W. Windle with Vesta and Heifer, and compared to the Celtic cernus, satelies, originally 'house-man,' and thus associated with the 'king of the house-men.' In Hindustan, however, a female deity, Jata, is assigned to the guardianship of the house. Although she is represented as a demonic power, she is friendly to her vassals, as she is not worshiped with incense, food, flowers, and so forth.

The Ainus have a fetish called Inao, invested with life, which is supposed to look after the household and general welfare of the family. Its special dwelling-place is in the northernmost corner of the house, and it is supposed to be invisible. Occasionally, in times of trouble, he is brought out from his corner, stuck in the hearth, and there prayed to by the head of the family. It is supposed to have been brought down from heaven to be the husband of the goddess of fire, and to help her to sit down to the table, and therefore he is called 'the ancestral governor of the house.'

3. Offerings to guardian spirits.—Since guardian spirits exercise such a powerful influence over the lives and destinies of men, it is not surprising that they are frequently the recipients of offerings to appease their wrath or secure their favour and beneficence.

The Thal of Indo-China, e.g., offer firstfruits of rice at harvest to the guardian spirit of the family before the household partake of the new crop. Besides the firstfruits at harvest, 'the guardian spirit is consulted on the parched grain in spirit,' at the time when the first thunder of the season is heard. 'When all is ready, the rice is served up together with fish, which have been caught, for the purpose, on a table set in a corner, which is sacred to the guardian spirit. A priest dounouts a long distaff-like to the generosity of the gift with children, then the family sit down to the table and consumes the offering. At the close of the banquet the daughter-in-law of the deceased ancestor, the guardian spirit (the guardian) fashioning and linking rice and fish for his use in the corner, after which she closes the shrines in the house in the name of the deceased.1

There is another instance of a spirit called Totoro who, it is thought, is the guardian spirit of the house. It is said that this spirit often brings in the invisible guardians so that they may not harm him when he eats the flesh of the animals killed in the chase. Spirits are also supposed to guard the clearings to which the deer come by night to drink, and the hunter must sacrifice a foul to the combination from time to time to secure the benefits of the custom prevails among the Indian tribes about Green Bay, Lake Michigan. While hunting, if a person has a particular guardian spirit, and therefore, when a young girl seized a house to eat it, her father first fondled it tenderly to appease the spirit who has charge of mice, in order that his daughter might not suffer from her meal.2

Among the Ewes of Togoland (W. Africa), before the new yams are eaten, every house-holder takes a raw piece of yam and goes with it to his loom (yslight) and prays: 'May the Artificer take this yam and eat! When they practice their art, may it prosper!'3

Again he takes a raw yam and goes with it under the house-door and prays: 'O my guardian spirit (adzina) and all ye gods who pay heed to this house, come and eat yam! When I also eat of them, may I remain healthy and nowhere feel pain. May my housemates all remain healthy!' After he has invoked their protection on his family, he takes a cooked yam, crumbles it on the hearth and adds it with red oil. With this mixture he goes again to his loom and prays, 'May the Artificer take this yam and pray about the end of the homestead, then under the house door: 'He of my guardian gods and he of the watchers of the house who lives in my house, and is mixed with the rice, may you take the white yam from my hand and eat!'4

Among the Ewe-speaking tribes of the African tribe it is customary at sowing a rice-field to reserve a certain portion at the entrance for the guardian spirits, who at harvest are invited to come and share with their servants. They will then content themselves with eating the grain in their private stores and not touch on the crops destined for the use of man.5

In the Teninber and Timor-laut Islands, East Indies, the first-fruits of the harvest are brought to the shrine, offered to the guardian spirit (omatere), or spirits of ancestors, 'which are thrown up as gods or spirits or household gods.' The Yoruba of the Slave Coast sacrifice fouls to their guardian spirit (ejeri), which is supposed to dwell in the head, by mixing some of the blood of the victim with palm wine. The head is cut off, and the forehead? The tinode in Florida, one of the Solomon Islands, are also approached by sacrifice on certain occasions—e.g., before a planing, a voyage, or a fight. The N. American Indians offer dogs and horses to the medicine bag, to which they look for safety and protection throughout life.

Among some of the Algokin tribes, when a man's guardian spirit is identical with his clan totem, should he be compelled to kill the sacred animal, due apology was made to it before destroying it, certain portions of the flesh being preserved as an offering to the manido (guardian).9

Herein again lies an important distinction from the Aborigines, and many even when the two are inseparable. The former is regarded as so intimately associated with an individual that prayers and sacrifices may with impunity be offered to it, but the latter is more closely concerned with the food group or clan and therefore is seldom the recipient of offerings from individuals. Apart from the evidence of Carl Strehlov, that the hymn which is sung at the initiation of the kanganaro describes the offering of a morsel of kangaroo fat to make the fat of the kangaroos increase,10 the act of oblation can hardly be said to form a part of the totemic rites in Australia—the home of the Aborigines, and the custom to which it is linked. Therefore conclude that totemic gods and spirits have arisen out of animistic and theistic conceptions rather than from ideas connected with totemism, although it is undoubtedly

1 L. A. F., p. 167. 2 Ibid., p. 172. 3 Ibid., p. 175. 4 Ibid., p. 175. 5 Ibid., p. 175. 6 J. F. H., p. 175. 7 Ibid., p. 175. 8 Ibid., p. 175. 9 Ibid., p. 175. 10 Ibid., p. 175. 11 Ibid., p. 175.
true that in America the doctrine of the clan totem has developed side by side with that of the guardian spirit conceived as an animal. Elsewhere, however, the patron spirit is much more closely allied to animism and theism. Wherever animistic conceptions prevail, there the notion of a tutelary genius will be found in some form or other. As spirits give place to gods, the spiritual guide is a protector of individuals, and has his place in the pantheon, till in the Christian Church the doctrine of a guardian angel watching over, succouring, and defending the faithful on earth is raised to the sphere of a higher spiritual level. Are they not all ministering spirits, sent forth to do service for the sake of them that shall inherit salvation? (He 1).

This is the function of the guardian angels in the NT; they are to lead men safely to the kingdom of heaven by helping them to attain salvation. It is not the Biblical conception that angels are the personification of natural powers, or merely the means of securing the favour and help of supernatural beings. They are consistently represented as a body of created spiritual beings intermediate between God and man (I’s 8), whose function is to act as mediators between the inhabitants upon God’s throne (Dn 7th), Ps 91:1 103:8, Is 6, Gn 16, Jg 13, Lk 11-th). Jerome thinks that every individual, whether baptized or not, has from birth an angel chosen by God to guard him, while Chrysostom2 and Basil hold that only the baptized enjoy the privileges of having a tutelary angel. Thomas Aquinas teaches that out of the least orders of angels are sent to men, and therefore alone are guardians.3

No doubt the Biblical account of the ministry of angels was inherited from the world-wide doctrine of tutelary gods and spirits, and to an extent influenced by it, but at the same time it is evident that the line of development has been on a higher and more spiritual level.

**LITERATURE.—The authors are quoted in the footnotes.**

**TUTORIUM.—See RIGORIS, PROBABILITY.**

**TWINS.—The birth of twins in the human species is an event so unusual that it has almost everywhere drawn popular attention and evoked expressions of emotion, varying from extreme terror through the whole gamut of fear, repugnance, suspicion, anxiety, perplexity, hope, and joy. The theory of twins is regarded as un-natural and monstrous, and therefore as pertaining evil. The unfortunate babies and their mother have been looked upon as guilty of a serious crime—a crime calculated to call down the vengeance of the higher powers. Accordingly they must be at once put to death, and the offence repudiated and cleared from the land. Or their birth has been taken to a message from the divinity conveying a warning of impending evil, only to be thrust aside by their immediate slaughter or by so variety of superstitions observed, intended by abstinence and humiliation to avert the threatened calamity.

1. Tabu of twins: its mitigation, ceremonies, and superstitions.—Among the peoples by whom this view of the birth of twins has been taken as those of Australia, the East Indian Archipelago, nearly as well as among the priest-ridden part of the aboriginal population of America, the population of the north-east of Asia, the non-Aryan tribes of India, and the backward classes and populations of Europe. Among the Brahmins, as the priests are called, there are many beliefs as reported of the Assyroians and Babylonians, the

1 Comm. in Matt. 180 (cf. II. § 120).
2 In Ep. ad Coloss. hom. iii.
3 Eunom Thol. I. qu. cu. art. 6.

Aryan population of India, and the Egyptians. Where the superstition has the fullest power both mother and children are at once put to death. A typical illustration of this is found among the Negro population of the Niger Delta. Even when the mother is allowed to live she becomes an outcast and must pass the rest of her days in the forest. If she ventures into the town or village, any paths that she may use will be defiled and unfit for the inhabitants. She may not drink from any well or river water-supply as her own people; she must not touch anything belonging to them. The consequence is that the mothers of twins simply die from hunger and exposure, or they take their own lives. A slave-woman is the professional killer of twins. She takes each child by one foot and the other and breaks its back across her knees. ‘The bodies are then placed in an earthen pot and taken into a dense part of the bush and there left to be devoured by wild animals and insects. In some parts of this district the children are not killed, but simply thrown into the forest to die of hunger and exposure. At Arobo in Africa, if her husband is not of a man of wealth, he may redeem her with another victim. More generally there are provided ‘twin-towns’ of cities of refuge, to which these unfortunate women may escape and where they can at least be saved from their own homes. There they must reside for a time to undergo purification. The period is stated by Mrs. D. Amaury Talbot, speaking of the Hibsos, as the mouth of the month of the lunar cycle; that is to be twelve moons. This, we may be sure, is the least penalty that can be imposed on them.

Leopard writes that ‘the women, looked on as unclean for the rest of their lives, are obliged to reside in villages, which are known as Twin-towns, or the habitations of defiled women, appointed for that particular purpose. From this time forth the husband, whether he be head of the house or not, is obliged to maintain a wife who has been so defiled; although at the same time he is strictly forbidden to cohabit or to have any dealings with her, being, as he is in every religious and personal sense, human and spiritual, divorced from her. But in spite of the fact that to him, as well as to all the members of his or her community, the woman is unclean and therefore taboo, the penalty of death being inflicted on both in the event of their breaking the law in this direction, she is allowed to form connections outside the village, and account to me, with men belonging to outside communities, and the offspring resulting from such intercourse becomes, at a matter of course, the property of the husband. The same proviso holds at New Guinea. But in the event of the defiled woman herself bearing twins again, these must be left to another woman. If it is known, the probabilities are that the death of the mother would be demanded by the household and the community as well. Or if not killed, she would be driven into the bush and left to die, although, if discovered by a stranger, he is at liberty to claim her as his own property.—that is at least if he feels inclined to run the risk of a venture so truly provocative of offense.’

2 In Bali, westward of the Hibsos country, the woman was, and perhaps is still, quarantined in an out-of-the-way hut for six days, after which she went through a ceremony of purification by the priests. The father, head of the house, was required to offer certain sacrifices. The threatened evil was thus averted, and the purified mother was then received back into the family circle. Among the Hibsos, however, if the mother dies during the birth of twins, she may be carried to burial by the ordinary door of the hut or along the ordinary path of the village, as she is born through a hole broken for the purpose in the wall of the hut and along a path specially cut through the bush.

7 P. 401.
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The lot of the children in Nigeria and adjacent countries has also been mitigated, to the extent that one only of them is now in most places put to death.

The Basari of Togonbad, e.g., preserve the boy if the twins are of different sexes, or the stronger of the two if the same sex. Yet it is possible that a big price is offered and cut in two. Half of it is buried with the condenmed twin as a sort of protection to the survivor, to help with the surviving twin, so that the spirit of the buried child may not avenge itself on the survivor. Survivors-twins are burdened all their lives. The women who have such twins, though apparently not driven away, are not allowed to take part in the agricultural activities (oiling and harvesting), until a certain number of years, or the harvest, until the dead twin has reappeared as a subsequent child.

A similar modification of the children's fate is found among the Ibasu tribes. On the lower Congo one of the twins is often neglected and starved to death. The reason given for this is that the mother does not like the extra trouble involved in caring for the two; but it is doubtful whether this is a sufficient explanation. In some cases where the twin that dies is also found among the Negro Yorubas and other west African tribes, both Negroes and Bantus. It is said to keep the survivor from pining for the deceased, and to give the spirit of the deceased a habitation. This arises from the special sympathetic relationships that exist between twins. We shall find illustrations elsewhere.

In Australia the usual reason assigned for killing one or both twins is the economic reason that the mother has not enough milk for them, and moreover cannot rear them and also get her food. This is a piece with the prevalent custom of infanticide, even of a single child, when the mother already has one dependent upon her. But among some tribes at least it does not appear to be the only reason.

Among the Eenhây the husband suspects his wife of infidelity. Among the Arunta, where twins are reported as of extremely rare occurrence, they are put to death, a woman with a soul is believed to have two bodies, and the twin is a sign of illness. Among the Yurips and the Nias twins are universally disliked and dreaded.

In the province of West Nias it is believed that they will grow up evil doers: if a boy and girl, they are specially evil, the one will become a murderer and the other a poisoner. Formerly the former used to be hung on a tree in a sack, and the latter miserably to perish. The Dutch government and missionary, it seems, have almost succeeded in suppressing the practice. In many cases the natives are still alive even of the parents. The father gets a priest to make a magical image of a board roughly cut in human shape, as a charm against these twins, and put up in the house to prevent a second such misfortune. Until it is ready, the parents dare not go out or speak to be given to a family of a different clan, becoming thus the child of that family, all relationships with its natural parents being severed. Among the Basutos the same custom prevails. The Nilotic Negro Dinkas, prescribes the substitution of goats for the sacrifice of the calves.  8

The neighbouring Nandi, a Nilotic Negro tribe, look upon the birth of twins as an insidious event, and the mother is useless for the rest of her life. Doubtless in earlier days she was put to death or expelled from the community. Even now her life must be a burden to her. 6 She is given her own cow, and may not touch the milk or blood of any other animal. She may enter nobody's house until she has sprinkled a calabashful of water on the ground; and she may never cross the threshold of a cattle kraal again. Special names, as is often the case, are given to children born in twin. Among the Nandi, in the Elen district, have rendered her lot a little less intolerable. But even there she is shut up for a while in the hut, and elaborate and protracted ceremonies must be performed with a medicine-man's assistance before she is released. Even if a woman produce twins, circumstances are unfavourable, and they are redeemed with the slaughter of a sheep.

In both N. and S. America the custom of putting two twins, or at least one of them, to death seems to have been universal. 9

The aborigines of the northern part of the upper basin of the River Amazonas allege a curious reason for their dislike of twins. To give birth to twin is considered by many a thing to be avoided at all costs. The unfortunate mother therefore will either try to separate the second child (or, if the girl is the last in the lot in the bush whither she has, in accordance with custom, retired alone to be delivered), or the Saliva on the other hand, saying she is a rodent. Their objections, however, seem to go deeper than this; for the Saliva husband believes that the second twin is the offspring of adultery. A chief has in fact been known to give one of his wives a whipping in public for having dared to bring two twins, and to threaten the others with similar consequences if they did the same. 10

From a pastoral letter by the archbishop of Lima in the year 1846, quoted by von Temski. It appears that the Peruvians of that date offered twins and children born first time from Amazon, or supernatural being, and preserved their bodies or buried them in their houses. 11 Other records show that the birth of twins was regarded as unnatural and unlucky and demanding sacrifices and ceremonies lasting many days. 12 The North-Eastern Madu of California who inhabited the foothills and western slopes of the Sierra reared the birth of twins as an exceptionally bad omen. The mother, it is said, was often killed and the newborn children were sometimes buried alive with her body or without. 13 Among the Seri of the Californian Gulf 'triplets are deemed evil monsters and their production a capital crime. 14

1 K. R. Dunand, JRAI Hist. 67.
8 A. C. Hollis, The Nandi, their Language and Folklore, Oxford, 1899, p. 68.
Among the Kavan of Borneo, the motive alleged for malevolent destruction in the jungle is to preserve the life of the other; and it is believed that a sympathetic bond exists between twins which renders each of them liable to all the ills and misfortunes that befall the other.

In the Ambatombakha the excuse for this treatment was that they would in any case die, if not in the womb, during the little time they might remain in the province of Imberia it was apparently the custom formerly to sacrifice the twins. More recently, though this custom had been abandoned, the parents were required to sacrifice one of them over to a relative; and, if a woman belonging to the royal family had twins, both they and the mother were sent away and lost their lives.1

Exposure or murder by violence is in fact a fate of one or both twins—a fate they share with their twin. They are still regarded as unlucky or even dangerous, but ceremonies are performed to ward off the evil.

The Ewe of Togoland, W. African Negroes, hold them to be forbidden to eat; for they must either be killed or sold, but they will not live long; they will die and go back to the father, or to the sister, as a mark of distinction they wear special beads; and their parents set up a house on the day of the funeral, but that of a feather of a pair of buffalo-horns and in some districts a curved wooden staff with the precaution that, if any of the twin's belongings are brought into the house, the father and mother are to be brought in and the twin's belongings are to be given over to them. In the same district the twins-fetish is also invoked at a funeral feast on setting up the horns, and a dog is bled to them, together with some of the meat which is provided for all who give it. In a feast for all who come together from the outlying villages. The parents of the twins are required to offer for the twins and dance, and the twins are carried on the back that every Egyptian is said to have the twin figures. In some these twins are very expensive. Twins must be kept as if they are children. They must eat a year earlier than other children, and smoke a month earlier than others.

Notwithstanding the practices and beliefs just mentioned, the Ewe are said to look upon twins with favour.

For the Ho the birth of twins is a very great joy; it is regarded as better than riches. Among the Fe, another tribe of Ewe, such births are very frequent. The children are regarded as children of Oohob, a supernaturally being. If twins were to be born, it would be regarded as a misfortune. Even twins if born are not allowed to look upon the other children or to touch the same animate object. It is the belief that they are to be kept away from the world and any other thing that is contrary to them. Both twins are kept away from the world and any other thing that is contrary to them. Both twins are kept away from the world and any other thing that is contrary to them.

For the Ho these twin figures are used for decoration. The Ho is a tribe of the coast of Togoland, and it is the belief that they are to be kept away from the world and any other thing that is contrary to them.

The Ho, a tribe of Ewe, when twins, a boy and girl, are born, neither of the parents may eat or sleep until an elaborate series of purificatory ceremonies, accompanied by feasting and the drinking of palm-wine, has been performed over them by others who are also parents of twins and who are paid for the rites. If the twins are to be kept alive, it is thought that they would become cripples. To the twins and their parents the flesh of hussar-apes and rats is forbidden. If any one shoot a hussar-ape, the parents of twins are expected to beat him with a stick. The exact relation between the hussar-ape and twins is difficult to determine. The hussar-ape is said to be the long-tailed monkey (Mercketta, a species of cercopithecus) are 'individual twins' of twins, and that twins may never

3. J. B. J. van Houtte, The Heavenly Twins, p. 27.
4. See note. ABANDONMENT AND EXPOSURE.
5. J. R. Y. WR XV, 1911, 24, 96, 100, 127.
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Turning from the Negroes to the Bantu, we find that the ambiguous position of twins is well ex-emplified by the Thonga.

Among the customs vary, as among the Fue, in different districts. The Bantu of Nyasaland, for example, were not put to death. Novelties made in the village, in some cases, lead to the death of twins, and if the children are allowed to live, it is usually by the mother or the father of the twins. In the village with the Thonga, the mother of twins is always treated as though she were a member of the priestly order of the village. She is allowed to keep her children, but not to marry. If she marries, her children are not allowed to participate in any of the ceremonies in the village. In the village with the Thonga, the mother of twins is always treated as though she were a member of the priestly order of the village. She is allowed to keep her children, but not to marry. If she marries, her children are not allowed to participate in any of the ceremonies in the village.

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scionally with disfavor, held that they threatened misfortune to their parents, and that the storing buffaloes were sacred and the kid should be wounded; and, if he wounded an antelope, it would escape him. In the Ganges valley, it is thought that the twins cannot die until the spell is broken by another woman bearing twins, or his wife another child.1

In India and adjacent countries twins are generally considered as monstrous, though there are differences in this respect. All the peoples, however, seem to agree that the birth of twins of different sexes is serious. It is held that their commencement is caused by the union of the spermatozoa of different fathers; for it has been sinful, amounting to prenatal incest.2

Among the inhabitants of the Siamese Malay States, when twins are rare occurrence there is considered to be something unlucky, it is otherwise with triplets: they are considered fortunate.3 In some other districts in Java, it is considered by the people that when a woman bears two children at the same time, it is proof that she has been amorous; in consequence, the women are careful to keep on good terms. This child ought to be returned to his formidable parent as soon as possible; but, since there is no means of identifying him with certainty, both twins must be treated alike. In consequence of this origin, twins after death are never buried in the same grave as their respective parents, but are buried in the same grave as their common parents.

The birth of twins in the island of Shikhalain in the Bazar archipelago is regarded as ominous, for the same reason: it is to avert the evil omens of their birth.2 The custom is also observed in some parts of the Philippine Islands.4

To the Gikryk of the island of Shikhalain twins are a source of displeasure, if not of fear. Such births are said to be relatively common, and that both boys or both girls are twins. The reason for the pair is believed to be offspring of the Mountain-man, a supernatural being, and the custom is believed to be maintained by the people who are careful to keep on good terms. This child ought to be returned to his formidable parent as soon as possible; but, since there is no means of identifying him with certainty, both twins must be treated alike. In consequence of this origin, twins after death are never buried in the same grave as their respective parents, but are buried in the same grave as their common parents.

2 Speaking generally, the Nilotc Negroes rejoice with triumph.
5 J. H. R. T. p. 396, iv, 73.
7 It is not known.
9 Wilkon, i, 69.
12 ib., p. 764.
16 In New Guinea, since to beget a woman might cause her to bear twins, it is not unusual for her to be wounded by using the knife if not the wound twins, or his wife another child.1

The birth of twins in the Ganges valley, it is thought that the twins cannot die until the spell is broken by another woman bearing twins, or his wife another child. In the Ganges valley, it is thought that the twins cannot die until the spell is broken by another woman bearing twins, or his wife another child.1

In India and adjacent countries twins are generally considered as monstrous, though there are differences in this respect. All the peoples, however, seem to agree that the birth of twins of different sexes is serious. It is held that their commencement is caused by the union of the spermatozoa of different fathers; for it has been sinful, amounting to prenatal incest.2

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the belief that the twins are due to two fathers.

Hence also the second-born child is commonly held to be the elder or higher in rank, as among the Negroes.

But there is another, and perhaps older, view, more widely held, that they are the result of divine impropriation.

In W. Africa we have seen that they are called 'fetish-children'. To the Fof Tongola they are the children of the Omo. The Aima of Calabar, the Kwakwati of the Ennedi, the hunter of the River, and the Hidjo pronounce one of them to be the offspring of an evil spirit (the other being born to the woman for an "incubus"), and regard their birth as a favour, which the jealous spirit is likely to recall, or to take the mother or her husband in payment for it. To prove this, the important event is celebrated by a variety of ceremonies, including songs, dances, and gifts to the parents (omniales offerings for the spirit), which have a way of disappearing by enchantment.

Two entirely black sheep are bought for the twins; they must have the care and observe their prayers and symbol of their spirits, their fetishes. In Indonesia likewise the birth of twins is ascribed to a demon. One of them, according to belief in the island of Lias, is due to superimposition caused by such a being, as is also the birth of an albino. Other causes are recognized in the eastern province of the island, as roughness or anger on the mother's part towards her parents or sister, continued cohabitation during pregnancy, or the eating of a double fruit. To the last we shall recur. Like the Warmund, the North Samoans believe some other cause will kill the twins if they are allowed to live; and they are therefore put to death. And in northern Patagonia, the offspring of the twins is the offspring of an "ante" (ghost of the dead).

The quieter ones are, of course, the larger, is put in a pot and buried alive. The Back of Demeurano also regard twins as the offspring of an evil spirit named Pernowarai. In Essaquepe a British commission, in 1871, reported that a native woman, who was not many years ago ascribed an outbreak of sickness to one of twins whom she had just brought to the coast. He became a wizard, a person of supernatural powers, "because a woman could not naturally produce two children at a birth"; and the unfortunate child had, indeed, been Investigated was born as the result of the mother's infidelity to her husband, but it is generally accepted that she has trespassed on the sacred space of a ghost whose power lies that way.4 In the Moluccas twins are attributed to the sky-god, Upulero, probably as father.5 This belief may be compared with a custom of the Tungva Tribes of S.E. Africa, who call twins 'children of heaven' and in this capacity ascribe to them special powers; and the mother is called Tilo, "heaven".6 The ancient Persians held that one of twins was the son of the lightning, to which they prayed the lord and creator of rain, and that the parents were asked to be excused if the lightning diverges and ceremonies. There is some evidence that they offered the twins, probably to the lightning; at any rate, if they died young, the children were endowed with supernatural powers in the dwelling-house as sacred things.

As among the Tungvas, twins taken to be the offspring of the Mountain-man, so their neighbours the Alains of Shakhal believe one of them to be of a supernatural being, on the ground that one cannot get out of the child at a time. This is a perpetual shame to the mother; and there is reason for believing that this was disguised at birth, as the twin's account expressly affirms. At all events the Alains state that only one survives, and that of one human paternity. It is also said that, like the Japanese, they hold that, when twins are born, the older is bold, strong, and lucky, while nothing distinguishes the elder from ordinary men. They, however, seek by means of sacrifice, prayer, and talismans to prevent such births. They avoid women who have given birth to twins; but, contrary to the Gilyaks, they hold that nothing is so likely to convey the infection as objects belonging to the

1 Partridge, pp. 38, 2574; Mrs. Anxury Talbot, p. 23; Anthropos, viii, 59.

2 J. M. W. van der Burgt, Ue ein Grand Peuple de L'Afrique Equatoriale, Bolse-Duc, 1904, p. 711.

3 E. Modigliani, le Vagabond Naut, Milan, 1890, p. 555; De Zwaan, p. 178.

4 K. Neumann, Deutsch New-Guinen, Berlin, 1911, i, 400.

5 A. E. Jensen, the Indiana Forelet, Manilla, 1900, p. 69.


7 Rendell Harris, Cult of the Heavenly Twins, p. 5, quoting the report.

8 Coedroshi, p. 239.

9 Ibid., pp. 356, 364, 492, 498.


12 Anthropos, vii, 770; Rendell Harris, Babbage, p. 161.
The belief in reincarnation is very widespread, and it has been discussed by the present writer in his Primary Paternity.\(^1\) The Semang, a Negrito tribe of Perak, hold that certain birds and animals eat only the souls of the dead; both birds and animals are considered to have the power to foretell the future; and a bird of this kind is looked upon as the offspring of a pregnant woman, but only while children.

The somewhat indefinite ascription by the various tribes of the north-western coasts of N. America to the power of the dead of eating animals is available to the husband of the young women, and renewing it year by year.

Arunta, which take the wolf in the forest.\(^2\) The birth of twins is connected with a misfortune, human life being intensified if both are girls; every one promptly runs out of the house, leaving the mother and children alone. To prevent this event, the Fihmen (one of the tribes) set up a figure of a wolf, made of wood, to act as a substitute for the husband of the young women, and renewing it year by year.

A pair of twins have the privilege of learning things by means of dreams. They are thought to be to spiritual and physical phenomena. They lose the privilege, however, if they eat animals which they have so much of, and do not grow any such animal. If this power appears to extend into adult life, twins among the Igorrians of S. America are believed to be born of the twins' parents; and among the twins are regarded as the elder; but both must be treated exactly alike: the Twin Houses,\(^3\) or set, each consisting of a small rude framework covered with a thatch of grass, form a sort of shrine. Upon a wooden girdle beneath the thatch is spread a white cloth, on which is cast a small cup of corn from an ear of corn, and a white streamer floats from a rough pole in front of the structure. The shrines of twin-shrine is ascribed to twin-bearers and twins, and to the two by persons who are born of twin, but not necessarily of the same mother. Under their direction and to their profit, the twin-bearers and twins, and their shrines, are arranged. A fowl is then sacrificed and the patient is washed over all these shrines in the water of the river; and the powers of twins are sometimes extended to their parents.

To cure a sprain, the mother of twins in Ceylon made to trample the hemp every evening for a couple of days.\(^7\) Among the Brahuis of Baluchistan, to cure the tertian fever, a twin is called on to stand opposite to the patient. This is hung round the patient's neck and is believed to drive the fever away.\(^8\) In Maryland it is asserted that the breasts of twins has power to drive away the whooping-cough from a child by giving it a piece of bread and butter.\(^9\) Among the Baganda a ceremony also intended to ensure male fertility to the plantains is performed by the father and mother, and an effigy of each of the twins, partly composed of ground oat-flower.\(^10\) Among the Basoga, on the north-east of Lake Victoria Nyanza, the birth of twins is a joyous event, though both the twins and their parents are subjected to taboos and ceremonies to render them innocuous. In the north-western district the persons of both father and mother are sacred; the former goes on a round of visits, and is believed to carry blessing wherever he goes. In the central district the children are held to be of divine origin. Their mother must sow her seed before any woman of her clan. The twins must be brought to the field of any classwoman who is about to sow; and the sowing is performed in their presence.\(^11\) The Buto, a Nilotic tribe bordering on Lake Kyoga, were held to be the birth of twins, though they and their mother are secluded, as among the

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1. \(^{[1]}\) Arunta, vi. 1028.
2. \(^{[2]}\) Leonard, p. 462.
In fact, it is chiefly in the control of the weather and the promotion of fertility that twins closely connect with another—that the powers possessed by twins are generally held to lie. Power over the elements, especially over rain and snow, is always attributed to them by the Indians of British Columbia. The Shuswap hold that, if a twin bathe in a lake or stream, it will rain. The Tsimshian think that whatever twins white birds on a thing, and that the weather. There fore they pray to wind and rain, 'Calm down, breath of the twins.'

A study of the Etuksaw by ethnologists tells us that they can cause disease and procure favourable winds and weather. Nuxa twins produce rain by painting their face black, according to the Bushmen. The Bushmen hold that this course for the abatement of a gale. In S. Africa twins are said to be able to foretell the weather by their feelings: this seems to be a relic of a belief in control of the weather, control having faded into prediction. A little farther north, the Bushmen employ the twin to procure rain. The women, stripped or covered at most with a grass petticoat, go in procession led by a mother of twins to the grave of a twin, or of an abortion, buried in a dry place, and pour water on it, or dig up the remains and bury them again in the mud near the water. Among the Wanyamwoi of the German East Africa a twin about to cross a river, stream, or lake, or in a stormy weather, fills his mouth with water and sports it out, saying, 'I am a twin.' The object of this ceremony is to prevent harm befalling him or his companions. It is only in the Upper Congo that twins are usually abundant, a twin is called to make excessive rain cease. He puts some rain-eradicating earth on the hands and feet, dips them into the rain to cease and the earth to dry up. Here twins also are credited with occult powers to affect the weather, or to cure or to cause the success or failure of a hunting or fishing expedition.20 In Gabun, French Congo, the images of twins, presented to the twin sanctuaries, are said to be used in rain-making.21 It is apparently held to ensure the continued fertility of their mother.22 From a consideration of the traditional disappearance of Romulus, the first of the twin-sanctuaries of Romulus, who, it will be remembered, was one of twins, J. G. Frazer has made the ingenious conjecture that the ancient Romans must have had a widespread superstition that twins have power over the weather in general and over rain and wind in particular. The superhuman powers of Gwyvelwyk and the mundane cult of such as die have already been referred to.

4. Cult of divine twins.—So far, abundant reason has been given for the conclusion that twins, being out of the ordinary course of nature, are held by many peoples to be children of extraordinary powers, or of portentous and even dangerous birth, and consequently that they, or at least one of them, must be laid under an especial protection, put to death, and, where this practice is abandoned or has not arisen, they and their mother (frequently their father also) must be surrounded with taboos. They are involved for various purposes, chiefly for rain and fertility. Rendel Harris, who has investigated the subject, has in a series of works established the existence, from a remote antiquity, in Mediterranean countries of a cult of divine twins, some indications of which are also found elsewhere. The twins of Greek legend, Castor and Polydeuces (called by the Romans Pollux), have of course long been known, and other twins of less renown have also been recognized. But the wide range of the cult, and the number of cases in which twins have been worshipped, had not previously been understood. Castor and Polydeuces, the twin sister with their sister with their twin, the tradition ally the children of Leda, born in some versions, out of an egg.

Twins, king of Sparta, the husband of Elara, though regarded in their life as their father, was credited in some accounts with the paternity of Castor only, the other two being the children of Zeus. It has been mentioned above that this belief in a divided paternity of a multiple birth is not unusual among the lower races; it is therefore one of the marks of the archaic origin of the cult of Castor and Pollux. The former, being the son of a mortal father, was himself mortal. Pollux, however, by some accounts, was credited with sharing his immortality with his brother and living with him alternately a day under the earth and a day with the gods. Their legend attributed to them a number of adventures; and they were worshipped as deo stari, protectors of travellers by water, and thence of travellers in general, the guardians of hospitality and of oaths, and were represented as riding on magnificent white steeds. As twins they were connected with the sky, with thunder and storms; hence probably not only their patronage of travellers by sea, but also their character as Dioscuri, sons of Zeus, and their reputation as saviours, which has been ascribed to their descent from the Tyndareans, they were special patrons of the kings of Sparta. Other twins were also known in Greece—Herakles and Iphikles, Amphion and Zethus, etc. Rendel Harris has also made out a good case for the existence of twin-sanctuaries in the peninsula and adjacent islands, leading to the inference that the twin superstition in Greece was not different from that found in other quarters of the globe.

The worship of the Dioscuri early passed to Italy, where it is attested on the coins of Magna Grecia and the mirrors of the Etruscan. It became firmly rooted in Italy by the well-known dilymphomy at the battle of Lake Regillus. But from the very beginnings of the city the twin superstition seems to have been accepted. The tale of Romulus and Remus is conclusive on the point. They built Rome, as Amphion and Zethus built Thebes, one brother slew the other—neither of these incidents is by any means strange in legends of twins—and the surviving twin disappeared in a thunderstorm, without a doubtless another way of expressing his relation to the sky and the storm-cloud.

The Siwins, perhaps originally divine horses before they became elaborated into human-shaped figures in the Etruscan, are rain-makers, probably connected with the lightning—certainly with the sky; they grant fertility to men as well as to the earth, and they aid the sailor and the traveller. In Asia Minor and Palestine the cult of the twins appears from a very ancient date. Esau and Jacob and other twins found in the Hebrew Scriptures are personages whose primitive form and attributes it is no longer possible to recover from the attrition of time and the corrosive energies successfully wielded by generations of pious editors. Traces, however, of the twin cult linger in the names of various places, like Ibn Airaq, near Bagdad, which has been identified with a place called in the book of Joshua Bne Baraq, 'sons of lightning'; and the account in the second book of Macoebes of the defeat by Judas Maccabeus of Timotheus almost certainly contains a Dionysiac tradition. Barca in N. Africa, a colony of Cyrene, seems to be connected with lightning; and the saliphum plant, which was sacred to the twins, was in the cabbalistic worship of its coins. The Pharaohs at Alexandria was dedicated to the saviour-gods. There is reason for suspecting legends, and perhaps the cult, of divine twins among both the Phoenicians and the Arabs.23 24 25 26 27 28
Farther north it is quite clear that Elesness was from ancient times a seat of the Twain-cult. The Twins were there known as Monnia and Atiz. When Christianity superseded the old paganism, Jews, Christians, and Copts took their place. The Syract Acts of Thomas shows that Thomas, or Judas Thomas, as he is called, was regarded as the twin of Christ. With his Lord's assistance he performs in the legend a number of deeds which are beyond doubt Dioscuric. Among the apostles James and John seem also to have been regarded as twins: whence probably their sobriquet Eliaziros, "sons of thunder." In various countries of Europe there are vestiges of Dioscuric cult in historical writers like Tacitus and in popular tales. A pagan altar has been found at Notre Dame, Paris, with a dedication by the boasters of the Seine to certain Celtic divinities and among them the Heavenly Twins. The ancient gods all over Europe and the Christian East have been succeeded by saints who perform similar functions and are often called by similar names. Many of these are in pairs or triads, and some of them are explicitly reputed to be twins or triplets, not merely in Christian profession and martyrdom, but by name. They have some of the sonorous names, or names which are variants of one another, according to a wide-spread custom of calling twins by names specifically given to twins, or names which are echoes of each other. A few of these may be found recorded in Rendel Harris's List.

Such are Speussippus, Elecosippus and Melicosippus, martyrs, of Langres, whose cult spread westwards from Cappadocia; Florus and Ampholius, martyrs of the two cities of Carthage, and martyrs; Protasius and Vervastius, martyrs, whose relics Ambrose opportuneely found at Milan for the conversion of the Arians; Cossus and Damian, physicians and martyrs, whose cult seems to have been known from the Euphrates to Kent. Other might easily be added from the ancient lists of Harris.

The electrical phenomenon sometimes appearing on the masts and yards of vessels during a storm in the Mediterranean was anciently held to be a manifestation of Castor and Pollux; and it was a good sign when the light was due west.1 This same phenomenon is now credited to St. Elmo, a patron saint of sailors, whose name occurs in a variety of forms, and of whom nothing whatever is known.2 Rendel Harris has reproved Professor For believing that in some of its forms the name is connected with Remus, who with Romulus was commemorated at San Remo on the coast of Italy. Rendel Harris also finds Remus preceded Castor and Pollux in the veneration of the Romans. They were exposed, according to the legend, in a rude boat on the Tiber; and from floating on the river they probably made their way, like other figures of the Twins, to sea as the patrons and protectors of seamen and voyagers.

Several pairs of mythical twins are found on the western continent. Of these the best known are the twins of Iroquoian tradition, Iosheka and Tawiscoa.

According to their legend, a woman named Atanese fell down through a rift in the sky upon the primordial waters, for there was no land as yet. By the advice of the turtle the animals dived, brought up soil, put it on the turtle's back, and so formed a land on which they could receive the falling birds, who were pregnant and promptly gave birth to a daughter. The daughter because in her turn pregnant of two boys, Iosheka and Tawiscoa. When these were born, birds were to be born in the natural manner, and by breaking his way out through his mother's side or armpit, ended her life with his own birth. The brothers grew up, Iosheka went about providing the earth. Cast out time armed with water. But the evil twin attempted to foul him by creating a gigantic frog to swallow all the water. A quarrel ensued, as in the case of Romulus and Remus, between Iosheka and Tawiscoa, using the horns of a deer, vanquished Tawiscoa, whose weapon was only a branch of the wild rose, and drove him away to the extremity of the west, his blood gushing from him at every step and turning into fire as it fell. The victor then established his lodge in the far east, opened a cave in the earth and brought forth all kinds of land animals, formed men, instructed them in the art of making fire and in the growing of maize; and it is he who imparts fertility to the soil. Iosheka is therefore the beneficent and divine helper of the Iroquois-Iroquoe; and the deeds and combat of the Heavenly Twins are the foundation of their mythology.

Without pausing to consider any other N. American twins, we may turn to Peru.

From before the times of the Incas the Peruvians seem to have worshipped in the form of the Heavenly Twins, as the Atacama, to us as Atairu, conjectured by Brionton to be properly Atchschuca, 'brother the twins.' From him and from his wife, the ancient Guanasiri, who seduced the sister of certain Guichannae, "raysless ones" or "darklings," she proved pregnant and produced two eggs, but died putting them into the world. From these eggs emerged two brothers, Apocatequil and Piguera, names which have also suffered some deformation. Apocatequil was the more powerful. By touching his mother's corpse, he brought her back to life; she slew the Guichanneus, who had destroyed his father; he released the race of Indians from the soil by turning it up with a golden spade. The thunder and lightning were due to him; thunderbolts were infants of lightning, gave fertility to the fields, and were esteemed as love-charms. 'In memory of these brothers, twins in Peru were deemed always sacred to the lightning; and when a woman or even a man was killed and sacrifices offered to the two primitive brothers, with a chant commencing A chawsa cañacuyot, 'O Thou who cannot twain,' words mentioned by the Spanishiards for the name of a deity.'

The Bakairi, a Carib tribe in the northern part of the Amazon basin, have a legend of twins who were cultural heroes.

The Bakairi were then few and oppressed by the jaguars, who are indiscriminately imagined with traits of both the lower animals and human beings. Their mother, called Twaawia, was pregnant, because pregnant by sucking two finger-bones of Bakairi killed by the jaguars. She died before giving birth to her children; and they were cut out from a body by the Countess O. Mueiter. The boys, who are called Keri and Kamo, were fostered by the jaguar, their natural captor. But the jaguar, seeing that the boys were weak and small, but manipulated another one to complete it. They then avenged their mother's death on their foster-father. With the help of the vultures they captured two birds; they stole fire from the fire (ania eutelus). From the Ocholol water-snake they obtained a root and made the birds, which animals they gave hawmanns, sleep, stones to build houses, arrows, tobacco, manioc, and cotton. They invented flutes and dancing. They made various tribes of men; and Keri is honoured as the ancestor of the Bakairi. They quarreled, but made the dispute up again. Finally they disappeared, nobody knows whether.

There are other mythical twins in S. America, but the subject need not be pursued.4 In New Zealand, Melanesia, and Micronesia there are moreover legends of two brothers, or a band of brethren, who appear to be culture-heroes, though the opposition of beneficent and malicious or of wise and stupid brethren is undeveloped; but they are not specifically described as twins.

If we inquire into the origin of the cult, it seems clear that the Dioscuri, as the sons of Zeus, were regarded as divinities of light. It is likely, therefore, that their appearances are represented as taking place in the middle of the summer about the first full moon after the solstice.5 So also there can be little doubt that the Atavins in India were divinities of the dawn and possibly the evening twilight. From divinities of light they would naturally pass to wild, or personify, the lightning (Zeus's weapon) and the storm. They came to be looked upon as protectors from the violence of the elements, and hence of voyagers on river or sea, and, by extension of the idea, of travellers generally. Their powers would gradually grow until they covered a sea region. The same connexion with light and lightning to be traced on the American

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1 The original authority is Jevont Relations, x. Huron (1636), 175. Cleveland, 1876. The text is from New World, New York, 1898, p. 169, American Hero-Myths, Philadelph, 1892, p. 13, amplifies the story from other sources.
4 Benet Harris, Basenepro, p. 155; P. Ehrenreich, Die Mythen und Religionen der sudamerikanischen Ueberlingen, Berlin, 1901, pp. 44.
5 Prieler, i., 302.
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TYPOLOGY

which may be intended for such a reliquary. Though there are not many texts in which the afterbirth or the infant is spoken of as a

historical person, it is possible to discern in its life and death a

mystical, or sometimes 'mystical,' as opposed to the literal or grammatical interpretation. Origen, as is well known, spoke of the

divisions of this 'spiritual' method, and highly favoured it. It was not his invention. Already both pagan and Jewish writers had found in it an admirable expedient for extracting salutary lessons from passages in their sacred books which seemed to be trivial, perplexing, or even of doubtful moral worth, if taken at their face value. It flourished particularly at Alexandria, and was much used by Philo. The practice of allegorizing the OT Scriptures became so popular, and the defining line between allegorizing and typology in the strict sense is so uncertain, that it is necessary at the outset to refer to the former; both branches of this mystical interpretation, as used by Christian writers, aimed at elucidating the latent principles of Christianity in the OT, but, if a definition between them is demanded, it is supplied by Herbert Manning, Bishop of Peterborough, 1819-29) in these terms:

"According to one mode [i.e. typology] facts and circumstances . . . have been applied to circumstances of the NT, or the symbols of which they have been described as mere emblems"; or, again, "An allegory is a fictitious narrative, a type is something real."2 This last sentence requires some modification; allegorizing may accept the historical truth of the narrative treated, but does not depend upon it; typology, the bishop holds, demands its historical truth. Van Mildert brings us nearer to the true test when he says:

"It is, indeed, essential to a Type, in the Scriptural acceptation of the term, that there should be competent evidence of the Divine intention in the correspondence between it and the Antitype."3

Again, Westcott says:

"A type presupposes a purpose in history wrought out from age to age. An allegory rests finally in the imagination, though the thoughts which it expresses may be justified by the harmonics which connect the many elements of life."4

"Any account of the ancient method of typology must take into consideration the fact that this

1 See art. DOUBLET.
2 Blackman, pp. 109, 123.
3 "A Type is the Scriptural Acceptation of the term, that there should be competent evidence of the Divine intention in the correspondence between the type and the Antitype."3

continent, where they further tended to become culture-heroes. But this does not account for their duality, excess in so far as they may have been, nor the third, the morning and evening, the dawn and the disappearance of light. It is perhaps due to an innate tendency in the human mind to repeat, to echo, to balance, or to contrast. This persists in psychology, in the belief that every action itself is performed in every department—in philosophy, theology, mytho-

logy, literature, art, ethics. It is responsible for the dualism of the great religions, for the frequent redistribution of the world, if not of the universe, for the symmetrical grouping of figures in a work of art, and for dramatic nemesis. In the domain of mythology and religion, whether pagan or Christian, it has doubtless been emphasized by the mystery attaching to the comparatively infrequent phenomenon of human twins. The beneficent and maleficent sides of their tabu are expressed in the opposition of characters and frequently in the double predicate.1

5. Afterbirth as twin.—The Baganda hold a curious belief that the afterbirth, or the navel-string (there is a variation as to this between the two accounts given by Roscoe; whom we are indebted for the information), is the twin or double of the child to whom it belongs.

The afterbirth was enclosed in a broken cooking-pot, covered with the leaves of the plantain, and placed at the root of the pumpkin—i.e. if a boy at the root of a plantain from which beer was made; if a girl, at the root of a plantain used as a vegetable. We are told that the child rubbed the second, and was believed to have a spirit, which became at once a ghost.1 On account of this ghost the plantain was guarded against any one not belonging to the clan from partaking of the beer made from it, or of the food cooked from it; else the beer or the food, by becoming possessed of the child, would be lost to the clan, and the child would then die in order to follow the ghost of its twin. To obviate this, no one of the clan, neither the grandfathers nor the great-drink the beer, so retaining the ghost of the afterbirth in the clan. More elaborate was the care taken of the king's umbilical cord, to which the ghost of the afterbirth attached, and which was always spoken of as if it were the afterbirth itself: hence probably the confusion between afterbirth and cord. A special officer, called the kikयegenye, who was second only to the kitiuki, or prime minister, was appointed to the charge of it. He occupied an enclosure next to the king's, in which was a temple built for the 'twin.' Once a month at new moon he carried the 'twin,' wrapped as it always was in bark-cloth, into the presence of the king, who took it out of its wrappings, inspected it, and returned it to the kikanyenge. He then exposed it in the doorway of the temple for the moon to shine upon it, anointet it with butter, wrapped it up again, and restored it to its place in the temple. When the king died, the kikanyenge made way for a new kikanyenge to take charge of the new king's twin;1 but it still remained his duty to care for the body 'till the end,' and to provide for the upkeep of the temple and enclosure. In due time the dead king's jaw-bone, to which the child was attached, was enclosed in a box, which would be added to his 'twin' and kept at the temple, where he would continue to be venerated.2 Even the jaw-bone and umbilical cord of the god Kibuka were preserved in his temple on an island of Lake Victoria Nyanza; and they are now in the Ethnological Museum at Cambridge.3

To the south of Uganda and west of the great lake, in Kiziba, formerly in German territory, similar customs and beliefs prevail.

The afterbirth, we are told, is considered as a kind of human being, and on the birth of twins the children are spoken of as four, instead of two, each afterbirth being looked upon as a child.4

In ancient Egypt also there seem to be traces of the same idea.

Monuments of the earlier dynasties show an object which has been called the Egyptian child's afterbirth, and applied upon standard in procession, together with the usual symbolic standards of animals. Its use was continued to the end of the Egyptian empire, though its shape was gradually conventionalized. The goddess represented as presiding at the birth of Quanum, Vesta, and so forth, was believed to bear or have been born a child like the reliquary containing the navel-string of Kibuka; and in other representations the same goddess wears a vase-like object

1 See art. DOUBLET.

1196].
3 H. Behes, Kiziba, Land und Leute, Stuttgart, 1910, p. 117.

1 See art. DOUBLET.
2 Baganda, pp. 59, 54, 235, 110; JAJ xviitl 33, 45, 63, 76.

1196].
3 H. Behes, Kiziba, Land und Leute, Stuttgart, 1910, p. 117.
distinction between type and allegory was not at all times recognized, and there must always be room for difference of opinion as to how far the inter- pretation offered of any passage rests finally in the imagination. One characteristic feature of the history of typology is the divergence of opinion as to the limits of justifiable exposition of types. The fundamental principle at the heart of this method of interpretation is that there is a continuity of revelation in the unity of Scripture. In days when the historical sense and the recogni- tion of progressive revelation were still inchoate it was the natural way of evidencing this unity of revelation. It is the product of the ages when history was regarded as a series of catastrophic events rather than as the unfolding of an age-long process, and it was therefore of immense value as a means of showing that history is not a mere series of accidental events, but the accomplishment of a divine purpose. Thus, though typology, as a branch of serious theological study, is now generally accredited and practically the only method of interpreting Scripture, it is not of recent date that it has taken on the form that the NT itself deserves careful study. It is proposed in this article to discuss (1) the extent and character of typological references in the NT, (2) the general history of typology in later times, and (3) its strengths and weaknesses as a method of interpretation.

2. In the New Testament.—From the first it was an integral and essential feature of the gospel of Jesus to establish and maintain an unbroken connexion with the old covenant. Jesus was aware that His teaching was such as to precipitate a cleavage with the traditions of the Jews. He therefore emphasized the essential unity: 'I am not come to destroy but to fulfil.' In the synagogue at Nazareth He expounded Is 61 as a scripture that day fulfilled in the ears of His hearers. He saw in John Baptist the fulfilment of the 'Elijah' prophecy. After His resurrection He expounded to His disciples 'in all the scriptures the things concerning Himself.' He taught that they 'testified' to His Lordship. He illustrated His message from OT parallels, as when He referred to Elijah at Zarephath, and Elisha and Naaman (Lk 4:22-25). On two occasions He is re- corded to have referred in particular terms to events of the old covenant, viz. the sign of the prophet Jonah, and the lifting up of the brazen serpent. At these we must look more closely.

Concerning the sign of the prophet Jonah, Matthew (12:38) interprets the sign as Jonah's confinement in the belly of the whale foreshadowing Christ's burial and rising. Luke (11:29) omits this application (though Plummer contends that it is implied in Sophocles). Matthew and Luke agree in giving the application that the contrast between the patience of the Saviour and the impenitence of the Jews at the preaching of a greater than Jonah is the warning sign. We have to inquire therefore whether Mt 12:38 is an interpolation by the evangelist, or else that Jonah can be justly regarded as a type. The story is now generally accepted as an allegory of the experi- ences of the gospel, though such is typical of Christ, in so far as the whole history of Israel is prophetic, but, regarded as a personal story, the story of Jonah corresponds so little with the mine in the belly of the whale, in principle, and offers so many difficulties in detail, that the suggestion worked out by Sanday, that Mt 12:38 is a distortion of the story of Jonah, is very questionable.

With regard to the reference to the brazen serpent, apart from the difficulty of treating the discourses in the Fourth Gospel as the actual words of Jesus, the case is clearer. But the treatment is markedly broad lines of principle and suggested analogies rather than detailed similarities. The in- cident referred to was already regarded as mysteriously en- abled. 'He is lifted up, of whom the scripture speaks: he is actually as apparently contravened a divine law.' Jesus intimates that that principle will be revealed in His own ministry, and the terms in which He speaks of it are such as to express that principle in the broadest possible way, for nothing is the Son of Man a conception not exhausted by reference to the manner of Christian suffering. In a very similar fashion Jesus spoke of His Body in terms of the Temple, because the Temple 'as the seat of God's presence among His people' exhibited a principle to be perfectly fulfilled by the Body of Christ.

Our Lord's example in this matter of reference to the OT Scriptures may be summed up as a full recognition that the principles of truth enshrined in the OT were to receive in Himself a fuller and clearer explication, and that therefore the OT Scriptures are full of teaching concerning Him; His practice therefore encourages us to search the Scriptures for the revelation of such principles, but it may be questioned if we can derive from His teaching any justification for the exploitation of formal resemblances or for indulgence in the fancy of elaborate working out of details. Throughout the NT the same reverence for the dignity and true spiritual value of the OT is marked. Even in those books which show the clearest leanings towards mystical interpretation, in instances where the correspondence seems most far-fetched (e.g., Mt 22:29), or the argument most alien to our modern ways of thought (e.g., Gal 3:23 or 1 Co 14), the respect for the old covenant as a medium of revelation, and the lofty nature of the NT itself, is always clearly discerned. Nothing in the NT can be compared with the puerilities of such a work as the Epistle to Barithand, which degrades the old covenant to a mere riddle of which Christianity is the answer, and which so keenly sees in Abraham's 318 men a foreshadowing of the Cross of Jesus, because the Greek number 318 is clearly made up of the Greek numbers 3 and 8, which were the numbers of St. John, the Apostle, and Jesus, the Hebrews—a work clearly influenced by Alexandrian methods of thought—the OT is never merely allegorized, and the restrained treatment of the figure of Melchizedek and of the Tabernacle ritual in that book afford a marked contrast to the fanciful elaboration with which both have been treated by later writers. A recognition of typological methods of thought is essential for a true understanding of the NT.

The extent of possible typological references is remarkably small.

Patrick Fairbairn gives the following list. But he has to confess that even this would be regarded as a long list.

 tipos: Adam, Melchizedek, Sarah and Hagar, Ismahel and Isaac, and Joseph, and the Hi-avenabim Abraham, Moses, David, Solomon, Jonah, Zorubabel, and Joshua.

Even in the Epistle to the Hebrews a work clearly influenced by Alexandrian methods of thought—the OT is never merely allegorized, and the restrained treatment of the figure of Melchizedek and of the Tabernacle ritual in that book afford a marked contrast to the fanciful elaboration with which both have been treated by later writers. A recognition of typological methods of thought is essential for a true understanding of the NT.

At any rate it is important to note that all these references occur quite naturally and that nowhere is there any sign of a studied exploration of the OT for possible types.

3. History of typology. This may for convenience be divided into three groups rather than periods, though each group corresponds roughly to a period in the history of the Church.

(a) The first is that of the apologetic use of types to prove against Jewish unbelief the antiquity of the Christian faith or to refute heresies. The very purpose of the apologists exposed them to fancifulness. Whereas the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews would show his readers that what they valued as the old covenant was but a shadow preparing the world for better and enduring things to come, Justin had to show that what the Jew

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objected to in the Christian gospel lay hidden in the Jewish Scriptures. We can understand how he was able to rediscover Moses at Rephidim, prefigured the cross of Christ, or even how the bells on the high priest's garment were a mystical foreshadowing of the apostolate.1

Another interesting fact is to note how entertaining and very fanciful interpretations of those false teachers who, as Hippolytus puts it, 'by seducing those ignorant of the holy Scriptures into such like fancies make fools of them.'2 The Catholics met such fanciful allegorical interpretations by application of a canon of truth or tradition, which limited typological exploration to the treatment of narratives in the canonical books and to the illumination of truths revealed in Scripture—a limitation not always observed in later times. When we come to Origen, we find him using and extolling the allegorical method because so few could reply to Celsus's objection to some passages in the OT. Herein he simply took over the already long-established method of dealing with difficulties in Homer. His intellectual greatness saved him from the extreme rationalism of his predecessor Clement, even though he adopted his recognition of 'a manifold sense of Scripture (viz., on the one hand, the literal or grammatical; and, on the other, the allegorical, universal, and mystical). It must be remembered that, though Jerome accuses Origen of allegorizing to such an extent that 'historiatae auserat veritatem,'3 Origen recommended the retention of the literal sense where it was profitable, but the literal often failed to yield the meaning of the words.4

(b) The school of Alexandria, inheriting this tradition from so great a master, carried the discovery of mystical significance in the Scriptures to excess, finding in the method a last field of opportunity for the edifying use of the Bible. The school of Antioch resisted this use; Theodore of Mopsuestia entirely rejects allegorical interpretations, questions how attractive and how dangerous the practice was.5 Tyconius points out how well the method meets the need of pagan writers, but calls attention to the fact that in the lack of any sound rule of interpretation anything can be proved from the Scriptures.6 Tyconius, after endeavoured to establish rules for the proper surveying of the 'forest of Scripture, and to systematize what he calls the 'reduplications' of the Bible. Being a Donatist, he fell under the condemnation of Augustine, who speaks slightly of his work.7 Augustine's own rule is thus summarized:

To divide a, modus est, ut quisque in sermone divinoque nec ad muros homunculum nec ad filia veritatis properent reperiri, figuratum esse cognoscat.8

On the whole the Latin writers were more restrained than the Greek, more tenacious of historicity, and therefore more inclined to typical interpretation proper than to what is merely allegorical; yet Jerome, for all his criticism of Origen's methods, is himself in danger of being free in dealing with Scripture. As time went on, the last link of the chain that fell upon the Church removed one of the surest restraints against unprofitable fancifulness.9

(c) The third group or period is that in which typology took its place in constructive theology, and begins with the Scholastics. It was the object of some of the Fathers in admitting a threefold sense of Scripture that was generally followed. Erigena indeed speaks of an 'infinite sense,' and was led by his mysticism to use the allegorizing method freely; the Scriptures to him were rich in secrets, glittering with divers colours. Rabanus Maurus admits a fourfold sense. Others went farther, acknowledging a sevenfold or even an eightfold sense. In the later stages of Scholasticism, particularly after the rise of the theory of the twofold nature of truth, and the spread of mysticism, some schools practically scorned the literal interpretation of Scripture on the ground that 'litera occultis, spiritus vivificant,' and 'carried this often to such an extreme, as to leave scarcely a trace of the simple meaning.'10 It must be acknowledged that some, like Hugo of St. Victor and St. Thomas Aquinas, tried to restrict such excesses.

The combined influences of the Revival of Learning and the establishment of the Bible as the sole regulas fides brought about in the writings of the Reformers an even more pronounced tendency to typology. Luther and Calvin are remarkable for the sanity and critical acumen of their commentators. Reaction from Scholastic fancies and a new reverence for the plain teaching of Scripture produced this result; but soon the demand for popular expositions of Scripture (and perhaps the dearth of really scholarly teachers) brought typology into great favour, and it became a definite branch of hermeneutics. In this connexion the name of Cocceius of Leyden in the 17th cent. is prominent, although he adopted no definite system, and seems to have been content with a formal resemblance to justify typological interpretations. Others, however, did endeavour to systematize the method.

Solomon Glassius published as Jena in 1623-36 a work in five books called Philosophia Sacra, of which one part is devoted to the study and classification of Scripture narratives. A work published in Leyden in 1611, and referred to as a principal authority by T. J. Horst, is the Introduction to the Critical Study and Knowledge of the Holy Scriptures, the first ed. of which (in 1605) appeared in 1619. A second ed. was being issued in 8 vols. in 1656. Glassius divides types into two main classes—'insects,' or those specifically asserted to be in Scripture, and 'impressions.' These are sub-divided, the first into those which Scripture 'expressly ostendit' or 'tacitly insinuat,' the second into those which are 'judicious' or 'context.' The last are to be rejected. He adds nine canons for classifying or recognizing types. The canons are not particularly helpful, but they afford the author the (to him) valuable opportunity of refuting Bullarmine's recognition of a type of the class in the story of Zacharias—a recognition, of course, far older than Bullarmine. The fact reveals one reason why the Protestant theologians were anxious to find clear rules to govern typology. Other popular works on the subject were Thomas Taylor, Moses and Aaron, or the Types of the OT opened, London, 1655; Samuel Mothers, OT Types Explicated and Improved, do. 1673, rewritten by Catherine Fry and published in 2 vols. in 1734 under the title Gospel of the Old Testament (regarded by some as the fullest exposition of the subject); and E. Vignettes, Observationum Sacrarum, 3 vols., Franeker, 1699-1708.

The last named displays the rise of rationalism, and certainly the rationalistic and unimaginative temper of the 18th cent. was unimpressed by the practice of typology. Something of the 18th cent. methods of thought affects Marsh's Lectures on the Criticism and Interpretation of the Bible, and here we find a quite definite rule as to the type of typology laid down. We will admit no types except those which Glassius had called innate. He defends this

1 Drial, xii. 23.
2 Ref. omn. hebr. v. 3.
3 Do Pecc. Dei, iv. 20.
4 P. de Voogt, Intro. in. i. 2.
5 Ad. gregor. v. 82. II.
6 In hoc loco. de vitiatione Christiana, iii. 30 (ed. 2).
7 In. iii. 10 (14).
9 "Pro fundamento tenenda vertice historiae" (Seuss, i. qu. eii. art. 1.)
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position with much good sense and learning, though it is really a confession of weakness and inability to discover the principles which govern the characteristic features of the Baptist and the

At the beginning of the 19th cent. the subject attracted attention. It was much affected in circles influenced by the Evangelical Revival. Typology was long regarded as the main learning of the Hampton lecturers in 1814 (Van Mildert) and 1824 (J. J. Conybeare), and of the Hulsean in 1826 (Temple Chevalier), besides giving rise to a good deal of the spread of scientific criticism and the study of ancient religions, and before long of comparative religion, were destined to strike a death-blow to typology as a recognized branch of hermeneutics. The religion of the Jews was for a time regarded as beneath the notice of the student of religion, and, when it came into its own again, a much broader view of the relation between the old and new covenants held the field. Thus De Wette wrote that the entire OT is a great type of Him who was to come, and that Christianity lay in Judaism as leaves and fruit lie in the seed. Again, F. C. Bampton, in his examination of the notions between the 'deeper apprehension and the immediate sense' in the law of general harmony by which all individuals, in the natural as well as in the spiritual world, form one great organic system. The impress of the modes of natural science upon this utterance did not recommend it to those whose conception of the supernatural and providential alienated them from the rising naturalism, but the effects of modern methods of scientific study are already apparent in Fairbairn's Typology, since the publication of which no standard work on typology has appeared. It survives now principally in the expositions of those to whom the results of Biblical criticism are still unwelcome. Sometimes it is pursued with dignity and real spiritual value (as in the works of Andrew Jukes), but sometimes with a distressing purblindness or even offensiveness. It must be acknowledged that, on the other hand, modern writers of the critical school have unduly ignored the importance of typology—an attitude to which that of Edwin A. Abbott offers a brilliant exception. In his view the NT, and particularly the Fourth Gospel, is full of typical suggestions. In this way, believing the author to record what he took to be facts, it has spiritual import, but reconciles the rejection of the historicity of the narrative with the retention of its spiritual import. In a word, he allegorizes the records, while acknowledging that the author believed that he was recording facts, but facts with a typical significance.

This view is of importance in two respects. First, it reminds us of the fact that the symbolic significance of things and words held a far greater place in the thought of ancient times than it does with us, who have learned to form abstract conceptions and to search for exact definitions. E.g., the NT writers can speak of the 'blood of Christ' without explanation, in a manner that perplexes us. In the second place, it is based on a fundamental principle of sound interpretation, viz. the endeavour to discover what the original author of any document meant to convey. When we read of Melchizedek, or the ritual of the Tabernacle, or of David, it is not enough to ask what those passages may suggest to us; we must first ask what they suggested to the original readers. If the principles of truth which they then suggested be one with the principles more clearly seen in the fuller revelation in Christ, then the imperfect revelation may be regarded as typical of the fuller yet to come, because so mankind was being prepared. Thus the elder lights of the typology of the Baptist and the

1 Quoted from an article in J. C. H. Bähr, Symbolik des Material der Christlichen Kultur, Heidelberg, 1887, l. 16.
2 Hermeneutik des OT, Leipzig, 1841, p. 335.

...UDASIS

UDASIS.—The Udásis are the principal religious order of the Sikhs (q.v.). Also known as Nának-purá, 'sons of Nának,' the founder of Sikhism, they are probably the oldest of the Sikh orders, but Náráí, their founder, Sik to bhair, in Nának's elder son. The term ñadas is derived from Sanskrit udās, 'sad,' and means 'sorrow' or 'sadness.' The Udásis were separated from the active or militant Sikhs by the third guru of that sect, Amand Dá, who did not wish to encourage them, as is sometimes stated. This separation is also ascribed to Arjan, the fifth of the Sikh gurus. Whoever effected it, the severance marks the cleavage in the Sikh sect which definitely ranged it against the Muslim Mughal power, leaving the Udás order still in touch with orthodox Hinduism. Nevertheless the tenets of the order, deeply coloured as they are with Hindu asceticism, did not prevent its finding many followers among the descendents and disciples of the Sikh gurus. Thus the sixth guru, Hargovind, is said to have allowed Sri Chand to adopt Gurūdītā, his eldest son, into the order by making him his direct disciple—a statement not free from chronological difficulties.

The Udás order was at an early period divided into four chapters (dhūan, lit. 'fires'). Their founders were Bāhā Ḥasūr or Ḥasūn, Phāl, Gondā, and Al-mast—four said to be disciples of Gurūdītā. Of these founders the first bears a Muhammadan name (Ḥasan) and the last a purely Arabic title, al-mast denoting one drunk with love or devotion. The holy ecstatic, now is represented at Nainī Tal and Jagannāth, places far from the Panjab and Sikhdom alike. Gondā is revered at Shikārpur in Sind, as well as at a shrine near Amritsar in the Panjab, while the other two possess shrines in the Panjab hills only. This distribution points to efforts made by the earlier gurus to spread Sikhism, or at least a quieter type of it, over India generally. The followers of these four chapters constitute the senior assembly (bārā akhārā) of the order, its junior, or chhōrī akhārā, having been founded later by Phērū, a disciple of Har-Rāi, and now under Guriā. In theory all Udásis are celibate, but those who are so in practice are styled Nānā (or 'naked') Udásis. Sir Edward MacLauren, however, gives a different explanation of the term Nānā.

He describes their usual dress as red in colour, but 'a large section of them go entirely naked, except for the waistcloth, and two rolls of bandages to cover their bodies. These, like the naked sections of other orders, are known as Nānā, i.e., the special reverence to the ashes with which they smear their bodies, and which are said to protect them equally from either extreme of temperature. Their most binding oath is on a ball of ashes.'

As smearing the body with ashes symbolizes also death to mundane things, the Nānā Udásis are probably strict celibates, and hence the Nango...
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the foundation of the chapter to a follower of the famous Sultan Sahib Sarwar, who was converted by Guru Nanak's father, Jeth Singh, and who eventually comprised many who used to affect the cult of that saint and perhaps still combine with it their acceptance of Sikh doctrine. The chapter, however, possesses the Brahminic akharā of Amritsar and is distinctly affiliated to orthodox Sikhism, and in the great Sikh State of Patīlā, where it is called the Bakhshī Sahib, it pays special reverence to the Gurus of Sikhism, or original "Book" of Bābā Nānak, and has an akharā of its own, distinct from those of the four dāflān. Lastly, but mentioned must be the Rāmdān Udaisā, a sub-division attached to another Gurdwārā, who was a grandson of one of Bābā Nānak's converts and established by one of the later gurūs in a monastery at Rāmdān, where the sub-order possesses a fine temple, at some distance from Amritsar. Each subdivision of the Udaisā has an organization for collecting and administering funds. Each is presided over by a head abbot (sri mahant), to whom the ordinary mahants, or monks, are subordinate.

The castes are generally are divided into two classes, one, from all Hindu castes and will take food from any Hindu. Sometimes, but not invariably, or even occasionally, congregated in monasteries, they are generally found formed into temporary Sikh places as Amritsar, Dera Nānak, and Kartarpur in the Panjāb, but they are also said to be numerous in the Malva to the south of it, and at Benares. The principal seats, however, lie in the central and in the District of Rohtāk, where Sikhism is by no means dominant. Their usages are not uniform. Some wear long hair like Sikhs, others matted hair like Sannyāsīs, and others again cut the hair. Some affix the tilak, or caste-mark, others avoid it. The dead are often cremated in the Hindu way, but apparently are sometimes buried. When a body is burnt, a samāṭh, or mausoleum, is erected to some Udaisā, but this privilege must be confined to those of special sanctity or mahants. While the majority are ascetics, some frankly engage in secular callings. Machagan gives the following picture of their relations with the Panjāb villagers.

In Lodhāiana the Udaisā are described as mostly Jāts by origin, the chādi or disciple and successor being usually chosen from these free traders, and are therefore the incarnation of the dravakās in Hindu villages, where they distribute food to such as wish for it. They are held by the Granth to be Bābā Nānak and of Guru Gobind Singh, although they do not attach much importance to the latter. The head of the college is called a mahant, who is also a mahant of the temple chādī. They are owned as well as in Hindu villages, and it is probably on this account they do not quite neglect Guru Gobind Singh. They rarely marry; and if they do so, generally lose all influence, for the dravakās soon becomes a private residence closed to strangers. But in some few families, such as that of Jaspīl Bāṅgar, which keeps a large langīr or almshouse going, it has always been the custom to marry the endowments being large enough to support the family and mantain the institution; but the eldest son does not in this case succeed as a matter of course. A chādi is chosen by the mahant, or by the family. If a mahant whose predecessors have not married should do so, he would lose all his weight with the people. The great shrine at Dera Bābā Nānak, in the Gurdaspur District, is in the custody of a community of Udaisā, whose mahant is to be appointed with the consent of the Bedi. Another shrine at the same place known as Tāhī Sahib, from a large tāhī or shisham tree* which grew close by, and was founded by Sri Chand, and is also after mahants of the Udaisā order. 2

Thus the Udaisā display all the normal features of an Indian religious order—a long-lived, real, abandoned in practice, professed adherence to a reformed faith, tempered by judicial compromise with the established system, and the inevitable evolution from an ascetic celibate order into a hereditary caste. In the last phase of the Sikh regime the Nānakputras had to employ as escorts to caravans, their sacred character as sons of Nānak ensuring them against attack.

LITERATURE.—E. D. Maclean, Census of India, 1891, xix. and xxii.; Punjāb and Punditarians, Calcutta, 1897; H. A. Rose.

UDYĀNA.—See SWAT.

UGRA, UGRIAN OSTIAK.—See OSYAKS.

UGRO-FINNS.—See FINNO-UGRIANS.

UKHARS.—See RUKHSARS.

ULTRAMONTANISM.—Ultramontanism is the term applied, often in a hostile or critical spirit, to the tendency to centralize in the papacy the doctrinal teaching and government of the Catholic Church. More vaguely still it is applied in general to extreme Roman Catholicism, to the tendency to emphasize all that separates Catholics from other Christians or from other men. Often enough it is used, quite inappropriately, as a mere nickname for ordinary Catholics who are conscious of their obligations as members of a universal Church. Thus the Catholic parties in the German and Belgian Parliaments have been called Ultramontane, though they would certainly not admit that they take their politics from Rome.

Historically, ultramontane was in occasional use in Central Europe from the 11th cent. onwards in a merely geographical sense, just as citra-montanus was used in Italy, to describe a man who lived south of the Alps. It does not seem to have been commonly used with any theological significance till the 17th cent., when it was applied to those who opposed the prevailing Gallican tendencies in France. The counter-reformation in general, and especially the pontificate of Sixtus V. at the close of the previous century, had done much to organize the central administration of the Church, while, on the other hand, the growing power and self-consciousness of the French monarchy tended to insist upon, and to express more definitely as principles, Gallican practices which might be traced back to the 13th century. It is in opposition to Gallicanism (p. e.) that Ultramontanism has its most definite meaning, and Fénelon, the Jesuits, and others who opposed the ecclesiastical policy of Louis XIV. and the Four Articles of the Gallican Church of France composed the ultramontane party. In the 18th cent., when the influence of religion was at its lowest, Gallican principles kept a strong hold on the French Church, but they found their most complete expression in the writings of the German Pelromius and in the policy of Joseph II. The Ultramontanism which opposed Gallicanism and Josephism was little more than the assertion of the universal character of the Church, which both those systems tended to obscure, and an effort, far from successful till the 19th cent., to assert the right of the Church to live her own religious life without the constant interference of the State.

Fornal Gallicanism, with its Four Articles, may be said to have been destroyed in France by the Revolution. The fall of the ancien régime liberated the Church; numbers of the more Gallican clergy were dispossessed by joining the Constitutional Church; and Catholicism was purified and revived by suffering and persecution. No more striking manifestation of papal power had yet been seen than this religious war, in which, according to the Concordat, practically deprived thirty-seven bishops of their sees. The Concordat was thus an Ultramontane act, and, though Napoleon added to it the Gallican articles of liberty and equality, and, when quarreled with the pope, tried to make the Four Articles the law of the State, nothing could restore the old pre-
Revolution Gallican system. The spirit, however, survived and inspired both the statesmen of the restored monarchy and many of the more old-fashioned clergy, yet the Restoration was also the period of the rise of Ultramontanism. This movement of the 19th cent. received its most powerful expression in the writings of Joseph de Maistre, de Bonald, and Lamennais. These men realized that the Revolution had destroyed the old foundations on which men had rested their habits of thought and action, and that a fresh start had to be made. De Maistre knew that the revolutionary spirit was still abroad, stronger perhaps than ever, and his Du Pape (1819) is an appeal as much to practical utility as to principle. It is only the Christian Church which has in it the strength to overcome "the Revolution"; and without an infallible papacy the Church is, like the States-General, reducing the monarchy to a shadow and therefore slipping back into revolution. He was disappointed with the immediate effect of his book, but his rigid, austere, and precise ideas proved a great influence on the Ultramontanes of the middle of the century. A man of far greater intellectual power than de Maistre, the Vicomte de Bonald emphasized the weakness of the individual man in finding out for himself the truths of history and conduct. What a contrast between the disagreement of philosophers and the agreement of practical men about practical matters! The individual reason rightly, therefore, falls back for support on the convictions of society and on tradition. This "traditionalism" Lamennais combined with the Ultramontanism of Joseph de Maistre. Lamennais's passionate temper always made him push a thing to its extreme limit, and he turned de Bonald's trust in tradition into a universal test of truth. The voice of the pope was for him the expression of this "universal consent." In his first stage he combined legitimacy with Ultramontanism; in his second he appealed to the people and tried to make democracy the exclusive ally of the Church. The Avenir, which Lamennais and his friends edited in 1831, was probably the most brilliant expression of the earlier stage of 19th cent. Ultramontanism. The enemy which the Avenir fought was the Gallican tradition of State control over the Church which had been reinforced by the revolutionary doctrines of St. Simon. The aim was liberty—liberty of conscience, of association, of education, of the press. Devotion to Rome was the great instrument of liberty, for the Gallican Church was the universal Church and was independent of the different governments. It provided also an element of fervour and historic sentiment at a time when Europe, under the influence of the Romantic movement, was casting off the 18th cent. and all its works and recapturing the power of religious enthusiasm. The exclusive form in which Lamennais's ideas were expressed ultimately set Rome itself against him, but the movement continued under wiser men, Lacordaire, Montalembert, de Ravanign, and others. They succeeded in all but destroying the old Gallican spirit and in putting a new life into the French Church. In the Revolution of 1848 the Church, which had been so unpopular in 1830, exercised a powerful influence. The defeat of Gallicanism, however, brought out a division in the Ultramontane ranks which the struggle in which the Ultramontane movement was passed under the Second Republic and which broke down the old State monopoly of education, led to the first open breach. On one side Montalembert, with his Papalism, prepared to make concessions to the State in order to secure an invaluable piece of legislation, and because they shared in the ideas of their time so far as these were not definitely opposed to Catholic principle. On the other side were a number of Catholics whose policy became characteristically identified with a newspaper, the party of the Univers. Like Veillot, they may have had some idea they would have influence over the spiritual policy for the Church the control of her own religious life. They wished to secure for her the predominance which in an ideal word the spiritual would have over the temporal, and which in fact the Church did partly enjoy in the Middle Ages. Such an aim was incompatible with the ideas and practices prevailing among a people who were far from being medieval in faith, but Veillot and his party were prepared to fight for it by bitter antagonism to free-thinkers, by opposition often bitter enough to those, even should they be bishops, whom they considered lukewarm Catholics, and in order by making lordly eyes on the Ultramontanes of the middle of the century. 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"When twenty-five years ago," he said in substance, "we boldly professed ourselves "Ultramontanes," the Ultramontane school was then the school of liberty. We asserted the inde-

dependence of the spiritual power against the encroachments of the temporal power, but we respected the Constitutions of the Church and of the State. The pope was not the whole Church nor the Emperor the whole State. On the one side there were bishops and consistory, a real authority, a religious, democrati-

can and democratic elements with their rights. No doubt there are those flashes of crisis when both the Pope and the civil government may override all rules. The old Ultramontanes admitted this, but they did not turn the exception into a rule. The new Ultramontanes have pushed every thing to extremes and accepting to the full the idea of power they have argued extravagantly against all liberties whether in Church or State."

Another French bishop could write that the fanaticism of the Univers had done more harm to religion than that of Voltaire. It is indeed difficult at first to understand Veillot's popularity among French Catholics. He seems the most perfect representative of that "insolent and aggressive faction" which never tired of calumniating their brethren in the faith and of trying to force their private opinions on the Church. For men not of the faith, whom he considered its enemies, for the free-thinkers, for 'the race of Cain,' he had no pity. He had never any hesitation in distinguishing between the wheat and the tares. Yet the Univers was never in any way identified with the Church, and Veillot appealed far more than Montalembert to most French Catholics. To begin with, he was intensely democratic. Himself a man of the people, he was always thinking of the people. It was his passionate desire to protect the simple from the aggressive irreligion of the bourgeois free-thinker, while his fondness for the extreme point of view in controversy, his scorn of moderate opinions, and his manner of expression, were metaphors in matters of religion were more in sympathy with French character than the constitutionalism of the Montalembert school. It must be added that the extreme character of French Ultramontanism under the Second Empire is partly to be accounted for by the reactionary policy adopted by Pius IX. when he returned from the exile to which he had been driven in spite of his liberal principles, to which his most complete expression of this reactionary policy was the Syllabus of 1864. More sympathy would be felt now than in optimistic mid-Victorian days for a document which was long regarded as having gone astray by the neglect of God and of Catholic principles. At the time, however, what appeared

1 Cf. Lezama: Montalembert, III. 104.
ULTRAMONTANISM

There was an echo of these continental battles even in England in the controversy which was raised by the issues raised by the editions of the 1846-1848 Berlin Review and the Foreign Review. These reflected, though in a more moderate form, the views of Döllinger and the ecclesiastical-pragmatists. They were taken by William George Ward and the Dublin Review. Neither side disputed the authority of strict definitions of dogma; but the controversy turned on the right to depart from the guidance of Rome. Acton claimed absolute liberty outside dogmatic definitions, while Ward looked to the paxQuo for positive direction. A loyal Catholic, he maintained, should accept not only the defined teaching but the 'doctrinal institutions' of Rome.¹

Underneath these controversies of the sixties we seem to see two tendencies at work. The more liberal Catholics wished, in various degrees, to keep in touch with the times, to make the best of the learning, the thought, the science, the political conceptions of the age. With some this might and did lead to a real contempt for traditional Catholic practices and methods. The Ultramontanes, on the other hand, felt the danger which lay in excessive sympathy with the 'spirit of the age.' The 'Rambler'... appeared to Mr. Ward to worship the modern ideal, both in ethics and in politics, with an unconscious which was quite inconsistent logically with the principles of Christianity.²

Ward had no hope in the movement led by Döllinger. To him contemporary thought was moving away from Christianity, and the one essential thing was to react against it, to preserve the purity of the faith and the Catholic faith. He called the view farther, much farther than Ward ever pushed it, and you come to Veilhut's extravagances with his conflict between the 'race of Abel' and the 'race of Cain.' Now the papacy under Pius IX. undoubtedly took the Ultramontane side, and the liberals found themselves more or less in opposition to the tendencies prevailing in Rome, while the Ultramontanes were anxious to make these tendencies prevail everywhere and, in opposition to the nationalism of the day and the attacks on the temporal power, to magnify the authority of Rome in the government and teaching of the Church. Veilhut, you looked forward to the time when papal bulls would take the place of all conciliar deliberation. Thus it is that the question of the doctrinal authority of the pope was raised and that the Syllabus led to the Vatican decree of infallibility. Yet there is a certain unreality about the controversies which ranged round the Council in 1869 and 1870, for the number of those who actually disbelieved in papal infallibility was small indeed. The papal Definition of the Immaculate Conception in 1854 had been accepted universally. What most of the opposition feared was the added governmental authority which they conceived the decree would give to the pope, the increase which it would produce in all those centralizing and autocratic tendencies which they dreaded.

¹I am much more concerned,' said Montalembert, 'about the government of the Church than about the definition of Papal Infallibility.'²

It is obvious too that the opposition of Dupanloup and the 'Inopportunists' was due to the fear that the Definition would lead to conflict with the State and would emphasize the differences between the Church and modern society. The language of the more extreme Ultramontanes in speaking of the pope as 'inspired,' or in such mad phrases as amongst the Pope thinks, it is by Acton's guarantee.

in him,' must have contributed not a little to make the 'liberals' fear that the Definition might mean the triumph in the Church of the more extreme faction.

This Definition came, after months of discussion, in a form more moderate than even such Ultramontanes as Ward had originally expected. It had the effect of making a clearer distinction between the doctrinal and the administrative functions of the Church. It is a strange position for an Ultramontane to claim that every utterance of the pope on matters of faith is protected by God from error. Papal infallibility is defined and in so far limited, and the conditions laid down in the Council of Trent have seldom, if ever, been satisfied by the papal doctrinal pronouncements of the last forty years.

Ultramontanism became, therefore, a vaguer term after 1870. The party of the Univers continued, indeed, to exist and to carry on its controversial methods in support of the temporal power of the pope or of the royalist movement in France. It saw in a political coup d'état the only defence against the doctrines of the Republican party directed against Catholic education, the religious orders, and other forms of Catholic life. Louis Veulliot died in 1883, but the Univers remained the most popular of Catholic newspapers under the editorship of de Cas-sagne's Bonapartist L'Autorité. It seems absurd, however, to call this party Ultramontane, since that at least during the pontificate of Leo XIII. its aims were opposed to those of the papacy. The pope was anxious to reconcile the Catholics with their governments both in France and in Germany. In Germany he succeeded in bringing the Kulturkampf to a close; though at the cost of putting pressure in 1886 on the so-called Ultramontaines of the Centre party, in order to secure their support for Bisмарк's seven years' army estimates, whilst in France his policy of urging the French Catholics to accept the Republic met with much opposition from the royalist.

In a sense, however, the term 'Ultramontanism' may be rightly applied to the administrative centralization which is a mark of papal policy since the middle of the last century. The enthusiasm felt so widely among Catholics for Pius IX., the great prestige of Leo XIII., a conscious reaction against disruptive national movements, the mere improvement of the administrative machinery of the Church are some of the causes which explain such a centralization. It was a particular feature of the pontificate of Pius X. and of the measures which he took against 'Modernism.' It has certainly helped to protect the unity and the tradition of the Church in the midst of growing hostility or at least indifference, and often enough Rome has proved more broad-minded than the local ecclesiastics. Thus two of the greatest bishops of the second half of the century, Ketteler and Manning, were appointed by the direct action of the papacy. Many Catholics would, however, welcome a reaction in the direction of the constitutional traditions of the Church, especially in such matters as the election of bishops and their synodal meetings.

LITERATURE.—It is difficult to give a bibliography on so general a subject. For the Gallican controversy see art. GALICANISM; for the 19th cent. Ultramontanism, F. Nielsen, Histoire de la Papauté au XIXe Siècle, Eng. tr., 3 vols., London, 1886, and by the same author, Histoire de l'activité ecclésiastique de l'administration papale, in Weifrd Ward, William George Ward and the Catholic Revival in England, 1851-1910 [see also G. Lecam, Notice sur l'histoire des rapports entre le royaume d'Espagne et le royaume de Catalogne, 4 vols., 1875-09]. For the Venetian Council see art. Concilia (Christian: Modern); for the measures taken by Pius X. against the Modernists see art. Modernists.

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and only incidentally by Daulatshāh (end of the 15th cent.); moreover, the author of the Chahār Maqāla, referred to in the literature of astrology in separate sections, places 'Umar among the astrologers and makes no reference to his poems. The most ancient MS, preserved in the Bodleian Library and dated A.D. 1461, contains 198 rubā'īs; a second MS, the first edition published by E. Heron-Allen. In later MSS and editions the number of quatrains is very much larger. Concerning the authenticity of these poems nothing can be said. The contents of the collection are systematic and, if account was taken of anonymous quatrains, either written as verbal tracts or transmitted orally, then the entire collection or part of it was ascribed to the mystic poet. Still another MS preserved in the Bodleian Library and dated 1897, contains 128 quatrains. These quatrains, if we can judge from the style, must have been written in the 10th cent. or later. They were certainly not written by a man of learning of whom nothing is known, but they may have been written by a man of learning whose name is unknown. Even in the oldest and presumably least adulterated MS the proportion of 'wandering quatrains' already discovered and assigned to their proper authors is about 12 per cent. Of the remainder many are probably genuine, but we have no means of identifying the original 'Umarian nucleus or determining its size. The whole collection must be viewed, not as the work of an individual, but as an anthology reflecting various aspects of Persian spiritual and intellectual life and covering a period of six centuries.

It follows that the character of 'Umar Khayyām cannot be read in the Rubā'īyat attributed to him, which give expression to diverse and often radically inconsistent modes of thought. Two notices, however, cited by Schukovski from writers of the 13th cent. throw some light on the matter. The first, from Distīn-Qīfī (see reference above), describes 'Umar as a man who tried to conceal his want of religion and shrank from uttering his real opinions. Concerning his poetry, Ibuw-Qīfī remarks that it is circular and reveals an religious spirit to those who look below the surface, although its literal sense is sometimes in accord with the teaching of the Īsfāhs. He then quotes four Arabic verses, of which the following is a translation:

'If my soul is content with a livelihood sufficient for my needs, which is gained by the labour of my hands and arms, I am safe from all changes and accidents, and care not whether Time threatens me or flatters my hopes. Have not the revolting heavens determined to reduce all happiness to misfortune? Therefore, O my soul, abide patiently in thy sleeping place: its towers will not topple down until its foundations have collapsed."

Najmu'ddin Dāya († A.D. 1256), author of a mystical work entitled Mi-rūd'l-Ṭahd, reckons 'Umar among those unhappy philosophers and materialists who have gone astray from the truth, and quotes two sceptical quatrains as evidence of his 'utter shamelessness and exultation.' This passage is most important because it shows that an ardent Sāfi of the 13th cent. looked upon 'Umar as an enemy to mysticism; and, insomuch as the rubā'īs quoted are probably authentic, we cannot but agree with those who regard 'Umar as the champion of materialism, when brought by Sufís and theologians against scientists and philosophers, carries no weight: 'Umar is as unlikely to have been a materialist as he is likely to have been a free-thinker. An instance is noted, further, that the name Khayyām occurs in twelve quatrains, and constitutes at least a presumption in favour of their authenticity, and that, taken together with two quoted by Najmu'ddin Dāya, exhibit the principal elements of the Rubā'īyat, viz. hedonism, philosophical contempt for the profanum vulgus, attacks on the orthodox, lamentations for the cruelty of fate, meditations on the incompatibility of a supreme intelligence with the sufferings of life and on the nothingness of man, hope of divine mercy, and a certain morality which recognizes the duty of doing good to others. But the Sāfi mysticism seems to be excluded, although the poet often makes use of Sufic terms.'


REYNOLD A. NICHOLSON.

UNCLEAN.—See Holiness, Tabu.

UNCTION (Christian).—As a religious rite, and apart from social usages, unction was taken by the Christian Church immediately from the Jews, though for some purposes it was borrowed by the Jews from other nations. In the OT unction was used in the 'consecration' of priests, kings, prophets, and places. 1 In connection with the complete rite of baptism.—This use of unction was almost universal from very early times up to the Reformation.

(a) The New Testament.—It is disputed whether the apostles used unction in the rite of Christian initiation. In 2 Co 19, 1 Jn 2, 27, all Christians are said to have been anointed. This is undoubtedly metaphorical, but it perhaps points to the actual use of oil in the apostolic age before or after baptism, at least in some places; as it was then certainly in use for other purposes, 2 the metaphor would in that case be more apposite. On the other hand, in Acts, where two accounts are given of the laying on of hands, the propriety of the laying on of hands is described, unction is not mentioned. Tertullian certainly thought that the apostles used it in connexion with baptism, for he traces it back to the 'primitive discipline' of the OT. 3 It is possible that it was used in the apostolic age in some places, but not in others, and it is noticeable that laying on of hands and anointing are not for this purpose joined together in the NT, though they were both there used for other purposes. 4 Or it is possible that the custom of anointing at baptism arose in sub-apostolic times, being due to a literal interpretation of the NT metaphor. 5

(b) The subsequent ages.—After NT times or at least from the middle of the 2nd cent. onwards unction was used, sometimes preceding, sometimes following immersion, or both before and after. But it is necessary to note that, originally and for many centuries, immersion and its complement, which in the West from the 5th cent. onwards has been known as 'confirmation,' were as a normal

1 Christensen, ibid. 35 f. 2 See § 1 below. 3 A. Christensen, ibid. 36 f.

2 De Baptism. 1.

3 Cf. Mk 16, 18. 723 sqq. 25, Ac 8 sqq. etc.

4 See, on the one side, F. H. Chase, Confirmation in the Apostolic Age, 1902, p. 59; on the other, H. J. Lawlor, art. Confirmation, vol. iv, p. 52.
rule a single rite; and it is immaterial to consider whether any particular anointing belongs to the one part or to the other.

We get no light on the subject in the scanty literature of the first three quarters of the 2nd cent., but it is to the Aramean

that mention is not usually mentioned in the Didache, though it gives the words of baptizing into the threefold Name. 1 Towards the end of the century Tertullian tells us that anointing was administered after the immersion, as a long-standing custom. 2 Ireneaus says that the Gnostic Marcossians used it in the parody of Christian baptism; 3 and early in the 3rd cent. Hippolytus says that the Naissenes (or Ophites) used it. 4 Theophilus of Antioch also mentions anointing as being the reason of the name 'Christian,' 5 and thus implies his belief that the custom was apostolic.

Ireneaus and Hippolytus, in the works mentioned, do not actually say that the Catholic used anointing, though we may infer this from the fact that the Gnostics were clearly copiyists in their baptismal rites; but the matter is now set at rest by the fact that the so-called Egyptian Church Order in all its versions has anointing, in this case before as well as after immersion, and in the Latin version, which appears to be the oldest, is wanting in the description of the rite. 6

I. The Mode of Administration.

We find only one anointing, and that before immersion, so that in this Church the confirmation took place before the rite at the font, instead of after it, as everywhere else and as in the NT.

The evidence for this custom is now full and complete; it continued till the 5th or 6th century. Probably Severus (patriarch of Antioch, A.D. 215-36) introduced the post-baptismal anointing among the West Syrians (Monophytes), and the Syrians (Monophysites), and still later the East Syrians (Nestorians). The only known exception is in a commentary ascribed to Ephraim, 7 where an anointing after immersion, and not before, is mentioned, but that work is rather later than Ephraim's. These commentaries are a catena of notes on the OT, many byJacob Barsal. The position of the Deut. 8:6 anointing in the heading is often doubtful, and the extracts may be paraphrases rather than quotations. If at any point they are not in accord with affixed citations of Ephraim (as is the case here), we may safely conclude that they are not his.

The ordinary custom, then, from the time of Hippolytus, was to have an anointing before, and at least one after, immersion; in that case ordinary olive oil was generally used before immersion and chrism or unguent (ασπόρο) after, the latter being mixed with balsam, spices, etc. But there are several exceptions. In Theodoret's 8 chrism of ασπόρο is used before immersion; in the Armenian and East Syrian rites oil is used throughout.

(c) At the effects.—This was a ceremony in the West (called in Spain afeitatio) which took place several days before baptism, and was named from the Baphokus. That it was accompanied with anointing and with the ears and nose being touched. For this ceremony oil was originally used, as we see in John the Roman Deacon's Epistle to Senarius 1 and in the works of Iulianus, bishop of Toledo. 2 Afterwards, as in the Rituale Romanum; 3 and in later pontiﬁcals, salvia was used instead.

In several authorities, such as Ambrose, 4 the Bobbio Missal, 5 the Stonus Missal, 6 Alcuin, 7 and Amalaris of Nore, 8 neither salvia nor oil is explicitly mentioned at the effects itself; but in the Gregorian Sacramentary 9 and the Gelasian, and, so elsewhere, the effects take place just before the anointing of shoulders and breast. It is quite possible that this anointing may be the anointing which takes place just before immersion, put into an earlier position.

(d) In consecrating the font.—In both East and West oil or chrism or both were often poured in the form of a cross into the water at the consecration of the font. We ﬁnd this in Iulianus 10 in Spain; at Rome, the Ordos Romani Septuagesimam; 11 in Gaul in the Missale Gallicum Vetus; 12 also in the Bobbio Missal 13 and the Missale Gothicum; 14 and in most Western pontiﬁcals. It is also common in the East. It is mentioned in the writer who possesthe Dionysius the Areopagite; 15 and is found in the Greek rite of baptism, 16 and the Armenian, 17 the Coptic, West Syrian, Maronite, and (in some MSS) the Eastern pontiﬁcals. 18

(e) During the catechumenate.—There are a few traces of an earlier anointing than that of the effects mentioned above. Augustine, speaking of our Lord's anointing the blind man with the clay in the gospels, says in De Bapt. 19 perhaps made him a catechumen. 20 This may refer to a custom of anointing at the reception of candidates into the catechumenate. In Spain Isidore of Seville speaks of catechumens being anointed before they became 'competentes,' i.e. accepted candidates for baptism. 21 The Roman Synod held A.D. 402 speaks of their being anointed at the third scrutiny. 22 But the phrase 'oil of catechumens' usually means the oil administered just before immersion, as opposed to the chrism administered after. In the later Western authorities three oils are distinguished: (1) holy oil, to sign the 'heathen child' on the breast and posteriorly on the shoulders before immersion; (2) 'holy chrism,' after immersion; (3) 'nick man's oil.' 23

(f) Consecration of the chrism.—In the West the chrism was ordinarily unction by the diocesan bishop, in the East by the patriarch, on Maundy

    1 [C. A.D. 1907.]
    2 The view of J. Armstong Tebbens, that the Didache only represents a piece of false antiquarianism, and does not give us a true picture of Christian life, is perhaps now more probable (cThS. viii. [1913] 205; and Barnack, Hermas, and the Didache [Dolmennean Lectures], London, 1920, Appx. (4b) A).
    3 De Bapt. 6:8; cf. de Rer. Carn. 8, adn. Marc. i. 14.
    4 At Athen. 6:1; Is. cxvi. 2.
    5 At Athen. 1. 12 (A.D. 180).
    6 The So-called Egyptian Church Order and Derived Documents (C. 117) (1916).
    7 Ep. lxx. (cix.) 2.
    8 Cf. loc. hom. vi. § 5, in Rom. hom. v. § 8; but we have these in the Latin translation only.
    9 Theodoret, Hær. Fab. Compend. i. 5 (5th cent.).
    10 Fab. Compend. ii. 6; Confirmation, and in. Connolly, The Liturgical Homilies of Narsai (TS vii. i), Cambridge, 1916, xii. 7.
    11 In Joc. 234, Lawler (loc. cit.) suggests that the word 'midich' (baptized) here means 'baptizand.' But in view of the above this is impossible.
    12 In Cest. ii. 9.
Thursday; so, in the West, in the Gregorian and Gallican Sacramentaries; Leo the Great in his Pastoral Letters that the procedure existed in the East in the 5th century. Proterius, bishop of Alexandria, was murdered on that day, and Leo says that the inholding of the chiasm has failed. But in the East, the Ambrose of Malabar rite, in which ordinary oil is used instead of chrism, is consecrated by the presbyter at the time of baptism; indeed, the little of the 'holy oil' said to be descended from St. John is allowed. There were exceptions. At the first Council of Toledo (A.D. 400) permission was given to consecrate chiasm at any time. In Gaul it was perhaps consecrated on Palm Sunday, formerly the Armenians sometimes allowed deconsecration of the oil, but this is now confined to the catholics.

The rule that bishops alone may hallow the chiasm is laid down in the first Council of Toledo, and Pope Innocent I, at the second and third Connell of Carthage, at that of Hippo, by Augustine, by the Council of Valon in Gaul, by the second Council of Seville, by Ambrosius of Meta, and by Thomas Aquinas; and also in Egypt, early in the 4th cent., by Didymus of Alexandria. But the time of consecration in Africa was laid down to consecrate the chiasm, as John the Deacon tells us. In the West the oil, as opposed to consecration, was ordinarily consecrated at the time of the service of the officiant, whoever he might be.

(g) Meaning of the anointing. Originally the anointing was considered to be the consecration of the Christian to the royal priesthood.

So Tertullian compares the baptismal anointing to the anointing of the Aaronic priests. The same idea is found in the Epistle and (epaphrasically) in the derived Apostolic Constitutions; Jerome, apparently alluding to the use of the word 'baptism,' in his widest sense, says that 'the priesthood of the kingdom is baptism.' The idea of consecration to the priesthood is also found in Augustine; Ambrose, John the Deacon, Eusebius of Seville, Alcinus, and his disciple Rabanus Maurus, and became a consecrating Chrism at consecrated was specially connected, by John the Deacon, Alcinus, and many others, with the anointing of the head immediately after immersion.

A special significance was attached to the post-baptismal anointing in places where the laying on of hand was dying out, or was less emphasized, and even in Egypt, where that ceremony was long retained.

The gift of the Spirit, elsewhere associated with the imposition of the hand, was then ascribed to the anointing.

This case is with Sarapion of Thmuis in Egypt, Ambrose (probably), and even Pope Innocent I. The North Italian author of the De Sacramentis says that signing (with chrism) the bishop (sacerdos) invokes the Holy Ghost in his several offices, and that the gift of the Spirit is thereby connected with the anointing in the sense that, in the East, where the imposition of the hand in confirmation died out early, we should perhaps see in the connection between the Chrism of Jerusalem which the object of the χρίσις to convey the Holy Spirit (Acts 10: 38).

1 Ed. Wilson, p. 49.
2 Ed. Wilson, p. 60 ff.
3 Ep. civ. 5.
6 Can. 20.
8 Denninger, j. 55.
9 Ep. ad Des. 3.
10 Can. 23 (A.D. 387 or 390).
11 Can. 21 (A.D. 393).
12 De Episc. et de Sacramentis. 13 Can. 2 (A.D. 44).
14 Can. 7 (A.D. 619).
15 Th, 3.
16 De Trin. ii. 15.
17 Ep. ad Serap. 7.
19 III. 16 (A.D. 372).
20 De Civ. Dei, xx. 10.
21 De Episc. ad Serap. 6.
22 Ep. ad Serap. 22.
23 De Instr. Cleri, i. 30 (9th cent.).
24 H. E. 28, 8 (in the early Syrian Church, to the anointing before immersion.
25 S. Thaur, 32 (c. A.D. 360).
26 De Myst. viii. (42).
27 III. 2 (3) (c. 400).
28 Serm. 227 (Hedicondeci ed.).
29 Serm. de bapt. 6 (4th cent.).
30 Cat. xxvi. (Myst. ili.) 3 (c. 349).

SYRIAN) apparently calls the unction 'the drug of the Spirit,' and certainly speaks of the gift received in the anointing as the Spirit given by the Spirit.

In the developed Eastern rites we sometimes find the association of the gift of the Spirit with the chrismation; explicitly in the Coptic rite in the prayer for the imposition after immersion, and in the Ethiopian. Other Eastern rites are confused on this point, but, as immersion and confirmation are never separated in them, they are not particularly careful to specify a special significance to one or other part of the service.

(h) Unction at the reception of heretics. This is in reality part of the question which we are now considering. For, as all agreed that the Holy Spirit could not be given outside the Church, even in the great controversy between Cyprian and Pope Stephen as to heretical baptism in the 3rd cent., the ceremony used when heretics were converted and admitted to the Church had normally as its object the reception of the Holy Ghost. It was the custom in the West and in 'Africa,' and originally (it seems) in at least some parts of the East, to receive heretics by the imposition of the hand. But in places where the latter ceremony was less emphasized they were received by anointing.

This was the case in D巨inos of Alexandria, at the councils of Orange on the Rhone and of Epson in Burgundy, and at the Trullan Council of Constantine. Basil also directs the reception of heretics by anointing, and Gregory Thaumaturgus says that this was the custom in the East. Theodore says that the Novatians were anointed on reception, because they did not receive baptism in the 3rd cent.

2. Uction of the sick. The early history of this subject has too often been considered, by writers of all schools of thought, merely from the standpoint of the post-Reformation controversies. It is more profitable to put these, in the first instance, on one side, and to deal with the purely historical question of the use by the Early Church of unction for sick people, whatever was the purpose of such unction. In the opinion of the present writer, it will be found that the evidence for unction of the sick is very much the same, as regards time, as that for unction in connexion with baptism, the only difference being that, while for the latter the evidence of the 2nd cent. is stronger than that of the 1st, for the former the case is reversed, and the evidence for unction of the sick, which is strong in the apostolic age, is even in the case which followed it. It will be found, it is believed, that the commonly expressed opinion on this subject will have to be reconsidered.

(a) The New Testament. Unction of the sick is mentioned as having been used during our Lord's ministry: in Mk 6: 13 the Twelve 'anointed with oil many that were sick, and healed them.' In the subsequent period it is condemned by St. James: 'the sick man is to call for 'the presbyters of the church,' who are to pray over him, 'having anointed him with oil in the name of the Lord,' and this 'prayer of faith ' is both for bodily healing and for forgiveness of sins. We read also of our Lord anointing with salve in performing cures; and of the figurativeointing of the eyes with eye-salve in the Apocalypse. The oil and wine used has period Samaritan had no religious significance, though they have received a spiritual interpretation. The passage in St. James is reconsidered by Origen and Chrysostom. The

1 Connolly, I. d. Hom. of Narses, p. 43, 45.
2 Denninger. 3 Le. 205.
3 De Trin. ii. 13.
4 Can. 1 (A.D. 441).
5 Can. 18. (A.D. 478).
6 Ep. canonicæ erami, clxxxviii. (14th cent.).
7 Serm. ad Quiricum (6th cent.).
8 See 6 (5) above.
9 See 6 (6) below.
10 Ja 5:14.
11 Mk 7:3122.
12 Ja 5:13.
13 Lk 10:14.
14 In Loc. hom. ii. § 4.
15 17 De Sacram. i. 6 (190).
latter implies that the unction of the sick was still practised in his day: he is speaking of the power of the priest to forgive sins.

(b) 2nd and 3rd centuries. The first known record of a unction of the sick after St. James applies to the reign of the emperor Septimius Severus (A.D. 193-211), or more probably to a time before his accession. Tertullian says \(^1\) that the Christian Priscus Torpacion had once (ulli-quaque) healed \(^2\) Severus, the father of Antoninus \(^3\) (Caraclalla) by anointing. If unction was used for the healing of a sick heathen, a fortiorem it would be used for Christians. It might be held that this was a purely medical use of unction. But any possible doubt on this head has been taken away by the investigations of R. H. Connolly with regard to the Egyptian Church Order (already referred to).\(^4\)

In the Latin as well as in the Ethiopic version of this Church Order there is a form given for the blessing of the oil for the sick, offered apparently by the lictor. This form we may with confidence assign, with the great bulk of this work, to Hippolytus of Rome, and therefore we have evidence of the unction of the sick from Rome early in the 3rd century. The form states that the unction is for the healing of the body, but nothing is said as to spiritual blessing. This new evidence shows that we must correct the statement of the committee of the Lambeth Conference of 1898, that 'there is no clear proof of the use of unction in the Christian Church and bishops of the fourth century'—a statement which has been frequently repeated.

(c) From the 4th cent. onwards. In the 4th cent., we have a sentence of Church Order which shows that the unction of the sick was a common practice. In the Testament of Our Lord\(^5\) a form is given for blessing oil and water for healing; this prayer is independent of the Hippolytan form, and much fuller; it incidentally refers to spiritual benefits. The oil would be for application, the water for drinking. The Apostolic Constitutions give a form\(^6\) for consecrating oil and water by the bishop, or by the presbyter, but this refers to healing, but incidentally also to demons and other spiritual ills. This form is not found in the epitome (of the eighth book of Apost. Const.) known as the Constitutions through Hippolytus.\(^7\) In the Canons of Hippolytus an oil for the sick and first-fruits are blessed; no form is given, but 'Gloria Patri' is added. In the Sacramentary of Sarpiion oil and bread and water for the sick are blessed; by the bishop, as the book contains only the portions of the services said by him.

The form contains the words 'Let every Satanic energy depart from...these thy servants,' and it has been suggested that this is the earliest instance in which the oil was consecrated specifically for use.\(^8\) Elsewhere in this work there occurs, after the anaphora, a 'precious anointing anoint these believers and waters that are offered' (by the lictor). In both these prayers bodily healing is primarily asked for, then spiritual blessings, and protection against demons and the like. A form for consecrating oil for the sick is found also in G. Horner's Statutes of the Apostles.\(^9\)

In the above works the people seem to have brought their oil (and water and bread) for the sick to be blessed by the bishop or presbyter, and then to have applied it themselves, in spite of Ja 5.14. At the same time they also brought firstfruits to be blessed.

We have a good deal of other evidence of the use of unction for the sick, the earliest referring to Egypt.

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1. \(\text{Ad Sept. 4.}\)

2. \(\text{See \(\text{Ad Sept. 6.}\) above.}\)

3. \(\text{Oss. Nov., Sermon VIII, 82.}\)


5. \(\text{I. 544, (c. ad. 350).}\)

6. \(\text{V. 29 (c. ad. 375).}\)


8. \(\text{Ibid.}\)

9. \(\text{Ibid.}\)

10. \(\text{J. Wordsworth, Bishop Sarapiion's Prayer Book, London, 1900, p. 77.}\)

11. \(\text{London, 1904, pp. 172-173. This is a long interpolation, and the date is not certain.}\)

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Pallassius, bishop of Hellenopolis, in his Historia Lusitana, describes how the monks of that country in the 4th cent. used oil for the sick and for the purification of the temple (c. 597), Macarius of Antioch (c. 597), and John of Lycopeolis.\(^3\) The first of these monks healed the sick by touch, the other by oil consecrated by himself.\(^10\) Eusebius also tells us how the monks of Egypt in that century anointed a paralytic with oil and healed him; and Rufinus makes a similar statement. On the other hand, Ambrose mentions only imposition of the hand in healing the sick; the Catholics would not allow an Ariad to lay a hand on a sick man's head.\(^11\) Thus unction and other modes of providing for the sick are alternatives, and we see the same thing in the NT: Mt 26.67 Lk 1.40.\(^12\)

In the 4th cent. Chrysostom says that the sick were healed with oil from the church lamp, and this was afterwards a common practice.\(^13\)

In the 5th cent. Pope Innocent I., asked if the sick might be anointed with chrism (sanctum oleum chrismatis), and if bishops might anoint, answers in the affirmative; \(\text{the oil blessed by the}\) bishop may be applied by any Christian if necessary, but it cannot be applied to penitents, because it is of the nature of a sacrament.\(^14\)

Some eighty or more years later Cæsarius, bishop of Arles (452), says in one of his sermons; 'Whenever any sickness comes, let the sick man receive the body and blood of Christ and then anoint his body,' and the promise made by St. James will be fulfilled. And in another sermon he says that it is better than money to anoint the body. Thus all Christians might anoint the body and blood of Christ, and faithfully and copiously to anoint (perumanent) oneself and one's own with blessed oil, and to receive not only the body, but also remission of sins, as James the apostle says.\(^15\)

Here then, in the beginning of the 6th cent., it is contemplated that an anointed man should ordinarily anoint himself, though the oil has previously been consecrated.

From the 6th cent. onwards we read of 'the oil of the cross' in healing. This oil was touched by a relic of the true cross, and was considered to be especially efficacious.\(^16\)

Among the Easterns we find the use of oil for the sick to be almost universal.

(2) Armenians in practice anoint only sick priests, not deacons or lay people.

The Instruction in the Christian Faith, by Chorhor, says that the unction is for the healing of the body and the forgiveness of lighter sins; the apostles sometimes laid hands on the sick, and sometimes anointed; unction is not essential, but prayer is, and, if necessary, this sacrament may be administered without the anointing of oil.\(^17\)

The earliest mention among the Armenians of unction as a preparation for death is c. A.D. 800; and no rite of consecrating the anointing oil for this purpose had in any ancient encolophos or mashotz.\(^18\) The old Armenian office for the visitation of the sick consists of prayers and communion.\(^19\) Deninger mentions a similar custom of anointing the faithful (not only the sick) on Maundy Thursday with butter (not oil), blessed by the bishop.\(^20\)

(3) East Syrians (Nestorians).—In the Tkhbās, or Missal, it is directed that the holy oil of baptism is not to be used for consecrating churches or for anointing the sick; \(\text{for an unction of the sick}\)

(1) The Liturgical Hist. of Palladius, ed. C. Butler (TU VI 1, 2), Cambridge, 1899-1904, \(\S 12 (\text{II. 35 ff.)}\)

(2) \(\text{Ib.}\)

(3) \(\text{Ib.}\)

(4) \(\text{Ib.}\)

(5) \(\text{Ib.}\)

(6) \(\text{E. F. Brightman gives other instances in JTAAS i. (1900) 260.}\)

(7) \(\text{Encycl. Ep. 5.}\)

(8) \(\text{In Matt. homm. xxxii, 6.}\)

(9) \(\text{See \(\text{A. D. 1454.}\) Ibid.}\)

(10) \(\text{Ep. ad Dechon. 1, A.D. 1493.}\)

(11) \(\text{The authenticity of this letter has been questioned, but without much probability. As late as the beginning of the 8th cent. Bede, in his History of the English Church and People, states in the Epistle of St. James, says, on Innocent's authority, that laymen may anoint themselves.}\)

(12) \(\text{Scrim. 265.}\)

(13) \(\text{Lambeth Temp. 1, p. 437, in the appendix to vol. v. of the Benedictine ed. of Augustine (also PL xxviii. 2583).}\)

(14) \(\text{Scrim. 379, p. 525. Also SCG 1, p. 465 (also SCG xxxix. 2273).}\)

(15) \(\text{For this and similar oils see DCA ii. 1433.}\)

(16) \(\text{T. E. Dowling, The Armenian Church, London, 1910, p. 139 f.}\)

(17) \(\text{Ib.}\)

(18) \(\text{It is given in P. C. Conybeare, Rituale Armenorum, p. 114 ff.}\)

(19) \(\text{161, i. 100.}\)

(20) \(\text{Syriac text (Urmil, 1890), p. 147. This part has not been translated into English.}\)
A single collect is appointed, and is to be said by the priest when he blesses the oil. In this Church (except of (if necessary), dust from the tombs of the martyrs, is mixed with oil and water and applied to the sick person. In the ordination of presbyters prayer is offered that they may lay their hands on the sick, and they may be healed.

(f) The Coptes have an office of the 'holy oil' which they call 'the lamp' (φανέρ): imposition of hands is included in it, and seven presbyters officiate. The Greek Orthodox also have a direction to anoint the sick with 'the holy oil from the lamp.'

(g) The West Syrians (Jacobites) also have an office for blessing 'the oil of catechumens, which is also the oil of the sick.'

(h) The Orthodox.—Here seven priests, if they can be had, administer the oil. The Russian Longer Catechism says that anointing with oil is a sacrament, in which, while the body is anointed with oil, God's grace is invoked on the sick to heal him of spiritual and bodily infirmities; and it then quotes Mk 6:12, Jas 5:14.

(i) The Church of England.—Theodore, archbishop of Canterbury, in his Capitulare (A.D. 680), says that Greeks allowed presbyters, if necessary, to make the exorcized oil and chism for the sick, but Romans confined the consecration of oil to bishops. The fee is fixed by the Synod of Egberton, archbishop of York (A.D. 732–749), say that the sick are to be anointed with oil hallowed by bishops (sacerdotibus), and that the presbyter is to have the 'cæliarum oils,' which in the Latin church may not be used without consecration. King Edgar's Canons (A.D. 960) order every priest to have anointing oil for the sick.

(j) The 18 Canons (c. A.D. 1000) direct the priest to 'have hallowed oil apart for children (i.e. for confirmation), and apart for sick men, and always to anoint the sick in bed.' Some sick men are haelful', so that they will not consent to be anointed (they feared that anointing would kill them). If a man is anointed and recovers, and then once more falls sick, he can again receive anointing; it is not an ordination, but in it is healing and forgiveness.

The form of blessing the oil is given in the Pontifical of Egberton, archbishop of York. It pray that it may be to every one who touches it for protection of mind and body, for the driving away of all pains and all infirmities, and every sickness of body, and to refer to the anointing of priests, kings, prophets, and martyrs. The form in the present Roman Pontifical is nearly the same.

In the later instances we see the restriction of the administration of the oil to a priest. This led to the practice of extreme unction, and then anointing was made to precede the last communion.

The anointing of the sick was retained in the First Prayer-Book of Edward VI. (1549), and was on the forehead, and explicitly for the healing of both soul and body. It was omitted in the Second Prayer-Book (1555), but restored by the Non-jurors.

3. Extreme unction.—When the Bridge of Egberton, archbishop of York. It pray that it may be to every one who touches it for protection of mind and body, for the driving away of all pains and all infirmities, and every sickness of body, and to refer to the anointing of priests, kings, prophets, and martyrs. The form in the present Roman Pontifical is nearly the same.

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of a female's front. At each anointing he prays for forgiveness in these words: 'By this anointing and His most tender mercy and compassion, He has forgiven thee what thou hast done against him through sight, (hearing, etc.). A psalm is said between each anointing, and after the unctus a blessing is given, referring to the ascension of mind and body. Then follows a prayer which has special reference to the sick man's approach of death, but this is not in the R. M. (2015) reprinted in Massel's note, and seems to be later than the rest. The sick man is then communicated if he is capable of retaining what he hears. Otherwise, he is accorded that spiritual communion suffices, and the well-known words are quoted: 'Vatumcredus tuum in manus Domini dedit.'A distinction of Office, probably of Hereford or Canterbury and of the 12th cent., the first prayer mentioned above ends differently; here there is only one prayer: 'Suffragio'; the various sentences are combined. 2 In this Pontifical two different prayers follow the blessing, referring to the forgiveness of sins.

Only one priest is mentioned in the Sarum Manual as administering unction, but Walter Raynold, archbishop of Canterbury (1315–37), speaks of sacerdotis in the plural; and W. Lyndwood glosses this by saying, except in case of necessity. 3 Raynolds says that all over fourteen years of age should receive extreme unction; 4 and also that it can be repeated only if a year has elapsed.

The oil was consecrated on Maundy Thursday; 5 and this was the case also at Rome. 6 By a constitution of J. Peckham, archbishop of Canterbury (1278–94), any unused oil was burnt. 7

The Council of Trent says that extreme unction was instituted by our Lord as a sacrament of the NT, outlined (insinuationum) by St. Mark, and confirmed to the faithful and promulgated by St. James. The matter 'is oil blessed by a bishop, for the unction represents the grace of the Holy Spirit, and the form is 'By this unction,' etc. 8

The effect is primarily forgiveness and strengthening of the soul, and occasionally restoration of bodily healing by the minister of bishops and priests. Extreme unction is to be used for those who appear to be dying; if they recover and then again fall ill, it may be repeated. 9 See also Art. Extreme Unction. 10

4. Unction at ordination.—The idea of anointing at ordination is consecration to God and endowment with His gifts. The custom is derived from the OT, where kings, high priests, priests, and prophets were anointed. In Ex 29:7, Lv 8:11, Moses anoints Aaron, whose anointing is also mentioned in Ps 133:1, Sir 43:24. In Ex 29:7, 29:30, Lv 8:10, 16:31, it was administered as priests; in Lv 21:9, Nu 25:3, high priests in general receive unction. In 1 K 10:26, Hanoil, asphaltum, and 'the oil of anointing' were used. This last was anointed in Ps 105:16, Is 61:3, perhaps metaphorical. The anointing with oil and spices in Ex 30:22. 'Oil of the vineyard in the name 'the Christ,' 'the Messiah' ('the Anointed One'), as in Lk 4:18, which quotes Ps 95:3, John 1:41, 20:29, in Ac 10:38, and in He 1, which quotes Ps 45:7; cf. also Dn 9:4.

But, while in Eastern ordinals we frequently read in an anointing in a metaphysical sense, the actual anointing at ordination was confined to the West. 1

1 Only hearse, and those hast eaten. The saying is from Augustine, in Ioan., tract. xxv. 12 (on Jn 6:36), 'cresc et manducasti;' but he is not speaking specially of spiritual communion.
3 Provocatio seu Constitutiones Anglic, Oxford, 1879, bk. i, tit. 6, 'Cum magna reverentia.'
4 Jos. Fl., tit. 7.
5 Jos. Fl., l. cest.
6 Jos. Fl., l. cest.
7 Ed. Greenwell, p. 3; Marténe, vol. ii. col. 101.
8 Ed. Greenwell, p. 28; Greenwell and Wooley, vol. i. col. 369. 9 Ed. Greenwell, p. 21; Marténe, vol. ii. col. 100; see also cols. 110, 129.
10 See § 3 above.
12 Ed. Greenwell, pp. 23, 28; Greenwell and Wooley, vol. i. col. 369.
13 Ed. Greenwell, p. 28; Greenwell and Wooley, vol. i. col. 369.
14 Ed. Greenwell, p. 21; Marténe, vol. ii. col. 100; see also cols. 110, 129.
15 See § 3 above.
France Pippin, father of Charlemagne, was anointed in 750. But in these cases there is no mention of crowning, and the anointing was the central feature of the ceremony. The other hand, the emperors who were crowned for many centuries at Constantinople—for no emperor was crowned at Rome before Charlemagne—appear not to have been anointed on the 9th. cent. (In Basil the Macedonian [367-386] is thought to have received anointing), or as some believe, not before the 12th or 13th cent. In the latter case the earlier references are nongraphical only. In the Greek rite of coronation as fully developed, and hence in the Russian rite which is derived from it, anointing is a prominent feature. It is uncertain if Charlemagne was anointed as Roman emperor. It will thus be seen that anointing at the inauguration of kings is earlier than at that of emperors. Both England and France claimed to have a miraculous chrismon sent down from heaven for the purpose.

The Abyssinians have the custom of anointing at the coronation of the Negus; it is probable that this is not derived from European practice, but is directly deduced from Holy Scripture.

The coronation service for an English king found in Egbert's Pontifical is the most ancient of those extant; it is printed by Martène and Mabillon, and the latter gives in his notes a collation of the same service in the Liber Missal. In Egbert the king is anointed once only on the head, one of the bishops ('unus ex pontificibus') saying the prayer, and the others anointing him. There is here no coronation of a queen-consort, though we find one later (with unction), in the 10th century. There was more than one recension of Egbert's office; that called the Liber Regalis, which probably dates from the time of Edward II, remains almost unchanged till the coronation of James II. In the service in the Sarum Pontifical given by Mabillon the king's hands, head, breast, shoulder-blades, and elbows ('ambae compasses brachiorum') are anointed. The custom of anointing has been retained in England ever since the Reformation, at the coronation of a king, of a queen-regnant, and of a queen-consort. Notices of unction at the coronation of James I. and his queen, of Charles I., Charles II., William and Mary, and Victoria may be found in Hierurgia Anglicana. At the coronation of George V. the king was anointed thrice in the form of a cross over the right breast of the Garter (laying over him a rich pall of silk or cloth of gold): first on the crown of the head, then on the breast, then on the palms of both hands. Charles I. was anointed first on the palms of the hands, then (after a prayer) on the breast, then between the shoulders, then 'on the boughs of both arms,' then on the crown of the head; this followed the more ancient custom. The English coronation rite is the remaining office in Christendom where the full rites of the anointing and all the details of solemn investiture are still extant. The chrismon was, before the coronation, consecrated at the Dean of Westminster if a bishop, otherwise by the Archbishop of Canterbury: but in the case of William

1 Woolley, p. 34. 2 ib. p. 167. 3 ib. p. 179. 4 F. E. Brightman, in JTSi II. [1901] 393 ff. 5 Woolley, p. 259. 6 ib. p. 177. 7 See the discussion in Woolley, pp. 40, 169. 8 lb. pp. 73, 103. 9 ib. pp. 30, 180. 10 lb. p. 109. 11 ib. p. 120. 12 ib. p. 109. 13 This ceremony is also be seen in the Liber Sac. (cd. W. Greenwell), p. 101. Some think that it is later than Egbert. 14 Woolley, p. 36. 15 ib. p. 109. 16 iii. 3. In his notes Mabillon refers to earlier authorities also. 17 ib. pp. 19, 25. 18 Ed. revised by Sir W. Staley, London, 1902-04, ii. 118, 121-124, 383 ff. 19 Maclean, The Great Solomony of the Coronation, London, 1911, p. 36. In this work the full office is given with elaborate notes. 20 ib. p. 309. 21 ib. p. 314. and Mary the oil was blessed in the coronation service itself; this addition to the latter was dropped from the time of Anne.

In France Napoleon I. was anointed on head and hands at his coronation; and his consort Josephine likewise. In Scotland unction was first allowed at a king's inauguration in 1329. After the Reformation there were four Scottish coronations: James VI. was crowned in 1567, when one year old; his consort, Anne of Denmark, was crowned in 1569; Charles I. was crowned as King of Scotland in 1633, Charles II. in 1651; at the first three coronations unction was used, but not at the last.

On the continent of Europe we find anointing retained at coronations in the reformed rite at Prague in 1619, in Prussia in 1701, in Denmark from 1559 to 1840, in Sweden from 1767 till our own day, and in Norway in modern times.

Uection at the consecration of churches, etc.—This also is taken from the OT.

Jacob anointed the stone in Gn 28:18, and S. B. Driver remarks that this was a very common idea among primitive peoples. The anointer was in Ex 28:40, Le 38:3, Nu 7:1. In Jn 6:57 we read of the pouring of a drink-offering to the smooth stones of the valley.

From early days churches and altars were consecrated with chrismon. We read of this in Gaal at the councils of Agde and Agatha 2 and Epaon, 3 in the Censuses of Egbert of York, 4 in his Pontifical, 5 in the Liber of Seconda Familia, 6 in Annales Maurins (A.D. 519), the disciple of Acula, 7 and Walsedid Strabo (A.D. 840). 8 In the Sarum Pontifical 14 the first church consecrated in the church was anointed with chrismon; holy water is also used. But neither oil nor chrismon was used in rechristening a deceased church. 9

We find the same custom in the East. In pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (c. A.D. 500) the altar is consecrated with unguent (μύρος). The West Syrians (Jacobites) use chrismon in consecrating altars, 10 as also do the Greeks. 11 From the 9th cent. we read of the Armenians consecrating churches with unguent, 12 even in the case of the rededication of a desecrated church. 13 Among the East Syrians (Nestorians) the consecration of a church is called εὐανερίζων ('laying on of the hand') and is of two kinds, with and without oil; the former is for new or rebuilt churches, or for rededicating a church which has been desecrated owing to some very grave cause, and must be performed by a bishop, the latter is intended for use after minor accidents or breaches of the ecclesiastical law, and may be performed by priests commissioned by the bishop. In the former each wall and the altar and the pier lintel of the sanctuary door towards the nave are signed with the oil in the form of a cross.

In the Sarum Manual of 1543 bells also are dedicated with oil and chrismon, and, at a much earlier date, in Egbert's Pontifical. 22 Similarly the Armenians dedicate with chrismon the apankotor— a wooden board struck by a mallet, and much used by Eastern Christians to call the people to church. 24 The Armenians also solemnly dedicate a cross, even for private use, with unguent. 25 In Dunstan's Pontifical the chalice is anointed when it is dedicated. 26

In England the Caroline divines used oil in consecrating churches. The Puritans objected that they shew us that the church, by the bishop's anointing some stones thereof with oil, and sprinkling others with water, and using from the Roman pontifical some more prayers, some more ceremonies upon it, becomes a ground more holy.  

7. **Anointing of a dead body.**—From the first the Christians prepared the body for burial either by anointing with unction, or with holy oils or ointments, and then sprinkling a little with holy water, or with holy water and oil, in manner of blessing the dead. They did this in contrast to the Roman custom of cremation. References to the Christian usages in this respect are found in Tertullian,3 Clement of Alexandria,4 Minucius Felix5 (early 3rd cent.), and in the Acta of Taraschus, a martyr in the Diocletian persecution (A.D. 304).6

As an ecclesiastical act we find it, in the East, in pseudo Dionysius the Areopagite; the hiarach [bishop] and the rest salute the dead body, and the hierarch pours oil on the departed, just as before baptism the candidates are anointed with the oil of the sacred chrism. In Goar's _Ékoulogion_ we read of a corpse being anointed just before burial with oil from church lamps, or of a cinder from the thruble being placed on it. This custom is also found in the books of the East Syrians (Nestorians). Some of the eleventh-century monks anoint the departed, the Armenians calling it a sacrament; but in practice, while in the case of a departed dignitary the East Syrians retain the solemn final kiss of peace, they do not appear to use unction. The office used by the Armenians for this purpose may be seen in Denzinger.13 In the West, Theodore, archbishop of Canterbury, says that dead monks were carried to church and anointed on the breast with chrism before the mass.14

**Literature.**—This is given in the footnotes.

A. J. MacLEAN.

**UNDER WORLD.**—1. **Origin of the belief.**—The wide-spread conception of an underworld in religion and myth is generally, though not invariably, associated with the dead. An underworld of the dead is not the only conception of their dwelling-place; spirits may lurk about the place of burial or linger among the abodes of the living; they may dwell in distant regions or islands, or they may ascend to a place in the sky. These conceptions may be held simultaneously, especially where classes of rank or order or idea of distribution suggest separate places for different classes of souls. They are also connected, especially in the lower culture, with the idea that man has several souls which will live separately and in different parts of abodes or localities. They may also result from the mingling of different tribal or racial beliefs. We do not know what ideas the earliest men had regarding the dead, or how soon the belief in a spirit, or soul, apart from the body, was entertained. But, while it must have been obvious that death had brought about some difference between the dead and the living, it is doubtful if the dead were ever regarded as absolutely dead and cut off from all life and action. The wide-spread and early custom of burial, the practice of placing articles by the corpse, and the feeding of the dead at the grave, all suggest the contrary. It is not improbable, therefore, that the dead man was regarded as passing some kind of existence in the grave. The grave was his house, and it was this idea perhaps that led to the custom of making very elaborate tombs for the dead, of which the charabanc or chariot of Persephone is an example. That the dead more or less lived on in the grave, while their return among the living was feared, is also suggested by the belief that they could come from it in the body—in which we find the root of the vampire belief—by the custom of hanging around of earth, or placing heavy stones on the grave, and binding the dead with cords. Many folk-traditions represent the dead as coming in the body from the grave, and in the idea of their still living in the grave or barrow is seen clearly in early Scandinavian tradition. Thus the grave was in itself a small under world. This was more emphasized where several persons were buried in one tumulus, or grave, or where the separate graves of members of one family or clan lay side by side. The grave or graves as a subterranean dwelling-place easily passed over into the conception of a hollow region under the earth, an under world where the dead lived. At whatever time the conception of the soul, spirit, or shade arose, it did not alter this belief. The spirit might come and go from the grave or inhabit with other shades the larger under world.

The formation of a belief in an under world was also aided by observed phenomena. The sun seemed to rise out of the earth or sea in the east and to sink into these again in the west. What then more natural than to suppose that during the night it passed through some underground region, to emerge again in the morning? This under world sometimes thought of as beneath the sea into which the sun seems to sink) through which the sun passed was then associated with the abode of the dead, and in many descriptions of the latter we are expressly told that, when it is night there, it is day there, and vice versa. Hence, too, the entrance to the abode of the dead is not always near at hand, but far off, usually towards the sunset, and their dwelling-place is reached only after a long and perilous journey.

Yet for many races the under world was not visited by the sun. Being under the earth, it was a dark and gloomy place, and this was accentuated by the fact that those who inhabited it were shades or shadows. Here, too, we may see another conception leading to the idea of another world. The eyes of the dead were closed; they were in darkness. Their shades were faint replicas of living beings, seen or not seen in dreams. It is possible that we could see their abode? The grave was a dark, hollow place, and men knew also that caves leading into the interior of earth grew darker as the entrance was farther left behind. There might then be a dark, hollow place within the earth, fit abode for those now shut off from light.

Thus the under world may be a shadowy, undesirable place, or, again, it may be a reflection of the upper world, now light, now dark, as the sun visits or leaves it.

2. **The under world in ancient religions.**—It is surprising that cultured races in the past hardly abandoned the belief in an invisible under world. The Babylonians called this region Aralu, and it was conceived as a vast underground dwelling, as 'the land without return,' the dark abode of all the shades of the dead, with its entrance in the west, the region of sunset. The sombre goddess Eresh-Kigal and the terriblegod Nergal ruled over it. Seven walls, pierced by as many gates, 2

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1 Hieroglyphics Anglicana, new ed., ii. 237.
2 Lk 23:46. 3 Acts 4:11; and, for embalming, de Res. Carn. 27.
4 Tertullian, Apologeticum, ii. 182. 5 Tertullian, ibid. 6 Tertullian, ibid. 7 Ibid., Tertullian, ibid. 8 Tertullian, ibid. 9 It is the meaning of the word; see Tertullian, Apologeticum, ii. 182. 10 Acts 20:37. 11 Acts 28:27. 12 P. 253. 13 Acts 28:27. 14 Acts 28:27.
surronded this place of terror, where 'dust lay thick on door and bolt,' where the shades dwelt with dust for their food, in darkness and gloom, among signified demons. All these ideas are vividly set forth in the story of the descent of Istar to Hades. By far the conceptions of a better region or of retribution were held by the Hindus and later by the Jains; and these beliefs are discussed here. Gloomy as was the fate of the dead in Aralu, there was a worse fate, viz. where burial rites had not been performed and the spirit had to wander, consumed by gnawing hunger and feeding on offal.

The older Hebrew conception was not dissimilar, and the strong desire to be buried in the family grave or by the side of relatives suggests that Sheol or Hades, like the under world elsewhere, was 'originally conceived as a combination of the graves of the clan or nation.' The shades (refphaim) dwelt in the under world, outside the rule of Jehovah, distinguished from each other according to their state on earth, but in a region of darkness, dust, and silence. The state of the shades in Sheol is seen from such passages as Ps 115:16; 149, Eccl 9:10. While the later belief was generally different from this, it still kept the idea of an under world, but now generally as an intermediate state of the dead, waiting for the day of judgment in different compartments of H, better or worse, for the righteous or the wicked. Sometimes it was a place of torment for the wicked at death, or it or a subterranean Gehenna became the place of torment after the judgment.

An under world does not appear consistently in Egyptian beliefs regarding the dead, their state and locality, which were of a conflicting nature. In the Old Kingdom period, and indeed all through the later periods, the soul was associated with the body in its sepulchre, leaving it and returning to it. An under world is spoken of here and there, probably connected with the grave. But many other regions—on earth's surface or in heaven—were open to the dead. In the Osirian religion the blissful abode was in heaven or elsewhere, and it was sometimes regarded as lying in a deep hole under the earth. The theology of the religion of Ram set the universal counterpart of the other world in the bark of the sun by night, passing through guarded gates into twelve successive regions, perhaps both above and below. These regions were either underground or in what corresponded to an under world—the valley through which the sun passed behind the Mountain of Sun-set until it reappeared in the east. This was the Dust, or Duat, the hidden part of the world.

According to O. Schrader, the primitive Indo-European concept of the realms of the dead was that the ancestral spirits dwelt in the earth. They made no distinction between this region of the dead and the tomb. In Vedic times in India, probably as the result of the newer custom of cremation, Yama's kingdom, to which the spirits of the


4. W. Max, Müller, Egyptian Mythology (=Mythology of all Races, vii), Boston, 1916, p. 176.

5. See Art. BABYLONIANS AND ASSYRIANS (Assyria, etc.)


7. See art. ABODE OF THE Dead, etc.


10. H. Chamberlain, Ke-Qi-Ar, Yokohama, 1883 (TSA X, Suppl.), p. 36; art. ABODE, ASSYRIA, etc.
Such an under world, sometimes situated beneath the sea, is known to some of the tribes of New Guinea, sometimes as a place resembling this world, sometimes much superior to it, while, as with the Waga-Waga, it is said that, when it is night here, it is day there, and et cetera, signifying that it is visited by the sun during our night.\(^1\) A region under the sea, called Taalaklom, is the place of spirits, according to the New Caledonians—a delightful place, of most fertile earth, where sickness, death, toll, and darkness are unknown.\(^2\) In many parts of Melanesia the other world is above ground, often on a distant island, but in the eastern group of islands it is below the earth and is called Panoit or other names. It is a peaceful place and on the whole resembles the upper world. But, according to some, the spirits die there, and then revive in another Panoit, situated below the first.\(^3\)

Generally in Polynesia, while a superior heavenly region was reserved for men of rank or for those slain in battle, there was an under world for all the others. The under world of the dead is found mainly among the tribes of the south-west, but sporadically elsewhere. It is reached after a long journey, and is generally a pleasant region, and also the place whence the first men emerged on earth according to some. Occasionally, when the underworld abode is one of several, and is to it that drowned persons go.\(^4\) Similar distinctions, according to rank or manner of death, occurred with the Mexicans, whose under world, Mictlan, was a gloomy place, reserved for those who did not go to one of the other regions. This resembled the dismal under world of the Peruvians, the place allotted to the bulk of the people. An under world of the dead is less frequently met with among the S. American tribes—\(\ldots\) the Tacamas, the Muyscas, and the Patagonians, who thought that vast underground caverns contained the souls of the dead, instead of these unpleasing places.\(^5\)

Among African tribes, both Bantu and Negro, the belief in an under world is very common. This country of the dead is usually reached through a cave or hole in the ground, or through a pool or lake. Especially with the Bantu it is a region much like the earth, with villages, forests, rivers, etc., but among some Negro tribes it is less desirable as, some of their sayings suggest.\(^6\) Stories of descent by the living to this under ground region are widely spread over Africa.

4. The under world in Christian belief.—Through both Jewish and pagan influences the locality of the souls of the dead in this region is placed beneath the earth, either as an intermediate state, with part of it as a paradise region (Irenaeus, Tertullian), or, more generally, a place of punishment. This belief is illustrated from theological writings, legends, poems (e.g., Dante’s Inferno), and art. It has now ceased to be a vital part of Christian belief.

5. The under world as fairyland.—In the art, fairy is used to signify how frequently the abode of the fairies, dwarfs, and such like beings is underground, and various theories for this folk-belief are discussed—\(\ldots\) that which regards fairies as spirits of the dead.

6. Divinities of the under world.—The divinity who reigns over the under world is frequently a personification of that region itself, and this is more particularly the case where, e.g., Earth and Under-earth are conceived as personified in one being. The earth-goddess is also the ruler of souls (e.g., Demeter or Persephone), with the under-earth people, the Δημήτριος or Ὑπαρχόν, as her subjects.\(^7\)

LITERATURE.—This is referred to in the footnotes. See also art. STATE OF THE DEAD, DESCENT TO HADES (Ethnio). J. A. MACCULLOCH.

UNDER WORLD (Greek).—The Greek conception of the under world is the product of a long process of evolution. The following strata can be clearly determined.

1. An under world which is strictly local, and in which the attributes of the dead are purely physical.—This conception is well expressed in a vase in the Central Museum at Athens. This archaic vase is of the type known as ‘prothesis,’ a class of vase used in funeral ceremonies and decorated with funeral subjects. Two mourners stand lamenting, one on each side of a grave, erect on which is a ‘prothesis’ vase. Within the grave itself is represented what the mourners believed the grave to contain: (a) the eidos, little winged figures of the dead, and (b) a great snake. The under world was to the vase-painter strictly local; it was represented exactly as itself. The eidos, or spirit, was represented either as disembodied, or, if winged, as shrunk men, represent the individual dead, strengthless and vain; the great snake represents the collective might of the dead, the θάλαμος of life, rebirth, the immortality of the γέροντες or tribe. This θάλαμος in human form was the tribal hero, in later monarchical days the king, like the ancestor of the Athenians, envisaged as half-man, half-snake. He was essentially a local power, and to him the fertility of the local earth was due; his temple was his tomb. This belief in the snake-hero was essentially the faith of a settled people of agriculturists to whom the local earth with its perennial crops was all-important—a people who practised field-magic. With the heroic age, its shifting of peoples, its conquests and migrations, the conception of the under world, dependent like all other religious conceptions on social developments, was bound to change. This brings us to the next development or stratum.

2. An under world remote, non-local, Pan-Hellenic—in a word, the Homeric or heroic under world.—In Odyssey, xli, the so-called Averka, we have a description of an under world which, though its kernel is undoubtedly local, i.e. Boetian, has become in virtue of many accretions Pan-Hellenic. See art. BESSUS, EARLY GREEK TRAVEL AND ADVENTURE, EGYPT AND N. AFRICA, § 4; NEROSES AND W. AFRICA, § 3; A. WERNER, African Mythology (=Mythology of all Races, viii.), Boston, ch. iv. 4.

3 See art. EARTH, EARTH-SIDES, § 7.
UNITARIANISM

Hellenic. This under world is no longer a local grave, but a vast remote kingdom of the dead, separate and distinct from the living world, by the stream of Oceanos, but in confused fashion accessible by a trench dug in the earth. The old conception partly lives on. This under world of Homer reflects, of course, the Homeric social structure in a state of decay. We have the great mass of the people represented by the 'strengthless heads of the dead,' who 'sweep shadow-like around,' and with whom Odyssey sympatizes; but there are the souls of great particular heroes, who, after drinking of the black blood, can hold converse with the living. Instead of the collective Sisypheus, the snake, we have individual aristocratic heroes who emerge in truly heroic fashion. The function of these splendid Homeric dead is not to fertilize the earth for their successors, but to live on themselves after their kind, though in more shadowy fashion. They are no longer either physical or local; they are functionless—no longer perennial, but merely immortal and quite non-moral.

To the literary Nekia of Homer must be added the great fresco of Polygnotus, the Nekia painted by him in the Lesche at Delphi of which Pausanias has given us a detailed account. 1 The Nekia of Polygnotus is, if we may trust Pausanias, based not on the Odyssey story, but on the epic monster, the Minotaur. In it is laid stress on a new element just dawning in the Nekia of the Odyssey, and this brings us to our third stratum.

3. An under world which is moralized, containing new elements—retribution and purification. —These two elements appear very clearly in a black-figured amphora at Munich. 2 To the right is Sisyphos rolling up his stone, to the left the Danaiads are filling their bottomless casks. Sisyphos stands for retribution, the Danaiads mark the transition to purification.

In the Nekia of Homer Odysseus, after he has had speech of various heroes whom he has known in the upper world, sees as in a vision, but does not speak with, Minos the judge of Hades, Orion the mighty hunter, and the great criminals Tityos, Tantalos, Sisyphos. Of these figures the two first are marked by one great characteristic: they are doing in Hades what they did in the upper world. Minos, who judged Crete, is judging in Hades; Orion is still hunting wild beasts. But the three 'criminals' have been usually supposed to be, not carrying on their normal pursuits, but being 'tormented.' S. Reinach has brilliantly and conclusively shown that the three 'criminals' are depicted as carrying on their earthly activities; it is only a later moralizing age that supposes them 'tormented.' We will take only one instance—Sisyphos rolling his stone. Sisyphos is the ancient king of Corinth, and, like all other ancient kings, a Sisyphos: weather and sky powers. He controls the sun; in a sense he is the sun. It is his business to roll the ball of the sun, the huge stone, up the steep of heaven, whence eternally it rolls down again. The senseless punishment becomes intelligible as a periodic function eternally incumbent. Hades is peopled with the Sisyphos powers of an elder world; it is the dower-house of antique religion.

The Danaiads are analogous figures; but about them have grown up accretions more complex; they stand not only for retribution but also for purification, and they are ultimately connected with the mystery-rite of Orpheus. Primarily, however, they are the daughters of the old Danaios, king of Argos. He makes the weather, and they make the rain; they are well-nymphs, projections of ancient rain-making practice to the earth. In order that water may well forth from sky and earth. They are depicted as on the vase pouring water in a pithos—well, the bottom of which was perforated, to fertilize the earth. But their labour is ceaseless, i.e., periodic, year by year. But, when their nature as rain-makers is forgotten, the ceaseless labour is thought of as a punishment, a retribution; they are 'condemned to carry water in broken vessels'; they, the fertility-bringers, are doomed to endless, barren toil. What was their crime? But for Pausanias, we could never have guessed. He saw in the Nekia at Delphi figures represented as carrying water in broken vessels, and he explains them as 'of the number of those who held the Eleusinian mysteries to be of no account.' They are the uninitiated, never purified in the upper world; they ceaselessly seek purification in the world below. Thus the well-nymphs, with their simple physical function as perennial fertilizers, have been moralized by a later and mystical theology.

In the Hades of Homer there are no water-carriers, no uninitiated, for Homer knows nothing of the mysteries. His theology has reached the retribution, but not the purification, stage. But from Homer onwards, as has recently been shown by Gilbert Murray, the conceptions of bliss and torment are in ancient literature, and we may add, in ancient art. So that the image of ancient water-carriers, whether Orphic or Eleusinian. The mental pictures of Heaven and Hell which were current in ancient times and are still to a certain extent traditional among us are based on the actual ritual of the mysteries. The scenes and arrangements, so to speak, of the other world are, in the first instance, projections of the initiation-ceremonies. Such is the purgatorial water-carrying of the uninitiated Danaiads.


JANE E. HARRISON.

UNEMPLOYMENT.—See Employment.

UNIATS.—See Syrian Christians.

UNIFORMITY.—See Law (Natural), Order.

UNITARIANISM.—Unitarianism, an English term derived from the Latin unitarius (first used of a legalized religion in 1600), is applied to a mode of religious thought and organization founded on the conception of the single personality of the Deity in contrast to the orthodox doctrine of His triune nature. The corresponding term 'Trinitarian' was first used in the modern sense by Servetus in 1546. The adjective 'Unitarian' has sometimes been employed beyond the limits of Christianity—e.g., in connexion with Muhammadanism; this article deals only with the development of modern Unitarianism on Christian lines. The place of the corresponding doctrine in the NT and the early Church must be studied in the usual authorities on historical theology.

1. Beginnings on the Continent.—The general movement of humanism at the opening of the 16th cent. led to a variety of speculation which was largely stimulated by the publication of the Greek text of the NT at Basle (1516). The emphasis of the famous Trinitarian verse, 1 Jn 5, its aversion to the scholastic type of disputations produced a marked effect on many minds. The earliest literary town of anti-Trinitarians is usually found in a treatise of Martin Cellarius
in constant communication with Holland, supplied most of the victims, down to Bartholomew Legate, of Essex, who declared Christ a 'mere man,' but 'born free from sin,' and who was the last sufferer (1555). He was hanged by Smithfield fires (1612), eighth man, who was burned a month later at Lichfield, charged with ten various heresies as incongruous as those of Ebion, Valentinus, Arius, and Manes. One foreign theologian, lawyer, physicians, mathematicians, men of letters and science, were all astir. They travelled and discussed, and new views were carried far and wide. In Naples a young Spaniard, John Valdes, became the centre of a religious group of noble ladies for the study of the Scriptures till his death in 1541; and in 1539 Melanchthon found it necessary to warn the Venetian senate of the existence of widespread Unitarianism in N. Italy. Out of this circle comes Bernard Ochino (1487-1565) of Siens, who passes slowly through Switzerland to London, serves as one of the pastors of the Strangers' Church (1530-53) till he is banished, takes shelter again in Zürich, and finally migrates to Poland in 1559, and joins the anti-Trinitarian party. There Catherine Vogel, a jeweller's wife, had been burned at the age of 80 in 1559 at Cracow for her testimony, and became, of all the visible and invisible world, who could not be conceived by the human intellect. 1 An anti-Trinitarian movement showed itself at the second synod of the Reformed Church in 1556, and in 1508 secured a leader in the person of a Piedmontese physician, George Blandrata. Dutch Anabaptists started various heretical movements, and David Joris of Delft (1501-56) declared in his Wonder-book (1542) that there is but one God, sole and indivisible, and that it is contrary to the operation of God throughout creation to admit a God in three persons. Thousands of Protestants from Germany, Alsace, and the Low Countries, migrated to England in the reign of Henry VIII., and the Strangers' Church under Edward VI. contained also Frenchmen, Walloons, Italians, and Spaniards.

2. Beginnings in England. — English thought was not unaffected. In the 15th cent. Reginald Peacock, bishop of Chichester, had opened the way by his two treatises, the Reprension of overmuch Blaming of the Clergy, and The Flock of Faith, 2 to the discussion of the relative values of Scripture, tradition, and reason as grounds of faith, and had pleaded for freedom of investigation. Later the Anabaptists represented directions from orthodoxy along independent lines. On 28th Dec. 1548 a priest named John Assheton abjured before Cranmer the 'damnable heresies' that 'the Holy Ghost is not God, but only a certain power of the Father,' and that 'Jesus Christ, that was conceived of the Virgin Mary, was a holy prophet ... but was not the true and living God. In the following April a commission was appointed to search out all Anabaptists, heretics, or contemnors of the Common Prayer. A number of London tradesmen were brought before this body in May. The opinions which they recanted included the statements that there was no Trinity of persons; that Christ was only a holy prophet and not at all God; that all we had by Christ was that he taught us the way to heaven. 3 Occasional executions took place, such as that of the surgeon, George van Parris, of Mains, in 1551 for saying that God the Father was the only God, and Christ was not very God. The Eastern counties, being

1 Wallace, Antitrinitarian Biography, ii. 199, quoting Polish historian, Mr. Ferrer, 2 Ed. C. Babington (Bolles ser. x. 1, 3), London, 1860.
3 J. L. M. Dillen, Glauchow, 1829.

3 Anti-Trinitarian opinions were developed in the first Baptist Church founded in London in 1531, by Baptist, Joh. Wyt, see W. H. Burgess, John Smith, the So-Baptist, London, 1911.
4 J. L. M. Dillen, Glauchow, 1829.
5 De Trin. Errore, p. 49.
6 Ib. p. 1121.
7 Rake, 1662.
UNITARIANISM

cultus addressed to Christ. 1 Socinus pleaded for the adoration Christi as obligatory on all Christians, and urged that the invocation Christi should not be forbidden. In 1579 he settled in Poland, where the rest of his life was spent. The members of the Minor Church were converted to his views, which found an expression in the Catechism issued by them in Polish in 1605, a year after his death. 2 A Latin edition followed in 1609. The Polish adherents of Socinus failed, however, to hold their ground. David of Blandrata and others were powerless. Roman Catholic reaction triumphed. Their college at Raków was suppressed, and finally in 1660 they were offered the option of conformity or exile. Some went to Germany and Holland; some carried their worship to Transylvania, and maintained a slender separate existence till 1735. But the influence of Socinus was perpetuated in the massive volumes of the Bibliotheca fratrum Polonorum qui us Unitarios vacant, published at Amsterdam (1655-69). His theology rested on a rigid view of the authority of Scripture. 3 The modern methods of historical criticism were of course unknown. Philosophy raised no difficulties about the supernatural, but reason started objections from the side of the multiplication-table.

'The essence of God is one,' says the Recognitio Catechism, 'yet the one God is in any way contain a plurality of persons, since a person is nothing else than an individual intelligent essence. Wherever there one, there are numerable persons, their number necessarily in like manner reckoned three individual essences, for in the same sense no one affirmed that there are three numerical essences, it must be held that there one numerical essence.' 4

But Socinus admitted the application of the term 'God' to Christ in an inferior sense (Jn 10:16 5); and he wrote in Jn 21:22 that the water, which Jesus had been conveyed to heaven, where he had beheld his Father, and heard from him the things which he was afterwards sent back to earth to teach. Raised again to heaven after his resurrection, he was made the head of all creation, with divine authority over the world, and in that sense God. He was thus 'nere man,' and deserved divine honours. Modern Unitarianism has departed widely from this Christology. Apart from the necessitarianism of Priestley, it is nearer to Socinus in its view of human nature, which he treated (against the Calvinists) as endowed with free expression of virtue and vice. But the Polish Unitarians did not regard it as intrinsically immortal. A future life would be a gift direct from God, its conditions being made known by him. But those who did not fulfil them there was no hell, only extinction.

Unitarianism acquired ecclesiastical status also in the adjoining province of Transylvania. In 1560, Blandrata was invited by Queen Isabella to the court of her son Prince John Sigismund. At Kolozsvar (Klausenburg) he was brought into contact with Francis David, who had been sent by his Roman Catholic teachers to Wittenberg. There David had passed into Lutheranism, but afterwards, dissatisfied with its doctrine of the sacraments, he joined the Calvinists. His distinction led to his appointment (1564) as bishop of the Hungarian churches in Transylvania. Under Blandrata's influence he began to doubt the separate personality of the Holy Spirit, and became involved in discussions with the Calvinist leader, Peter Melius. In these debates Melius is said to have first used the word Unitarius. David was strongly enough to carry large numbers of clergy and laity with him. In 1568 a royal edict was issued, granting entire freedom of conscience, speech, and giving legal recognition to the Four Religions, Roman Catholicism, Lutheranism, Calvinism (or Reformed), and the Klausenburg Confession. More than 1,000 preachers were ordained for the new churches, and many professors in colleges and schools, ranged themselves under David's supervision. David, however, soon advanced another step, and effectively renounced the Trinity. Christ. Blandrata's attempt to influence him through Faustus Socinus (1578) did not convince him, and in the following year, under a Roman Catholic prince, David was tried for innovation in doctrine and sentenced to imprisonment. Five months later (Nov. 1579) he died in the castle of Deva in his seventieth year.

The name Unitarians first appeared in an authoritative document in a decree of the Synod of Lescalva in 1600. It was formally adopted by the Church in 1638. For two centuries after David's death the community was in frequent danger from political and religious vicissitudes. Their churches were transferred to Calvinists or to Roman Catholics; they were deprived of their schools; they were debarred from public office. A statute of 1721, however, gave protection to 'the Four Religions,' and they have since enjoyed ecclesiastical peace. 6 They have now about 140 churches, chiefly among the Szeklers of Transylvania, with a few in Hungary, including a vigorous modern foundation in Buda-Pesth. Till 1913 their bishops sat in the Hungarian House of Peers. At Kolozsvár they have a university, and they have devoted great attention to education. No doctrinal subscription is imposed upon their ministers, and under the influence of progressive change, and contact with Unitarian teaching in England and America, the Socinian Christology has been abandoned. The secular hymn-book 1855 made no provision for the worship of Christ.

5. Growth of Unitarianism in England.—The teaching of Socinus gradually made its way into England. The Latin version of the Recognitio Catechism was sent to England with a dedication to James I.; it was formally burned in 1614. Two Socinian works appear in the first two catalogues of the Bodleian Library (1629-35), but a considerable number of other books can be traced in the library of the Unitarian bookseller Thomas Hyde in 1674. Bishop Barlow, himself once a Unitarian, in Directions for the Choice of Books in the Study of Divinity (originally drawn up in 1550 and expanded after 1673), named numerous others in connexion with a syllabus of the principal questions at issue between Socinians and other Reformed communions. 7 Theology was deeply concerned with the claims of the Roman Catholics on the one hand, and the controversies of the Puritans on the other, and from the days of Richard Hooker (1553-1600) a series of writers discussed the respective authority of the Church, the Scriptures, and reason. Doubtless revelation was necessary, but Scripture was its medium. If it was the teacher of theology, what was theology, asked Hooker, but the science of divine things? and, what science can we attain unto without the help of natural discourse and reason? 8 The Arminian revolt against Calvinism tended in the same direction, and the ever memorable John Hales (1584-1650), when he 1 See below. 2 The town of Raków, founded in 1569, was the ecclesiastical base of Socinus for many years (1592-1597). 3 His treatise de Auctoritate S. Scripturam, written in 1570, was first published in Socinus's lifetime, and published again by a Jesuit Lopez as his own. Commissioned in 1728 in a charge by Bishop Snall Brooke, it was translated into English by Edward Combe in 1745. 4 Eng. tr. by Thomas Rees, London, 1815, p. 3. 5 See below. 6 Cf. Michael Lombard, Sambucus, Summae Uniterinae Theologicæ Christianæ (1625). The above was written before the great majority of Unitarian Churches published a statement of faith by a Jesuit Lopez as his own. 7 The grammes Remains of Dr. Thomas Barlow, late Bishop of Lincoln, London, 1686. 8 Laws of Religious Politics, bk. iv. ch. vii. 11, ed. Keble, Oxford, 1836, i. 475.
left the Synod of Dort after hearing Episcopalian exposition. In 36, 4 he had John Calvin good-night. 1
A stream of protest flowed against such the mysteries of the Godhead beyond the terms of Scripture. It had been the plea of Aeneas, who, having been among the Accusations of de Provincialis at Amsterdam and William Chillingworth (1602–44) owned him as the teacher of the mischiefs of creeds which led to the "persecuting, burning, cursing, damning of men for not subscribing to the dogmas of men as the words of God." 2 Chillingworth was indebted for acquaintance with Socinian literature to Lord Falkland. He had seen some volumes in the rooms of Hugh Cressy of Merton College, Oxford, who 'claimed to have been the first to bring in Socinian's books.' Cressy afterwards became a Benedictine monk; Falkland was designated by John Aubrey 'the first Socinian in England.' Other and wider influences were at work. Lord Herbert of Cherbury (1583–1648) in his de Veritate 3 analyzed the whole faculties of the mind, and discovered among the notions common, innate, of divine origin, and indissoluble, certain common notions of religion in all men. These he exemplified historically twenty years later in the de Religione Gentilium (completed in 1645), one of the earliest treatises in comparative theology. The great authority of Cremona (1797) gave at once to his exposition of Christianity in the de Veritate Religionis Christianae. 4 He discourses of the attributes of God, but is silent about His triune nature. He proves that there was such a person as Jesus, that he rose from the grave and was worshipped after his death. He vindicates his character as Messiah, but never mentions the Incarnation. His annotations on the NT were generally free from the spirit of reason. It was not surprising that Stephen Nye, the author of the Brief History of the Unitarians also called Socinians, 5 should affirm that he 'interpreted the whole according to the mind of the Socinians.' Under such influences diversity of opinion was recognized as inevitable. Writers so different as Hales, Jeremy Taylor, 6 and Milton 7 declare in almost the same words that heresy is not a matter of the understanding; the faithful pursuit of reason did not make a heretic; the mischief lay in the influences that perverted the will. Chillingworth thought it possible to reduce all Christians to unity of communion by showing the diversity of opinion was no bar to this. That all Christians should think alike was an impossibility; it remained for them to be 'taught to set a higher value upon those high points of faith and obedience wherein they agreed than upon those points of less moment wherein they differ.' 8 Such writers did not adopt the theology of Socinian, but they were in agreement with him in his plea for Scriptural statements rather than dogmatic creeds. 'Vitalis in religion,' said Benjamin Whichcote (1609–83), the leader of the Cambridge Platonists, 'are few.' 9
Meanwhile an occasional English traveller like Paul Best (1590–1657) had visited Poland and returned infected. Milton noticed in the Areopagitica 10 the 'stay'd men' sent by 'the grave and fragil Translatingian' to learn 'the theological arts of England.' The danger of Socinianism was spreading. The Convocations of Canterbury and York agreed in June 1640 to prohibit the import, printing, or circulation of Socinian books; no minister should preach their doctrines; laymen who enunciated their opinions should be condemned. 11 A series of angry writers denounced them with shrill abuse. Parliament made the denial of the Trinity a capital crime (1649), but an English translation of the Elenchos (1609) was published in 1652 at Amsterdam, followed by A Twofold Scripture Catechism from the pen of John Biddle in 1654. These works led the Council of State to order John Owen, whom Cromwell had made Dean of Christ Church and Vice-Chancellor of the university of Oxford, to prepare a reply. His Vindiciae Evangelicæ appeared in 1655.

2 Do not look upon these things, he wrote with heat, 'as things afar off whereas you are little concerned; the evil is at the door; there is not a City, a Towne, scarce a Village in England, wherein some of this poison is not poured forth.'

6. Influence of Biddle and Locke.—John Biddle (1616–62) has often been called the father of English Unitarianism. Sprung from the family of a Gloucestershire yeoman, he graduated at New College, Oxford, and graduated M.A. in 1641. The Gloucester magnates appointed him shortly after to the mastership of the free school in the parish of St. Mary de Crypt. There his Biblical studies led him to renounce the attempts to prove in the understanding of God's works, he the Trinity, the particular difficulty being the deity of the Holy Ghost. Imprisonment in Gloucester and at Westminster did not prevent him from publishing his views, which were opposed to the prevailing orthodoxy. Released in 1652, he founded for the first time gatherings for the discussion of the Scriptures on anti-Trinitarian lines, and these developed into regular meetings for worship. John Biddle, son of a wealthy and generous merchant, who had been the friend of Biddle and also had close relations with Archbishop Tillotson (1630–94), promoted the circulation of literature. The Brief History of the Unitarians, also called Socinians, was published at his request in 1657. The Toleration Act of 1660 excluded those who denied the Trinity on the one side, and Roman Catholics on the other. But an active controversy broke out the following year, which resulted in the production of a long series of Unitarian tracts (1661–70) largely financed by Firmin, in which the chief ecclesiastical disputants, John Wallis and William Sherlock, were cleverly played off against each other, and the argument was enforced on grounds of Scripture and early patristic testimony. The Unitarian influence was so strong that Parliament found it necessary (1669) to bring against those who denied the Trinity on the one side, and Roman Catholics on the other. But an active controversy broke out the following year, which resulted in the production of a long series of Unitarian tracts (1661–70) largely financed by Firmin, in which the chief ecclesiastical disputants, John Wallis and William Sherlock, were cleverly played off against each other, and the argument was enforced on grounds of Scripture and early patristic testimony. The Unitarian influence was so strong that Parliament found it necessary (1669)
to threaten the profession of the obnoxious heresy with cumulative penalties amounting to the loss of all civil rights, and three years' imprisonment. But though at this time a mild and peaceful influence had entered the field. In 1695 John Locke (1632–1704) had published his treatise on The Reasonableness of Christianity.

Locke's Letters concerning Toleration and his Essay on Human Understanding had already placed him at the head of contemporary English thinkers. It was a lamentable sign of the heated temper of the time that the inquisitorial nature of Christianity was published anonymously. Locke did what Grotius and Hobbes (in the Leviathan) had done before him. He went back to the Gospels and the first preachers of the new faith, and found that their message consisted in the proclamation of Jesus as the Messiah, the proof of this character resting on his fulfilment of prophecy and his miracles, especially the Resurrection. He had indeed already confided to his journal in 1691 the pregnant remark that these miracles were to be judged by the doctrine, and not the doctrine by the miracles. But he could still say in 1703 that the Scripture had God for its authority and none for its matter. This did not, however, prevent him from recognizing the occasional character of the apostolic letters; and in the paragraphs of the essay published in his lifetime (1704, after his death) by treating their teaching as relative to the age and persons for whom it was designed, he really laid the foundation of the historical method. His whole theory of knowledge, however, and his polemic against all infallibility, led him to fall back on the conception of revelation, and to find in Scripture an ultimate authority for religious truth. Meanwhile the violence of some of the Trinitarian controversialists drove many minds along the paths already trodden by Milton and Sir Isaac Newton in the direction of some form of Arianism. William Whiston (1672–1752), who had succeeded Newton at Cambridge as Lucasian professor in 1703, was deprived for this heresy in 1710; and it was in the background of the treatise of Samuel Clarke (1675–1729) on The Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity; though he objected to the ancient Arian statement, 'there was (a time) when there was no Son.'

The formularies of the Church of England precluded anything like general change within its ranks, but the Church was organized on the basis of dogmatic creeds. The English Presbyterians under the leadership of Richard Baxter (1615–91) had ardently desired comprehension in the Establishment, but they had as ardently repudiated what they called 'human impositions.' Driven out of the Anglican Church, unable to create a Presbyterian polity, they found themselves side by side with the Congregationalists in 1659. When they took out licences for places of worship, their trustees avoided doctrinal tests, though they themselves were mainly Calvinistic. They often devoted their chapels to 'the worship of God by Protestant Dissenters.' Sometimes the Presbyterians were named, sometimes the Independents, sometimes both conjointly. They reserved to themselves, in the language of Timothy Jollie of Sheffield (1635–1714), 'liberty to reform according to Scripture rule in doctrine, discipline and worship.' The way was thus open to gradual theological modification. The process was slow, and its operation unequal in different places. Pastors and people did not always move together. The transition through varying types of Arianism naturally took place at varying rates; e.g. Nathaniel Cudworth (1634–1678), after resting in Clarke's Arianism, finally abandoned it in his Letter on the Logos. The result was that at the beginning of the 19th cent. nearly 200 chapels were occupied by Unitarians, who were unfavourable to sectarian activity. When the Manchester Academy (now Manchester College, Oxford) was opened in 1766, its first principal, Thomas Barlow, who dedicated it 'To Truth, to Liberty, and to Religion,' was himself an Arian. His colleague, Ralph Harrison, became a Unitarian. True to the practice of their forefathers, the founders refrained from imposing any tests on either tutors or students. The Presbyterian Board, established in 1689, governs the Presbyterian College at Carmarthen—the continuator of a series of academies, the first of which was founded on the same basis by Samuel Jones, sometime fellow of Jesus College, Oxford, one of the 2000 ejected ministers of 1662.

7. The work of Priestley and Beilarm. The process of gradual change was pursued from another side. Joseph Priestley (1733–1804), bred among the Independents, threw off the Calvinistic theology of his youth, and, after resting a little while in Arminianism, while in Aix-la-Chapelle, he began to preach in Leeds, a simple humanitarian view of the person of Jesus. His scientific studies had already gained him the fellowship of the Royal Society (1766), and his Appeal to the Serious and Unbiassed Professors of Christianity carried his name in 30,000 copies over England. His industry, his wide range of knowledge, his clearness of thought and style, his fearless utterance, his untiring earnestness, his elevation of purpose and purity of life, his simple piety, secured for his theological and philosophical teaching a dominant position in Unitarian thought. At Doddridge's Academy at Davenport he had studied Hartley's Observations on Man, and adopted a materialist view of human nature. But this in no way impaired the religion which he learned from the Gospels. The teachings of Jesus, guaranteed by his miracles and triumphantly established by his resurrection, supplied him with a positive ground for faith; and the identification of the God of revelation with the Sole Cause of all phenomena, including every form of human action, a typical materialism, which long pervaded Unitarian devotion. In his Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity illustrated he affirmed that his doctrine should produce 'the deepest humility, the most entire resignation to the will of God, and the most unreserved confidence in his goodness and providential care.' Among the Yorkshire acquaintances of Priestley was Theophilus Lindsey (1723–1808), vicar of Catterick on the Tees. A movement had been started by a small group of the clergy of the Establishment for the relaxation of the terms of subscription. The failure of a petition to Parliament led Lindsey to resign his living (1769). 22 Sometimes the Unitarians were named, sometimes the Independents, sometimes both conjointly. They reserved to themselves, in the language of Timothy Jollie of Sheffield (1635–1714), 'liberty to reform according to Scripture rule in doctrine, discipline and worship.' The way was thus open to gradual theological modification. The process

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3 London, 1699.
5 London, 1712.
6 Pastoral Care Exemplified (funeral sermon for his father), London, 1764, p. 22.
7 London, 1767.
8 London, 1777.
9 A letter written in the Year 1730, concerning the Question whether the Logos supplied the Place of a Human Soul in the Person of Jesus Christ, London, 1759.
10 London, 1770.
11 London, 1749.
12 London, 1777.
13 J. H. Moir, Hist. of Unitarianism, etc., p. 152.
1829), once like Priestley an Independent, to a theological tutorship in a college at Hackney. A severe and vigorous pen, and took a leading share in promoting the development of denominational activity. This was opened in 1791 by the foundation of the Unitarian College at Highbury with its actual existence, the Laboratory and the Practice of Virtue by the Distribution of Books. 3 Lindsey, Priestley, and Belsham were its leaders. The preamble and rules, drawn up in 1791, declared the professed belief in the power of God, and the simple humanity of Jesus Christ, in opposition both to the Trinitarian doctrine of three Persons in the Deity and to the Arian hypothesis of a created Maker and Preserver of the world. The love of civil and religious liberty prompted a petition the next year (1792) for the abolition of the penal laws affecting religion, to which Charles James Fox lent his aid, and this was accomplished in 1813 (so far as Unitarians were concerned) by the repeal, through the efforts of William Smith (1758–1835), M.P. for Norwich, grandfather of Florence Nightingale, of the clauses of the Toleration Act which rendered the profession of Unitarianism illegal. Meanwhile local Unitarian associations had been founded, and a denominational literature was springing up. Chapels long closed were reopened. Priestley had asserted a Unitarian Fund was started; and missionaries were sent out to various parts of the kingdom. Endowed by the Act of 1813 with civil rights, the Unitarians proceeded to form an association for protecting them (1819); and finally in 1825 a number of separate organizations were amalgamated in the British and Foreign Unitarian Association. This body was created to promote the public welfare of Unitarians. But its founders refrained from imposing any definition of them on its adherents. In the spirit of the English Presbyterians of a century and a half before, they left each member free to interpret them for himself.

The type of Unitarianism then prevailing was largely shaped by the writings of Priestley and Belsham. There were still Arians of different degrees (designated as 'high' and 'low') among Unitarians. Both the enthusiasm of controversy fell more and more clearly on the humanity of Jesus, and the proof of this lay in the Scriptures. The doctrine of their plenary inspiration, that Jesus was not a man, but a claimant of a Christ, that Unitarianism denied already distinguished different documents in Genesis. The narratives of the birth of Jesus were inconsistent with each other, and one or both might be rejected. But both the OT and the NT contained "authentic records of facts and of divine interpositions," and Charles Wellbeloved, principal of Manchester College, York, could write in 1825: "Conscience us that any tenet is authorised by the Bible, from that moment we receive it. Prove any doctrine to be a doctrine of Christ, emanating from that wisdom which was from above, and we take it for our own, and no power on earth shall wrest it from us."

On this basis Jesus was presented as "a man constituted in all respects like other men, subject to the same infirmities, the same ignorance, prejudices and frailties," who was chosen by God to introduce a new moral dispensation into the world. For this end the Holy Spirit was communicated to him at his baptism. He was instructed in the nature of his mission and invested with voluntary miraculous powers during his sojourn on earth. He was equipped with the Messiah, was sent forth to reveal to all mankind without distinction the great doctrine of a future life in which men should be rewarded according to their works. Of this the supreme proof was found in the Resurrection, to which his ascension to the throne of glory was a necessary preliminary; and he was destined to reappear to raise the dead and to judge the world. From this scheme all theories of atonement and penal atonement were eliminated. Baxter with his natural frankness had admitted that a necessitarian "cannot accuse himself of having done wrong in the ultimate sense of the words." 4 But, though this type of Unitarianism had produced a curious reluctance to recognize the existence of a 'soul,' its teachers lived habitually at a high moral tension, demanding a constant conformity of the will of man to the will of God. Associated with the emphatic assertion of the Father's wisdom and beneficence, such views naturally anticipated the final victory of good. Thomas Southwood Smith (1788–1861) in his Illustrations of the Divine Government 5—a book warmly admired by Byron, Moore, Wordsworth, and Crabbe—powerfully impressed on Unitarian thought the doctrine of universal restoration, which had already found expression in the history of Cromwell's chaplains, and gained various champions (Hartley among them) in the 18th century.

9. Legal difficulties. The modifications of belief which had brought many of the occupants of chapels erected by PresbyterianSECTION 2: among Unitarians to Unitarian theology at last aroused the attention of those who remained orthodox. Besides a number of meeting-houses, the Unitarians were in possession of two important trusts—Lady Hawley's Charity in York (1704), and Dr. Williams's Trust in London (1716). A suit was instituted against Lady Hawley's trustees in 1830. Legal proceedings were slow and costly, and on 3rd Dec. 1833 judgment was finally given against them. One of the trustees was the minister of St. Saviourgate Chapel (which Lady Hawley had habitually attended), Charles Wellbeloved. It was at once seen that the whole tenure of the chapels was endangered. A long period of litigation followed, but the Law Lords finally confirmed the first decision in 1842. Meanwhile numbers of suits were threatened for the recovery of the buildings, burial-grounds, and endowments which had descended in undisputed succession through generations of pastors and laity. Between Lady Hawley's pastor, John Hoatham, and Charles Wellbeloved there had been a quarrel, but one moreyt by that time (1833–1800); the three pastorate covered 144 years. In the presence of such continuity of tenure the claim of the existing occupants was irresistible, and in 1844 the Dissenters' Chapels Act, introduced by the Government, gave the needed relief. Without naming either Presbyterians or Unitarians, it secured to such Dissenting congregations as had no creeds or tests the right to change their opinions as they saw fit in the lapse time. 4 The chapels subsequently built by Unitarians, and the funds raised for the support of their ministers, have been almost invariably founded on the principle known as 'open tracts,' - the conscious liberty of this historic evolution supplies the key to the conflict of tendencies in modern Unitarianism between the impulse to theological denominationalism and the desire to realize on however small a scale the 'Catholic communion' which had been the ideal of the English Presbyterians who followed Baxter.

9. Martineau and the modern school. The most potent personal influence, and most successful direction was that of Mary (Mary Anne) Martineau (1805–1900) (q.v.).


4 See Art. Universalism.

5 Cf the speech of W. E. Gladstone, on the second reading, Parliamentary Debates on the Dissenters' Chapels Bill, London, 1844, p. 120.
In his first work, *The Rationale of Religious Inquiry*, he abandoned the position of the older Unitarianism, which would have accepted the doctrine of the Trinity, and, everlasting torments, if they could be found in the Scriptures. "No seeming inspiration," he affirmed, "can establish anything contrary to reason." Three years later by the famous Liverpool controversy (1839), in the midst of intense criticisms of the evangelical scheme of salvation, he laid the foundations of a new view of revelation no longer as a communication of truth, certified by miracles, but rather to the conscience and affections—and a fresh interpretation of the moral life on the basis of free will instead of necessity. Meanwhile he was reading Strauss, and soon reached the conclusion that belief in miracles was not essential to Christianity. The Messianic function of Jesus was thus undermined. Wellbeloved had already insisted on the contemporary significance of many of the prophecies supposed to refer to Christ. When the miracles were disowned, the second guarantee of the supernatural character of Jesus fell away: the followers of Locke found themselves deprived of their "reasonable" Christianity, and the faith of Christ was only a superior kind of natural religion. Martineau meanwhile pursued a double line of study. In a group of articles in the Westminster Review he explored the establishment of Christianity on its critical side, while on the philosophical he indicated the communion of the human spirit with the Divine, and presented Jesus as the expression, within the limits of our nature, of the righteousness and love of God. Revelation was thus transformed from supernatural instruction into the realization of more exalted character; its medium was not a written word, but a higher personality. To establish the principles of spiritual theism and find a place in man's soul for "dwelling in God and God in him" which Priestley had described as the highest type of personal devotion was the aim of a long series of brilliant articles in the *Prospective and National Reviews*, which culminated in two great treatises, *Types of Ethical Theory* and *A Study of Religion*. By these works, as well as by his sermons and occasional Addresses, he exercised an influence which went far beyond his own denomination, so that Gladstone described him as "the greatest of living [English] thinkers." Religious writers were not inactive beside him. The saintly John James Taylor (1797–1869), in his *Retrospect of the Religious Life of England*, delineated with singular breadth of view and literary charm the significance of contrasted principles of authority and freedom; and from his pen came the first formal discussion of the Johannine question in England in his *Attempt to ascertain the Character of the Fourth Gospel*. A long series of scholars had pleaded for the revision both of the text and of the translation of the NT; and, by the advice of the veteran John Kenrick, George Vance Smith was invited to join the company of the Reverens (1870). In James Drummond (1833–1918) Unitarianism possessed a theologian of the older school of learning, whose works on *The Jewish Messiah* (1877), *Philo Judaeus* (1886), *Inquiry into the Character and Authorship of the Fourth Gospel* (1903), and *Studies in Christian Doctrine* (1908) maintained the tradition of devout scholarship. John Rolly Beard (1800–76) led the way with modern dictionaries of the Bible by his *People's Dictionary of the Bible*, and made other valuable contributions to theological literature. Cultivated laymen, also, such as Edgar Taylor and Samuel Jackson, and, rendered no small services to the Unitarian cause. Most influential of all, perhaps, in its protest against prevailing supernaturalism was *The Creed of Christendom* by Ralph Waldo Emerson. Francis William Newman and Frances Power Cobbe found many readers; and the writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson and Theodore Parker, together with the studies of Max Muller, opened the way to the bounds of Christianity. The Hibbert Trustees, who sought to promote the spread of Christianity in "its simplest and most intelligible form," were the first to inaugurate in 1878 a series of lectures on the history of religions, and Manchester College included that subject in its theological course as early as 1875. The discourses of Martineau, J. Hamilton Thom, and Charles Beard provided varied illustration of the preacher's power; and the sermons and hymns of Stopford Brooke, after his withdrawal from the Church of England in 1890, presented, with a rich glow of personal beauty, the main features of religion as understood by Unitarians.

10. Church organizations.—While English Unitarians have been active in education and philanthropy (witness their domestic missions in Ireland and the establishment of the original *Toronto Review*), the new *Christian Examiner* (1835–1918) is an attempt to secure large numerical increase. New chapels have been built, but denominational zeal has never been active. Congregational independence has been steadily maintained. In 1882 a National Conference was organized, which has now 365 congregations in the United Kingdom on its roll, but they have no common name. Proposals for united action on Presbyterian lines were made by Martineau in 1888, but the demand for congregational autonomy defeated them. The individualists fostered by the constant plea for liberty is unfavourable to the growth of corporate church-life. Generous funds have been raised in aid of ministers' incomes and insurance, and the Conference has found it necessary to lay down educational qualifications for access to these benefits, and has thus constituted an accredited class of religious teachers. Unitarianism has thriven actively in some districts in Wales, but it has not become rooted in Scotland. The oldest of its congregations north of the Tweed was founded at Edinburgh in 1776. In Ireland Thomas Emlyn was prosecuted at Dublin in 1703 for denying the deity of Christ. Ulster Unitarianism witnessed a movement against subscription which culminated in 1726 in the formation of a separate Presbytery of Antrim on a non-subscription basis. Many of the ministers passed through Arianism to Unitarianism, and in 1830 the Remonstrant Synod of Ulster was formed. At the same time, largely through the zeal of Martineau, then assistant pastor in Dublin, an Irish Unitarian Christian Society, embracing both individuals and congregations, was established in Dublin, which was merged (1835) in an Association of Irish Non-subscribing Presbyterians and other Free Christians, including the Presbytery of Antrim, the Synod of Munster, and the Remonstrant Synod of Ulster. Finally, in 1910 the Antrim Presbytery and the Ulster Synod united for purposes of church government under the name of the Non-subscribing Presbyterian Church of Ireland.

11. Unitarianism in America.—Unitarianism in America sprang out of the Congregational order...
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of the New England churches. Their theology was Calvinistic, but the 17th cent. foundations were variously covenants instead of dogmatic creeds. Thus the First Church in Boston affirmed:

'Ve . . . do hereby solemnly and religiously promise and bind ourselves and all our children and successors in this and all our successors in all our places of worship belonging to the rule of the Gospel, and in all sincere conformity to [Christ's] holy ordinances, and in mutual love and respect to each other, so near as God shall give us grace.'

The way was thus open, as in English Dissent in the 18th cent., to gradual theological change. The literature of the Trinitarian controversy passed across the Atlantic, and the heretical discussion in the works of Sherlock and South, Clarke and Whiston, supplemented by the writings of the Unitarian Emlyn, began to produce its effect. A slow movement towardsarianism and Arminianism had been set in, invigorated by reaction against the 'great awakening' under Jonathan Edwards (1735) and the early preaching of George Whitefield (1740). Jonathan Mayhew (1720-66) and Charles Chauncy (1725-57), pastors in Boston, led the way towards a more liberal faith. Under the ministry of James Freeman (1759-1833) the congregation of King's Chapel purged their Anglican liturgy of all references to the Trinity. By 1780, says the historian of the church, the first Episcopal church in New England became the first Unitarian church in the New World. The writings of Priestley and Lindsay were freely circulated, and at the end of the century the doctrines against which they protested had been rejected by all the Boston ministers but one. The name Unitarian was indeed rarely attached to the churches, but the mode of thought and worship prevailed more and more widely. It was found all the way from Portland (Maine) to Charleston (S. Carolina).

In 1803 William Ellery Channing (1780-1842) came to Boston and began the ministry which so powerfully influenced Unitarian thought. In reaction against a still powerful Calvinism, with its doctrines of human depravity, the wrath of God, and the atoning sacrifice of Christ, he proclaimed 'one sublime idea,' which he defined as 'the greatness of the soul, its divinity, its union with God by spiritual likeness, its receptivity of his Spirit, its self-forming power, its destination to immovable glory, its immortality.' This was the real challenge to New England orthodoxy; it operated with no less force in dispelling the materialism of Priestley and giving a fresh impulse of spiritual life to Unitarianism on both sides of the Atlantic with this excited view of man's true being, Channing declared himself surer that his rational nature was from God than that any book is the expression of His will; and reason and conscience were thus enthroned in the ultimate seat of judgment. Neither philosopher nor scholar in the technical sense, he exercised by his religious genius and the force of his ethical appeal a far-reaching influence both in the United States and in Europe. 'Always young for liberty,' he protested against every form of sectarian narrowness. He cheerfully took the name Unitarian because unwarmed efforts were made to raise against it a popular load upon religious antagonists in any sense a Trinitarian. But he believed in Christ's pre-existence; he accepted his miracles. He would not, however, exude from his fellowship the strong dogma that [although] the miracles were not miracles altogether. For such a mind denominational aggressiveness was impossible, and this spirit was infused into the leaders of the movement. The centenary in 1858 in the foundation of the Divinity School of Harvard University in 1816, when the Unitarian controversy was at its height.

'It being understood,' said the constitution, 'that every encouragement be given to the serious, impartial, and unbiased investigation of Christian truths; and that no assent to the peculiar tenets of any denomination be required either of the Students, or Professors, or Instructors.'

The movement of which Channing was the most distinguished representative soon demanded some kind of organization. Literature must be circulated, congregations assisted, and churches built. In 1825, on the same day on which English Unitarians formed their association, the American Unitarian Association was constituted. A noble line of eminent scholars, theologians, historians, jurists, poets, statesmen, accepted its principles and gave dignity to its profession of faith. It was not long, however, before new forces appeared on the field. The study of German philosophy produced a school of New England transcendentalism. Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-82) (q.v.) resigned the pulpit of the Second Church in Boston on the question of the observance of the Lord's Supper, and six years later his famous 'Address to the Harvard Divinity School' (1838) signaled the breach of the new thought with the older views of revealed theology. Edward Hitchcock (1810-60) emphasized the same theme in a much criticized sermon on 'The Transient and Permanent in Christianity' (1841), followed by his widely read 'Discourse of Matters pertaining to Religion' (1842). A new type of Christianity without miracle was thus presented, emphasizing the divine immanence in nature, and holding up the religion of Jesus—the love of God and the service of man—as the 'absolute religion.' Unitarianism faced into the snare from which Channing would fain have saved it, and developed an orthodoxy of its own. When Henry Whitney Bellows of New York proposed to organize the churches (1868) in a National Conference, and its members adopted the declaration that they were 'disciples of the Lord Jesus Christ,' a group of bolder spirits formed a 'Free Religious Association,' where Emerson's name appeared first on the list. In 1894, however, the Conference repudiated all authoritative tests, and simply accepted 'the religion of Jesus, holding, in accordance with his teaching, that practical religion is summed up in love to God and love to man.' The developments of criticism, science, and philosophy, the study of comparative religion, the desire for the widest possible fellowship, and the growing demands of philanthropy, have all contributed to the growth of the Unitarian denomination, and in 1900 the 'International Council of Unitarian and other Liberal Religious Thinkers and Workers' was formed in Boston. It has since held large and successful gatherings in London, Amsterdam, Geneva, Boston, Berlin (1910), Paris (1913), and Boston (1920), assembling a wide representation of different nationalities and faiths.

As in England, so also in America, Unitarianism has been an important influence in religious thought. It represents a mode of approach to the great problems of human life and destiny in which it is closely allied with the time-spirit. Its loose- ness of denominational organization has made possible an advance over vast intervals of time, and hesitating, but its churches steadily increase, and in 1918 the list (including Canada) comprised 490 societies. The Divinity School of Philadelphia was opened in 1833, and in 1834, and the Unitarian Theological

1 See p. 171.
2 J. W. Chadwick, William Ellery Channing, Boston, 1903, p. 246, quoting without date 'one of the letters of his later life.'
School at Berkeley (California), founded in 1904, have remained more definitely within Unitarian lines.

2. World-wide influence.—(a) The Colonies and India.—The British Dominions, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Africa, all have Unitarian churches. English and American Unitarians are also in close touch with the Theistic churches of India, and with the Unitarians in Japan, and receive students from the Far East into their theological colleges, besides sending out representative ministers to preach and lecture.

(b) Germany.—Contemporary thought has been affected by the same general influences which produced the Unitarian movement in England and America. The writings of the English Deists of the 18th cent. helped to foster German rationalism, and the critical study of the Scriptures led to the abandonment of doctrines of mechanical inspiration and Biblical authority. Belief in miracles was partly undermined by the influence of science and philosophy; and the denial of the divinity of Jesus by F. C. Baur, together with the investigations of F. C. Baur into the development of the early Church, opened new paths for the historical treatment of the origins of Christianity. Baur and his followers reached by Baur were modified by the subsequent researches of some of his own pupils, but a powerful school of Unitarian thought, led by teachers such as H. Holtzmann (Strassburg), H. Holstein (Heidelberg), Carl von Weizsäcker (Tübingen), A. E. Biever (Zürich), R. A. Lipsius (Jena), O. Pfleiderer (Berlin), reached a position which was substantially Unitarian, though it did not employ the name or lead to withdrawal from the State Church. In 1865 a liberal union was founded under the title of 'The protestantverein,' which gave practical expression to this mode of thought. It still exists, though in a state of somewhat diminished activity. Recent theological liberalism has tended to take one of two directions. Under the influence of Albrecht Ritschl (q. v.) of Göttingen, a higher value has been ascribed to the person of Jesus, quite apart from external miracle, than was usual among the older 'liberal' theologians. Among the leaders in this direction are A. Harnack, W. Herrmann (Marburg), and H. H. Wendt (Jena). On the other hand, the study of Christianity in connexion with the religions of the empire has led younger scholars to emphasize its relations with contemporary phenomena; and along these lines the names of W. Wrede, J. Weiss, and W. Bonnset, and the brilliant group led by H. Gunkel, E. Troeltsch, C. Clemen, H. Weinel, W. Heitmüller, and H. Lietzmann have all been working. The valuable translation and commentary issued under the general editorship of Johannes Weiss, and the long series of Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher, represent the general attitude of liberal theology on the problems of primitive Christianity.

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UNITED PROVINCES OF AGRA AND OUDH

North-West Frontier Province, which was formed out of some Districts of the Punjab. The joint jurisdiction of Delhi and the two Provinces between N. lat. 23° 52' and 31° 18', E. long. 77° 3' and 84° 39', with a total area of 107,267 sq. miles and a population in 1917, 14,822,000. The Provinces contain a hilly and submontane country lying to the north-west to the part of the Central Indian plateau to the south; while the central and more important region constitutes the W. and Central Indo-Gangetic Plain, the basin watered by the rivers Ganges, Gomti, and Brahmaputra. These Districts between these two main rivers until they join at Allahabad (q.v.) are known as the Duāb, 4 land of the two waters.

1. History.—The United Provinces form one of the best-known historical regions of India. The original population, wrongly classed as Dravidian (q.v.) by Risley, was probably of the Mon-Khmer stock. These 'pre-Aryans' have left traces in stone implements in the hills and plains, cup-marks on boulders in the northern hills, and cave paintings in the Kaimūr range to the south. At some unknown date, possibly about 1000 B.C., these peoples gave way to a new vendetta settled for a considerable period in the E. Panjāb 1 seem to have moved gradually eastward, and the Mahābharata and the Rāmāyana epics describe the fortunes of the two brothers of these Aryans, one of them to the west with their capital at Hastinapura (q.v.), the other at Ayodyha, the modern Ajodhya in the Faizābād District. One wave of invaders or colonists seems in the early period to have moved along the base of the Himalayas into Madhūra or Bihār; the other occupied Mahāyadēsa, the 'Middle Land,' or the Duāb and its surrounding Districts. 2 For the earliest period there is no settled history till the time of Gautama Buddha (c. 507-487 B.C.). The next fixed date is that of Chandragupta Manuṣya (321-297 B.C.), the Sandracoottus of classical writers, who rose to power after the invasion of Alexander the Great. His grandson was the famous Aśoka (q.v.), three of whose pillar edicts have been found in the Provinces. We know little of the Kушān or Saka invaders who entered India about the middle of the 2nd cent. B.C. The Gupta dynasty rose to power about A.D. 320 until 450, when the first Hun invasion took place. This was remarkable because many of the Rājput (q.v.) houses sprang from its chiefs. In 1518, however, Babu, the great Malabar invader, raided the Provinces, and under the early Muhammadan kings Delhi was the capital, being succeeded by Agra early in the 16th century. Bābur defeated the Afghan king Ibrahim in 1526 and founded the Mughal empire, which with its capital at Agra or Delhi, under Humāyūn, Akbar, Shāhjāhān, and Aurangzib, lasted till the death of the last in 1707. Then commenced a period of anarchy until by treaty with Asaf d-daula, Nawāb of Oudh, most important in order of population being Lucknow, Benares, Agra, Cawnpur, Bareilly, Meerut, and Muhammadda. The composition of Oudh, of which the population is 1,000 of each faith only 72 Hindus, as compared with 399 Moslems. Having been deeply impressed with the social and religious effects of the abolition of the old system of zamindaries, the British Government has been most attentive to the development of the Provinces, and the results are strikingly shown in the rapid rise of education and the improved condition of the whole population.

2. Religion.—Hindus (85-94 2%) are much in excess of Muhammadans (14·77 %) or Christians (38 %), but now Hindus are slowly decreasing, and there is an increase in Muhammadans and Christians. The progress of Islam is not to any great extent the result of direct propaganda, but is due largely to social conditions. Muhammadans are more prolific; they live more in towns and under less insatiable conditions than Hindus; their diet is more varied and liberal, and they are less addicted to the use of drugs like the preparations of hemp; they marry later and allow widows to remarry, while high-caste Hindus prohibit widow-marriage. The progress of Islam is largely due to its better health in seclusion (parda), and being confined to the house, they are more liable to attacks of plague. 3

(a) Brahmanic Hinduism.—What has been termed Brāhmanic Hinduism is the creed of the better classes, while the lower castes are largely animistic. It is impossible to draw the line between these two. But while all grades of society converge and intermingle, a great deal of Hinduism is regulated by a body of Brāhmans numbering 43 millions, many of whom enjoy a high reputation for sanctity, act as domestic priests, or advise on philosophical, and ethical questions. The majority, however, exercise no religious functions, and make their living by agriculture or domestic service, or take employment in the army or the police. Some of the most sacred places of Hindu pilgrimage are found in these Provinces: Hardwar, shared by Saivas and Vaishnavas; Mathurā, devoted to the cult of Kṛṣṇa; Prayāg or Allahābād, the sacred junction of the Ganges and Jumna. 2

(b) The development of monotheism.—An important development in recent times is the tendency to adopt a form of monotheism.

To quote R. Burn, 'the general result of my enquiries is that it is certain that the great majority of the people, the Supreme God, called Bhagāwan, Parameśwara, Ishwar, or Narān. Mr. Balie made some enquiries 2 which showed that this involved nothing more than a single person and I am inclined to think that this is not limited to the more intelligent, but is distinctly characteristic of Hindus as a whole. There has been much discussion as to whether this monotheistic idea has been a natural result of contact with Islam or Christianity. As pointed out above, however, the idea of a single personal God was not unknown to Hindus long before they came into touch with adherents of these two religions, and I am inclined to think . . . that the tendency of Hinduism, with all its eclecticism and elasticity, is to develop more on the lines of innumerable beliefs, than on an entirely new, directed, and copied more or less from some foreign religion. 4

The Hindōos, a Saiva or a Vaiṣṇava has no real place for Parameśwara in his religious ideas, and would probably explain his presence by saying he was Śiva or Vishnu. According to the Purifico philosophy, Parameśwara is the universal spirit when manifested as a personal god, who, according as he is designated by activity (reign), goodness (enfr), is separated from the divine personalities, Brahma, Śiva and Vishnu. This, however, is merely stated to explain his nature, for it is a religious theory which does not trouble the ordinary Parameśwara worshipper. To him Parameśwara is the supreme personal god, the sovereign of the world, is pleased by good and displeased by evil deeds, but is too much excited to trample much about mundane affairs. If the Hindu is not satisfied with Śiva or Vishnu, he will look on Śiva and Vishnu as the whole or a Vaiṣṇava. 5

2 See art. PILGRIMAGES (Indian), § 7.
5 Mann, Lewis, II. 31.

subordinate to him, though much more valuable helpers in the work of the grace as his paramahansas may be, it makes him at bottom a nonentity. But it is to some extent worse to say that he is a "worthless" paramahansa. He may or may not repeat his name in the morning, and occasionally he has the Sad Naardnap Radhak recited in his honour; but that is all. It is a waste of time to import a god with prayer and sacrifice when his attitude is one of avove aloofness: -

and the Hindu reserves his attentions for the minor gods and goddesses.'

(a) Itlam.—The local distribution of Muhammadan-
danism is dictated partly by historical, partly by economic causes.

The Muhammadan is found chiefly where Muhammadans held sway in the past: in Meerut and Rohilkhand Divisions, the "Home Concessions" of the Moghul Empire, in Agra, Farrukhab-
bad, Jamnapur and Oudh, all centres of Muhammadan States or
provinces. In Cawnpore, Allahabad and other districts with large cities, his tendency to urban life is sufficient to explain his numerical strength; this is also a factor which affects his presence in such historically Muhammadan centres as Agra, Meerut, Lucknow, Fyzabad, and Bareilly.

(b) Jainism.—Jains, numbering 75,427 in 1911, show a tendency to decrease. The city mercantile class, deficient in virility owing to their sedentary habits, produce small families, and, as E. A. H. Blunt reports, the country Jain shows little en-
thuism for or knowledge of his religion.

"The truth seems to be that whatever theoretical differences may be between Jainism and Hinduism their followers in the same creeds in the same community do not differ very greatly in their religious lives. The bar to caste barriers is no more insuperable than between Roman Catholics and Protess-
antes. — Men of to-day think less about religion because the conditions of modern life have become more complex than they were for other
than mundane affairs. The active pursuit of religion, which made the active performance of ritual, if not merely old age,
the official or professional man takes to religion when he retires." 1

It is natural also that, when a Jain girl is married into a Hindu family, she rapidly succumbs to the influence of the more popular faith. Jainism being reticent and unenterprising, she naturally adopts religious usages which enjoy more prestige and which are regulated by Brahmons, whom Jains themselves employ for their domestic rites.

(c) Sikhism and other faiths.—Sikhs, numbering 15,186, are foreigners, mostly sepoys or policemen. Parsis, Jews, and Brahmins are also foreigners and possess little influence, while Buddhists, re-
presentatives of a faith once dominant, now number only 780, and are mainly confined to the Tibetan frontier, with a few Nepalese, Chinese and Mohammedan converts, and other small groups.

The Arya Samaj is chiefly confined to the upper and educated classes, and seems as yet to have made little impression on the peasantry. 2

(e) Christianity.—Christians show a remarkable increase. The propaganda began with the visit of a Roman Catholic priest to Agra in 1578. It became active through the work of Henry Martyn at Cawnpore in 1810. In 1811 the Baptist Mission-
ary Society, and in 1813 the Church Missionary
Society, entered the field. Christians, including those in the Native States, numbering 58,518 in 1891 and 102,955 in 1901, increased to 170,694 in 1911.

"The new convert, may be, is no better than his prede-
cessors; but a new generation, the children of the first genera-
tion of converts, is growing up. If the missionaries could
and can get little out of that first generation, the second generation is in their hands from their earliest years. The children of the converts, besides being different from their parents; their grandchildren will be better still. It is this which provides the hope to the believers so often drawn of the inefficacy of Christian conversion. And this generation is now beginning to make its influence felt. The Hindus follow of these converts have now to acknowledge not only that they are in many ways better off than themselves, but that they are being helped by the operation of a power which has contributed so much to the better estee in which Christians are regarded. . . . A convert, no doubt, is still outcaste, but he is now regarded as a member of a fresh caste, and Hindus bear with his idiosyn-
cracies as they do with those of his paramahansa.


W. CROOK.

UNITY.—See CHURCH.

UNIVERSALISM. — i. Uses of the term.—The word 'universalism' has been used in at least three distinct senses. (a) It is convenient to take first in order the use of the word which is in fact the most modern. It designates the setting aside of the belief that a nation or a race is privileged to enjoy the special protection and favour of God, or of a deity whom it recognizes as peculiarly its own; and contemplates all nations and races as standing, actually or potentiaily, in one and the same relation to one and the same God. Universal-
ism in this sense has become current largely owing to the influence of E. C. Baur; its opposite is particularism. In the OT the view of the special relation of Jehovah to his people is expressed in such passages as Jg 11 II, when Jephthah says to the Amorite: 'Will not thou possess that which Chemosh thy god giveth thee to possess? So whosoever the Lord our God hath dispossessed from before us, them will we possess.' The steps by which this particularism yielded to the larger thought, first of Jehovah's rule over all peoples as God above all gods, and next as being the only God, whose sway is universal, but who has chosen Israel as his special care, are sufficiently familiar. There are within the pages of the OT occasional indications of a desire to extend to other nations the Messianic hope and the kingdom of God. 2

In the NT we are familiar with the distinction between the universalism of St. Paul and of the Lukan writings, 3 in contrast with the exclusiveness of the Jew and the Judeo-Christian, who, if they did not entirely disapprove the profer of the gospel to the Gentiles, yet wished to make conditions and impose practices which St. Paul strongly repudiates. In the NT the larger thought seems to win its way through the announcement of a salvation which, beginning from Israel, shall be unto all peoples, to the Apocalyptic vision of the 'great multitude which no man could number, out of every nation, and of all tribes and peoples and tongues,' 4 and of a New Jerusalem whose gates are never shut.

(b) The second use of the term 'universalism' has to do with the theological question of the extent of the benefit wrought by the atoning death of Christ, and with the relation of the Calvinian doctrines of election and predestination (qq. v.) to the expressed purpose of the gospel, that all men might be saved. The Armenians had maintained, as the second of their five points, 'that Jesus Christ by his death and sufferings made an atone-
ment for the sins of all mankind in general, and of every individual in particular,' but they went on to say that none could be partakers of this benefit but those possessing a true faith, which can belong only to those who are regenerated by the operation of the Holy Spirit, and who have thus by their own contribution contributed to the better estee in which Christians are regarded. . . . A convert, no doubt, is still outcaste, but he is now regarded as a member of a fresh caste, and Hindus bear with his idiosyn-
cracies as they do with those of his paramahansa.

2 Census of India, 1911, vol. xv. pt. i. p. 136 f.

3 See BDB, p. 151; v. 11, p. 113.

4 See ERE II, 78 f.; Census of India, 1911, vol. xv. pt. i. p. 136 f.

4 See vol. xii. p. 34.
UNIVERSALISM

The doctrine of universalism is the belief that all mankind will be saved, or redeemed, by a process that is universally applicable and effective. This belief was popularized in the 17th century by Jean Amyraut (1576–1641), who defended the universality of redemption in his 'Disquisitio de Deo' and 'Disquisitio de Deo et homine'. Amyraut's work was influential in the development of the doctrine, and it was further developed by such figures as Richard Baxter and John Owen.

The concept of universalism is often contrasted with particularism, which holds that only a select group of individuals will be saved. The universalists argue that all mankind is benefited by the redemption that Christ accomplished on the cross, and that salvation is offered to all through the grace of God.

The universalist position has been held by numerous figures throughout history, including John Calvin, who was a key figure in the development of the doctrine. Calvin's teaching on universalism was influential in the development of the Reformed Church, and it has been a prominent feature of the Christian faith in many contexts.

The doctrine of universalism has been a topic of debate in Christian theology for centuries, with proponents and opponents on both sides. While some have argued that universalism is a necessary aspect of the Christian faith, others have rejected it as incompatible with the teachings of the Bible.

In conclusion, the doctrine of universalism is a significant aspect of Christian theology, and it continues to be a topic of discussion and debate among Christians today. The concept of universalism offers a compelling vision of the saving grace of God, and it challenges believers to consider the implications of this belief for their own lives and for the world at large.
Death is the means whereby the soul is made more immediately subject to redeeming influences, and through corruption and reformation rise to various stages of spiritual development, the highest of which is eternal communion with infinite goodness. To such a view of this is to be attributed a large share of that likeness of God whereby men was made at the beginning.

Origen († A.D. 254) extended the notion of the discipline of souls much farther both in scope and in detail; his mind was at times more laborsome and more speculative than Clement's. He conceived a chain of existences in which the human life of this world is but a link. Souls arrive from an infinite past, in which their experience and their destination have been carried on with the most varied results, to exercise here their privilege of reformation, of the free will of God, according as they have accepted or resisted the spiritual influences that are perpetually striving for their redemption. Into future worlds beyond this life Origen carries the divine work of leading souls towards the goal of all sentient being, which is attained in likeness to God, for in the end God will be all in all. Fallen angels and demons will be rescued to share with mankind the ultimate salvation. It is to be noted that, when Origenism was anathematized as heresy, under Justinian (A.D. 541-543), it was not his view of the universality of salvation that was condemned, but then, as afterwards, his doctrine of the pre-existence of souls and of the final salvability of devils.

Gregory of Nyssa († A.D. 394) moves towards the same result from his central conviction as to the ultimate perfection and multiplication of all evil, as he says: "If God will be in all existing things, evil, plainly, will not then be among them." 1 The resurrection is nothing else than the reparation of our nature in itself" 2 Nothing that has its origin from God will fall out of His kingdom. Wherever the God that is intermingled with the good is mixed up with evil, everything that originated from God will become such as it was from the beginning, before the event of its separation.

The same view was taken by Didymus of Alexandria († A.D. 365), who explicitly endorsed Origen's opinion on the conversion of devils.

Among the Anabaptists in the Church in the East it suffices to mention Theodore Mopœmenus († A.D. 428), an opponent of Origenism, who maintained that sin and its penalty were both agents in the moral purposes of God as conducive both to self-knowledge and to repentance, and thus effective for the restoration of the wicked.

The current of Alexandrian thought came again to the surface in the 9th cent. in the mind of John Scotus Eriigena († A.D. 777), in the form of a pantheistic theology. He predicts, at the conclusion of a complicated and somewhat inconsistent scheme, the absorption of all into the divine; wickedness, death, and misery are all transformed into good, or, as he puts it, "the soul is in all beings." In the period immediately preceding the Reforma-tion, the doctrine of universal salvation is found in connexion with very various forms of doctrine and life; e.g., this belief is seen in combination with the Antinomianism of the Brethren of the Free Spirit (q.v.), and the fanatical asceticism of the Albigensian Cathari. 4

3. Universalism in Germany.—A certain prevalence of Universalism among the German Anabaptists has been attributed to the influence of Hans Denk, scholar and mystic (1495-1527), but his extant writings do not show that he gave it any prominence in his teaching. That the Anabaptists were largely credited with such opinion is evident from the cap. of the Anabaptist Confession of the Augsburg of 1530, where there is formal condemnation of the Anabaptists 'who believe that there will be an end of the punishments of the damned and the destruction of the world.' At the end of the 17th cent. and the beginning of the 18th controversy was very rife on three points—the eternity of punishment, the millenium, and the restitution of all things. A number of the most eminent and ableminded Protestant divines, especially on the last-mentioned topic, are embodied in a great work published in three volumes folio at Frankfurt in 1701-10, entitled Missiven ausserordentlicher Wahrheit, oder das Geheimniss der Wiederkunft aller Dinge, compiled by Johann Wilhelm Petersen (1638-1727). Petersen had been professor at Rostock and a prominent divine of the Lutheran Church. He was deposed from office in 1692, because of his having embraced Universalist opinions, to which he had been converted by his wife, Johanna Eleonora von Merlau. She had been influenced in this direction before her marriage by the writings of the English mystic, Jane Lead, whose opinions were widely circulated in Germany by her disciples, who conducted the Philadelphia Society. Petersburg was a very voluminous writer, and both he and his wife contributed largely to the contents of the great compilation.

For many years after the appearance of Petersen's work a great number of writings, for and against the doctrine of restoration, were published. On the orthodox side appears the great name of Johann Lorenz von Mosheim (1694-1755). On the other side the most notable was the treatable published in America. It is proper to be written by Paul Siegvoi, but it is known that the author's real name was Georg Klein-Nicoli, for which Paul Siegvoi is the transparent disguise, executed with the aid of German, Latin, and Greek.

Such subjects as eternal punishment were from this time open to latitudinarian treatment in Germany, but it remained for F. D. E. Schleiermacher (1768-1834) to give to his contemporaries and successors a definite direction towards Universalism. Among systematic theologians the one who has most closely followed Schleiermacher (q.v.) in his eschatology is the Zürich professor, Alexander Schweizer (1808-88). 3

4. Universalism in England.—It has been inferred, from a mandate of Simon Langham, archbishop of Canterbury, dated 5th Nov. 1605, 4 that doctrines of universal salvation, extending even to the salvability of devils, were current at that time in England. A number of opinions are condemned as erroneous, extending from the possible salvation of Sarmene, Jews, and pagans to beliefs such as, e.g. , "it is not possible that one should be damned for original sin without actual sin," and that the nature of demons may not be essentially irreparable. This statement is addressed to the governors of the University of Oxford, and it is surely more probable that it intends to deal with the possible re-appearance of Origenistic speculation in academic disputations than with any popular advocacy of such views.

The 42nd of the English Articles of 1553 has for its title 'That all men shall not be saved at the length,' and it runs:

'They also are worthy of condemnation who endeavour at this time to restore the dangerous opinion, that all men, be they never so ungodly and at least, preserved, when they have suffered pains for their sins a certain time appointed by God's justice.'

It is generally admitted that this condemnation is directed against Anabaptist opinions promulgated by foreign refugees who had then recently come to England in large numbers and been permitted to establish churches. The doctrine is not attributed to the English Lollards, save probably in one document, viz. The Protestation of the Clergy of the Lower House within the Province of Canterbury, with Declaration of the Faults and Abuses which heretofore have and now be within the same, worthy

1 See art. PHILADELPHIENS.
3 D. Wilkins, Collectanea Magnae Britanniae et Hibericae, London, 1737, II. 75.
special Reformation (1536), where, under no. 4, we read:

"That if there be a place where they [souls departed] be punished, God is not yet born, nor He that shall redeem the world."

Here, obviously, not a doctrine of temporary punishment is contended for, or punishment at all is condemned. The return of foreign Protestants to their own countries on the accession of Queen Mary (1553) probably accounts for the withdrawal of the Articles 40, 41, and 42.

If it were not strange if, in the general outburst of the most diverse religious opinions from 1640 onwards, the maintenance of universal salvation had not found a place. It is warmly advocated in a little anonymous book entitled:

"Divine Light, manifesting the love of God unto the whole world: with the True Church.

Wherein the holy Spirit of Truth manifesteth the Glory of God in Christ, exalting Christ, a spiritual Christ, and All-saving Jesus; shewing that Christ is a sure Foundation, and chief Corner-Stone for all Spiritual building, unto the raising up lively hopes for all People to proceed in Believing the great Mercies and loving-kindness of our God in Christ, in whom God hath redeemed us his saints, and All; having wrought all things for us, and all in Christ, wherein we are made perfect. So that was freest of all the Londoners, whom he had appointed his servant for the Good of All:

in bringing Glad Tidings of Good Things unto the whole Creation." Eps. 52. 7. 13.

The Lord will work for the manifestation of his Truth in this his due time. Printed in the year 1646. 1

The author does not deny that the elect are found in all nations, but that they are the only ones who are chosen to proclaim to the world general redemption and the holy covenant. It is evident that the work attracted much attention, for in A Testimony to the Truth of Jesus Christ as also against the Errors, Wrongs and Blasphemies of the Time and the Toleration of them, Inscribed by the ministers of Christ within the Province of London, December 14, 1647, we find that the 'errors against God's eternal decree of Election and Reprobation' are taken verbatim from the Divine Light. Under date 4th Feb. 1646 the Lords and Commons put forth an order for a day of public humiliation 'for the growth and spreading of Errors, Heresies and Blasphemies,' and among the 'errors enumerated are two, referred to Divine Light:

"(e) That God's eternal election is of all men, one as well as another; and all shall be saved at last, both men and devils, and that they that deny it are the great Antichrist; that true faith is to believe it; and that though this Faith of general redemption is a doctrine in the world, it should be sufficient to save all the rest of the Creation."

In the so-called Draconic Ordinance, passed by Parliament in 1648, while deniers of the Trinity are threatened with death, those who maintain that all men shall be saved are declared liable to imprisonment.

Another vigorous little tract, of six pages, written by Henry Hoole, and published in 1653, deserves mention in connexion with the Divine Light, viz. The Light of God spreading itself in all the dark Corners of the Earth; with glad Tidings to all People, with a Restoration of all Things, and the Lyon's Power overthrown.

At this time three men were itinerating in the country, preaching Universalism, and gathering small bodies of adherents. They often preached in corners that were frequented by the clergy in public dispute after the manner of the 'gifted brethren' of the army. These were William Erbury (1601-54), Gerrard Winstanley († 1652), and Richard Coppin († 1659). The last-named was frequently imprisoned; his works largely consist of accounts of debates with his clerical opponents and his judges. One of his chief contentions is that there may be redemption from hell, and in support of this he argues that, in Biblical language, 'everlasting' does not mean 'endless.'

The latter point is elaborated at length by Samuel Richardson, a Baptist, in his work entitled Of the Torments of Hell: The Foundation and Pillars thereof, discovered, searched, shaken and demolished, wherein it is demonstrated that there shall be a Punishment after this Life, for any to endure, that shall never end, printed in 1658, and reprinted in The Phoenix, ii. (1708). In this little work the author carries himself beyond the end proposed, but he convinces himself of the ultimate salvation of all men.

In 1661 appeared an anonymous treatise entitled A Letter of Resolution concerning Origen and the Chief of his Opinions, reprinted in The Phoenix, i. (1707). The author was George Rust, who in 1667 became bishop of Dromore. His statement of Origen's opinions is not mere exposition, but reveals the author as more than favourable to the notion of universal restitution.

A classic of Universalist literature was being produced at this period by Jeremiah White (1629-1707), Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, and chaplain to the Lord-Lieutenant, whom he had appointed his servant for the Good of All:

in bringing Glad Tidings of Good Things unto the whole Creation. Eps. 52. 7. 13.

The Lord will work for the manifestation of his Truth in this his due time. Printed in the year 1646. 1

The author does not deny that the elect are found in all nations, but that they are the only ones who are chosen to proclaim to the world general redemption and the holy covenant. It is evident that the work attracted much attention, for in A Testimony to the Truth of Jesus Christ as also against the Errors, Wrongs and Blasphemies of the Time and the Toleration of them, Inscribed by the ministers of Christ within the Province of London, December 14, 1647, we find that the 'errors against God's eternal decree of Election and Reprobation' are taken verbatim from the Divine Light. Under date 4th Feb. 1646 the Lords and Commons put forth an order for a day of public humiliation 'for the growth and spreading of Errors, Heresies and Blasphemies,' and among the 'errors enumerated are two, referred to Divine Light:

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1 Works, London, 1630-31, III.

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tion in Parliament Court, London, and was suc-
cceeded there, on his return to America in 1794,
by William Vidler (1758-1816), who had been a
laureate, Unitarian, and, embracing Universalism in 1792, had been expelled, with his
congregation, from the Kent and Sussex Associa-
tion of Baptist Churches. Vidler was not success-
ful in maintaining a large congregation in London,
but he maintained his views by editing the
Universalist's Miscellany, which in 1802 became
The Universal Theological Magazine. This con-
tinued to be published until 1860, and was
succeeded by The Monthly Repository (1805-37), a
valuable record of men and movements on the
liberal side of the old dissent.

Universalism, apart from any attempt at the
organization of a Church, found an advocate in Sir
George Stonhouse († 1703), a Syriac scholar of
eminence, who had spent much time in the ex-
amination of Syriac MSS in Continental libraries.
At Oxford he had been a member of the little
band of Methodists over whom John Wesley pre-
sided, nicknamed the Holy Club, and had main-
tained, against his fellow-members, the doctrine of
holy communion. In later life he resided at
East Brent, Somerset, and was much interested in a
society formed in the neighbouring parish of
Burnham and called the Burnham Society, 'to study
religion and divinity and debate on the differ-
cence of religious opinions, in brotherly love.'
The minutes of the society record dis-
cussions on the pre-existence of souls and universal
restoration. Stonhouse published (anonymously
at Bristol in 1761) Universal Restoration or A Scripture
Doctrine, and two subsequent volumes on the same
subject in 1768 and 1773.

Another independent study is The Restitutio-
on of All Things: An Essay on the Important Purpose
of the Universal Redeemer's Destination (1758), by
James Brown, chaplain of the British garrison at
Savannah in the Province of Georgia. The author
is apparently quite unaware of any efforts or
books of purport similar to his own.

At the close of the 18th cent. Universalism
began to spread among English Unitarians. John
Prior Estlin, of Bristol (1747-1817), published Dis-
courses on Universal Restoration (1815), directed
principally against the doctrine of the final annih-
lation of the wicked. A more generally interest-
ing treatise of the subject was put forth by T.
Somervell Smith (1768-1833) in his Illustra-

David Thom (1735-1802), minister of the Scot-
church, Rodney Street, Liverpool, having been
licensed by the Presbytery of Glasgow, was in
1825 censured and suspended by that Presbytery
upon charges of heresy, which, however, lay ei-
tirely within the sphere of Calvinistic doctrine.
His adherents formed an independent congregation,
which soon became known as Berean Universalists,
for Thom now espoused the doctrine of a ' finished
salvation,' analogous to that of Kelly, and
constructed on a distinctly Calvinistic basis. His
work consisted of labours and often paradoxical
interpretations of Scripture, but in 1850 he re-
published Jeremiah White's Restoration of All
Things with a historical preface. The same year
marked the appearance of a magazine, The Un-
iversalist, edited by Richard Roe, to which Thom
became a constant contributor, his efforts being
largely devoted to restraining the Unitarian ten-
dencies of contemporary Universalism, especially
in the United States.

Universalism has, at a later time, been approached
from various sides by writers within the Church of

5. Universalism in Scotland.—As early as 1755
certain Unitarian congregations in Lanca-
ashire) which had been associated with the Reformed
Presbytery (a branch from the Cameronian side of
the Scottish Covenanters) united in declaring their
belief in 'the boundless love of God and the uni-
versal redemption of all men.' The young minister,
who was a zealous and eloquent preacher, was
suspended, and in 1758 was forced to leave his
charge, but in 1760 he was received into the Church of
the New Phœnix, a Unitarian body. About 1779 he
became minister of the Congregational church in
Dovercourt, Essex, where he remained for the rest
of his life, and where he died in 1810.

6. Universalism in America.—The progress of
Universalism in America has found a competent
and judicious historian in Richard Eddy; hence
its main lines may be readily traced and succinctly
stated.

The first advocates of universal salvation were
probably the German Baptists, called Dunkers or
Tunkers, who were settled in Germantown, Pa.,
as early as 1710, and there established a church.
They brought or imported Universalist books from
Germany, and among them was The Everlasting
Gospel, attributed to Paul Siegvolk (see above).
The translation and printing of this, which may

1. Extracts, etc., were printed in 1788.
be regarded as the primary document of American Universalism, is probably due to the influence of G. W. Murray, after suffering persecution for preaching Universalism in France and Germany, settled in Pennsylvania in 1741.

The title runs thus:

"The Universal Gospel, commanded to be preached by Jesus Christ, Judge of the Living and Dead, unto all creatures, Mark xvi. 15, concerning the Eternal Redemption found out by him, and by his Son, Sin, Hell and the Devil abolished, and the whole Creation restored to its primitive Portion, by the present Antichristian World. Written in German by Paul Siegvolk, and translated into English by John Rechhal. Germantown: Printed by Christopher Sower, M.DCC.LXX."
In 1822 a further stage was reached, in which Jacob Wool, who wrote under the name 'Restorationist,' gave evidence of the difference of opinion which was at this stage beginning to appear in universalism. Wool, in his Glimpses of the Christian Body, and of the Incompatibility of the Two Doctrines—viz., that of 'universal salvation at the commencement of a future state' and that of the 'final restoration of all men by Jesus Christ,' adding:

'The doctrine which admits all characters alike to heaven at death, is subversive of a just distinction between virtue and vice.'

This diversity of opinion led to an actual schism. In 1831 a number of Universalist churches formed the Massachusetts Association of Universal Restorationists, which continued for ten years. The great majority, including many who had a doctrinal affinity with the Restorationists, strongly disapproved of the schism. The seceders, while adopting the Winchester Profession, altered, in 1833, the first clause of Art. iii. so as to read:

'We believe in a retribution beyond death, and in the necessity of faith and repentance.'

The 'no future punishment' creed disappeared in 1878 as the motto of Universalism, when the Universalist ministers of Boston and its vicinity approved a declaration of the faith, in which these words occur:

'We believe that repentance and salvation are not limited to the religious conditions of time; that, as a living and experimenting being, man is held responsible for the acts of evil done by him during his earthly existence, and for his thoughts in the future life, is salvation by Christ, and gives no warrant to the imputation to us of the "death and glory" theory.'

Art. iv. runs:

'Whatever differences in regard to the future may exist among us, none of us believe that the horizon of eternity will be always open to either largely or for a long time covered by the clouds of sin and punishment, and in coming into the enjoyment of salvation, whosoever that may be, all the elements of penitence, forgiveness, and repentance are involved. Justice and mercy will then be seen to be entirely at one, and God be all in all.'

Already for many years the objections to Universalism from the side of the Unitarians had been disappearing, as the views here stated were gaining ground among Universalists. The Universalists, combining a liberal faith with an evangelical fervour, appealed to many whom the drier light of Unitarianism did not reach, and without any formal alliance the two denominations have been constantly associated in social efforts and religious sympathy.

In 1903 a centennial meeting, held at Winchester, N.H., re-affirmed the Profession in its original form. In 1886 the following 'conditions of fellowship' had been added to Art. iii. in a general convention held at Boston:

'The acceptance of the essential principles of the Universalist Church of Universalism; (2) the universalism of the Church; (3) the spiritual authority and leadership of His Son, Jesus Christ; (4) the absolute need of salvation; (5) the final harmony of all souls with God.'

The latest statistics of the Universalist Church in America record the names of over 600 recognized ministers, and a still larger number of parishes and meeting-places; seven in Canada, some of which have fellowship with Universalist conventions in the United States. There are numerous women's missionary societies and mission circles; a regular mission is maintained in Japan, and a congregation has been formed in Cuba. There are also eight colleges, theological schools, and academies.


JAMES EDWIN OGDENS.

UNIVERSALITY.—I. Definition.—The universal is defined by Aristotle as 'whatever may naturally be predicated of many things,' or 'that which is included under a single universal is more than one thing.' The important word in these definitions is 'naturally.' It is explained by the following:

'I call that universal which belongs to the subject, distinc-

trively, essentially, and as it is what it is; in scholastic
terms, which is true de omni, per se, and quodv uis ipsum.'

By de omni Aristotle means 'in every case and always.' By per se and quodv uis ipsum explain the 'naturally.' There are four senses of per se: (1) when the predicate is part of the definition of the subject, (2) when the subject is part of the definition of the predicate, (3) when which is not predicated of any other subject, (4) when the subject itself is the cause of the predicate.

Aristotle means by universal in the strict sense—the primary universal, as distinguished from the collective universal. Per se and quodv uis ipsum are the same, but he seems to have in view per se in the first and the second sense only; for he has just said that whatever is universal is inherent in things, and consequently he says that everything is inherent in either of those ways or according to accident, but accidents are not necessary. This is what Aristotle means by universal in the strict sense—the primary universal, as distinguished from the collective universal, as when we say that triangles have their internal angles equal to two right angles, or that two contradictory predicates, 'straight' or 'curved,' imply the notion of line.

Grote and Prantl reduce the third and fourth senses to the first. Grote says of the third:

'The predicate must not be extra-essential to the subject, nor attached to it as an adjunct from without, simply concomitant or accidental.'

Of the fourth sense he says:

'The like distinction holds in regard to events: some are accidentally concomitant sequences, which may or may not be realized (e.g., a flash of lightning occurring when a man is on his journey); in others, the conjunction is necessary or causal (as when an animal dies under the sacrificial knife).'

The same identifications are made by Prantl:

'The latter explains the third sense of per se thus: 'what is enunciated not is predicative manner as property, but as individual substance, remains identical with itself in the multiplicity of possible predicates.'

Prantl expressly identifies the fourth sense of per se with the first. The third and fourth are both regarded as resting upon the activity of the creative concept and its necessary causality.

The meaning of Aristotle seems to be this. In certain cases attributes are essentially conditioned by the nature of the subject in which they are found, but we do not see this. The predicates may not after all be true de omni. Similarly with regard to events. The nature of the living thing may essentially condition the effect of the wound, but after all it may not. Such wounds may not be always fatal. We cannot, therefore, make such universals the basis of a demonstrative science. We do not see the primary universals or the necessity which belongs to such universals.

This interpretation of Aristotle common to Prantl and Grote, is in accordance with the scholastic treatment of demonstration, especially the demonstratio possibilita. The property of possibility as flowing from the determination of a thing as a rational natural is an illustration of the third sense of per se. Possibility was supposed to belong to man essentially. This is certainly not evident in itself and has led to an extremely different interpretation of Aristotle, occurring by Saint-

1 De Interp. vii.
2 Mot. (vit.) vili, 12 (1939).

1 Asul. Post. i. 4.
2 Lib. i. 4. C.
3 H. L. Aldrich, Artic Logica Rudiimenta, ed. II. L. Mansel, Oxford, 1853, Appendix K.
5 Prantl, Grundriss der Logik des Abendlandes, I, 122.
Hilaire and Mansel. With regard to the third sense of the word, he interpret it as referring to the existence of the substance. Saint-Hilaire says:

'The individual substance is never necessary; and, moreover, it is for itself alone, and is never in a subject other than itself.'

As to the fourth sense he says:

'No more does it carry in itself a character of necessity; thus in the first sense, the necessity that the man die by strangulation; for there is a crowd of other totally different men who was not.'

This would restrict the universal and the necessity it involves to the first two senses of the word per se.

In this restriction Mansel agrees with Saint-Hilaire, and puts forward a theory of the demonstrative syllogism which limits it to the demonstrations of mathematics.

2. The two universals.—The truth is that Aristotle has two universals—the primary universal, where subject and predicate are co-extensive, and convertible, which is characterized by necessity, and another universal in which this is not the case. In one passage he says:

'By universal here, I mean that which is not convertible with its subject.'

His object is to show that such a universal, unless it issues in a primary universal, is valueless for scientific purposes. Indeed, in the universe belongs to mathematical science and other deductive sciences; the other universal belongs to the uniformities of co-existence and sequence which experimental science investigates. Locke, Dugald Stewart, and Mansel have regarded deductive science, especially mathematics, as involving an essentially distinct logical procedure from that of the inductive sciences. J. S. Mill seeks to reduce mathematics to the inductive level. Medieval thought and Platonism tend to enlarge the scope of demonstration. The teaching of Aristotle is the same as that of Locke, Stewart, and Mansel.

It is this distinction of the two universals which some later logicians seem to have in view. Petrus Hispanus distinguishes between predicatable and universal. Predicable is affirmed of many things, but universal exists in many things. Others make the distinction turn upon whether in the proposition we tell of the subject quod sit or quale sit—what it is or what are its attributes or characters. This, he says, is that only is a universal which is predicated of inferior classes; but a predicatable which is also predicated of coordinate classes would not be a universal. There are thus five predicables, but only two universals—general and species.

3. The problem of universals.—The above doctrine of universals considers the universal as its nature is affected by the precise relation in which the predicate can stand to the subject in a proposition; and the distinction of universals which it sets up affects the consideration of universals taken in their widest sense. The most difficult problem relating to universals—a problem still unanswered—is that concerning their existence. Do they exist only in the mind? If outside the mind, where? Are they mere names?

4. Plato and Aristotle.

'Two things,' says Aristotle, 'may be fairly ascribed to Socrates—inductive arguments and universal definition, both of which are connected with the starting point of science. But Socrates did not make the universals or the definitions exist apart; his successors, however, gave them separate existence and set the kind of thing they called Idea.'

2 Angel, Pod. II, 1.
3 Petrus Hispanus, Summae logicae, tract. II.; cf. R. Sanderson, Logica Arbor Compendium, Oxford, 1876, bk. I. ch. II.

They at the same time treat the Ideas as universal substances, and again as separable and individual. That this is not possible has been shown before. The reason why those who say the Ideas are universal have renounced those two views it is certain that they did not make the Ideas substances identical with sensible things. They thought that the sensible particulars were in a state of flux and none of them remained, but that the universal was apart from these and different. And Socrates gave the impulse to this, as we said before, by means of his definitions, but he did not separate them from the particulars; and in this he thought rightly, in not separating them.

These agreements of Aristotle with Plato are at the Platonist theory of Ideas—the theory as expounded in the earlier dialogues. Whether in the later dialogues the Platonist theory undergoes a change we shall consider below. Aristotle knows of no such change. Plato's theory as conceived by Aristotle is as follows:

Plato supposed that there existed, besides the individual things of sense, which are continually changing and passing away, another kind of being, apart from matter and movement, which he termed Forms or Ideas, by participation in which each individual and sensible thing is made to be what it is. These Ideas are eternal and self-existent. Material things participate in them, and are copies of the Ideas, which are hypothetical exist in an intelligible region apart from the world. When we, on perceiving sensible things, form general concepts, we, according to Plato, do this by reminiscence or participation in the Ideas, with which we were familiar in a previous state. What we term the general concept is the former, having an existence as an intelligible form in our intellect. Arthur Butler and others have distinguished the Platonic Idea from the general concept in the sense of the understanding; but this separation is rejected by Bonitz and Zeller.

Whatever may be thought of this theory, it is remarkable that the most essential objections to it have been brought forward by Plato himself in the Parmenides.

'Perhaps,' says Jouvet, 'there is no passage in Plato showing greater metaphysical power than that in which he adds his own theory of Ideas. The arguments are nearly, if not quite, those of Aristotle.'

The difficulties—how without division or multiplication the Ideas can participate in the many, or the many in the Ideas; the necessity of a still higher universal to unite the Ideas themselves with its corresponding phenomena; the so-called third-man argument; most serious of all, the uselessness of Ideas for knowledge, arising from the ipse dixit of the understanding; but this separation is rejected by Bonitz and Zeller.

The perplexities,' says Jouvet, 'which surround the one and many in the data of the Ideas are also alluded to in the Philebus, and no answer is given to them. Nor have they ever been answered by any one else who separates the phenomenal from the real.'

This statement may be allowed to stand, but the question arises: Did Plato separate the phenomenal and the real, or did he unite them? The answer is that he did both. The imperfect soul is a category of the spatial and temporal. The Idea is spaceless and timeless, yet it does not exist in total aloofness from phenomena. It is in this way that we answer the difficulties which have been raised in this connexion, and which have led to the theory of a 'later Platonism.' There is in reality no essential change. The force of these objections—perhaps quite correctly considered by some school, perhaps pressed home by Aristotle—was no doubt felt by him. But what happened in this case is what in such cases always happens. The old point of view is retained and an effort is made to show that it answers the new questions. In this respect there is a striking parallel between the later philosophy of Plato and that of Fichte. Originally, in Fichte, the Ego projects from itself a purely ideal and universal world. Schelling showed

1 Metaphysic, 1069 a 32.
2 Lectures on the Hist. of Ancient Philosophy, p. 379; n.
3 Plato in the Older Academy, Eng. tr., London, 1876, p. 241, note 42.
5 Ib. p. 7.
6 The Parmenides of Plato, ed. T. Maigue, Dublin, 1878, p. xvi.
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that the world in its cura produces the Ego, and thus also through the world enters the history of philo-

sophy.
The Absolute is in the world, therefore, as well as in the Ego. Fichte in his later philosophy seeks to show that his Absolute—the Ego, pure Being, the one universal, living and passive phenomena. In the Philebus, Sophist, and Timaeus Plato does the same. The Idea is spaceless and timeless, but nevertheless one with mind and life and power in the phenomenal world. It is just in this that the change wrought in the philosophical standpoint by Aristotle consists. He denies the transcendental existence of the Idea or universal, and places it in the composite world of matter and form. The world thereby ceases to be merely phenomenal. Matter itself becomes something positive. It is no longer a mere negativity. The centre of gravity has passed from the ideal to the real world. Both Plato's and Aristotle's doctrines have been called realism. Both affirm the reality of the Idea or Form; but in Plato it is a reality above the world, in Aristotle in the world. Aristotle rejects the detached existence of the universal. He holds that the subjective concept is related to the objective reality, but in place of the transcendental existence of the Idea, in contradistinction to individual objects, he regards the Essence or Form as im-

manent in the things. The precise nature of this immanence, in Aristotle, has been a matter of dispute. According to Hamilton, 1 he has been viewed as 'a Realist, a Conceptualist, and a Nominalist, in the strictest sense.'

The questions at issue are formulated by Porphyry thus: whether genera and species do really exist in nature, or in mere conceptions only; whether or not they are bodies or incorporeal; whether they are inherent in the objects of sense or dis-

joined from them. 2 Even though Aristotle brought down the Idea from its super-celestial sphere and embodied it in things, it still has an existence in the Divine Being, the Form of Forms. If the Divine Mind be one with things, i.e., if Aristotle be interpreted pantheistically, we have still the questions as to the nature of this union— the unity and multiplicity of the Idea. If the Divine Mind be different from things—i.e., if he be interpreted theistically—the Idea has a trans-

cendent existence. If, however, the Divine Mind where the unification of the Idea lies; and what is the nature of it is the subject of the great controversy between nominalism and realism in the Middle Ages. The difficulty consists in this: that, if the universal is merely something repeated over and over again in in-

dividuals, then genera and species fall asunder in merely resembling individuals, essential com-

munity of nature is denied; but, if such repetition be rejected, and the universal be considered as some one thing throughout the individuals, then the plurality becomes merely phenomenal and illusive. Extreme representatives of realism, like William of Champeaux, held that the universal exists for itself as a universal in individual things, and were thus led into pantheism. 3

Fichte realms, not the moderate realism of St. Thomas Aquinas we have a fusion of Aristotel-

ian and Platonie realism. St. Augustine had already interpreted Plato's Ideas as the thoughts which God had of things before He created them. St. Thomas Aquinas admits the existence of the universal or the Form in a threefold sense, ante rem, in re, and post rem. 4 The universal ante rem corresponds to the Platonie Ideas, understood as archetypal ideas in the mind of God—the patterns

In the Divine Intellect after which all things were made. With regard to the universal in re or a parte rei, the universal nature does not exist as the same in the individuals as it exists in them objectively. It is only alike in them. We, in a more comprehensive consideration of it, regard it as a unity of community of form, as one and the same. The universal nature exists as a universal, in the human intellect, by virtue of its power of recog-

nizing the common nature. This is the universal realism. There is, however, a universal, as it were, not only in the act of recognition in the mind, but also in the unification of the world, and in the human being as he makes the world, or the objects of sensation. The common nature which is known by the mind? Moderate realism answers this question by its doctrine that universals are fundamentally in things. Universal sia sunt formalitas in mente fundamentali in rebus iisus.

'‘To the universal nature thus fundamentally taken, it does not essentially belong, to be one or many, in the intellect or out of the intellect, in individuals or outside them, communicable to a number or incommunicable.' 1

If we ponder on this universal, we shall not find it so very different from the timeless and spaceless Idea of the Platonie Philosopher and Sophist, but it approaches the conception by which Plato sought to allay the difficulties and doubts he himself raised in the Parmenides.

6. The doctrine of formalism.—It was almost in-

evitable that this doctrine should pose the question at the roots of things an Essence or Form in itself subject to no individualizing conditions, should beget a new form of realism. This is precisely what did happen. Duns Scotus distinguishes carefully between the unity of an individual and the unity of a universal nature. The last he conceives almost as certain modern logicians conceive the unity of a series in a property as preserved in things. The universal appears in the particular individual things, but it is apprehended as universal by the understanding. In itself it is neither particular nor universal, but just what it is. It is something antecedent to universality and particularity, but as antecedent in itself, indifferent to either. 2 This is what distinguishes the realism of Duns Scotus from the earlier realism of Bernard of Chartres or William of Champeaux, that uni-

versals are not apprehended as actus such in ob-

jective reality. 3 This would be to reduce them to individual unities; or, rather, numerically the same nature would pervade the individuals. In the system of Duns Scotus a primitive universal unity—matter—is progressively pluralized and individualized by form, almost as a single throb of Bergson's clau veil is broken into its manifold reverberations in nature. Each throb, however, is in Scotus a system of unities; and it is evident that these universals, if they are neither to be pluralized in the individuals nor consolidated into a single being in a real universal, must be con-

ceived as passing over into the individuals, and yet as each retaining its own unity in them. This is the view that underlies the doctrine of formal-

ism elaborated in the Scotist school. Universality is thus conceived as in the things, not by a dis-

tection of reason, as moderate realism would hold, not by a distinto real, as extreme realism would hold, but by a formal distinction which still allowed it to be identified with the series of individual things.

7. The realism of Francis de Mayronis.—It is obvi-

ous that such a view approaches very close to

2 Porphyry, Intro. ch. 1.
3 Prantl, lii. 120.
4 Ed. li. 10 ff.


5 Prantl, lii. 30.
6 Stock, Gesch. der Philosophie des Mittelalters, ii. 502; et Couturat's variable (Engels, of the Philos. Soc. conv., I. 183 E.)
the doctrine which regards the universal as such as existing in things, and, if we regard this universal as numerically one with the universal as contemplated by the Divine Mind, we are in danger of being led back to a pantheism such as was usually held by Thomas of Chalmas. If now we are to escape such pantheistic conclusions, there is one, and only one, way of escape within the same general point of view; it is to give the universal a separate existence, as Plato did, independent of the Divine or any mind. This step was taken by the greatest of the disciples of Scotus—Francis de Mayronis. Relations are divided by Mayronis into relationes secundum esse and relationes secundum dict. The former are between things which in their entire being fall under the category of relation; the latter are between things which, taken by themselves, are absolute, but are understood with reference to something else and remain entitatively distinct from the relation into which they enter. This corresponds to what has been recently called the monistic and the monadological concept of relation. The relation between subject and object of knowledge is so distinct from its terms that it exists separately—from which it follows that ideas are veritable entities.\(^1\) Universals in themselves therefore exist neither in the soul nor in things. They are not a something as against another something; but they are something as against nothing or as against a mere mode or manner of being. They are extrinsically and the-same thing independent of being and of the idea. They are not necessary, nor are they contingent. They have an intelligible being from themselves essentially distinct from God. With Duns Scotus, Mayronis distinguishes between esse essentiae and esse existentiae. It is the latter esse that comes from God. To the same kind of being—esse essentiae—belongs the primum principium commonitas, i.e. the principle of contradiction, which he regards as a hypothetical copulative proposition.\(^2\) In all this we may see in Francis de Mayronis a medieaval 'new realist'.

8. Nominalism. The realism of the Scotists tends to pantheism or else to the setting up of uncreated entities independent of the Divine Mind. The only other course is to identify completely the universal with individual things, i.e. to give up the universal as such, to recognize only individual things—the doctrine of nominalism. It has been sometimes questioned whether medieval nominalism is really nominalism and not rather conceptualism. With regard to the early nominalism, it is hard to put any other interpretation on the opinion attributed to Roscelinus by Anselm, that universals are flos vocis. His pupil Abelard is supposed to have approached more nearly to the concept of id, standing. To Abelard, however, it is a classification of relations, not of theories about relation. Such relations are moreover real, not mere relationes rationis, and have a being distinct from the existence of the things between which they relate. The relation between the subject and object of knowledge is so distinct from its terms that it exists separately—from which it follows that ideas are veritable entities.\(^3\) Universals in themselves therefore exist neither in the soul nor in things. They are not a something as against another something; but they are something as against nothing or as against a mere mode or manner of being. They are extrinsically and the-same thing independent of being and of the idea. They are not necessary, nor are they contingent. They have an intelligible being from themselves essentially distinct from God. With Duns Scotus, Mayronis distinguishes between esse essentiae and esse existentiae. It is the latter esse that comes from God. To the same kind of being—esse essentiae—belongs the primum principium commonitas, i.e. the principle of contradiction, which he regards as a hypothetical copulative proposition.\(^4\) In all this we may see in Francis de Mayronis a medieaval 'new realist'.

9. Modern philosophy; the psychological problem. All the problems of modern philosophy have been set to it by medieval philosophy. The problem of the universals is no exception. The schools of the thirteenth century, in their attempt to modern philosophy a problem which had to be solved psychologically. What constitutes the community of nature between general thoughts within us as a whole? Is it the universality of a soul, that, metaphysically, philosophy has been driven in Ockham to give up the belief in a common nature in things.

(1) Hobbes. In modern philosophy we find the psychological consequence in Hobbes. The idea of a common nature in things is given up. Thoughts are as individual as things. 'There is nothing,' says Hobbes, 'universal but names.'\(^5\)

(2) Locke. To Locke, on the other hand, all knowledge consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas. Names can be general only if they stand for general ideas. Locke has been termed a nominalist, but it has even been stated that he could be interpreted as a realist. But, if conceptualism means finding the universal in the idea, then Locke is what he has been generally considered, a conceptualist. According to Locke, 'the mind makes the particular ideas received from particular objects to become general... by considering them as they are in the mind, such appearances, separate from all other existences, and the circumstances of real existence, as time, place, or any other concomitant ideas. This is called abstraction, whereby ideas taken from particular beings become general representations of all of the same kind, and their names general names, applicable to whatever exists concomitantly to such abstract ideas.'\(^6\) Abstractions are fictions and contrivances of the mind, that carry difficulty with them, and do not call upon us to offer ourselves any terms that are ready to imagine. For example, does it not require some pains and skill to form the general idea of a triangle (which is yet some of the most abstract, most general, and different forms of which it must be neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equiangular nor rightangled, and none of those at once). In effect, it is something imperfect, that cannot exist; an idea wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent ideas are put together.\(^7\)

(3) Berkeley. This doctrine Berkeley, the protagonist of modern nominalism, attacked in the Introduction to The Principles of Human Knowledge.

Whether others have this wonderful faculty of abstracting their ideas, they best can tell. For myself I find indeed I have a faculty of imagining, or representing to myself, the ideas of those particular things I have perceived, and of various compounds and dividing them. I can imagine a man with two bodies or the whole body of a man joined to the body of a horse. I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself abstracted or separated from the rest of the body. But then whatever I imagine or erect I imagine, it must have some particular shape and colour. Likewise the idea of a man that I trace to myself, must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny, a straight, or a crooked, a tall, or a low, a middle-sized man. I cannot by any effort of thought conceive the abstract idea of a horse by itself abstracted. And it is equally absurd for me to form the abstract idea of motion distinct from the body moving, and to think of myself as moving in another manner nor revolving; and the like may be said of all other abstract

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2. Stedf., ib. 98, 992, 2
5. Ibid., ch. vii.

\[\text{References:} \]
2. Stedf., ib. 98, 992, 2.
5. As cited in this chapter, § 9.

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general ideas whatsoever. To be plain, I own myself able to abstract in one moment, as when I consider some particular parts or qualities separated from others, with which, though they are united in some object, yet it is possible they may really exist, without the connection of any of those another, or conceive separately, those qualities which it is impossible should be annexed; or that I can abstract from a general notion, by abstracting from particulars in the manner aforesaid—which last are the two proper acceptations of abstraction.1

Berkeley explains precisely what he means by universality:1

'It is, I know, a point much insisted on, that all knowledge and demonstration are about universal notions, to which I fully agree. But is there not something more? These notions are formed by abstraction in the manner premised—universalitv, so far as we can comprehend, not consisting in the abode to

positive nature or conception of anything, but in the relation it bears to the particulars signified or represented by it; by virtue whereof in that things, names, or notions, being in their own nature particular, are rendered universal.2

In the edition of 1734 he says:3

'And here it must be acknowledged that a man may consider a figure merely as triangular; without attending to the par-

ticular qualities of the angles or relations of the sides. So far he may abstract. But this will never prove that he can frame an abstract, general, consistent ideas of a triangle. In like manner we may consider Peter so far forth as man, or so far forth as animal, without framing the aforementioned abstract ideas, either of man or of animal; inasmuch as at all that is per-

celved, in this case, is considered.

(4) Hume.—Berkeley's doctrine on this subject was pronounced by Hume to be 'one of the greatest and most valuable discoveries that have been made of late years in the republic of letters,' and he besought himself that "in the name of that great man, he had a duty to others, and to his own mind." Hume's view was essentially different. Berkeley had said that all general names signify indifferently a great number of particular ideas. Hume attributes to him the opinion that all general ideas are nothing but particular ones, annexed to a certain term, which gives them a more extensive signification, and makes them recall upon occasion other individuals, which are similar to them.4 This Heritage is not so his own to himself. He holds that the idea before the mind is always some particular idea. Abstract ideas are in themselves individual, but, when we have found a resemblance among several objects, we apply the same name to all. The name, being applied to other individuals, different in some respects from the idea we have first on hearing it, does not revive the idea of all these individuals, but the custom of applying the name to them as a readiness to survey any of them, which produces any other individual one for which we have occasion. It is clear that Hume differs from Berkeley in this, that he does not recognize, and does not allow the mind to abstract of regard-

ing the individual idea as representing and stand-

ing for the class to which it belongs. In Hume the idea is particular, and only possesses the power in association with the name of calling up other particular ideas. The nominalist doctrine, as it appears in Berkeley and Hume respectively, determines the counter-conceptualist doctrines of Reid and Brown.

(5) Reid.—Reid contends that Berkeley unwillingly or unwarily grants all that is necessary to support abstract and general conceptions:

1. A man may consider a figure merely as triangular, he may form a conception of this object and consider it for no man can consider a thing which he does not conceive. He has a conception, therefore, of a triangular figure, merely as such. I know no more that is meant by an abstract general conception of a triangle.1

2. He who considers Peter so far forth as man, does so merely for the sake of the meaning of those abstract general words man and animal, and he who conceives the meaning of them has an abstract general conception.2

(6) Brown.—According to Brown, the feeling of resemblance in certain respects is the true general notion, or general idea, as it has been less properly called, which the corresponding general term expresses.3 Brown holds that between the perception of two or more objects and the invention and employment of the corresponding names there must rise in the mind an intervening general notion of resemblance, the feeling or notion of the resemblance being immediately subsequent to the perception. It is the omission of the stage of the general notion that constitutes in his view the error of the nominalists.

Thus, as Reid regards the power of considering a figure merely as triangular, or Peter merely as man, as a proof of having the abstract and general conception, so Brown regards the circumstance of felt resemblance between two or more objects as the general notion of such objects. Brown has been criticized by Hamilton, but J. S. Mill in his Logic has been influenced by Brown's view.

(7) James Mill.—James Mill held that a general idea is that of a combination of individuals belonging to the class. The word 'man' calls up the ideas of an indefinite number of individuals. The name 'man' is the name of every individual and of the whole combination. This confounds general and collective terms. 'Tree' does not mean a wood.

(8) Hamilton.—According to Sir W. Hamilton, the opposing parties are really at one. The whole controversy arises from not distinguishing the images of sense and the unpercutible notions of intelligence. The situation depends upon the interpretation expressed in German by the terms Beqgriff and Anschauung. The images of the imagination, which were what Berkeley and the nominalists meant by ideas in general.

If we were only this distinction that was wanting, the controversy would have ended long ago. Not to mention the schoolmen, the distinction was present to Berkeley himself. The really important question is, What is the relation between thought proper or pure imagination and intelligence? Is the image always necessary to the realization of the concept? Hamilton held that it was:

'The concept horae, I say, cannot, if it remain a concept, that is a universal attribution, be represented in imagination; but, except it be represented in imagination, it cannot be applied to any object, and, except it be so applied, it cannot be realised in thought at all.'

This is what Hamilton termed the 'relativity of concepts.'

(9) J. S. Mill.—When this view of the relativity of the concept to the image is adopted, there is but little difference between the conceptualism of Hamilton and the nominalism of Brown.

According to Mill, 'We have only complex ideas of objects in the concrete: but we are able to attend exclusively to certain parts of the concrete idea: and by that exclusive attention, we enable those parts to determine exclusively the course of our thoughts as subsequently called up by association; and are in a condition to carry on a train of meditation or reasoning relating to those parts only, exactly as if we were able to conceive them separately from the rest.'

The distinction between Hamilton's view and Mill's thus reduces itself to that of 'a potential universality as against an universal potentiality,' but in neither writer is there an attempt to account for or to show the necessity of the relativity of the concept, or, what is the same thing, the power of a partial consideration of an idea to lead out beyond it.

(10) Mansel.—A different view of the relation


between the concept and the image is taken by Mansel:

'...it is a fact that the image may be represented by the concept, and the concept by the image, though probably not in the same way as that in which the concept may be represented by the image, and the image by the concept. But, if intellect and its laws are in correlation with, and form an organic unity with, the inner essences of things and the forces which control them determine, and are determined by, spatial relations, it will follow that the formulation of a philosophical theory of the concept and the image is impossible without a recognition of the concept and the image as entities of energy which may exist, move, and be transformed into one another. It is not from the

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UNIVERSE.—See COSMOGONY and COSMOLOGY, ESCHATOLOGY, NATURE.

UNPARDONABLE SIN.—See SIN (Christian).

UPANISADS.—The Sanskrit treatises or dialogues known as the Upānisads are the expression of the philosophical speculation of Indian sages and teachers during many centuries. The period of their fullest fruition, when with most originality and insight Hindu thinkers proposed to themselves and to the circle of their pupils solutions of the world's greatest mysteries, both mental and spiritual, is supposed to have been from the 6th to the 4th centuries before our era. There is no age of the Brāhmaṇas; for the Upānisad literature appears as a strata after the early Vedic poetry, and the prose treatises of the Brāhmaṇas with their minute ritual and ceremonial observations. And it is precisely with this feature of the concept as a sort of insubstantial principle that Lotze has in view when he says:

'Of the true universal, on the other hand, which contains the rule for the entire formation of its species, it may rather be said that its content is always precisely as rich, the sum of its marks possess in as great a measure as that of its species themselves; only that the universal concept, the genus, contains a number of marks in a merely indefinite and even universal form; these are represented in the species by definite values or particular characteristics, and finally in the singular concept all determination is contained in the genus, replaced by one fully determined in quantity, individuality, relation to others.

In the last chapter of the Posterior Analytics Aristotle asserts the existence of a faculty—the organ of primary truths, the basis of demonstrative science—by means of which reason can pierce the objects of sense and penetrate to the universal and the cause. The whole of medieval philosophical speculation assumes such a power. Aquinas, Scotus, Ockam, all alike imply it. Modern philosophy uniformly rejects it. Empiricism or empiricism denies it. Idealism denies any real essence whatsoever from thought.

1 Prolegomena Logica, p. 161.
2 Lectures on Logic, i. 150.
3 ‘A Reply to Dr. J. W. Rich’s Essay on the Consciousness of the Universal and the Individual.’
4 Lotze, Logik, Eng. tr. ed. B. Bosanquet, Oxford, 1885, i. 52.
5 See art. SPACE, POWER.

1 See art. SPACE, POWER.
UPANISADS

Sanskrit root sad, 'to sit down,' 'to be seated,' with the prefixed prepositions upa and ni. Original and definite doctrines are in general the property of the teacher, and its use as a title of the treatises in which the doctrines are conveyed may be compared to the Greek εὐαγγέλια, or the English 'Gospel.'

The native Indian equivalent of upanisad is rahapsam, 'secret,' 'hidden.' The latter term apparently always connotes the idea of secrecy or concealment of a text or doctrine, the knowledge of which should be communicated only to those who are accounted worthy. Thus in one passage it is enjoined that the teacher should not teach the doctrine to his eldest son, 'but to none else, whoever he may be.' This conception of a secret or esoteric knowledge has always determined the treatises of the Upanisads to be regarded as sacred writings, and in many of the sects of the Upanisads, as many as are maintained to this day as an inviolable principle of their religion.

The number of these treatises is very considerable. A late collection contains more than 100 names. And, if all works, early or late, that include mystical teaching or propound special theories or doctrines concerning the unseen are to be regarded as having just claim to the title Upanisad, there would seem to be no reason why such treatises should not be indefinitely multiplied at the present time. The total number, according to Barth, 'amounts to nearly 250,' including an 'Allah' Upanisad, assigned to the time of Akhrar.

Most of the later Upanisads are sectarian in character, and with more or less fidelity expound Upanisad doctrine from the point of view of the popular religions, excluding Vaisnava, or Siva, or endeavouring to promote the discipline and teaching of the Yoga, or with other limited aim. Many are attached especially to the Aitareya and of these the majority are of comparatively late origin. The treatises quoted or referred to by Saikara in the 9th cent. in his commentaries on the sacred texts are usually and without correctness supposed to be older. The fact is however, that they contain earlier and later material, strata of thought or language which have been worked up and welded together, and have all undergone modification and interpretation at the hands of later teachers and revisers. These older works are few in number, and together with the earlier Atharvyan treatises may be regarded as forming the Upanisad form of the sacred writings in the more restricted sense of the term.

2. Authorship.—Of the authors of these treatises, nothing is known with certainty. Many names of teachers or authorities have been preserved, and in some instances the document is signed at the side of the firm of the teacher, the attitude of the pupil who respectfully listens to his master's words. In ordinary usage, however, the word is employed to designate the doctrine which the teacher inculcates, and, finally, mystical or secret doctrine in general. It is in this sense that the Upanisad teaching the Vedanta, the end (anta) and aim of the Veda, the substance and sum of all true wisdom and in practice the fundamental principle of all Hindu literature, the word is thus confined to the highest and most abstract teaching or knowledge, the speculative doctrines which are regarded as within the province of truth, divine revelation. Its use as a title of the treatises in which the doctrines are conveyed may be compared to the Greek εὐαγγέλια, or the English 'Gospel.'

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3. Classification.—It is usual to classify these older treatises in three or four groups, which may be distinguished not only by the character and fullness or archaism of their teaching, and the style and diction which they employ, and the more or less archaic nature of their composition. It is not possible, however, to go beyond a provisional and general statement or to have much confidence in details of arrangement which may find expression in a definite scheme of chronology. As a whole the Upanisad literature is later than the Aitareya (9-7n.) and earlier than the condemnation of philosophical rule and precept into mnemonic Sutras. The internal dependence and succession set forth below is substantially that of Denzsen, to whose work all students of Indian literature and philosophy are greatly indebted. On broad lines and in substance the arrangement may be accepted, at least provisionally. With our present knowledge broad and tentative conclusions only are justified. Earlier and later elements in thought and style and composition are not always separable, or capable of being assigned to their right position in the history of the texts. Some treatises, notably perhaps the Svetasvatara, which is in extent and on general grounds is placed comparatively late in the chronological order, contain archaic elements, on which have been imposed later doctrines until the various strands of thought are almost inextricably interwoven, and the teaching presented is with difficulty reduced to self-consistency.

(2) The oldest group consists of six treatises, written in prose of an archaic style. At the head of the group are the Brihad- 

aryagana and the Chhândogya Upanisads, which are acknowledgment to be the most complete and authoritative exponents of Upanisad doctrine. The other members of the group, in the order named, are the Taittirīya, Aitareya, Kaṇāṭaka, and Renā. The last-named is composed partly in verse, and as regards its teaching also seems chronologically to approximate to the second group.

(3) In the second group the composition is almost entirely metrical. The oldest and most independent member of the group is the Kātha or Kāthaka Upanisad. There follow the Ṛgvedā- 

ātāra, or the Svetasvatara, and the Mahābhārata. The authors of the third and fourth treatises are said to be directly indebted to the latter two, and a direct or a mediate relation is maintained between the last three treatises on the one hand and the Mahābhārata on the other. This is the leading principle of the Upanisad teaching, which in the earlier group appears in a formative stage and open to discussion, are apparently regarded as established principles in the Vedas and India. It is of course probable that Saikara was acquainted with other treatises of the type, but which may be included among those which have been preserved; but, if so, they are now known under different names. The Sanskrit texts are probably, but not always, also separately; see the 'Litera- ture' at the end of this article.
sustained by the character of the teaching which they impart. Two of the later number of the Upanisads, together with the Brahmana, are attributed to the Atharvaveda. 

Of the latter group of seven, the seven are sectarian in character, or belong to the Atharvaveda or the systems and schools of the principal sects. For the most part they are very short, more rarely in prose and verse intermixed. Their doctrine or teaching varies with the sect to which they belong, they apply sectarian principles to sectarian ends, and to establish the religious doctrines of their several creeds. The most interesting perhaps and important are the oldest teachings to the Vedas philosophy, not a little force they urge and maintain the fundamental doctrines of the Vedic sects, but not the Upanisads of this group, which are accessible in modern renderings. Thirty or more are usually enumerated as the oldest and most instructive. A short list includes: Brahmanda, Aranyak, Mahat (Yajnavalkya); Atharvaveda, Revalya (Svivita); Brahma, Aranyak, Mahat (Yajnavalkya), Yoga-Sutra (Vasistha); Atharveda, Revalya (Svivita).

4. Translation and interpretation.—The difficulties of translation and interpretation of these treatises are considerable. Like the other scriptures of the Veda, the texts have certainly been preserved in the Sakhis with fidelity and accuracy from ancient times. Previous, however, to a final determination of form and limits they were evidently treated with much freedom, being revised, re-edited, interpolated or explained, and in general made to conform to later or individual standards of orthodoxy and belief. A considerable number of them were made accessible for the first time to Western students in the latter half of the 19th cent. by Anquetil du Perron, who worked for a Persian translation in the year 1656 of a collection of 50 Upanisads known as Upanishat. The text itself is the strangest medley of Latin and Persian, with Sanskrit words transfigured or adopted, almost unintelligible without a key. As is well known, Schopenhauer (q.v.) regarded the publication as epoch-making in the history of Western philosophy, and the system of his own mind. Thirty years later Rammohan Roy, the great Indian reformer and founder of the Brahmo Samaj (q.v.), published English translations of several treatises. He was followed in English, French, or German by H. T. Colebrooke, E. B. Cowell, P. Regnanda, O. Böhtlingk, A. Weber, and others. The most important and satisfactory renderings are those by Max Muller in SBE, and by Deussen in his Sechzig Upanisads. The latter contains introductions to the several treatises which are of great value.

5. Contents and analysis.—A brief analysis of the number of these treatises and the more significant treatises will enable a fair conception to be formed of their general scope and character. Often the Upanisads are not easy to analyse on account of the desultory nature of their style and contents. The abrupt changes of subject, the absence of any logical method or arrangement, the universal employment of metaphor are constant stumbling-blocks in the way of classification or orderly analysis. The entire treatment is suggestive rather than intimate oral instruction than of methodical exposition. There is little development of thought, nor is any attempt made to set forth a progressive and complete exposition of the truth as the authors conceived it. The most important writings are the Brhadāranyaka and the Chāndogya.

1 For a full statement of the reasons for the order adopted, and the mutual dependence of the treatises, see Deussen, SBE ii. 22 ff.

2 See Max Muller, SBE i., p. 18 ff., who gives an example of Deussen's style from his rendering of the Chāndogya (Upanisads).

3 The Brhadāranyaka is the most interesting, containing the figure of most of the principal teachers of all the Upanisads, and presents the most systematic exposition of doctrine. It is attached to the Jājasa-neyin school of the Yajurveda, and in its present form it is a collection of the first three books, the Sāntapatha Brāhmaṇa, of which according to the Mādhyamindī añkhā, it forms the last of the four añkhās, or collections, into which the Brāhmaṇa is divided. In the Kāśa añkhā, or school, it is the second, longest, first of the three main divisions of the Shāstras existing form is composite, and not the work of one author. It comprises six añkhās, or chapters, of which the last two are of later date and adopt a different theological and philosophical standpoint, especially, as it seems, with regard to the doctrine of transmigration. The first four añkhās are Vedantic, and of these the earlier two exhibit the philosophic doctrine of the dīnman, which is more or less familiar, and transcending the finite, the sympathetic worship of the gods. The third and fourth chapters may be regarded as the kernel of the treatise, in which is recorded the final teaching of the Upanisads. It is in its essential character characteristic of the Brhadāranyaka. In reply to questions addressed to him Yājñavalkya with elaborate detail and subtilety expounds the metaphysical doctrine of Brahman or the dīnman, which ideally is the infinite, undivided, and not merely a type under whose shelter many convergent thoughts and reasonings have found expression, Yājñavalkya may claim a place with the greatest thinkers of the world of any age.

The earlier chapters of the first añkhā are to a large extent occupied with symbols and fanciful plays upon words. Mṛtyu, or death, is at the beginning of things and produces successively the creation, speech, light, the sky, the earth, etc. The whole is explained as intended to promote the worship of Vīra. The third chapter to the Šudra Brāhmaṇa, representing under the form of a contest of the dīnman and asuras in song (adyātīth) the antagonism of good and evil. The ārtī describes the last of the senses in turn, but are themselves overcome by the agency of prāna, or the breath, and victory remains with the dīnman. The passage is too long to quote, but is a good example of the allegorical method of the Upanisads. In the fourth and following chapters various cosmological theories and processes, more or less fanciful, are set forth, consisting of the fundamental assertion of the unity of the self (dīnman) with the triad nama, rūpa, kāya; the name, the body, the spirit; of which are given rich speech, subhāsas (the eye), and dīnman, i.e., the bodily or lower self. "Thus being a triad is one, that self (dīnman) is three; it is that in which all dualism is divided; therefore is it immortal, guarded (covered) by the true. Prāna (breath) is the same as the name, the dīnman (or form) are the true; by these is the breath guarded." Following upon the teaching of the first añkhā, the second expresses the knowledge of the higher knowledge, the higher self, the self in the dīnman with which the last paragraph of the first añkhā seems to form a complete whole. The first chapter of the Brhadāranyaka a substance also in Kaye, iv., is remarkable in that it represents a Brahman as seeking enlightenment from a ruler of Kṣatriya race, Aśvatātra of Benares (Kāśi), who refutes his erroneous conceptions of the Brahman and makes known to him the real truth concerning the nature of the dīnman. This representation of the dependence of a Brahman upon Kṣatriya instruction is usually understood and probably rightly, to be indicative of an early condition of Indian society, in which the Brahmans did not hold the practical monopoly of all knowledge which was there in later times; they were equalled or surpassed by members of the warrior caste. The discussion makes free use of metaphor and simile, and many passages present difficulties of interpretation. In the first chapter Charaṇa, a Brahman, then proceeds to the definition of the dīnman which is the first of the dīnman. The substance is given to him by his guru, the master of the art of self-knowledge, who, in turn, a higher master is given to him, and so on, until the true nature is then explained under the figure of profound slumber (snyata); the sleeper is at rest, unconscious, no longer subject to any external disturbance or influence. "From that dīnman all prānas (senses), all worlds, all dīrmans, all creatures proceed. The secret (āntā) "this is the truth." The "truth" (aditya samstāna, or the reality of the reality," i.e., the most essential reality). The prānas are the true, of them he (the dīnman or Brahman) is the translation; he is two, material and immaterial, mortal and immortal, the latter being the dīnman (sāntapatha), the first that and this, that, the real and the unreal. . . . Further, with regard to the dīnman this is the material, that the spiritual, the body (dīnman); this is the mortal, the permanent, the true. Of this material, this mortal, this permanent, the essence is the transcendent of the essence of the body. Breath, however, and the other within the body are
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immortal; this is the immortal, the impersonal, the īśwara; of this immortality, this impersonal, this īśwara, the essence is the purusa (person) in the right eye; for it is the essence of the īśwara. . . . Accordingly its significance (adhibhūta, inherent) and its characteristic (neti neti) is expressed by neti neti); and so on; but beyond this, that you say it is not so (īśwara), there is nothing further. Perhaps, however, is 'the reality of real' (neti neti neti); that is the senses (prajñā) are the real, and is their reality.

The fourth chapter expounds the doctrine of the true Brahmān, the all-comprehending and universal Self, in the form of a question, given by Yājñavalkya about abandoning the world for the life of a recluse, to his master Maitreya. The narrative is repeated with unimportant variations in iv., and the master Maitreya replied, 'What is the worth of me to that of me? I do not know immortal? What my lord knoweth declare to me.' . . . And Yājñavalkya said: 'There is no soul for the love of husband is the husband dear: but for the love of the self (ātman) the husband is dear. Not indeed for the love of the wife is the wife dear; but for the love of the self (ātman) the wife is dear.'

The same formula is then repeated for sons, wealth, cattle, the Brahmān and Kṛṣṇa, the worlds, gods (deva), Vedas, creatures.

‘Not indeed for the love of all is dear: but for the love of the self (ātman) is dear all. The self is indeed to be seen, to be heard, to be perceived, to be beheld, O Maitreya! When the self is seen the body, the senses, the mind, the ears, etc., will vanish. For wherever the Brahmān caste other than in the ātman (self) him the Brahmān caste rejects; who knows the Kṛṣṇa caste other than in the ātman him the Kṛṣṇa caste rejects; who knows the other caste other than in the ātman him the other caste rejects; who knows the gods other than in the ātman him the gods reject; who knows the Vedas other than in the ātman him the Vedas reject; who knows the creatures other than in the ātman him the creatures reject; who knows everything other than in the ātman him the everything rejects. This Kṛṣṇa and Brahmān caste, these worlds and gods, these Vedas, all these creatures, this self is all.

As the sea is the meeting-place of all waters, of all contacts the skin, of all tastes the tongue, of all forms the eye, of all fragrances the nose, of all sounds the ear, of all scents the mind (vijñāna), of all sciences the intellect, of all actions the hands, of all productions the feet, of all communications the skin, there is no existence of these creatures (elements), into them it again vanishes; after death there is no existence.

‘For where there is as it were duality there one sees the other, smells the other, tastes the other, greets the other, hears the other, perceives the other, touches the other, knows the other, but where the self (ātman) alone is all this, how should be another, smell another, greet another, hear another, perceive another, touch another, know another? How should he know him whereby the self (ātman) is not? H. O, the ātman is not so; not; not (neti neti); incomprehensible for he is not comprehended, indestructible for he is not destroyed, unexhausted for he is not annihilated, un.signalized for he is not called by names, uncomputed for he is not counted, imperishable for he is not destroyed, impermanent for he is not destroyed, unessential for he is not destroyed, unaffected for he is not affected, unknown for he is unknown, unimpassioned for he is unmoved, unmodifiable for he is unmodified, unadulterated for he is unclouded, uncreated for he is not created, unformed for he is not shaped, uncoloured for he is uncoloured, unshaped for he is unshaped.

After a fifth chapter, in which the doctrine of Brahmān is set forth and elaborated under the symbol of honey (nāha), the world is the honeycomb (nāha-roopa, nāha-shālī), giving in succession the names of the teachers by whom the doctrine has been transmitted, leading up to Brahmān and Svayambhū the self-existent.

Apart from the divine or mythological origin to which the succession is traced it is impossible either to allude or to dispose of the correctness of the names given in these lists. It is sufficiently probable that the fame and names of the masters of the schools would be preserved within the schools themselves, and not likely that the lists are entirely due to imagination or invention. The presence of the records here would seem to indicate that the two adhyāyās once formed a separate whole, which has been more or less interpolated, and has been mixed with other parts of the book, in a single treatise. A similar list, coincident with this for two-thirds of its length, is found at the close of 1 Bhāṣya, i. iii.; cf. r. xv. 16, iv. 4, 10, 15, 15. It is difficult to tell how far these are the Śāṅkara terms which are employed. The ‘last’ and ‘trans- cendent’ (neti neti) is the extreme refinement of Upanisad teaching with regard to the higher Brahman of the birher Brähman, the fourth adhyāya, and a different and shorter grammatical scheme at the end of the Upanisad. There are variations also in the two recensions of the text.

The Yājñavalkya books, adhyāyās iii. and iv., begin with his acceptance of a challenge by King Janaka, which his other children had been unable to take up. In nine chapters questions on abstract and metaphysical problems touching the life after death and the nature of the self are put to him by his rivals, and by his successful dealing with these, his vindications and the claim to be the son of all. The ninth chapter concludes with a renewed challenge on the part of Yājñavalkya to meet any questions put to him, but no one ventures to presume the rôle of questioner. The book is in general introductory, asserting the authority and predominance of the great teacher, who is to expound the ultimate truth in the dialogue of the succeeding adhyāyas.

In the first chapter of the book King Janaka Vaidheha repeats various definitions of Brahmān that have been given to him, as speech (vṛddha), mind or will (prāna), the heart (ātman). Yājñavalkya has no difficulty in proving that these are imperfect explications, mental approximations to the truth, but not the truth itself. In the second and following chapters Yājñavalkya asserts the doctrine of inherent control, from which it is difficult or impossible to escape, of simile and metaphor. Brahmān is the purusa in the eye, the ātman in the ear, the neti neti, the self-illuminating (atman), is the true and only light, within the heart, self-illuminating (bhūmikā), is a better simile, self-illuminating (neti neti), is explained in the Vedas as well.

There is then a father not a father, a mother not a mother, the worlds not worlds, the gods not gods, the Vedas not Vedas.

Then a thief is not a thief . . . mendicant not a mendicant, a hermit not a hermit; unexuded by good, unexuded by evil, he has then purveyed the divine favors of the the gods.

Though he then sees not, yet is he seeing, though he sees not; for there is no interruption of seeing for the Seer, because he is pure and imperishable; and is one, and is unique, and is not divided into parts of from him, that he could see.

A similar assertion is made with regard to the senses of smell, taste, speech, hearing, thought, sensation or touch, knowledge; all designed to show that the affirmations and predicates of ordinary life are meaningless when applied to the ātman:

There where as is it were another, then would one see the other, smell the other, taste the other, address the other, hear the other, think the other, feel the other, know the other. A solitary ocean is the Seer, without a second (ekadis.), that is the Brahman-world, O King.2

The fourth chapter further illustrates and explains the nature of the ātman, the fifth is the instruction to Maitreya, as in iv., and the sixth and last chapter of the adhyāyas give the ātman.

The fifth adhyāya opens with an invocation, asserting the twofold nature of the ātman, the mind, and the external air-filled space. There follows the well-known parable of Prājñāpati and his disciples.

The three (races) of Prājñāpati's sons, gods, men, and asuras, lived as students of their father Prājñāpati. Their period of studentship finished, the gods said: 'He pleased to tell us, sir.' He said to them this syllable Da. Have you understood?" he said. "We have understood," they said. "'You have understood.'" Yes, he said, 'you have understood.'

Then the men said to him: 'He pleased to tell us, sir.' He said to them this syllable Da. Have you understood?" he said. "We have understood," they said. "'You have understood.'" Yes, he said, 'you have understood.'

This same divine voice, the thunder, repeats Da Da Da, that is, Subdue yourselves, Be generous, Be merciful. Therefore should these three be enjoined, self-restraint, generosity, mercy.

The further chapters of the book relate for the most part to the question which are more or less adequate representations of the truth. The most interesting is the exposition of the four feet (pada) of the ātman of the Brähmanas. Each foot has a special meaning. The one foot (daśarūpa) is the right foot (dhyāna) symbolizes the bright or shining one, the sun or the purusa in the sun. The last chapter of the adhyāya of Aditya, or the sun, repeated in Vịṣṇu, Up. xvii–xviii.

1 Bhāṣya, i. iii. 22 f. 2 Bhāṣya, i. ii. 31 f. 3 Adi. iii. xxii. 10, v. xxxix. 1; cb. vi. iii. 6.
The sixth and final adhyāya is khôṣā, additional or supplementary. It supplies little new information or teaching, and is in parts even more highly metaphorical and difficult. The usual routine is followed, and Nachiketas is moved to anxiety, thus Yājñavalkya's authority is claimed for some at least of the instruction offered.

(c) It is hardly necessary or worth while to follow through in similar detail the Čhandogya, which shares importance with the Brhadāraṇyaka as the most ancient written source of Upanisads. It has been divided into eight chapters, or prājyāsaktas, not all of which are parts of the original treatise. There has been combination, adaptation, and insertion; but no data are available for determining the changes that have been made or for restoring the primitive form. The additions or interpolations are probably more numerous than the losses.

The treatise is highly charged with symbolism. Meditation on the sacred syllable Om is enjoined, which is the essence (rāṣā) of all things, and is the udgīthā, on which in its successive forms as prāṇa, nāth, etc., the deus meditate in their rivalry with the ausaras. Om is the immortal impulse (śakti), a name, or, in accordance with prāṇa, prapāṇa, or the udgīthā, to the syllables of which a symbolical interpretation is given.

(c) The Katha or Kāthako Upanisad is placed by many authors, and perhaps with reason, among the ancient metrical Upanisads. It belongs to the literature of the Black Yajurveda, of which the Kaṭhas formed a well-known school; and it is perhaps the best-known of the Upanisads, having been rendered into English by Rühmohlen Iyoy in the early part of the 19th century. Since that date many editions and translations have been published. Its historical and literary affinities are not easy to determine. Dampier's critical evidence of direct dependence of the Īṣa- and Śvētāvatara Upanisads upon the Kaṭhā; and that the Śvētāvatara has exercised an indirect and less powerful influence upon the two other members of the group, the Muṇḍaka and Mahāmārāṇya. The general classification may be accepted, but the details of interrelationship are still very obscure.

The text of the Upanisad consists of two adhyāyas or six sūtras, the first three of which contain the story of Nachiketas and the three gifts which he obtained from Death, the all-knower. The fourth sūtra is a further exposition by Death of the Brhāman, a polemical answer against pluralism. In the fifth and sixth sūtras the atman or Brhāman is described under various figures or metaphors, the one Self and lord, all-comprehending, self-existent, the eternal thinker. They who discern the Self within are wise and secure to themselves eternal happiness and peace. The legend of Nachiketas is found also in the Brhāmava of the Black Yajurveda, and is there explanatory of a well-known religious rite. To judge from analogy, the myth was probably invented to account for the existence of a rite which bore this name, the original circumstances or foundation of which had been forgotten.

Nachiketas is the son of Vājṣāraṇa, a religious householder, who at the call of religion is represented as making the voluntary sacrifice of all his worldly possessions (sānyāsa) in order to provide for his spiritual interests. The name perhaps signifies 'annointed,' 'unobserved,' and was designed, as in many names, to produce an effect, to cause those who heard it to think of inconspicuous, and 'unobserved' by the watchful powers of evil. Vājṣāraṇa distributes all his goods in alms, and Nachiketas, knowing that the sānyāsa of the father involves the giving away of the son also, is anxious to learn his fate. He chooses to be guided by Nachiketas, signifying thereby that filial relations and claims have thenceforward no meaning to him, and is taught that the Self, in the turn of the sānyāsa, takes the answer literally, and goes off to the house of Yama, where he stays for three days, and in the absence of the master of the house is left without entertainment. Yama is so annoyed that a Brähman guest has been thus inhospitably treated, and follows him, teaching him, and thus Nachiketas learns that his father's fate may be overcome, and that he may be moved to kindness and sympathy towards him. The second request is for an explanation of the fire-sacrifice, the ritual of which Yama reveals and promises that it shall henceforth be bear his name, the Brhāman, it is a knowledge and Nachiketas may have correct and right, and the sacrifice should be performed. However, that is difficult arises with the third boon: 'When a man is dead, there is a doubt—some say he is, others he is not. This I would fain know, taught by thee. This is the third gift that I choose.'

'Heresy or heretical talk old have been in doubt. Hard to understand and reconcile is this subject. Choose another boon, Nachiketas; do not urge me, excess words.'

'Though the gods have here been in doubt, and thou thyself, O Death, hast acknowledged it to be hard to understand. Hard to believe as it seems; no other boon is comparable to this.'

'Choose long-lived sons and grandsons, cattle in plenty, elephants, gold, and horses; choose rich possessions on the soil, and life for thyself as many years as thou wilt.'

'If there is no doubt in the knowledge in these the spirit—wealth and long life. Be lord over the wide earth, Nachiketas; I grant thee command over all desires.

Whatever desires are difficult to realize here below, ask according to thy will—liberal medium with his chariot and music, not to be envied by any man, give them to him, Nachiketas. Ask me not, Nachiketas, concerning death.'

'What produce is this? All produce which, O Death, are est above, or long life and industry and indulgence and pleasure? That, O Death, which doubts rule here below, declare to us what will be in the great Hereafter. No other boon does Nachiketas choose than that which unlocks this mystery.'

Yama is under the necessity of yielding; and he begins by congratulating Nachiketas on his preference for knowledge rather than wealth or pleasure. But he is not an easy way:

'Though anxiously sought it is not to be gained when taught by common men, and without a teacher access thereto there is none—so small that it eludes the grasp of the mind.

Reasoning will not find the way, but taught by another one is easily learnt. It is thine now: a true seeker art thou; an inquirer such as thou is to be desired.'

The exposition then begins with the identification of the sacred syllable Om (q.v.) with the Brhāman. It is one of the most commonly chosen metaphors of the Upanisad writers:

'This syllable is the Brhāman, this syllable is the Self; he who knows this syllable, whatever he wishes is his.'

The text then sets forth in metaphysical terms the nature of the transcendent in the individual, and of his character which he may be known.

'The Self is Saccā, and does not die; he has no origin and no descent. Unborn, eternal, abiding is that Ancient One. He dies not, when the body dies. If the slayer determine as he slays, if the slain thinks himself slain, they both are in error; there is no slayer, and no slain.

Smaller than the great, smaller than the great, the Self is concealed here in the heart of the creature. Free from desire and from grief, his senses subdued, a man sees the majesty of the Atman.

Sitting he moves fast; lying he goes everywhere. That god of joy and not-joy who save himself he does not know to save.

Ridless in the bodies, changeless in the changing, the wise man discerns the atman, great, all-pervading, and is saved from sorrow.

Not by dissertation nor by wisdom nor by much sacred lore is that atman ever attained; only by him who chooses in him to be gathered; to him the atman discovers his own being.

He who has not devised from evil, who is restless, ill-content, whose mind is not, who has no knowledge cannot gain him.

Him to whom Brhāman and Kṛtaśrī are alike indifferent, and death would not come by reason, who could not find him?'

In the third sūtra the Self, the highest Brhāman, is the charioteer sitting in the chariot (the body). boddhi (intellect) guides the car (the mind), sorrow, rūpa (the senses), the horses, the objects of sense the road on which they travel:

1 Chhāndū, Up. v. i. 1; Kauṇ. Up. p. iii, iv. iii; Prāśna Up. p. iii.
3 In i. 8; see SBS xv. p. xxii f.; Deussen, p. 292 f.
Sāṅkara wrote a commentary upon it. The relation of the individual and the universal Self is asserted and discussed from an entirely Vedântic point of view. On this basis, however, were superimposed the later and sectarian systems of the chief and doctrine, which introduced freely the dogmas of the sects, and even the names of sectarian divinities. Sāṅkâra and Yoga conceptions also, intermingled and reiterated, and in some parts predominated over the principles of the Vedânta.

The Upaniṣads therefore Sāṅkara does not reduce to himself, and even greater explanation and analysis. Its modes change too rapidly to be fixed and indexed. The text also is in many instances corrupt, and out of various readings, which seem to be more or less conjectural, it is sometimes only possible to select that which appears to give a tolerable sense.

The treatise begins with an interpolation and a challenge: What is the cause of the universe? and is it to be found in the entities at the beginning of the creation or in the eternal Brahmā? Or are there two kinds of eternal beings, one of which is only the highest, the other the entire world?—the former is Brahmā, the latter the universe. And who is the one who is the highest of the two, and who is he who is the creator of the world?—the former is Brahmā, the latter the universe. And what is the name of this Brahmā?—there is no name by which he is known. There is no name by which he is known. He is the highest of all, the whole, the one who is the cause of the world.

The first seven verses of the second adhyāya are a hymn in praise of Sâńkâra made up for the most part of texts from the Vâjasaneyas and Taittirîya Sâṅkhilas. The rest of the chapter is written in the style of a Yoga, adoration of the god who is above and behind all phenomena.

The opening of the third adhyāya again is sectarian; Rudra is creator, sustainer, lord of all. The (imperative) Brahmâ is higher than all, and those who know the great purûya, shining as the sun beyond the darkness, are immortal. The purûya is the incarnate Self (âtman).

Without hands or feet he grants and moves, eyeless he sees, various he hears. He knows what can be known, but none knows him; he is the name purûya, the first, the great. Smaller than him is the sun-god, the greatest of all, which, exalted in the heart of the creator. Passionless, by the grace of the creator one sees him unmoved (akrtvam, lit. without will). Deussen, or synopsis of the Brahmâ, the great lord, the unaging Ancient, the self of all, all-pervading, omnipresent; for him Brahman, Brahmâ, the one who is identified with all, who is known by the Vedas, the eternal, creator of all, dwelling in the heart of him:

"Of him there is no image whose name is Great Majesty. His form is not visible, none ever sees him with the eye. They who with heart and mind know him thus dwelling in the heart become immortal." 

The section ends with a brief prayer to Rudra.

The fifth adhyâya contains teaching on the two themes of knowledge and ignorance, of the means of deliverance from the latter, and of the Brahmâm as transcending all. He manifests himself in various ways, 'migrating through his own works,' and is seen only in this and not in any shape, he appears to many, as knowing his own form, manifest under many forms. In the sixth and last adhyâya neither nature nor time is the source of all, but Brahman alone. He is the beginning and cause of all, the one god, hidden in all beings, without parts or attributes, immortal, the lord, protector and ruler of all, the universe. This is the word which is the universe in the Vedânta, not to be communicated to one who is unworthy.

6. History of doctrine.—It would seem, therefore, that the characteristic central doctrine of the Upaniṣads, the doctrine of Brahmâ or the âtman, was at first developed and systematized within Kârttikeya, as Kârttikeya andâtman was the central and controlling idea of the Vedânta, as the word kârttikeya was always occupied by the term kârttikeya, as'what is occupied by a name is always occupied by the word. This combination of royal functions with the mood of a philosopher or a poet was not unfamiliar to Oriental experience. The Brahmâ, on the other hand, occupied himself almost exclusively with...
the ritual and the securing of his class ascendance; and only later adopted a doctrine of the universe which had been formulated on the other hand, but which harmonized with his modes of thought, and lent itself readily to his schemes for the establishment of his own predominance on the basis of secret or superior knowledge. The reference to the Kaṭṛtya Brahman was, if possible, monopolized by him, but which had not been in accord with the facts. Probably also the doctrine and several duties of the átmanas (p.c.), whether widely practised or not, afforded an opening and facilities for the assimilation of the new knowledge. In later times the position was reversed, and with the establishment of intellectual and class pre-eminence the Brahmanas confirmed their claim to a monopoly of the supreme wisdom; and this was conceded to them the more readily as the other castes became more and more immersed in political intrigue or business enterprise. In the issue, by perseverance and the skillful use of circumstances at Brahmanas secured the first place in knowledge as in honour, and were regarded as the depositories of the secrets of wisdom and right instruction.

This highest and most treasured teaching, for which divine authority was claimed, was formulated as the cardinal doctrine of the Upanisads literature, an idealistic monism, which consisted essentially in the assertion that all is one, 'one only without a second,' and as a necessary corollary that the material universe as it manifests itself to and is approached through the bodily faculties is an ill (maya). Only Brahman, the unknown Self (ātman), is in possession of a real existence. Brahman, moreover, is an abstract impersonal neutral, not an individual or masculine. The attribute of personality, as all other attributes, is denied to him, and he or 'it' can only be defined, if such may be called definition, by negatives (neti neti). The human self, the self of the living being (ātman or jīvātman), is subject to delusion only so far as it imagines itself to be an individual, distinct from all other selves. In reality it is itself the supreme Self (ātman), identical with Brahman; there are not two or many selves; but Brahman and every so-called individuality in this world, and the same. There is no 'difference,' in the realm of true understanding and insight. 'One only without a second' (ekdvēdyam) expresses the ultimate thought and the fundamental postulate of the speculation of the Upanisads; or, as the doctrine has been formulated by Deussen and others in the form of an equation which summarizes Upanisad teaching in this respect,

Brahman = ātman.

The formula is not of course due to or used by the authors of the Upanisads themselves.

8. Secondary teaching. This idealistic and monistic doctrine of the self or reality of Brahman underlies all the teaching of the Upanisads. Although not peculiar to the Indian literature, it is there developed in its most complete form and carried to its utmost logical conclusion. A considerable portion, however, of these treatises expounds what is generally known as the doctrine of the lower Brahman, a compromise or concession to the views and the presuppositions of the universe as stable, for all practical purposes permanent, conditioning his daily life, limiting and satisfying his outlook upon reality. This teaching was thus accorded to those only, who were incapable of comprehending and using the higher knowledge, whose mind worked within the limitations imposed by the faculties of the body. For these there was constructed or traditionally maintained a cosmological doctrine. Thus Brahma appears as the creator of a real world, which is then informed, sustained, and its working ensured by his universal and vitalizing presence.

In this sense the attempts at speculating on the doctrine which has no existence apart from him, and will ultimately be resolved or cease to be, returning into the source from which it came. Brahma therefore in the cosmological theory of the Upanisads, is regarded in his capacity as the unchangeable and does not contain or convey the secret of the highest knowledge, becomes individualized, endowed with properties and capacities, and an apparent or provisional reality is allowed to the universe and to the souls therein. The human ātman or jīvātman possesses a measure of freedom and individuality of its own, it thinks and determines, and of its own free and enlightened will promotes its return to the paramount, the supreme soul in which it was derived. Thus far therefore the Upanisads may be said to contain the germs at least of a real theism. It is for the most part in the later and comparatively later speculations in the 'Sāṁkhyā, the doctrine of the idealism of the ātman doctrine, tentatively harmonized with the latter and subordinated to it in the Upanisad teaching. All things would ultimately return to their primitive source, and their impermanent and unreal character would be made manifest. Thus the higher doctrine or faith was conserved under the forms and as the ultimate truth of the later doctrine.

9. Psychology. To the same secondary teaching belongs the psychological doctrine of the Upanisads, so far as these treatises may be said to present a consistent or coherent doctrine concerning the human soul. It is evident that this teaching also is derived from external sources, originally independent, and only artifically and with difficulty accommodated to the fundamental presupposition of Upanisad thought. Where all souls are one, and there is no difference, there is no room and no need for a psychology. On the lower plane of teaching, however, souls created by or emanating from Brahman are in a certain sense distinct and individual, and it is from the recognition of distinctness is ultimately due to maya and to maya alone. Some provision therefore must be made for their return, their final and universal reunion with Brahman, if a permanent duality was to be avoided. The last alternative as a solution of the mystery of the soul's nature and existence did in fact find expression in some of the Upanisads in premonitions and intimations of the later doctrine of the Sākhyas, which is avowedly dualistic. In general, however, the psychological teaching expounds two independent themes or subjects—the states of the soul, and the means or methods of its return. No definite connexion is made between these, or any relation suggested. They are due to different systems of thought, and no attempt apparently is made or regarded as necessary to co-ordinate them. The latter doctrine, including especially that of the two paths, is closely related to the wider doctrine of predestination.

The four conditions or states of the soul are: (1) the waking state; (2) dream-sleep, in which the soul remains conscious and active in its dreams; (3) dreamless slumber, snánapa, snánapa, in which the soul is as passive, and for those only, who were incapable of comprehending and using the higher knowledge, whose mind worked within the limitations
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is unknown to the older Upānisads. It was perhaps invented to secure or complete the correspondence with the four āramas, the turiya being the sublime but undefinable state to which the mahāyoga leads. The three earlier Upānisads derived also mystical names: vaidśārṇa, that which is common to all, the habitual mode or outlook of all men; taitāra, luminous, vigorous, intense; priyākta, intense, similar states or states familiar in the experience of European and other mystics.

But Here, cf. cf.: make in substance states sīvpti. one subject doctrine of far the parallels passes the lime mystical epirit. Chhdnd. 410.

In dream-sleep the soul fashions its own world in the imagery of its dreams, the spirit serves as light for itself. But the dreamer the scenes and experiences through which he passes in his dreams appear real, and in this his dream-world no other has part. The illusion of duality, however, is still maintained; there is one who knows and another that is known. In other passages the spirit is represented as quitting the body during the dream-sleep and wandering hither and thither, returning sometimes only with difficulty to its accustomed home.

In the third state all distinct consciousness of knowing subject and known object is superseded, the human spirit is one with the eternally knower, the supreme intelligence, priyākta ātman. In the teaching of the earlier Upānisads this is apparent, for the whole universe is held to be in an eternal union with Brahman. "When a man has fallen so sound asleep, and has so passed over from his body, that he knows no dream-image, that is the Self, that is the immortal, the fearless, that is Brahman." 2

The introduction of a fourth state appears to have been based upon a recognition of the transitory character of the suppliant. The number is increased, and the spirit of the suppliant may then return to the waking state in which it is troubled and anxious, and the external visible universe is regained. The object of knowledge when the three states of the mind have ceased, and the spiritual subsists alone by itself, contrasted as a spectator with all the things as a substance undifferentiated, set free from all existing things, this spiritual state is called the turūpa. 

The introduction of a fourth state appears to have been based upon a recognition of the transitory character of the suppliant. The number is increased, and the spirit of the suppliant may then return to the waking state in which it is troubled and anxious, and the external visible universe is regained. The object of knowledge when the three states have ceased, and the spiritual subsists alone by itself, contrasted as a spectator with all the things as a substance undifferentiated, set free from all existing things, this spiritual state is called the turūpa. In this state the divine spirit has union with the Brahma. This, however, is not to return by any return to a lower condition; nor does it interfere with or destroy the memory of a time in any of the illusory activities of ordinary life. Worldly duties and employments do not affect the soul that is one with Brahman.

10. Eschatology.—The Indian doctrine of the two paths, the deva-yána and the pitṛyána, the way of the gods and the way of the fathers, by one or the other of which the souls of the dead make their way from this world to a future abode of happiness or misery, presents easily recognized parallels to similar teaching in other faiths. That the theory of the independent existence of the soul in India admits of little doubt. Later it was elaborated and brought into close association with the kindred doctrine of transmigration and was then carried far by wandering Indian missionaries; and in this way it may have interested and influenced the beliefs of other peoples, especially the Mithraic teaching concerning the ascent of the soul to the highest heaven. As early as the Rgveda reference is made to the deva-yána as the path by which Agni bears the offerings to the gods, and on which the gods themselves descend to partake of the sacrifices. On the same road the faithful worshipper ascends through successive stages or 'stations' to the highest felicity in Brahman. The passages in the Upānisads which enumerate the 'stations' give no indication of the origin of the theory, nor attempt to explain its meaning or purpose. The earliest is probably Chhdnd. IV. XV. 51:

He (who knows this) . . . (after death) goes to light (arśka, brightness), etc. to day, etc. from day to day, from day to the light half of the moon, from the light half of the moon to the six months of the sun's northward movement, from the month of the first to the month of the second year to the two months after, and from the moon to the moon, from the moon to the lighting. Thereupon an unerringly correct guidance conducts him to Brahma. They who proceed thereby do not return to the changing life of man. 1

The pitṛyána, on the other hand, is the way of darkness, for ignorant and defiled souls, and progress is marked by analogous but contrary stations; e.g., the dark half of the moon is substituted for the light half, etc. Those who travel on this road do not reach the goal, but are born in the moon till their karma is exhausted, after which they return to earth, and are again subject to rebirth.

But those who in a village fulfil their religious duties and give alms (i.e. gṛhastha) go to the smoke, from the smoke to the moon, from the dark half of the moon to the six months of the sun's southward movement. They do not attain to the year. From the months they go to the world of the fathers (pitṛloka), from the world of the fathers to the other, from the other to the moon. They ascend to the wind (vāyu). Having become wind (i.e. gṛhastha) becomes smoke, having become smoke becomes vapour, having become vapour becomes cloud, having become cloud becomes cactus in rain, and exists as such rice or corn, herbs or trees, seashore or boats . . . They who have lived a good life in this world will be a reward attain a good rebirth, they who have lived a life of misery, they who in this world have lived a shameful life will attain a shameful rebirth. That is a pigr or an ostracized subject. 2

There is thus in the Upānisads tentative if somewhat indefinite teaching with regard to the fate of the soul at and after death. Two conceptions were thus involved, with the probability originally independent and belonged to different orders of ideas. Neither of them was due in its inception to the thinkers of the Upānisads, but both were derived from external and pre-existing sources. The thought of a return of the soul to the earth, to be embodied again in human or animal form, or even in the form of an insect or plant, is common to nearly all primitive peoples, and is undoubtedly of great antiquity. The distinct thought of a recompense of felicity or suffering in another world for the deeds done upon earth is neither universal nor so old. It has usually been accepted as an alternative to the earlier view of the soul's future destiny, superseding or displacing but not amalgamating with it. The contribution which the Upānisads thinkers made was in effect to combine these ideas by transferring the retribution from an other world to the future existence in the known and visible present, and by asserting the precise equivalence of the recompense after death to the deeds, good or evil, of the earthly life. Thus all the elements of the Indian doctrines of karma and transmigration are found in the oldest Upānisads. They obtain here their final and fullest expression. No evidence or proof, however, is offered in support of these theories, nor is there any reference given to previous history or development, which might explain or justify the statements made. They are supported, as is all the teaching of the Upānisads, by an appeal to the authority of eminent teachers of the past. It seems strange that no attempt should be made to fortify so important a doctrine as transmigration by reference to analogy, or to a wider and reasoned view of life as a whole. They are simply recorded as the definite and complete statement of the final destiny of the soul.

11. Summary.—Thus a very considerable part of this literature is occupied with ideas that belong to the lower Brahman, and are avowedly inferior to the ultimate and supreme truth that Brahman is all in all. They are half-truths, 1 SES. I. 69; cf. Chhdnd. v. I. 11. 12, Brah. v. I. 12, Kaus. ii. 3. 2 Chhdnd. v. x. 31. SES. I. 69. 3: Deussen, p. 234 f. and references.


2 [On the soul see besides the Upan., and the references there given. Deussen regards the introduction of the turiya as due to the influence of the Yoga doctrine, which involved the belief that by intense meditation, abstinence, and self-control the union of the human spirit with the one eternal spirit might be secured.
guiding and controlling the practical life of the universe, which lose interest and significance when it is understood, in an absolute and self-sufficient manner. It is undoubtedly older in India than the period of the Upanisads, and gives expression to the austere quality which is native apparently to some forms of Indian religious life. The Upanisads, moreover, never seem to have been logically or otherwise, what is called a system; in fact, it is a collection of disconnected prose poems, each uttered as a kind of theocentric prophecy, at a moment when the speaker's religious experience was at its peak.

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of flocks and herds being at least 200 per cent per annum, that of crops in the fertile soil of Meso-

damia at least 400 to 500 per cent, the rate of interest was excessively high according to our stan-
dard. But security from loss by misfortune or disorder, must have led to a rapid increase of wealth. A fortunate possessor

must soon have owned more than he could possibly provide for. He was bound to employ others as shepherds or labourers merely to preserve his property. Unless he could command the services of slaves or subjects, he had to pay for such services. He might, and in Babylonia usually did, allot a portion of his flock to some shepherd to tend, demanding back after the pasturing and breeding season, his own again with a stipulated rate of increase, which we may loosely call usury. He might let out his farm or part of it to husband-
men, demanding a stipulated share of the crops, and leaving the rest as wages for the labour expended. Whether this constituted usury or not may depend on whether the amount demanded as return from the labourer bore a more or less reasonable relation to the average crop likely to be obtained. The reasonability of the trans-
action depended upon many considerations which would not be said to the present day. In cases where a man's former prosperity had enabled him to realize his profits in the more stable form of money, he might lend that money as an accommodation to one who had less or even none, on the understanding that he was to receive again his own with usury, but where to draw the dis-
tinction between fair interest and usury must depend, not only on the custom of the country; but also on the yield it might reasonably be expected to produce when invested directly in agriculture or farming. So long as the return for the accommodation which a creditor demanded kept well within the naturally expected profit to be made by the borrower, both were sharers in the benefits brought about by the accommodation. The abuses which might constitute usury arose by a demand for excessive return or by failure to accept responsibility and share in the unavoidable loss which fell on the borrower. It must early have occurred to the lender to demand security for his loan. But in an early established custom the person of the debtor was held as security. This personal security extended over all the borrower's posses-
sions. The debtor who failed to pay had to work off his debt by selling his land, or his cattle. It was not fair that the members of his family should be called upon to help him to discharge his debt. Thus he might assign any or all of his family—wife, children, or slaves—to work off his debt. This was to their advantage as much as to his, for they were thus secure of a living, though precluded from the profit of their labour, while, if he was bankrupt, he had no means of providing for them any more than for himself.

But the situation was full of possibilities of oppression, and the rich or prosperous man would soon have become master or partial owner of his poorer brethren indebted to him. So long as such a master treated his dependents fairly, and the land was secure from foreign conquest, a few rich men with a large industrious body of well-treated servants, certain of adequate maintenance, might well constitute a prosperous community. But the raids made in war, the spoliation of the rich man's capital, or the failure of a crop must have reduced the condition of the tenants. They might have been 

seen that an overworked or underfed population would grow discontented and so be unreliable in case of invasion to maintain the security of the land against foreign aggression. Hence legisla-
tion was introduced to check the abuses which might lead to an undue exploitation of labour by capital. The celebrated Code of Hammurabi, the best-
known body of legislation dealing with the subject, which we must regard as the outcome of innum-
erable other attempts in the same direction, devotes a large part of its regulations to controlling the tendencies of the state of society to permit oppres-
sion by the exaction of unfair enforcement of the literal terms of what had been entered upon as a free contract. These regulations of the code are already dealt with in the art. LAW (Babylonian), vol. vii. p. 817, and may be briefly summarized here. When a debtor owed for rent or share of crops and was unable to pay by reason of the failure of the crops not due to his own negligence, he was allowed to postpone payment to the next year. It was not legal to insist on the payment of any debt in one special form of tender, though this was often specified in a contract. Produce was made legal tender in any case, thus obviating the difficulties which would arise if its value were low, or money scarce, and equalizing the variations of exchange. The right of a creditor to seize the person of the debtor or of his dependents, and hold him or them in servitude until the debt had been worked off, was an obvious opening for great abuse, but was modified by the Code. By its enactment that such service should not exceed ill-treatment and, in any case, extend beyond three years, it clearly eliminated much injustice. The text of the Code as treated in art. LAW (Babylonian) was not then complete; but a contemporary, or at least very early, copy from Nippur1 gives one of the lost sections enacting that, if a man borrow grain or money from a merchant and has not grain or money sufficient to repay him, he shall give the merchant whatever he has in his power in place of the debt that he owes in the presence of the city elders, and the merchant may not declare to accept it. This was a far-reaching enactment, and may be suspected of aiming specially at the enforcement of debts or at any rate to men not exactly neighbours. By far the larger number of debts of which we have any record were owed to the temples, which stood to the people in the relation of agricultural banks. Their advances were of the nature of fines forced to meet the steady scarcity at seed-time, or to meet the expense of harvest operations when the last year's produce had already become exhausted, though a fresh crop was now in sight. They were mostly for a short term with-

out interest, interest being demanded only in the case of delay to repay at the fixed time. Many of these temples were large land-owners, and also owned numerous flocks or herds. They, like other great owners, often farmed out the nucetar system, furnishing to their tenants seed, agricultural instruments, and working animals, while advancing wages in kind. The numerous records of temple transactions which have reached us, due to the recovery of large temple archives, may easily have distorted the picture that we are able to draw of social life at that period, but they must have dominated the general custom. The landlord on this system was bound by that custom and his own interest, as well as by humanity, to see that his debtor, who was his tenant, should not be oppressed or exploited, tending to paralyse his efforts for their mutual profit.

1 See ASL, April, 1915, p. 225.
that debt and the servitude to which it led were very common features of Babylonian society. It was further met by a general amnesty from capital or seisin-bailiffs, proclaimed by many a sovereign apparently to inaugurate his new reign, to secure popularity and encourage loyalty and thereby to achieve power to maintain his rule. The ability thus to double on fields the power over which the king had over temple revenues, as the temples were the chief holders of credit. Their responsibility to the citizens who sustained that credit was the last sight of the Lord. They were called upon to redeem members of their city who became captives in war if these were without means to redeem themselves. The temples were stewards of their wealth for the god who watched over the welfare of his people. The loss to certain members of debts unpaid was a loss to the community at large who had furnished the source of their wealth, but, as this was the result of prosperous years, it might fairly be taxed to equalize over a term of years the incidental losses due to accident or bad seasons, to the ‘hand of God,’ or to enemy action. To grant such an amnesty, which seems to have involved the release of those in view, the restoration of liberty to prisoners and hostages for debt, was regarded as an ‘establishment of equity’ and was the prelude to fresh legislation. It is not completely clear that this amnesty touched only those who were indebted to the very rich persons or the temples, which were naturally in the power of the king. If private indebtedness was cancelled, it is difficult to see how injustice to the private creditor was avoided. By what compensation should have received for the forfeit of his capital and interest.

Most writers on the subject appear to have regarded the rates of interest charged for loans as exorbitant, but the high interest is associated in all periods with oriental custom and economic conditions. The multiplication of capitalists and the competition between them for investments have reduced the rate of interest under modern conditions to what we regard as fair, but any national scarcity of raw material or capital is bound to raise the rate again. Practically the risk involved determines the rate charged for a loan. Professional money-lenders were then more rare, and had to take greater risks. The profits which a borrower was able to secure by actual trading or farming were so high that accommodation for interest was less attractive to the lender unless the rate was high.


USURY (Christian).—i. In the New Testament.—The words of Jesus contain allusions to borrowing and lending, but, as we should expect of one who refused to be a judge and divider (Lk 12:48), there are no direct precepts to guide the Christian conscience. Mt 22:34 and Lk 6:42 are but translations of an unchallenged exhortation of the spirit of charity.

The Parable of the Talents (Mt 25:14–30) and the Parable of the Pounds (Lk 19:11–27) allude to banking and interest, but in casual phrases, not in the pith and marrow of the teaching. Borrowing itself would be an evil if in that age and country, not so much of the commercial type, but more of the loose and personal kind, as between friend and friend, kinsman and kinsman. The shiftless Oriental is ready if at all conscienceless borrower, and the Syrian peasant who to-day loans out his earnings in petty usury doubtless had his like-minded début in his forefathers.

The ethic of these personal borrowings was adequately covered by the general principles enunciated by Jesus; there was no call, nor was it His method, to deal with usury as an economic and commercial factor.

What mattered for the future centuries was that by His life and example even more than by His words the great Master had suggested a certain attitude towards this activity. Himself reared among the poor and needy, He lived the life of a travelling teacher without home or material possessions; to those who left home and kindred and lands for His sake He had promised everlasting life (Mt 10:9); and to the rich young ruler, morally perfect though he claimed to be, He had given the arresting command to sell all and give to the poor (Mt 19:21). Among the slaves and the folk of the lower orders who formed the majority of the early converts such teaching was treasured and, it may be, unduly emphasized; its potency appears in the communist movement of Acts (4:32) and in the fact that the love of goods was regarded as a disqualification for the ear of the Christian society was the care of the poor. It is as but one phase of a general attitude to this world’s goods that we must explain the Church’s dislike of usury. In their simple, fraternal communities, with their pervasive atmosphere of kindly charity, the hard bargainer for gain was a chilling and unwelcome intruder, the personification of the spirit of the alien work without.

2. In the Fathers.—The early Fathers looked upon usury with severe disapproval. They may have been influenced in certain cases by the classical moralists, the determining standard for them was the OT legislation and the general principles of the NT teaching, more especially a strained interpretation of Lk 6:22. Tertullian, Cyril of Alexandria, and Clement of Alexandria accept as still binding on Christians the OT precepts (Ex 22:25; De 24:18; Ps 15:5, Exk 18), the first-named regarding the prohibition of interest as only a preparation for the higher demand of the Gospel to forgo even the capital; ‘Quo facultas assisserat honorem ipsi praebens ficta est fraudulenta miserae.’ Among the general prohibitions of the NT, Lactantius condemns it. The Fathers of the 4th and 5th centuries write to the same effect, only with a rising vehemence that suggests that the evil was increasing in decadent times. To Chrysostom, ‘It is evident that there is应在 the category of crime;’ Audent etiam foerestas dicere, non haboe alium vivere. Hoc nisi et latrocinium etopium in animis; esset autem dicere...et bonum...et malum...Basil and Gregory of Nyssa in their days, the spirit denounced the usurers as a breed of vipers that gnaw the wound that bears them.

The standpoint of the Fathers, however, is not to be explained as a mere narrow reading of Scripture: it is the view of men whose Christian conscience abhorred the exploitation of the defenceless and unfortunate. The practice of usury is regarded throughout this period not as an economic but as a moral question. Borrowing was still largely for the urgent personal needs of poor men who were fit subjects not for exaction but for charity. It was the soulless miser—living safely and meanly, gloating over his gains ill-gotten by pitilessly faramous and unremorseful. All men, who sat for the portrait of the usurer and drew the fire of the preacher. The Christian conscience was finely sensitive to the obligation of charity. Wealth was the gift of God, and man was but stewards, debtors, and not possessors.

1 See art. ‘Interest,’ in DCG.
2 G. M. Mackie, Bible Matters and Customs, London, 1898, p. 54.
3 C. Marc, iv. 17.
4 Test. iii. 48.
5 Strom. ii. 18.
7 Dio. Ins. Ins. vi. 18.
8 Paul. Ins. Ins. vii. 6 Dno mortui, xli. c. de Tobia, passim.
9 In Psalms, cxxxviii.
10 Hom. in Ps. xiv.
11 Ursula ($.c. Evararia.)
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'Understand then, ye rich, that ye are in duty bound to do service to him, who hath had more than ye yourselves need. Be ashamed of holding fast what belongs to others. Imitate God's equity and now shall be poor.'

This note struck in The Preaching of Peter is typical. To a teacher like Ambrose rights of property were a creation of avarice; charity or almsgiving was an act of simple justice. 2 In all this the Church is moving in the realm of precept and not of law. Although the notion of usury is in law distinguished between consumables (e.g., a loaf) and fungibles (e.g., a house). In mutumum the thing borrowed was for consumption; its whole value lay in its first use; the use and the substance were inseparable: an adequate compensation was made when an equal quantity was returned.

In this category money was ranked. When A borrowed money from B, his ownership over it was absolute; it was more than possessio, it was dominium; the process of exchange had the quality of a sale, and to sell an article and then charge for the use of it was unjust.

This was the decision of the canonist conscience; in itself the loan of money did not justify a charge for its use. In those days of limited opportunity for investment it was doubtless often a gain to the lender to agree to accept currently the money, so long as it was returned intact. And the Schoolmen were ready to face the logic of facts and to make allowance for special cases. The custom sprang up of admitting compensation on various extrinsic grounds.

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4. The Church had to reconsider her whole attitude to trade and economic practice. The old view that business was an evil, with its roots in covetousness, had to go. The interchange of goods by which men lived had to be accepted; only its methods must be morally examined. Christian principles had to be applied to the practical issues of life. The middle of the 12th century saw the publication of the Scholastic works of Thomas Aquinas. Even as he formulates his judgments on usury he has to make concessions, and, once one gap is made in the hedge of restriction, other gaps appear as the centuries pass, until

2. Endemans, Grundriss der ekonomische Lehrer, I. 2.
3. Council of Seaux (515), can. 55.
4. J. Ashley, An Introd. to English Economic History and Theory, I. 150.
5. They accepted the dictum of Aristotle, made familiar to us from The Merchant of Venice, that barren metal does more good than money. Money was increasingly used as a medium of exchange; the modern concept of capital had not been evolved. The fact was overlooked that the money borrowed could purchase, e.g., a cow, a corpse, or a.cross breed. This view is repeated by the Council of Aix-la-Chapelle (789), and by the 9th cent. ecclesiastical law becomes positive in extending the prohibition to the laity; bishops are to remit all Christians to private persons to obtain usury, and to punish the recalcitrant. Legislation thereon has changed its form to the usury laws, which are in the context.

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4. Legal and ecclesiastical law made the distinction that usury is forbidden only to the laity, and that a cleric who lends money is cut off from the communion of saints. The 2nd Council of Lyons (1274) went further, forbidding any community, corporation, or individual to permit the letting of houses to foreign persons. Spiritual penalties are reinforced by civil; by another canon the wills of unrepentant usurers were declared invalid, thus bringing usury definitely within the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts. The Council of Vienne (1311) brought matters to a climax, declaring that usury is a sin, as of no effect or branding as a heretic any one who partially held that usury was not sinful.

4. In the Middle Ages,—This growing stringency indicates the advance of a tide that could not be checked. 'Since in almost every place the crime of usury has become prevalent,' admits the canon of the 3rd Lateran. Significant is the concession made in favour of the Jews by the 4th Lateran; only vast sums of money were exempted from usury. By the 11th cent. commerce was finding new channels; towns were arising, markets opening, and thus problems of trade became urgent. Churchmen themselves needed large sums for building and for Crusades. This activity in the money market called for readjustments and new methods. The Church had to reconsider her whole attitude to trade and economic practice. The old view that business was an evil, with its roots in covetousness, had to go. The interchange of goods by which men lived had to be accepted; only its methods must be morally examined. Christian principles had to be applied to the practical issues of life. The middle of the 12th century saw the publication of the Scholastic works of Thomas Aquinas. Even as he formulates his judgments on usury he has to make concessions, and, once one gap is made in the hedge of restriction, other gaps appear as the centuries pass, until

5. A squar or drawing a fixed rent for a piece of land could transfer to another that right. Real productive property (ser frigilgs) was the indispensable basis for this contract; but the privilege was extended later to shops, toll-booths, etc., so that even the不由 trader and usurer could raise money to expand their business in this way.

6. The stay-at-home merchant could entrust his goods to an agent—e.g., a son of a trading ship—by keeping the share of the profit of the venture. This partnership assumed many forms. There were two conditions: (1) the partner remained the owner of his capital; and (2) he shared in the risk, thus earning a moral right to a share in the profits. In view of all these gaps in the hedge it is difficult to maintain that the ban on usury seriously hampered trade and commerce. Indeed, no schoolman or canonist would have tolerated a contract which

1 E.g., Thomas Aquinas, Summa, II. ii. qu. lxviii.
2 Politics, I. 3, 32.
3 Cf. Ashley, II. 397 f.
long to impede forces so potent as the trading instinct in man and the international necessity of commerce. The masses during these centuries still lived largely by agriculture and the primitive crafts. Hence, not only farmer and craftsman had a big margin of wealth to tide over ill-health or bad harvests or grievous taxation. In such conditions the petty usurer was a temptation and a snare, as he is to-day in similarly undeveloped communities — e.g., India and Egypt. Moreover, interest calculated per month, as was the system then in vogue, resulted in exorbitant charges. As the zealous guardian of the poor and the distressed, the Church was probably wise in keeping her hands off usury. Her policy was certainly a long step in advance of the pagan practice by which the debtor was suffered to fall to the status of a slave. After the flight of the barbarians, moreover, there was a period of chaos; commerce was stagnant rather than seeking for new outlets. What wealth an impoverished society possessed was swallowed up in the necessities of life; only after her recovery would there be free wealth for development, and that found open channels in partnerships and rent-charges. When capital was thus scarce and lending the monopoly of a few, unlimited freedom to impose interest led to violence and produced a social cancer in that unripe age. Further, the Church was not herself detached from the realities of the economic world. She was one of the largest holders of property and monies, and Churchmen, as stewards of that material wealth, were driven to find ways and means of investment. The lessons of their own practical difficulties were not lost on them, as in their experience of the mortes prioriter.

The Franciscans, with their sensitiveness to the needs of the poor, instituted at Orvieto (1463), Pernig (1467), and elsewhere thereafter a system by which man-funds with a small loan to the poor on the security of pledges. 'But, writes Ashley, 'even with papal patronage and the promise of spiritual and temporal advantages to those who should subscribe towards so charitable a work, the managers of the mortes found it necessary to make a small charge for the loan in order to cover working expenses.'

A wordy warfare followed between the various orders, resulting in the notable judgment of the Lateran Council of 1515 by which the mortes were allowed to levy moderate interest, provided their object was to cover working expenses and not to make a profit. Such a verdict could not fail to have far-reaching effect. The Church, which had resisted usury in the interests of the poor was now compelled to allow moderate interest to an institution which existed on behalf of the poor. The Council itself apparently felt that the question had reached a new phase, and re-defined usury thus:

"This is the proper interpretation of usury, when gain is sought to be acquired from the use of a thing not in itself fruitful (such as a rock or a field), without labour, expense or risk on the part of the lender."

The controversy on the triple contract in the 16th cent. also shows forces moving towards the admission of interest. A capitalist class was emerging—a process that was aided by the large profits made by traffic in Indulgences for which the Church herself was responsible. The powerful banking house of the Fuggers of Augsburg was behind John Eck who championed this method of investment at the University of Bologna in 1515, and John Major argued with energy in its favour.

Three different contracts with three different men were arranged by the Fuggers for the investment of their capital in the banking business of the Augsburg furriers: (1) a contract of partnership, (2) a contract of insurance, (3) a contract of insurance against fluctuation of profit. Could a merchant make all three contracts with one man? That meant that his capital was guaranteed to increase. Was this the case?

At Bologna there was no decision. Yet the campaign taken up by Major and others might have achieved success but for the wave of reaction that came with the counter-reformation. Liberal opinion was swamped, and a reversion was made to the position of 1513, when the Practica of Sixtus v. (1586), which revived the sternest condemnation of usury as 'detestable to God and man, as condemned by the sacred canons, and as contrary to Christian charity.'

5. The Reformation and usury. The yoke of authority was broken by the Reformation and it was inevitable that in the freer atmosphere of Protestantism the binding strictures on usury should be cast off. Not that that process was unopposed. On the contrary, the removal of the Church's ban only showed how strong was the popular sentiment against the practice; witness Martin Luther's earlier deliverances on the subject. These are not the scientific judgments of the theologian, but rather the utterance of a son of the people, feeling keenly that oppression at the hands of the nobles and rich city merchants which led to the peasants' rebellion; there was also in the case his Christian fury against the Jewish usurers' ensnaring of his fellow-believers. His zeal for moral reform tended to swing him back towards the strictures of the Fathers. He called on ministers to preach against usury (1540). In more reasoned mood, however, in cases where the participators are not poor, he allows rent-charges on real land and interest that compensates for actual loss (damnum emergens and lucrce cessiones), provided the charge is moderate (four or five florins to the hundred).

Melanchthon professes to accept the traditional, Scriptural prohibitions. But a practical guiding consideration to his mind is whether the usury is so moderate as to have a disintegrating effect on the commonwealth, a consideration forced upon him doubtless by his study of classical times.

'Societas civilis non potest esse perpetua cum non servatur aequalitas . . . Exauritur ergo altera pars et non servatur aequalitas, si servari ostendit ut concasse fuerant immoediatae usares. . . .'

He allows a payment 'supra sortem,' not only in cases of damnum emergens and lucrce cessiones to those engaged in lucrative trade, but even where there is no damnum emergens, provided always the interest is moderate: 'Licit stipulare de eo quod interest etiam ante moram.'

It was left to Calvin, however, to finally open the sluice, and that, too, with a mood of suspicion intention behind part. His standpoint is really the same as that of his contemporaries.

Only he wrote to 10000 guards a guaranteed opinion, the substance of which was seized on and the reservations slurred over. The expression opposed was not for everybody. He hesitated to make any concession, feeling on the one hand, that to condemn usury altogether was to impose restrictions severer than the Lord Himself desired, and, on the other hand, that, if he yielded an inch, some would take an acre. And what he feared came to pass.

1 The Catholic Church has been slow to give official sanction to usury. As late as 1682 in the Juxta Perfectionis, Justinian II., follows canonist lines. Not till 1839 did the Holy Office allow, in a particular case, that interest could lawfully be taken for money lent by such people who were in lucrative trade. Cf. J. M. Harty, 'Historical Evolution of the Catholic Teaching on Usury,' in Irish Theol. Quarterly, iv. (1910) 17.

2 Sermons, 1510, 1524.

3 Letter against the Selbans, 1534.

4 O. Schnell (Vaterlandischen Mannes in Deutschland wahrend der Reformationsteil, Tubingen, 1881, p. 1194.

5 Hase divina testimonia ampesturam et scilicet usus variis discipulis (De Contradictione [Opera], ed. E. H. Bindels, Amsterdam, 1775, p. 84.)

6 Hb. in Pii 158; 'Scilicet ergo contractus omnes quibus alter ex alterius damnum lucrume liquide capitum quocumque tandem nomine vestriantur damnari'; cf. Sermon in De off. zuili.

7 Bull. Comm. in Pii 158; 'Scilicet ergo contractus omnes quibus alter ex alterius damnum lucrume liquide capitum quocumque tandem nomine vestriantur damnari'; cf. Sermon in De off. zuili.
by the London municipality in 1363. The exact point of offence is defined in the revised statute (1390) which declares 'he that preaches usury to lend us more than is certain without risk.' The wide-spread bitterness towards the Jew was one other illustration of the popular verdict against usury. The very exorbitant nature of the interest allowed, which per cent. i.e. 433 was enough to breed odium, and kings made rather a questionable use of these strangers. Feeling rose so high that the Jews were expelled from the country, and the following century (1376) the citizens of London called for the same measure against the Lombards, the agents of the grievous papal exactions, who had taken over the detested trade.

The way to change was prepared by the relaxations of the canons themselves, but more by the fact that in the 15th century, money transactions were altering in character. The borrowers were no longer poor men in need, nor barons suddenly confronted with some savage taxation or a levy for a crusade. Traders making good profits now needed money for developing business; they were willing and ready to pay for loans. Many began to find themselves in better times with a margin to invest; the phenomenon of capital was emerging. Still, when Henry VIII in 1545, under the guise of limiting usury, really sanctioned interest at 10 per cent, he was probably in advance of public opinion. At any rate a wave of reaction followed, and the Act was repealed under Edward VI. War conditions marked the closing decades of the period. On the one side, the desire to 'too much squinted towards Moses' preached a stricter standard than even the canons and attacked rent-charges and partnerships.

The 'little more' of interest was likened to a sixth finger, a monstrous; the usurers were as ivy on the oak, all-devouring. 'To what shall I liken this generation? They are like a butterer's box; for as the butterers at last come to the butter, so all the money cometh to the usurer.'

There are indications of resentment of another kind caused by the arrival of a 'new rich' and the dispossession of old families by these 'ungraceful petty Brokers.' Irresistible forces, however, drove the other way. 'But good Lorde, how is the worlde changed,' writes Thomas Rogers, 'that which Infidels cannot abide, Gospellers allow.' The Reformation had broken the old spell of authority, and disciples of Calvin found ready listeners. Henry Bullinger and others spread abroad the doctrine that usury which was not only so far as it was 'biting.' But, as Cunningham has it, 'The most important factor was the revolution in English commerce which interested during the 16th century; for various circumstances had combined to bring about an entire recasting of the ordinary business system of the country. For one thing, the exclusive trading of the great gilds had suffered a series of severe blows and it was open to anyone to engage in commerce and win its rewards. The great improvements in the management of estates—as well as the planting of new industries—brought much wealth into the hands of many citizens all through the country. . . . For the first time in the history of England the circumstances were present which rendered the general formalisation of capital possible.'

The Act of 1571 marks the victory of the liberal school. The rate was lowered to 8 per cent in 1624, but more significant was the fact that in that measure an attempt was made to distinguish between usury and interest. The controversy smouldered on, but really for the time being the question had been settled by the advent of capital and the consequent changed conditions of commerce. The point at issue altered to the rate

2. Henry Smith, Works, ed. Thomas Fuller, i. 99.
5. Ib. sect. 190 (b).
of interest, for the limitation of which Thomas Culpepper, and others pleaded. John Locke entered the lists with some Considerations of the Consequences of lowering the Interest and raising the Value of Money (1691), but it was in another connexion that he made his most significant antecedence, anticipating the next phase of the controversy: 'For it is labour indeed that puts the difference of value on everything.'1 Jeremy Bentham's classic Defence of Usury also indicated a fundamental fact which makes the perennial question, 'The children who have eaten their cake are the natural enemies of the children who have theirs.'

The repeal of the usury laws in 1839 appeared to be 'the end of an old sin.' But the freedom was abused. The usurer with his merciless exactions again came under control by the Money-Lenders Act of 1860, which requires the registration of their business names and addresses and allows the court, where the lender prosecute s for debt, to cancel the contract if the rates are excessive. Petty loan business, however, still survives.

7. The modern phase of the problem.—History repeats itself in the present phase of the controversy. Usury has come to mean exorbitant interest, but the legitimacy of interest is still debatable. The early attacks on usury were motivated by the theory that the usurer will always be poor; the latest attack finds its strength in the plea that interest is an unjust tax on the labouring classes.

'The usurer, my Lord,—and observe as a final and inevitable truth—that whether you lend your money to provide an infested population with crotches, stretchers, hearth, or the railroad accommodation which is so often synonymous with the three, the tax on the use of these, which constitutes the shareholding of the debenture holders, is, naturally, exalted by avarice, and by no means an aid granted by benevolence.'3

Henry Smith said that the usurer was like a butler to whom all the counters returned. What offends the moralist-to-day is that money is lent by those who have abundance and returns to them to increase that abundance, the increase being the unpaid dues of labour, which alone, the argument runs, produces wealth.

'It is not only that "every gate is barred with gold," but that year by year the burden of the past is becoming heavier on the present. Wealth passes down from father to son like a gathering snowball, at the same time as industry gets massed into larger and larger organizations, and the guidance and supervision of the industry is taken more and more out of the hands of the worker and given to the capitalists.'

By interest, then, the socialist claims, the rich are made richer and the poor poorer and the very evil that Melanchthon had feared.

Is interest, then, an unjustifiable tax that could be eliminated? The experience of the Franciscans with their mendicant friars and Foucher with his Exchange Bank6 may well give pause. In spite of the strength of the socialist indictment, neither in theory nor in practice has the way out been demonstrated. The contention that labour alone creates value and that interest is the unpaid wage of the labourer and therefore wrong is not established unless it is reckoned that the service rendered by capital involves no sacrifice. The waiting or abstinence of the capitalist has not been swept out of court in spite of Lassalle's picturesque of the ascetic millionaires of Europe... like Indian penitents or pious saints... holding a plate to tempt the people to collect the wages of their abstention.'

'It is not true that the spinning of yarn in a factory after allowance has been made for the wear-and-tear of the machinery, 1 Of Civil Government (Collected Works, London, 1777, vol. ii. ch. v, § 49.
2 London, 1787, letter x.
3 John Hucin, 'Usury,' On the Old Road, London, 1855, ii. 225 f.
4 W. Stuart, prel. to Bülow-Flavinus.

is the product of the labour of the operatives. It is the product of their labour, together with that of the employer and subordinate managers, and is as capital employed; that is the product of labour and capital; and therefore the spinning is the product of labour of many kinds, and of waiting.'

Could even a socialist community abolish interest and so give the labourer the full value of his labour? The difficulty lies in the fact that so many kinds of labour are not equally productive. A vintage is harvested in 1920 and valued at hundreds of pounds. But in 1940 that value has increased enormously. Can labour be recompensed according to the value in 1940? It would be simple if the labourers could wait till 1940. But can they? Someone must wait, and that is the plea for interest—the price of waiting. Interest has been defined as 'human impatience crystallized into a market rate'; the premise that a man is willing to pay for this year's over next year's goods.'

Only if all labour yielded products of immediate use could the community return the same each year value for his whole labour. But in a progressive society effort must constantly be made for bettering conditions; expenditure must be put forth on schemes that can yield no immediate return. If the community has hired the next finer means of transport and a nobler social equipment, can they do so without denying themselves a portion of the value of their labour? Is sacrifice not inherent in progress? A socialist state might possess itself of much capital, but that capital would not be inexhaustible. Some day the question would arise: where is the capital to come from for these improvements? How can a state engaged in these enterprises with deferred returns except by raising some contribution from other fields of labour? This could be done only by raising the price of other goods above the level of their labour value, or by paying the labourers less than the value of their labour. Thus the socialist society has to impose a burden upon its citizens and deny them the full value of their labour just because of this fact that certain goods take time to mature; i.e. the element of waiting cannot be eliminated, and the price of that waiting must be paid.

'The complaint against interest is after all only a complaint that the great advantages of rapid progress cannot be had for nothing.'

What practical policy can be suggested? It is admitted that laws directed against usury simply lead to more exorbitant charges to cover the risk of breaking the law. The most successful antidote is the co-operative bank, which meets the needs of those most subject to temporary distress, such as the artisan and the peasant farmer. The popular dislike of interest springs from the worker's resentment towards the idle rich. That privileged individuals should draw from a community enough for a life of idleness and luxury 'will always be regarded as a fundamental immorality.'4

But, as Cassel goes on to point out, that really calls for a more equal distribution of the nation's wealth rather than tampering with the method of interest. Society must consider rather the methods by which superabundant wealth comes into a few idle hands—as the laws of inheritance, unsaved increment, and all forms of monopoly. Meaning the concept of the Christian Church is not to dictate any particular economic method but to maintain a zealous watchfulness over all developments in behalf of her ideas of justice, charity, and brotherhood.

4 Ib. p. 182.
USURY (Hebrew).—1. Terms.—These do not throw much light on the moral and religious ideas connected with the subject. The word 'šēq' [Shaqa], and has been supposed to imply the dependence of the borrower on the lender, but it is more probable that there is no connexion between the two uses of the word. 'Za' (to 'borrow') is also used in the sense of 'lend,' they have been supposed to imply the binding of the debtor to the creditor. Nouns from these roots are used for 'pledge' or 'security.' 'Za' is used for 'secure;' 'Itz (or 'Itza) means 'pledged,' 'nego,' 'neqah,' and 'neqah' 'interest.' 'Noshahah also means 'bide;' and 'neqahah is supposed to mean 'something bidden off,' or to refer to the injuries and ruthless behaviour of a creditor in exacting interest. The AV 'usury for neqahah simply meant 'interest' when AV was translated, and the suggestion which it now makes of exorbitant interest is misleading; it is simply 'interest,' as far as the mere word is concerned, apart from the implications of any special context. From the obviously neutral word ναχα, EV 'interest,' from ανα, 'to be great,' is often used as a parallel and synonym of 'neqahet; and the word is rendered in the LXX by ραγχή, and in the Vulgate by usura, which are simply the ordinary words for 'interest.'

2. History.—Debt plays only a small part in the OT, partly, no doubt, because it was not an important factor in primitive times, though it became more so as Israel grew more civilized and life more complex. In an agricultural community the failure of the crops might lead to borrowing (Nu 15:14), i.e., in debt by becoming security for a friend (Pr 6:1). In later times taxation for a native government or for the payment of tribute to a foreign suzerain was a source of some importance. As for a legal case of concern, debt always seems to have originated from such causes; the OT has little or nothing to say about the spendthrift who got into debt through sloth or extravagance. Moreover, there is no commercial borrowing, which is a source of profit to the borrower, though known at a very early period in Babylon—e.g., in the time of Hammurabi—does not seem to have existed in ancient Israel. There is no certain and definite information as to the rate of interest. The clause Neh 5:1, 'Restore ... the hundredth part of the money,' has been understood to mean that interest was at the rate of one per cent per annum, and that creditors were to forgo their interest; but most recent authorities—e.g., Batten, ICC—read 'neqaha' 'interest,' for 'm'ath, 'hundredth.' Two apparently contrary words were used with the interest being determined mainly by the urgent need of the borrower. The consequences of debt might be severe; loans were sometimes obtained on the security of land or houses, i.e., on mortgage; when the debtor could not pay, the creditor took the property. Where there was no such security, the debtor and his family might be sold as slaves (2 K 12:4, Neh 5:4).

3. Moral and religious significance.—Like other misfortunes, debts and the usury which was sometimes committed in connection with them is sometimes regarded as judgment on sin (Dt 15:10-15), and it is one of the characteristics of the wicked man that he borrows and does not repay (Ps 57:10). It has been supposed to help with the debtor and seeks to help and protect him; his position is regarded as the result of unavoidable misfortune. It is the duty of the prosperous man to help his poor neighbour in distress benevolent loans; it is not to be a pure matter of business (Dt 15:1-7); Ps 37:11, Pr 19:17). Necessaries are not to be pledged; thus the widow's ox, or her clothing, or a millstone are not to be taken in pledge (Dt 24:6, Job 24:4). Clothing when pledged must not be kept over night (Ex 22:26, Dt 24:8). In fact the OT does not regard with approval the practice of taking pledges (Job 22:24).

In view of the fact that the insolvent debtor and his family might be sold as slaves, Ex 21:11, which directs the emancipation of the Israelite slave at the end of the seventh year, was designed to give some measure of relief to the debtor. This attempt is carried to an extreme in Dt 15:1-7, which appoints a sippur, or release, at the end of every seventh year, when all debts were to be taken away. The sequel shows what a large-hearted generosity the Deuteronomic writer demanded from his fellow-countryman:—Beware that there be not a base thought in thine heart, saying, The seventh year, the year of release, is at hand; and thine eye be evil against thy poor brother, and thou give him nought (15:10). There is, however, no evidence that the law was ever enforced; it is on the face of it impracticable. Indeed, the Deuteronomic writer himself seems conscious that he is only setting forth an ideal. This appears from 15:1. We may set aside the AV 'Save when there shall be no poor among you,' and adopt the RV 'Howbeit there shall be no poor with thee, i.e. no one shall need to borrow,' for Jehovah will surely bless thee ... if only thou diligently hearken unto the voice of Jehovah thy God, to observe to do all this commandment. As Driver says in his comment on this passage, there will be 'no occasion for the present law to come into operation, if only the nation so comports itself as to merit Jehovah's blessing.' On the other hand, Dt 23:19-25 and other commandments, so that there were poor, the nation was not likely to observe this particular ordinance; in either case, it would be a dead letter; so it seems to have been. Other authorities propose the less probable rendering, 'Howbeit there should be no poor in thee, i.e. the nation should establish a social system which would make poverty impossible. The Priestly Law of jubilee (Lv 25) has a similar object to the release. It provides that at the year of jubilee all land shall go back to the family to which it originally belonged, and that an Israelite sold for a slave through poverty shall be treated as a hired servant, and released. As the loss of the family inheritance or of personal freedom was often due to debt, this law would have mitigated the unhappy consequences of what we should call bankruptcy. Here again this law, like that of the release, was a dead letter. Nevertheless, these laws are evidence of the anxiety of the legislators that neither an individual nor a family should be permanently ruined by insolvency.

A persistent feature of OT teaching is the prohibition of interest as between Israelite and Israelite, although interest may lawfully be taken from a foreigner (Ex 23:18; Deut 23:19). A higher rate than 25% is sometimes regarded as usury (Ps 15:7; Pr 28; Ezek 18:1-7; 22:25; Neh 5).
USURY

Interest would often be exorbitant and indebtedness long in arrears. Ex 22:24, (Deut 23:20), understand it to be fraudulent and unjust claims, successfully asserted through the corrupt administration of the law or by sheer violence. There can be no doubt that borrowing and its consequences contributed to the transference of the land from the yeoman farmers to comparatively few wealthy landowners against which the prophets protested. Doubtless the evils of the system largely arose from exorbitant interest, and from the unreasonable and imperious behaviour of creditors; but, as has already been pointed out, *neshekh, EV 'usury,' is not usury in its modern sense of excessive interest, and we cannot give it that meaning in the OT passages in which it occurs; it means interest generally. It is true that Ex 22:24 specially refers to the poor, but even then Benzing and Nowack are probably wrong in holding that it means only excessive interest; and in inutor passages there is no ground for any such limitation. As we have said above, the writers had not commercial loans in view, and their teaching was not intended to apply to interest in that connection. The objection to 'interest,' seems to rest on two main grounds: (1) that the prosperous man with a superfluity should help those in difficulties, suffering from want; if gifts were made voluntarily, at least there should be free loans; (2) as in modern times, it was constantly the interest that ruined the debtor, where he might have repaid the capital, so that the social evils which crushed the poor were largely associated with interest; the simplest and most effective remedy seemed to be to prohibit interest altogether. In other words, the principle involved is that wealthy men should see in the misfortune of their fellow-men a need for generous assistance and not an opportunity for exploiting the need of the unfortunate.

The prohibition of interest and the other provisions in favour of debtors, like many other humane provisions in the OT, apply only to Israelites; lending to foreigners is expressly allowed (Dt 23:20), and is spoken of as a privilege granted by God to the faithful Israelite (Dt 29:9).

This is another example of the particularist attitude often found in the OT.

**Literature.**—See sections on 'Debt' in Heb. Arch. of Ewald, Bechtel, Bank and Nowack; the commentaries on these passages cited, especially Driver on Ex 22:25 (Cambridge Bible, Commentary of the CO, Oxford 1896), and the present writer's article 'Debt' and 'Usury' in BDB.

W. H. BENNETT

USURY (Jewish).—I. General views of Mishnah and Talmud. In the Mishnah and Talmud usury is indicated either by the Biblical word פִּיסָא or, as is more frequently the case, by the term פָּרָק. Both terms denote money, food, or any article which a man gives on loan to his fellow-man, on the condition that the latter repays something for the loan in addition to the original sum lent. The discrimination made in modern times between 'usury' and 'interest' is unknown to Jewish law. All 'increase,' whether large or small, is prohibited. Judaism has ever regarded the lending of money by one Jew to another Jew as merely a way of relieving the latter's temporary distress, an act of pure charity. The basic assumption is that the borrower is poor and wants money to satisfy his own personal wants. It is one of the 365 'negative precepts of Judaism that a Jew may not lend on loan to another Jew. This prohibition is based on Lv 25:7, 'Thou shalt not give him thy money upon usury, nor lend him thy victuals for increase.' Another of the 365 'negative precepts of Judaism is that a Jew may not borrow from another Jew on interest. This is derived from Dt 23:20, 'Thou shalt not lend upon usury to thy brother—'the peculiar 'Hippli' form of the verb מָמַשָּׁה 'to increase.' This prohibition is aimed in this case at the borrower. Likewise the Judaism of Talmud and Mishnah forbids any Jew to be an intermediary or agent or surety or co-borrower in any usurious transaction between Jew and Jew. The Rabbis by a curious exegesis derived this prohibition from the redundancy of the phraseology in Ex 22:25, 'If thou lend money to any of my people that is poor by thee, thou shalt not lend him as usurer, neither shalt thou lay upon him usury.' The medieval Jewish codes lay it down that, in the case of a Jew who has become a convert to another religion, it is forbidden to a Jew to lend to, or borrow from, him on interest. Likewise it is forbidden to a Jew to lend to, or borrow from, a Karaita Jew on interest.

2. Different kinds of usury. The Talmud and the medieval Jewish codes enumerate several kinds of 'increase' (מָמַשָּׁה). These are (a) פִּיסָא פָּרָק, i.e. 'fixed increase,' (b) פָּרָק פָּרָק, i.e. 'the mere dust of increase,' (c) פָּרָק פָּרָק, i.e. 'the semblance of increase,' and (d) פָּרָק פָּרָק, i.e. 'some means other than money.' They all refer, of course, to dealings between Jew and Jew. The first of these denotes the ordinary transaction where interest on loans is paid direct on a loan, in violation of the express command of Scripture. The second (often called 'Rabbinical increase' as distinguished from the first, which is frequently known as 'increase under the Mosaic Law') denotes interest paid in some indirect way connected with bargain and sale, or interest the amount of which was not stipulated nor mentioned at all when the loan was first transacted but which was paid subsequently or unjustly by the borrower or taken voluntarily by the lender with the consent of the borrower. It also covers cases where interest was paid by the borrower on the mere anticipation of a loan. A rule of this kind would forbid, on the ground of usury, the sale of futures, made when the market-price has not yet been fixed. Thus the Talmud says:

A man should not say to his neighbor: 'Give me a kor of wheat and I will return it at threshing-time.' because the market-price of wheat might rise in the meantime and the lender would profit.' Or, again, 'a lender may not lodge in the borrower's house free of charge nor may he rent anything from him at less than the standard rate.'

The third of the four above-mentioned kinds of 'increase' is illustrated by the case of a Jew who, after the loan has been paid, is allowed by the latter to perform some religious work on his property in connexion with synagogue-worship or home-ritual.

It is astonishing to read what an emphasis the Talmudic Rabbis laid on these sins of 'moral' usury. A loan from one Jew to another should be an act of kindness without the least expectation of profit. This, the OT 'Debt in all lands' has been upset by the Rabbis inexorably, in spite of changed times and conditions. Turning again to the already-mentioned four species of 'increase,' we should say that (a) פִּיסָא

1 See T. B. Bakkah 30a, Qm. 2 Th. 70b. 3 Th. 64b.
557, where charged, was recoverable at law, before the Jewish court ('Beth Din'). If the defendant refused, he was hanged by order of the court, unless for a small debt. The penalty was the same.

This was different. This was not recoverable. But, if the lender desired 'to fulfil his duty in the sight of Heaven,' it was obligatory on him to return the charge made. In other words, it was an act of religion, not of law.

According to the medieval Jewish codes, the prohibition against taking or giving interest was suspended in the two following cases:

(a) Acting Rabbis or teachers of the Law, in borrowing from, or lending to, one another articles of food such as grain, etc., were allowed a fixed interest up to 20 per cent. But such charges were not to be made with frequency lest they might thereby set an undesirable example to the laity. As Rabbis were not commercial men, such transactions were not to be regarded as usurious. It was merely one of the ways of Rabbis helping one another and helping themselves at the same time. It hence came under the heading of 'charity' rather than 'usury.'

(b) Money left by bequest or gathered for the support of orphans or the poor, or for the upkeep of schools for religious instruction or for the building of a synagogue, might be lent out on interest. This relaxation was made inevitable by the fact that in most countries of medieval Europe Jews were precluded by the prevailing laws from investing any funds in landed property or in any other business, as their reputation was closed to them, they felt complete justification in investing public funds on what was, in the strict sense, an undeniably usurious basis.

3. Usury as between Jew and Gentile.—According to Maimonides, a Jew lending money to a Gentile is relatively free from the temptation to charge interest. Maimonides regards this as one of the 'affirmative' precepts of Judaism, deriving it from Dt 23:19, which, according to him, should be translated 'lending and charging money to a Gentile.' But this view of Maimonides has been severely criticized by the later Jewish legalists and codifiers, and has never found acceptance generally. The prohibition of usury here is simply that in all transactions between Jew and Gentile interest may be given and taken by both parties.

Commerce is usurious. Usurious transactions, as was natural, frequently involved both Jew and Gentile. Hence, it was only to be expected that, where Gentile intervention took place in a loan between Jew and Jew (and vice versa, where Jewish intervention took place in a loan between Jew and Gentile), the temptation of the part of a Jewish lender or borrower to find a loophole for taking or paying interest, and thus evading the Jewish prohibition of usury as between Jew and Jew, was considerably more strong. Hence, when well aware of all these contingencies, and their enactments on many a nice point in this connexion are very searching. Here, e.g., are a few specimens culled from the Shalah' Arith of Qara:

'Suppose the money of a Jew is deposited in the hands of a non-Jew who went and lent it to another Jew on interest. If the non-Jew was responsible for the safety of the money then the Jew is allowed to receive the accruing interest. But if the non-Jew is not responsible for the safety of the money, then interest is prohibited.'

'Suppose the money of a non-Jew is deposited with a Jew. If the latter is responsible for its safety then he may lend it to a Jew on interest. But if he assumed no responsibility for the money, then he is allowed by Jewish law to lend it to a Jew. But he must not do this because it might convey a wrong impression.'

'A Jew says to a non-Jew, Come and lend me my money for interest to Jews and I will pay you as much for your work. The non-Jew accepts. Hence, because the money belongs to the Jew and the clerk has no responsibility. But if a non-Jewish money-lender asks his Jewish clerk to do the same, the transaction is prohibited. But, in fact he must not do it on account of the wrong impression which might be conveyed.'

'Suppose a Jew borrows from a non-Jew on interest, then it is forbidden for a follow-Jew to be a surety unless the lender distinctly stipulated that in case of default of principal he would make payment in specie against the surety [who would then sue the borrower and thus infringe the usurious law as between Jew and Jew].

These are but a few instances out of a large number given in the Shalah' Arith. USURY (Jewish)

4. History underlying the Jewish laws concerning money-lending and borrowing; vi. 4, 5 and 8. T"eh"a Beth, Laws of Usury, 1603.
UTILITARIANISM

in their efforts to earn an honest and reputable livelihood, the Jews were shackled. In England, Spain, and many other European countries he was absolutely forbidden by law to follow most of the trades and handicrafts which were open, without question, to all other citizens; and when, in rare instances, freedom was given, it was penalized and embittered by the imposition of special taxation. The Church left the Jews nothing to do except to deal in money or second-hand clothes. But it would be erroneous to suppose that the usurers of the Middle Ages were confined solely to Jews. The increasing spread of commerce and commercial enterprises in those days made it imperative for governments to devise expedients for evading the canonical embargo upon usury. Italy was the first European country to start this evasion. Others soon followed—with the result that the competition between the Christian (chiefly Italian) and Jewish money-lenders in England became so keen as to render the Jews less indispensible than they formerly were to the English Exchequer. The impression, that was brought England by Edward I. was the corollary of this fact.

5. The views of modern Judaism on usurers and usury.—The somewhat disproportionate tendency of Jews in recent times to follow the trade of money-lending may be set down as a piece of sheer atavism. Racial characteristics have a way of surviving long after the original causes which created them have disappeared. But it must be strongly emphasized that money-lending is considerably on the decrease among Jews of the 20th century. Commerce, handicraft, the professions of law, medicine, dentistry, literature, art and science, and daily—the present day are entering these callings in great numbers and with great gusto. Many of them are recruited from the ranks of the poorest parents. The trade of usury is looked upon with shame; and the usurer is stigmatized as a reproach to his people. In some Jewish communities to-day the money-lender is forbidden to have any voice in the affairs of the Synagogue and is socially tabued by the Jews themselves.

In fine, the attitude of modern Judaism towards usury practically coincides with the attitude of the Judaism of the OT, the Mishnah, the Talmud, and the codes. The trade of the OT is summarized in Exk 138. [He] ‘when there rise up upon usury, and lieth taken increase: shall he then live? he shall not live . . . his blood shall be upon him.’ On this passage the comment of the Talmud is, ‘The money-lender is compared to a murderer.’ The Mishnah2 includes the usurer among those who are disqualified from giving evidence in a court of law. The Shulhan Arukh—the code on which modern orthodox Judaism, whether as creed, law, or life, is based,—says:2

1 When can usurers be considered as having returned from their evil ways and as being again admissible as witnesses in a court of law? When they have torn up all the documents on which the principal and interest due to them from clients are recorded, and have cut up and destroyed them, so that they will never again lend on interest, not even to non-Jews. They must also restore to their former clients all the interest they have ever taken from them. If they can no longer identify all their clients they must devote the money to communal purposes.2

Those voices of the past are still expressive of general Jewish conviction to-day.


1 T. B. Babba Mevta, 61b. 2 Sandkrin. iii. 2.

UTILITARIANISM.—I. INTRODUCTORY.—The term ‘Utilitarianism’ is used for both an ethical theory and a practical movement. The practical movement will be dealt with under II. 3. ii. below. As an ethical theory it signifies that the ultimate end is and ought to be general happiness, and that the action which the agent thinks will do the greatest good or the greatest happiness to the greatest number.

In Mill’s words: ‘The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, that the conduct which, under any given circumstances, is objectively right, is that which will produce the greatest amount of happiness on the whole; that is, taking into account all whose happiness is affected by the conduct.3 By happiness Sidgwick means pleasure and freedom; and pleasure he defines as ‘feeling which the sentient individual at the time of feeling it implicitly or explicitly apprehends to be desirable; desirable, that is, when considered merely as feeling.’4

For utilitarianism Sidgwick prefers ‘some such universalism as Universalistic Hedonism,’5 He says ‘universalistic’ in order to show that the utilitarian end is general, not individual, happiness. G. E. Moore: ‘The utilitarian standard is not the agent’s own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether.’6 Hedonism (q.v.) is a general principle regarding all systems of ethics which regard pleasure as the end actually aimed at (psychological hedonism), or as the end that ought to be aimed at (ethical hedonism). We may say that strictly the latter is alone worthy of consideration, for psychological hedonism, if true, makes any system of ethics irrelevant. But the earlier utilitarians based their theory of general happiness on the psychological assumption that man always desires pleasure, and that he is a co-operative creature, subject to the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do.7 Even J. S. Mill did not clearly distinguish between psychological and ethical hedonism.

The name ‘utilitarian’ (taken from ‘utility’ in the sense of pleasure or excess from pain) was first used by Bentham in 1831. In 1832, writing to Dumont, he said: ‘To be sure a new religion would be an odd sort of a thing without a name: accordingly there ought to be one for it—at least for the professors of it. Utilitarian (Engl.), Utilitarion (Gall) would be the more proper.’8

In his earlier writings Bentham used the word ‘utility’ with great freedom. In later life he preferred to speak of ‘felicity’ or ‘happiness’ as pointing more clearly to the ideas of pleasure and absence of pain. ‘Utilitarian’ had been as little used by Bentham that J. S. Mill believed himself to be the first to apply it to those who accepted the greatest happiness principle. Mill tells us that he found the word in Galt’s Annals of the Parish. It is there used to designate people who held certain revolutionary views current at the end of the preceding century. It was through Mill that ‘utilitarianism’ became the generally accepted names for the party and the creed.

II. HISTORICAL.—Utilitarianism, both as an ethical theory and as a practical movement, is English. The idea of the greatest good for the greatest number is no doubt to be found in Greek philosophy, in the Stoic conception of the ‘citizen-


2 The Methods of Ethical, iv. i. 1, p. 411.

3 Ib. ii. iii. 1, p. 121.

4 Ib. i. 3, p. 411.

5 Utilitarianism, p. 16.

6 Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation, i. 1 (Works, Edinburgh, 1873, ii. 2. 400).

7 Works, x. 25, 290.
ship of the world.' Leibniz, again, by establishing the general good or happiness as the end of law and of morality, is spoken of as the precursor of utilitarianism. The Benthamists of the 18th cent., especially Holbach, Montesquieu, and von Holboc, were to some extent occupied with the same ideas. But the movement to which the name is given is an English movement, and, with the first descriptive treatment of it historically, the account may be confined to English writers.

1. We must begin with Hobbes. The theory of association which played so large a part in the earlier utilitarian speculation, can be traced to him, although he never worked it out. His influence, which continued for two centuries, is best seen in the effect it produced upon those who opposed his theories. His conception of man as an unsocial and egoistic being with an insatiable desire for power, and his notion of morality as political obligation, had to be answered. And these answers were often the means of modifying the philosophical beliefs of his opponents, among whom were the utilitarians.

The answer to Hobbes made by the Cambridge Platonists does not concern us here. A contemporary of theirs, however, Richard Cumberland, foreshadowed utilitarianism in his De Legibus Nature, published in 1672. This work was lengthy and confused, and utilitarian principles were combined with others. Cumberland's object was to prove, as against Hobbes, that morality was natural, man being by nature social. He defined good as 'a preservation,' following Hobbes here, but he included in preservation both perfection and happiness. Most stress was laid on the latter, and most practical use was made of it in the working out of the theory. Individual happiness, he held, must coincide with the good of all because of the Divine sanction: 'The greatest Benevolence of every rational Agent towards all, forms the happiest state of every . . . and therefore the Common Good is the supreme Law.'

A popular fallacy makes Locke (Essay concerning Human Understanding, 1689) the founder of English utilitarianism. Moral action was necessarily selfish to Locke, but this he held in common with other non-utilitarian moralists. He did not adopt the greatest happiness principle, and he did not work out the pleasure side of his theory. English utilitarianism, largely due to him, was, of course, of immense importance in the development of utilitarianism.

An answer in the 18th cent. to the unmitigated egoism of Hobbes came from the Moral Sense school. Their method was psychological rather than rationalistic, and took the form of a new account of human nature. Of this school Hutcheson, through his emphasis on benevolence, approached nearest to the position which utilitarianism was to take up, and from Hutcheson came the formula 'the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers.' A slight change of this formula, as Cotterham, in another translation (1767) of Beccaria's Dei Delitti e della Pena, states that he got it from Priestley. That was probably a mistake, as it does not occur in Priestley's works. The exact formula used by Bentham, 'the greatest happiness for the greatest number,' is found in a translation (1767) of Beccaria's Dei Delitti e della Pena. Whether it was suggested to him by Hutcheson is not known.

In 1731 there was published anonymously a small dissertation stating the conclusions of King's Origin of Evil. It was entitled Preliminary Discourse concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality. The author was John Gay. This was the first definite statement of the utilitarian position. Brown, Tucker, and Paley are the logical successors of Gay. Their theories, far as essentials are concerned, may be regarded as expansions of Gay's outline. In the Dissertation Gay treats first of the criterion of virtue, then of the motive, and finally of the sanctions. This was the programme which was the psychological groundwork of his theory of ethics. The' immediate criterion' of virtue Gay found in the will of God. But, as God must will the happiness of men, the latter is the 'criterion' of God's will. Happiness is defined as a 'sum of pleasures.' The motive of the moral agent is egoistic, for all desire is desire of pleasure. Gay is then faced with the fundamental difficulty which beset all the utilitarians, up to and including John Stuart Mill, of proving the coincidence of the pleasure of the individual and of society.

For, if men were all to be actuated only by a desire for their own pleasure, it was manifest that the coincidence of the pleasure of the individual with general pleasure must be proved before the latter could become an object of desire. Gay met this difficulty by the theory of the happiness of others. He enumerated four sanctions—the natural, the social, the legal, and the religious. He emphasized the last, for he realized that there is no sanction which can ensure the complete coincidence of the interests of the individual and of society. Happiness is not the only value of the individual except the supernatural sanction. It is their emphasis on this sanction which constitutes Gay, Brown, Tucker, and Paley theological utilitarians, and which, starting as they did with the selfish theory of the moral motive, renders their system of utilitarianism alone consistent. In his discussion of the supernatural sanction Gay brings out clearly his theory of obligation, which became the accepted one. The moral imperative was not categorical but conditional, he held—conditional on the required action being a means to the happiness of the individual. Complete obligation to virtue could then come from God only, for He alone could make the coincidence between 'my happiness and general happiness' perfect.

Then those who, either expressly exclude, or don't mention the will of God . . . must either allow that virtue is not in all cases obligatory . . . or they must say that the good of mankind is a sufficient reason. But how can the good of mankind be any obligation to me, when perhaps in particular cases, such as laying down my life, or the like, it is contrary to my happiness?'

The latter part of the Dissertation is given up to the discussion of psychology. The psychological basis for the utilitarianism of Gay found in association. Through the law of association other things beyond the pleasure of the individual might be desired as proximate ends, though the ultimate end was pleasure. In this way altruistic desires might be developed. Gay held it unimportant that the ultimate motive was always egoistic. If a man helped another, his immediate motive being kindness, the fact that his ultimate object was to benefit himself was of no consequence.

It has seemed worth while to discuss Gay's treatise rather fully because, though it consisted of 50 pages, was published anonymously, and attracted little notice at the time, it contained all the essentials of the utilitarianism that we now advocate. We find no important modification of Gay's utilitarianism made by any one until we come to John Stuart Mill.

In 1740 David Hume published his first treatise on Ethics, being book iii. of the Treatise of Human Nature. The Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals was published in 1758. Hume's standpoint was very different in the two works. It is
unnecessary to discuss the cause of this change; so far as concerns ethics, the Inquiry seems to represent his real position. In his analysis of the moral influence of the works of Hume, Mill recognizes modern utilitarianism. But he exercised no influence until the time of J. S. Mill. In the Treatise Hume makes the moral motive ultimately egoistic; his principle is enunciated by Gay, and afterwards found in Hartley, Brown, Tucker, Paley, Bentham, and James Mill; whereas in the Inquiry his account of human nature implies original benevolence as well as egoistic tendencies. Disinterested benevolence is natural.

'Hume's treatment of the moral motive is more important than his treatment of the principle of utility. He accepted the latter, but he did not use it consistently in his analysis of the virtues.

Between Hume's two works there appeared Observations on Man, his Frame, his Duty, and his Happiness (1748) by the physician David Hartley. In this work Hartley elaborated the theory of the association of ideas in a way which greatly influenced the later associationist school and especially James Mill.2 Tucker was not a typical associationist-utilitarian. Much of his work was given up to theological discussions. He accepted the utility principle, but, like J. S. Mill, he held that there were qualitative differences in pleasures. In practice also he seems to have held that conduct should be guided by 'obedience to the Scripture precepts' rather than by consideration of consequences. He was probably the first to raise the difficulty of the hedonic calculus. It is impossible, he says, 'for the most sagacious and experienced persons to make any accurate estimate of the future consequences of particular actions, so as, ... to determine justly, what action would contribute most to augment happiness and lessen misery.'3

2. Theological utilitarianism. — Just twenty years after Gay's Dissertation there appeared the Essays on the Characteristics (1751) by John Brown. In 1768 the first volumes of Tucker's The Light of Nature Pursued were published, and in 1785 came Paley's Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy. Brown, Tucker, and Paley, along with Gay, are the exponents of theological utilitarianism, the first definite form which utilitarianism took, and which exercised an influence during the time and its influence. A generation trained in Locke's was not disposed to adopt the system of the Moral Sense school; but welcomed the rival system whose groundwork was a conception of consciousness as composed of separable atoms, sensations and ideas, aggregated into clusters.

The outline of theological utilitarianism was found in Gay's Dissertation, and neither Brown, Tucker, nor Paley added anything vital to it, though they amplified and popularized it. J. S. Mill says that Brown in his Essays on Shaftesbury's Characteristics produced an able argument for utilitarianism. His account of the essays that Mill refers. Brown's argument was in brief, that common sense pointed to conduciveness to happiness as being the essence of virtue. He argues that 'those very affections and actions which in our ordinary course of things, are approved as virtuous, do change their nature, and become vicious in the strictest sense, when they contradict this fundamental law, of the greatest public happiness.'

The ultimate end Brown gives as the 'voluntary production of the greatest happiness.'1 The moral motive, he says, is egoistic. 'The moral motive, by which individuals can possibly be induced to the practice of virtue, must be the feeling immediate, or the prospect of future private happiness.2 How can the end and the motive be reconciled? 'It is self-love alone that can be called seeing and all-powerful God' alone can do it, a God who will hereafter make them happy or miserable, according as they designedly promote the happiness of their fellow-creatures.' This is all entirely in line with Gay. Brown did not touch psychology. For that he definitely refers his readers to Gay.

Abraham Tucker was an extraordinarily prolix writer. There are seven volumes of The Light of Nature Pursued. The first four appeared under the name of 'Edward Search' in 1768; the last three were issued posthumously. Like Gay, Tucker turned to theology, and, like him, he held that ultimately men were egoists—though not in the sense of Hobbes. Altruistic tendencies were explained by contingency and translation. Tucker seems to have convinced himself that the agency is to him no more than the dependency of actions upon volition.4 The will follows the strongest motive. All this was thoroughly consistent with the Lockeian groundwork and with the ordinary utilitarian theory of obligation. Two points remain to be stated. Tucker says that there are no qualitative distinctions in pleasure. This had been implicit in Gay and others. The second point has reference to the hedonistic calculus. Tucker argued, and Paley followed him here, that there must be general rules of expediency, and that these must be followed rather than any effort made to calculate the probable felicific consequences of any particular act. Tucker states many of the modern objections to the calculus.

1 Our tastes,' he says, 'varying as much as our faces makes us very bad judges of one another's enjoyments.... Nor do we judge much better of our own pleasures, for want of being well aware of their aptness to clay upon repetition and to change their relish perceptibly according to our dispositions of body or mind or the circumstances we happen to stand in.'

2 In 1785 William Paley published his Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy. Paley received a complete philosophical system from his predecessors, and he acknowledged freely the debt he owed, in especial to Tucker's Light of Nature Pursued. But he applied and popularized their principles in such a successful way that the name now associated almost exclusively with his name. His definition of virtue—the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness—lends itself easily to caricature. Though his views did not differ in any essential from those of the previous theological utilitarians, he emphasized more unpleasantly than any of his predecessors the selfishness of the moral motive, and the doctrine of rewards and punishments after death. He was consistent on obligation. 'We can be obliged,' he said, 'to nothing, but what we ourselves are capable of gaining or losing something by. If it is possible, however, to make too much of the weaknesses of theological utilitarianism as found in Paley, and to forget the sound sense of most of his teaching. In computing the consequences of his teachings he took into account what would ensue if all men acted as the individual was acting. 'Whatever is expedient, is right.' But then it must be expedient on the whole, at the long and the very particular end. The conclusion is not applicable.
forgery is a damage of twenty or thirty pounds to the man who accepts the forged bill: the general consequence is the stoppage of paper-currency. 1 And he brushed aside the specious argument that an act done under pressure of necessity can have no moral consequences. 'Those who reason in this manner do not observe, that they are setting up a general rule, of all others the least to be endured: namely, that savagery, whenever savagery is practicable, will justify any action.' 2 Paley analysed the commonly accepted morality of his time to prove that considerations of utility underlay it, and he applied this utilitarian criterion to pressing problems of the age. He exercised very considerable influence, and his Principles became the standard text-book at Cambridge.

3. Empirical utilitarianism and the philosophical radicals.—Ethical theory of Bentham. — Jeremy Bentham was born five years after Paley, but he lived until 1832. Paley having died twenty-seven years before. Paley went to Cambridge, and Cambridge became the centre of his method of utilitarianism. Bentham went to Oxford, but it was in London that he gathered disciples round him and founded his school. The Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation was published in 1789, but it was not published until 1799, four years after Paley's Principles had appeared, and only then through the insistence of Bentham's disciple, John Stuart Mill.

Bentham made little mention of his indebtedness to his predecessors, but of Hume's Treatise and of the treatment of utility in it he said: 'For my own part, I well remember, no sooner had I read that part of the work which teaches on this subject, than I felt as if scales had fallen from my eyes.' 3 Priestley also, according to his own account, influenced him. Apart from these acknowledgments, and those to French and Italian utilitarian writers, he states his ethical position as though it were original to himself. So far as his theory is concerned, the only originality lay in his treatment of the hedonistic calculus. At the same time utilitarianism will always be associated with the name of Bentham. There is no doubt that the hold it obtained on men's minds was largely due to his thorough application of the utility principle in the spheres of economics, jurisprudence, and politics, and to his gathering round him a devoted group of followers who applied, taught, and popularized his doctrines.

Bentham's system is nowhere better set forth than in three works—A Fragment on Government (1776); The Principles of Morals and Legislation (1799), where, however, the author's first concern is with jurisprudence rather than with ethics; and the Deontology published posthumously in 1834. J. S. Mill held that the Deontology had been considerably altered by John Bowring, who edited it. The crude egoism of Bentham's theory is more apparent in it than elsewhere, but there seems no reason to doubt that it substantially represents his views.

Bentham assumed dogmatically the hedonistic end, 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number.' 4 His 18th-c. individualism led him to picture society as composed of a number of separate and largely antagonistic units. As J. S. Mill put it in his 'Essay on Bentham,' written at a time when he was emerging from the influence of Bentham: 5

Bentham's point of view with regard to sanctions was somewhat different from that of the theological utilitarians. They used sanctions to prove the ultimate harmony of the interests of each with the interests of the community. For Bentham, sanctions were the result of the general desire of the rational individual to act for the general good. He did not attack the problem of cases where no system of legal rewards and punishments could bring about the consequences he sought.

The list and number of sanctions differed in the three ethical works, but in the Principles Bentham mentioned four. They are practically the sanctions of social contractism. They are, the natural consequences of actions such as 'disease produced by dissipation'; the political sanction, or legal penalties and rewards; the moral sanction, or public praise and blame; the religious sanction, or the effect of religious hopes and fears. The last was of little importance: 'As to such of the pleasures and pains belonging to the religious sanction, as regard a future life, of what kind these may be, we cannot be open to our observation.' 6 Bentham's teaching on sanctions is summed up by himself in the following passage:

'It has been shown that the happiness of the individuals, of whom a community is composed, that is, their pleasures and their security, is the end and the sole end which the legislator ought to have in view, that the sole standard to which each individual ought, as far as depends upon the legislator, to be made to conform his behaviour. But whether it be this or any other thing else that is to be done, there is nothing by which a man can ultimately be made to do it, but either pain or pleasure. Therefore four distinct classes of forces from which pleasure and pain are in use to flow: considered separately, they are the natural, the physical, the political, the moral, and the religious; and inasmuch as the pleasures and pains belonging to each of them are capable of giving a binding force to any law or rule of conduct, they may all of them be termed sanctions.' 7 In a footnote he adds: 'Sanction, in Latin, was used to signify the act of binding, and, by a common grammatical transition, any thing which serves to bind a man: to wit, to the observance of such or such a mode of conduct.' 8

Bentham, driven by the determination to have some weapon with which to attack abuses consecrated by custom, elaborated the hedonistic calculus. The morality of an act, he said, was to be decided by majority principle; he devised a calculation of the consequences of the act in terms of pleasure. In order that the calculation should be scientific certain things must be taken into account, viz., the utility of the act, the pleasure, its certainty, its propinquity (Sidgwick points out that this has no locus standi unless it affects the certainty), its fecundity, or 'the chance it has of being followed by sensations of the same kind,' and its purity, or 'the chance it has of not being followed by sensations of the opposite kind.' 9 The extent of the pleasure, or the number of people affected, should also be taken into account and the whole so balanced that the total quantity of pleasure attendant on an act should be known. Quite consistently Bentham disallowed any difference in quality in pleasure: Other things being equal, joy is as good as happiness; and happiness is as good as contentment; so he urged that government should be put into the hands of all, and advocated universal suffrage, voting by ballot, and annual parliaments.

1. Principles, ii. viii.
2. ib. ii. vii.
3. A Fragment on Government, sec. 1., ib. viii.

Bentham's utilitarianism was based on the assumption that every individual has a natural right to be happy. His theory of government was in harmony with his psychology. Members of Parliament, he held, must be restrained, and restrained, to be restrained at all; so he urged that government should be put into the hands of all, and advocated universal suffrage, voting by ballot, and annual parliaments.

1. Principles, i. iii. § 10.
2. ib. i. iii. §§ 1, 2.

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In 1776 Bentham's first work, *A Fragment on Government*, was published anonymously. Towards the close of his life the *Code of Parliamentary Reform* appeared, and *The Constitutional Code* was published posthumously. Not only political theory but also jurisprudence received attention at his hands. 'He found the philosophy of law a cluse,' Mill said, 'and left it a science.'1

Bentham attracted a band of disciples and founded a school. It is to the efforts of his disciples that we owe the publication of the bulk of his works. Bentham, needless to say, was intemperate in his estimates of different to the fate of his writings. Among all Bentham's followers James Mill had the greatest ability. He joined Bentham in 1802. From that time the philosophical radicals were a group of men with a definite ethical, political, and economic faith. J. S. Mill said of this creed

1 'It was not mere Benthamism but rather a combination of Bentham's view of that of the modern political economy and with the Hartelian metaphysics. Malthus's population principle was quite as much a banner and point of union as Bentham. Those only are happy (I think) who have a system of dispensation.'

Bentham and James Mill were contemporary rather than successive leaders of the school, as Leslie Stephen put it, 'Bentham's life was cut short; Mill lived only four years after Bentham's death. A prominent part was also played by George Grote, the two Ausins, and, last of all, J. S. Mill. In 1824 the *Westminster Review*, the organ of the school, was first published, and did much to spread its creed. Psychology was supplied by James Mill in his *Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind*. Mill adopted the association psychology of Hartley, but discarded his cumbersome, some physiological theory. His theories of the self, the external world, and belief—largely Hume's position—were also accepted by the school. In economics, the views of Ricardo and Malthus were adopted. As they held the theory of the iron law of wages, the only method of amelioration lay, they thought, in restraining the increase of population. Their general policy was one of laissez-faire, and this attitude was a contributory cause to their disappearance from politics. They returned some members to the first reformed parliament, but they were afterwards swallowed up in the Whigs.

iii. John Stuart Mill. J. S. Mill spoke of his father as 'the last of the 18th century.' He himself was a transition thinker, and many of his inconsistencies are explained by his endeavour to reconcile Benthamism and utilitarianism, as illustrated in his utilitarianism and his positions, or by saying that he was one of the two great fictional minds of England in this age.

J. S. Mill gradually moved away from the position of Bentham and his father. In 1863 came what he called 'a crisis in my mental history,' when he fell under the influence of German idealism.

1 'Never, indeed, firmware in the conviction that happiness is the test of all rules of conduct, and the end of life. But I now thought that this end was only to be obtained by not making the direct end. Those only are happy (I thought) who have their minds fixed on some object other than their own happiness; on the happiness of others, on the improvement of mankind, even on some art or pursuit, followed not as a means, but as an end in itself.'

In 1833 Mill published in the *London Review* an answer to Adam Sedgwick's criticism of Paley. Under the influence very largely of Sedgwick and of W. Whewell the theological utilitarianism of Bentham's followers in the school. In his reply to Sedgwick Mill indicated what was his own theory of human nature—that man is originally altruistic. After his father's death he spoke out more plainly, and in 1838 he appeared with the *London and Westminster Review* his 'Essay on Bentham.' The substance of his criticism of Bentham is that his reading of human nature was too narrow. He 'failed in deriving light from other minds by his own' utilitarian principles such as to furnish him with a 'correct and complete picture of man's nature and circumstances.'2 The influence of the idealism of Coleridge, Wordsworth, Carlyle, Sterling, and Maurice can be traced through the formative paragraphs of his later work. 'Man is never recognized by himself as being capable of pursuing spiritual perfection as an end; of desiring, for its own sake, the development of his own character to his standard of excellence, without hope of good or fear of evil from other men. More than this, no one has been interested in the limited form of Conscience, this great fact in human nature escapes him. Nothing is more curious than the absence of recognition in any of his writings of the existence of conscience, as a thing distinct from philanthropy, from affection for God or man, and from self-interest in this world or in the next.'3

In his small work *Utilitarianism* Mill united the two ends of pleasure and spiritual perfection by his theory of qualitative differences in pleasure, and conscience reappeared therein as the internal sanction to be opposed to Bentham's external sanctions. In an essay published in the *Westminster Review* in 1852, entitled 'Dr. Whewell on Moral Philosophy,' Mill, probably under the influence of James Mill, said, 'till, married, reverted to the narrower and more orthodox utilitarianism which he held in early life. This essay of Mill's, however, was only one move in the controversy between Bentham and his leaders of the school of 'Paley reversed.' That school, led by Sedgwick and Whewell, after superseding Paley in Cambridge, found itself confronted with a new Benthamism—a Benthamism which in the hands of Mill and his disciples, were developed by minds by means of a wider interpretation of human nature.

Mill's defence of utilitarianism which appeared in *Froude's Magazine* in 1861, and was published in book form in 1863, was largely directed against the Cambridge school.

1 'I must again repeat,' he said, 'that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete code of the ethics of utility. To do as one would be done by, and to love one's neighbor as oneself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality.'

2 As Sorely says, Mill claimed for utilitarianism that 'it is not selfish, because it regards the pleasures of others as the means of equalizing the number and value of pleasures, it is not sensual, because it recognizes the superior value of intellectual, artistic, and social pleasures as compared with those of the senses.'

3 Mill separated himself most completely from his predecessors in teaching that pleasures differ not only quantitatively but qualitatively. 'It is quite compatible,' he said, 'with the principle of utility to recognize the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others;' and again, in the oft-quoted words, 'it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied; better to be ourselves even if amiss, than to be others even if in the right.'
development. In Liberty his mind was turning that way when he took for the motto of his third chapter von Humboldt's saying, 'the end of man is . . . the highest and most harmonious development of the individual.' His paragraph on qualitative differences in pleasure contrasts, however, with his statement a few pages earlier in the Utilitarianism as to the theory of Duty. In the latter he said the utilitarian is thoroughly grounded—namely, that pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable things . . . are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain.\footnote{Utilitarianism, ib., p. 10.} Mill departed from Bentham also in his emphasis on the internal sanction of conscience, which he defined as 'a feeling in our own mind; a pain, more or less intense, attendant on violation of duty.'\footnote{Ib., p. 41.} That the growth of conscience was largely dependent on right education—on the attaching of the appropriate sanctions; and also psychologically it was to be explained by association, Mill held with Bentham. But he also held that the core of conscience was the 'social feelings of mankind.'\footnote{Ib., p. 65.} He reasoned, in his fellowship with our fellow creatures. . . . The social state is at once so natural, so necessary, and so habitual to man, that, except in some unusual circumstances or by an effort of voluntary abstraction, he never conceives himself otherwise than as a member of a body.\footnote{Ib.} Here he follows Hume and Hartley in attributing to man natural altruistic tendencies, in crediting him with 'sympathy,' as opposed to Bentham's theory of self-interest as the motive of action.

Mill's often criticized 'proof' of utilitarianism rested on the doctrine of psychological hedonism.\footnote{Ib., p. 34.}

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For fuller account of the Mills see art. MILL, JAMES AND JOHN STUART.

The most distinguished of Mill's younger associates was Alexander Bain of Aberdeen. Bain was described by the liberal philosopher as 'the man of most independent and unembarrassed mind; he was neither a philosopher nor a utilitarian, but a genuine and profound thinker.' The point of chief interest in his ethics is his treatment of disinterestedness. 'To obtain virtue in its highest purity, its noblest hue,' he said, 'we have to abstain from the mention of both punishment and reward.\footnote{Ib.} So far as I am aware, to the use of our disinterested impulses, they are wholly distinct from the attainment of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. They lead us, as I believe, to sacrifice pleasures, and incur pains, without any compensation.'\footnote{Ib.} Sorley says of Bain: 'He had no illusions except the great illusion that mind is a bundle of sensations tied together by laws of association.'\footnote{Ib.} In the light of this metaphysical theory of the self—with slight variations the accepted theory of the utilitarians—it is easier to understand the utilitarian conception of an end which is a succession of pleasant feelings, 'a sum of pleasures,' and which left reason out of account.

4. Evolutionary utilitarianism; Herbert Spencer and Leslie Stephen.—Spencer's ethical views are found chiefly in the first and last parts of the Social Statics and in The Principles of Ethics. The first part of the latter, The Data of Ethics, was published separately in 1879; the remainder of the Principles in 1882-83. The Social Statics was published in 1851, eight years before Darwin's Origin of Species. But even at that date the evolutionary hypothesis had taken hold of Spencer's mind—it was in the air. He was led by his investigations into the origin of species, by his researches into the variation of forms found in different natural surroundings, by his emphasis on the principle of natural selection as explaining these variations, gave a wide-spread currency to the evolutionary theory. Nor must the part which A. Russel Wallace played be forgotten. Darwin also saw, however, that natural selection alone would not explain evolved conduct, for this . . . more evolved conduct is, the smaller a part does natural selection play, because civilised society protects the unfit and does not allow them to be exterminated. This difficulty is overcome by the—now largely discarded—hypothesis of the transmissibility of acquired characters. Evolution by natural selection—or, in his own phrase, 'survival of the fittest'—and by means of the transmission of acquired characters was for Spencer the explanatory and synthesizing principle of all knowledge.

Ethics, however, was Spencer's main interest. Everything else led up to this. For his ethics see art. SPENCER, HERBERT, 2 (5).

Our concern here is with the relation of Spencer's ethical system to utilitarianism. We have to see why he himself called it 'rational utilitarianism' as opposed to the empirical utilitarianism of Mill, and why it is generally known as evolutionary utilitarianism. Spencer's opposition was directed against the method of utilitarianism, not against its greatest happiness principle. He accepted pleasance as the good, though even here he was not consistent.\footnote{Ib. Life is good or bad, he said, 'according as it does, or does not, bring a surplus of agreeable feeling.'} The good, he unhesitatingly called 'pleasure.' Pleasure is the end and is 'as much a necessary form of moral intuition as space is a necessary.
form of intellectual intuition.' But Spencer was an evolutionist as well as a utilitarian, and at other times he had defined 'intuition as the perception of a human society' or 'quantity of life measured in breadth as well as length.' It is true that he stated that conduct tending to preservation of life was good because life involved a 'surplus of agreeable feeling.' The preference was for utilitarianism, which should conduct to preservation of the individual, of the family, and of the society, only supposing that life brings more happiness than misery. This supposition is not a series of detached acts, he said, in each of which a man can calculate the sum of happiness or misery attainable by different causes. Like Spencer he held that the evolved state was necessarily a happy one. The radical criticism of Stephen's theory, as of all evolutionary theories of ethics, is that he took what is, namely the trend of evolution, and identified it with the ideal, with what ought to be.

5. Rational utilitarianism; Henry Sidgwick.

E. Albee in his History of English Utilitarianism, published in 1902, spoke of Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics as 'the last authoritative utterance of traditional utilitarianism.' Though his system, Sidgwick differed in some ways from all his predecessors. He was 'a Utilitarian,' but 'on an intuitional basis.' He found in certain fundamental 'intuitions' the basis of his system, whereas the earlier utilitarians were opposed to all forms of intuitionism, though in J. S. Mill a new spirit of understanding and appreciation of the rival school had begun to show itself. Sidgwick, further, though an adherent to the discarded psychological hedonism, which had formed part of the stock-in-trade of preceding utilitarian writers, including J. S. Mill.

Sidgwick's analysis of the nature of desire was very similar to Butler's. 'Our conscious active impulses,' he said, 'are so far from being always directed towards the attainment of pleasure or avoidance of pain for ourselves, that we can find everywhere in consciousness extra-regarding impulses, directed towards something that is not pleasure, nor relief from pain. He naturally discarded also the utilitarian theory that extra-regarding impulses were not primary but were due to 'association' and 'translation.'

'to what I may call my own school, to Hume, Bentham, the Mills, G. H. Lewes, and Mr. Herbert Spencer. Indeed not following Spencer in defining the good as length and breadth of life; he defined it as the 'health of the social organism.' Society may be regarded as an organism,' he said. This organism is several in the social tissue, modified in various ways so as to form the organs adapted to various specific purposes. The working of evolution could be seen in the social organism.'

Leslie Stephen was opposed, like Spencer, to the hedonistic and evolutionary view. Life is not a series of detached acts, he said, 'in each of which a man can calculate the sum of happiness or misery attainable by different causes.' Like Spencer he held that the evolved state was necessarily a happy one. The radical criticism of Stephen's theory, as of all evolutionary theories of ethics, is that he took what is, namely the trend of evolution, and identified it with the ideal, with what ought to be.

1 Principles, ch. ii. § 9.
2 Autobiography, ii. 58.
3 Social Statics, i. vi. 1.
4 Jb. i. iii. § 2.
5 Preface, p. vii.
6 Preface to the 6th and subsequent editions of The Methods of Ethics.
7 The Methods of Ethics, 1. iv. 52.
8 Jb. i. iv. 53.
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amounted to little more than the acceptance of what purported to be the verdict of common sense. He arrived too rapidly at the conclusion that the good was desirable sentient life, and from that it was no great step to define it as

Sidgwick found a second principle—the maxim of prudence, that 'one ought to aim at one's own good on the whole'—to be as fundamental as that of utility. This maxim, when one's own good or pleasure is emphasized rather than good 'on the whole,' brought confusion into Sidgwick's theory. He admitted that there were times when a choice had to be made between individual and general pleasure and when all mundane sanctions failed to reconcile them. To rationalize his system a harmony between universal and particular reason had to be shown. This harmony depended on the existence of a supernatural Being. Unable to accept the Christian faith and gaining no positive assurance from psychical research of an all-good and all-powerful Being, Sidgwick left his system with the dualism in it unresolved. For a further account of Sidgwick's ethics see art. SIDGWICK (HENRY).

6. Present-day utilitarianism.—Little has to be said about utilitarianism since the time of Henry Sidgwick. To-day it is not a theory of paramount importance in ethics. As J. S. Mackenzie says, it is still the dominant view among writers on economics, but it has ceased to have much hold on English ethical thought. 1 To him, utilitarianism can be distinguished. One contains Sidgwick's disciples. E. E. Constance Jones, who may be taken as representative of this school, has under the title Rational Hedonism re-stated Sidgwick's position and met objections to it. 2 Another school, that of the rationalist utilitarians, has found a spokesman in J. M. Robertson. In his Short History of Moral Robertson calls Sidgwick's ethical logic inconclusive, 'leaving as it did that earnest thinker conscious of a need for a future state.' 3 There is, however, an unresolved antagonism in Robertson's own theory. For, while accepting the greatest happiness principle as the ethical end, he says, 'there can be no stronger "obligation" than that of following your own happiness as you see it.' The two ends, he thinks, would often be in harmony owing to the individual's natural altruistic tendencies, or to pressure exerted by society or the working of conscience. A man 'cannot, unless he is abnormally selfish, escape discomfort in knowledge of suffering or injustice or failure in reciprocity.' But what of the 'abnormally selfish' man? In Robertson's theory, no blame, in the ethical sense, attaches to him for his failure to act for the common good. He is what he is through no fault of his own. The criminal is the result of 'pathological conditions,' or a 'product of maleducation or stress of circumstances.' Free will is demolished and with it moral responsibility.

1 For the critical utilitarian... the bad character remains bad, baseness remains baseness, the liar a liar, the thief a thief; and his task is simply to try to guard himself and society against each form of evil in the best way, as society acts against the madman, in whose case even the free-willer recognizes the physical causation. 2 And what of the man, not necessarily abnormally selfish, who is in spite of the discomforts of our actions contrary to the interests of others, doing what appears to himself to be for his own pleasure? He is, on Robertson's principles, doing that which is his own strongest 'obligation'; nor does any blame

I. INTRODUCTION.—1. The utilitarian theory of duty.—Utilitarianism failed signalily in dealing with duty. It tended to 'identify duty with coercion; to change the "ought" if not into a physical "must" at least into a moral "must" of fear of pain and hope of pleasure.' 1 This was the natural outcome of the psychological hedonism on which the ethical theory was based. Bentham said of pleasure and pain that it was for them alone not only 'to point out what we ought to do' but 'to determine what we shall do.' 2 On this basis he was consistent in adding in the Dictionary that it was 'very idle to talk about duties,' and that 'ought is a word that ought to be banished from our vocabulary.'

According to psychological hedonism, all desire was desire for pleasure, and the strongest desire excited by the keenest pleasure moved to action. Bain said:

'Wherever two present sensations dictate opposite courses, there is an experiment upon the relative strength of the two. The resulting volume of one is stronger, and is the ultimate canon of appeal.' 3

On such a foundation as this no scope is left for the concept of moral obligation.

But the consciousness of duty could not be ignored—the consciousness of something higher than and conflicting with inclination, in the light of which inclination 'ought' to be suppressed. Utilitarians accordingly dealt with the duty consciousness empirically by explaining its genesis and function. It owed its origin, they said, to sanctions external or internal; pleasures and pains so attached to acts that the individual forbore to follow his first inclination and to act for his own selfish interest, and acted for the interests of all. Now there is no doubt that an individual is brought to a consciousness of moral obligation and to a knowledge of particular duties through social influences. It is not here, but in its account of the ultimate nature of moral obligation, that the utilitarian explanation is inadequate.

Later utilitarianism, as represented by Sidgwick and his school, was not hampered by psychological hedonism. Sidgwick said:

'It seems that the notion of "ought" or "moral obligation"... does not merely import (1) that there exists in the mind of the person judging a specific emotion... nor (2) that certain rules of conduct are laid down which will follow on their violation... What then, it may be asked, does it import? What is the definition of the "right," or "right," and other terms expressing the same fundamental notion? To this I should answer that the notion which these terms have in common is too elementary to admit of any formal definition.'

Sidgwick thus refused to resolve the "ought" into anything else. As we have seen in the account of the views of J. M. Robertson, rationalist utilitarianism has no place in its system for moral obligation. The "ought," as understood by the ordinary moral consciousness, is excluded from any determinist system. For this reason, it is not certain that on a thoroughgoing analysis of the system of Sidgwick and his school any logical place would be found for the concept of moral obligation.

2. Motive and intention.—The controversy as to whether the proper object of moral praise and blame is 'motive' ('spring of action') or 'intention' (the object of desire) is a bitter one. 'An action done from duty,' Kant said, 'derives its moral worth, not from the purpose which is to be obtained by it, but from the maxin by which it

2 Bentham, Principles, i. 1
3 The Emotions and the Will, London, 1840, p. 401.
4 The Methods of Ethics, i. iii. 31 f.
5 The Utilitarians, art. SIDGWICK (HENRY), vol. xi. p. 500, and arts. in J.F. f. and elsewhere.

4 Th. p. 307.
5 Th. p. 449.
is determined.1 In opposition to this we have the utilitarian position. 'There is no such thing,' Bentham said, 'as any sort of moral that is in itself bad. All moral right and wrong depends entirely upon the consequences, what to do. And J. S. Mill holds that the moral right and wrong depends entirely upon the intention.2 'Intention' Mill defined as 'what the agent wills to do,' as opposed to motive, 'the feeling which makes him wish to do it.' It is important to note that Bentham and the Millis were entirely consistent in holding that moral quality did not lie in motive. On their own theory, that pleasure was the only motive, they could have come to no other conclusion.

'Let a man's motive be ill-will; call it even malice, envy, cruelty; it is still a kind of pleasure that is his motive: the pleasure he takes at the thought of the pain which his own or any one whose he expects to see, his adversary undergo. Now even this wretched pleasure, taken by itself, is good.4

The sharp line drawn by utilitarianism between motive and intention has had a considerable influence. It has tended to induce other moral theories which rested on a truer psychological basis to make a separation between motive and intention, attributing moral quality to one only. Secondly, it has tended to make morality external. With regard to the first point the truer attitude seems to be. With regard motive and intention as distinguishable but not separable—as the effective and ideational sides of the same thing—and to hold that moral judgment belongs to the two taken together. This was the whole moral position of Bentham's definition of motive and intention puts this well: 'Intention is the outcome foreseen and wanted; motive, this outcome as foreseen and wanted.'5

With regard to the second point, utilitarianism, finding no real quality to reside in consequences, though in 'attempted' consequences, made morality an external thing. According to Mill:

'The morality of the action depends entirely upon the intention—that is, upon what the agent wills to do. But the motive, that is, the feeling which makes him will to do what he does, makes no difference in the act, makes none in the morality: though it makes a great difference in our moral estimation of the agent, especially if it indicates a good or a bad habitual disposition—a bent of character from which useful, or from which hurtful actions are likely to arise.'6

The last part of this paragraph seems to point to character as the final object of moral judgment, and to make it a good in itself. This, however, is illusory. At the end of ch. iv. Mill states the position clearly in the following words:

'The object of the will must be right to do right means to good, not intrinsically a good; and does not contradict the doctrine that nothing is a good to human beings but in so far as it is either itself pleasant, or a means of attaining pleasure or averting pain.7

3. The hedonistic calculus.—J. M. Robertson says that the great task which faces moralists to-day is a system of 'applied ethics.'8 Utilitarianism professes to supply a scientific calculus—the hedonistic calculus of Bentham—which renders this system of applied ethics possible.

Bentham summed up his schema of mensuration in the lines:

\[
\text{Intense, long, certain, speedy, fruitful, pure—}
\text{Sensations of pleasure and in palatable endure.}
\]

Such pleasures seek, if private be thy end:
If it be public, wide let them extend.
Such pains avoid, whichever be thy view:
If pains must come, let them extend to few.1

While still adopting Bentham's calculus, most of his successors pleaded not for a fresh inquiry into every act but for rules founded on well-considered utility.

Is the utilitarian calculus theoretically possible? Some moralists, including J. S. Mackenzie, have denied that it is possible. The calculus implies that a quantitative judgment is applicable to pleasures, that a certain intensity can be balanced by a certain duration of pleasure. The difficulty about the calculus, however, is not theoretical but practical. There is no known unit of mensuration. Further, pleasure-pain values vary according to persons, times, and circumstances. Albee says that the one really fatal objection to the calculus in his opinion is that urged by Spencer in the Social Statics that 'there would necessarily be an important shifting of the scale of hedonic values with every stage of intellectual or moral progress (or decadence) in the order of the individual, the community, the nation, or the race.'2 This practical difficulty, the lack of scientific precision, is intensified when we remember that the pleasure-pain consequences have to be estimated for all who engage in the calculation, all the persons, the individual, the community, the nation, or the race.3

Who are these? Our own family? Our fellow-countrymen? The present generation? Or must we act so as to promote the welfare of future generations? J. S. Mill did not limit happiness to mankind. The good act is one by which happiness is 'to the greatest extent possible, secured to all mankind; and not to them only, but, so far as the nature of things admits, to the whole sentient creation.'4 This widening of the scope of the calculus is in keeping with the modern conception of organic life as a whole. In practice, however, utilitarians have narrowed the scope of the calculus, which seems to point to its failure as a scientific rule.

4. Pleasure the ethical end.—Against those utilitarians who said that pleasure was the only thing which could be desired some critics of utilitarianism have held that pleasure cannot be the object of desire at all, and that, if not an object of desire, it cannot be the ethical end. It seems, however, truer to hold that pleasure may be desired, and other things that pleasures may be, and often are, desired because they are pleasant. Nor should we, with Green, deny the possibility of a 'sum of pleasures' as the ethical end, for by this is meant no more than pleasure lasting as long as possible and as intense as possible.

The first criticism of pleasure as the ethical end that must be made is that it lacks the quality of virtue which the moral consciousness demands in the good and affords no explanation of the essence of the particular virtues. Huxley's statement, 'If it can be shown by observation or experiment that theft, murder and adultery do not tend to diminish the holiness of the person, they, in the absence of any but natural knowledge, they are not social immorality,' has simply to be denied. J. S. Mill's admission of a qualitative difference in pleasures is really an admission that for moral conduct one must transcend pleasure as either the supreme standard or the supreme good. Further, as Green said, there must be permanence in the ethical end. Pleasure does not fulfill this requisite.

4. Utilitarianism, p. 17.
The ancient city of Vāsāli (Visālā of Ramāyaṇa) was equally sacred to the Jains and the Buddhists long ago. It is now represented unquestionably by the village named Basār or Basārī (not Basar or Bāsār, as in nearly all books), situated in the Hajipur subdivision of the Muzaffarpur District of the Bihar and Orissa Province, in 25° 59' N. and 85° 8' E. The site of the city occupies a space about ten miles in circuit, which includes several villages besides Basār and many ruined mounds. The most interesting group of remains, situated near the village of Bakhirā at the north-west corner of the site, probably stands outside the line of the city walls, which, so far as is known, appear to have been built of mud, not masonry. The largest and most prominent mound, evidently the site of the fortified palace or headquarters of the local ruler, stands in the south-east corner of the city area and is called Bisalgarh, 'the fort of Kajā Bīśālī,' the eponymous hero of the place. The village of Basārī is on the south and south-west of that mound. The identity of Vāsāli with the group of remains associated with the village of Basārī is conclusively proved by the survival of the ancient name with only slight modifications; by geographical bearings taken from Patna and other places; by topographical details as compared with the description recorded by Hiuen-Tsiang (Yuan-Chiaw), the Chinese pilgrim in the 7th cent.; and by the finding on the spot of sealings of letters inscribed with the name Vasiśa. The documents, which were addressed to officials and other residents, have totally disappeared. The sealings found number about 1000, of which two or three bear the name of the town. The collection ranges in date from about 200 B.C. to A.D. 500, and is of much interest for many reasons, but need not be further described here, as it gives no information concerning the history of religion.

1 H. Barker, in Mind, 1899, p. 418.
2 L. I. 47, sc. 13 in Schlegel’s text.

Although the site of Vāsāli has been visited and described by three professional archaeologists, Cunningham, Bloch, and Spooner, their explorations, owing to limitations of opportunity, have been extremely slight and superficial, so that in reality very little is known concerning the local remains of antiquity. The area of the city offered tempting possibilities for future inquirers. No distinct local tradition of the ancient glories of the city has survived. The identity of the site has been completely forgotten by the people, and is known only to a few students of Indian antiquities. No pilgrims visit the ruins, and no consideration of the ancient town or shrine exists among them. Yet few places in India have stronger claims upon the veneration of both Jains and Buddhists. Vardhamāṇa Mahāvīra, commonly spoken of as the founder of the Jain Church, belonged to a noble family of Vasiśa, where he was born and spent all his earlier life. After he had entered upon the ascetic career, he is said to have resided in his native town or the immediate neighbourhood for twelve rainy seasons, during which travelling was unlawful for persons of his profession. The Jain scriptures often mention Vasiśa. The archaeologists have not sought for Jain remains on the site, and nothing in their reports would lead the reader to suppose that the Basārī area was the birthplace of Jains, as it is known to moderns. Brāhmanical tradition ignores Vasiśa almost completely, and no remarkable event in the history of orthodox Hinduism seems to be connected with the locality, although in the 7th cent. the territory of which Vasiśa was the capital contained several scores of Hindu temples, besides hundreds of Buddhist stūpas and vihāras, which have been obliterated and deserted. The Jain establishments at that time were still numerous, and remains of them must survive. Nobody has thought of even looking for them. Such attention as the site has received has been bestowed almost exclusively on efforts to trace Buddhist holy places described by Hiuen-Tsang.

1 The best account of the life of Mahāvīra is that in ch. III. of Mrs. Sinclair Stuart’s The Heart of Jainism, which gives a summary of the conflicting legends of the various sects. See also II. Jacob, Jainas Sutras, pt. 1. (SBE xvii.), and art. JAINAS.
Vaisesika

Tsang. The discovery of the sealings mentioned above was accidental in the first instance. The earlier Chinese pilgrim, Fa-Hian, who visited Vaisali at the beginning of the 5th cent., mentions only a few of the most notable sacred buildings which were then standing. His account implies that in his time the city was inhabited and that the holy places were maintained. The sealings establish beyond doubt the fact that during the reign of Chandragupta II. (c. A.D. 375-413), at the time when Fa-Hian was travelling, Vaisali was an important place, governed by a prince of the imperial Gupta family. It was in the province of Tirra or Drabhukti, the modern Thirutt. The decay of the city and the gradual desertion of the Buddhist institutions took place in the interval between A.D. 405 and 637, the approximate respective dates of the visits of Fa-Hian and Huen-Tsang. The ruin of the city may be ascribed to the decline of the Gupta power and the troubles connected with the Hun invasions of the 5th and 6th centuries. Nothing is known concerning the local history between the days of Buddha, about 500 B.C., and the visit of Fa-Hian nine centuries later.

In the time of Buddha Vaisali was the capital of the Lichchhavis, a tribe, people, or nation who were regarded as descendants of the Vaisali sect of the Vaishali nation. But Huen-Tsang distinguishes the Vaisali territory from the Vyri country to the north-east, roughly equivalent to the modern Darbhanga District. The origin and affinities of the Lichchhavis, who certainly were foreigners, afford much room for speculation. Spooner seems to suggest that they were domiciled Persians. The writer of this paper believes that they were a mixed Mongolian race, akin to the Tibetans and other Himalayan peoples. They had many peculiar customs, quite different from those of ordinary Hindus. Manu 1 treats them as Vrišya Kṣatriyas, who did not observe fully Hindu dharmas. They lived under the government of an aristocratic oligarchy or senate, of which the president was called king. The legendary splendours of their capital are often mentioned in Buddhist books. The Dūlta, or Tibetan Vinaya, thus describes them:

"There were three districts in Vaiśali. In the first district were 70,000 houses with golden towers; in the middle district were 14,000 houses with silver towers; and in the last district were 21,000 houses with copper towers; in these lived the upper, middle, and lower classes, respectively." 2

The city was imagined as a kind of earthly paradise, beautified by splendid buildings and charming parks, in which countless birds made melody. The Lichchhavis were believed to have lived in a round of continuous festivities. The chiefs waged war with both the Bimbisāra and Ajātashatru, the kings of Magadha with whom Buddha had dealings. The city, according to an early tradition in the Dūlta, was reckoned among the six great cities, the other five being Śravasti, Saketa, Champa, Vārānasī (Benares), and Rājagaha.

The political pre-eminence of Vaiṣali at an earlier period is indicated by the strange story in the Bhuddha-Sāla Jātaka. 3 We are told that the wife of Bandhula, commander-in-chief of the Śravasti kingdom, felt a longing instinct to the condition of pregnancy, and insisted on her lord taking her to Vaiṣali because, she said, 'I desire to go and bathe in the waters of the Śravasti city where there is one place of the kingdom where the king may get water for the ceremonial sprinkling.' 4 Although it is impossible to explain the allusion fully, it is clear that the water from the sacred tank at Vaiṣali was regarded as the last resort in the law and consecration of 'the kings' wherever they may have been. The LichchhAVISIS at a later period were Vaiṣali and Bimbisāra.

Vaiṣali stood on the ancient royal road leading from Pātaliputra (Patna) to Nāpāl, the line of which is marked by four Āsoka pillars and other notable ancient remains. The city thus was in direct communication with the imperial capital and with many places of high importance in the olden time. The distance from Patna is about 27 miles in a direction a little west of north. The Lichchhavis were the only city distant enough to dwell for about eight centuries from 500 B.C. to A.D. 300, when they reappear as the source from which Chandragupta I. (q.v.), the founder of the imperial Gupta dynasty derived. That chief married a Lichchhavi princess, and his powerful son, Samudragupta (c. A.D. 330-375), habitually described himself as the 'son of the daughter of the Lichchhavi.' Probably the Lichchhavis of Vaiṣali had been subject to the suzerainty of the Kusans, had become independent when the Indo-Scythian dynasty waned, and then had made themselves masters of Pātaliputra. Their own city certainly flourished.

1. Thereafter, for the discussion of this subject the reader is referred to the references given in the Introduction of the forthcoming volume of the Lichchhavi excavations, by the late Mr. Hoernle, F.R.S. 2. N. 465 of Cambridge tr., vol. iv. p. 94. 3. See art. COSMIA (Buddhist).
therefore introduce an entirely new element into the world of Brāhmaṇ thought. Further, both systems in their common definition and arrangement of logical ideas upon which their influence and fame depend. These common characteristics have led to a complete fusion of the two systems in the later philosophical literature of India, and to a failure to distinguish Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya doctrines on the part of earlier European students of Indian thought. Now, however, for a better understanding of the systems, we must enable us to determine the original distinction of the two systems. The Nyāya used to be regarded erroneously as the earlier, and it is only recently that the priority of the Vaiśeṣika has been recognized.

Its founder bears the name of Kanāda, Kanābhāṣka, or Kanāgabhū. All three names have the same meaning, viz. 'devourer of atoms'; whence it follows that these names must have originally denoted a system of mockery bestowed on account of the atomistic character of the Vaiśeṣika doctrines. The atomlessnicknames, which in course of time have become real names, are often met with in the Indian world of letters. Kanāda is supposed to have composed his text-book, the Vaiśeṣikākāra, between 500 and 400 B.C. He is supposed to have been the inventor of a system, a part of which, or all of which may be known, and for that purpose assumes six categories, which in his judgment comprehend all existing things. In discussing these categories and their subdivisions, he treats of the most diverse problems, especially in cosmology and psychology, so that a complete system of philosophy is built up upon his doctrine of the categories. The following are the categories: 1. substance (dravya); 2. quality (guna); 3. movement or action (karanam); 4. association (samādhyā); 5. difference (viśeṣa); 6. inherence (saṃveṣa).

To the category of substance are assigned: earth (i.e. all organic and inorganic substances with the exception of the remaining four elements), water, fire, air, ether, time, space, soul, and the organ of thought (manas). To begin with, it appears to us strange that time and space are included among substances. Kanāda's conception of substance, however, is wider than ours; he intends by it that which has qualities and movement, and is the immediate basis of phenomena. The resemblance of the category to the nature of time and space, to which Kant was the first to give a final answer, is discussed, strangely enough, only incidentally and occasionally, in the whole of Indian philosophy. In this respect the Sāṅkhyā philosophy has made a distinct advance, in that it regards time and space as two qualities of the eternal matter regarded as a unity.

The exposition of the category of substance affords Kanāda the opportunity of setting forth his atomic doctrine, which is derived from Buddhist sources. This has been shown by W. Handt in his treatise on the Vaiśeṣika philosophy. According to the doctrine of Kanāda, the atoms of earth, water, fire, and air are eternal and uncreated. Although they themselves have no extension, their heterogeneous nature is the cause of the extension and visibility of the combinations of atoms. How this is to be understood, and where the visibility of these combinations begins, on these points Kanāda himself—apart from the silence of the Vaiśeṣikākāra—does not seem to have provided any definite views. Later teachers of the school set forth the theory that an aggregate of three atoms (try-ānuka)—others say, of three double atoms (dev-āyuka)—possesses extension; when it is visible, the shape of the dust mote (trasaṃreṇa) dancing in the sunlight.

The whole of this doctrine is vigorously combated in the philosophical works of the Vedánta and Sāṅkhyā, and indeed for reasons obvious on both sides. The adherents of these two systems assert that, if the individual atoms are possessed of extension, the aggregate cannot be extended: for every quality of a product is determined by the similar quality of its material cause. The cosmogeny of the two systems of Vaiśeṣika system depends upon its theory of the atoms. It is also dominated by the wide-spread Indian conception, that periods of creation and destruction of the universe follow one another in regular order; and on each occasion the evolution and decay of the universe are effected in the same way and by the same causes. The following explanations are in conformity with the exposition of W. Handt, only that they do not begin, as he does, with the dissolution of the universe, but with its development.

During the period of dissolution, by which, however, the three infinitely great and therefore eternal and unchanging substances, ether, space, and time, are unaffected, no combination of the four elements of gross matter takes place, nor any union between the numberless individual souls and the atoms. But the soul possesses an element in a latent condition in the shape of dispositions. When the retributive force of merit and demerit with all its inevitable consequences, which here also, just as in the other systems of Indian philosophy, is the power that urges the universe on its course, is again aroused, the period of dissolution comes at once to an end. The souls therefore unite afresh with the atoms; and by this means a movement is started in the universe which marks the beginning of a new creation of the material universe. This movement first originates in the atoms of the air, giving rise to double atoms, and through them to the gross matter by which &c. forth and fills space. Thereupon within the elements of air the atoms of water combine together, whence in the same way the great ocean of the universe is produced. Within this ocean again the earth atoms come together, and form after the rise of double and triple atoms the solid mass of the firm earth. Finally, the element of fire comes into being, its atoms also combining in the same way within the water. The resulting fire is divided into the fiery element, which in a certain sense represents the guard that restrains the destructive force of the fiery element, in order that its destroying power may be prevented from interfering with the organic course of the evolution of the universe. After the material universe has thus come into being, empirical existence begins afresh for the souls. These unite with bodies in accordance with the consequences of their work, still unconquered from the preceding world-cycle; and in a new series of existences leap up for themselves merit and guilt, and earn reward and punishment until the cycle comes to an end. In the Sāṅkhyā philosophy, a cause is assigned compelling the dissolution of the universe; but in the Vaiśeṣika the process of its dissolution is accounted for in a very remarkable way. By their continual wandering through numberless souls the souls are so weakened and exhausted that they need a long period to recruit. Just as living creatures upon earth after the sufferings and toils of the day sink at night to sleep, and remain in their tins unoccupied and with their experience of pleasure or pain, so a universal night spreads over the universe, wherein the individual souls may recover from the sufferings of the saṃsāra. Further, a remarkable explanation is not possible in a system which,

1 Die atomistische Grundlage der Vaiśeṣika-Philosophie nach den Quellen dargestellt, Rostock, 1900.

VAISNAVISM

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like the Sankhya, maintained that souls were
Only a soul that actually
destitute of qualities.
experiences, wills, and knows could be thought of
as in a condition of exhaustion. That, in fact, the
Vaisesika philosophy does conceive of souls as
endowed with qualities of their own will be understood from a consideration of the second category.
The process of the dissolution of the universe
goes on, then, in the following manner. The affections disappear which are evoked by the action of
merit and demerit in the individual souls, and
which form the bond between body, the senses,
and the external world. The motive force therefore is restrained which maintains the cycle of
existence. The bond is consequently broken which
exists by the power of merit and demerit between

the material atoms and individual souls. The four
atomic elements are now dissolved in regular succession, the earth in water, the water in fire, the
fire in air.
The process of the dissolution of the
atomic elements is effected in the reverse order to
that of the formation of the material products from
the atoms, affecting first the triple atoms, and after
their destruction, when only double atoms remain,
seizing in turn upon these, so that finally each of
the four elements maintains its existence in the
form of isolated atoms.
From this stateinent of the cosmology of the
Vaisesika system, which the original texts present
in connexion with the category of substance, we
turn to the category of quality. This category
comprises the ideas of colour, taste, smell, toucn
(together Avith temperature), number, extension,
individuality, connexion, separation, priority, posteriority, knowledge, joy, pain, desire, aversion,
and will. This list bahkaramisra enlarges in his
commentary on VaiSesikasutra I. i. 6, with seven
other qualities, which, though included in the
seventeen preceding, yet in his opinion deserve
special mention.
They are weight, fluidity,
adhesiveness, sound (the characteristic quality of
the ether, which is the medium of the undulations),
after-effect (or self-reproduction, samskdra, manifesting itself in three ways, as continuance of movement in obedience to a given impulse, elasticity,
and memory), finally, merit and demerit.
It will be seen that this enumeration comprises
mental as well as material properties. This affords
Kanada an opportunity under the category of
quality of developing his psychology.
Contrary
to the philosophical teaching of the Vedanta and
Sankhya, mental qualities according to the
Vaisesika system are attached directly to the soul,
as has been indicated above, but only in the form
of dispositions.
For no psychological process is
possible for the soul that finds itself in an isolated
condition.
It is only in consequence of the soul's
union with the organ of thought [manas) that its
faculties are capable of activity.
Both souls and
the organ of thought are eternal substances but
the soul is all-pervading, i.e. not bound down to
time and space, while the organ of thought is an
atom. The latter is the intermediary between the
soul and the senses, since urged by the soul it
betakes itself on each occasion to that sense
through which the soul desires to perceive or to
act (for the capacities of walking, speaking, etc.,
are, according to the Indian view, comprised under
the idea of the senses a distinction is therefore
made between the senses of perception and action).
Thus the organ of thought contmues to move as
long as it is actuated by a process of perception or
a bodily activity. If it rests motionless in the soul,
the union of the latter with the senses ends, and no
perception or act or experience is possible.
Kanada declares the organ of thought to be
an atom, because in his view different perceptions or other psychological processes do not take
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place simultaneously, but always one after the
other, though frequently in exceedingly swift sucOn account of its minute size as an atom
cession.
the organ of thought can unite at any given instant
only with a single sense, and can only convey the
idea of a single object. If the organ of thought
were omnipresent like the soul, or if the soul
could enter into immediate relation with the
objects of knowledge, aU objects would be simultaneously perceived. As the organ of thought, on
the one hand, imparts the quickening power to the
soul, so, on the other, it acts as a kind of ciieck by
preventing the soul from exercising more than one
function at the same time.
The subdivisions of the third and fourth categories, those of movement (or action) and association, are of little significance. Difference, the fifth
category, on the contrary, holds an important place
in the Vaisesika system, inasmuch as by virtue of
it the difference of the atoms renders possible the
formation of the universe. The name, therefore, of
the entire system, Vaisesika, is derived from the

word

for ditt'erence (vi^esa).

From

the very beginning, the sixth category,
inherence (or inseparability), the enunciation of
which reflects great credit on the insight of
Kanada, attracted the attention of Sanskrit
scholars.
This conception is clearly distinguished
from that of occasional or separable connexion,
which is regarded as a subdivision of the category
The relation expressed by inherence
of quality.
subsists, for example, between the whole and its
parts, the genus and the species, the particular
object and the general idea with which it is
associated, between a thing and its properties,
between movement and that which is moved.
Later teachers added to these six categories a
This conception is one
seventh, non-existence.
which has proved very injurious not only to the
development of logic, but also to philosophical
speculation in the later works of all schools. Bearing in mind the negative tendency of all Indian
thinking, we can readily understand how Indian
philosophers were led to work out this idea with
Of this the division
ever-increasing refinement.
of the category of non-existence into four subInstead of
divisions furnishes a ready proof.
prior nonfuture existence the Indian says
for
past
posterior non-existence
existence ;
existence.' The simple relation existing between
two things that are not identical (to give the usual
example, between a pot and a cloth) is described
as 'mutual (or reciprocal) non-existence,' and the
actual impossibility of a thing (as of the son of a
barren woman) as absolute non-existence.'
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M. Monier-Williams, Indian
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L. Suali, Introdtczivne alio studio
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sika System, Amsterdam, 1918 Sarva-darSana-saiiyraha, ch. x.,
Vaisesika Aphorisms,
tr. by Cowell and Gough"^, London, 1894
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R. GaKBE.
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VAISNAVISM.— I.
'Vaisnava'

is

applied

Introductory.— The term
to

that

Hindu

sect the

which worship in a special way Visnu,
as contrasted with the two other greater ^ects, the
Saiva, or worshippers of Siva, and the Sakta, or

members

of

worshippers of ^akti, the female personification of
energy. Their worship is not to be confounded
with the orthodox worship paid by the higher
classes of Hindus to Visnu as their individual
patron deity (ishta-devata). Like Saivism, Vaisnavism is a form of monotheism, tlie setting aside of
the triune equality of Brahma, Siva, and Visnu in
favour of a single god.
No attempt has been made at the more recent
enumerations to collect statistics of the numbers
I'ow of the rural classes follow any
of these sects.


distinctive sect, and it has been found impossible to record the numbers of their adherents with any approach to precision.  

3. The development of the worship of Viṣṇu.—Since the Vedic period the development of the cult of Viṣṇu has undergone many modifications. Though he is an important deity in the mythology of the tenth book of the Mahābhārata, he holds a subordinate position in the Rigveda; his essential feature being that he takes three strides, interpreted by some authorities to mean the rising, culminating, and setting of the sun, but more probably meaning the three successive deities through the three divisions of the universe. The later development of his personality has been fully investigated by R. G. Bhandarkar, who traces its stages as follows: in the 5th cent. B.C. a religious reform arose like that which gave origin to Buddhism and Jainism, but based on theistic principles; this soon assumed a sectarian type in the form of the Pāñcarātra or Bhāgavata religion; this, again, was combined with the cult of Nārāyaṇa, the "resting-place or goal of gods"; soon after the Christian era the Áhūtra tribe of shepherds contributed to it their tribal hero Kṛṣṇa; in the 6th cent. this faith, the predominant characteristic of which was devotion, or love, came into contact with the doctrine of spiritual monism and world-illusion promulgated by Sāṅkara-chāryya (q. v.); the hostility to spiritual monism, especially that of the Pāñcarātra, which was brought by the Rāmānuja (q. v.) made strenuous efforts to displace it by the religion of bhākta in a re-invigorated form; he was followed in the north by Nimbārka, who advocated the cow-herd element and enjoyed the cult of Rādā, mistress of Kṛṣṇa; the same policy was continued in the 13th cent. by Madhva or Anāndatīrtha, who established the doctrine of pluralism and brought into prominence the name of Viṣṇu as supreme god; in the north Rāmānādava added the cult of Rāma, and his successor Rāmānuja that of Nārāyaṇa; Kāśī in the 15th cent. preached strict monolothism, the cult of Kṛṣṇa, and condemned idolatry; Vallāhī in the 16th cent. founded the erotic cult of Kṛṣṇa and Rādā, and Chaitānya in Bengal that of the boy Kṛṣṇa and Rādā, a corruption which led to the degradation of Viṣṇavism; in the Deccan Nārāmānava and Tukārām discarded the worship of Kṛṣṇa-Rādā, cultivated a more sober type of worship, disseminated their ideas not in Sanskrit but in the vernacular languages, preached pure love of God, and endeavored to unite the heart and morals as a necessary to salvation.

3. Viṣṇu and his incarnations.—Viṣṇavism has thus developed on several distinct lines according as the object of devotion, Viṣṇu, varies in his manifestations, incarnations, or "descents" (avataṃ). This theory tends towards syncretism, the absorption of the lower animal-gods or totems of the more primitive tribes into the Brāhmaṇical pantheon. The incarnations of Viṣṇu are sometimes enumerated as six, ten, or twenty in number; but those of Kṛṣṇa and Rāma are the most important. The cult of Rāma goes back in the Viṣṇu Purāṇa to about the 5th cent. B.C.; in the Rāmāyana of Vālmīki, which in its original form is based on pre-Buddhistic materials, while its kernel was probably composed before 500 B.C. and the more recent portion was probably added till the 2nd cent. B.C. and later, Rāma is depicted as a high-souled hero, and thus with his faithful wife Sita he won the affections of the Indian people. But it is not till the 12th cent. that his cult was fully developed. This cult is described in the Viṣṇu Purāṇa, which seems to go back to the Gupta period (A.D. 320-455). The tenth book of the Viṣṇu Purāṇa has exercised a more powerful influence than any other work of its class, was translated into Hindi by Lalā Rāma Kavi under the title of Prakā Sāgara, 'The Ocean of Love,' and is now the most popular manual of the cult of Kṛṣṇa. The cult of Viṣṇudeva-Viṣṇu seems to be mentioned by the Greek traveller Megasthenes; and, if it prevailed in the period of the first Maurya emperors, it must have originated long before that time, and probably owes its development to that stream of thought which began with the Upanishads and culminated in Buddhism and Jainism. Kṛṣṇa seems to have risen to be a local deity known as Gopāla, 'cow-herd,' or Govinda, probably a later form of Govind, 'finder of cows,' which was an epithet of Indra. He was worshipped by the Áhūtra shepherds, who wandered with their flocks over the region from Mathurā to Dwarkā. The spread of this world-illusion of pantheism, which was brought by the Rāmānuja, and which was at first also indulgent of pantheism, was the cult of an oceanic god of the western sea localized at Dwārākā. How far this cult was influenced by Christianity, which makes the case of the Kṛṣṇa as the "Saviour" of the Caucaian is still a question of controversy.

The imperfect combination of the cults of Mathurā and Dwārākā is shown by the vagueness and inconsistencies which were invented to account for the late Kṛṣṇa cult.

4. The subdivisions of the Vaiṣṇavas: influence of the creed: sacred places.—The subdivisions of the Vaiṣṇavas follow the teaching of the great missionaries, of whom an account has elsewhere been given. The most important is that of the Sri Vaiṣṇavas, founded by Rāmānuja, the followers of whom are more numerous in Southern than in Northern India. The second school is that of Madhva, or Anāndatīrtha, who preached the doctrine of duality (dvaita), in opposition to the non-duality of Sāṅkara-chāryya. The third follows the teaching of Rāmānādava, whose characteristics were that no distinction was made between the Brāhmaṇas and the so-called "untouchables," and the use of the vernacular tongues as the medium of his teaching. The fourth is the Vallāhīachāryya, whose works have left us practically nothing. Vaiṣṇavism is essentially monistic, while Śaivism is often ultimately pantheistic or, rather, is apt to relapse into pantheism, though it, too, is monotheistic.

5. "Taken as a whole, one of the chief characteristics of the United Provinces population is a real and unaffected kindliness. Vaiṣṇavism would certainly appeal to them, and it adopted would tend to enhance the very quality which would cause its adoption."

It represents to a large extent the Buddhist

5 Bhandarkar, p. 52f.
8 Ibid. p. 705; A. L. Basham, Lālā Rāma; Māyā; Madhava; Rāmānuja; Rāmānūja, Ramāyana.
9 Census of India, 1931, xc., United Provinces, pt. i. p. 128f.
10 Ib. p. 129.
type of life and morals, in which regard for the sinner, a feature of Valentinianism, is a predominant feature. 1 Tod records that the spread of Krsna-worship among some of the Rajputs (who generally, being warriors, favoured the Saiva cult) exercised an ameliorating influence on their life and manners. On the other hand, Dubois expresses a less favourable view of the sect in S. India.

The feeling of aversion which orthodox Brahmins entertain for Vaishnavite Brahmins is shared by Hindus of all castes. A stigma of procracy appears to cling to them. It cannot be the case, however, that the disaccord with which they are regarded is entirely due to their worship of Visnu. I think it must be largely imputed to their excessive pride and arrogance, their extreme severity, and their superstitious manners: for though all Brahmins share these characteristics, it is generally acknowledged that the Vaishnavites display them in an intensified form. 2

Again, the erotic tendency of some Vaishnava literature, particularly in connection with the cult of Krsna and Radha, has aroused opposition among the more sober-minded Hindus, and it must be noted that the rival cult of Rama is singularly free from excesses of this kind. Growse remarks on one set of poems:

1 If ever the language of the brothel was used for temple use, it has been so here. 3

In Bengal the licentious habits of some orders are notorious.

The Bairagi and Bairagiya [male and female] Vaishnavas are often seen at the races. The races being recruited by those who have no relatives, by widows, by individuals too idle and degraded to lead a steady working life, and by prostitutes. Visnavori or Boishtis, according to the vulgar proscription, has come to mean a courtisan. 4

In N. India the cult of Vijnana or Krsna is specially observed at Mathura (p.q.v.) and the adjoining towns of Brindaban and Gokul (pp.v.v.); Vijnan is worshipped at Pur (as Jagannath; p.v.); he has a famous shrine at Badarinaras (p.q.v.); in Gujrat Krsna is worshipped at Dwarka; at Pandharup in the Sholapur District, the Deccan, Vijnan is worshipped as Vithoba; in the south his chief seats are Conjeeveram and Tirupati. The Valabharhcharyas have their chief temples at Gokul and at Nthdwara in the Mewar State of Rupatãn, Rama-worship centres in the scenes described in the Râmâyana, Ayodhya, Chitrakért, and Nasik.


W. C. CROOKE.

VALENTINIANISM.—Valentinianism is a form of Gnostic teaching which originated with Valentinus, about the middle of the 2nd century. The term is a somewhat vague one, for Valentinus was generally regarded as the chief master of the Gnostics, and all the Gnostic schools were affected in some degree by his influence. His name was often attached to systems which had borrowed from him superficially, as well as to those which had grown directly out of the teaching of him.

4 See above.

1 Life and writings of Valentinus.—Of the life and writings of Valentinus comparatively little has come down to us. He was born on the coast of Egypt, at the end of the 1st or the beginning of the 2nd cent., and was educated at Alexandria. For some time he worked in that city as a Christian teacher, but eventually migrated to Rome, where he lived during the period between the episcopalates of Hyginus and Anicetus (A.D. 137-166). He must have come forward as a Gnostic teacher before his arrival in Italy. For Justin mentions having heard of the conspicuous heretics, and appears to have discussed his theories in the Synagoga, written about A.D. 160. Epiphanius states that he first became the head of a sect in Cyprus, and that he broke with the Church because he was passed over in the election of a bishop. A personal grudge of this kind is, however, commonly imputed to famous heretics in the controversial writings, and there is no reason to doubt that Valentinus advanced towards his later position by a natural process of reflexion, which would be stimulated by the Gnostic atmosphere of the Alexandrian Church. It is more the probable tale that he never formally detached himself from orthodox Christianity.

Valentinus was the author of a number of writings which have now perished, with the exception of some fragments, in the form of hymns, homilies, epistles, and possibly a treatise entitled Sophia. A late tradition makes him the author of a Gospel, but of this there is no evidence. His adversaries themselves pay tribute to his eloquence and intellectual power, and their testimony is fully borne out by the meagre specimens of his own writing which have been preserved. His system as a whole is known to us only from hostile witnesses, whose acquaintance with it had been formed at second hand; but through this obscurant medium it is still possible to recognize in Valentinus the foremost of the Gnostics, and one of the most gifted and versatile minds of the early Church. He was at one a poet, a philosophe, and a great religious teacher. Out of the chaotic materials of Gnostic tradition he constructed a harmonious body of thought in which there are not a few elements of real speculative value.

2 Sources.—Of the patristic accounts of Valentinus the earliest was that of Justin, and an outline of it has already been given. A.D. 1-3. Hippolytus described the system in an early work which is now lost, but can be partially reproduced from pseudo-Tertullian, Philaster, and Epiphanius. Our remaining sources are Irenaeus, Tertullian, and the Philo sophoumena of Hippolytus; but Tertullian is for the most part directly dependent on Irenaeus. Hippolytus and Irenaeus—the two cardinal authorities—are broadly in agreement, but their differences are sufficient to prove that they worked independently. Preference has often been given to the account of Hippolytus, which is shorter, clearer, and more symmetrical. But a number of indications make it almost certain that Irenaeus is closer to the original sources, although he has presented his material with little discrimination, and has confused the teaching of Valentinus himself with that of his disciples. The notices of the controversial writers are supplemented by the Excerpta from Theodotus, a selection of passages from an early Valentinian writer which is appended to the Stromata of Clement of Alexandria. The value of these extracts is greatly impaired by the difficulty of arranging the detached sentences in any intelligible order, and by the intrusion of comments which cannot with certainty be distinguished from the text. Curious parallels arise from the similarities in thought, and occasionally in lan-
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guage, between the Encoptes and the account in Irenaeus. A direct connexion is not probable, but there is reason to believe that the writer quoted by Irenaeus has been influenced by the works of Valentinus, which, if he, have made use of the same document. In addition to the sources enumerated, we have the Fragments of Valentinus himself, by which we are enabled to compare and interpret the evidence of the patristic writers. A number of fragments have also been preserved from the works of later Valentinian writers—notably the Letter of Ptolemaeus to Flora, which is quoted at full length in the Epiphanius, and the excerpts from the commentaries of Hermogenes, which are given by Clement and Origen.

3. The system of Valentinus. It is stated by Irenaeus that Valentinus adapted the principles of current Gnosticism to a doctrine of his own; and his system clearly betrays this dependence on earlier phases of the Gnostic movement. At Alexandria he can hardly have failed to come into personal contact with Basilides, and the influence of the older teacher is apparent in various details of his system (e.g., the multiplication of logoi, the doctrine of the passions as alien spirits invading the soul, hence the word ‘espoused’ as the sphere of the Demiurge). To Basilides, too, he may have owed the impulse to build a philosophical system on the basis of Gnostic tradition. For the un instructed listener, however, he reverberates to the older Gnostic constructions. It seems to have been his purpose to form a comprehensive system which should gather up in itself the more valuable elements of all previous gnostic. To this we may attribute the complexity of detail which marks the system, and which has sometimes been set down to later elaboration. From this too we can best explain the remarkable diffusion of Valentinian gnosticism. All the Gnostic sects were able to recognize in it their own characteristic tenets, brought into a larger context, and impregnated with a deeper meaning. As Valentinus borrowed from the earlier types of Gnosticism, so he adopted many suggestions from those Eastern religions which lay behind the whole Gnostic movement. The division of dogs into groups of eight, ten, and twelve recalls the similar grouping of divinities in the Egyptian religion. The conception of the Pleroma as made up of thirty rods has its obvious counterpart in the thirty supreme gods of Zoroastranism. Some of the details in the history of Sophia and the Soter appear to have been directly taken from Pyrrhonian and Phrygian myths of the mother-goddess rather than from their Gnostic analogies. But, while thus elaborating the mythological framework, Valentinus informs it, to a far greater extent than any of his predecessors, with a philosophical significance. Hippolytus may be right in his contention that the system is largely indebted to the Pythagorean theory of numbers; but the chief philosophical influence (as Hippolytus himself acknowledges) is undoubtedly that of Plato. Valentinus endeavours in his own fashion to work out the Platonic conception of an ideal world reflecting itself in the world of visible things. His doctrine of the soul as longing to be restored to the kingdom of light from which it has fallen is ultimately derived from Plato. The Gnostic mythology, as remoulded by him, partakes in some measure of the character of the Platonic myths. His aeons are no longer separate divine beings but aspects of the nature and activity of God. They spring from one another no longer in the manner of the Chaldean theologians. The traditional episodes of the Gnostic history of redemption are more than half allegorized into inward experiences in the life of the soul. Gnostic in the hands of Valentinus attempts to transform itself into a real philosophy, offering a solution of the metaphysical problems of the origin of evil, the relation of spirit to matter, the creation of the world, the nature and destiny of the soul. With Valentinus the distinctly Christian element is much more pronounced than in earlier Gnosticism. He had begun his career as a Christian teacher, and perhaps never regarded himself as alienated from the Church. So far as can be ascertained, he instituted no peculiar rites or sacraments to mark out his following as a separate sect. All through his system we can trace the desire to bring his thought into as close relation as possible to the Christian teaching, and with this intention he makes a continual appeal to Scripture. In no recorded instance does he fall back on the esoteric writings which were favoured in Gnostic circles. His practice is rather to make use of the Scriptures acknowledged by the Church, OT and NT alike, and to read the esoteric meaning into them by a forced application of the allegorical method. But, while he thus appeals to Scripture in order to commend his teaching to orthodox Christians, he regards it as at best a secondary source of revelation. This is apparent as well from his historical mode of interpretation as from his explicit statement:

'Many of the things written in the public books are found also written in the Church of God: ... The law written in the heart is the precept of the Beloved (i.e., the spiritual race has come from God, and is itself an immediate source of divine knowledge).'

Not only does Valentinus accept the Christian Scriptures, but in his scheme of redemption he makes room for Christian believers as the "psychical" class, intermediate between the "pneumatic" and the "hydro". Earlier Gnosticism had allowed only for the higher class, predestined to life, and the lower, in which all spiritual potentialities were lacking. In the Valentinian system the third class is also capable of salvation, although in an inferior degree. This estimate of the "psychical" nature was not due, as the Fathers complain, to arrogance and exclusiveness, but to a genuine solicitude for the mass of ordinary Christians. But the Christian affinities of the system are most clearly discernible in its central motif; for its various speculations all converge in a doctrine of redemption, in which the chief place is assigned to Jesus. The redemption is conceived, in the first instance, as the deliverance of the spiritual element from matter, but it was connected, at least in Valentinus's own teaching, with a pure and lofty ethic.

The heart is purified by the expulsion of every evil spirit; and when the only good Father visits it, it is sanctified, and grafted with light; and he who possesses such a heart is so blessed that he shall see God."

It would be too much to say that with Valentinus Gnosticism joined hands with Christianity, but we may fairly credit him with a sincere endeavour to mediate between the two forms of teaching. He sought, on the one hand, to bring Gnosticism into closer sympathy with the Church and, on the other, to secure the Church's recognition of the elements of truth in Gnosticism. The Valentinian system as described by the Fathers, whose evidence is consistent, in the main, with that of the Fragments, falls into two clearly marked divisions: (1) the events within the Pleroma, (2) the history of the creation and redemption. One difficulty, however, which has often been considered as of paramount importance, meets us at the outset. According to Irenaeus, not only does the Church by the Pleroma have a female consort, while Hippolytus, who is here supported by the Fragments and the Exeget. Theod., speaks of a supreme principle who is the

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2. ib., in Strom. ii. 20.
source of all being. Irenæus himself admits that on this point there is a difference among the various schools. The discrepancy is not, perhaps, so serious as might appear at first sight, especially when we remember that for Valentinus the idea of the Logos was more metaphysical than personal. He apprehends the supreme principle as a unity, but as still containing within itself the possibility of distinction. This, indeed, is the presupposition of the whole system—that the supreme principle was capable of being first of a self-unfolding into the multiplicity of being.

The supreme being, whatever conceived as monad or as dyad, is moved by an inner necessity of love to impart its fullness, and by a certain deficiency to seek the supplementation of its fulness. A dyad constituted the Pleroma. Bythos and Sige put forth Nous and Aletheia, from whom proceed the two pairs, Logos-Zoe and artisans. These four pairs, or 'syzygies,' make up the Logos world; which is complete in itself—a Pleroma within the Logos world. Logos is the former world; Sige, second world; Bythos, third world; and Sige, fourth world. From the anthropological and ecclesiastical world proceeds the Pleroma, as the second world proceeds from the first. Thus the Logos, the inferior to the Logos, is the Pleroma, which is also the supreme. If these lower pairs the male is designated by an adjective, the female by a substantive—in keeping with the Valentinian doctrine that the female contributes a vague substance, on which the male imposes form. The harmony of the Pleroma is maintained by the opposition of the younger son, who aspire, by one account, to comprehend the unknowable Father, by another, to create like the Father in virtue of her sole activity. She produces an ablation, but, on the prayer of the other members of the Pleroma, two new sons, Christos and the Holy Spirit, are put forth by Nous and Aletheia, and separate Sophia from her formless offspring. It falls out of the Pleroma, but is sought out by Christos and the Spirit, who endow it with form and then return. As a thank-offering for the restored harmony the thirty sons in fellowship put forth a new son, Jesus.

The second part of the system is concerned with the events outside of the Pleroma, after the departure of Christos from the lower Sophia (called in Irenæus by the Aramaic equivalent 'Achamoth'). Bereft of her helper, she is afflicted by the four persons of the Pleroma, the flesh, formlessness, and the form, and Jesus, the common fruit of the Pleroma, is sent forth to be her consort and to beget a son for her. As a result of her and his joint activity a new world is created. It is the world以内 of our actual world, which is of the Logos and Sophia nature. Jesus incarnates within this world, in the form of a man, and because he is a spirit, he is able to enter into the anthropological world, for he is the Logos of this anthropological world. He therefore, together with the Logos of the Pleroma, makes it possible for the anthropologcal world to be saved through his incarnation. He underlines the importance of the Logos within the anthropological world, and shows that the anthropological world depends upon the Logos for its existence.

Sophia is saved by Christos, her offspring by Jesus, the fruit of the Pleroma, while Jesus, the son of Mary, redeems the souls of men. It may be inferred from several indications in the Eusebian Theod., and the Positio Irenæi manuscript of 350, that these two symbols were sometimes regarded as aspects of a single redeeming power.

From this brief survey of the system it is evident that Valentinus conserves, and even accentuates, the mythological traits of older Gnosticism, while seeking, as he must, to rationalize them. Instead of unmeaning names, the terms bear designations which imply intellectual or religious qualities. The several stages of the history are determined not by astral conceptions but by a speculative scheme, carefully thought out, though in many respects obscure. Valentinus, moreover, has made a deliberate attempt to overcome the dualism implicit in all Gnostic thought. The cause of Sophia’s fall, and of the consequent origin of evil, is not so much a sin as a presupposition, due to an impulse in itself good. Her fall takes place within the Pleroma, where she continues to abide.

The Pleroma no longer stands in sharp opposition to the lower world but is linked up with it and is the ground of its existence. The Demiurge, though an inferior power, is imperfect rather than evil, and he is raised up into something higher. The worlds without the Pleroma are copies of it on a lower plane, and at each descending stage its history is repeated. One of the most significant of the changes due to Valentinus is the addition of Horos to the Gnostic cosmogony. For the Oriental conception of two opposite realms of being he substitutes the Greek one of a limit, preserving all existences in their due place and order. To a Greek instinct we may likewise assign the pervading thought that the divine activity, at each stage of the cosmic process, impresses form on formless substance. But with all his effort Valentinus does not succeed in resolving the dualism which lay at the foundation of Gnostic theory. It is tacitly assumed that from the beginning there existed along with God a world of alien matter or not-being. This is capable, in varying degrees, of being moulded by the divine Artist, but in the end there is a residuum with which He can do nothing. The world of utter chaos is left over to the demons; the 'material' souls can seek for no participation in the Redeemer’s gift.

4. Underlying purpose of the system.—Valentinus is at once a philosopher and a religious teacher, and from this double point of view we must consider the underlying purpose of his system.

(1) On the one hand, he seeks to bring the abstract and inaccessible God into relation to the actual world. The Pleroma is the first outgrowing of God from Himself, the manifestation of the Absolute in a sphere of being which is still, in some sense, one with Him. This process of self-unfolding is continued on an ever-descending scale until at last the divine principle is merged in the depths of matter. A hymn of Valentinus, preserved by Hippolytus, gives vivid expression to this normative idea:

I behold all things suspended by spirit; I perceive all things borne on by spirit—flesh suspended from soul, soul upheld by air, air suspended from ether, and fruits produced by bythos, and the child born from the womb.

Matter, it is here implied, is linked with the cosmos, the cosmos with the lower heaven, this with the Logos, and this again with bythos, from which absolute source all being has its birth. In another striking passage Valentinus compares the world to an imperfect image of God, which is inscribed, however, on the curtain of His whom it represents so as to authenticate it:

† Quoted in Strom. iv. 12.
Thus the whole universe is conceived as an infinite gradation of being, instinct, though ever more faintly, with the power which has called it forth. Valentinus, like other writers in this stream, is associated with the idea which had hovered before the minds of Greek thinkers ever since the days of Plato, and which finally received its classical form in Plotinus. His thought is disguised and hampered by the Gnostic ideas which he received from the philosophical point of view he may be classed as one of the chief precursors of Neo-Platonism.

(2) The philosophical interest is, however, subordinate. Valentinus was primarily a theologian, and it was in the effort to solve religious problems that he was led to the speculations on which he bases his system. The controversial writers, who are intent on exposing the absurdities of the heretical teaching, are chiefly occupied with these strange speculations; but they are far less prominent in the surviving utterances of the Valentinians themselves. The Fragments and the Exc. Theod. only touch on them incidentally. Heracleon, in the extracts from his commentaries which we possess, makes hardly any reference to the Pleroma, and the questions which he discusses are intrinsically theological. Valentinus' speculations are considered seriously and sometimes accepted by Clement and Origen. The Valentinian theology, like that of the Church, has its centre in the problem of redemption, but this is approached from the metaphysical, instead of the ethical or mystical, side. Redemption, as understood by the Gnostic thinkers, is the deliverance of spirit from the material element, which is literally the fallen state of man. How is this fall of spirit out of its native sphere to be explained? No answer is possible except that some disaster has taken place within the spiritual world, and the Gnostic sets himself to discover the nature and origin. Not only so, but he is required to show how the primal error has been corrected. There can be no redemption for men on earth unless we have the assurance that order has been re-established in the upper world; the restoration, like the fall, must begin from above. Valentinus, therefore, sets out from the doctrine of the Pleroma, and the redemption achieved in heavenly places after Solstitial diversity has restored the original harmony. But these speculations form only the background of the system. They supply a prologue in heaven, which is not to be mistaken for the real drama, although it provides the key by which it must be interpreted. Valentinian, like the orthodox teachers, is occupied all along with the redemption accomplished by Jesus, and differs from them chiefly in his endeavour to correlate it with a universal redemption. This involves him, however, in further differences, which affect his whole religious attitude. In spite of his desire to construe the universe as the harmonious unfolding of a single principle of being, he is compelled, like other Gnostic thinkers, to fall back on an ultimate dualism. The fall of spirit cannot be metaphysically explained unless it is assumed that from the beginning there existed something alien to God. This duality reveals itself in the world of men as well as in the cosmos generally. Souls differ from one another in kind, and are not capable of the same idea or purpose of redemption; man makes a greater effort to break through the exclusiveness to which all previous Gnostics had stood committed. At the risk of inconsistency he recognizes the intermediate power of God, and out of this it is one of the chief objects of his system to find a place for them within the scope of the redeeming process.

But in the end he is driven back on the traditional Gnostic doctrine that only the spiritual can be truly saved, and that their salvation is nothing else but the inherent prerogative of their nature.

'Ye are originally immortal, and children of eternal life, and ye would have been distinguished to you, that ye were sanctified andish it, and that death may die in you and by you; for when ye dissolve the world, and are not yourselves dissolved, ye have dominion over creation and all creature.'

In this remarkable saying Valentinus appears to hint at a lofty doctrine of the obligation resting on 'spiritual' men in virtue of their privilege. They are placed in the class of the righteous, and therefore voluntarily entered it, in order that they may cooperate with the higher powers, and that through them the dominion of death may at last be utterly destroyed. In the light of such a saying it is impossible to doubt the noble religious temper of the great Gnostic. The very doctrine which in other leaders of the movement had served to foster a spirit of egotism and of contempt for the inferior mass of men is transformed by him into a supreme motive for human service. Yet the conception of one class of men who are marked out as essentially different from others is none the less made prominent. These higher natures alone are destined to a true redemption, and for them the work of a redeemer is hardly necessary. Like others they acknowledge Jesus as their Saviour, but what they receive from him is far more than the apprehension of their own native excellence as the children of light. It is this failure on the part of its noblest representative to reconcile the Gnostic teaching with Christian ideas that stamps it most unmistakably as alien, in its fundamental character, to the gospel.

5. Subsequent history of Valentinianism.—The history of Valentinianism as a system is very imperfectly known to us, but there is evidence that the sect extended itself rapidly, and founded adherents in Italy, Gaul, N. Africa, Egypt, Syria, and Asia Minor. Tertullian describes it as in his time 'freqvrentissimum plane hereticorum collegium.' According to Hippolytus, it came to be divided at an early date into two schools—the Eastern, or Anatolic, and the Western, or Italic—and the fact of this division is confirmed by the Exc. Theod., which purport to give the doctrines of the so-called Eastern Valentinianism.

The schism, we are told, was brought about by a difference of opinion as to the body of Jesus. The Easterns maintained that he assumed a pneumatic body, while the Westerners taught that his body was psychic, the Spirit descending on him at his baptism in the likeness of a dove. Both of these views are represented in the Exc. Theod., and from this it has been inferred that the division cannot have been so sharp as Hippolytus affirms, or that it must have followed some other line of cleavage. Clement, however, may have made his extracts from several writers, belonging to different schools, or Thecodotus himself may have quoted from other Valentinians, with whom he was not in full agreement. Why the dispute should have turned on an issue that appears so secondary and artificial it is difficult to say. It may be that the Christological controversy which was to rend the Church a century later was anticipated in some fashion by the Gnostic thinkers. More probably the question as to the nature of the Redeemer's body served merely to focus some radical difference of view as to the scope and purpose of redemption and the constitution of the light body. It is significant that the sect was divided on a matter that concerned not the speculative construction, but the doctrine of the Person of Christ. We have here a circumstance which shows Valentinianism was much more closely allied to

1 Strom. lv. 13.
orthodox Christianity than the records of the Pagans might lead us to suppose. This conclusion is further borne out by the extant writings of the two leaders of the school who were next in influence to Valentinus himself, and both of whom appear to have been personal disciples—Ptolemaus and Heracleon.

(a) Ptolemaus. — In his system as a whole Ptolemaus adhered closely to Valentinus—so much so that Irenaeus has made little effort to distinguish his separate teaching. He added, we are told, new and more complicated details to the esoteric, and thought of the souls as personal beings, not merely as modes and aspects of the divine nature. In his doctrine of redemption he laid particular emphasis on the relation of the work of Christ to that of the Demiurgo. But besides the notices in the Fathers we possess the Letter of Ptolemaus to Flora—the one document of 2nd cent. gnosticism which has come down to us complete. In writing to a Christian of whom he hoped to make a convert, Ptolemaus would no doubt present his views with studied moderation, but his Letter, however, we regard it must be taken as an authentic statement of Valentinian doctrine. It deals with the specific question of the validity of the Law, and distinguishes (1) a Law given by God to Moses; (2) a Law appended by the elder to this Mosaic code. In the Law given by God three elements are likewise distinguished: (1) spiritual precepts, which are of permanent value and were endorsed by Jesus in (2) commandments, which were only for a time and were abrogated by Jesus; (3) ordinances that must be interpreted in a typical or symbolic sense. The teaching of Jesus is accepted throughout as the one criterion of truth. Ptolemaus betrays his Gnostic presuppositions by identifying the God of the Law with the Demiurgo, whom he conceives as an inferior and imperfect God, just rather than absolutely good. But the Letter is evidence that the Valentinians not only were interested in Christian problems but also could discuss them with a sober and critical judgment which we too often miss in the orthodox theologians.

(b) Heracleon. — The name of Heracleon is attached by Epiphanius to a fantastic mythological system, but this account of his teaching may conveniently be set aside, in view of the considerable fragments which have been preserved from his own commentaries. It may be gathered from these that he accepted the Valentinian construction, but that he employed it chiefly as a background for understanding the redemptive work of Jesus. Like Valentinus, he recognizes three classes of men, and makes the salvation of the 'spiritual' consist in an inner enlightenment by means of gnostics. He appears to concede, however, that even the spiritual natures are capable of a fall. He holds, too, that after being saved themselves they must re-enter the world and help to redeem the 'psychic.' In his conception of the Person of Christ he adopts a strongly docetic position.

(c) Marcus. — If Ptolemaus and Heracleon stand for a Valentinianism which had much in common with orthodox Christianity, a different tendency is represented by Marcus, who flourished about the same time. For the doctrines of Marcus we have practically no other source than Irenaeus, whose account of his superstitious and immoral character is perhaps coloured by prejudice. None the less it is evident that Marcus developed the ideas of Valentinus in a one-sided fashion and that he betraying the characteristic feature of his system is number—symbolism. From the numerical values of divine names he seeks to discover the nature and order of the cosmos and the mode by which the world has come into being. The Valentinian theory of redemption is connected by Marcus with the ideas of contemporary magic and astrology. He formed a sect which seems to have stood quite outside of the Church, with institutions of its own and special baptismal rites, accompanied by exorcisms. From such a development as that of Marcus it was manifest that the Valentinian system, in anything like its original form, could not long maintain itself. In the hands of the master and his more enlightened disciples it was capable of serving a genuine philosophical and religious interest. But it had been evolved by an artificial process from the primitive Gnosticism, and reverted in course of time to the earlier type.

For several centuries Gnostic sects continued to arise which called themselves Valentinian, and which preserved the language and occasionally some of the ideas of Valentinus. The Pedita Sophia and the other Coptic writings may on this ground be assigned to the Valentinian school, although their connection with it is often remote. We hear of Valentinians in Italy about A. D. 360, and in Spain at the end of the 4th century. But these late survivals belong to the general history of Gnosticism, and the true Valentinian movement had exhausted itself within two or three generations of the founder’s death.

LITERATURE.—The subject of Valentinianism is discussed in all the general works bearing on Gnosticism (p. ). The Fragments of Valentinus were first collected in J. F. Grabe, Speculumion S. Petrus", 3 vols., Oxford, 1714, which is still valuable. They are reproduced, with commentary, in A. Hiegenfeld, Ketzerrecht und Urchristentum (Berlin, 1872), and in the patristic accounts of the system are also fully discussed. One of the oldest of modern accounts of Valentinianism is that of E. de Faye, Gnostiques et gnosticisme, Paris, 1913, pp. 39-415. The relation of the Ess. Theod. to Irenaeus is discussed by F. W. Dibelius, ZNTW, x. (1930). G. Heinrich, Die Valentinianische Gnosis and die heidnische Schrift, Berlin, 1871, and R. A. Lipsius, art. ' Valentinus,' in Smith’s Dictionary of Christian Biography, 23 vols., 1857-1866, are still indispensable. The most useful work on later Valentinianism is A. E. Brooke, The Fragments of Heracleon newly edited from the MSS., Cambridge, 1891 (FS. 1).

E. F. SCOTT.

VALHALLA.—See BLIND, ABODE OF THE (Teutonic).

VALIDITY.—I. Introductory.—The notion of validity (from Lat. validitas, validus, to be strong') is largely employed in Kantian thought, and receives a wide and various application. A comprehensive discussion of the notion is a desideratum, and would form a useful introduction to the philosophical and scientific disciplines, including philosophy of religion. In treating of it one must reckon with the fact that validity is a 'noble use of'4 in philosophical usage, so that it is difficult to invest it with a clear and unambiguous meaning. The terms with which it appears to be most frequently associated, with which indeed it is often identified, are those of truth and value. Thus the validity of a judgment has been described as its correctness.5 The validity of an argumentation or inference its truth-producing virtue, or—as it might otherwise be expressed—its truth-conveying capacity. Lotze's valuable and suggestive treatment has done much to fix its use in philosophy; and it seems to the present writer that an examination of Lotze's discussion will serve to bring out the general nature and scope of validity. An examination, further, of the distinction between

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origin and validity will illustrate the application of the

2. The datum of thought.—With Lotze the
discussion of validity belongs to the doctrine of
thought, and the problem of validity arises first in
connexion with the ideas or rudimentary concepts
composing the material with which thought sets
out upon its work of reflection. The first operation
of thought (to convert impressions into ultimate
antecedents) is ideas or meanings, so as to
prepare 'logical building-stones' 1 for its
subsequent structures. As a result of this operation
each impression receives a certain objectivity or
validity.

Thus 'green' or 'red,' e.g., remains an object for consciousness as such after the creation of the external stimulus which produces the impression. We no longer present it to ourselves as a condition which we undergo, but as something which has its being and its meaning in itself, and which continues to be what it is and to mean what it means whether we are conscious of it or not. 2

Moreover, its validity or objectivity of meaning for ourselves is confirmed and tested in the experience of others. 3 But the validity or objectivity of an idea, meaning, or thought-content is not

valid until it has the support of a real existence independent of thought. Logical objectification, which converts subjective impressions into objective ideas, cannot give external reality to reality beyond thought, so that no question of ontological as distinguished from logical validity is here raised. Indeed it is matter of

indifference whether certain parts of the world of thought indicate something which has besides an independent reality outside the thinking minds, or whether all that it contains exists only in the thoughts of those who think it, but with equal validity for them all. 4

The discussion of the Platonic world of ideas 5LOTZE offers a sharper representation of the nature of validity, describing it as an ultimate and

underivable conception designative of reality apart from existence and occurrence. The reality of an idea or thought-content is similar to that which belongs to truths and laws; and, though wholly unlike the reality belonging to things or events, it is a form of reality which the mind cannot but acknowledge.

1 We all feel certain in the moment in which we think any truth, that we have not created it for the first time but merely recognized it as valid before we thought it and will continue so without regard to any existence of whatsoever kind.

The idea or thought-content is thus essentially eternal or timeless, being independent of its manifestations in the reality of existence or of its realization in the reality of thought (as occurrence or event). So Plato taught. It is true that Plato ascribes existence to the ideas or universal notions, but it is Lotze's contention that he does not thereby seek to hypostatize their eternal validity into an existence at all resembling the existence of things or events. Here the traditional interpretation of the Platonic doctrine is affirmed to be on wrong lines. 7 Plato's supercelestial world of ideas, without local habitation, and composed of pure intuitions as the reality of all that we ordinarily call the real world (and Plato may be said to indicate this in the very sublimity of the language in which he describes its wondrous landscape) is the intellectual interpretation, though false, is not without excuse. For in the Greek tongue there was no technical equivalent for validity or reality not inclusive of existence, and it was impossible for Plato to predicate of the ideas without at the same time substantiating them, or subsuming them under the general denomination of substance, existence, or real being (ē̄re, oî̄̄sia). To the antecedent ideas Lotze ascribes a secondary sort of existence (dō̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄�� 1 14. 5 14. 4 16. 6 200-202. 7 215. 8 But see J. Rowe, The World and the Individual (Gifford Lectures), 2 vols., New York, 1901, 1, 227.


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1 J. Dewey, in Studies in Logical Theory, Chicago, 1906, p. 75; see also footnote, p. 70.

2 ii. 472. 3 1. 2. 4 L. 9.
what takes place in the object-matter—unless the sceptical contention holds that, for ought we know, the process of thought may not mediate a valid knowledge of reality at all.

But, while the subjective processes of thought are more than merely formal, they are not to be regarded as constitutively the real world. In the formation of conceptions, in classification, in judgment and inference, we do not go through processes which take place in things.

The world of valid truth does not, in Lotze's view of it, "undergo changes of contentions and even parallelings in any way the successive steps and missteps, the succession of tentative trials, withdrawals, and retracings, which mark the course of our own thinking."

The activity of the various logical processes is not of a constitutive but of a strictly intermediate and instrumental value. The winding path is only a means to the attainment of the purpose, and must be left behind; the scaffolding—to cite another well-known illustration—is only a means to the construction of the building, and must be taken down to allow the full view of the result. In each case, however, it is a necessary and indispensable means. This illustrates Lotze's contention that, despite the subjectivity of the thinking process, its results may still be objectively valid. Finally, subjectivity in no way discoverable in the process, it may still be present in the product. How this may be Lotze is hard put to it to show; but that it is so, that subjectivity does not necessarily imply invalidity, is none of his most invincible convictions.

The difficulties that beset Lotze in his endeavours to interpose between the scepticism that could not admit the validity of thought for reality and the idealism in making thought determinate reality, seemed to find an ultimate identity between them were largely due to the externalism of his representation of the relation between the thought-process and the thought-product; and one sympathizes with the plea of the 'genetic' logic that the activity and the content of thought should be viewed more historically, from the standpoint of their generating conditions in the movement and reading of experience. It is no mere accident of language that "building" has a double sense—meaning at once the process and the finished product. The product of thought is simply the process carried on into its completion. There can be no possible divorce or separation between the formal and the material in thought. In the activity of thought we are not cast loose from dependence upon material conditions and circumstanc…

5. Origin and validity.—(a) Introductory.—A consideration of the question of origin and validity should throw further light upon the notion of validity. From the revolutionary standpoint of pragmatism it may be a 'musty old antiquity' that is here presented to its historical development; but the development is, according to Lotze, of metaphysical idealism according to which the relation between thought and reality is organically conceived and maintained that reality must be present in the beginning of the thinking process if it is to be reached at the end, and must cooperate with the activities of thought in the production of results.

(b) The sources of validity—The question of origin and validity is directly connected with the general problem of the validity of the thinking process. Validity of the thinking processes, to say the least, is an essential condition of the possibility of the existence of thought. The question of the validity of the thinking process is therefore the most fundamental problem of all. The question of validity is, in fact, the question of the possibility of the existence of thought. The question of the validity of the thinking process is therefore the most fundamental problem of all.

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VALIDITY

(b) In logic.—First consider the distinction between origin and validity as applied to logic, taking logic as designative of the whole philosophical discipline which deals with the question of validity in knowledge. Here the problem of origin and validity is that of the relation between psychology and logic in respect of the treatment of the distinction between the two disciplines used to be drawn in this respect. Psychology, it was said, describes the conditions under which thought originates as a psychological process; logic views thought apart from such conditions and in reference to the standard of truth and reality. In other words, psychology was held to be a purely descriptive science, and logic purely normative or regulative.

To psychology fall questions of genesis and history; to logic questions of authority, worth, value.

'Logic is not concerned with the manner in which the elements utilized by thought come into existence, but with their value, when they have somehow or other come into existence, for the carrying out of intellectual operations.'

1 But in the recent logical movement there is a strong tendency to supersede or dispose of this antithesis between origin and validity, or, as it is often called, logical-objectively, origin and value. It is said that judgment, with conception and inference, depends for its significance, for the measure of its validity, upon the stage of organization in which it begins; and, accordingly, the appreciation of the claim to validity should not be made in abstraction from the actual conditions and circumstances of origination.2 Psychology should enter into logical evaluation.

Now the less 'philosophical logic' abides by its essential position. While acknowledging the importance of genetic and historical considerations, it still affirms with Lotze that psychological analysis fails to reveal the complete significance of the operations of thought. The problem of validity or worth transcends the natural history of mental products. Indeed, as B. Bosanquet puts it, natural selection is not at all interested in natural history. 'It is being equal to the whole situation' (i.e. to the situation not of yesterday but of to-day) 'that is the criterion for logic as for morals.'

(c) In ethics and politics.—From the above it would appear that in logic there is no irreconcilable difference between the 'genetic' and the 'philosophical' theorists, between the standpoints of origin and of validity; and that the distinction between origin and validity certainly here exists, and again reflects the recent emphasis upon the genetic and historical. But, if the study of the past means only 'translating the present into terms of the past,' then we need not be astonished at the prevalence in our time of ethical and political scepticism. To trace the ancient pedigree of an idea or institution is not, however, to explain it fully or really, much less to explain it away, and empty it of all ideal meaning. The line of ethical development, e.g., may be traced from the lowest stage of customary morality to the recognition of the inherent goodness of the moral life, without thereby necessarily affecting the question of the validity of the moral law. With some pernicious custom or fantastic belief may be the antecedent and the partial cause of a moral rule now rightly regarded as binding. Sociological fact speaks in Law and Order, vol. ii, ch. 4; cf. also G. Ritchie, Philosophical Studies, pp. 104-105.


be maintained. Faith divorced from reality, like the fruits severed from the roots in the earth, is doomed to wither and die.\textsuperscript{1}

Where the objective reference of religious faith is held to be a reality and no illusion, it must still be allowed to the standpoint of origin that it is implied in, make a rigid separation between psychological fact and logical meaning. Just as in secular and scientific knowledge a judgment having the appearance of immediate certainty is often found to involve subjective influence, so palpable element of subjectivity enters often into the judgments of religion. E.g., when the mystical visions of the medieval saint shape themselves into direct and immediate revelations of the transcendent mysteries of Catholic dogma, we can hardly fail to detect the influence of the subjective or psychological factor in experience, especially if we have followed the course of the dogmatic development in Christendom.\textsuperscript{2} A parallel might be cited in the claims of modern ‘spiritualism,’ whose communications from the dead — even granted that they have a real foundation — are sometimes quite obviously the product of a liberal Protestant eschatology.

Yet, when all allowance is made for subjectivity in religious experience, the consciousness of the developed Christendom is still intact, maintains with the problem attaching to it of the validity of religious knowledge. While we have asserted that the ontological postulate implied in the religious consciousness is not scientifically verifiable, we do not thereby confess the invalidity or irrationality of the analogical mode of reasoning, which religious philosophy has perforce to adopt in common with scientific theory, but of which it is more than its own personal practice must now enter here into a defence of the method of analogy in theistic argumentation, and in particular of the application to divine reality of the anthropomorphic ideas of personality, purpose, and value. It is a merit, to our mind, of the personalistic trend in recent philosophical thought that it finds the only possible clue to the interpretation of God and divine things in the analogy of human experience at its best and highest. But we may be permitted to observe that in the modern theistic use of the analogy of human nature, which is reflective and critical, only a general agreement and correspondence, and not an identity of symbols and meanings in their personal aspects. Nor does it follow from the vindication of the analogical method in religious philosophy that any particular analogy is ultimately valid. Beyond the general logical or epistemological question, Is the method of analogy capable of conveying religious truth?\textsuperscript{3} lies the ontological inquiry, Does the method of analogy actually convey it in such and such a case? Thus here, as in connexion with the process of thought in general, the problem of validity passes into the wider problem of truth.\textsuperscript{4}

See also artt. AnalogY, Epistemology, Teleology, Logic, Value.

Literature. — References to the subject are to be found in general works on logic and metaphysics, also in works on the philosophies of ethics, and religion. The books of which the present writer has made the most use are cited in the footnotes. See also F. H. Bradley, The Principles of Logic, 1883; N. Keynes, Studies and Exercises in Formal Logic, do. 1894; F. C. S. Schiller, Formal Logic, do. 1911; J. M. Boas, Thoughts of a Philosopher on Logic, or, Genetic Logic, 2 vols., do. 1906; C. G. Sillvart, Logic, Eng. tr., 2 vols., do. 1911; F. Poulton, Introd. to Philosophy, Eng. tr., do. 1911; F. C. S. Schiller, Philosophy: Its Scope and Relations, 2 vols., 1906.


3 For a useful discussion of the principles of analogy, teleology, and subjective religion see Galloway, The Philosophy of Religion, pp. 224-260.

4 See sect. Siva (Hindu).
place between Muhammadans and Sanyasins. They found themselves in a wild spot called Chanpurāyana, and here the child, aged 4, made a legend narrated by his devoted cows and gopis. The infant Kṛṣṇa, being so small, was not away from the cowherd boys, and only the bees and birds sang. When the boy cried, the bees would fly away, and so would the birds. On one occasion when the boy was playing with a copper bowl of water, and the bowl was overturned, the gods showered flowers, and a divine music filled the air. On another occasion, a chambermaid entered the temple and tried to bring out the sacred image of Viṣṇu, but the image would not move. On yet another occasion the boy said that a horse should be given him, and at once a horse appeared, which he rode and taught the brahmins. He also went to the city of Dvārakā, and lived like a human being, but his birthplace was at Kālia Gān. He lived a life of simplicity and service to the poor, and his teachings were accepted by all. He also taught the importance of devotion to the cow and the cowherd boys, and this led to the spread of the cult of Vāsudeva Vīśnunātha, also known as Vithalnātha.

2. The Mahārāja Gosāinī.—Vālabbha was an accomplished prose writer, and he occupied a high position as achārya, by his son Vithānlā, his eldest son having died soon after his father, this Vithānlā, the second guru of the sect, proved an able successor. Like his father, he made long journeys, visiting the same places and in addition extending his travels to Dvārakā, through Cutch, and to Mālva and Mewār. Turning southwards, he came to Fāngāhrāpur, the seat of the worship of Viṣṇu among the Kṛṣṇa-śeṣas. He is said to have made 226 disciples. His proselytism came from many classes—Bānias, Bhāṭṭānas, Kumbhis, Sūtras, Lōlares; a few Brahmins and Muslimāns were also attached, though, of these various castes, enjoyed the privilege of eating together at the same table—a privilege that was soon rescinded. Vithānlā, who was known by the name Gosāinī, took up his residence at Gokul, the birthplace of Kṛṣṇa, and was frequently designated Gokul Gosāinī, a name adopted by his male descendants. After his death each of his seven sons established his own gūḍi. They dispersed themselves throughout India in order to diffuse their doctrines. Each claimed to be an incarnation of Kṛṣṇa and made numerous proselytes. The Gokul Gosāinīs, the most celebrated of these propagators of the new doctrine, he infused vitality into the tenets of the community both by his teaching and by his writings, and it is said they have always claimed pre-eminence among the members of the sect. They keep themselves separate from the other communities, while these profess equal veneration for all. It was probably during the period of the dispersion of the sons of Vithānlā that those religious heads first acquired the title of Mahārāja or Mahārājīn Gosāinī. The descendants of these Mahārājīs now number probably over 70, of whom about ten have their seats in Dombey and one or two at each of the following places: Surat, Ahmadabad, Nagār, Cutch, Porbandar, Anmerli, Jodpur, Bundi, Kotī. Only two or three of them have any knowledge of Sanskrit; the rest are grossly ignorant and indulge in the worst forms of luxurious living. They endeavour to live up to the title which has been given them in respect of costly apparel and dainty viands. They aspire to the acquisition of wealth and property, and their votaries are drawn very largely from the wealthier and more luxurious communities and are for the most part very scrupulous in the observance of religious custom, and as the Mahārājīs, on the other hand, are not modest in their exactions, the opportunities of the latter for fulfilling their worldly ambitions are ample. At their various seats they possess temples with residences attached. There they celebrate daily their special worship in the presence of crowds of followers, men and women, and indulge in those licentious practices which have won for them, especially in later times, a shameful notoriety.

3. Hedonistic tenets.—The Vālabbhāchāryans have often been called the Epicureans of India, a method the historians of religion have followed. These epicurean tenets are akin to their teaching, in that they are usual living. The process by which this development was reached is profoundly instructive to the student of Indian religion and is in strict analogy with the history of many other religious and spiritual movements.
into Brjâhāsa under the name of Pramâsîgâr ('Ocean of Love'). It was selected by Vallabhâchârya as the foundation of his system. The original form of the sect, as it is held, to symbolize spiritual devotion under the figure of earthly love; but in its interpretation by succeeding Maharâjas of the sect it was converted into a code of religious intricacy, not only sanctioning, but enjoining, the most hideous sensuality.

4. Cult of the guru.—The Siddhânta Rahasya, ascribed to Vallabhâchârya and claimed by him as a direct word from God, deals with them in a different order. It contains the doctrine of the origin of the sin and the mode of its expiation. It consists of only about a dozen lines in Sanskrit, in the course of which we find a characteristic suggestion regarding the supreme importance of the guru, the Gosâñjî, the mediator between God and the sinner:

'The offering which has (in the first instance) been enjoyed by its owner is not acceptable by the god of gods. Therefore in the first instance, in all doings everything should be dedicated.'

The dedication in the first instance, here referred to, is that which takes place when the offering is made to the guru, through whom it reaches Krânya, of whom he is the manifestation. Of the terrible nature of this dedication this divine evidence is given below.

Another writer of this school is even more explicit in his assertion of the lofty claims of the Gosâñjî:

'Whoever holds his guru and Śī Thâkejî [the god] to be different is distinct from a jirdhâ (a kind of bird). Whoever disobeys the orders of his guru shall go to Asîpatra and other dreadful hells and lose all religious merits.'

Śrî Gokâlnâtha, fourth son of Vîthalnâth above referred to, in his Vachandmrt ("Nectar of Precept"), in his exposition of the pûshât-mûrgha, dwells with even more precision on the fate of those who disobey their preceptors:

'He who gets angry in his heart maligns his guru and utters harsh terms towards his guru becomes dumb, and after that he becomes a sinner. He is then the creature of the region of the vegetable kingdom, and after that he is born a creature of the region of the dead. As he remembers Śrî Bhâgavân [God], in the same way he remembers and repeats in his mind the name of his guru.'

Another of the books of the sect runs riot in its laudation of the Gosâñjî or Vîthalnâth, the second in this dynasty of gurus.

'He is possessed of all virtues; he is the very personification of the most excellent being [God]; he is all incarnations. He is himself the creator of the endless crores of worlds wherein his glory is diffused all over.'

In the Guruvasî, another production in the same line, it is said:

'When Hari [God] is displeased with any one, the guru saves him [the sinner] from the effects of the god's displeasure. Therefore a Vaisya should serve his guru with his body and mind.

The principal gurus are Śrî Achâryâ and Śrî Gosâñjî and the whole family called the Vallabh family. The worship of the guru is to be performed in the same way as the worship of God.'

This high claim made on behalf of the guru is not confined to this one sect. The attitude of many Hindus towards their chosen gurus is marked by a similar reverence; the peculiarity of the claim made on behalf of these Vâllabhâchâryas, guruîs is that it is put forth on behalf of a family line, a kind of aca'ryâ, religious dynasty, not on the guru chosen in each case by the devotee, but of one who is set over him in virtue of the right of birth and natural succession. This is quite in keeping with the title honorific, whose Mahâraj his and the worldly ambitions with which it was associated. It may also

1 Siddhânta Rahasya, quoted in Hist. of Sect of Maharajâs, p. 30.
2 Tânta by Hariyâna, quoted in Hist. of Sect of Mahârajâs, p. 82.
3 Brjâhāsa, quoted in Hist. of Sect of Maharajâs, p. 82.
4 Vachandmrt, quoted in Hist. of Sect of Maharajâs, p. 82.

be said to be the root of all the degeneracy and moral corruption that have made their name and the name of their sect so notorious.

4. Initiation.—In the Vâllabhâchârya sect there is a special ceremony of initiation into the community accompanied by the repetition of a formula expressing reverence for either Krânya or Râma. In the Vallabhâchârya sect this rite may be administered at the early age of three or four years. In some parts of India it is performed at a somewhat later age. A rosary or necklace, called kanthi, of 108 beads made of tali-wood is put around the neck of the candidate for initiation, and he is taught the use of the eight-syllabled prayer: "Śrî Kṛṣṇaḥ barâgam māma,' 'The blessed Kṛṣṇa is my refuge.'

There is a second initiation called samarpanya, or dedication, which, in the case of males, takes place in the eleventh or twelfth year, and, in the case of females, upon marriage or shortly before it. This rite is also called Brahmasamandana ('union with Brahma'). The formula repeated on this occasion begins with the eight-syllabled formula of the first initiation and continues thus:

't he who is_submitted to, is definitely influenced by being enduring for a thousand measured years with the name Kulâs to the worshiped Krânya dedicate my body, organs of sense, life, limbs and other alms my wife and family, property with my own self; I am thy slave, O Krânya.

There is nothing in this formula that goes much beyond the expressions of devotion that one meets with in other forms of Hindu worship. In form it does not go beyond the 'tan, man, and dhan' that enters so constantly into the expression of Hindu devotion. But the sense in which this initiation was enjoined and accepted by the Vallabhâchâryas is made clear in a commentary on Vâllabhâ’s Siddhânta Rahasya. The commentator, who was no other than the celebrated Gokâlnâtha, the grandson of Vâllabha, the famous fourth son of the second guru, Vîthalnâth, thus expounds the formula:

'Therefore in the beginning, even before ourselves enjoying, wives, sons, etc. (prâna includes daughters along with sons) should be made over because of the expression savra maitre ['all things'] occurring in the text. After marriage, even before using her ourselves, the offering of her (the wife) should be made with a view to her becoming useless by ourselves.'

6. Sensorial Practices.—In this conception we have the fons et origo of the gross sensality that is bound up with the religious practices of this sect. The amorous deeds of the adolescent Krânya, who is the object of its worship, were understood in their literal and normal sense, and under this notion the sect was sought through carnal union with the guru, or religious head, who claimed to be the incarnate of the god, through whom alone the god was accessible to the worshipper. It is only when one realizes the hold which this interpretation of the above-quoted formula of initiation took of the blind votaries of these gurus that one can conceive the possibility of these debauchery that has so long disgraced the religious exercises of this community, through so many generations. The husband who regards with complaisance the desecration of the virtue of his wife, the father who consents to the violation of his daughter by these debauched pretenders to religious sanctity is, obsessed with the monstrous delusion that spiritual gain can come to him and through the sensual indulgence of his spiritual progeny. To him, the male world was, if it is not to his own credit to submit to any degradation that appears to do reverence to these high-priests of delirium. He drinks with avidity the water that has been worked up by the wet heat of this filthy being, eats with relish the remnants of his meals, chews over again the pān supârî (leaf with betel-nut) which has been spat out of the mouth of this divine guru.

1 Monier-Williams, Brâhmanism and Hindûsîm, p. 351.
The immorality of the temple-worship quickly spread itself into the whole life of the community. The rás mandali (carval love-meeting) soon became well known institution in many places. The purpose of these gatherings was to re-enact the scenes of the mythological story of Krishna's amorous sporting with the gopīs by the waters and in the woods of Mathura.

Doctrines and practices such as have been described were bound to call forth, sooner or later, protests from within the community itself. With the growing education and enlightenment of the Maharajas influences some of the better spirits awoke to shame and indignation. One of these was Karsandas Mulji, a resident of Bombay, who in 1856 raised his voice and in the columns of the Satya Prakash ("The Light of Truth"), a weekly paper, began to fulminate against the exactions and corrupt practices of the Vallabhacharyan Maharajas. The Maharajas had at that time suffered a few set-backs to their pretensions. These furnished an opportunity to the dissatisfied in the community. The Maharajas had begun an attack on the Brahmans, of whose influence with the people they were beginning to fear to have been deprived. Those of their own community who were eager to see abuses among themselves corrected undertook to assist the Maharajas in their conflict with the Brahman on the condition that they would reform their own practices. The Maharajas, yielding to this pressure, agreed to accept the proposed reforms, which, among other things, demanded the cessation of the adulterous behaviour of some Maharajas towards the women of their families, especially in the winter temple-service at four o'clock in the morning, and of the violation of the young girls of the community. The reformers aimed also at relief from the heavy money exactions which the Maharajas knew so well how to levy by means of threats of their displeasure. To these and to some other demands of a minor character the alarmed Maharajas gave an unwilling consent, stipulating that the agreement should not come into operation for a year. Further, the Maharajas had been worsted in their attempt to secure exemption from appearance in courts of justice; a objection appeared to the idea that it would be a degradation to them to sit lower than a European. The High Court of Bombay refused to entertain their claim. When, during an action, a plaintiff wanted to subpoena the Mahārājās as witnesses, they closed their temples, and their followers, who could not take their meals without paying the morning adoration to the Maharajas and the image, were kept without, fasting. These fasting followers were released from their unhappy plight only on their subscribing a bond which pledged them to obey the Maharajas and to undertake in no circumstances to summon them to a court of justice. All this gave rise to a large amount of newspaper criticism, which tended to weaken the prestige of the Maharajas.

In 1860 the Mahārājā of Surat came to Bombay and, by presiding at the distribution of prizes at the Gujarati Girls' Schools, appeared to place himself on the side of social reform. Invited to a meeting at which the question of a renaissance of the abandoned women was to be discussed, the Mahārājā appeared among the opponents of the suggested reform and apparently got the worst of the argument in this public discussion. The editor of the Satya Prakāśī then challenged the Mahārājā to a discussion in the press. The Mahārājā, indicated his views through the columns of the Satya Prakāśī ("Praman of our Religion"); a paper published under his patronage. The editor of the Satya Prakāśī accused the Satya Prakāśī of being an article expressing the subjective religion of the Hindus and the Present Heterodox Opinion's, which set forth a doctrine to the effect that the followers of Vaiṣṇavism, at least, were not followers of Mahārājās. In the course of this article he made certain allegations regarding the Mahārājā which became the subject of an action for libel. The case was tried in the Bombay High Court. In the May the Mahārājā died an action for libel against the editor and the printing house of the Vallabhāchāry community, at the instigation of the Mahārājā, attempted to interfere with the course of justice by resolving that none of the cases, unless of except communication, should be heard in the Mahārājā's absence, with the result that they were found guilty and sentenced to heavy fines. The Mahārājīlibel case came on for hearing on 29th Jan. 1865. The Mahārājā occupied the High Court during 24 sittings spread over a period of 40 days. Thirty witnesses were examined for the plaintiff. For the defendant (Karsandas Mulji), some of the latter being men of learning and eminence in the community. The case excited the most interest among learned communities in the city. It led to a complete exposure of the lives and practices of the Vallabhachāry Mahārājās, and the verdict was in favour of the defendant on the main issue of justification, with costs, and for the plaintiff on the defendant's plea of "not guilty," without costs. With respect to this part of the plea the Chief Justice took the view that a public writer could not make an attack on the character of an individual in his private capacity, although he might be deprecated and an adulterer, and besides that the defendant was not justified, without previous knowledge of the plaintiff's misconduct, in publishing an attack on him, although the allegation subsequently turned out to be true. The Puise Judge, on the other hand, held that the article was an attack not on the private character of the plaintiff, but on his character as a Maharajah, or religious preceptor, and that the defendant was quite aware of the existing practices of the sect. The issue of the trial was a complete success for the Vallabhachāry reformer, an important victory for the cause for which he stood, and a crushing exposure of licentiousness in the high places of religion.

Many who witnessed this trial more than fifty years ago have hoped that the death-blow had been given to the prestige and to the licentious practices of the Vallabhachāry Mahārājās. But the astounding fact is that the Vallabhachāry Mahārājās continued to flourish. Twenty years after the trial the Maharajas of the sect was found guilty of complicity in a mail robbery and sentenced at Rajkot to a term of imprisonment. Some of them might have been in the entire Vallabhachāry community would have been shocked by this revelation of depravity in a religious leader. This aspect of the case seems to have affected them little; it failed to impress on the community on other and quite different grounds. They were stricken with horror at the thought of the danger to the caste of their Maharajas that was involved in his being condemned to eat the prison food. Local merchants in Bombay organized a meeting at which it was resolved to petition the Government to relax the prison rules in favour of this sacred personage! Needless to say, their petition was unheeded. Probably in no other country than India would it have been possible for any system to survive such exposure.

This episode in the history of the Vallabhachāryas has been narrated here for these reasons, that it led to the full disclosure of the real character of the teaching of this sect and of the width of the gulf which lies between morality and religion in the current conceptions of multitudes of the people of India, and that it also illustrates the powerlessness of public opinion, as it exists in India, to grapple with social customs that rest on religious sanctions having their roots deep down in the amorphous soil that is the product of ages of pantheistic thinking.

LITERATURE.—A clear statement of the place of the Vallabhachāryas is contained in M. Monier-Williams, Brahmanism and Hindutwa, London, 1879. A very full history of the sect, with a detailed account of the Maharaja libel case, will be found in A. S. Radha-Kunja, "History of Maharaja in B. India, London, 1865. The chief authority of the sect is the Bhagvat-Gita, the hymns of the Kṛṣṇa, was translated into Brijbhas with the title Premadyak ("Ocean of Love"). Among the books of the sect are the Gita and the Bhagvant Tiks Subodhini, the Siddhānta Rādhāgaṇa, both written for Vallabha, the Vaiṣṇavas ("Nectar of Nectar"). Most of these have been translated into commentary on the Prakāśīgīrī, Guraṃrāi ("Gurū- Worship"), Vīrāha Śatāli, Siddhānta Vīrū (a commentary on Gokulamāth, Sri Siddhānta Rāmdarśa, the Bhagatī Rādhā Chaitanya, the Bhagatī Tiks Subodhini, the Bhagatī Rādhanāma, both ascribed to Vallabha, the Vaiṣṇavas ("Nectar of Nectar"). Most of these have been translated into commentary on the Prakāśīgīrī, Guraṃrāi ("Gurū- Worship"), Vīrāha Śatāli, Siddhānta Vīrū (a commentary on Gokulamāth, Sri Siddhānta Rāmdarśa, the Bhagatī Rādhā Chaitanya, the Bhagatī Tiks Subodhini, the Bhagatī Rādhanāma, both ascribed to Vallabha, the Vaiṣṇavas ("Nectar of Nectar").
VALUE.—1. The nature of value.—Value is one of the last of the great philosophic topics to have received recognition, and even now the Encyclopaedia Britannica has an article only on economic value. Its discovery was probably the greatest achievement of empiricism in the 19th cent., but opinions on the subject are not yet crystallized, and it is still one of the growing points of philosophy and one which seems likely to overshadow older views. It is clear from the antiquity of the antithesis of 'fact' and 'value,' and the difference between the standpoints of 'description' and 'appréciation.' It is widely held that consciousness of value differs in kind from consciousness of fact. It is posterior to the latter, and represents a reaction upon fact. It is an attitude assumed towards fact, a weighing of fact in relation to an agent, and his feelings, desires, interests, purposes, needs, and acts; and it expresses his appreciation (appréciation) or repugnation (dépréciation) of it in this relation. It follows (1) that a certain subjectivity, or, better, a relation to personality, is involved in all values; (2) that values are not of the same kind as, and react upon, when it reacts upon stimulation, and that for a purely theoretic or contemplative view no values would exist; (3) that values are something superadded to, and independent of, qualities of the mind, in order to express their relation to its purpose and acts, and do not inhere in objects per se. Indeed they seem to be even more subjective, variable, and personal than the 'secondary' qualities of objects, and hence are often called 'tertiary' qualities. Nevertheless they are also objectified and projected into objects, when these are regarded as valuable objectively and per se, or when the 'validity' of actual valuations is as¬

2. The history of the notion.—Historically the importance of the problem of value has been recognized very slowly, gradually, and grudgingly, and, moreover, its philosophic history is obscure. No early philosophy having made it central, or even expressly considered it. In the light of subsequent developments, however, we may trace its emergence to the Platonic doctrine (in Republic, vi.) of the Idea of Good. When Plato conceived the Good as the culmination of the Ideal world and as the principle which was to unify, systematize, and organize all the other 'forms,' he was really putting 'value' above 'being,' considering as the supreme principle of explanation, and expressing the same thought as Lotze, when he declared that the beginning of metaphysics lies in ethics. For he was proposing to view all being teleologic¬ally, and to make its relation to a 'good' or end (an ethical notion) essential to its being. This was to affirm not only the objective validity of the 'tertiary' qualities, but also their supremacy over the others. Plato, however, did not himself develop this line of reflection, nor succeed in inducing philosophers in general to investigate the problem of values. To the more naturalistic they seemed to react upon perception or intuition in their ultimate reality. Spinoza's wholesale repudiation of their objectivity, at the end of bk. i. of his Ethics, is

typical in this respect. The modern developments of the subject proceed from Kant, who, however, came upon it rather incidentally at the end of his philosophic career, and apprehended its significance very imperfectly. Kant's philosophizing had ended in the theoretical, and practically he practically repudiated, or at least he limited, all essential beliefs in (God, freedom, and immortality) could not be scientifically justified. Yet they had to be presupposed, he believed, for purposes of action; i.e., to carry on life it was necessary to exist as if they were true. He devised therein the notion of a practical postulate, which was to be practically imperative without being theoretically cogent, attaching it to the Moral Law of unconditional obligation, and endowing it with objects of 'faith,' which were to be carefully distinguished from objects of knowledge. He thus established (1) a dualism between faith and knowledge which had obvious interest for theology, and (2) a supremacy of the practical over the theoretic reason, which was more fruitful, because less naive, than Plato's. The latter result tended to raise 'values' above 'facts,' though the former at first masked this consequence, and took such a philosophic long to overcome the Kantian dualism. Both, however, were prolific of further developments, divergent from the main line of post-Kantian speculation, which was that to notice that, just as the existence of fact must be conditioned for us by our knowledge, so our knowledge must in turn be conditioned by our interests and the prospective value of the objects of our cognitive endeavours. For a long time the investigation of value was carried on only in Germany, and even then progress was slow. The first (probably) to see that here was a new problem was F. E. Beneke, a practical psychologist among the German philosophers of his time, and hence a victim of Hegel's intolerance. Already in his Grundlegung zur Physik der Sitten (1821) he sees that, if the science of morals is practical, the notion of value lies at the root of it. He lays it down that the value which we attribute to a thing is determined by the pleasure which it has excited in us, and he makes the whole of ethics depend on feelings of value. In his Grundlinien des natürlichen Systems der praktischen Philosophie (1857-40) he makes it more explicit that valuations arise in the mind as reactions upon stimulation and are conditioned by the things of the external world, distinguishes between subjective and objective valuation (Wertgebung), and traces the growth of 'dispositions' to value and to desire. R. H. Lotze (1817-91) revived the Platonic idea that good ranks above all being, wanting metaphysic to show what ought to be conditions what is (Metaphysik of 1841), and that 'Nature is directed to the accomplishment of Good,' and interpreted the 'ontological' proof of the existence of God as meaning that the totality of value cannot be utterly divorced from existence. In the endeavour to vindicate value he had the sympathy of his theological colleague at Göttingen, Albrecht Ritschl (1822—89), who agrees with him that the facts of concrete experience are the source of our general notions, and not, as Platonism has always held, pale re¬

flexions of the latter. Hence personal experience is not deducible from metaphysics, but vice versa. Ritschl, however, started rather from the Kantian dualism of faith and knowledge and tried to differentiate them from fact, and from the latter, but he was less familiar with distinct objects, those of religion—an independent method, which it shared with ethics and aesthetics—distinct from that of metaphysics and science, and in turn he supposed a further differ¬

1 Microcosm, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1894, I. 206.
2 Theologie und Metaphysik, Bonn, 1891, pp. 32-40.
ent in kind from theoretical judgments, though equally capable of validity and certainty. It was therefore to misconstrue the essential meaning of religious affirmations to take them as expressions of theoretic insight rather than of moral truth. It is mainly to Ritschel that it is due the current arithesis between value-judgments and judgments of fact and method. The theoretics of sciences are different in kind according as they use the one or the other. Ritschel, however, recognized that this separation could not be really carried through. He observes: 'All continuous cognition of the things which excite sensation is not only accompanied but also guided by feeling' (pleasure-pain, as indicative of value for self, by way of enhancement or inhibition), and 'in so far as attention is necessary to retain the end of knowledge, will become the vehicle of the purpose of exact cognition; the proximate motive of will, however, is feeling, as expressing that a thing or an activity is worth desiring. Value-judgments therefore are those that determine all connected knowledge of the world, even when it is carried out in the most objective fashion. Attention during scientific observation always desires that such knowledge has a value for him who exercises it.'

This seems to render all theoretic judgments dependent on, and subordinate to, value-judgments; but one might dispute the coincidence of theoretical and independent value-judgments. In the sciences value-judgments accompany the theoretic, whereas 'independent value-judgments are all cognitions of matter-judgments.' They are, therefore, as they excite moral pleasure or displeasure, or otherwise set the will in motion to appropriate goods or to ward off evils. The religions also are composed of such independent value-judgments expressing man's and the world's duty and aim. From this position it was easy to pass to that of W. Windelband (1845-1915), who, while sharply distinguishing between judgments and evaluations or judgments about judgments (Beurteilungen), emphasized that the latter are involved in every judgment in that it affirms or denies, approves or disapproves. Logic, therefore, becomes a science of values, a third normative science, along with ethics and aesthetics, and like them aims at the discovery of universally valid norms. Philosophy becomes the critical study of the universally valid values; their recognition was the duty and aim. Windelband was followed by H. Rickert and H. Münsterberg (1883-1916). The Austrian schools of C. von Eulenburg (1850-1916) and A. Meinong (1853-1920) devote themselves to the discussion of the objects and sorts of values, of their aims and their desires, and will, the laws of the valuation-process, and the accompanying feelings, and apply to all values the economic law of marginal utility. The rise of the social sciences and the influence of the empiricism of (1788-1860), by raising the question of the value of life as a whole, emphasized the importance of values. F. W. Nietzsche (1844-1900) effectively directed attention to the transformations of values, and set himself, before he went mad, to bring about a 'transvaluation' (Umwertung) of all the accepted values. Josiah Royce (1848-1917) acclimatized the distinction between appreciation and description in the English-speaking world with his Spirit of Modern Philosophy (1892), and since then there has been a good deal of (rather unsystematic) discussion of the problems of value, especially in America. Among the intellectual biases of the dominant 'idealism' has been unfavourable to it. The pragmatists, however, were glad to recognize the presence of valuations in cognitive processes, and to deny the intellectual nature of 'pure' thought and 'absolute' truth. They em-

2 Prüfung, Freiberg i. Br., 1884.
3 Das Grundtale der Erscheinungen, Tübingen, 1894.
4 The Eternal Values, Boston and London, 1898.

plasize the human, purposeful, and personal character of value, tend to regard all values as relative, primarily to the particular situation which is valued, and declare the existence of efficacy of values to be plain, empirical facts.

3. Sorts and criteria of value.—As the result of this historical development it is generally admitted that distinct sciences of valuation do exist, though there is no agreement as to what they are. However, it is clear that several sciences have been specialized to study them. Thus (1) economic value has long been manifested as a fundamental notion of political economy, which, ever since Adam Smith, has divided it into value in use, i.e. the utility of objects for human purposes, or, as J. S. Mill said, their 'capacity to satisfy a desire or serve a purpose,' and value in exchange, i.e. their power to induce or compel people to pay (other valuables) for the use of them. The former is simply teleological value, which refers to the relation of means and end; the latter is when an object is not only useful but also difficult to procure, and is the special concern of economics (q.v.).

(2) That ethics deals with values is also agreed, but though there is a consensiveness there specific ethical values are and how they are related.

(3) Aesthetic values are also beyond dispute.

(4) Pleasures must be either pleasure and pain (unpleasantness) as a negative value, since even the most ascetic do not really succeed in holding that pleasure is, or in denying that pain is, as such bad. The opposite doctrine, that all intrinsic values are essentially religious, is commoner, but need not disturb the classification of values. For, even if the question whether objects are valuable because they give pleasure or give pleasure because they are desired (valued) were decided in favour of the former alternative, it would still be true that the other values are at least relatively independent. Consciousness of value does not directly imply consciousness of pleasure-pain, nor vary concomitantly with it; e.g., in conscious wrongdoing an ethical value which is felt not as pleasant, but as painful, is nevertheless recognized. Similarly the aesthetic value of a work of art may be recognized, which is yet declared to give no pleasure and to leave the spectator 'cold.'

(5) It has been mentioned that, according to the school of Ritschel, the objects of the religious consciousness are really values, and affirmations about them are essentially value-judgments. And, though other theologians dissent from it, this view gets considerable support both from the psychology of religion, which interprets religious beliefs as expressions of spiritual needs, and from every theological admission that faith, as well as reason, is operative in the apprehension of religious truth.

(6) There are good reasons for recognizing the distinctiveness of biological or survival-values. For they are capable of objective scientific study, and cannot be simply represented, as Herbert Spencer thought, by the hedonic values. Pleasures are not always conducive to life, nor are all pains evil. The relations of survival to pleasure-pain are complex; so are its relations to the ethical values. Survival-values have a high degree of positive value as to compel universal assent and so high a negative value as to entail complete extinction and universal repudiation.

(7) Several schools of philosophy hold that logic is the science of valence, and that truth is the positive, error the negative, value; and this
treatment is often implied also where it is not avowed. It would seem to be borne out by the far-reaching and influential doctrines, and aesthetics as 'normative' sciences, and proved by the conformity of logic with the criteria generally used to distinguish values.

As such oppositions appear to be used: (1) that between existence and value, the 'is' and the 'ought.' Even though there are in man natural tendencies to approve of what has succeeded itself, and to criticize what is being considered worthy of being—i.e. both to realize ideals and to idealize the actual—there remains a considerable discrepancy between the existent and the valuable. It cannot (ordinarily) be argued that, because a thing exists, it is valuable, or that, because it is valuable, it must exist. What is need not be what ought to be, nor need what ought to be exist. Hence the 'laws' of a science of values are not natural uniformities, but 'norms,' i.e. precepts or imperatives; they formulate not what actually does happen, but what ought to happen 'normally,' i.e. if the persons concerned recognize and submit to the order proper to them.

(2) Values appear to be positive and negative. As they express the attitude of a subject to an object, they indicate the acceptance or rejection, putting or withdrawing the force of attractiveness or repulsiveness of the latter. They occur therefore in couples of antithetical predicators, both admitting of degrees of intensity. Hence values may compensate, cancel, or neutralize each other, and the final value of an object may vary according to the balance between its positive and negative value, or become practically nil. A state of consciousness which is 'neutral,' and an object which is 'indifferent,' are cases of such zero values.

(3) All values are disputable. They involve a relation to a valuer whose valuation need not be correct, and need not be accepted. The allegation of a value, therefore, is not equivalent to its validity. All values are to be understood as primarily claims to value, which may be allowed, disallowed, or reversed, when other values are considered. In some cases such reversal is normal: thus, if A and B are enemies or have opposite interests, what is 'good' for A is normally 'bad' for B, and vice versa.

With the aid of these criteria the following kinds of values can now be enumerated: (1) Hedonic values are the pleasant (positive) and the unpleasant or painful (negative). (2) Aesthetic values are the beautiful (positive) and the ugly (negative); also the attractive-repulsive, the fitting-improper, the noble-vulgar, the elegant-coarse, and many others. (3) Utility values are the good (positive) and the bad (negative); also the useful-useless. These last, though they properly have reference to the relation of means and ends ('the good'), naturally pass over into ethics, when this science is conceived teleologically, i.e. as the science of the final end or supreme good. (4) Other ethical values, relative to other conceptions of ethics, are marked by the oppositions of 'good' and 'evil,' 'right' and 'wrong,' 'ought' and 'ought not.' 'Good' and 'bad' seem sometimes to be used absolutely in ethics, but this usage hardly proves the existence of 'absolute' values. On closer inspection, the meaning is seen to be good or bad for the ethical end, however that is conceived. (5) Religious positions reveal their character as values by the interferences of such antitheses as God-devil, salvation-damnation, election-probation, holy-sinful, sacred-profane; also by the frequency with which religious arguments turn out to be not the impossibility of the existence of faith, or the existence of faith in line with the values 'true' and 'false,' 'truth' and 'error.' These also claim to be absolute; but whether what is believed true is so may be disputed, just as whether what is beautiful, or fair, or beautiful, or valuable, or conducive to survival actually has the value which it claims. Even what is felt as pleasant is not always conceded to be a true 'pleasure' in every 'inward or external' sense to be 'real.' This illustrates also a further confirmation of the whole doctrine, that the various value-predicates are freely transferable from one species of values to another, and that the same fact and value collapses, because fact without value cannot be found. (2) The very fact that it is considered so desirable to find it proves that it is impossible to do so. For the importance attributed to the discovery of fact, and the eulogistic sense in which 'reality' is opposed to 'appearance' or 'illusion,' are, in fact, values. This comes out especially in doctrines about the 'degrees of reality,' which are plainly degrees of value, or about the distinction between 'reality' and 'existence.' (3) It is not psychologically possible to reach any fact, except by a process permeated throughout by values, viz., a purposive or end ('good') by a choice of the 'right' means, which implies selective attention, preferences for what seems valuable, and the influence of concomitant value-feelings and of a variety of prejudices and of biases. (4) The logical reason for holding that every fact alleged must contain a latent value, that it claims not only to be 'true' but also implicitly to be better than any other judgment it was possible to make under the circumstances. Its maker was probably aware of this, and consciously preferred it to all alternatives that occurred to him; but, even where he did not think of any, they remain logically conceivable, and hence the actual judgment is only justifiable by its logical claim to be the best. Hence the value-relation and attitude can never be eradicated from even the merest and most stubborn 'fact.'

Nor, conversely, can a recognition of fact be wholly eliminated from knowledge. Pure value exists as little as pure fact. It would be purely fanciful and sheer postulation, and neither fancies nor postulates are elaborated without regard to fact. They are made to be realized, and, when they are recognized as impossible, their value is destroyed or impaired. It is said to be 'not possible' to realize utterly unrealizable ideals. This recognition of fact, however, is always relative to the existing state of knowledge, and may be modified as knowledge grows. Knower are often concerned to raise up false notions for the purposes of an inquiry or a science, hypo-
thetically and experimentally. Hence it is not to be supposed that what is taken as fact, and formally is 'fact,' must remain so. It may turn out to be only a methodologically convenient 'fiction.' In general it may be considered that, since values are always in every the 'facts' that are recognized as such, they are themselves facts, and that the antithesis between values and facts cannot be made absolute. Values are not simply fortuitous and gratuitous additions to facts, which are merely subjective and should be eliminated by strict science, but are essential to cognize process and compatible with absolute value. But, as a result, such ideas too are always reactions—upon prior facts—and are generated by their evaluation; and, moreover, these prior facts may have been merely hypothetical constructs recommended by their prospective value.

5. Value and existence. It would seem to follow from the relations between value and fact that values cannot be denied existence in any world that can exist for men, and this in several senses. First, they are operative in and on human minds and find expression in human acts and embodiment in human institutions; (2) they can occur in, and relatively to, any universe of diction, however false; (3) (found in the fact among itself of some kind of values is sometimes said to be incapable of real existence, and cited as objections to the connexion of values with existence. But both must be so related that it is not applicable to one and to the other, and to conduct to its successful manipulation. Otherwise they become false ideals and futile fictions. Also an ideal which is recognized as impossible appears to lose pro tanto its obligatoryness and power of attraction. 'Ultra posse nemo obligatur.'

Whether it is possible to infer the existence of a valuable object from a recognition of its value alone is a question of great importance for religion. For the objects of the religious consciousness appear to be largely or wholly of this kind, and the religious 'proofs' of their existence to be ultimately such inferences. They are, moreover, stubbornly persisted in, in spite of the protests of common sense against their validity, and have an important function also in the other sciences, in which they are not recognized so openly, but masquerade as 'axioms' and 'prior truths.' If, discussing then in its generality this inference from value to existence, we should remember that all values are initially claims, which may fail of verification. It is an idealism as solid to reside in the reality of the valuable objects on what may be an unheard claim, viz. on the demand for them alone, unsatisfied and unconfined by experience. Logically they are to start with nothing but postulates. It may be legitimate to take them as methodological principles, but even then they must be regarded as hypotheses to be assumed experimentally, until they have adequately approved and verified themselves by their applications to the actual problems which they concern. For example, it may be legitimate to extract from the actual pursuit of ends and of happiness by men the methodological and values, and be regarded as tending towards a supreme all-embracing end towards universal happiness; but can it be maintained that therefore such an end is actually operative, or that perfect happiness (i.e. everlasting and unalloyed pleasure unaccompanied by pain) is possible? To justify such inferences two further assumptions would seem to be necessary. The first is that human operations and the moral life are formable with human nature and bound to satisfy its demands. Now these assumptions, traditionally described as the axioms of the ultimate rationality of existence, are evidently themselves nothing but values for which existence is postulated, and, if they are to be admitted as axiomatic truths on their own assurance, it is difficult to see what limits can be set to the postulation of objects of desire. Even as it is, methodological postulates are given great, and generally undue, power in verifying themselves, because, so long as they work at all, their failures can always be ascribed to the imperfection of our knowledge, and are not values and the value-postulate of total failure to predict the course of events need lead us to abandon the postulate of their 'causal connexion.' Hence the testing of a value-postulate is always, in any sense, the ultimate test, and not in any sense that makes this presupposition alone a sufficient reason for regarding it as absolutely true; still it is better to get a postulated value confirmed by experience than to accept the mere recognition of value as an adequate guarantee of its existence. What kinds and amounts of experimental confirmation are to be considered adequate to verify the existence of postulated objects of value will naturally depend on the specific subject-matter, and, as in addition the various ways sought and got need not be in harmony with each other, and some may prefer unsound to true, and vice versa, the relevance of some of the values found to the existence to be proved may be called in question, opinions will probably long continue to differ on these matters.

6. Value and validity. It follows from the above that the transition from value to validity is by no means a matter of course, though this is often assumed, both as regards ethical and as regards logical values. In both cases the motive is the difficulty of validating value claims, which is a long, and indeed theoretically an unending, process. Hence the temptation to allege absolute and self-proving values which are independent of their working in experience. The absolute values alleged, however, are only formal claims, as comes out very clearly in Kant's account of the absolute value of personality and of the 'law' of duty. The declaration that every person should be treated as an end in himself is merely a recognition of the formal claim that every person makes to be so treated (even though he never is so treated, and apparently could not be, in the actual order of things), which may serve as a definition of personality; while the moral 'law,' that duty should be unconditionally fulfilled, is merely a paraphrase of the obligations of right which hold in every case is any light thrown on the questions how, concretely, any one should be treated, or what, concretely, his 'duties' are. Similarly every judgment formally claims to be true, absolutely and unconditionally, and, as it mentions no restrictions to its claim, it may be said to be so; but, as this is so, however false a judgment may turn out to be, it establishes no presumption in favour of its real truth. Thus it is quite possible, and indeed necessary, to inquire whether the values claimed are really possessed, and to question the validity of the values actually recognized. This indeed is one of the chief occupations of critical philosophy. It means that the problem of value occurs also in the sphere of values; the antithesis of 'ought' and 'is,' which was supposed to differentiate value and fact, arises again over the value of values, when they are taken as facts for the purpose of assessing their value. The explanation perhaps is that error and failure are possible in all human operations and human reflections, in the estimation of values. The values which are claimed are subject to revision and correction, and, if it is decided that they are, but ought not to be, they can be called either 'false' or 'wrong'; for it is intrinsically as legitimate to use the value-
predicates of logic as those of ethics to describe their failure.

The difficulty of determining the precise connection between value and validity is, however, largely due to the obscurity of the notion of validity itself. We are accustomed to regard validity at first as an absolute and (theoretically) unquestionable degree of value, and to illustrate it from the ideal validity of logic and of ethics. On examination, however, this sense of validity appears to be merely formal, and to be nugatory or null as a guarantee of truth. For instance, the values of the individual, the valid and the valuable fall apart. Neither is the valuable necessarily valid, nor is the valid necessarily valuable. Every moral order makes extensive use of inferior moral motives; every science uses probable but invalid reasonings. Whether the ideal validity is ever reached, or would be valuable if it were, seems more than doubtful. Hence it seems proper to reduce the meaning of validity to a high, or generally recognized and practically indisputable, degree of value, and to make value determine validity, not validity value.

VI. Value and valuation.—If value is conferred upon an object by a personal attitude towards it, it is clear that all objects can be valued by being included in a valuation-process. Many objects, however, are so valued according to circumstances, or are so rarely important enough to be valued at all, that they are conceived as neutral or indifferent per se. So it is only if an object is constantly valued in a particular way that its value adheres to it and it comes to seem intrinsically valuable. For it then emancipates itself from the personal valuation and makes its valuation look like a mere recognition of an already existing value.

Values are objectively valued in other ways also. Thus the personal reaction expressed in a value-judgment carries a formal claim to universality, since every one initially regards himself as the measure of all things, until he is instructed by the dissent of others. Thus claim therefore maintains itself only whereas it is not disputed, and should not be taken as more than methodological. By the comparison of value-judgments it appears that different persons value very differently; hence many value-judgments, being in dispute, are regarded as 'merely subjective.' About others many or all are found to agree, and these may therefore have varying degrees of objectivity. Thus objects which have obtained social recognition as valuable come to rank as objective values. A value that has risen to be objective may then maintain itself without continuing to be valued, and even though, under the circumstances, its value may have been converted into the opposite, thus, once a literary work is ranked as a 'classic,' its value remains uncontested, even though few care for it or even read it, except for examination purposes; and King Midas no doubt continued to think gold most valuable in spite of his inability to digest it. It cannot always be assumed therefore that, because a value is current and is recognized, it is functionally, any more than that it is right.

There are then plenty of objective values, which any valuer encounters and has to recognize as given. But they may nevertheless all be considered as products of valuation-processes, and as presupposing prior value-judgments. For when the valuation of an object has been repeated and has long been regarded, led to a change in the reflective value-judgment becomes superfluous, and an immediate apprehension of value results, just as immediate perception supersedes judgment about familiar subjective recognition. In other cases, it is true, this process does not occur in the history of the individual, but it can then be traced in that of the race, whose achievements the individual inherits. And many, e.g., be pleasant, beautiful, or right, without a judgment or process of valuation; but the immediacy of its value-claim is no bar to any inquiry into why it is so valued, how it has come to be so, and whether it ought to be so, and not thankful, or pleasant as it seems to be. Hence the values which are psychically data, and psychologically immediate, may always be logically mediated and translated into objective values for and by the valuable object itself. The function of valuation-judgments is to render the valid and the valuable distinct. They then function as facts to be evaluated.

8. Transvaluations.—The process of reflective reconsideration of given values continually leads to changes in their status. Hence 'transvaluations' must be regarded as normal and entirely legitimate occurrences in every sphere of values, though they are not everywhere as socially prominent in the annual changes of the fashions.

As Dewey says, 'All valuation is in some degree a revaluation. Nietzsche would probably have made much of a sensation, but he would have been within the bounds of common sense, if he had confined himself to the assertion that all judgment, in the degree in which it is critically intelligent, is a transvaluation of prior values.'

One sufficient reason for this is that, strictly speaking, it is not psychologically possible to repeat a valuation. Transvaluations are made possible either because the valuation has lost its novelty, and the delight of discovery is gone; it is acquiring familiarity and beginning to breed contempt or indifference; or again it is growing easier, or the resistance to it is diminishing, as habituation renders it less repugnant. Moreover, valuations necessarily vary according to the changes in the organic needs which condition them. His tenth penny bun will never taste as good nor be valued as highly by a hungry boy as his first. No doubt these changes in value are little noticed because many of them are slight, unimportant, and ephemeral; but they would anyhow be obscured by the general bias in favour of stability. Unless it is discounted, it will hardly be recognized that stable values are exceptions rather than the rule. They bulk large because they are attended to and selected. Their stability is always more or less a construction for methodological purposes, like the extraction of stable objects out of the flux of happenings. It is always to some extent a fiction, because it is never at once a critical, absolute, and unchanging degree of objectivity. Thus objects which have obtained social recognition as valuable come to rank as objective values. A value that has risen to be objective may then maintain itself without continuing to be valued, and even though, under the circumstances, its value may have been converted into the opposite, thus, once a literary work is ranked as a 'classic,' its value remains uncontested, even though few care for it or even read it, except for examination purposes; and King Midas no doubt continued to think gold most valuable in spite of his inability to digest it. It cannot always be assumed therefore that, because a value is current and is recognized, it is functionally, any more than that it is right.

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us to these transvaluations is the stability of words; for these change their form much less rapidly than in the thought. 9. Conclusions.—The above survey of the problems of value may be regarded as confirming most of the preliminary points noticed in § 1. The philosophical importance of the subject has been attested by the great variety and universal prevalence of values. The provisional definition of value as essentially a personal attitude, as a recognition of the value of an object from a personal point of view, has maintained itself and proved a clue to the labyrinth of values. It also renders somewhat manageable the psychological debates of the schools of Meinong and von Ehrenfels as to whether values are rooted in feeling, will, or desire. For a personal attitude is a concern of the whole man and not of psychological abstractions. If, however, it is thought necessary to pick one among such psychological phrases, it is probably best to say that value is a personal attitude, of welcome or the reverse, toward an object of interest. For few are likely to dispute that 'interests' are relative to personality. This relativity, however, is not to be regarded as importing any objectionable subjectivity into values, just because it proves to be the source also of their objectivity. For it turns out that all objects are pervaded by values and constituted for the values that belong to them, and hence their avowed values may just as rightfully belong to them as the values latent in their other qualities. Accordingly the opposition between value and fact breaks down. 'Facts' are themselves values, values established in the endeavour to analyse out the factor of givenness contained in experience, and presupposing purposive manipulation of appertaining objects. They are thus 'made' things, though they are not made out of nothing, but out of previously recognized facts which are subjected to criticism to determine what they 'really are.' Values are also in so far as they presuppose valuations, purposive manipulations of data, and judgments; also in that they have prospective reference to action, and are intended to guide it. Accordingly, the belief that values belong to the practical side of life is well founded, and even truer than it seemed; for in ultimate analysis logic also is a science of values. Its theoretic values presuppose purposes, selections, choices, and manipulations, which manipulate reality in and do not differ in kind from those which are openly 'practical.' It is clear also that the notion of value as something gratuitously superadded upon fact must be modified, if it is interpreted as meaning that values are something unreal, artificial, and optional. Reality in its fullness contains and exhibits values, and they are ejected from it only by an effort of abstraction, which is relative to certain restricted purposes, and is never quite successful. Values therefore are not to be regarded as gratuitous additions to reality, made out of the superfluity of human perversity, but as its highest products and the culminating points of its significance for us.

LITERATURE.—The literature is extensive but scattered, and often raises the questions about value only incidentally and in connection with other problems. The historical part of it has been mentioned above in § 2; the modern is still largely contained in periodicals, in English journals, Philosophy and Psychology (1915), in discussions conducted under W. M. Urbau (vol. xiii. [1919] nos. 17, 25, xiv. [1920] nos. 5, 9, 11, 19, 25), consideration of the articles (2), J. Dewey (1919) 19, 10, H. W. Schneider (4v. 6, 29), R. B. Perry (4v. 7), C. von Eilberg (1925) 25, xvi. 4v. 7, W. R. Wells (1925, etc.). In mind art. by S. Alexander (new ser., 1, 1921) 92, E. J. Mackenzie (1925) 292, E. P. Thompson (1926) 292, H. J. K. van den Born (1927). See, e.g., in the Schiller Jahrbuch, 1927, 404, 406, and in the Jahrb. f. Geschichte der philosoph. Literatur, 2 vols., 1927, 1928.

VAMPIRE.—I. Introduction.—A vampire may be defined as (1) the spirit of a dead person, or (2) his corpse, re-animated by his own spirit or by a demon, returning to say the life of the living, by depriving them of blood or of some essential organ, in order to augment its own vitality. This forms a particular aspect of the general belief that ghosts, or spirits sent by sorcerers, can annoy the living in various ways, or cause their sickness or death. The vampire is often one who has died an untimely death, or whose after life is unhappy, or a dead sorcerer, wizard, or other omnolous person. Blood being a well-known soul-life-vehicle, it was supposed that by pouring blood upon graves, or by other work, one might obtain it, as is seen from the well-known example of the shades for whom Odysseus sacrificed sheep on his visit to Hades, as well as from the custom of pouring blood upon graves. Taylor suggests that, when it was seen how certain persons grew thin and bloodless day by day, the easy explanation was that a nocturnal ghost or demon was sucking out the life blood. The vampire belief might originate. The superstition is also connected with the fear which is aroused by the dead, partly because they are often seeking or calling the living, and, in those aspects of it which concern the return of the revitalized corpse, it is an extension of what may have been a primitive conception, viz. that the dead have a life of their own in the grave, which, was, in fact, often erected as a kind of house, more elaborate than the houses of the living. Many tales both from savage and from barbaric peoples show that the dead are still living in the tomb and can encounter any intruder who comes near them. It is known that the line between life and death seems to have been but vaguely defined. To prevent the return of the dead, whether bodily or as a ghost, many precautions were in use—e.g., enclosing the grave with a high fence, piling heavy stones upon it, diverting the course of a stream in order to bury in its bed and then permitting it to flow as before, binding the corpse securely (though this was done for other reasons also) or mutilating it. 1

2. Range and examples of the vampire superstition.—While the most gruesome examples of this superstition (the vampire as a revitalized corpse) are to be met with among nomadic peoples in modern Greece, and in China, it is found in many other parts of the world and has been entertained in remote ages. It is not easily separated from 1 Odysseus, 4v. 84; H. O. Trumbull, The Blood Covenant, Philadelphia, 1893, p. 115 ff.; cf. art. Blood, § 7.

1 P. C. H. 1872, 1882.

other beliefs of a like kind. Not only the dead, whether in bodily or in ghostly form, prey upon the living, but demons also, who sometimes have originated from ghosts, suck the blood of the living or feed on corpses.

Belief of this kind regarding spirits of certain dead persons are found sporadically in Polynesia, Melanesia, Indonesia, in India, and among African and South American tribes. Among higher races traces of the idea of the dead walking among the living are found among ancient Babylonians and other Semites, and in Egypt regarding the khou.

In ancient Scandinavia the idea that the dead were alive in their barrows gave rise to the belief that they might become unhallowed monsters of the vampire kind, as is seen from the Grettis Saga. Parallels occur in Saxony England and among the early Teutons and Celts. In modern Greece the vampire belief has prevailed for many centuries, but largely moulded by Slav influences. The vampire superstition holds that various persons become vampires after death. The corpse is relativized and thirsts for blood. Its ravages begin with the feet, and it attacks other necromants, and these in turn become vampires. When the grave of a suspected vampire is opened, the corpse is found undeayed, the lips stained with blood. Its ravages nightly, the grave must be re-entered by cock-crow, else the vampire must remain wherever he is, stiff and helpless. A great epidemic of vampire superstition occurred in Hungary in the 15th cent., which was investigated by a royal commission. In China a vampire belief exists, and offers a curious parallel to that of the Slavs.

3. Rites of riddance.—Among the Slavs, when a grave is opened and the corpse is found to be fresh, swollen with blood, and life-like, it is transfixed through the region of the heart with a stake of aspen or maple (Russia), blackthorn or hawthorn (Serbia), but this must be done with one blow, for two blows would restore it to life. A suspected corpse is also buried in this way. A vampire at Laibach in 1672 is said to have pulled out the stake and thrown it back; a person who committed suicide was often buried at cross-roads, the body transfixed with a spear or stake, in Britain and elsewhere, in order that the ghost might not walk, but perhaps in earlier superstition lest it should return. This was forbidden in England by law in 1824.

Sometimes also the head of the vampire was cut off. The heads of murderers whose spirits the living feared were also cut out and destroyed, or set between the legs or beneath the body. Another effectual way was to burn the corpse to ashes, but care was taken to drive back into the fire every creature which might come from it—worms, snakes, beetles, birds, etc.—lest the vampire should have embodied itself in one of them, and so resume its foul work. This was done among the Slavs, and in Bulgaria a sorcerer armed with a saint's picture is supposed to drive the vampire into a bottle containing some of its foul food, and, when corked up, the bottle is thrown into the fire. In Greece any corpse which is found not to have suffered destruction, as well as any suspected of being a vampire, was, and even now still is, exhumed, cut to pieces, and burned, to prevent its further wandering as a revenant. When the body was burnt, water or oil was poured on the grave, and the heart was torn out of the body and dissolved in vinegar. This is a reversion to the old pagan custom of cremation of the dead, and, in spite of Slav influences, the Slavish method of staking the body is in use.

In China suspected corpses were allowed to decay in the open air before burial, or, when buried, were often exhumed and burned. In the absence of the corpse from the grave, the coffin-lid was removed, thus letting in fresh air, which prevents the body from re-entering it. When the corpse was running about, rice, red peas, and pieces of iron were strewn round the grave; it could not pass these, and was found stiff and dead on the ground, and could then be burned.

To guard against the attacks of vampires, various charms, amulets, sacred symbols, and magic herbs are concocted, used in the various countries where the belief exists.

4. Love motive in the vampire belief.—Sometimes the vampire may have intercourse with the living, and sometimes his only motive seems to be the spread belief that the dead or ghosts can have sexual union with the living, and, as far as revitalized corpses are concerned, this motive is found in the ancient Greek story of the girl Philinnia, who after her death was found with the youth Machates in her father's house as his lover, leaving him at dawn. In such stories as this the vampire is linked to the ghostly male, or nightmare, in its erotic capacity. Sometimes one hand—the motor—enters into a room through the keyhole, as the vampire does—and to the mediaval succuba on the other, in so far as the latter, like other erotic demons, preys upon the vital powers of man, so pleasing them. The vampire-lover theme is also illustrated by the 'Dead Rider' cycle, as in Burgers Lenore or Scott's spirited version, William and Helen. Burger's poem is based on the folk-belief that a dead man appears to those dearly loved—lover, wife, or child—because they sorrow so much, or in order to draw them to the grave. The living person rides with him on horseback or follows him, ignorant that he is really leading them to the churchyard. The corpse sinks into his house—the grave—and the living barely escapes being entombed, or sometimes dies at the grave. Of this there are Scandinavian, Icelandic, Albani, Breton, Scots, and English versions, and it is even found among the Araucanians as a purely native tale.

5. Vampire and werewolf.—Attention has been drawn elsewhere to the connexion between the kindred superstitions of the vampire and the werewolf. The main links are that the dead may become werewolves or other wer-animals and prey on the living; and, as in Greece and among the

1 J. C. Lawson, Modern Greek Folk-Lore and Ancient Greek Religion, Cambridge, 1910, p. 368; B. Milatius, De quorum consuetudines opusculum, Cologne, 1615, ch. 128.
2 J. Michal, Slavic Mythology (The Mythology of All Races, ill.), Boston, 1918, p. 291 f.; A. Calhoun, Traits sur les apparitions des morts, nevers, 1878.
4 W. E. Raven, Russian Folk-Tales, pp. 271, 224, Songs of the Russian People, p. 413.
6 See ref. in Fraser, J.A.I. xvi. 86; Raven, Russian Folk-Tales, p. 326; S. Alferman. Religionsgeschichten, Heidelberg, 1915, p. 183; E.B. 432.
10 Tylor, p. 199.
13 Pilegri, Mirabilia, p. 615; for vampires taking the form of men to deceive women cf. E.R.E. i. 359.
15 In art. Lycanthropia, § 4. 7 C.R. i. 359. 8 C.R. v. 527.
VANCOUVER ISLAND INDIANS

SLAVS, that the man who was a werewolf in his lifetime becomes a vampire after death.

A further link of connexion is found in the fact that both Slaves and werewolves are believed to be

cause storms, drought, famine, and cattle-Plague;

both are killed by an aspen stake; and the vampire is sometimes the offspring of a witch and a werewolf. With these two is often a witch or wizard who has assumed animal form, both of these are often blood-suckers and eaters of human flesh, with all the perverted tastes of a vampire.3

The earth personified, occasionally as Cerberus, was at some time supposed to be an enter of the dead.4 Demonic beings of the under world were also represented as eaters of the dead—Cyparissus, the Egyptian "eater of hearts" or "eater of the dead," etc.4

6. The vampire in literature.—Such a superstition has naturally attracted some attention in literature. Byron has an effective passage referring to it in The Giaour. His prose work on the subject (unfinished) was completed by Polidori and dramatized by Charles Nadler. Hoffmann introduces it in one of the tales in The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari, in which a gigantic Golgotha is cast out of the grave. It is also the subject of Théophile Gautier's La Morte amoureuse, and of a story in J. S. Le Fanu's Green Tea. But the whole superstition has reached its most effective treatment, with the greatest verisimilitude, from Browning in his Dracula,5 which embodies in a striking manner all that is believed on the subject in Transylvania.


J. A. MACULLOCH.

VANCOUVER ISLAND INDIANS.—The Indians of Vancouver Island are not a homogeneous people, but belong to three clearly defined groups. The northern part of the island is occupied by tribes of Kwakiutl speech; they are closely related to tribes occupying the mainland of British Columbia to the east and for a considerable distance north of Vancouver Island. The southern part of the island is occupied by Coast Salish tribes. These are but a comparatively small section of the widely spread Salish stock, which are found throughout the United States as far as the lower Columbia Valley. The remainder of the island—roughly speaking, the southern two-thirds of the west coast—is inhabited by a group of tribes variously known as Nootka (from one of the best known tribes of the group) or Aht. These Indians are almost entirely confined to Vancouver Island; the extreme northwestern part of Washington, however, in the neighbourhood of Cape Flattery, is occupied by the Makah Indians, an offshoot of the Nootka group. The Kwakiutl and Nootka tribes are quite clearly, if somewhat remotely, related in speech.5

1 Balston, Aborig., p. 492.
3 Cf. Hesse, Metaphysik der Phantasten, in the Organe Hymnica, like the stone sarcophagi.

The Salish languages may also prove to be related to Kwakiutl and Nootka, but only remotely so at best. These three groups of tribes exhibit numerous intertribal connexions, the dominant position, on the whole, being held by the Kwakiutl Indians of the north. In this article the religion of the Nootka Indians will be taken as the type for the aborigines of Vancouver Island. Much of the data on the other tribes will be found in art. SALS.

Beliefs and practices of a more or less definitely religious character enter so largely into almost every phase of life in the Nootka life that it is not altogether easy to mark off religion as a separate subject for ethnologic treatment. For practical purposes the subject of Nootka religion may be considered as embracing the beliefs in supernatural beings of various sorts, prayer, the acquisition of 'power' either by means of amulets and the help of definite beings or by means of the performance of secret rituals of predominantly magical content, shamanism and witchcraft, beliefs in souls, tabus of various sort and other beliefs of more or less clearly religious reference, and public rituals.

1. Supernatural beings.—It is very difficult to classify the various beings of a supernatural order that are recognized in Nootka belief. They range all the way from a Sky Being, who seems almost on the point of becoming comparable to our own conception of a Supreme Being, down to patrons or guardians of tribes, and even the stubborn individuation of birds, such as individual cedar trees or house-beans. The line between beings endowed with a more or less distinctive personality and mere amulets is strangely difficult to draw. In the west of these Salish tribes, there are a considerable number of monsters whose only raison d'être, so far as humanity is concerned, is that some part of their body can be utilized for amuletary purposes. On the whole, the idea of the majority of the Nootka supernatural beings cannot be said to be very firmly defined. As regards their relation to humanity, they might be classified as objects of prayer, beings capable of granting 'powers' of a great many different sorts, beings that are impersonated in rituals, generally in ritualistic dances, beings that figure in myths and family legends, and beings that are visibly represented, by masks or privileged to do so, as creeds. This classification is not a mutually exclusive one, however, as many supernatural beings appear in more than one connexion.

Thus, the Whales is important in ritual, legend, and crest representation, and is believed to grant 'powers' or 'medicines.' On the other hand, the Whale is important as a crest and to mythological beings quite distinctly related. While hunting powers and other gifts are bestowed by him in legends and by virtue of inheritance of such legendary gifts rather than directly in the actual present. Differing from the Whale is the Thunderbird, in that he is not identified with an actual animal species, and that he is very frequently, perhaps most frequently of all beings, impersonated in ritual performances. Again, such a being as the Ahtahakok, a kind of demonic wood-spirit, plays an important part in ritual and as an amulet-dispenser, but is never represented as a crest (his mask is used only in connexion with a ritual).

It is difficult in some cases to tell whether a particular type of being is conceived of as a single personality, like the more important gods and goddesses of the Greeks, or as embracing a class of numerous individuals, like our fairies. The latter is probably far more often the case, though true examples of both are found among the Salish. Sometimes the Indians themselves seem to waver between contradictory conceptions, as in the case of the Thunderbird. He is generally, it seems, thought of as a distinct individuality, at least if that there were originally four Thunderbird brothers, but that three of them were destroyed by the Woodpecker, yet the tendency to localize his home on some particular mountain-peak and to give him position on the current among the different tribes have led in the
minds of some to the rationalizing conclusion that there is more than one Thunder-bird in existence. In the story of the Chief, who enters hardly at all into the life of the natives except as an object of prayer. He is believed to dwell in the sky and to be, in a general way, the dispenser of life in its various forms to the animals. He is not represented either pictorially or in rituals, and never, so far as known, occurs as a character in the mythology, not even as creator or transformer. So popular is this belief that one may be tempted to look for Christian influence, was it not for the obviously standardized form, and hence presumably great age, of the prayers addressed to him.

As in all Indian mythologies, a large number of animals are represented as human or semi-human characters in Nutka myths, many of them being endowed with supernatural powers. Few of these, however, can be considered as of interest in a purely religious connexion; the attitude of the Indian towards many of them is comparable to our own in reference to the fantastic characters of a romance or fairy-tale or even, not infrequently, to the purely human characters of a modern novel. The Thunder-bird, the most northern Pacific Coast tribes as a creator or transformer, plays the part in Nutka mythology purely of a greedy trickster or bully, comparable to the leprechaun in Ireland. The theory is advanced that animals are descended from human-like beings of the mythological period finds its counterpart in the belief that animals to-day, when out of sight of people, divest themselves of their animal blankets and look, talk, and act like ordinary human beings. Most of the animals represented in the mythology and a large number not so represented are impersonated, by means of face-paints, masks, and ceremonial regalia, in the dances of the Wolf ritual (a few of these dances are the Raven, the Woodpecker, the Sea-gull, the Wasp, the Halibut, the Octopus, and the Deer). Even in this connexion, however, it is doubtful if the animal beings themselves, as a whole, have further religious significance than that their representation has become associated with a ritual which is charged with the quality of religious emotion. The animal dances as such seem to be of interest largely as pantomimic performances. Among all these animal beings, however, there are at least some that have a degree of religious importance. One may be observed (or were customarily obtained) from the Wolf, the Whale, the Hair-seal, the Sea-otter, the Shark, the Beaver, and others. Of particular importance among these is the Wolf. The Wolves are believed to form a supernatural community of their own, with four special fast runners of the chief and the Raven as news-tellers. They are looked upon with great reverence—an attitude that finds its fullest expression in the Wolf ritual, founded, according to its origin legends, by the Wolves themselves.

In the mythology we also meet with a number of human-like figures that belong to the supernatural world without being identified with either animals or monsters. Here belongs the creator Kapkimiya, who created the first man out of the thigh of the first already existent woman, made the island of Tlcsin, the home of the Tsishanith tribe descended from them, and assigned them the various foods, animal and vegetable, that they and their descendants were to use. Kapkimiya is evidently the chief figure, and the whole is doubtless paralleled by local creators in the other Nutka tribes. Another important figure in the mythology is Kwatyiats, a sort of creator or, better, transformer, who experienced many curious adventures and events to the end of creating the world in present shape. The rock-carvings in the interior of Vancouver Island are believed to be his work. He is still alive, but it is not known where he resides. With him is often associated the chief of the Raven, is a trickster. Another transformer is known as Creating-everything-to-be-different. His work consisted chiefly in transforming various animals and people into the relatively harmless animals that we know to-day.

We need no more refer to a few of the host of powers with which the Nutka Indian peoples the land, the sea, and the air. The Heli, the small white-headed scaly being who darts out lightning with his red tongue. He is generally represented as a six-legged gliding on the moon or down a tree, or carried like a belt about the Thunder-bird. When seen, a bit of his tail should be tugged off and preserved as a gift for victory in whaling and other sea-associted hunting. The Yasi are fairy-like folk that dwell on the summits of mountains. They wear feathers on their heads and are associated with fire and the aurora borealis. They are occasionally evil beings, frequently dissolving into foam. A supernatural bird, the Mikhinisch, said to resemble a female mallard duck, is a potent source of luck in hunting. The Ahmashk, already referred to, is a kind of forest ogre, evidently related to the Nulini, or Fool-dancer, of the Kwakwath; his usual mask is valued as an amulet forcredulity. The Chinai was brownie-like woods-focks who do all sorts of strange things, such as hunting for sea-carcasss as though they were real; they give point to those who are fortunate enough to see them. The Pokumis are wild and elusie beings, transformed from persons who have become possessed of wild and human ways or overcome by intense cold. The Pokumis are often represented in the pantomimic dances of the Wolf ritual. The Shalichik is a kind of animal-like monster, who is a sort of mountain and whose red hair is a powerful amulet for success in war. A child of this race is more than one yard in colour and with a tail attached to each of his heads, is particularly virulent as ‘medicine’; a small part of his body is a powerful charm for both war and hunting. The Tulituk, the Nutka equivalent of the Sisloti so often represented in the art of the Kwakiutl Indians. The Tsakoakta is an enormously strong being with red, shaggy hair and with his right foot large, his left extremely small. The earth of his tracks is a strengthening ‘medicine’ for the most important of all the supernatural, natural powers, in ritual and legend as in the acquisition of medicine; he is the original of the class of beings represented by, but not actually believed to be identical with, quartz crystals. They have the power of incredibly rapid flight and make a loud noise when they appear. They have become associated in Nutka belief with the Wolf ritual, their characteristic sound having being identified with the supernatural whistling that is believed to emanate from the wolves and that is imparted to the initiates of the ritual. It is therefore not surprising that the quartz-like Hena is held to be found also in the body of a wolf, of whom it forms a sort of subsidiary soul.

It is remarkable that the power emanating from most of these forms of animal and of man is intimately bound up with some amulet-like or fetish-like object, generally some part of his body that is, often with considerable violence, taken from him. The conception of a benevolent attitude towards these animals or divinities and the spiritual guardianship over him—a conception that prevails among so many American Indian tribes—is, on the whole, signally absent here. It is present in some degree in the legendary accounts of ancestral experiences of the acquisition of power, yet even here the chief emphasis is always placed on the supernatural object acquired and handed down or on the privilege of ceremoniously representing such an experience, not on the notion of a mystical relationship.

2. Prayer.—Prayer is often held to represent religious feeling at its purest, particularly when the prayer is of individual and of a non-ritual form. Among the Nutka Indians prayers are, so far as known, always of strictly standardized form. They are either sacred songs sung at a ritual by an individual and in the presence of the community (such prayers, e.g., are addressed to the Wolves of the Wolf ritual or in the rites of exorcism in the same ritual) or they are private, addressed to the Sky Chief to the sky. The latter class have more of a magical
than purely religious connotation, and this in spite of the fact that they are addressed to the nearest approach that the Nutka have to a generalized Supreme Being. They are self-seeking in tone; more, in fact, than directly so. For a superiorit in success at the expense of others.

Generally the secret ritual prayers are for some special gift, as wealth, success in hunting or fishing, protection against the malevolent influences of the supernatural, or the performance of a ritualistic act, or whatever else, good or evil, one may desire the fulfillment of. As a rule, however, the specific prayer is preceded by a more general or less exacting prayer.

A typical example of such a 'life-prayer:': 'Look down on me, O Chief, have pity on me. Cause me to be alive. Cause to be sent back whatever evil words may be said of me by any one. If at any time one prays in secret for my death, may I cause his curse to recoil on himself; may I cause him to swallow his own (evil words). Cause me to be without affliction, O Chief. Grant me, O Chief, thy wealth (or whatever else one desires) . . .'

While the private prayers of the Nutka are strictly standardized in form, the texts of the public prayers seem to differ considerably according to the varying family traditions. Here, as throughout Nutka life, family exclusiveness in matters of privilege and property is respected.

3. Acquisition of power; secret rituals.—Like so many other primitive peoples, the Nutka feel the necessity of continuous supernatural assistance in the pursuit of the ends of life. The individual must, whenever possible, evoke his own powers by the support of some of the mysterious influences that surround him. Prayer can do much for him; the more possession of an amulet or fetish or 'medicine' probably more; still more efficacious is a token resulting from an encounter with a supernatural being. The handling of all such tokens, as well as of all supernatural objects or animals not actually controllable with spoken words, is regu-

larly hedged about by various tabus. Generally fasting and a period of sexual continence are required, also absence from the home. A token may not be lightly rejected, if disaster is to be avoided. One must also know beforehand just how it is to be utilized, what one must do or say in order to secure the benefits of its supernatural influence. Frequently one must be careful to take only the right half. Frequently, too, it may not be taken into the house, but must be kept in a secret spot in the woods. Its power may be communicated by rubbing or other handling, or a small piece of it may be kept as a charm. Thus a bit of it may be inserted in the cedar-bark wrapping of a sealing or whaling harpoon. Every Indian possesses a considerable number of 'medicines,' for various purposes and of different degrees of potency. Their possession is generally a secret to all but the immediate heirs of their acquirer or inheritor; certain 'life medicines' may even be kept entirely secret until the approach of death. It is interesting to note that the mere possession of secret or magical lore is itself 'good medicine.' As one parts with knowledge, his power of resistance to adverse influences is lessened.

It is not always possible to secure the special assistance derived from supernatural helpers or inherited fetishes. Hence the main reliance of the Nutka Indian for the success of his hunting, fishing, or other ventures is on the punctilious performance of certain private magical ceremonies that we have termed 'secret rituals.' There is an astonishing number and a bewildering variety of such rituals. Every family possesses, by secrets in their hands, medicines or 'natural magic' sufficient to bring success.

Sometimes several versions of a magical ritual— 

one derived, say, from the paternal, the other from the maternal, tradition—are known by an individual, but they may never be combined or confused. The secret rituals are always performed in a hidden spot at a considerable distance from the house; for the more elaborate rituals the various families have prepared spots deep in the woods, often in or close to the edge of swamp. They range in complexity from comparatively simple magical performances, prayers, and spell-pronouncements lasting but a single night to elaborate ceremonies that may last months or more. The former are either abbreviated versions of more elaborate rituals or relate to the easier quests, such as salmon-trolling; the latter are concerned with the more hazardous or exacting pursuits, such as whaling, sea-sonal hunting, or sealing. Each secret ritual is in effect a prayer and magical compulsion toward some desired end—success in trapping fish, spearing cod, harpooning sea-otter, whaling, acquiring wealth, acquiring love, warding an enemy; even the satisfaction of such unusual desires as success in stealing or the learning of a raven's speech may be compassed by the performance of a ritualistic act. The details of each ritual differ according to special family tradition and the nature of the end sought. The constant features seem to be prayer, the pronouncement of secret words, the delivery of talismans, the taking of tokens, the rubbing down of talismans, the taking of medicines, bathing and rubbing down with hemlock branches (until the skin peeled, in the practice of the hardier aspirants for success), the wearing of cedar-bark and feather regalia and the laying on of symbolic face-paints, and most important of all, the performance of magical actions. In principle these actions are dominated by the philosophy of sympathetic magic and by the symbolic efficacy of imitation and the handling of effigies.

Thus, the aspirant for success in whaling may spend hours diving into a pool and coming up to the surface and blowing into imitation of a whale, by means of the growths on the underside of the whale, or by the skin that gorged out (a symbolic representation of the whale that is blind to his pursuer and allows himself to be caught). Needless to say, these secret rituals have no real, no purely social bearing.

The magic ritualist may, however, be accompanied by a close relative, say a son or nephew—frequently, in the more elaborate types, by his wife. Not the least interesting thing is that they all insist on their dependence for success on a proper calendrical placing. The most auspicious season for their performance is the period between the winter and summer solstices, when the days are progressively longer; during a given month it is the days of the waxing moon that should be chosen. This symbolism of this is as obvious as it is world-wide. Indeed, there is every reason to believe that what little precision of solar and lunar observation the Nutka Indians attained was conditioned by the necessity of correctly delimiting the span of auspicious days.

4. Shamans. —The Nutka, shaman, or medicine-man, is such by virtue of supernatural power personally acquired by him or, at least theoretically, by right of inheritance from an ancestor who acquired it himself (or herself) acquired such power. Properly speaking, the acquirement of shamanistic power is on a par with the acquirement of any other type of supernatural power, as for hunting or fishing. In either case the possession of power may be due to the magical maneuvers in the performance of a secret ritual, to the acquirement of a supernatural token or amulet-like object ('medicine'), with or without the inter-
position of a supernatural being, or to the inheriting of a family 'medicine.' What distinguishes the medicine-man is the function exercised by his 'powers.' These are derived from spirits, that is, from entities which are, in a way, the personification of the power, and the manner of holding and exercising this power.

The main functions of the medicine-man are the location of disease, the cure of disease, and the prevention of misfortune. With the former he is expected to be successful, and failure is regarded as a disgrace.

The supernatural beings and 'medicines' that bestow shamanistic power are rarely the same as those that give power for other purposes. There is a long list of eerie or unusual objects whose discovery and retention are believed to make a man a shaman—a title limited to a limited extent, for a really powerful shaman has generally a number of sources of supernatural guidance. The specific beings that grant shamanistic power belong to 'birds' and 'birds' mates,' Certain birds—e.g., ducks—certain land animals, and certain fish are believed to be powerful shamans themselves and to meet once a year in a doctoring contest. The leader of the 'birds' is a supernatural bird known as Khvini, or Khvili, who is said to belong to the Sky Chief; the leader of the 'fish' is a small eel-like marine fish. The former has the greatest shamanistic power of all. The shamanistic being (animal) bestows power not so much by way of a dream, as so commonly in aboriginal America, as by the amuletic virtue of his own body. This is in accord with the general materializing tendency that pervades Nutka religion.

The power of the 'medicine' amulet or being is, in the case of the Nutka shaman, exercised by virtue of its actual presence in his body. A shaman's supernatural power (manitu [q.v.]) is not a mystical influence that guides him, but resides in a concrete object that he is believed to keep inside his hand or chest. A powerful shaman may have half-a-dozen or more such 'medicines' in his chest, in supernaturally reduced form. These are never made visible to the laity except on special occasions, such as at a very severe illness or during the transition of the shaman's ghost. The shaman is put on display for inspection. The shamans are believed to have the power of causing their 'medicines' to fly through the air to any place or person desired. The wide-spread conception of the 'flying' or 'shooting' of disease-causing substances seems, by an easy transition, to have been transferred to the Nutka materializations of the manitu concept. The modus operandi of the Nutka shaman differs according to circumstances. The usual methods are: sucking of the part affected (actually or supposedly), manipulation after rubbing the fists against the hands, resuscitation by uttering certain syllables in a conventional manner, and the singing of specific medicine songs. These songs are often dreamt during the performance of a secret ritual for the attainment of shamanistic power.

2. Soul beliefs and supernatural phenomena.—The Nutka Indians say that the course of life is like the walking of a man on a straight line as thin as a hair. If he misses a single step, he drops down into the grave. The soul or life essence of a human being is conceived of as a wee mannikin, a shadowy doublet, which can be held in the palm of a shaman. It may leave the body through the crown of the head, but may either return of its own accord or be brought back through the ministrations of a shaman. If it fails to return, it means that it has reached the land of disembodied spirits, that its human component or other words, is dead. It is then referred to by a term, cheka, which may be rendered 'ghost,' but which is more freely used to refer to any discarnate spirit and even to any spirit taken to reside in other objects such as an elephant. The ghost is always thought of as evil, and great efforts are taken to rid of its malign influence in a house in which a person has died.

Distinct from the soul is the hlimaksti, often translated as 'paint,' but more correctly as 'the spiritual body,' or more properly, the anatomical heart, but the mind or 'soul' in its psychological, not theological, sense. It is the seat or principle of intelligence characteristic of human beings alone, and is generally localized in the heart or breast.

According to one legend, the creator Kapkimliya made a vertical column of ten faces, stuck close together, and put it into the bridegroom's hand as a seal of intelligence. This is the hlimaksti of to-day. If all ten faces look in one direction, the man with whom the bride is to be married; if five look one way, five the other, he is in a state of evenly-balanced hesitation. The first woman had no hlimaksti put beside of her; hence women are believed to be more forward than intelligent than men.

The life after death is supposed to be located in an under world, which is divided into a 'good' and a 'bad' section. In the 'good' quarter are little streams in which spring-salmon run and form the food of the ghostly inhabitants. The spring-salmon of the world of the living are believed to be sent up here by departed spirits. The occupants of the 'bad' quarter of the underground world eat like men. In the opinion of some Indians, the dead turn into wolves or owls. This belief does not necessarily exclude the other.

As among all primitive peoples, there is a vast number of beliefs current among the Nutkas in regard to supernatural phenomena and relations. Only a very few of these need be touched upon here. An eclipse of the sun or moon is caused by a supernatural being known as Codfish-in-the-sky, who holds the luminary in his mouth. During an eclipse each of the Indians would rush off to perform a secret ritual for rolling fish. The magical concept at the basis of this practice is evident: the fish eventually trolled for was to bite just as the Codfish was biting the eclipsed sun or moon. Another very curious belief is referred to by the term 'going off to another place.' The Indians believe that at two unknown periods during the day, twins of the same age are transferred from the world of the living to the recesses of everything in the village, houses and all. After a short time, during which it is difficult to keep awake, everything is shifted back to its proper place. Should one be lucky enough to keep awake during this periodic shift, and be engaged in a secret ritual, he is certain to prove successful in whatever he is praying for.

Perhaps the most interesting belief concerning the relation of the human being to the supernatural world is that which regards twins as salmon incarnations. So much is this taken as a matter of course that it is believed that a twin child involuntarily bursts into tears when it sees a salmon being treated cruelly. Both twin children and their father are subject to many onerous tabus, and the children are not expected to live long. The significant thing about twin fatherhood is that it makes the father an instrument of the salmon-world. The appearance of twins is looked upon as a harbinger of an unusually big salmon run, and the father devotes all his energies during the fishing-season to the singing of songs, the performance of secret rituals, and the observance of tabus intended to propitiate the salmon and provide his fellow-villagers with a maximum catch. Should he disregard the injunctions of the
salmon-world implied by the birth of twins, dire misfortune is certain to befall him.

6. Rituals.—Ceremonialism, both social and religious in character, is very prominent in Njuka life. It is somewhat arbitrary to divide ceremonies into the two classes, as, on the one hand, a religious quality (some sort of legendary or supernatural background) is rarely absent from even the most matter-of-fact or casual ceremony (say, a naming ceremony). On the other hand, every properly religious ceremony, such as the elaborate and peculiarly sacred Wolf ritual, is given the setting of a secular potlatch (giving feast) and regularly contains numberless features that have a purely social, not religious, significance. The major two ceremonies of primarily religious connotation are the Wolf ritual (known by the natives as N dowanna) and a shamanistic performance termed tseyek. The former undoubtedly has a native Njuka nucleus, but has been much influenced by the winter feast of the Kwakutl Indians. The latter ceremony is primarily at home among the more southern Njuka tribes; it is also found among the Coast Salish and Quileute (north-west coast of Washington). The Wolf ritual differs considerably among the various tribes, and is of interest both for its origin and in its ceremonial details. In essence it is a quasi-dramatic representation, at least in native theory, of certain legendary occurrences.

Just as a young man or woman, in the legendary past, is believed to have been carried away by wolves to their supernatural home, to have been taught many religious dances and songs, and then released to his or her people with these immaterial gifts, so, in the ceremony of to-day, the novices, who are expected to be initiates of the ceremony, are represented as seized by wolves that break into the village and carry off into the woods, there to teach particular dances, which, after they are learned, are performed and learned by the community among their own people in a state of religious frenzy. The dances vary greatly in character, but are largely pantomimic, referring either to animals, occupations, or supernatural beings. Many of them are inspired by a spirit of savage recklessness that may take the form of self-torture or ceremonial killing. The association of all those (novices and old initiates) who dance a particular dance into a "secret society" is a very much more weakly developed concept than among the Kwakutl. On the other hand, the individuals who are fed out together throughout the ceremony as wolf-peers, by hereditary right, may be looked upon as constituting a true confraternity.

In a rather vague way the Wolf ritual may be interpreted as a kind of placation of the powerful supernatural beings that appear as wolves, but there can, in actual fact, be no talk of a definite function of the ceremony. It is a complex historical growth that serves as a traditional setting for the public expression of a particular emotional state or exaltation and for the satisfaction of certain artistic needs. Even the spirit of ribald humour finds expression in it. To a large extent, also, the purely religious and artistic moods are overlaid by the desire, so characteristic of West Coast culture, to enhance one's social prestige by display and a lavish expenditure of wealth. As usual with great tribal ceremonies, it undoubtedly means different things to different temperaments.

The tseyek ceremony is ostensibly undertaken, like so many other great tribal ceremonies among American Indians, for the cure of a sick person who has been injured by others, or by shamanistic treatment. The main feature of the ceremony is the singing of a peculiar type of songs, accompanied by beating of sticks and certain conventional gestures, by the whole group. Each dance takes part in the ceremony as a number of such tseyek songs that have become his property by family inheritance. Novices who are to be initiated into the tseyek ceremony sing these songs for the first time, and the performance is more advanced type of initiation takes place—that of those who have had some supernatural shamanistic experience, or who have a hereditary shamanistic right, into the formal status, often theoretical rather than actual, of shaman. This part of the ceremony offers suggestive parallels to the well-known Midé-wiwin of the Ojibwa and other Algonquian tribes. Indeed, the two types of initiation, through propitiation and shamanistic, may be looked upon as constituting a series of degrees not unlike the more intricately developed system of shamanistic degrees current among the Algonquian tribes.


EDWARD SAPIR.

VANNIC RELIGION.—See Aremia.

VASUBANDHU.—VASUBANDHU (c. A.D. 420-500), the second of three brothers of a Kausika Brahman family, was born at Purnapura (Pesh- war) in Garh自在 (Kandahar), and one of the most prominent figures in the history of Buddhism. His not less celebrated elder brother, Asanga, is well known as the first propounder of the Yogachara school of Buddhism, i.e. Buddhist idealism. Of the youngest brother, Virūchikshās, we know nothing.

VASSUBANDHU.—VASUBANDHU was the second-century Indian Buddhist scholar of the Mahayana school who, along with the Chinese Buddhist scholars Fa Hsien and Xuan Zang, introduced Buddhism to China. He was an important figure in the transmission of Buddhist scriptures to China. Vassubandhu's major work was the "Vasubandhu's Treatise on the Doctrine of the Middle Path," which was translated into Chinese and became a key text in the development of Chinese Buddhism. Vassubandhu's work emphasized the use of Madhyamaka philosophy to resolve the contradictions and paradoxes of Mahayana teaching. His influence was significant in shaping the development of Chinese Buddhism, particularly in the development of the Tiantai school, which was founded by Hui-neng. Vassubandhu's work was also influential in the development of Tibetan Buddhism, where it was used as a foundation for the development of philosophical systems, such as the Paitrika and the Debakara. His work on the "Great Madhyamaka System" was instrumental in the development of these philosophical systems, which were used to systematize the teachings of the Buddha and his later disciples. Vassubandhu's writings are also significant for their contribution to the development of the "Golden Mean" (Golden Mean) system of ethics, which emphasized the importance of balance and moderation in ethical practice. This system of ethics was influential in the development of Chinese moral philosophy and continue to be influential in Chinese thought to this day.

to acquire a thorough knowledge of the Saṅkrāntika doctrines. With this object he went to Kaśmira (Kashmir), the headquarters of the study of the doctrine, carefully disposing himself to study under a false name, lest scholars of that country should be jealous and refuse to instruct him. There, for two years, he studied with Kaṇha-bhadra, he studied the doctrine, against which he would, however, frequently dispute, hazarding his objections on the teachings of his master, and bestowing on them such a lucid and facile manner that the teacher of Saṅkhyā, Kaṇha-bhadra, had his suspicions aroused by the extraordinary ability of the uninitiated student. Vasubandhu, who was named Nandaprajñā other than Vasubandhu, whenupon he advised him secretly to go back to his own land, and after some time he should kill him. Vasubandhu therefore returned to his home, where he composed a poem of 600 verses called the Abhidharmakosā,1 a commentary on the Abhidharmakosā of Buddhabhadra, and sent it to Kaśmira. The king of Kaśmira and the scholars were at first delighted with it, imagining that he was expounding and propagating their doctrine; but, on the advice of Skandita, who knew that the compendium was not quite favourable to their sect, the author was asked to write an explanation. So he expounded the verses in a prose commentary, with the addition of seven verses and one chapter on the non-ego. These verses together with the commentary are called Abhidharmakośa-bhaṭṭācārya.2 Vasubandhu afterwards travelled to Ayodhya (Oudh) and was converted by his brother Anagha to the faith of the Mahāyāna, and composed many treatises in defence of his new creed, with commentaries on various Mahāyāna works. He died there (in Nepal, according to Tibetan tradition) at eighty years of age.4

2. Works. — Vasubandhu’s first literary undertaking seems to have been the composition of his Paramavasthepati (‘Seventy Verses on the First Principle’), in which he refuted and destroyed all the ground principles of the Sāṅkhyā philosophy as given in the Śāṅkhyakārikā-sūtra. Sāṅkhyakārikā-sūtra, by whom Buddhāvīrama, Vasubandhu’s teacher, had been defeated in an ecclesiastical dispute. This fact gave general satisfaction, and King Vikramaditya rewarded him with three lacs of gold.

Before turning to his Buddhist works, we may make a few additional remarks. First, it must be borne in mind that about the 2nd cent. B.C. Kaṇṭhāyānputra founded the Sarvāstivāda school and composed the ‘Ājñāntik论文 (‘First Steps to Knowledge’), a simple catalogue raïsonts of the technical terms of his doctrine as contained in previously published ‘six-branch-treatises’ (patañjali-sūtra). He thus laid the foundations of the Sarvāstivāda canon. A.D. 260, a very detailed commentary on this work, called Abhidharmakosa-mahāvīhiḥ (‘Thorough Discussion of the Abhidharma’), was composed by 500 arhats of Kaśmira. In this work we have not only a detailed explanation of the text, but also a minute discussion of each topic, so that the commentary became immediately a mine of dogmatics and the sole authority for the sect, by whom it was called Kaśmira in India. Hence, its special name Kaśmira-vijñānabhūṭa (‘Vijñāna-follower of Kaśmira’). This Sarvāstivāda doctrine is realistic and teaches a direct perception of external objects. Its rival doctrine is that of the Saṅkhyāks, which, though also realistic, asserts an indirect perception instead of a direct one. The two doctrines were the most influential in Mahāyāna. Vasubandhu, though originally a Sarvāstivāda, was a free-thinker, and did not blindly follow either his orthodox tenets or his lately adopted Saṅkhyākārikā ideas. Scholars designated his guiding principle ‘a preference of reason, and his eclecticism is shown in his celebrated works Abhidharma-kosa, called by native scholars ‘the ingenious treatise’.

It is divided into eight treasure-houses (bhūjanātha): (1) Elements (bhūjanātha); (2) Worlds—effect; (3) Words—effect; (4) Passions—auxiliary-explanation; (5) Sages—auxiliary-explanation; (6) Causality—auxiliary—cause; (7) Meditation—auxiliary—cause; (8) Special.

Pūddatīlālīkāya (‘Exposition of Personality’), is devoted to the argument of the non-ego. This he composed when invited by the Emir to compose a treatise on his work. To the first chapter a dogmatic explanation of the word Abhidharma is prefixed. It says that Abhidharma means ‘conclusions’ or ‘inferences’, and that the process is confronted with a two-fold kind. The one aimed at is nirvāna, or final consummation, which is said to be mediated by the realist character of things; the other is the apparent characters of things. This confronting of things, i.e., insight, is called pure. It is the Final Abhidharma. This insight is in the state of pure insight is in the state of pure, where the realist is the mediant by his own speculation. This is the state of apparent or apparent doctrine. Hence, Vasubandhu in his work sums up the essential contents of the Abhidharma literature of his predecessors, and as this literature is the main source of his treatises, his work is entitled Abhidharmakosa (‘Repository of the Abhidharma’). In this way he set forth concisely all the elements and phenomena and the rationale of the non-ego, derived chiefly from the sources of the Sarvāstivāda school, but some tenets were taken from the Saṅkhyākārikā school and sometimes he introduced his own views.

Although Vasubandhu sympathized in his work with the Saṅkrāntika and showed his preference for it, he was more realistic and satisfied with these realistic speculations, in which he was immersed until he came to the second stage of his philosophical development. When converted to Mahāyāna, he adopted the subjective idealism of that school and he was completely merged in his not less celebrated epic composition Viśīṣṭātṛatā-trīśūla (‘Thirty [Verses] on Pure Ideals’).5 The philosophical school based on this treatise teaches that all phenomena, both material and non-material, originate in mind, which is divided according to its action into eighteen pure ideals (viśīṣṭa-viśīja), viz. (1–5) five ideas belonging to the five sense organs, (6) idea of mind (maṇo-viśīja), (7) idea of mind of idea (maṇo-maṇo-viśīja), (8) receptacle-idea (ālaya-viśīja). The seeds (bjûja) or possibilities of all phenomena are retained in the eight ideal, whence comes the so-called objective world, in consequence of which all are disturbed and rove about in painful efforts after peace. If we once fully understand that nothing else exists but mind, then the objective world ceases to exist for us, and those eight confused ideas are turned into eight kinds of enlightened wisdom (viśīja) by means of which we can unite in the tathatā (‘truthness’) which transcends sense and thought.

The Abhidharma-kosa and Viśīṣṭātṛatā-trīśūla are the two most celebrated of Vasubandhu’s twenty odd works, and represent the successive development of his philosophical views. It seems to claim that the end of his life was reached in a quite different phase of belief. He composed 24 verses entitled Lontag for the Birth (in Sukhārī, i.e., the Paradise of the West), being a summary of the Apārāmitāsūtra,6 to which he subsequently added a commentary. These verses with the commentary, regarded as one work, are called the Apārāmitā-sūtra-āṭāyadāsika. From them we see that he believed in the Aṃtiṇāh or Apārāmitāsūtra,7 to which he subsequently added a commentary. These verses with the commentary, regarded as one work, are called the Apārāmitā-sūtra-āṭāyadāsika. From them we see that he believed in the Aṃtiṇāh or Apārāmitāsūtra,7 to which he subsequently added a commentary.

1 Nañjó, no. 1270. 2 Th. no. 1203. 3 Nañjó, no. 1270. 4 Th. no. 1270 and 1203.

2 Th. no. 325, 30, 27, etc.

3 Th. no. 1204.


5 Nañjó, no. 1215.

6 Th. no. 25, 20, 27, etc.

7 Th. no. 1204.

VEDANTA

VEDAS.—See Literature (Vedic and Classical Sanskrit), Vedic Religion.

VEDANTA.—Vedanta in Sanskrit signifies the ‘end or final aim of the Vedas.’ The word was employed at first to denote the older Upanisads (see art. Upanisads), but generally serves as the name of the system of the six philosophical systems of the Brähmans (i.e. Śāṅkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṁsā, Vedānta, Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya). In the Vedanta the pantheistic doctrine of the Brahman, the All-One, is systematically developed, and placed on a firm foundation. The founder of the Vedanta, or rather the first teacher who made a formal presentation of it (in the Vedāntasūtras or Brahma-sūtras) was Bādarāyaṇa.1 Since, however, his treatise is set forth in the form of aphorisms—precisely like the śūratra or ‘clues’ of the other philosophical schools of India—wherein they are completely unintelligible, it is impossible to gain a satisfactory knowledge of the system from his work alone. This is first supplied by the expositions of the numerous native commentators, of whom the most important was the renegade Saṅkarā, who lived in A.D. 800. Besides expounding the Brahma-sūtras, Saṅkarā composed a large number of commentaries on the Upanisads, and wrote several independent treatises on the Vedanta philosophy. It is reasonable to suppose that the conceptions of Saṅkarā agree in all essentials with the views set forth by Bādarāyaṇa. Nearly all educated Hindus in modern India, except in so far as they have embraced European ideas, are adherents of the Vedānta; and three-fourths of these accept Saṅkarā’s interpretation of the Brahma-sūtras, while the rest are divided among the varying explanations of the system offered by one or other of the remaining commentators.

The fundamental proposition of the Vedānta philosophy is in agreement with the doctrine of the ancient Upanisads, viz.: ‘the atman (i.e. our self or our soul) is identical with the Brahman, the All-Soul.’ Since, then, the eternal and infinite Brahman, the power that works in everything, cannot consist of parts, or be subject to change (for everything that consists of parts, and is liable to change, is perishable), it follows that every one is essentially not a part or an emanation of the Brahman, but is Brahman entire and indivisible. Not to absurdize the doctrine (there is one only, without a second). Therefore in India the Vedānta doctrine in the form in which Saṅkarā has presented it is called the ‘doctrine of nonduality.’

In opposition to the fundamental thought of the Vedānta, as thus set forth, is arrayed not only experience, which teaches the existence of a manifold variety of persons and things, but also the ceremonial law of the Veda; for the latter is based upon the belief in transmigration and retribution, and therefore takes for granted a multitude of individual souls. This twofold contradiction is refuted by the assertion that both experience and the ceremonial law of the Veda depend upon the ‘ignorance’ (avidyā) natural to every man, by which the soul is prevented from distinguishing itself from the body, the psychical organs and other controlling influences, and from recognizing that the empirical universe is an illusion (māyā). In truth, the entire world of phenomena is merely a delusion, comparable to a jata mārgaṇa, which dwindles on closer examination; or like a dream-image, which seems real only to the sleeper, but vanishes in waking hours.

There is only one thing in the universe which is made manifest by the power of illusion, viz. the soul. This self admits of no proof, but it also stands in no need of proof, for it is in itself the basis of all argument, and therefore is already established in the evidence of the intellect. Similarly, also, it cannot be denied, for every one in denying it assumes and testifies to its existence. The self, moreover, cannot be anything distinct from Brahman, since Brahman alone exists. Every thing that is associated of the body, sense, spiritual nature, omnipresence, eternity, etc.—holds good, therefore, of our soul. Here in our inner self we must seek for knowledge. In himself alone, in the depths of his own being, can man find the solution of the riddle of the universe, and know the only true real.

Whence ‘ignorance’ arises, by which the true condition of things is hidden from us, the Vedānta philosophy does not inquire. It tells us only that ignorance is removed by ‘knowledge’ (vidyā), or ‘universal perception’ (svāyāgya-dharmena). If this universal perception has been attained, and each man by the illusionary nature of everything that is not soul, and the absolute identity of the soul with Brahman understood, the determining conditions for the earthly existence of the soul are removed. For this existence is understood as only an illusory appearance. He who knows ‘I am Brahman’ has gained emancipation from the saṁskara.

Since Saṅkarā recognizes the unconditional authority of the Upanisads, he is compelled to take account of their entire contents, to which a considerable extent are in opposition to the doctrine here set forth. He accomplishes this by setting up two systems side by side with one another—(1) the higher or esoteric knowledge (parā vidyā), which adopts the metaphysical standpoint, and proclaims the doctrine of the nondualistic Brahman, as it has just been stated, to be the absolute truth; and (2) the lower or esoteric knowledge (uparā vidyā), which takes its stand at the popular empirical point of view, and offers a popularly religious explanation of the universe. While in the ‘higher knowledge’ the Brahman is free from all attributes and qualities (mārgaṇa), in the ‘lower knowledge’ it appears endowed with the attributes of personality (saṁskara). It is owing to ignorance that these attributes are ascribed to the Brahman, for men who cannot rise to the height of the metaphysical standpoint are necessarily attached to the world. In the lower knowledge, therefore, the Brahman appears as a personal God, who creates and rules the universe, and rewards or punishes men according to their deeds. The universe also is looked upon as real, and the statements of the Upanisads with regard to the wandering of the soul through innumerable bodies hold good. The lower knowledge teaches that the soul is constrained by the psychical organs, the bodily senses, the vital principle, and the moral determination, that under such limitations it completes the cycle of metempsychosis, and that by believing worship it may attain to the lower personal Brahman. Union, however, with the lower Brahman, the Brahman of attributes, is merely an inferior temporary lot. Complete deliverance is attainable from the metaphysical point of view solely by the knowledge of the higher Brahman, the Brahman without attributes. Everything that is taught in the lower knowledge is worthless to him who has learnt to know himself as the eternal indivisible Brahman; for he understands that these attributes are but a product of ignorance, that qualities are attributed to it merely for the purposes of worship which do not really belong to it, and in the light of the supreme knowledge, he is without them. He who has attained to this knowledge is no
longer led astray by the delusive appearance that surrounds him. In complete indifference towards the course of the world he awaits the end of his life. I shall not dwell on exactly the same principles as in the Sākhya (see the art. SĀKHYA). At death the wise man is lost in Brahman.

Among the commentators who dissent from Sākhya's interpretation of the Vedānta, and who represent one or other of the philosophical and religious viewpoints of various sects, the most renowned is Rāmānuja, who lived in the 11th cent. after 1000, and who has the advantage of possessing enough Vedānta works (e.g. the Kāraṇādipikā) of the system approximates to the lower exoteric knowledge of Sākhya, and as an adherent of the Pancharātra doctrine introduces into Bādarāyana's treatise views which are nearly related to the Christian standpoint, but are alien to the true Vedānta doctrine. In his view the individual souls are not identical with the supreme soul, i.e., as he represents it, with God, but are separate and independent of him. This point of view is the same. The cause of their earthly existence is not 'ignorance,' but unbelief; and deliverance is union with God, to be gained not by 'knowledge,' but by believing love. According to this history of the Vedānta philosophy, therefore, the same theistic tendency makes its appearance which may be observed under the form of the system of Yoga in the further development of the Sākhya doctrine.


R. Garbe.

VEDDAS.—I. Geographical distribution and mode of life.—The Veddas, the aboriginal inhabitants of Ceylon, are to be regarded as the island representatives of the short, long-haired, pre-Aryan aboriginal tribes of India. They are a tribe that has extended over the whole island (for there is no reason to doubt that the Yakkas of the Mahāvamsa were Veddas); now the few surviving relatively pure-blooded Veddas who do not practise agriculture are to be found in the park country of Uva, while communities carrying on a rough cultivation, whose members have more foreign blood in their veins, exist in the poorer part of the game, honey, yams, and fruit, they are still able to collect these in sufficient quantity not only to support life, but to leave a surplus to barter with the 'Moormen' on their annual visits or to take into the nearest Sinhalese village to exchange for iron, cloths, pots, and occasionally rice and coco-nuts. So long as this sort of life is possible, communities are necessarily small and the old mode of habitation in caves and rock shelters persists, but where the country is less wild the Sinhalese have killed down the game to such an extent—even where they have not settled them—that it has been necessary to abandon cultivation, and for this purpose they have organized themselves in villages and at the same time have commonly intermarried with the Sinhalese. It is in this way that the second class of Veddas, the villages, who have originally adopted the Sinhalese process has been going on for hundreds of years, and there is evidence that centuries ago there were 'Vedda' communities—i.e. communities with Vedda blood—by whom the Veddas and their contemporaries—politically organized and having chiefs who were in constant relation with the Sinhalese court. This process of contact metathesis has had as its most striking result the complete loss of the original Vedda (non-Aryan) language, while the identity of the relationship systems of the Veddas and Sinhalese is presumably to be attributed to the same cause. The coast Veddas, who have intermarried with the local Tamilis, whose physical type they have acquired and whose beliefs they largely share, though they alone among the Veddas, 'must be taken to mean forest Veddas, unless village Veddas are specifically mentioned.

The Veddas have never been metal workers, and, although they have no traditions concerning the use of stone implements, the quarts artifacts described by the couples Sarath and others must, at least provisionally, be attributed to them. The iron bladed tools they possess, their axes, knives, 'flint and steel' strike-a-lights, are the only metal tools they use. These arrow heads and axes were noted in the 17th cent. by Robert Knox, who mentions the silent trade for metal in exchange for flesh and honey practised by the wilder Veddas. Apart from their skill as hunters the Veddas show the bare beginnings of a few arts and crafts. They make no pottery except where they have learnt it from the Sinhalese. Personal ornaments scarcely exist, yet the rocks of some of the caves bear very rough drawings of men and animals and the skin bag in which honey is collected. They are drawn by women and were said to have no religious or other special significance. The Veddas have no musical instruments, but during their dances they frequently beat time with their hands on the abdomen; and G. S. Myers, who has examined phonographs of their songs, considers that they are simpler in structure than any other native songs hitherto published, and indeed represent the very beginning of melody-building.

2. Social organization.—The Veddas have a clan organization with descent in the female line; the clans are exogamous, though this rule is not strictly adhered to. Two intermarrying clans, the Mörane and Unapane, are considered superior to the others, with whom they should not intermarry. If, however, the marriage is at all in doubt, the unknown, the correct marriage being the cross cousin, especially with the daughter of the mother's younger brother. A high standard of sexual morality is maintained in both the married and unmarried. There is close comradeship between a man and his wife's father; an unmarried man assists his mother's brother, his actual or potential father-in-law, in most activities, and this association continues after marriage. A man's bāna (sister's son, daughter's husband) is always welcome to hospitality in cave or hut, when other relatives would not intrude. Though descent is in the female line, through the male line the Vedda has little personal property, his axe and bow and arrows being his most important possessions, but land, or, more strictly speaking, hunting and fishing rights, the tenure of certain caves, as well as the right to the combs of the rock bee on definite tracts of land, descend from father to son, or are presented to a son-in-law on his marriage.

The Veddas have no regular chieftainship, but the oldest man of each small group exercises considerable authority, the importance of such men being enhanced by the Sinhalese and other officials,
who naturally make a point of dealing with the most intelligent and authoritative member of a group.

3. Religion.—The basis of the Vedda religion is the cult of the dead, and the Vedda point of view on life after death is determined by the customs observed when a death takes place. When a man, woman, or child dies, the body is left in the cave or rock shelter in which death from sickness occurred. The body is not washed, dressed, or ornamented in any way, but is allowed to lie in the natural supine position and is covered over with leaves and branches. The cave is then deserted for some years, and, if any bones are left when the Veddas return, they are thrown into the jungle. When an attempt is made to discover the reason for the desertion of the place of death, the usual answer is to the effect that 1 if we stayed we should be pelted with stones; and some Veddas, including at least contaminated, definitely stated that it was the spirit, or yaku (fem. yakini, pl. yaku), of the dead man who would cause stones to rain on anybody staying near the corpse. Although fear of the dead (expressed by leaving the site of death) occurs among all the wilder Veddas, a few old men were by no means convinced that any particular individuals were more in danger, no doubt the spirits of important and influential men survived, but whether this applied to quite ordinary individuals was more doubtful, and in one community there was a special ceremony the object of which was to settle this point.

Each Vedda community consists of a small number of families who, since cousin marriage prevails, are doubly related by blood and marriage; the yaku of the recently dead, called collectively the Nae Yak, are supposed to stand towards the surviving members of the group in the light of friends and relatives who, if well treated, will continue to show loving kindness to their survivors, and only if neglected will show disgust and anger by withdrawing their assistance or even becoming actively hostile. 1 Hence it is generally considered necessary to present an offering to the newly dead, usually within a week or two after death, though a few Veddas stated that they would not hold a Nae Yak ceremony until they specially required the help of the yaku, or until misfortune threatened or occurred to them. Among those offering must consist of cowpea and coco-nut milk, the food that every Vedda esteems above all others; but betel-leaves and areca-nut are often added, and the offering is a small group of ‘wild’ Veddas said that this offering would in the old days have consisted of yams and water, if, as was often the case, coco-nuts and rice could not be obtained.

In each community there is one man, called kapurale or duggana, who has the power and knowledge requisite to call the yaku; and in the ceremony of presenting the offering called Nae Yaku Natanama (literally, the dancing of the Nae Yak) this man calls upon the yaku of the recently dead man to come and take the offering. The kapurale (who may conveniently be spoken of as the shaman) becomes possessed by the yaku of the dead man, who speaks through the mouth of the shaman in hoarse, guttural accents, saying that he approves of the offering, that he will assist his listeners in hunting, and often stating the direction in which the next hunting party should go. Besides the shaman, one or more of the near relatives of the dead man may become possessed, but this, though common, is not invariable. The yaku leaves the shaman soon after he has promised his favour and success in hunting, the shaman always collapsing as the spirit goes. After the death of all the men, women, and children of the group who are present, the offering, usually on the spot on which the invocation took place, though this is not absolutely necessary. It was clear that this eating of food which had been offered to the yaku was an act of communion, and an essential part of the ceremony which was thought to bring health and good fortune; for some communities even anointed the heads of their dogs with the milk of the offering, explaining that this was done because of their value.

Besides the yaku of the recently dead there are other important yaku, chief among whom are Kande Yaka and his brother Bilindi Yaka. Kande Yaka is the spirit of an ancestor, a mighty hunter in his day; he is invoked to give success in hunting, and during the ceremonial dance given in his honour a realistic pantomime of tracking and killing a deer is performed. Spirits of the dead were believed to go to Kande Yaka and become his attendants until death, and it was necessary for a spirit to resort to Kande Yaka in order to obtain permission to accept offerings from his living relatives, and to obtain power from him to assist them in return for their offerings, or to cause the community either to continue or to change their habits of food and behaviour. Thus Kande Yaka, who is of especial assistance in hunting, becomes lord of the dead.

We have, however, little doubt that to the majority of Veddas Kande Yaka is especially the yaku who gives success in hunting, and that his relation to the dead does not leap to their minds on the mention of his name as does the idea of his helpfulness in hunting; for Kande Yaka was essentially a friendly and helpful yaku, who, unlike many other yaku usually beneficent, never sent sickness; in fact, Kande Yaka the spirit scarcely differs as patron of hunters from Kande Wanniya the mighty hunter, still living and showing kindness and helpfulness towards the people among whom he dwelt.

The Nae Yaka, Kande Yaka, Bilindi Yaka, and certain other spirits who belong to the primitive Vedda culture, and to this day these are the important yaku among the wilder Veddas. But centuries of contact with Sinhalese and Tamils have led old Veddas to regard some of Sinhalese and Tamil demons (or gods) as yaku. Thus, running roughly parallel with the three stages of development can be recognized in the Vedda religion: (1) the cult of the dead, including the cult of the spirits of recent ancestors, i.e. of the Nae Yak and the yaku of certain Veddas who have been long dead and may well be regarded as heroes; the most important of these is Kande Yaka; (2) the cult of foreign spirits, who have become naturalized and have taken the friendly protective nature of the Vedda yaku; the cult of the yaku of a number of names of Veddas’ may be considered to belong to this stratum; one of these, Panikkik Vedda, is the canonic spirit of one Panikki Vedda, i.e. Panikki the Vedda, who is mentioned in a 16th. cent. manuscript; this man, who seems to have been the chief of a group of mixed Vedda and Sinhalese blood, was in fairly intimate contact with the Sinhalese court; (3) the cult of foreign spirits which is not generally regarded as such, have retained their foreign nature and are, in the main, terrible or even hostile. Another feature of this stratum of thought is the endorsement of true Vedda yaku.
VEDDAS

with foreign attributes. The god Skanda, or Kandyan, as he is often called, is a Coylon, worshipped at Kataragam in the south of the island, chiefly by Tamils. There are no Veddas in this district now, but formerly the forests in the neighbourhood were inhabited by Veddas who were known as the Kovil Yamathan Veddas, i.e. Veddas of the temple precincts, and they cannot but have been much influenced by the worship at the great temple. In the Eastern province the present inhabitants are Veddahs who were known by the same name, and witnessed a dance performed seven days after the death of a member of the community. Here the yaka of the dead man was said to go to the Kataragam God before joining Kande Yaka. Among most village Veddahs Indigolae Yaka had taken the place of Kande Yaka; he gives good fortune in hunting and is looked on in the Nae Yaku ceremony. Gale Yaka was also important among village Veddahs, but possibly in some localities this is only another name for Indigolae Yaka. Among the wilder Veddahs Gale Yaka was never mentioned, and Indigolae Yaka. If Knoll was killed, he was looked upon as a foreign spirit attendant upon Kande Yaka.

The kirimanna, literally 'the grandmother,' are the spirits of Veddah women; many are named and seem to be linked with the seasons and their topics. From one aspect they have a malignant character, for, though they are said to love children, they often steal them and cause their death through sickness. Veddans gathering rock-honey will usually propitiate them by an offering of honey.

The worship of the yaka consists essentially of ceremonies during which the shaman or chief performer dances himself into an ecstasy—a condition, we have no doubt, of genuine dissociation of consciousness—during which he is thought to be possessed by the yaka whom he invokes. These dances are often pantomimic, and, though in different localities the ceremonial varies, especially as regards elaboration, the ritual of each dance is fixed by tradition. Various objects are proper to certain yaka, the most important being the aude, a ceremonial representation of an arrow, the blade from 8 to 16 inches long, hafted into a wooden handle considerably shorter than the blade. Ordinary arrows are also used in dances, while for each yaka a special set of arrows is required. It was noticed that, once an article was used in connexion with the yaka, it was not placed on the ground. The kiriborkra, literally 'milk bowl,' a vessel filled with the white juice squeezed from cocco-nut meat, was a necessary part of the ceremonies in which Kande Yaka, Bilindi Yaka, or the Nae Yaku were invoked, and the main features of the dance centred round this bowl. No attempt is made here to describe all of these ceremonies; it may, however, be mentioned that women never take part in the dances, though they are always present, and may become possessed by the yaka.

The method of invocation of the yaka is essentially the same in all Vedd ceremonies; an invocation is sung by the shaman and his disciples, as he in olden days, slowly dances, usually round the offering that has been prepared for the yaka. Sometimes the invocations are quite appropriate and consist of straightforward appeals to the yaka for help, or recite the deeds and prowess of the yaka when he too was a man. But at other times these are very largely leaping. Probably in many of these instances they are merely the remnants of old Sinhalese charms that are not only displaced from their proper position, but also, in places, altogether neglected in the process as to have become inexpressible. As the verses are recited, the dance is performed, and the shaman, more and more quickly, he unites his hair, which falls over his face as he throws his head forward, his voice becomes hoarse, his speech staccato, his body in unison with the dance. The dance and the expression; he is then possessed by the yaka, and, although he does not lose consciousness completely and can co-ordinate his movements, he does not remember this. There is a recollection of what he has said and has only a general idea of the movements of the dance performed. With this condition, another member of the community always follows him, often with hands upon his waist, ready to support him if he should fall. Whatever happens, the ceremony ends apparently unconscious; the condition does not, however, last long, the shaman gradually coming to and continuing to dance. Troubling and shivering—which certainly occurs—is said to mark the entry of the yaka into the shaman. When the yaka leaves the shaman, the latter always falls back exhausted. Partial collapse during the ceremony does not necessarily indicate a bad performance.

The invocations by which the Veddas call upon the yaka fall into two main groups: the first, distinguished by their simple form, are straightforward requests to the spirits of the dead to provide game and yams, or to show their loving kindness by partaking of the food provided by their descendants; the second group, embracing a considerable range of beliefs, are all longer and more complicated and often contain references to events which happened before the spiritual beings to whom they are addressed attained their full power as yaka. In nearly all the invocations animals and articles of food are not mentioned by their usual name, but described by periphrases. Only the simplest invocations have been selected as examples; many are very complicated and undoubtedly the Veddas themselves either give them meanings quite different from those of the texts or have lost the significance entirely and are content to intone sounds almost or quite meaningless to them.

The two following invocations (nos. 15 and 16) to Nae Yaku are from a forest and a village community respectively:

(1) †Salutation! Salutation! Part of our relatives! Multi- tude of relatives! Having called (you) at the (right) time (we gave you) white sandal (rice); (you ate, you drank. Do not think any wrong of us); we also eat (and drink).

(2) Our father who went to that world come to this world. Take the rice. Come quickly to place (for us) the sambar deer, to place the spotted deer. Take this betel leaf. Come very quickly. Come quickly my mother's people. Take the rice, take the rock honey, take the betel leaf. To place the sambar deer, to place the spotted deer, come very quickly.

The next (no. 16) is an invocation to Kande Yaka, and the fourth (no. 24) is sung when collecting rock-honey:

(16) King of the hills, who continues to go from hill to hill, cause rain. (He is) the Wanniya of the Chief of the hill, who causes to fall the horns of excellent sambar deer, from foot to (print), from Ranné Damana (the grass plain of yaka) to Kandyan, to their proper places.

(24) Lady New Goddess, (you) must show (me) a bee-hive to-day. Having chopped (it out) I will hide (it) and go.

As already stated, the possession by yaka is to be considered as due to a dissociation of personality; the traditional movements, words, and music all tend to bring about a more or less automatic condition which seems to be more easily induced the longer the practitioner has been shamanizing. Nor must the somewhat prolonged training of the shaman be forgotten. The present writers are convinced that there is no trickery about these ceremonies.

The shaman invoking a yaka holds or exhibits the special object (e.g. the aude) proper to that yaka, and it seemed to be thought that the yaka first comes into possession of the shaman. Each yaka has his traditional mode of behaviour. The shaman possessed by Kande Yaka goes through the pantomime of tracking and killing sambar deer; Bombara Yaka spars a wild boar and is wounded by it before he succeeds in killing it; Dola Yaka smokes out rock-bees' nests and collects the honey. These pantomimes are often extremely dramatic. The yaka examine the offerings and allow them, and express approval, some straightforward prophecies.

The numbers preceding the invocations here given refer to those in ch. x. The present writers' manuscript where all the invocations collected are printed and their meaning discussed.

1 See for these C. G. and B. Z. Seligman, The Veddas.
good hunting (each in his own department); for, though Kande Yaka is patron of all food supplies, there are certain deities separately invoked for help in getting yams, rock-honey, and tree-honey. The yaku have their methods of showing approval of the offerings; usually they scatter some of the food, sometimes they feed a favoured member of the community or place leaves dipped in the sacred food upon his chest, or, putting his arms on his shoulders, the shaman, gazing and making a mystic incantation, disappears with the food upon the yaku. Sometimes a yaka asks why he has been called. Is it because any one is sick? And, if any one is brought forward, he will feed him or anoint him with sacred food which is thought to cure the sickness.

The manifest object of most ceremonies is to obtain food, but there is no suggestion that any of them are performed to increase the food supply, as are the takaciums ceremonies of Australia. They are also performed to cure sickness, and it is in this connexion that the Pata Yaku ceremony may be mentioned. This ceremony is held for a pregnant woman, that she may have safe delivery. Baskets of fruit are used on all the various occasions for the purpose, but the reason not demonstrated. It is certainly no exaggeration to say that the yaku beliefs, to whose influence usual or unusual events are alike attributed. No creation traditions of any country belonging to the natural features of the country could be discovered among the wilder groups of Veddas.

LITERATURE.—John Bailey, 'Wild Tribes of the Veddas of Ceylon,' The Jour. of Ethnol., x., 1889; 

VEDIC RELIGION.—DEFINITIONS.—With a view to avoiding confusion, it is advisable to define at the outset the sense in which each of the three terms 'religion,' 'mythology,' and 'magic' (witchcraft) is to be employed in the present article. Religion means, on the one hand, the body of beliefs entertained by men regarding the divine or supernatural powers, and, on the other, that sense of dependence on those powers which is expressed by word in the form of prayer and praise, or by act in the form of ritual and sacrifice. Mythology means the body of myths or stories which give an account of gods and heroes, describing their origin and surroundings, their deeds and activities. Mythology is thus included in, though not coextensive with, that aspect of religion which is concerned with belief. Magic means that body of practices which, instead of seeking to gain the goodwill of divine beneficent powers by acts of worship, is largely directed against demoniac and hostile agencies, and aims at obtaining certain objects by magic means, without the intervention of deities. Magic as such, being essentially different from religion and representing a more primitive stage of belief, is excluded from the scope of this article except where, as is sometimes the case, it is inextricably mixed up with religious ritual.

I. MEANING AND IMPORTANCE OF THE SUBJECT.

By the general term 'Vedic religion' is here understood the religion of the Vedic period of Indian literature, which extends from some time after the Aryan immigration into the north-west of India, that is, from at least as early as B.C. 1500, down to about B.C. 200.

Vedic religion is peculiarly important as a branch of study. It is not only the earliest body of religious beliefs preserved in a literary form, but it also represents a more primitive phase of thought than is recorded in any other literature. It can, moreover, be traced step by step through the various stages of its development. It is, finally, the source of the religion of the Modern Hindus, which can thus be historically followed up to its origin throughout a period of well over 3000 years. As a natural result of its value to the investigator of religious thought in general, the study of Vedic religion gave birth, in the latter half of the 19th cent., to the sciences of Comparative Mythology and Comparative Religion.

2. STAGES OF VEDIC RELIGION.

Three main successive stages may be clearly distinguished in the religion which is recorded in three corresponding phases of Vedic literature, viz., in (a) the Vedas, (b) the Brāhmaṇas together with the Śrātras, (c) the Upaniṣads.

(a) The religion of the four Vedas, regarded as a whole, is concerned with the worship of gods largely represented by the personification of the powers of nature; the propitiation of demoniac beings comes only to a limited extent within its sphere. The oldest and most important of the four Vedas, the Rigveda, from which considerable portions of the others are borrowed, is a collection of metrical hymns containing a large mythological element. These hymns are mainly invocations of the gods meant to accompany the libation of soma juice and the fire sacrifice of melted butter. The polytheism of this Veda assumes in its latest hymns a pantheistic colouring. Only a very few of its hymns are connected with witchcraft.

The hymns of the Atharvaveda, on the other hand, consist largely of spells meant for magical application, while their religion is pronounced pantheism. The contents of the two other Vedas are entirely sacrificial in purpose. The Śāmaveda is almost exclusively composed of verses borrowed from the Rigveda to be applied in the ritual of the Soma sacrifice. The Yajurveda consists of ritual formulas, largely in prose, which, not being directly addressed to the gods, are practically of a magical type. The religious phase which it represents is, in spirit, identical with that of the Brāhmaṇas.

(b) The Brāhmaṇas are discursive theological treatises in prose dealing with the Vedic ritual; while the Śrātras, text-books composed in a very concise style, largely condense and systematize the contents of the Brāhmaṇas and add much matter on domestic and everyday observances. The main difference in the mythology of the Brāhmaṇas, as compared with the Rigveda, is their recognition of a father-god as chief of the deities; while the general character of their religious belief is explicit pantheism. As to cult, they represent a ritual system which, in complexity of detail, far surpasses anything the world has elsewhere known, and is almost rivalled by that part of the Brāhmaṇas, as a continuation of their speculative side, the Upaniṣads really represent a new religion.
which is in virtual opposition to their ritual or practical side. This now, purely pantheistic religion, is characterized by the doctrine of transmigration, a doctrine unknown to the Veda, and only incident in one of the Brāhmaṇas. A world-soul takes the place of the father-god of the Brāhmaṇas. He is the main object of speculation, and the identity with it of the individual soul is the great fundamental doctrine of the Upaniṣads. The religious aim now is no longer to secure a happy and blissful after-life by sacriﬁcing correctly to the gods, but the release, as a result of true knowledge, from rebirth by absorption in the world-soul.

3. VEDIC RELIGIOUS BELIEFS.

The following account of Vedic beliefs, which are almost entirely mythological, starts from the statements of the Rigveda, to which the subsequent developments of the Vedic period are, if of sufficient importance, in each case added.

(a) COSMOGONIC BELIEFS.—Judged by their fragmentary references to the origin of the world, the poets of the Rigveda usually regarded it as having been mechanistically produced like a building, the material being wood, and heaven and earth being supported by posts. The agents in the construction are regularly either the gods in general or various individual gods.

The last book of the Rigveda, however, contains a few cosmogonic hymns which represent other views. One of these (x. 80), though among the latest of the period, preserves a very primitive belief. It accounts for the origin of the world from the body of a primeval giant, whom the gods sacriﬁced. His head became the sky, his navel the earth, and his heart the earth; while from his various members the four castes were produced. This being, called Purusa, or man, and interpreted pantheistically in the hymn itself as ‘all this, both what has become and what shall be,’ reappears as the world-soul in the Atharvaveda and the Upaniṣads.

There are, again, two cosmogonic hymns of the Rigveda which explain the origin of the universe, philosophically rather than mythologically, as a kind of evolution of the existent (sat) from the non-existent (asat). In another hymn of the same type, the agency of a creator (dhiitā) is, after the evolution of the ocean through heat (tapas), introduced. The ocean was cloud, heaven, earth, air, and ether. There is also a hymn (x. 121) in which heaven and earth and the great waters are described as the creation of Hiranya-garbha, the golden germ, who is said to have arisen in the beginning, to be the one god above all gods, and is ﬁnally invoked as Prajāpati, lord of all created things. It is to be noted that in the cosmogonic hymns the waters are commonly thought of as coming into existence ﬁrst. In the Atharvaveda the all-god appears as a creator under several new names, especially as Skambha, ‘support’; also as Prāna, ‘breath’; Kāma, ‘desire,’ and others.

The cosmogony of the Brāhmaṇas requires the agency of the creator Prajāpati, who is not, however, always the starting-point. Sometimes the waters come ﬁrst; on them floats the golden germ (hiranyagarbha), from which arises the spirit that produces the universe. This contradiction is due to the theories of evolution and of creation being combined. One cosmogonic myth of the Brāhmaṇas describes how the submerged earth was raised by a boar. The latter in post-Vedic mythology developed into an avatār of Viṣṇu.

(b) COSMOGONIC BELIEFS.—Heaven and earth are ordinarily regarded in the Rigveda as the parents of the gods in general. It is only very rarely that other gods are spoken of as parents of the rest: thus Dāyavaṇa, the son and the brother of the gods, and both Brahmāṇaspati and Soma are mentioned as their father. The cosmogonic hymns connect the origin of the gods chiefly with the elements of water; but they also describe the gods as born after the creation of the universe.

(c) ORIGIN OF MAN.—The Vedic beliefs regarding the origin of the human race were somewhat ﬂuctuating, the ultimate theory of origin, however, always thought to be divine. Agni, the god of fire, is at least once said to have begotten the race of men, and certain families of seers are regarded as independently descended through their founders from the gods. Usually, however, the human race is traced to a ﬁrst man, either Manu or Yama, both of whom are sons of Vivasvān, a solar deity.

4. THE VEDIC GODS.

The Vedic Indian believed in the existence of a large number of supernatural beings, varying in character from the all-good, all-knowing, all-powerful and all-loving gods, to the gods of natural phenomena of the universe. A distinction was made between the gods or by ritual expedients. The divine powers, again, may be classed as higher gods, whose power pervades the world and controls the great phenomena of nature; and as lesser divinities, whose activities are restricted to a limited sphere or are conducted on a smaller scale: for instance, tutelary deities and elves. The divine nature is further shared by men of days gone by: ancient heroes who are associated with the deeds of the gods, and ancestors who live with the gods and receive worship like them. Finally, at the bottom of the scale, we ﬁnd many inanimate objects which are deified, being invoked and worshipped like divine beings.

A. THE HIGHER GODS.

The gods are usually stated in the Rigveda and Atharvaveda, as well as the Brāhmaṇas, to be thirty-three in number; but there are occasional deviations or inconsistencies in regard to this belief. Troops of deities, such as the storm-gods, are, of course, not regarded as included in this number. The sun-god, Soma, is divided into three groups of eleven, distributed in earth, air, and heaven, the three divisions of the universe. These three groups, now containing eighty-one, are the deities of nature. Certain deities are, moreover, described as the offspring of others. The Atharvaveda and the Brāhmaṇas also expressly state that the gods were originally mortal, adding that they overcame death by the practice of austerity. The same thing is implied in the Rigveda, where the gods are said to have acquired immortality by drinking Soma or by receiving it as a gift from Agni and Sāvitr. In the post-Vedic view, the immortality of the gods was limited to a cosmic age.

Their physical attributes.—The gods of the Veda are anthropomorphic in appearance. The parts of their bodies, which are frequently mentioned, are in many cases, however, little more than figurative
illuminations of the phenomena of nature represented by the deity. Thus the arms of the sun are said to be more than his rays; and the tongue and limbs of Agni merely denote his flames. Some of the gods appear equipped as warriors, especially Indra; others are described as priests, especially Agni and Brahman. All of them drive through the air in luminous cars, drawn chiefly by steeds, but sometimes by other animals.

**Their food.**—The favourite food of men is also that of them, consisting of milk, butter, grain, and the flesh of sheep, goat, or cattle. It is offered to them in the sacrifice; this is either conveyed to them in heaven by the god of fire, or they come in their cars to partake of it on the litter of grass prepared for their reception. Their favourite beverage is the exhilarating juice of the Soma plant.

**Their abode.**—The home of the gods is described as heaven, the third heaven, or the highest step of Vayu (the zenith), where, cheered by draughts of Soma, they live a life of bliss.

**Their attributes.**—The most prominent characteristic of the Vedic gods is power; for they are constantly described as ‘great’ and ‘mighty.’ They regulate the order of nature and vanquish the great powers of evil. They hold sway over all creatures; no one can thwart their ordinances or live beyond the time they appoint; and the fulfillment of wishes is dependent on them. Their omniscience, which is restricted within narrow limits, is seldom referred to. It is an attribute which is emphasized in the case of Varuna only.

The Vedic gods are benevolent beings who bestow prosperity on mankind, the only one in whom injurious traits appear being Rudra. They are, moreover, moral authorities to the standard of an early stage of civilization. They are described as ‘true’ and ‘not deceitful,’ being friends and protectors of the honest and righteous, but punishing sin and guilt. They are not, however, above employing craft against the hostile, and occasionally practise deceit even without the justification of a good end.

Since, in most cases, the Vedic gods have not yet become dissociated from the physical phenomena which they represent, their figures are indefinite in outline and deficient in individuality. Having many features, such as power, brilliance, benevolence, in common with others, each god exhibits very few distinctive attributes. This vagueness is further increased by the practice of invoking deities in pairs—a practice making both gods share characteristics properly belonging to one alone. When nearly every power can thus be attributed to every god, the identification of one deity with another becomes easy. There are, in fact, several such identifications in the Rigveda. The idea is even found in more than one late passage that various deities are but different forms of a single divine being. This idea, however, never developed into monotheism, for none of the regular sacrifices of the Vedic period were offered to a single god. Finally, in other late hymns of the Rigveda, we find the deities Aditi and Prajapati identified not only with all the gods, but with nature as well. This brings us to the beginning of that pantheism which became characteristic of later Indian thought.

**Henotheism.**—The practice of invoking individual gods as the highest, frequent even in the older Rigveda, gives rise to Max Müller’s theory of the ‘henotheism’ or ‘kathenotheism’ of that Veda, which he defines as ‘the belief in individual gods alternately regarded as the one true god, the Rigveda presenting for the moment treated as an independent and supreme deity, alone present to the mind. Criticism has, however, shown that we have here only to do with an exaggerated form of praise which does not amount to actual pantheism.

The Vedic gods may most conveniently be classified as deities of heaven, air, and earth, according to the threefold division suggested by the Rigveda itself.

1. **CELESTIAL GODS.**—The historically oldest among the gods of the sky, as going back to the Indo-European period and identical with the Greek Zeus, is Dyaus Pitar (the Sky God, Dyaus-pitar = Zeu스 páytr, Jörr-píter). Dyaus is generally coupled with Prthivi, Earth, when the two are celebrated as universal parents. He is once described as armed with a bolt, and, in another passage, as making the clouds in allusion to the lightening sky.

Another and much more prominent deity of the sky is Varuna, the greatest of the Vedic gods besides Indra. He, too, dates from an earlier period, for in name he is probably identical with the Greek Οὐρανός, and in character he is allied to the Avestic Ahura Mazda. Varuna is the guardian of physical and moral order (rta). By his ordinance heaven and earth are held apart; he regulates the course of sun, moon, and stars; he causes the rivers to flow and the clouds to fertilize the earth with rain. He is the avenger of men’s wrongs and false dealing. He is angry with sinners, whose he severely punishes, binding them with his fetters. But he is gracious to the penitent, releasing men not only from their own sins, but from those committed by their fathers. The prayer for forgiveness of guilt is characteristic of the Varuna hymns, which in general are the most exalted and solemn in the Rigveda. With the development of Prajapati as creator and supreme god in the later Vedas, the importance of Varuna waned, till in the post-Vedic period he retained only the dominion of the waters as god of the sea.

Five gods represent various aspects of solar activity. The oldest of these, Mitra, the ‘friend,’ probably a personification of the sun’s beneficent power, is an inheritance from the Indo-Iranian period, being identical with the Persian sun-god Mithra, whose cult became so widely diffused in the Roman empire during the 3rd and 4th centuries A.D. In the Rigveda he has almost entirely lost his individuality, and is hardly ever invoked except in connection with Varuna.

Suña, etymologically allied to the Greek Ημέρα is the most concrete of the solar deities, this being the regular name of the luminary. He is the husband of Dawn. His car, often referred to, is generally described as drawn by seven steeds. He is the soul of all that moves or is fixed, all creatures depending on him. He prolongs life, and drives away disease. His eye and his all-seeing power are often spoken of; and he is besought to declare men sinless to Mitra and Varuna.

Savitr, the ‘stimulator,’ represents the quickening activity of the sun. Bestowing immortality on the gods as well as length of life on man, he also conducts the spirits of the dead to where the righteous dwell. To him is addressed the most famous stanza of the Rigveda (lii. 62. 10), with which he was in ancient times invoked at the beginning of Vedic study, and which is still repeated by every orthodox Brähman in his morning prayers. It is called the Śatásīrṇī from the deity, or the Gaṇeṣṭīrṇī from the god.

‘May we attain that excellent Glory of Savitr the god,
That he may stimulate our thoughts.’

Pusan, the horse god, is probably the most bountiful power of the sun, appearing chiefly as a pastoral deity, who protects cattle and guides
them with his good. He is a guardian of paths; and, knowing the ways of heaven, he conducts the dead to the abode of the fathers.

Indra occupies a subordinate position in the Rigveda, and less frequently invoked than the four gods just mentioned. Visnu is historically the most important of the solar deities; for he has become (in modern Hinduism) the chief god of modern Hinduism. His three strides, typifying doubtless the course of the sun through the three divisions of the universe, constitute the central feature in his most high-styled myth, viz., the apas or heaven, the abode of the gods. He is frequently said to have taken his three strides for the benefit of man.

This general trait is illustrated by the Brāhmaṇa myth in which Visnu assumes the form of a dwarf as an artiste to recover the earth, now in possession of demons, by taking his three strides. Visnu’s characteristic benevolence was in post-Vedic mythology further developed in the doctrine of his avatāra (‘descents to earth’), or incarnations for the good of humanity.

Ugās (equated to Ḥīra and Auvera), goddess of dawn, the daughter of Dyaus, is the only female deity invoked with frequency in the Rigveda, and is also the mother of graces. Being a poetical rather than a religious figure, she did not, like the other gods, receive a share in the Soma offering.

The Adhvaryus (‘lords of steeds’), twin gods of morning, sons of Dyaus, eternally young and hand-some, are addressed in many hymns. They very frequently receive the epithet nāsastva, ‘true.’ Ugās is born at the yoking of their chariot, while their spouse Stryā, daughter of the sun, accompanies them. They are characterized successively to deities. Delivering from distress in general and from shipwreck in particular, they are also divine physicians. They have several traits in common with the two famous horsemen of Greek mythology, the Asklepios, sons of Zeus and brothers of Helen. The origin of these twin deities is obscure; it is perhaps most likely that they represent either the twilight, half dark, half light, or the morning and evening star.

2. ATMOSPHERIC GODS.—Indra is the dominant deity in the aerial sphere. While Varuṇa is the great moral ruler, Indra is the mighty warrior. Indra is, indeed, the favourite and national god of the Vedic Indian. An indication of this is the fact that more than one-fourth of the Rigveda is devoted to Indra; it is a mythological creation of an earlier period; for Indra is a demon in the Avesta. Though he is more anthropomorphic than any other Vedic god, his original character is still tolerably clear. He is primarily the thundergod, and his conquest of the demon Vṛtra is the central feature of the mythology which surrounds him. Hence Vṛtra-han, ‘slayer of Vṛtra,’ is his chief and specific epithet. Armed with his bolt (vyṛtra), claimed by copious draughts of Soma, and aided by the Maruts, or storm-gods, Indra engages in the fray. The fight is terrific; for heaven and earth tremble with fear as the conflict rages. The constant repetition of the theme corresponds to the perpetual renewal of the phenomena of the thunderstorm which underlie the myth. The result of the victory is the release of the waters for man and the recovery of the light of the sun. Indra thus became a god of battle whose aid is constantly invoked in conflicts with earthly foes. He is often described as the protector of the Aryan colour, and vanquisher of the black race. One of his chief myths is the Orthopedia (the straight one) (which in the Pali form of Sakka became his regular name in Buddhist literature). Certain immoral traits appear in Indra’s character. He occasionally indulges in acts of capricious violence, such as slaying his father or shattering the ear of Dawn. He is greatly addicted to Soma, which he drinks in enormous quantities to stimulate him in his boisterous exploits. One entire hymn in the Rigveda (x. 119) consists of a monologue in which Indra, inebriated with Soma, boasts of his greatness and power. While Varuṇa, after the period of the Rigveda, gradually recedes, Indra, in the Brāhmaṇas became the chief of the Indian deities (svetavya), and even maintained this position in the Purāṇas, though, of course, subordinated to the Trinity Brahmā-Varuṇa-Siva.

Three of the less important deities, if they are connected with lightning, Tīrtha, a somewhat obscure god with the epithet āptaya, ‘watery,’ mentioned only in detached verses of the Rigveda, seems to represent the ‘third’ (trītva = Greek τρίτον) form of fire. He goes back to the Indo-Iranian period, both his name and his epithet occurring in the Avesta. In the Rigveda he appears as a preserver of Soma, who aids Indra in slaying Vṛtra and the three-headed demon Viśvārūpā, or performs the latter exploit himself. He kindles the celestial fire, and even appears as a form of fire. His house is hidden and remote. As almost all traits with the same name are ascribed to him by the latter at an early period. In the Brāhmaṇas he appears as one of three sons of Agni, the other two being Ekata and Dvīta. In the epic poetry Agni is the name of his wife.

Apaṁ napat, ‘son of waters,’ also goes back to the Indo-Iranian period. Rarely mentioned in the Rigveda, he is described as clothed in lightning and shining without fuel in the waters. He thus represents the lightning form of fire as produced from the thundercloud.

Mātarīvān is referred to only in scattered verses of the Rigveda as a divine being who (like the Greek Prometheus) brought down the hidden fire from heaven to earth. He was originally, in all likelihood, conceived as an aerial form of Agni, with whom he is sometimes actually identified. His character then underwent a transformation; for in the later Vedas, the Brāhmaṇas, and the post-Vedic literature he appears as a wind-god.

It is somewhat remarkable that Rudra, the early form of the post-Vedic Siva, who in the Rigveda occupies a very subordinate position, like that of Visnu, should have risen to parallel pre-emminence with Visnu in a later age. Rudra is usually described as armed with bow and arrows, but sometimes he appears with the universal creative and conserving shaft. He is fierce and destructive like a wild beast, being ‘the ruddy, noisy of heaven.’ The most striking feature of the hymns addressed to him is his fear of his terrible shafts and deprecation of his wrath. For he slays men and cattle, and assails with disease. He is, indeed, the one malignant deity of the Vedas. His malevolence, however, unlike that of a demon, is not the only side of his character. For he is a healer as well as a destroyer, being even lauded as the greatest of physicians. Thus he is often besought not only to preserve from calamity, but to bestow welfare on man and beast. The euphemistic epithet Siva, ‘auspicious,’ which begins to be applied to him in the Rigveda, grows more frequent in the later Vedas, till it finally becomes his regular name in post-Vedic mythology. With the increased use of this epithet, the malevolence of Rudra becomes more pronounced in the later Vedas. The White Yajurveda, which adds various disgraceful attributes, furnishes the transition to the terrible and war-like exploits. One characteristic of the orthopedia, the straight one, of Rudra is somewhat obscure; but the inference from the evidence of the Rigveda seems to be justified that he originally represented the destructive agency of the thunderstorm. His un-
canny and balfeul traits have, however, also been explained as starting from the conception of a deity as a god hast, whence storm and disease attack man and beast.

The sons of Rudra and Pṛṇi (the ‘mottled’ cloud-cow) are the Maruts, or storm-gods, also called Rudras, and are said to be thirty seven or thrice sixty deities, the constant allies of Indra in his conflicts. They are described as like fires at their birth, and as ‘born from the laughter of light’ or as ‘washed with fire’ were armed with spears and battle-axes, wearing helmets and decked with golden ornaments. Their headlong course is often graphically depicted. They ride on golden cars which gleam with lightning: with their bellies they rend the mountains and shatter the lonely trees of the forest. They share to some extent the destructive as well as the beneficent traits of their father Rudra. Their lightning-bolt slays men and kine. But they also bring healing remedies, apparently the rains with which they fertilize the earth.

The god of wind is not a prominent deity in the Rigveda. Under the more anthropomorphic form of Vāyu he is chiefly associated with Indra. As VāTa (the ordinary name of wind), he is described in a more concrete manner (often in connexion with the verb an, ‘to blow,’ from which the word is derived), being couched only with the less anthropomorphic god Parjanya.

A personification of the rain-cloud is Parjanya, son of Dyaus. He is not a prominent deity, being invoked in only three hymns of the Rigveda; which, however, describe his activity in the rainstorm very vividly. He quickens the earth with rain, causing abundant vegetation to spring up. He also bestows fertility on the animal world. For thus comes to be spoken of as ‘our divine father.’

The waters, Apah, are praised as divine powers in four hymns of the Rigveda. They are celestial, abiding in the home of the gods. The aerial waters are the mothers of one of the forms of Agni, Apaṇ napti, son of waters. But, as flowing in channels and having the sea for their goal, the waters are also terrestrials (cf. 3). They are young wives, mothers, goddesses who bestow boons to animal and human life. They not only bear away defilement, but cleanse from moral guilt, the sins of violence, cursing, and lying. They also grant remedies, health and immortality.

3. Terrestrial Deities.—Rivers are not infrequently personified and invoked in the Rigveda. Thus the Sindhu (Indus) is celebrated as a goddess in one hymn, and the Viśā (Bīsá) and Satudri (Sutlej), sister streams of the Panjāb, in another. The most important and oftentimes lauded is, however, the Sarasvatī. Though the personification goes much further here than in the case of other streams, the connexion of the goddess with the river is never lost sight of in the Rigveda. In the Brāhmaṇas, Sarasvatī has become identified with the goddess of speech, and in Hindu mythology she appears further modified as the goddess of eloquence and wisdom, invoked as a Muse, and regarded as the wife of Brahmā.

Earth, or Prthivī, the broad, nearly always associated with Dyaus, is often spoken of as a mother. The personification is rudimentary, the attributes of the goddess being chiefly those of the physical earth.

By far the most important of the terrestrial deities, and the most frequently invoked of the Vedic gods, being celebrated in about one-fifth of the hymns of the Rigveda, it is only natural that the personification of the abode of the Vedic ritual, should engross the thoughts of the poets to such an extent. Agni-a (Lat. ignis) being also the ordinary name for fire, the anthropomorphism has not proceeded far. The bodily presence of Agni in the sacrifices is made in connexion with the various aspects of the sacrificial fire. Thus Agni is called ‘butter-backed,’ ‘butter-faced,’ and ‘butter-haired,’ with reference (to the oblation aga (beetle) cast on the flames. His teeth, jaws, and tongues are associated with the action of burning. Agni is borne on a brilliant car, drawn by two or more steeds, which he yokes to bring the gods, for he is the charioteer of the sacrifice.

Beyond his sacrificial activities, little is said about the deeds of Agni. It is otherwise mainly his various births, forms, and abodes that occupy the thoughts of the Vedic poets. Agni is usually called the son of Dyaus and Prthivī, sometimes also the offspring of Tvaṣṭra and the waters. But owing to the daily production of Agni from the two firesticks, they, too, are his parents. He is then a newborn infant, also called ‘son of strength’ because of the powerful friction required to kindle the flame. He wakes at dawn, for the fire is lit every morning. He is thus the youngest of the gods; but he is also old, having conducted the first sacrifice.

As not only terrestrial, but sprung from the aerial water and having been sent down from heaven, Agni is often spoken of as having a triple character. This threefold Agni is the earliest Indian trinity, probably the prototype not only of the later Rigvedic triad of Sun, Wind, Fire, connected with the three divisions of the universe, but also of the triad Sun, Indra, Fire, which, though not Rigvedic, is still ancient. There may be a historical connexion between this triad and the conception of the three charioteers of Brahmā–Viṣṇu–Śiva. This triad of fires may, further, have suggested, and would explain, the division of a single sacrificial fire into the three which form an essential feature in the cult of the Brāhmaṇas.

As kindled in innumerable dwellings, Agni is also said to have many births. He assumes various divine forms and has many names; in him are comprehended all the gods, whom he surrounds as a felly the spokes. Though scattered in many places, he is one and the same king. It was probably from such speculations on the nature of Agni that the idea of immortality was made to the conception of a unity pervading the many manifestations of the divine which has been noted above (p. 609).

As the deity most intimately associated with the everyday life of man, Agni is spoken of as an immortal who has taken up his abode among mortals in human dwellings, and is constantly called a ‘guest’ and ‘lord of the house.’ Being the conductor of the sacrifice as well as the summoner of the gods, he is very frequently described as a ‘messenger,’ who moves between heaven and earth. Agni is, however, most characteristically called a ‘priest,’ usually by the generic terms puraj and purajīra; or specifically ‘domestic priest’ (purajhita), oftenest of all ‘invoker’ or ‘chief priest’ (hotri). He is, in fact, the great priest among the Vedic gods, as Indra is the great warrior. Agni is a mighty benefactor of his worshippers, whose enemies he consumes. The benefit which he confers are chiefly domestic welfare and general prosperity, while those which Indra grants are mostly the rewards of victory.

Agni is the very origin of the in the Rigveda as a ‘goblin-slayer,’ a trait surviving from what is perhaps the oldest phase of the cult of fire as warding off the attack of evil spirits.

Since the origin of sacrifice, by the side of fire-worship, the other main feature in the ritual of the Rigveda, the personification of the juice of
the Soma plant is naturally one of its most prominent deities. Judged by the number of hymns addressed to him, Soma is third in importance among the Vedic gods coming next to Agni from this point of view. Since the plant and the juice are constantly before the eyes of the priests as they sing the praises of the god, the personification is vigorous. The imagination of the poets dwells chiefly on the processes of pressing and straining, which it overlays with ecstatic imagery and mystical fancies of almost infinite variety.

Of rarer occurrence than Vedic Soma is the Soma of the Upanisads, which is spoken of as 'lord of plants' or as their king, being also designated 'lord of the forest.' There are many references to Soma growing on the mountains. Heaven, however, is regarded as its true and original home; and the myth of its having been brought down to earth by an eagle (īyena) is often alluded to.

The mental stimulation produced by drinking Soma is expressed by one of the poems of the Rigveda with the words: 'We have drunk Soma, we have brought forth, we have entered into light, we have known the gods.' Its exhilarating power is, however, dwelt upon chiefly in connexion with Indra, from whom it injures in light conflict with the aerial demons. Soma thus came to be regarded as a divine drink, which bestowed immortality on the gods, being called amṛta (allied to amritas, the Greek 'immortal' draught). Hence the god Soma places his worshipper in the imperishable world of eternal light and glory, making him immortal where Yama dwells. Healing power is similarly attributed to Soma. The juice is medicine for the ailing man, and the god heals the sick, making the blind to see and the lame to walk.

In some of the latest hymns of the Rigveda, Soma begins to be somewhat obscurely identified with the moon. In the Atharvaveda and the Yajurveda this identification is explicit in several passages. It is already a commonplace in the Brāhmaṇas, which explain the waning of the moon as due to the gods and fathers consuming the ambrosia of which it consists. One of the Upaniṣads, moreover, states that the moon is king Soma, the food of the gods, and is drunk up by them. In post-Vedic literature, finally, Soma is a regular name of the moon. This somewhat remarkable coalescence of Soma with the moon must have started from the exaggerated terms in which the Rigvedic poets describe the celestial nature and brilliance of Soma. It was doubtless furthered by the imagery in which the poets of the Rigveda indulged. Thus Soma is spoken of as dwelling in the waters (with which it was mixed), and Soma in the bowls is once even compared to the moon in the waters. Soma is often called Indu, or 'drop.' This word shared the fate of Soma, also becoming a regular name of the moon in the post-Vedic period.

Soma must already have been an important feature in both the mythology and the cult of the Indo-Iranian period; for the Āvestan Haoma shows many points of agreement, in both directions, with the Soma of the Rigveda.

4. ABSTRACT DEITIES.—One result of the advance of thought, during the period of the Rigveda, from the concrete towards the abstract was the creation of a new class of deities, the abstract deities. Of the two classes which may be distinguished, the earlier and more numerous one seems to have started from epithets which were applicable to one or more older deities, but which when detached from the originals dwells chiefly as the want of a god exercising the particular activity in question began to be felt. When the type was once established, the creation of direct abstractions of this kind became possible. We have here names denoting either an agent (formed with the suffix -dr or -dar, the Lat. and Gr. -tor, -der), such as Dhātu, 'creator,' or an attribute, such as Prajapati, 'lord of creatures,' of the Rigvedic gods are nearly all of rare occurrence, appearing for the most part in the latest book of the Rigveda. Thus Dhātu, an epithet of Indra and Visvakarman, appears also as a independent god, who creates heaven and earth, sun and moon. In the post-Vedic period Dhātu has become one of the regular names of the creator and preserver of the world. The other type of the rare Vīdhā, or the Rigvedic, Dhātu, the 'supporter,' Tatr, the 'protector,' and Netr, the 'leader.' The only agent god mentioned with any frequency in the Rigveda is Tvāṣṭṛ, the fashioner or 'artist,' though no hymn is addressed to him. He is the most skilful of workmen, having among other things fashioned the bolt of Indra, and a new drinking-cup for the gods. He shapes the form of beings and presides over generation. He is a guardian of Soma, which is called the 'mend of Tvāṣṭṛ,' and Indra drinks it in his house. He is the father of Saranyā, wife of Vivasvat and mother of the primeval twins Yama and Nemi. This origin of the origin is obscure. He may in the beginning have represented the creative activity of the sun; having then, because of his name, become the centre of attraction for myths illustrative of creative skill, he finally rose to be a god whose epithet was artiste in the Vedic pantheon. Oldenberg thinks that Tvāṣṭṛ, the 'artist,' was originally a direct abstraction of artistic skill. He regards the solar deity Savitṛ, the 'stimulator,' whose name is similarly formed, as from the outset an abstraction of this type.

There are a few other abstract deities whose names were originally epithets of older gods. They are of rare and late occurrence in the Rigveda, their appellations being mostly compound in form and representing the supreme god who was being evolved at the end of the Rigvedic period. The historically most important among these is Prājapati, 'lord of creatures.' Originally an epithet of such gods as Savitṛ and Soma, the name is mentioned in a late verse of the last book of the Rigveda as that of a distinct deity in the character of a creator. Prājapati is often in the Atharvaveda and the White Yajurveda, and regularly in the Brāhmaṇas, recognized as the chief and father of the gods. In the Śūrvas he is identified with the god Visvakarman, 'the creator.' Similarly, the epithet Visvakarman, 'all-creating,' appears as the name of an independent deity, to whom two hymns of the last book of the Rigveda are addressed. In the Brāhmaṇas, Visvakarman is expressly identified with the creator Prajapati, while in post-Vedic mythology he appears, doubtless owing to the name, as the artiste of the gods (like Tvāṣṭṛ in the Rigveda). Hiranyagarbha, the 'golden germ,' once occurs in the Rigveda as the supreme god, described as the 'one lord of all that exists.' In the Yajurveda he is expressly identified with Prajapati, and in the later literature his name appears chiefly as a designation of Brahmā. In one curious instance it is possible to watch the genesis of an abstract deity of this type. The refrain of a late hymn of the Rigveda refers to the unknown creator, to whom the interrogative pronoun Ka? should we with sacrifices worship? This led to the word Ka being used, in the later Vedic literature, as an independent name of the supreme god. In the Atharvaveda Rohini, 'the long-haired (as Rohini, has become a distinct deity in the capacity of a creator, the name having originally been an epithet of the sun. The only abstract deity of this type occurring in the oldest as well as the
latest parts of the Rigveda is Brhaspati, 'lord of the spell,' of whom Brahmaaspati is a frequent occurrence. Manu, with whom the gods most prominently characterize is, however, his priesthood. As the divine brahma priest, he seems to have been the prototype of the god Brähma, chief of the later Hindu trinity. The name Brhaspati itself survived in post-Vedic mythology as the designation of a sage, teacher of the gods and regent of the planet Jupiter.

The second and smaller class of abstract deities comprises personifications of abstract nouns. There are seven or eight of these occurring in the last book of the Rigveda. Two hymns are addressed to Manu, 'wrath,' and one to Svadātha, 'faith.' Aumatu, 'favour,' (of the gods), Aditi, 'de- votion,' Śānti, 'peace,' Ātman, 'spirit,' and Nīrīti, 'decease,' occur in only a few isolated passages. These abstractions become commoner in the later Vedas. Thus Kūma, 'desire,' first and foremost, is this, the arrow, with which he pierces hearts are already referred to; he becomes in post-Vedic mythology the well-known flower-arrowed god of love. In the same Veda Kārti, 'time,' and Jāmudā, 'support,' are commoner personifications. While Prāna, 'breath,' and some other analogues abstractions are identified with Prajāpati. Śri, as a personification of beauty or fortune, does not begin to appear till the Brāhmaṇa period. A purely abstract deity, often incidentally celebrated throughout the Rigveda, is Aditi, 'liberation,' 'freedom' (literally 'un-binding': a-diti), whose main characteristic is the power of delivering from the bonds of physical suffering and moral guilt. She, however, occupies a unique position among the abstract deities owing to the peculiar way in which the invocation seems to have come about. She is the mother of the twin gods, grandsons of deities called Adityas, often styled 'sons of Aditi.' This expression at first most probably meant nothing more than 'sons of liberation,' according to the interpretation given by the Rigveda and elsewhere. The word was then personified, with the curious result that the mother is mythologically younger than some at least of her sons, who (e.g. Mitra) date from the Indo-Iranian period. The goddess Diti, mentioned only three times in the Rigveda, probably came into being as an antithesis to Aditi, with whom she is twice mentioned there and several times in the later Vedas. The Atharvaveda speaks of her sons, the Dītas, who in post-Vedic mythology are demons, enemies of the gods.

5. GODDESSES, in general, play an insignificant part in the Vedas, taking no share in the government of the world. The only one of importance is Usas (p. 604). Next comes Sarasvatī, who, however, ranks with only the least prominent of the male deities. Very few others are celebrated in even as much as one entire hymn. Such are Prithvi, Earth (p. 605); Rāti, Night, the sister of Dawn, conceived not as dark, but bright with stars; Aranyāni, goddess of the forest; and Vīc, goddess of the woods. Many more were mentioned. Such are Parnāsī and Dhiyāṇa, goddesses of plenty. Less often referred to are Rādhā and Śīvatī, spoken of as bountiful goddesses; in later Veda texts they appear as the presiding deities of full and new moon respectively. Kuṅkū also is mentioned in these texts as a personification of the new moon. Iti is a sacrificial goddess, the personification of the oblation of milk and butter. With her also mentioned Māhā or Bhadrā, another sacrificial deity. The wives of the great gods are still more insignificant, being mere names formed from those of their consorts, altogether lacking in individuality. Thus Aignā, Indrāni, Vārnavāni, are mentioned of Agni, Indra, and Varuna respectively. Kuṁvāni, as the wife of Rudra, first appears in the Sātras. The 'wives of the gods' (devīnām potāti), occasionally mentioned as a group, are given no place assigned to them, apart from the gods, in the cult of the Brāhmaṇas.

6. DUAL DIVINITIES.—A peculiar feature of Vedic religion is the invention of pairs of deities whose names are combined as dual compounds. About a dozen such pairs are celebrated in entire hymns, and about half a dozen more in detached verses of the Rigveda. By far the largest number of hymns is addressed to the couple Mitra-Varuna; though the names most frequently compounded in the dual are Heaven and Earth (dvāvāyvīthī). Most likely the latter pair, having been associated as a divine couple from the beginning, have formed, gradually, an important religious group, each of whom has become the subject of a separate group of hymns. They are also occasionally the Two Worlds (rodus) in the Rigveda.

7. GROUPS OF DEITIES.—Among the creations of Vedic mythology we also find a few more or less definite groups of deities, generally associated with some particular god. The Maruts who, as we have seen (p. 609), attend on Indra, form the most numerous group. Under the name of Rudras, they are also occasionally associated with their father Rudra. The smaller group of the Adityas, of whom Varuṇa is the chief, are constantly mentioned in company with their mother Aditi. Their number in the Rigveda is stated to be seven or, with the addition of Mārtaṇḍa, eight; while in the Brāhmaṇas and later it is regularly twelve. One passage of the Rigveda enumerates six of them: Mitra, Aryaman, Bhaga, Varuna, Daśa, Apsa; Śīra was probably regarded as the seventh. A much less important group, without individual names or definite number in the Vedas, is that of the Vaṣus, whose leader is, in the Rigveda, generally Indra, but in later Veda texts generally Agni. In the Brāhmaṇas their number is stated to be eight. There are, finally, the Vīsvedevas, who, according to the Brāhmaṇa, is the god group who in the Rigveda only appear in the invocation (dvāvāyvīthī) hymns. It is an artificial sacrificial group, intended to include the whole pantheon, and thus to ensure the omission of no deity when all were meant to be invoked. But in spite of its name, this comprehensive group was, strange to say, sometimes conceived as a narrower one, associated with others like the Vasus and Adityas.

B. LESSER DIVINITIES.

1. ELVES, GENI.—Besides the higher gods already described, a number of lesser divine powers are known to the Rigveda. The most prominent of these are the Rūhas, a dept-handed trio who by their marvellous skill acquired the rank of deities. Among their five main feats of dexterity, the greatest consisted in transforming the bowl of Tvasṛ into four shining cups. The bowl and the cups have been variously interpreted as the moon with its four phases or the year with its seasons. The Rūhas further exhibited their skill in resting the cows on their horns. The cows, by whom Heaven and Earth seem to have been meant. The myth of the Rūhas having rested for twelve years in the house of the sun is probably an allusion to the intercalation of twelve days at the winter solstice, so as to bring the intercalation of 355 days into harmony with the solar year of nearly 366 days.
Occasional mention is made in the Rigveda of an Apsaras ("moving in the waters"), a celestial woman, to whom Vaivasvata Manu, his father, gave the name Gandharva. Occasionally more Apsaras than one are spoken of. In the Atharvaveda and later, the Apsaras form a class, regularly associated with the Gandharvas; and though they are still connected with the waters and clouds, their sphere is here, as well as in the Yajurveda, extended to the earth, where they haunt the different varieties of fig-trees called Nyagrodha, Asvins, and Udumbara, in which the music of their cymbals and lutes is heard. In the Brāhmaṇas they appear as nymphs of great beauty, devoted to song, dance, and play. Several individual names of Apsaras are mentioned in the later Vedas, but the only one occurring in the Rigveda is that of Urvāsī. In an obscure hymn (x. 95) she engages in a dialogue with her earthly spouse Pururavas, whom she has forsaken. The myth of their alliance is told more fully in one of the Brāhmaṇas. Gandharva is, in the Rigveda, a single being (like the Gandarewa of the Avesta), who dwells in the aerial sphere, guards the celestial soma, and is (as in the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa) the owner of the celestial waters. In the later Vedas the Gandharvas form a class associated with the Apsaras in a stereotyped manner, and are brought into relation with marriage and with wedding ceremonies. In the post-Vedic period the Gandharvas have become celestial singers.

2. TUTELARY DEITIES.—There are a few divinities of the tutelary order, guardians watching over the welfare of house or field. One of these is Vāstupati, 'lord of the dwelling,' rarely mentioned in the Rigveda, where he is invoked to grant a favourable entry, to remove disease, and to bring about prosperity. The Śrutas prescribe that Vāstupati should be propitiated when a new house is to be occupied. Kṣetrasya pati, 'lord of the field,' is besought in the Rigveda to grant cattle and horses and to confer prosperity. The Śrutas state that he is to be worshipped when a field is ploughed. Stītā, the 'furrow,' is once invoked in the Rigveda to dispense crops and rich blessings. In a Śutra she appears as the wife of Indra. Here, too, Urvāsī, the 'arable field,' with her garland of threshing-floors, is supplicated to bestow welfare.

C. HEROES. The heroes of the Rigveda are all ancient seers or priests. (1) The most important of them is Manu or Manus (which also means 'man'), the ancestor of the human race, styled 'our father' by the poets, who also speak of the sacrificers of their own day as 'the people of Manu.' Regarded as the son of Vivasvāt, he bears the patronymic Vaivasvata from the Atharvaveda onwards. He is thus a doublet of Yama as progenitor of mankind. He is represented as the institutor of sacrifice. Soma is said to have been brought to him by the bird, and Indra is described as drinking the Soma of Manus to fortify him for the conflict with Vṛtra. In the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, Manus plays the part of Noah, being saved in a ship from a deluge, which has swept away all other creatures, by a fish (in post-Vedic mythology an acātār of Vājī). Manus then became the ancestor of the human race through his daughter Iī, who was produced from his offerings. (2) Atharvan is frequently mentioned in the Rigveda as a sure priest, who practised devotion along with Father Manus. In the Atharvaveda he appears as a companion of the gods, being related to them and dwelling in heaven. The name is also found in the plural as that of a group of fathers. In the Atharvaveda, the Atharvans are described as destroying goblins with a magical herb. (3) Dadyatik, son of Atharvan, is a son-in-law who is a genius of great age. A myth told about him is that the Āavins gave him a horse's head, with which he proclaimed to them the mead of Tvastṛ was to be found. Indra is also connected with this myth; for he is said to have discovered the horse's head, and with the bones of Dadyatik to have slain ninety-nine Vītrvas. (4) Atri is one of the ancient seers most frequently mentioned in the Rigveda. The myth of his deliverance from the demon Vṛtra is often referred to. He is also said to have found the sun when hidden by the demon Svarbhāna and to have placed it in the sky. The Atris are a family of seers to whom the authorship of the fifth book of the Rigveda is attributed. (5) Kavya is another ancient seer and sacrificer often spoken of in the Rigveda. He is said to have been befriended by Agni, Indra, and the Maruts; and to have been specially aided by the Āavins, who restored his sight. Most of the hymns of the eighth book of the Rigveda are attributed to his desendants the Kavyas. (6) Kutsa is one of the few Vedas whose association with the sacrificer is marked. He is chiefly connected with the Indra myth. Riding on the same car as Indra and acting as his charioteer, he is even invoked with Indra in the dual form. He is especially associated with Indra in slaying the demon Śūṣṇa. When Kutsa was pressed by his foes, Indra tore off the wheel of the sun to aid him. Nevertheless Indra sometimes appears as hostile to Kutsa, delivering him into the hands of an enemy. Several hymns of the first, third, and ninth books of the Rigveda are assigned by tradition to the seer Kutsa. (7) Much less frequently mentioned in the Rigveda is the seer Kavya Usan, who is characterised as a seer of wisdom. He, too, is associated with Indra. He is said to have fashioned for Indra the bolt for slaying Vṛtra; and once joins him and Kutsa in slaying the demon Śūṣṇa. (8) Some names, moreover, appear predominantly or exclusively in the plural as representing families or groups of ancient seers, who, if in some cases historical in origin, have become invested with mythological traits. A frequently mentioned group of this kind are the Angiras, who are closely associated with Indra in the myth of the capture of the cows. They are described as seers who are the sons of the gods, and who by sacrifice obtained immortality as well as the friendship of Indra. They receive offerings of Soma, and are invoked like gods. When used in the singular, āngiras is nearly always an epithet of Āgni, who is called the first seer Angiras or the chief Angiras. The word āngiras appears to be etymologically identical with the Greek ἄγγελος, 'messenger.' This points to the Angiras originally having been regarded as messengers between heaven and earth, attendant on Āgni. But if they were mythical in origin, they came to be regarded as an actual priestly family, the composition of the ninth book of the Rigveda being attributed to them. This is also indicated by the epithet āngirasaḥ, 'the Atharvans and Angiras,' a designation of the Atharvaveda which occurs in that Veda itself as well as later. (9) Another group of ancient priests are the Bhūrgas, chiefly connected with the myth of the communication of fire to men. The Indian Prometheus, Matarīv, brought the hidden Āgni from heaven to the Bhūrgas, who established and diffused the sacrifice. Several passages of the Rigveda they are referred to as if an actual tribe of bygone days. In the later Vedic literature, Bhūrga is the eponymous hero of a tribe, and regarded as a son of Varuṇa. (10) A definite numerical group of

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ancient priests, but rarely referred to in the Rigveda, are the ‘Seven Seers’ (ṣapta ṛṣiyāḥ). They are referred to as self-existent. Their number may have been suggested by the seven technical priests, of whom they would then represent the prototypes. In the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa they are regarded as the seven stars in the constellation of the Great Bear, and are stated to have themselves been originally bears. This identification was doubtless brought about by the sameness of number in the two groups, added by the similarity of sound between ‘seven’ and ‘bear,’ and ṛṣi, which in the Rigveda means both ‘star’ and ‘bear.’ (11) The above groups are all spoken of as ‘fathers,’ and nearly all of them, besides a few others, are mentioned as races of ancestors to whom worship is paid. Those thus characterized in the Rigveda are the Navagras, Vairūpas, Aṅgirasas, Ātharvas, Bhūrus, Vāśītās. The last four, whether mythical in origin or not, appear in the historical aspect of families to which the composition of the Ātharvaveda and two books of the Rigveda was attributed.

D. ANIMALS.

Animals play a considerable part in the mythological and religious ideas of the Veda. (1) Among them the horse is prominent as drawing the sun chariot. In the Rigveda at least four individual steeds, probably all representing the sun, which are regarded as deities and objects of worship. The most notable of these is Dūddhikā or Dūddhikvarṇī, to whom four hymns are addressed. He is described as a swift and victorious steed, regularly invoked with Uṣas, occasionally with Agni, the Āsvins, Śūrya, and others. The divine horse TĀrkya, addressed in one of the hymns of the Rigveda, is a god-impelled mighty steed, a vanquisher of chariots, speeding to battle. In one or two later Vedic texts Tārkya is referred to as a bird; and in the epic and later literature he is identical with the swift bird Garuda, the vehicle of Śūrya. A third steed, several times mentioned, is Paiteva, spoken of as white, a dragon-slayer, a conqueror invincible in battles, worthy to be invoked like the god Bhaṣag by men. Lastly, there is Ēkaśva, the swift steed who draws the bright form of the sun, but also contends in a race with Śūrya. (2) The cow, however, is the animal which occupies the much more important position in Vedic mythology and religion. Cows, representing beams of light, draw the car of Dawn. Rain-clouds, especially in the Indra myth, are personified as cows; Pīṣṇi, the mother of the Maruts, being an individualization. The bountiful clouds are doubtless the prototypes of the many-coloured cows, mentioned in the Atharvaveda, which yield all desires in the heaven of the Blest, and which are the forerunners of the Cow of Plenty (KāmaśŚekha) of post-Vedic poetry. The animal herself is already regarded as sacred in the Rigveda; for one of the poets impresses on his hearers that she should not be killed, and she is frequently designated by the term aggha, ‘not to be slain.’ She is even addressed as a goddess; and the divinities Ilī, Aditi, and Pythvi are sometimes conceived in the form of cow. In the Atharvaveda the worship of the cow as a sacred animal is fully recognized. That the tendency to deification had already begun before the Aryans entered India is proved by the evidence of texts which shows that the sanctity of the cow is at least as old as the Indo-Iranian period. (3) In the Rigveda the goat is the animal that draws the car of Pāṣan. This is doubtless the animal that in the future became Ekapād, the ‘one-footed goat.’ In the later Vedic literature we occasionally find the goat connected or identified with Agni. (4) The ass appears in Vedic mythology only as drawing the car of the Āsvins. (5) The dog met with in the Rigveda, with two brindled hounds of Yama, chief of the dead. (6) The boar has, in the Yajurveda, a cosmogenic character, as the form assumed by the creator Prajapati when he raised the earth out of the waters. From this conception the boar incarnation of Śūrya was developed in Hindu mythology. (7) The tortoise has, in the later Vedas, acquired a semi-divine position; for in the White Yajurveda he is spoken of as an incarnation of Śūrya. In the Atharvaveda he appears under the name of Kaṣyapa, beside or as identical with Prajapati, receiving the epithet Sūryanubhū, ‘self-existent.’ In the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, Prajapati is said, when producing all creatures, to have changed himself into a tortoise. This transformation became, in Hindu mythology, the tortoise incarnation of Śūrya. (8) A monkey named Vṛśakapi occurs in an obscure myth told in a late hymn of the Rigveda as a favourite of Indra. (9) Another late hymn contains a panegyric of frogs as bestowing cows and long life. (10) The bird frequently figures in Vedic mythology as the eagle (gāyā) that brings the Soma to Indra. Nosy animals in Vedic mythology generally appear as demons or exhibit demonic traits. (11) The serpent is here the most prominent and useful animal. The most powerful demon Yṛṣa, the foe of Indra, is thought to possess; for he is frequently designated as ahi, ‘the snake.’ The serpent, however, also shows a beneficent aspect in the divine being Ahi Budhnya, ‘the dragon of the deep,’ who is supposed to dwell in the fathomless depths of the ocean. In the later Vedas, the serpents (śurpaḥ) are mentioned, along with the Gandharvas and others, as a class of semi-divine beings that dwell on earth, in air, and in heaven; and in the Sūtras, offerings to them are prescribed. In the Sūtras, we for the first time come across the Nāgas, human beings in appearance, but serpents in reality. In the Hindu period, serpent-worship is found all over India. Since there is no trace of it in the Rigveda, while it prevails widely among the non-Aryan tribes, the conclusion seems justified that when the Aryans overpassed India, the land of serpents, they found the cult diffused among the aborigines and borrowed it from them.

E. DEIFIED INANIMATE OBJECTS.

Besides the great phenomena of nature, various features of the earth’s surface, as well as artificial objects, are treated as deities in the Vedas. This is a fetisistic worship of inanimate things chiefly regarded as useful to man.

1. Mountains are frequently addressed as divinities in the Rigveda, but only along with other natural objects, such as rivers and plants, or in association with gods. Parvatā, ‘mountain,’ is even invoked with Indra in the form of a dual compound. Besides rivers and waters, already mentioned as terrestrial goddesses, plants (gāth) are regarded as divine powers. One entire hymn of the Rigveda is devoted to their praise, chiefly with reference to their healing powers; the Atharvaveda refers to a medicinal plant as ‘a radiance’ and the Black Yajurveda prescribes an animal sacrifice to plants for the obtaining of offspring. Large trees, called ‘lords of the forest’ (vighnāpati), are also sometimes addressed as deities, mainly in association with waters and mountains.

2. Various sacrificial implements are deified. The most important is the sacrificial post. It is regarded as a form of Indra in the Rigveda, in which posts set up by priests are described as gods. The sacrificial litter (bhorā) is also de-
fied, and the ‘divine doors,’ by which the sacrificial enclosure is entered, are goddesses. The worship of the ‘sacred doors’ is embedded in three hymns of the Rigveda; spoken of here as immortal, unaging, more mighty than heaven, they are invoked to drive away demons and destruction. The word vrdh– and pedic used in pounding the soma plant are invoked in the Rigveda. In the Atharvaveda divine power of the highest order is ascribed to uchita, the ‘remnant’ of the sacrificial services, to a host of various sacrificial ladles. The agricultural implements named bana and sird, probably the ploughshare and the plough, are invoked in a few verses of the Rigveda, and, in the ritual, receive the offering of a cake.

3. Weapons, finally, are sometimes defined: armour, bow, quiver, arrows, and drum being invoked in one of the hymns of the Rigveda. The drum alone is also celebrated in an entire hymn of the Atharvaveda.

4. Idols seem not to have been known in the age of the Vedas; at all events they first begin to be referred to in the later additions to the Brähmanas and in the Sûtras. One verse of the Rigveda, however, seems to allude to some image of Indra.

5. Material objects treated as symbols of deities are occasionally mentioned in the ritual literature. Thus the wheel (yakta) represents the sun in various ceremonies; and appears to the hindu mythology as one of the weapons of the solar deity Viṣṇu. A piece of gold, sometimes in the form of a disk, also indicates the sun on certain ritual occasions. A symbol must have been used by the phallic worshippers (śāntdevād), who are mentioned with repugnance in the Rigveda. In the post-Vedic period the phallic or linga became typical of Siva’s generative power, and its worship is widely diffused in India at the present day.

5. DEMONS.

a. The demons which are often mentioned in the Vedas are of two kinds. The higher and more powerful class, the aerial foes of the gods, are generally called Asuras in the Atharvaveda and later. This word, however, rarely means ‘demon’ in the Rigveda, where it usually preserves the older sense of ‘being of mysterious power,’ and denotes a god (abhrura in the Avesta). The earlier notion of the conflict between a single god and a single demon, exemplified by Indra and Yatra in the Rigveda, gradually made way for that of the hostility of gods and demons as two opposing hosts. This is the regular view of the Brāhmaṇas. Here the Asuras, no less than the gods, are regarded as the offspring of Prajāpati; here, too, the Asuras often vanquish the gods at the outset, being finally worsted only by artifice.

In the Rigveda the terms dānu and dāsoya, properly the name of the dark aborigines overcome by the conquering Aryans, are frequently used also to designate aerial demons, adversaries of the gods. A group of demons are the Paṇis (‘nigards’), primarily the foes of Indra, who with the aid of Sarama tracks and releases the cows hidden by them.

Of individual demons, by far the most frequently mentioned is Yatra, the ‘encompasser,’ the formidable opponent of Indra. His mother being called Dānu, he is also sometimes alluded to by the metronymic term Dānaca (which later becomes the name of a class of demons). Another powerful demon is the flesh-eater of the cows, which he guards, and which are set free by Indra and his allies, notably the Agnirases. Other demon adversaries of Indra are Aśura, described as a black eagle; and the cows Indra drove out; Viṣṇurāja, son of Vṛṣaruchi, a three-headed demon slain by both Trita and Indra, who seizes his cows; and Svarbhāṇa, who eclipses the sun (his successor in Hindu mythology being Rūha); these and other minor demons are generally described as Dāsas, and slain by Indra in favour of protégés; such are Sūṣaṇa, Saṁbaras, Piprû, Nanuc, Dhumu, and Cunari, besides some half dozen others who were originally, in all likelihood, terrestrial foes.

b. The second or lower class of demons are terrestrial goblins, enemies of men, as Asuras are of gods. The Vedas mention nine kinds of demons for them: Rakṣasas. They are nearly always mentioned in connexion with some god who destroys them. The much less common term gāṇa or gāṇa-rakṣasas (primarily ‘sorcerer’) alternates with rakṣasas, and perhaps denotes a species. Terrestrial demons appear in the shape of various animals or birds, having also the power to assume human forms in order to deceive. With human shape they often combine some monstrous deformity; they are even described as blue, yellow, or green in colour; they are male and female, have families, and are mortal. Greedy for flesh and blood, they enter by dining into them, thus causing disease and madness. As they prowl about at night, and the sacrifice is the main object of their malignity, Agni is naturally the god most often opposed to them, and most frequently invoked to drive them. The Rakṣasas, a very important group of goblins, scarcely alluded to in the Rigveda but often mentioned in the later Vedas, are the Pišacac, eaters of raw flesh or of corpses. Besides some other groups of goblins of lesser importance, there were included in Vedic belief many other hostile agencies, such as those of disease, which it was one of the main tasks of magico-religious practice to combat. Only a few among the groups of terrestrial spirits were thought to be, after the manner of elves, helpful to men, as in harvest work, or in battle by terrifying the foe.

6. RELIGIOUS PRACTICE.

a. The cult of the Vedic Indian has three aspects. It endeavours, in the first place, to win the favour of the gods, who are almost without exception benevolent. It further aims at warding off the hostility of the demons, who are malevolent, here having recourse to practices which for the most part are not of a religious, but of a magical character. Lastly, it aims at appeasing and ensuring the treatment of gods and of demons; for, while ancestors receive worship as divine beings, means are taken to prevent them from unduly prolonging their uncanny presence amongst men. There are:

b. The worship of the gods has two sides, finding expression either by word or by act. Praise of their greatness and power, or prayer for welfare and forgiveness of sin is addressed to them on the one hand; sacrifice consisting of food and drink is offered on the other. Prayer and praise, which include frequent invitations to the sacrifice, are largely metrical in form, entirely so in the Rigveda. Prayer, however, is almost entirely of the ritual type, intended to accompany a ceremony, or at least to form part of a liturgy. In the creative age of the Rigveda new prayers were produced for ritual purposes; but in the age of the later Vedas, with the development of a system which foresaw almost every desire and prescribed the offering to ensure its fulfilment, prayer was reduced to nothing more than the mechanical application of ready-made formulas. It is doubtful whether even in the earliest period, much room was left, owing to the highly ritual type of the worship, for independent prayer. It is hardly in any case have gone beyond the expression of a concrete desire addressed to a particular
deity; it could certainly not have had the character of a communion of the worshipper with divine powers, for they are not necessarily accompanied by a ceremonial act. Thus the hymns of the Rigveda addressed to Usas were recited without any attendant offerings.

As the hymns of the Rigveda, in addressing prayers to a god, aim at securing his goodwill, they are, in the first place and to a large extent, pneumatics which praise the greatness and the mysterious nature, and the exploits of the deity in question. The petition for the gifts hoped for, when the favour of the god has thus been won, is then brieﬂy added. The beneﬁts desired are almost entirely of a material, not of a moral, kind. They are mainly expressed by such general terms as treasures and blessings, protection and victory; when stated in detail they consist in long life and vigorous offspring, cattle and horses, cars and gold; or the punishment of enemies, niggards, and Brähman-haters by their gods. The prayers may be summed up on the lines:

Rarely does the worshipper pray that his thoughts may be righteous, that he may refrain from doing what displeases the gods, that he may be reconciled to an offended deity, or delivered from the bonds of guilt; and his supplications lack the note of passionate appeal, deep aspiration, mental struggle, or humble submission to the divine will. As regards its eﬃcacy, prayer was held to be a source of no smaller power than the sacriﬁce in gladdening and stimulating the gods. But a hymn had to be composed with faultless art, 'as a skillful workman constructs a car'; it had to be free from impurities which impair the work, and covered with the ﬂail.' Then it invigorated the god like draughts of soma, stimulating him to new deeds; then it increased the mighty strength of Indra so that he slew the dragon. When prayer is thus believed, even in the Rigveda, to exercise the direct inﬂuence of a spell, magic is already beginning to encroach on the domain of religion. A similar tendency is observable in regard to the sacriﬁce which accompanied the prayers to the gods.

c. The general character of the Vedic sacriﬁce is essentially supplicatory, as it aims only at the obtaining of future beneﬁts to be bestowed by the gods, and is not concerned with the past. What seems to be expiatory sacriﬁces are in reality of this order also, for they are accompanied by supplications that the guilt incurred should not be punished. Such expiatory sacriﬁces are of two kinds. They are either intended to mollify the wrath of a god aroused by the transgression of his divine will, being generally offered to Varuna, the guardian of moral order and punisher of sin; or they aim at removing guilt as a kind of impalpable substance much as if it were a disease, producing this result either by the aid of a god, especially Agni, or by means of ﬁre, water, mediæval plants and spells, which are supposed to burn, wash, purify, or drive it away without the invocation of divine powers. This latter type belongs mainly to the sphere of the Atharvaveda, where magic supplants the religious prayer.

Even a sacriﬁce made in fulﬁllment of a vow, after a god has granted a boon, is in reality only a supplenary offering postposed, as when in the Atharvaveda Agni is promised an oﬀerings. Prayer was, however, by the latter rites covers his reason; or when, in the Brahmana story of Sunahśeṇa, the childless kIng vows, if a son is born to him, to sacriﬁce that son to Varuna. Thank-oﬀerings in any true sense are unknown to the Vedic оﬀerings; there they are not, not being found in the vocabulary of the language. An approach to the notion of a thank-oﬀering is only to be found in a Sūtra passage, in which certain oblations or sacriﬁces are prescribed on a man regaining his health.

The conception of the eﬀect of sacriﬁce which prevails in the Rigveda is that the offering wins the favour of the god, and indemns the offering and accompanying prayer. The Soma offering satisfies, gladdens, strengthens the god, who loves the sacriﬁcer and hates the niggard. The reward that follows is a voluntary act of the god, resulting from the benevolent attitude induced by the offering. It is not regarded as the repayment of a debt, though the sacriﬁcer feels that the god cannot well help requiting him. While conceptions of being in the presence of a mighty being, the sacriﬁc
er does not look on himself as inﬁnitely far removed from the god, who is his old friend, and whose right hand he grasps. Even in the Rigveda, however, traces are already of being in the notion that the sacriﬁce exercises compulsion not only on gods, but also over natural phenomena without requiring the co-operation of the gods. Here again is an early and primitive stage of the domain of religion. In the ritual of the Brāhmaṇas we ﬁnd that the latter has already been largely supplanted by the former.

d. The Vedic ceremonial was essentially based on the use of a sacriﬁcial ﬁre, 'the mouth of the gods,' into which the oﬀerings were cast, and by which they were conveyed to the gods. Exceptionally only, ﬁre was not the instrument of sacri
ciﬁce. Thus the oblations were cast into water, those to the dead were placed in small pits at the funeral sacriﬁce, while offerings to Rudra and demons were thrown into the air, hung on trellises, or dissolved in the water. In the ritual there was beside the sacriﬁcial ﬁre a litter of grass (barkhī), the soft seat on which the gods sat down to enjoy the offering. On this litter, according to the ritual texts, the oblations were deposited for a time, before being committed to the flames which conveyed them to heaven. Thus the gods were conceived as partaking of the sacriﬁce both on the litter and in their celestial abode. A god may be invoked, in the latter passage of the Rigveda, to bring the gods to the sacriﬁce and to take it to them in heaven (vii. 11. 5). This contradiction is doubtless to be explained by the survival of the litter in the ceremo
nial, from the time when oﬀerings were presented on it alone. The burning of the litter at the end of the rite may perhaps originally have formed the transition to offering sacriﬁces in ﬁre.

In the Vedic ceremonial, even of the earliest period, we have to distinguish between the simpler ritual of the single domestic fire and the more complicated and technical ritual conducted with the three sacriﬁces, which are independent of the former, though they may originally have arisen by its division. The single domestic sacriﬁce was maintained by every head of a family, who performed the rites connected with it himself. The three sacriﬁces were set up only by men of position and wealth, becoming a centre round which the sacriﬁcial activity of many Brāhmaṇas and priests revolved. After the regular morning and evening sacriﬁces the new and full moon ceremonies, were performed in essentially the same manner with the three sacriﬁces as with the one, the ritual of the latter, however, being simpler: the very words were nothing with the one only, while the Soma sacriﬁce could be carried on with the three only. The chief of
the three fires, called Gārhapatyā (doubtless representing the old domestic fire of the hearth), was the only one always maintained in the house, and two being divided from it for every sacrifice requiring their employment. It was used for the practical purposes of heating the vessels and preparing the offerings. The second, the Ahavaniya, situated to the east, was that in which the gods received their offerings. The third or Dakṣiṇā fire, placed in the south, the quarter specially connected with the souls of the dead and evil spirits, was used for offerings for those regions and for uncanny beings. About this fire and the pots dig around it, the ritual of the sacrificers to the manes chiefly moved.

When a fire was established for purposes of the cult, it was either produced by means of the firesticks (called aranyās, and consisting of a lower slab of soft and a drift of hard wood) or fetched from certain places, as the house of a rich owner of herds or of a great sacrificer. At the four-monthly sacrifices offered at the beginning of the seasons and at the Soma sacrifice, a new fire was rubbed and united with the old Ahavaniya, doubtless with the intention of giving a greater spirit. With regard to the material of the sacrifice, the Vedic Indian, as a general principle, offered to the gods what was his own favourite food. It comprised the chief produce of the dairy and the grain, the former in milk, in its various forms, and butter, together with the two principal kinds of grain, barley and rice (the latter, perhaps, not being used in the earliest period), cooked or baked in different ways. Among these, the products of the cow were unmistakably believed to have a more sacred and mystical import. In the cult of the dead, libations of water were characteristic. As beef and goats’ flesh, less frequently that of deer, and of the principal kinds of meat eaten, cattle, goats, and sheep were the usual victims in the animal sacrifice, the hēgoat, it would seem, being regularly offered on all lesser occasions. On the other hand, animals the flesh of which was either not eaten at all or only exceptionally eaten, such as the pig, dog, deer, as well as fish and birds, were not sacrificed to the gods. It is true that, in the rare and costly horse-sacrifice, an animal was offered the flesh of which was never a regular article of diet. This is, however, to be accounted for by the intrusion of magic into the domain of sacrifice; for the intention underlying the ceremony was to transform the victim into a magical acquisition of the horse to the royal sacrificer. This sacrifice was, indeed, akin to a peculiar tendency in the sacrificial ceremonial, to offer to a god what corresponded to his special individuality. Thus to the goddesses Night and Morning was offered the milk of a black cow having a white calf. In the animal sacrifice, a victim was often chosen which agreed with the deity not only in sex, but in colour and other qualities. The starting-point of this practice was probably the notion that the eater acquires the qualities of the animal he eats, and that his strength is increased most by eating the flesh of the animal most like himself. Thus the mighty Indra, who is constantly called a bull in the Rigveda, commonly receives the sacrifice of a bull, as also of a buffalo, to which he is often compared. The sun-god Sūrya has a white hēgoat offered to him.

The victim was killed by strangulation, and without bloodshed. With an evident desire of avoiding blood-guiltiness, it was addressed with such epithets as ‘Thou blue-robbed bull go not harm to me, death do thee; thou goest to the gods by pleasant paths.’ The ceremonial dealing with the disposal of the carcass was divided into two distinct sacrificial acts. In the first place, after an incision had been made, the caull (omentum) was extracted, being thereupon cooked and solemnly offered to the gods. This rite was concluded by the distribution of the remains as food to the other gods. The second act of the ceremonial consisted in cutting up the carcass into parts, certain sections of which were offered to the gods, while others were eaten by the priests. What remained was distributed among sacrificers, priests, and Brahmans. A magical rather than a religious notion underlies the practice of men eating the remnants of the sacrifice of which the gods have first partaken; for those regarded men who partook of the remnants of the nature of a medicine, which transfers to man the divine blessing connected with the sacrifice, or the particular power implied in the individual offering. The separate sacrifice of the caull was perhaps a relic of a time when that was the only portion of the victim which, owing to its agreeable odour, was presented as a burnt-offering to the gods. The blood of the victim was, in the Vedic ritual, not eaten, but was poured out as an offering to the Rakṣasas or lower demons, who were regarded as fond of blood, and who similarly received the offal of the grain used in making baked offerings. Analogously, the blood of the victim was regarded as having an uncanny nature, such as Rudra or the souls of the dead, were not partaken of by the sacrificer. Thus a bull offered to Rudra might not be eaten or even brought to men. In the case of the funeral cakes presented to the manes only might be snelt.

In connexion with the animal sacrifice, the interesting question as to whether the human sacrifice was known in the ritual of the Vedas suggests itself. The only certain trace of such a sacrifice is to be found in the important ceremony of building the brick fire-altar (called anīr-cauyana). Here it is prescribed that five victims—man, horse, ox, ram, he-goat—are to be sacrificed to different gods, and their five heads walled up in the lowest layer of the edifice. The object of this ceremony, which was a magical rite rather than an actual sacrifice, was to give stability to the altar. It is mentioned in the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa as the custom of a not very remote past, for which other rites had been substituted. The human sacrifice (paragam-mahāra), which the ritual books describe in detail, was probably only an innovation invented to imitate the horse-sacrifice. But of any actual human sacrifice there is no certain trace in Vedic India. Nor does the ancient literature, like that of Sunāṭhepa, nor the evidence of various Buddhist legends, is by any means conclusive.

Not only were food and drink presented to the gods to satisfy their hunger and thirst but an intoxicant, of which the sacrificer also partook, was offered to them. This was the juice of the Soma plant, which was pressed, mixed with milk or other ingredients, and presented to the gods. Soma was certainly not the popular drink of the Vedic Indian, whose favourite intoxicant was called sūra. How, then, is it to be accounted for that, in this case, he did not offer to the gods what he liked best himself? The explanation is that, having during the Indo-Iranian period been adopted in the cult instead of the earlier mead of the Indo-European age, it retained, by the force of tradition, its old-established position even in the Vedic cult.

Occasionally we find that objects which do not constitute food are sacrificed. Thus a man who desires the possession of deadly weapons sacrifices iron nails. Here again the connexion of the cult with witchcraft; the sacrifice becoming a means of obtaining something analogous to the objects offered.

1. Priests.—Vedic India was already far removed from that primitive condition of things in which every man was his own priest, and did not require
the services of persons possessing technical knowledge as intermediaries between him and the divine powers. On the contrary, it is certain that, even in the period of the Rigveda, there already existed a priest who officiated at ceremonial and magical qualities to act for others in the difficult and dangerous intercourse of man with gods and spirits. There were, indeed, already a number of sacrificially qualified Vaisyas and Vivas- nitras, in which the art of praying and sacrificing correctly was practiced as a hereditary calling, all of them employing the same cult, notably that of the ‘invoker,’ or ‘sacrificer,’ as they were called. There were no public priests; for there was no public worship of a national, tribal, or even conglomerational character. Vedic worship was of an essentially private type, sacrifice being performed on behalf of its individual instrument (yajaman) by the priests who acted for him and whose prayers belonged to him. This, coupled with the fact that idols were not used, accounts for the absence of temples in Vedica India.

Two sacrificial types have to be distinguished in the Vedic cult: the domestic priest (purohita), whose function it was to superintend the worship of his own household, and the priest (yajamana) who had to play a certain prescribed part in an individual sacrifice.

The Purohita was generally in the service of kings only, though Brahmans occasionally appeared in an analogous capacity with the house of men of high position. That the employment of a Purohita in a royal household was considered essential is indicated by a Brhmaana passage which states that the gods would not eat the food of a king who had no Purohita. The domestic priest was appointed by the king, and held his office for life, being often succeeded by his son. In the ceremony accompanying the appointment, the same verse was employed as when the bridegroom takes the hand of the bride in the wedding rite. The Purohita was, in fact, the king’s right hand man, giving the direction for all the ceremonial ceremonies and sacrifices. Even in the Rigveda the whole prosperity of the country is said to depend on the Purohita, ‘the guardian of the realm,’ and the Purohita Devapi at the sacrifice employs a spell to procure rain on behalf of his royal master, while in the Atharvaveda another Purohita uses spells to secure victory in battle.

Of the sacrificial priests there were several, with different names and technical names, the chief being the Hotr or ‘invoker,’ the Udgar or ‘chanter,’ the Adhavrya or officiating ‘sacrificer,’ and the Brahman or superintending priest; in the period of the Rigveda the Hotr was the most important. Later the Brahman became so. The Purohita was probably not one of these, though he might be employed to perform the functions of one of them; in the earlier period he sometimes appears acting as Hotr, in the later as Brahman. Thus in the Rigveda the Purohita Devapi is chosen as a Hotr, and Agni is called both a Purohita and a Hotr. The Rigveda contains a list of seven kinds of sacrificial priests, and this was probably the regular number, not only then but in the Indo- Iranian period. Seven priests still appear in various parts of the sacrificial ceremonial in later times, though, with the development of the ritual, additional cases were otherwise employed. The Avesta, which has eight sacrificial priests, probably added one to the original number. It is, in any case, a striking fact that the Znotar, the leading priest who recites the Gathas in the Iranian Homa sacrifice, corresponds, in both name and function, to the Hotr who recites the verses of the Rigveda in the Vedic Soma sacrifice. The most important of these seven Vedic priests were the Hotr and the Adhavrya. It was the duty of the former to recite the hymns which, in the chief libations of the Soma sacrifice, celebrated a particular god and invited him to drink Soma. When the hymns of the Rigveda were composed, their seers (gisi) themselves played the part of the Hotr at the sacrifice; and that the latter was, in the earlier period, regarded as the leading priest is evident from the fact that for Agni, the priest god. The Adhavrya performed the practical part of the ceremonial, tending the fire and the litter, arranging and cleaning the utensils, and the springing of the fire. The remaining five acted as assistants to one or other of the two chief priests. The Agnitha, or ‘fires- kindler,’ helped the Adhavrya in tending the sacrificial fire. The Upavaktya or ‘exhorter’ (known also as Prs, ‘director,’ and Maitrayazy, ‘priest of Mitra and Varuna’), whose duty it was to give various orders to other priests, plays the part, in the animal sacrifice, of the only assistant, and, in the Soma sacrifice, of one among the several assistants of the Hotr. The other three assistants of the ancient list belong to the Soma ritual exclusively: the Potr, or ‘purifier,’ and the Nst, or ‘chaser,’ before the Soma sacrifice in the later Vedas, while the main function of the Brahman was to recite hymns addressed to Indra, in the same way as the Hotr, whose assistant he was. In the later ritual this priest came to be called Brahman. The Brahman, with the title of Purohita, acquired the technical sense of the priest who superintended the whole sacrifice, and whose duty it was to know the three Vedas.

sg. Sacrifices. — The Vedic cult consisted of regularly recurrent or of occasional sacrifices. Our knowledge of the former is derived from the ritual literature, for there are only few and obscure traces of them in the hymns of the Rigveda, which is almost exclusively concerned with the Soma sacrifice. It is, however, probable that they were performed, at least in their main features, during the earliest Vedic period. These regular sacrifices are of three kinds, as connected with the course of the day, the month, and the year, being performed, respectively, twice a day, twice a month, and three times a year. Each of the first two kinds could be conducted, though without any difference in the ceremonial form, either with the single domestic fire or with the three sacrificial fires. On the other hand, the annual sacrifices, which were celebrated at the close of the year, the expenditure required the greater ritual of the three fires. It was a general characteristic of all periodic sacrifices that they were never addressed to one single god.

The daily rites took place morning and evening. They consisted, on the one hand, of fire-offerings to the gods, and, on the other, of gifts of food presented to all beings. The latter comprised offerings placed on the threshold and elsewhere for the deities and spirits in and around the house; a libation to the souls of the dead in the southern quarter; food scattered for dogs and birds; and meat and drink given to needy human beings.

The monthly sacrifices were generally required at the new and full moon, consisted of cooked oblations or of cakes offered to the gods. Among the numerous deities receiving them, the most prominent was Indra.

The seasonal sacrifices were offered every four months, at the beginning of spring, of the rains, and of the cool weather. Throughout these the Maruts are especially prominent. The ceremonial which inaugurates the rainy season, Karita, is offered with a view to procuring rain and consequent plenty. Then also two figures of dough covered with wool, and intended to represent a man and a swa, are sacrificed in order to
 promote the increase of flocks. In these two offerings the influence of magical notions is clearly observable. With the seasonal celebration of the rains was combined a great expiatory sacrifice with which the priests not only prepared for or consecrated sacrificial cakes and the libations of milk; in sacrificing eleven he-goats to various gods; in pressing, purifying, mixing the soma juice; in pouring it into or out of various vessels, presenting it to the gods, or drinking its share. All these operations were accompanied by the calls, recitations, chants of the priests as they carried out the details of the ritual, which were far too numerous to indicate here.

The soma sacrifice was preceded by a protracted ceremony of initiation (diksā), which was undergone by the sacrificer and his wife, and was followed by another of purification (avadāthana). Both of these ceremonies were probably known to the Rigveda. The Diksā belongs to the ancient type of magical rites which were intended as a preparation for intercourse with gods and spirits by producing an ecstatic condition. It consisted in seclusion at various forms of asceticism (tapas) ending in physical exhaustion. Fasting was a chief element in the preparation for this as well as other rites. A preliminary bath was taken, as in the wedding ceremony, in ritual life, and injurious substances which would nullify the effects of the initiation. On the other hand, no bath might be taken during the course of the soma sacrifice, for it would have been regarded as washing off the sanctity communicated by the Diksā. As in the funeral and some other rites, the hair and beard were cut off and the nails pared, because they were considered impurities.

In the ceremony called avadāthana ('campaing down' to the water), with which the soma sacrifice terminated, the black antelope skin and the sacred cord used by the sacrificer and his wife since the beginning of the Diksā were thrown into the water along with the soma shoots which had been pressed out and the sacrificial utensils which had been in contact with the soma. Finally, the sacrificer and his wife, as well as the priests, descended into the water to wash off the supernatural powers which they had acquired, and on emerging put on fresh garments. The offerings and texts which accompanied the Avadāthana ceremony were closely addressed to Varuna, the god who delivers from guilt.

h. Rites of family life.—As the Vedic wedding ceremony had in its main features probably come down from the Indo-Aryan ('praise of Agni'), it is the Agni (Agni) 1) required the ministration of sixteen priests. This rite occupied only one day; other soma sacrifices lasted for several days, up to twelve; while another class, called sattras or 'sessions,' sometimes extended to a year. These prolonged soma sessions formed an unimportant exception to the rule that every sacrifice was performed for a single individual; for here a number of Brahmans combined in such a way that each, while officiating as a priest in the usual manner, was accounted a sacrificer (yajamāna). The texts which deal with the soma sacrifice furnish sufficient details for a complete picture of its ceremonies, which in the main were doubtless the same in the period of the Rigveda. Numbers of priests and lay spectators thronged the sacrificial ground, on which burned the three fires strewed around with sacrificial grass. Between the fires was the red, an oblong shallow excavation somewhat narrowed in the middle and covered with a litter of grass for the reception of the offerings to the gods. Scattered about the sacrificial ground were the attending victims, the seats and fire-altars of the various priests, vessels containing water for various purposes, pressing implements, tubs, and bowls for soma. Among them moved about the officiating priests and their assistants, in whose midst were to be seen the sacrificer (yajmajna) and his wife, emaciated by initiatory asceticism. The priests were not only engaged in sacrificing, but also engaged in the preparation of sacrificial cakes and the libations of milk; in sacrificing eleven he-goats to various gods; in pressing, purifying, mixing the soma juice; in pouring it into or out of various vessels, presenting it to the gods, or drinking its share. All these operations were accompanied by the calls, recitations, chants of the priests as they carried out the details of the ritual, which were far too numerous to indicate here.

The soma sacrifice was preceded by a protracted ceremony of initiation (diksā), which was undergone by the sacrificer and his wife, and was followed by another of purification (avadāthana). Both of these ceremonies were probably known to the Rigveda. The Diksā belongs to the ancient type of magical rites which were intended as a preparation for intercourse with gods and spirits by producing an ecstatic condition. It consisted in seclusion at various forms of asceticism (tapas) ending in physical exhaustion. Fasting was a chief element in the preparation for this as well as other rites. A preliminary bath was taken, as in the wedding ceremony, in ritual life, and injurious substances which would nullify the effects of the initiation. On the other hand, no bath might be taken during the course of the soma sacrifice, for it would have been regarded as washing off the sanctity communicated by the Diksā. As in the funeral and some other rites, the hair and beard were cut off and the nails pared, because they were considered impurities.

In the ceremony called avadāthana ('campaing down' to the water), with which the soma sacrifice terminated, the black antelope skin and the sacred cord used by the sacrificer and his wife since the beginning of the Diksā were thrown into the water along with the soma shoots which had been pressed out and the sacrificial utensils which had been in contact with the soma. Finally, the sacrificer and his wife, as well as the priests, descended into the water to wash off the supernatural powers which they had acquired, and on emerging put on fresh garments. The offerings and texts which accompanied the Avadāthana ceremony were closely addressed to Varuna, the god who delivers from guilt.
After sunset the husband led his bride out of the house, and, as he pointed to the polo-staie and the vahana, what the young couple exhorted each other to be constant and undivided for ever. The wedding was followed by three nights of conjugal abstinence, meant doubtless to exhaust the patience and divert the attacks of hostile demons.

Similarly, in the rites performed both before and after birth for the welfare of children, the magical names were read and sanyasi's followed. Thus a powdered drug was dusted into the nostrils of a pregnant woman to ensure the sex of her offspring being male; and unripe fruits of the Udumbara tree were attached to her in order to communicate to her child the exuberant maturity which that fig attains.

On the tenth day after birth, when the period of impurity was over, the ceremony of giving the child his name was performed. In the third year the rite of tonsure, accompanied by an oblation, took place. The boy's hair was cut and arranged so as to be worn in accordance with the custom of the family. The hair which was cut off was buried. A similar ceremony was performed when the beard of the youth at the age of sixteen was shaved.

But far by the most important rite connected with boyhood was that of initiation or 'introduction' (upanayana) to a religious teacher, which took place at the respective ages of eight, eleven, and twelve in the case of boys of the first three castes. Standing at the sacred fire, the preceptor invested the boy, whose head had been shaved, with a girdle, which he wound round his waist three times from left to right, at the same time pronouncing certain formulas. He then grasped the boy's hand and, placing his own on the pupil's heart, recited a verse indicating that he had assumed power over the boy's will. On this occasion the youth also received a garment, a staff, and a sacred cord to be worn over one shoulder and under the other arm. During the whole course of his subsequent apprenticeship, the religious pupil (brahmastra) was required to practise chastity, to refrain from certain kinds of food, to tend his preceptor's fire with fuel, and to beg food in the village. But his chief duty was to study the Veda and to learn the famous Sàvriti stanza from the Rigveda, which is introduced to the study of the Vedic texts, this rite of initiation, which was regarded as a spiritual birth, the pupil had become one of the 'twice-born,' qualified to eat the remnants of sacrificial offerings. Though this ceremony is not even alluded to in the Rigveda, it must have been known at that time, for it can be traced back to a still earlier age. The evidence of the Avesta shows that among the ancient Persians a youth of fifteen was received into the community of Zoroaster with a sacred cord; and among primitive peoples similar rites have been found all over the earth to symbolize reception into the community of men as an entry into a new life. This ancient rite was in India transformed into a spiritual ceremony which gave admission to the community of those qualified for the study of sacred knowledge. The period of apprenticeship was terminated by the ceremony called smriti-patri, or 'return,' the main element of which was a bath intended to indicate symbolically that the quality of religious studentship (brahmastra) was washed off.

The father then invested his son with the clothing and insignia of the domestic ritual; it will, however, be more convenient to deal with them later as part of the ceremonial relating to death and the future life.

In Rigveda, Public life is presented as an exercise of public character because connected with the person of the king, the sacrifice was still instituted by him as an individual; and though prayers for the country and the people might be incited to, the emphasis was on the public sacrifice which was offered in the name of the tribe or the nation. In the royal ceremonial, magical practices were, as we found to be the case in the domestic ritual, more prominent than the sacrificial acts. The first of these celebrations calling for description are the consecration (ubhiśekā) of the king and the royal inauguration (rājasūya). Neither of these is mentioned in the Rigveda, and they were probably developed in the later Vedic period; but the magical elements which they contain are most likely very old. Both these celebrations included Soma rites. In the consecration ceremony the king was seated on a chair covered with a tiger skin and made of the wood of the Udumbara, the tree which to the Indian was typical of plenty. A cup, also made of Udumbara wood, was filled with a fluid compounded of butter, honey, rain-water, and other ingredients. With this fluid the king was anointed or besprinkled. In the Rājasūya a similar besprinkling took place; but it was followed by a series of further rites intended to secure success of all kinds. These included a symbolical ride on a herd of cows; the discharge of arrows at feeble relatives of the king, who were plundered; and a game of dice in which a cow was the stake, and which was won by the king.

Another ceremonial, regarded as still more dignified and efficacious, was the Vajapeya ('draught of vigour'), a kind of Soma sacrifice, which might be performed not only by kings, but even by men of royal descent or of the Brāhma n caste. Its most characteristic feature was a chariot race, evidently a magical rite intended to secure for the sacrificer the swift power embodied in the horse. It also included a rite called the 'ascent of the post' (yāpyārahoṣa). A wheel made of wheaten flour, and symbolical of the sun, was placed on the top of a sacrificial post. Mounting by means of a ladder, the sacrificer grasped the wheel as he uttered the formula, 'We have reached the sun, ye gods.' On descending to the ground he seated himself on a wooden throne and was besprinkled as in the inauguration ceremony. This part of the Vajapeya rite aimed at the attainment of exalted position.

The splendid ceremonial, however, culminated in the horse-sacrifice (ahoca-medha). It was not a thank-offering, as might at first sight be inferred from the words of the Brāhmaṇa description of each king who performed it. 'He victoriously traversed the earth and offered the horse-sacrifice.' It was in reality a supplicatory sacrifice offered, after military successes, for the fulfilment of the king's highest wishes in the future. According to the ritual texts, this sacrifice is addressed to the gods in the aggregate, but with special reference to Prajāpāti (an evidently late trait); but there are indications that it may originally have been addressed to Indra the Vajra-slayer, an obvious god to associate with a rite which is a glorification of military heroism. The horse itself represents swift vigour, a quality which the king aims at obtaining and impressing upon himself by means of this sacrifice. The ceremony was begun by bathing the horse, when a four-eyed dog (that is, one with two spots above its eyes) was killed with a club by a man of low origin. The horse, having been consecrated, was allowed to roam about free for a year, guarded by a retinue of armed youths. During the interval the sacrificial ground was the scene of various offerings and rites, according to the nature of the sacrifice, and lutes played. High and low, young and old, took a share in the pomp of the ceremonial. At
length, when the year had come to an end, the horse was sacrificed during the course of a Soma offering, during which the "Tthe priest, who risk the following the later Vedic ritual the horse is accompanied by a number of other victims; but in the Rigveda (two hymns of which are concerned with the horse-sacrifices) mention is made only of Pishon's he-goat, which announces the parting to the gods. But when the carcass was cut up, the chief consort of the king lay down beside the dead horse, while obscene conversations were carried on between the priests and the women of the royal household. Before the cauld was offered to them the priests pronounced and solved riddles among themselves, as they had already done at a previous stage of the ceremony. The whole rite concluded with a purifying bath at the end of the third day.

7. DEATH AND FUTURE LIFE.

A. BELIEFS.—a. The soul, variously called aum, 'spirit,' manas, 'mind,' ātman, 'the prāṇa, 'respiration,' was thought to be separable from the body during unconsciousness, and to continue its existence after the body had been destroyed by cremation or burial. But, though it was generally believed to be immortal, it was not considered as a mere spirit or shadow, but to retain its personal identity in a corporeal state; for the body, purified by the power of Agni and freed from the passions, is the abode of the immortals, the inhabitants of the other world. The doctrine of transmigration is not to be found in the Vedas; its beginnings are met with in the Brāhmaṇas, where the notion of repeated births and deaths in the next world appears; but it shows itself fully developed even in the oldest Upaniṣads, and must have been generally accepted by 600 B.C., since Buddha would not otherwise have received it into his system without question.

The spirit of the deceased proceeds upward through the air on the path trodden by the fathers (piṭas) to the realm of eternal light. It is natural that Agni, who burns the corpse, should have been regarded as the conductor of the soul on its journey. Arrived in heaven, where he recovers his former body in a complete and glorified form, the departed meets the fathers who revered Yama, and receives from the latter a resting-place. According to the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, the dead, on leaving this world, make their way between two fires, which burn the former and the good deeds. This latter proceed either by the path which leads to the fathers or by that which leads to the sun. The Upaniṣads also hold that there are two paths for the good: by the one, those who possess complete knowledge of the world-soul go to Brāhmaṇa; by the other, those whose knowledge is imperfect reach the world of heaven, whence, after the fruit of good works has been exhausted, they return to earth to be born again. On the other hand, those who are ignorant of the self go to the dark world of evil spirits, or are reborn on earth. To illustrate the mystery of the future life, the Katha Upaniṣad tells the myth of Nāraka, who, on visiting the realm of death, is informed that those who have not enough merit for heaven and immortality fall again and again into the pot of the dead and, entering upon the cycle of existence for days, come back late with a body or as a stationary object; that he who controls himself reaches Viṣṇu's highest place; but that there is no hell for the unworthy.

b. Heaven.—The abode of the fathers and Yama is situated in the highest or third heaven, where is eternal light. It is also described as the highest point of the sun or the highest step of Viṣṇu. It is the abode of which Yama drinks with the gods. In the Atharvaveda it is stated to be a fig-tree (ādvaṇṭha). Heaven is believed to be the reward of the righteous, of heroes who risk the fire, and of those who by rigorous penance, and, above all, of those who bestow liberal sacrificial gifts. The Atharvaveda is full of references to the bliss in store for the latter. The deceased, on entering heaven, see again father and mother, wives and children. Sickness is left behind; bodily imperfections or frailties are unknown; and old age cannot prevail. There are neither rich nor poor, neither oppressors nor oppressed. The life of the blessed consists in serving the gods, more especially in the presence of the two kings Yama and Varuna. Here the sound of the lute and of songs is heard; streams of Soma, gātri, milk, honey, and wine flow; and there is spirit-food and satiety. Bright, many-coloured cows, which yield all desires, are at hand. The life in heaven is thus one of indolent material bliss, devoted to sensual joys. In the Upaniṣads the life in the heaven of the gods, being followed by re-birth, is a lower and transient form of bliss; only those who know the truth reach the highest stage, the condition of changeless joy and unending peace which results from absorption in the world-soul.

c. The best who dwell in the third heaven are called piṭaḥ or 'fathers.' By these are generally meant early ancestors who made the paths of heaven, and by which the immortal abodes are entered. Different races of them are distinguished (p. 608), the Āgirases being more especially associated with Yama. The fathers are also spoken of as lower, higher, and middle; as later and earlier; all being known to Agni, but a few only to their descendants. The fathers are fond of Soma, feasting with the gods and leading the same life as they do. Being immortal, they are even spoken of as gods. Great cosmical actions, like those of the gods, are sometimes attributed to them; thus they are said to have adored the sky with stars, and to have placed darkness in the night and light in the day. As the burning of the corpse was in no sense a sacrifice, the corpse-devouring Agni was distinguished from the Agni who wafts the offering to the gods; and, similarly, the path of the fathers from that of the gods. The Satapatha Brāhmaṇa goes further, discriminating between the heavenly world (añgrya loka), that is, the world of the gods, and that of the fathers (piṭra-loka).

The fathers are prayed to like the gods, especially to invite the dead, to help them therein; and to refrain from punishing their descendants for any sin humanly committed against them. They are also besought to give riches, offspring, and long life to their sons; individual ancestors being sometimes invoked by name. Coming to the sacrifice on the same car as Indra and the other gods, they drink the pressed Soma as they sit on the litter of grass to the south (the quarter of the dead). They arrive in thousands and range themselves in order on the sacrificial ground. They receive oblations, which are, however, different from those offered to the gods.

d. The chief of the fathers is Yama, to whom three hymns of the Rigveda are addressed. He is only spoken of as a king who rules the dead, but it is implied that he is a god as well. He is, as is natural, closely associated with Agni, the conductor of the dead. Yama is the son of Vivasvat and of Saranyā, Tvaṣṭar's daughter. He was a mortal, who chose death and abandoned his body. Finally, he reaches the earth and the other world, whither the ancient fathers have gone. Having been the first of mortals that died, he is called 'our father.' As a mythological creature, Yama goes back to the Indo-Iranian period, corresponding to Yima, son of Vivalvant,
in the Avesta. The most probable conclusion to be drawn from the facts of the ceremony is that Yama represents the chief of the souls of the deceased, as having been the first father of mankind and the first of those that died. This conclusion is supported by the fact that in the Avesta there is the root of an easily definable word. It is, perhaps, also borne out by the appearance of Yama and his sister Yami in the character of twins in a hymn of the Rigveda, where the very repudiation of their scandal points to the existence of a belief in the descent of mankind from primordial twins. Some scholars have, however, identified Yama with various phenomena of nature, such as Agni, the sun, or the moon. In the Rigveda Yama's foot fetter (padbīna) is referred to as parallel to the bond of Varuna, and his messengers that seek the lives of men must have indeed feelings of dread. It is not till the Atharvaveda and the later mythology that Yama becomes more closely associated with the terrors of death, and assumes the character of a regular god of death; though even in the epic his domain is not limited to hell.

The owl and the pigeon occasionally appear as Yama's emissaries; but his regular messengers are two dogs, described as four-eyed, broad-nosed, breathing fire, and keeping watch along the path to the other world or wander about among men, keeping watch on them; and they are besought to grant continued enjoyment of the light of the sun. Their functions seem to have been similar to that of the dogs of Yama in the Vedas, custom of placing them at the entrance of the house, which guards the path to the other world.

The conclusion of a watch-dog of the dead goes back to the Indo-Iranian period, as shown by the evidence of the Avesta, where a four-eyed hound is stated to keep guard at the head of the bridge which leads to the other world. If the epithet śabdās ('brindled') is identical with the Greek ἱστέγεσσες, the notion of a dog of death must go back even to the Indo-European age.

c. Hell.—As the virtuous, in the opinion of the Vedic seers, were rewarded in the future life, it is natural to suppose that they believed in some kind of abode for the wicked. The evidence of the Rigveda cannot, however, be said to go beyond speculations. It is regarded as an underground 'darkness. But there can be no doubt that the belief in a regular hell exists in the Atharvaveda, which speaks of the house below, of black and lowest darkness, the abode of goblins and sorceresses, called nārakā loka as contrasted with svarga loka, the heavenly world of Yama. The torments suffered in this infernal region are also once described. It is not, however, till the period of the Brāhmanas that the notion of future punishment appears fully developed. Thus the Satapatha Brāhmana states that every one is born again after death and, being weighed in a balance, receives reward or punishment according to his deserts. Nothing is said in the Vedas of a final judgment or of a destruction and renovation of the world.

B. THE CEREMONIAL.—a. Funeral rites.—Creation was the normal method of disposing of the dead in Vedic times. That burial was also practised to some extent is undoubted, though the ritual books have no rules regarding it, except so far as the bones of the cremated are interred. The predilection of the Vedic theologians for the god of fire was most probably the reason for incinération having already become the almost universal practice among the Aryans in India. The body and hair of the dead man were cut off and his nails trimmed; his body was anointed, decked with a garland, and dressed in a new garment, which he was intended to wear in the nether world. The corpse was then carried or driven to the burning ground and was tied to it, in order to efface the footsteps and so prevent death from making its way back to the living. The dead man was then exhorced, with verses from the Yajur Veda; the Rigveda, to go by the ancient paths, past the two dogs of Yama, to the fathers. The widow, who had mounted the pyre and lain down beside the corpse, was now carried away to render to the king of her new spouse (her husband's brother). That the ceremonial excluded the burning of the widow is undoubted; but the ritual act which was required to recall her to life shows that her ascent of the pyre was symbolical of the actual immersion of bygone times. Indeed, it must be assumed that this ancient custom, though not sanctioned by the Vedic ritual, survived through the Vedic period in the families of military chiefs. Having by their example gradually spread to other classes, it became, in later times, a universal practice throughout India. If the deceased was a warrior, his bow was taken from his hand, an indication that at one time it was burned with him; if he was a sacrificer, his combustible utensils were placed with him on the pyre. Here we have a survival of the ancient custom of laying the implements of their property for use in the next life. At the same time as the corpse was burned, a cow and a he-goat were sacrificed. These animals, however, did not represent property, but were intended as a means of deflecting the consuming power of fire to them as substitutes for the corpse; and, by a fiction, Agni was supposed not to burn the dead man, but to send him 'done' to the fathers.

The mourners, on returning from the burning ground, bathed, changed their clothes, and refrained from looking round. On entering the house of the deceased, they touched purifying or auspicious objects such as water, fire, a burning; and finally removed the sacrificial fire of the dead man by some aperture other than the door.

A death was followed by a period of impurity, varying from three days to ten, according to the degree of kinship. As the return of the soul was feared during this time, the surviving relatives took constant precautions to avoid infection. Thus only food which was bought or presented by others was eaten, and generally they were against introducing anything tainted into the system.

Generally on the third day, what remained of the bones of the cremated man was collected, placed in an urn, and temporarily buried, to the accompaniment of the Rigvedic verse, 'Approach thy Mother Earth.' During this ceremony the deceased was no longer thought of as in the realm of Yama, but was actually present. This inconsistency is not due to a primitive belief surviving beside the more recent conception of life in the heavenly world.

Last of all—according to the Brāhmanas, after the lapse of years—a burial mound was erected, the bones being exhummed for the purpose of removal to a suitable spot. During the following night music was performed, cymbals being beaten and the huts (rīvā) played, the female mourners repeatedly going round the bones with their left hands towards them. On the following morning, the bones were taken to a place, out of sight of the village, where the fire altar was first erected, the bones were cremated with roots. A hole or furrow having been made, the bones were deposited and a mound of stone and earth was erected over them. Grain was scattered on the mound as food, while milk and water were poured into and a twig of twigs into it, as drink for the deceased. When the mourners returned, various precautions were taken to pre-
VENT DEATH FROM FOLLOWING THE LIVING; THUS A STONE OR A CLAY WAS DEPOSITED AS A BOUNDARY. THE RIGVEDA, REFERS, IN ITS FUNERAL HYMN, TO THE ERECTION OF A STONE TO DIVIDE THE LIVING FROM THE DEAD.

THOUGH THE VEDIC VETERAN RETAINED MANY PRIMITIVE BELIEFS IN THE CEREMONIAL CONCERNED WITH THE FUTURE LIFE, HE HAD RECIPROCALLY FORBIDDEN THE TERRORS AND SACRIFICIAL AGONIES WHICH INSPIRE THE FUNERAL RITES OF THE SAVAGE. THE VERSICLES WHICH HE EMPLOYED IN THAT CEREMONIAL, WHILE COMPROMISED WITH MUCH PETTY RITUAL AND BREATHING MIRTH, ADDED TO HIS OWN PERSONAL CONSIDERATIONS AT THE SAME TIME REFLECT TRUE IN THE GODS, AS GUARDIANS OF THE DEAD, AND FILIAL PIETY TOWARDS ANCESTORS. IF WE FIND HERE NO traces OF DEEP FEELING AND GENUINE SORROW, THIS IS DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE IMPERSONAL FORMULAS CONTAINED IN THE RITUAL TEXT-BOOKS ARE THE ONLY AVAILABLE EVIDENCE FOR THIS PERIOD.


OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THIS CEREMONIAL IS ENTIRELY DERIVED FROM THE RITUAL WORKS OF THE VEDIC PERIOD. THERE IS NOTHING ABOUT SPIRITUALITY IN THE HINDU RELIGION THAT IS NOT ACCOMPANIED BY HYMNS TO THE MIGHTY GODS WITH WHOM THAT VEDA IS CONCERNED. NEVERTHELESS, THERE CAN BE LITTLE DOUBT THAT, IN ITS ESSENTIAL FEATURES, IT ALREADY EXISTED IN THE EARLIEST VEDIC AGE; FOR ITS GENERAL CHARACTER IS EXTREMELY PRIMITIVE: THERE IS NO TRACE OF THE SOULS OF THE DEAD ABDLING IN HEAVEN; THE GIFTS OFFERED TO THEM ARE NOT ONLY FOR THE SACRIFICIAL FIRE, BUT ARE PLACED IN THE EARTH; AND THE SPIRIT WAS ENTECTED TO THE EARTH TO BE FED AND CLOTHED. THE ONLY DETAILS WHICH PROBABLY DO NOT GO BACK TO THE TIMES OF THE RIGVEDA ARE THE OFFERINGS TO SANA AND AGNI, AS WELL AS THE PRESENCE OF BRAHMANS.


VEGETARIANISM.—IN THIS ARTICLE AN ATTEMPT IS MADE TO CONVEY THE DIFFICULTY TO THOSE PORTIONS OF THE SUBJECT WHICH ULTIMATELY HAVE A PRACTICAL BEARING, EVEN THOUGH THE WAY MAY LIE THROUGH THE INVESTIGATION OF SOME OTHER LESS IMPORTANT ETHICAL PRINCIPLES. THE OMISSION OF ALL INVESTIGATION INTO THE HISTORY OF VEGETARIANISM IS Dictated NOT ONLY BY FIDELITY TO THIS AIM, BUT ALSO CONSIDERATION THAT IN THIS PARTICULAR SUBJECT NO SOUND INFERENCES AS TO MODERN PROBLEMS CAN POSSIBLY BE DRAWN FROM ANY RECORDS OF THE PAST. IT IS, E.G., INTERESTING TO LEARN THAT THE POET OVID WROTE IN FAVOUR OF A VEGETABLE DIET AS BEING NATURAL TO PRIMITIVE MAN. THE SAME IS TRUE OF HIS WORKS, SUCH AS HIS HERALD, WHERE HIS WORDS WERE EFFECTIVE. THEY MAY HAVE BEEN, AND YET NO ONE HAS RECORDED THE EFFECT; OR THEY MAY HAVE BEEN MINTED AT FIRST BY DISSAY AT THE SIGHT OF GUTTERS DIPPING THE PRAYERS IN A BOWL BY THEMSELVES NO EVIDENCE OF VEGETARIAN PRACTICE; AND, IF THEY WERE, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO CONNECT IT SECURELY WITH THE GRADUAL DECLINE OF ROME. IN SHORT, AT ALL TIMES THE IMPORTANT QUESTION HAS BEEN, NOT THE PRACTICE OF AN EXCEPTIOAL MINORITY, BUT THAT OF THE MASS OF THE POPULATION—JUST THE LARGE COMPLEX FACT WHICH HAS NEVER BEEN RECORDED.

THAT OMISSION LEAVES TWO PRINCIPAL ASPECTS OF THE QUESTION TO BE CONSIDERED: (i) THE PHYSIOLOGICAL ARGUMENT, WHICH IS TREATED AS OF SUBORDINATE IMPORTANCE, OWING TO THE EVIDENCE TO BE GATHERED FROM FACTS BEING STILL VERY INCOMPLETE; AND (ii) THE ETHICAL ARGUMENT, INCLUDING OUR DUTY TO THE LOWER ANIMALS, THE BEARING OF THE EXAMPLE OF CHRIST, AND THE QUESTION OF HOW THE NON-VEGETARIAN DIET IS HELPFUL TO THE HIGHER SPECIES.

(i) THE PHYSIOLOGICAL ARGUMENT.—IN SEVERAL TREATISES ON VEGETARIANISM MUNCH HAS WRITTEN ON THE PHYSIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF A VEGETARIAN DIET, BUT VERY LITTLE OF ANY VALUE. THE TRUTH IS THAT BEFORE THE HUMAN BODY CAN BE AVOIDED AT—IN OTHER WORDS, BEFORE ANY BROAD INERENCE CAN BE DRAWN FROM EXPERIMENTS—THE QUESTION MUST BE SO FAR SIMPLIFIED THAT IT BECOMES ABSTRACT; THAT IS TO SAY, EXPERIMENTS HAVE TO BE CONDUCTED UNDER CONDITIONS WHICH DO NOT OBTAIN IN ORDINARY LIFE.
It is impossible to make sure that any two sets of experiments deal with the same data; e.g., no one could ascertain how great in any given case has been the influence of mind upon the bodily tissues. Wonderful records are given of endurance exhibited by vegetarians on a spare diet of fruit, and of prolonged effort not only of brain but of muscle. But it is quite uncertain whether the spirit of the individual in question has not affected the result; so as to make it useless as a guide in cases where such spirit is wanting. Again, the more the problem is considered, the more formidable grows the indication, for it is becoming more and more evident that a fair number of individual lives have been under observation and in all cases the health has been well maintained on a vegetarian diet, it is still open to a sceptic to insist that an examination of the next generation, or perhaps the next two or three, is required before the experiment can be deemed conclusive or scientific. If any one is convinced that the children of vegetarians are born infirm—in other words, that the human stock loses vigour if abstinence from meat becomes general—it is ridiculous to urge in answer that facts yield anything like a scientific disproof of the contention. No one would venture to say that any most important and exhaustive work has yet been made, and there is very little likelihood of any such being undertaken. Supposing—what is not easy to suppose—that some hundreds of adults allowed themselves to be placed in an experiment, there is no guarantee that similar results would be gained from people who were victims of compulsion or involuntary abstainers, or from enthusiastic votaries of a new cult, or from men and women of different antecedents and different occupations. Thus the condition of a convert to a particular diet at the age of 40 is not a sure indication of what would be the effect of a similar diet to a man of the same age, still less on another of 20, or on a child of 10 years old, or on a woman of any age.

Moreover, the question is obscured by the varieties of diet, as indeed under the title of vegetarian. Large numbers of people abstain from meat, but not from fish; others from brown meat, not from chicken; others eat meat once a week; others eat eggs, but no meat or fish, and so on. Then, there is the complex question of starch, of vegetables, of sweets, of fruit, and sugar. A sound opinion seems to be that the mischief caused by too much starch is quite as serious as that due to the uric acid found in meat. Then there is the starting of the principle that in living differences in different constitutions, anyhow for a time, and the incredible skill and delicacy required before any chemical analysis can certify food-values with any precision, and it is indisputably a matter of the most importance to know the food-values of a diet under investigation. It is further noteworthy that, in this country at any rate, we are unacquainted with the kind of knowledge which some would seem to possess of their natural food. Thus, the medical profession. For not only has there always been and is still a reluctance on the part of medical men as a profession to undertake the importance and prestige of science by preaching the sanitarian power of unassisted nature, but it appears that till quite recently the preparation for the practice of medicine has included study of the chemical questions or of food-values. Thus in a matter of great complexity, which for our enlightenment requires bold but very careful experiment and the most scrupulous observation of results, little or nothing has been done which could give promise of a scientific induction. We are thrown back on amateur and haspanded experiments, and it may be said that such innovations on convention and tradition as have been attempted have been introduced by outsiders, and rather obstructed than favoured by medical opinion. To this professional attitude parallels from other professions could be easily adduced. Hence, it is claimed for vegetarianism that the case in its favour is strongly in science and can be proved by experiment, no cautious student of the subject will yield a ready assent. The truth is that the strongest arguments in support of vegetarianism are not, strictly speaking, to doubt the truth of their conviction—but, if the number of such were ten times what it is, it would still be illogical to argue that the residue of mankind would benefit to an equal degree. The complexities of the problem are the difficulty of ascertaining how far the experiment in any case has been fairly tried, at what age, after what antecedents, and, perhaps most of all, what experiment. For, along with other uncertainties, many individuals have experienced a varying amount of discomfort in the early stages of the new regime. Of those a certain number still prefer slightly to taste this or any discomfort, abandon the attempt and give themselves out as evidences of vegetarian failure—a testimony wholly worthless in reality, but quite sufficient to deter most of us from such an innovation. Further, as various are the indications afforded by the prejudice of foreigners, especially Orientals, the crudest generalizations, based, if on anything at all, on nothing better than travellers' unverified gossip, frequently pass current as substantial evidence. Such facts, indeed, as have been accurately observed and reported can obviously give ground for nothing better than conjecture.

2. The ethical argument. The appeal to human compassion in the matter of the treatment of animals, though logically cogent, has been made with very little success even in this country, where the sentiment of kindness towards animals is strongly developed, as compared with that of other European peoples. If man could prove that flesh foods were indispensable to his existence, of course there would be little objection to the starting of the principle that in living differences in different constitutions, anyhow for a time, and the incredible skill and delicacy required before any chemical analysis can certify food-values with any precision, and it is indisputably a matter of the most importance to know the food-values of a diet under investigation. It is further noteworthy that, in this country at any rate, we are unacquainted with the kind of knowledge which some would seem to possess of their natural food. Thus, the medical profession. For not only has there always been and is still a reluctance on the part of medical men as a profession to undertake the importance and prestige of science by preaching the sanitarian power of unassisted nature, but it appears that till quite recently the preparation for the practice of medicine has included study of the chemical questions or of food-values. Thus in a matter of great complexity, which for our enlightenment requires bold but very careful experiment and the most scrupulous observation of results, little or nothing has been done which could give promise of a scientific induction. We are thrown back on amateur and haspanded experiments, and it may be said that such innovations on convention and tradition as have been attempted have been introduced by outsiders, and rather obstructed than favoured by medical opinion. To this professional attitude parallels from other professions could be easily adduced. Hence, it is claimed for vegetarianism that the case in its favour is strongly in science and can be proved by experiment, no cautious student of the subject will yield a ready assent. The truth is that the strongest arguments in support of vegetarianism are not, strictly speaking, to doubt the truth of their conviction—but, if the number of such were ten times what it is, it would still be illogical to argue that the residue of mankind would benefit to an equal degree. The complexities of the problem are the difficulty of ascertaining how far the experiment in any case has been fairly tried, at what age, after what antecedents, and, perhaps most of all, what experiment. For, along with other uncertainties, many individuals have experienced a varying amount of discomfort in the early stages of the new regime. Of those a certain number still prefer slightly to taste this or any discomfort, abandon the attempt and give themselves out as evidences of vegetarian failure—a testimony wholly worthless in reality, but quite sufficient to deter most of us from such an innovation. Further, as various are the indications afforded by the prejudice of foreigners, especially Orientals, the crudest generalizations, based, if on anything at all, on nothing better than travellers' unverified gossip, frequently pass current as substantial evidence. Such facts, indeed, as have been accurately observed and reported can obviously give ground for nothing better than conjecture.
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system would long ago have roused public sentiment to a pitch of fury; and even now, assuming what is very doubtful, that the butchering is as painless as possible, there remains against man's will to be killed. The question is, not whether the broad indictment that to rob millions of them of life unnecessarily is a kind of murder.

It is difficult to say what answers to the above arguments are made. Much of the evidence is too lax on the question and custom is too strong to have allowed the matter to be fairly discussed. The truth is, an enormous majority of people are too much under the yoke of custom to be awake to the moral appeal. Many would readily admit that they cannot meet it, nor are they at pains even to excuse themselves save on the plea of convenience. Meanwhile it would be difficult to measure the mischief caused to our social life by this particular form of heedlessness. Compared with foreigners, Britons are peculiarly sensitive to the claims of the animal kingdom. Such kindness as we show is based on religion, but also on the outcome of an inherited sentiment, powerful to-day, but, it must be admitted, of somewhat recent growth. If, then, both sentiment and religion are flouted by any particular custom, and little or no protest is raised against it, it follows that our moral principles are assailed by a deadly form of insincerity, all the more deadly for being largely unsuspected. Indeed, if these considerations are sound, we, as a society, are under the ban of Christ's denunciation of the Pharisees, who were guilty in proportion as they were blind.

But there are plausible arguments for a practice so general as the slaughtering and eating of animals. Probably the most prevailing is the idea that it makes on the whole for health. The physiological aspect of the question must be dealt with separately. Here it is only necessary to observe that, granted the fact, there need be no dispute as to the principle asserted. It may be conceded that man is on so much higher a plane than animals that his welfare must take precedence of theirs in all cases where there is a direct conflict. But that there is such a conflict is exactly what the humanitarians deny. They maintain that the evidence of fruits, cereals, etc., being sufficient to support human life in full vigour is abundant; and that their teaching is not that man should suffer in order to spare animals, but that, as long as there is reason to believe that animal flesh is no better (indeed is inferior) as food for man than from the point of view of nutrition, it is not right to kill animals and eat them.

To this it is replied that, if abstinence from meat became general, intolerable evils would result, such as the means of livelihood being taken from millions of workers, and the loss of skins which are needed for clothing and which are supplied at present from animals bred or preserved for food. There would be a prospect also of large industries being destroyed and thousands of workers being thrown out of employment.

One obvious answer to these misgivings is that they are based on the assumption that a vast revolution in diet could come about suddenly. There is of course no reason to assume anything of the kind, least of all in a country where conservative prejudice on this subject is adamantane. But that is not the kind of answer that touches the core of the issue. It is, the reverse, the question of conduct in this case, as in many others, is far too uncertain to be worth arguing about. Nor would there be any need to forecast the future with the lack of ethical conviction, if once we could make it we were made clear that obedience to divine law means obedience in spite of uncertainty as to results. The training of the Apostles was directed to this end throughout, that they should walk by faith and not by sight. But to limit obedience to occasions of utility is to destroy its faithfulness. Thus, if man recognizes the claims of animals to good treatment, as it far transcends, it is far more imperative that of others because the results of the opposite line of conduct are not easy to foresee. This is the point at which religious considerations supplement ethical. If the question of the value of animals to us, we are bound to treat them kindly, even if the results were likely to be far more inconvenient than they possibly could be. Indeed, the experience of food shortage has taught us that all the difficulties supposed to be inherent in vegetarianism are faced without hesitation as soon as the situation is understood. In other words, professing followers of Christ ignore what is admitted as a divinely sanctioned claim, but recognize it as soon as ever 'provision for the flesh,' against which St. Paul (Ro 13*^4) and our Lord (Mt 6*^3) war us, seems to be in question.

A more solid objection is presented when it is urged that the Founder of our religion and the Pattern of our conduct did Himself habitually partake of animal food. How can humane-minded people take their stand on a doctrine of the general disallowance of the law which the Son of God Himself disobeys?

To face this objection fairly, it is necessary to point out that the oft-quoted parallel of Christ's silence concerning slavery is not at first sight applicable. Against slavery He did undoubtedly establish principles of charity between man and man which were certain, if followed, to overthrow the institution sooner or later. But it cannot be said that any teaching of His can be quoted which bears at all directly against the practice of slaying animals for food; and it is quite legitimate to argue that He had no such objection to the practice on humane grounds as He must have had against the practice of depriving a fellow-man of his liberty. Moreover, the question is not, 'Why did He refrain from denunciation?' but rather, 'Why did He participate in the practice?'

The explanation must take account of the main purpose which—as far as we can grasp it—the Saviour set before Himself in His work on earth. From no other point of view can the fragmentary character of Christ's ethical teaching be understood. But any adequate statement on such a theme would range far beyond the limits of this article. This much, however, may be said, that, in proportion as any interpretation of Christ's teaching and work falls short of the full doctrine of the faith as to His person, it will fail in explaining the gaps in the ethical teaching. In other words, if Jesus is regarded only as a divinely-gifted prophet, His life and teaching were not only abortive, but needlessly so. With slight precaution He could have escaped an early death and extended His teaching and the sublime example of His conduct for other fifty years. There is no way of meeting this criticism except by holding fast to the Christology of St. Paul and St. John. The task before the Lord was not to teach mankind, but to save them by His incarnation, death, resurrection, and the gift of the Holy Spirit from heaven. Now, while engaged on this task, He gave just enough time to evangelization to reveal what human life would be if men lived it in the full conviction and certainty of God's love and presence among them. The revelation was grievously misunderstood at the time and subsequently, owing to men's tendency to turn the gospel into a burden of moral law, more crushing than that of Christ as the more spiritual form of the law, that of the Ten Commandments. Therefore the teaching was in the main barren of precepts dealing with everyday conduct. The danger of literalism of interpretation was imminent, and we may con-
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chide that, if Jesus had given us anything like a complete code of moral precepts, or even a full picture of a sinless life extended far into old age, our difficulties would have been alleviated finallly and completely from the difficult task of understanding His work of redemption to the far simpler but hopeless endeavour to live up to the level of His nature. The reason given by some of the authors of this scheme of salvation owing to utter inability to rise up to its meaning. Hence the Savior refrained from all attempt to guide His followers by rules, but gradually taught them that they must learn to know and love that their lives were to be quickened by the Holy Spirit whose indwelling was to be to them their strength and inspiration for all time. In view of this prospect, we can understand why His ethical teaching was so suggestive but so paradoxical, so figurative, and incomplete. It was designed, not to save us from the trouble of thinking, but to turn our thoughts to the Comforter whom He promised to send.

But, in considering the moral example of Christ, we have to recognize the fact that He resolutely declined to gratify the expectation of the Jews that He would be the mediator of a certain form of conduct to be imitated unintelligently. Not only the Pharisees but all mankind are ready to go through almost any unpleasantness if thereby they can escape the pain of recasting their ideas. From the beginning of His ministry, however, Christ saw Himself sternly against this temper. His first word spoken in public (Mt 4:19) was an echo of the Baptist's injunction: 'Change your minds: for the Kingdom of the Heavens is come nigh.' Clearly the Lord intended that deep principles should be learned by men, and that, as they were learned, human conduct should change. Supposing, then, the Lord made Himself no instruction, not specifically to a principle of conduct, but to a social custom, the meaning of which was widely misunderstood, that would have been an attempt, foredoomed to failure, to improve human life without human co-operation; for it is certain that moral improvement cannot be achieved if we do not know what we are doing and why we are doing it.

Therefore Christ taught principles based upon the fact of God's Fatherhood, one of them being that the human body was to be honoured. This was taught not by a formulated rule, but by the fact of the Incarnation as soon as it was accessible, that is, for hunger and thirst. Christianity, social customs, to be considered and modified in accordance with the underlying principle of reverence being due to our bodies made in the image of God. Thus the question of the kind of food that we eat arises naturally as the Incarnation is gradually being better understood.

Further, Christ's life on earth was an exhibition of divine power triumphing in and through the uttermost of created weakness. By His endurance of that weakness He manifested His personal strength, inherent and inalienable, as the Son of God. Now that strength was the strength of a Redeemer, a Transformer, an Uplifter. Christ found mankind sunk in evil prejudices and evil customs. He took upon Himself our poisoned nature, as it was, that He might cleanse and re-instate it; He did not seek to better the conditions so as to make His task easier. He took on Himself all the disabilities which resulted from human blundering, to show how, not so much in spite of them as in spite of them, He could triumph over Satan. Hence the freedom from temporary restrictions and the universality of His teaching.

It is therefore strictly relevant to the main question to ask what kind of food best helps us in our endeavour to show reverence to our bodies, while at the same time we assert our mastery over them. There is no difficulty as to the latter duty, but there is much haziness of mind in regard to the former, due to ignorance which can be dispelled only by experience of the effects of a reformed diet. Vegetarianism leaves for us the impression that they all seem naturally to result from nothing more than the relieving of the body and the mind from constant injection of poison. Once that is discovered, but not yet fully understood, is that a 'simple' diet, consisting principally of fruit, lettuce, and 'unstarchy' foods, secures cleanliness for the inside of our bodies, in contrast to the noisome defilement which in flesh-eating societies has come to be taken as a matter of course. Here there is no room for dispute. If a certain diet promotes cleanliness while another causes dirt, that is enough reason by itself for preferring the former. It is then a question of fact which can only be tested by experience. Again, vegetarianism favours moderation in diet; and if — as seems to be the case, and has indeed been certified by the restriction of diet in time of war — most people clog their energies by needlessly taxing their digestions, it remains that a diet free from poison is to be preferred. True, elaborate cooking enhances the excess, whatever be the results; but, as the poison of meat is a stimulant which is followed as usual by a reaction, and as the reaction is a certain languor which feels like hunger but has nothing to do with it in reality, there is a peculiar danger in a diet of flesh which vegetarians for the most part escape. It will be noticed that it is here assumed that excessive eating is common. We need not give all the evidence for this assumption. Perhaps the most distinct indications were given during the ration-time in 1917 and 1918 that the prevalent fashion of excess had been mainly among men who could afford superfluous food, between the ages of 40 and 60. In advancing years dialect the wisdom of a gradually diminishing diet, but when also it is quite easy to maintain by skilful cooking the craving of a palate-appetite almost at the level that it kept at 30 years of age. Our social customs, our prejudices, and our craving all make real moderation in eating difficult; and among the influences that favour excess, meat-eating followed by a nerve-reaction that is mistaken for illness, which in reality is only anaemia.

In this connexion, however, the most serious indictment against flesh-eating has still to be mentioned. Meat is a stimulant, and its heating properties act upon the system by increasing the power of the animal in man. By meat-eating, in other words, the temptation to sensuality of all kinds is strengthened.

No sooner is this affirmation made than it is traversed as follows: either (a) it is flatly denied, and instances of vegetarian or quasi-vegetarian yet sensual peoples are adduced; or (b) it is contended that, if any immunity from animalism is secured, it is at the cost of diminished bodily vigour.

(a) No arguments are more fallacious than those which rest on a false induction. The whole question is far too complex to allow of certainty. We can guide our conduct by probability only, and probability admits of degrees. If we confine our attention to ourselves — the British people—the evidence, as already remarked, gives us eminently certain results. It is nevertheless very weighty and cogent as a guide to conduct. We know something about the temperament of our own people, practically nothing about foreigners' temperament, as we know nothing of that of the Japanese. That is to say, while it is very difficult
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to exclude other influences, such as heredity, religion, and social habits, even when we are considering ourselves alone, it is wholly impossible in the case of foreigners. In other words, evidence as to the physiological and spiritual effect of a certain diet in England is of some value for English people, but of less value for foreign with the elements of self-denial, whatever it is for people so different from us as the yellow or the black races. The evidence, then, which it is worth while considering is that which is drawn from British people; and, further, it may be drawn from people experimentally and without prejudice, from those who made the experiment, while very little weight can be attached to the affirmations of those who have not. For, while a large majority of young men, all flesh-eaters, are troubled with strong sensual desires to which a huge proportion give way, the constant assertions of those, the minority, who have made the change, to the effect that continence has forthwith become easier for them, remain uncontradicted in reality, no matter how often they are ridiculed.

Moreover, the benefit, it cannot be too often insisted on, is not only relief from certain trouble-some conditions, but a manifest purification of thought and desire. Mali mores sunt mali amores,' said St. Augustine, and no cause of life-wreckage has been more fatally operative than the attempts of this world in contradicition with the desire. If, then, converts to vegetarianism who have tried both forms of diet are the only witnesses in possession of first-hand evidence, and if their testimony is practically unanimous and wholly unassailable in confidence as to the reform of their diet being to them an immense assistance to the higher life, we are bound to conclude that, in a difficult and complex question, we have here in good sooth a solid foundation on which to build, a real light in the darkness, a veritably guiding principle. Especially is this the case when we remember that the matter is far too personal to admit of publication. A little a posteriori evidence given confidentially outweights all noisy a priori contradictions.

Nothing, however, is easier than that a principle admitted in theory should be denied in practice. If people meant what they say when they deplore the ravages of venereal disease, they would eagerly grasp at anything that held out any hope whatever of mitigating the power of the temptation, no matter what the indifference or immobility, or even by, or even if they themselves were called on to undergo real prolonged discomfort. No such excuse, however, is available. The only real obstacles to change are the most stubborn: hatred of change, positive dread of a new idea, both confirmed by deep and wide-spread misunderstanding.

(b) The objection that a non-flesh diet lowers the bodily vigour must be met with a flat contradiction, as very nearly all the evidence points to the contrary, except in abnormal cases. It is true that for a time a sudden change from a full meat diet to a régime of vegetables strictly so called may mean under-nourishment, if the foods are not carefully chosen. Or a still more disastrous blunder is made in substituting a huge amount of innutritious vegetables for beef and mutton, as a way of inducing corpulence and losing vitality. This method is not to make the change gradually and discover by experiment and counsel both the amount and quality of the nourishment required. Other benefits found in meat from a non-vegetarian diet, especially if it avoids the danger of excess of starch and is diminished with advancing years, are as follows:

1) equability of spirits and immunity from depression, especially on waking in the morning—many would admit that this evil is due to heavy feeding over night; but it is not generally known that it is chiefly due to the meat poison; (2) immunity from rheumatism, lumbago, and other requirements of sleep; (3) comparative indifference to cold; (5) cure or mitigation of sea-sickness, mountain-sickness, headache, languor, etc. It is asserted by a vegetarian, however, that whatever can be expected after an interval of time varying in different cases, from the change of diet, and that so-called failures are either abnormal cases or due to want of perseverance.

Other objections are advanced not because of their cogency but as excuses for maintaining the status quo. It is urged that a vast industry would be destroyed and many thousands of caterers deprived of their livelihood. The whole force of this argument rests on the absurd assumption that all classes of the community would make the change suddenly. What is far more relevant is the prospect of a great stimulus to the wholesome cottage industry of fruit-growing, allotments, and agriculture generally. But it should be borne in mind that, granted the cogency of the ethical arguments, Christians ought not to be in a hesitancy as to their execution. One man, in the long run anyhow, suffering is diminished by right action and never increased.

Summary.—For the sake of establishing princi- mple, it is necessary to observe that the history of vegetarianism is of little use. Nor can it be contended that the physiological effects can be stated with anything like scientific cogency. Numberless individual testimonies in its favour could be quoted against a comparatively small number adverse. But the induction is too narrow to allow of any conclusions being drawn which can be reckoned more than very probable. One, however, so much as probability is conceded, the ethical argument becomes irresistible. Two considerations alone would establish this assertion: (1) the slaughter of animals being unjustifiable unless its necessity can be proved; (2) the practical certainty that flesh foods are stimulative to the animal passions, especially of the adolescent male, unless the consumption of them is restricted to a level hardly possible of attainment. Other benefits of a frugal and light farinaceous diet concern such exceedingly important departments of life as interior cleanliness and, of course, health of body, and therewith the paying of due reverence to it; the equality of spirits, and increased capacity of sustained hard work, both bodily and mental. Where a fair trial of the reformed diet has been given, it must be conceded that in these respects the individual testimonies in its favour are very numerous and convincing. Against all this, however, are custom, prejudice, misunderstanding, ignorance, and social inconvenience, much exaggerated but sufficient to demand thought and care. These forces, though for the most part inert, will probably check any considerable advance in the direction of change for many years to come.

VIKRAMA ERA— VIRGIN BIRTH

naturalium Lebensweise [Vegetarianism], Frankfurt, 1884; G. Benke, Der Vegetarismus, Berlin, 1885; A. Windle, Kritik der Vegetarismus, Neuwied; W. V. Vegetarian Messenger, Manchester; The Vegetarian Annual, London; The Vegetarian Directory and Food Reform, Vol. III (1899).

E. Lyttelton.

VENDIDÁ.—See AVesta.

VESTAL VIRGINS.—See HEARTH, HEARTH-GODS, PRIEST (Roman).

VESTMENTS.—See DRESS.

VICARIOUS SUFFERING.—See SUFFER.

VIKRAMA ERA.—The era known by the name of Vikrama, or more fully Vikramādi, or, according to the Jainas, Vikramārka, is that commonly used by Hindus over all N. India, except in Bengal, where reckoning by the Sakra era (q.v.) is preferred. It is commonly called Somavat, an abbreviation of Sāvitravesa, 'year,' but that word is sometimes used in connexion with dates expressed in other eras. The Vikrama era is also current in Telingana, or the Telugu country, and in Gujurat, where it begins at the interval point in 57 B.C., but, according to Fleet, 58 B.C. is correct. The year is lunisolar, consisting of twelve lunar months, harmonized with the apparent motion of the earth around the sun, the term of intercalation and omission, which may be studied in the technical chronological works by Jacob, Sewell, and other scholars who are cited in some of the publications mentioned at the end of this article. In N. India, the Vikrama year begins in the month Chaitra or Chait (March-April), but in Gujurat it begins seven months later in Kārtika or Kārtik (Oct.-Nov.). We also hear of localities where the year began either in Aśāsā or Aṣāṣ (June-July), or in Mārgasāris, or Māgh (Jan.-Feb.). Another variation arises from the practice of sometimes reckoning the month to end with the full moon (pūrṇima), and sometimes taking it to end with the new moon (amanita). The year, in any case, never coincides exactly with a year A.D., so that any summary formula of conversion will give more than approximate results. Consequently, the subtrac-

tion of 57 from a V.E. date gives the year A.D.; e.g., 1507 V.E. is equivalent to the period from 27th March, 1800, to 15th March, 1801 A.D., according to Cunningham's tables for a year A.D. beginning with the month Chait. Another complication is caused by the use in Rājputāna of a variety of the era called A-nanda, 'without nanda,' the term nanda being taken as equivalent to 90. An A-nanda year V.E. is converted roughly into a year A.D. by adding (90-57) 33. Thus 1507 V.E. A-nanda would be approximately 1800 A.D. instead of 1800, as according to the ordinary (sa-nanda, or 'with nanda') reckoning. The bardic poet Chand, who habitually uses the A-nanda form, was unjustly accused of erroneous dating until his practice was understood.

A Hindu date may be expressed in an 'expired' year, as, when we say a man is 70 years of age, he may have completed 70 years; or it may be expressed in a 'current' year, as when we say that an article was written in 1916, meaning the unfinished year at the time of writing. The causes mentioned above, besides others, make the exact conversion of V.E. into A.D. dates a difficult business. Tables must be consulted, but they are not and always must be recalculated. The equivalent of a date requires an expert.

The name Vikrama or Vikramādiya appears not to have been applied to the era until quite a late date, in the 10th or 11th century A.D. (Gupta times and 6th cent.) the era was known as that reckoned according to the practice of the Mālava tribe (grāṇa), who inhabited Mālva, then including S. Rājputāna. Probably the era originated in the mountains of Ujjain, at Ujjain, the ancient capital, from which the Hindus reckoned longitude. At that period the years were sometimes called kṛta (lit. 'made'), apparently with reference to a Vedic 4-year cycle of which the first year was termed kṛta.

No record is known of any rājā Vikram or Vikramādiya at Ujjain or elsewhere in 58 or 57 B.C., from whose accession the epoch of the era might be reckoned, as tradition affirms that it actually was reckoned. But it is possible that such a rājā may have existed, and the assumption is that the name Vikrama as applied to the era should be that of the king who established it. It is also possible that one of the later kings bearing the common title of Vikrama or Vikramādiya may have become associated with the era by erroneous tradition. The strongest candidate for the honour of being considered the original of the rājā Vikram (Vikrama) of popular legend is Chand-ragupta II. (q.v.), Vikramādiya (c. A.D. 575-613). Hoernle suggests Yoga-dharman (c. A.D. 530), who may possibly have been the successor of both kings ruled in Mālva. The origin of the era remains unknown, nor is there any clear evidence to show how, when, or why the name was changed from 'the era according to the practice of the Mālava' or 'the ancient era in the country Vikrama.' The subject has been much debated by archaeologists without positive result.


VINCIUTO.—See Mokṣa.

VINAYAS.—See LAW (Buddhist).

VIKRAMA ERA— VIRGIN BIRTH

VIRGIN BIRTH.—1. Ethnic. (1) A wonder birth or a supernatural birth is one of the commonest ideas in folk-tale and myth. In not all of these, however, is there what can strictly be called virgin birth. The latter certainly does not occur where ancient myths of the birth of heroes, great men, or kings are concerned. In spite of direct evidence of true human descent, myth told how a god was their real father. Plato and Augustine were said to be sons of Apollo, the kings of Egypt sons of a god and a human mother. In these myths also the mother is already wedded, and the divine parent is father in a purely physical and mental material form, in that form taking the place of the husband. In many folk-tales and sagas where the conception of the child is supernatural, and due to contact with or to swallowing some substance, or to the breath or the soul of a man or divine being falling on the woman, or to many other causes, the woman is already married, and the birth is not, strictly speaking, a virgin birth. In this aspect these stories are purely ritual customs in which married women desirous of having children make use of certain substances, certain means, certain rites, to aid or perhaps to cause conception. 1 Epigrapha Indica, xlii. 310.

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There are, however, a number of stories, both from the lower and from the higher culture, in which a virgin bears a child because she has swallowed a pebble, a blade of grass, or some other substance.

Pohalihonne, a hero of the 8th of New Mexico, was born of a virgin who had eaten two nuts. Fe-hi, who founded the Chinese race, was the son of a virgin who ate a flower which had sprung to her garment when bathing.

Sometimes pregnancy is caused by mere contact with certain objects, by lathing, or by the sun's rays. But, while such stories regarding virgins or at least unmarried girls (and this distinction is an important one, considering the commonness of pre-nuptial amholds), are fairly sets of transposition, the lower culture, it is certainly an exaggeration to say that 'the Virgin-Mother myth is universal in Paganism.'

E. S. Hartland, in his work, *Primitiv Paternity*, maintains that these stories, the corresponding rites to cause pregnancy, and many other factors have resulted from a former universal ignorance of the physical causes of conception, still alleged to exist among Australian tribes. While his arguments are weighty, it still remains doubtful whether this ignorance ever actually was so wide-spread. The universal existence of the coward would seem to imply knowledge of fatherhood. Widowhood and monogamist or in virgin births of a child born in the often metamorphosed form of some substance swallowed by the woman, and that again is a man or hero who has taken the form of some substance, in order to penetrate the womb. Yah, the culture-hero of Iriothalian tribes, frequently transformed himself into a pebble, to which a woman fell in love, and he was then reborn. With the Arunta of Australia a spirit of a totemic ancestor enters a woman and is reborn from her. Conception, then, for the Arunta, is not supposed to result at all from intercourse, though that may prepare the way for it.2 Paleolithic peoples, at any rate, (1) it has been widely believed that sexual intercourse is a condition, rather than a cause, of sex or of conception; or (2) that conception might be regarded as the result of one cause. In any case, the stories, which tell of a supernatural birth, the stress is more often upon the nature of the substance swallowed than upon the miraculous birth.

On the other hand, the theories of the Freudian school with regard to the substitution of myths and folk-tales in dreams in which there is 'wish-fulfilment,' and in which the unconscious supplants the conscious, might here be considered. In many stories, after an explanation of such legends of supernatural and virgin birth without reference to this hypothetical ignorance of the cause of conception.4 In support of this the mythical act of conception actually occurs in a dream in some of the stories in question—e.g., the story of Buddha's mother and the white elephant and that of the mother of Mithras.5

(2) Although virgin birth has been asserted of Zoroaster, this is hardly supported by the accounts in the sacred books. A substantial tale, 'the Heavenly Glory,' created by Ahura Mazda, mingled with all the stages of birth in Zoroaster's ancestral line. The sacred books tell how his father ate a plant containing the freewill principle, Zoroaster, and how both his parents ate food containing his substance. But this leads up to his actual physical generation. So, also, when myth tells how the future saviour Soshyas would be born of a girl, this is because some of the stories of Zoroaster, preserved through long ages, will enter her womb.6

(3) The myths of Buddha's birth came into being long after his historic existence, while, in being based on transmigration, they expressly contradict his own teaching. Buddha, existing in heaven, decided to be born again on earth for the enlightenment of men. For this purpose he chooses his father, the king, to be born as a virgin birth (also commonly asserted of him) out of court. His mother dreamt that, in the shape of a white elephant, he entered her womb. Next day this dream was interpreted by several Brahmins, who told the king that he would have a son, the J. M. Robertson, *Christianity and Mythology*, London, 1910, p. 392.


7 Cf. art. *Inscation* (Buddhist), vol. vii, p. 159.


10 SBE xix. [1855] 186.

Buddha. The ordinary physical generation is implied, but to this is added the supernatural element of Buddha's pre-existence, as in the Arunta theory of birth. Later stories, however, alter the dream into an actual occurrence. It is nonsense to speak of his mother as 'Maya the virgin.'

2. The Virgin Birth of Christ.—The narrative of the Virgin Birth of Christ is found in Mt 1.23 and Lk 1.33, i.e. in the only Gospels which profess to record the event of the Birth. The alleged silence of the rest of the NT is no necessary proof of its non-acceptance—e.g., by St. John or St. Paul. It was universally accepted without contradiction in the early Church, except among the Ebionites, even some Gnostic groups approving of it. Ignatius, soon after the death of St. John, witnesses to it most emphatically, and everything that we know of the dogmatists of the early part of the second century agrees with the belief that at that period the Virginity of Mary was a part of the formulated Christian belief.1

The first denials of it came mainly from Deistical writers in the 18th cent., and later objections come generally, though not wholly, from those who reject the 'supernatural' aspect of Christ's personality. The accounts in Matthew and Luke appear to be independent of each other in form, and are both regarded as to the main fact. Matthew's narrative is written as if from Joseph's point of view, Luke's from that of Mary, and these, as the original repositories of the knowledge of the fact, have been regarded as the respective sources from whom the narratives were drawn. The story itself is apparently older than either of the accounts of it. The silence of Mark need not be viewed seriously, as it is no part of his purpose to relate the story of the Nativity, while he uses the significant phrase 'Son of God' (1).2 This applies equally to John, though his language regarding the Incarnation has been thought to presuppose the Virgin Birth—e.g., 'the Word became flesh' (14)—while his reference to believers being born 'not of blood... but of God' (c.9) may presuppose the divine element in Christ's conception as the symbol of Christian regeneration. There is nothing to show that St. John repudiated the story.

The reading in some Patristic quotations which makes the passage itself a quotation from 'John', who was believed to have been accepted as the true one by some critics, but need not be pressed.

St. Paul's silence is regarded as weighty, yet he does not repudiate it, and, while its use might have added weight to his arguments for Christ's divinity and pre-existence, he does not formally refer to it, just as he makes wean reference to any fact of Christ's earthly life, outside the Crucifixion and the Resurrection. Perhaps he wrote before it was generally known; certainly before it was known from the Gospels. Of this there is a part with that St. Paul regarded Christ's entrance into the world as 'no ordinary act,' and his references to it have always 'some significant peculiarity of expression'—e.g., Ro 1.4; 1.3; 2.5; 2.9 (God sending his Son), Ph 2.6 ('becoming (RV)[in] the likeness of men'), Gal 4.4 (ἐγένετο) instead of the more usual γενέσθαι elsewhere used by him). St. Paul's doctrines of Christ as the Second Man from heaven and of His freedom from the taint of Adam's sin almost imply belief in the Virgin Birth.

Orr also suggests a significant parallelism between the phraseology of 18:19 and that of 18:18.

The passages of Matthew and Luke are found in all the MSS and Versions, and cannot be regarded as interpolations. They do not differ in style from


2 The word 'bebogen' seems to mean 'in the womb.' 6 But they may be accepted as possibly genuine ('The Gospel according to St. Mark,' ed. A. Plummer, Cambridge, 1915, p. 1).

the rest of the Gospels, and probably always formed part of the Palestinian tradition. It has been suggested, however, that, if Lk 1:56 of the Jewish source is found in Is 7:14. No Jew, however, would ever have applied this to the birth of the Messiah, though it was in accord with Matthew’s method to use it as pointing to an event otherwise known to him. Other critics have conclusively proved that the myth of virgin birth was unknown to Jewish thought, and that its origin in pagan mythology, some going so far as to assume an Oriental myth, for the existence of which there is no evidence whatever. The other mythical sources of the story, however, must be excised, for it must be obvious that they have nothing whatever in common with the stories of Matthew and Luke: in these there is no idea of physical procreation as there is in Greek myths, and all such myths were regarded with abhorrence in Christian circles. Any comparison of Matthew and Luke with such pagan myths (notwithstanding that these show the human feeling that extraordinary personages should have an extraordinary origin) will prove that we are moving in a different atmosphere—in the one reticence, in the other lack of it and a piling up of myth. Matthew and Luke give no explanation of the mystery. They feel that here is a fitting introduction to a life such as the world had never seen before, and to the events of that life they immediately pass on. With sublime simplicity they use the two words but the angelic messenger (Mt 1:20, Lk 1:8). Divine power, the power of a spiritual God, causes the Incarnation through the Virgin Birth. The reticence is marked in comparison with the exuberant language of the Apocryphal Gospels, and, if the Virgin Birth narratives are mythical, no myth was ever expressed in such bold and restrained language. The comparison with pagan myths has been influenced by knowledge of the lack of reticence in the pagan art and theology, into which pagan elements have crept. What we find there is, however, quite foreign to the Gospels.

3. Doctrinal significance of the Virgin Birth.—Only the briefest statement is possible here. It has been held that belief in the divinity of Christ, in the Incarnation, is possible without a belief in the Virgin Birth. While this is not to be denied, the fact undoubtedly remains that those who reject the latter are generally those who in greater or less degree reject the former. It is impossible for any one to say, granting the Incarnation, that virgin birth should not have been recorded for it. An absolutely unique personality such as Christ’s demands some new beginning, just as it was consummated on earth by the Resurrection. An Incarnation inaugurating a new humanity, itself to be creative in the lives of men, implies some new kind of birth, and the Virgin Birth is not out of harmony with this new step in development. The pre-existent Logos taking human flesh is a new event in history: the Virgin Birth adequately supplies the means to this, and no other method is even suggested to the NT. Such an Incarnation is itself so wonderful that the additional event of virgin birth hardly makes any further demand on faith.

While virgin birth is not the ground of Christ’s sinlessness through the absence of human paternity—the handiwork of a predisposition to sin being presumably as transmissible by motherhood alone—yet it is apparently connected with it through ‘the power of the Holy Ghost,’ in both Matthew and Luke. The miraculous conception is in direct relation to the subsequent personality and function. —It is he that shall save his people from their sins (Mt 1:21); that which is to be born shall be called holy (Lk 1:76). The assumption of a unique birth coupled with the dynamic and ethical power of the Spirit excluded the natural disposition to sin. The sinlessness of Christ was that of a
new Personality, human and divine, and it was
fitting that such a Personality should be embodied in
One of our own; our existence was uniquely conditioned.
Whatever the link between sinlessness and virgin birth may be, 'a
sinless man is as much a miracle in the world as a virgin
birth unless unity and physicality were mutually
conditioned. Whatever the link between sinlessness and virgin birth may be, 'a
sinless man is as much a miracle in the world as a virgin
birth unless unity and physicality were mutually

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VIRGIN MARY.—See MARY.

VIRTUE.—See Ethics and Morality.

VIRTUES.—See Seven Virtues.

VITALISM.—See Abiogenesis, Biogenesis.

VIVISECTION.—Etymologically the term 'vivisection' denotes the cutting of living animals
under any conditions and for any purpose. But it
has come to be associated with experiments made on
the vertebrates below man for the advancement of
medical science, whether with or without pain.
To define vivisection, therefore, as 'the infliction of real and serious suffering on a vertebrate living
animal for scientific purposes' is misleading.
1. The justification of experiments on animals.
—Experiments accomplished by pain were un-
doubtedly performed on animals before 1875 in this
country, and in other countries more generally
and perhaps less resolutely. Their ostensible object was to promote man's knowledge of physio-
ology and pathology. A committee of the Royal
Medical and Chirurgical Society, e.g., made exper-
iments before that date on a number of animals to
determine whether, for example, the injection of persons apparently drowned, in order to give
assistance to the Royal Humane Society. In the
course of these experiments animals were half-
drowned and kept in water three, four, or five
minutes.2 As a matter of fact, from the time of
Galen of Pergamos (born A.D. 131) painful exper-
iments on animals were practised, and from them
unquestionably knowledge of anatomy as well as
do physiology and pathology was gained. Thus
Harvey was enabled to establish the circulation of
the blood; Hunter his collateral circulation;
Claude Bernard discovered glycogen in the liver;
Sir Charles Bell laid bare the intricacies of the
nervous system, and the names of Pasteur and
Koch will always be associated with the most far-
reaching of all pathological discoveries—those
connected with microcosms. That pain accompanied
the experiments by which these and other steps in
medical science were reached, that prolonged pain

1. A. B. Bruce, Apologetics; or, Christianity defensibly stated,
Edinburgh, 1892, p. 410.
P. 5.
3. Vivisection: the Royal Society, for Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals, and the Royal Commission, p. xix.

was frequently inflicted, that medical students
were taught by experiments made before them by
their professors; that animals were subjected to
experiments on their own account—all these facts
are generally admitted. And the admission
justifies the determined attempts to put an end to
experiments on animals made in the past by the
Victoria Street Society for the Protection of Animals
from Vivisection and other anti-vivi-
section societies. It is, however, only fair to
add that during the last thirty years immediately preceding 1876 the 'torture' of animals
had been materially lessened by the discovery
and use of anaesthetics.

But, apart from the cruelty which was practised, a
principle of importance was involved, viz.
whether medical science was to depend for its
progress on the casual observations of the doctor
or was to be promoted by experiment also. In the
former case progress would be minimized owing to
want of control over the phenomena; in the latter
case the time, method, and subject-matter would be
determined by the investigator. No responsible
person can controvert the science advances
mainly by selective experiments, or that all
knowledge shows sooner or later the way to
practical utility. There is no sense in reviling
winter sowing because in April there are no crops.
Experiments on animals have enabled us to
light the causes of disease, instead of dealing with
the symptoms. If, in the process of acquiring know-
ledge by experiment, pain is inflicted in some
degree, this must be counter-balanced, in forming
our judgment, by the greater pain we thereby
learn to prevent. Unfortunately this fact has
been overlooked as a rule in the controversy about
vivisection, and so the remark of Lord Justice
Fletcher Moulton before the Royal Commission of
1906 was to the point:

'If you want to do good in a particular way, and want
to know how you can do it effortvly, give your heart a rest, and
your brain a chance.'

2. Findings of the Royal Commission.—The
year 1876 marks a turning-point in the history of
vivisection. Since that your protests against the
'torture' of animals have become, in this country
at least, an anachronism. A Royal Commission,
consisting of Viscount Cardwell, Baron Wimma-
ugh, W. H. C. Floster, Sir John B. Horslake,
T. H. Huxley, J. E. Erichsen, and R. H. Hutton,
was appointed on 22nd June 1875 to 'inquire into the
practice of subjecting live animals to experi-
ments for scientific purposes, and to consider and
report what measures, if any, it may be desirable
to take in respect of any such practice.' The
Commission issued its report on 8th Jan. 1876.
In its conclusion was that it is 'impossible altogether to prevent
the practice of making experiments upon living animals for the
attainment of knowledge applicable to the mitigation of human
suffering or the prolongation of human life; ... that by the
use of anaesthetics pain may in the great majority of cases be
greatly mitigated; that the infliction upon animals of any un-
necessary pain is justly abhorrent to the moral sense of Your
Majesty's subjects generally.'
The Commission finally recommended that the
practice of experiments on living animals should be
regulated by law and placed under the control of
the Home Secretary.
The first result of the findings of the Commission
was the passing of the Cruelty to Animals Act,
1876 (39 and 40 Vict. c. 77). By it all experiments
on animals by an unlicensed person were pro-
hibited, and ordinarily experiments were confined
to a registered place; all licences were to be
vouched for by one or more of the presidents of
six great scientific bodies and by a professor;
the use of curari as an anaesthetic was disallowed;
invertebrate animals were excused from the opera-
tion of the Act; and a series of recommendations on

1 Evidence of Lord Justice Fletcher Moulton, p. 76.
experiments were imposed, especially one which insisted that the animal must during the whole of the experiment be under the influence of some anesthetic of sufficient power to prevent the animal feeling pain; this being modified by a subsequent section which allowed one series of experiments with an anesthetic prescribed for the certificate and for given reasons. One important fact had not come to light at the passing of this Act. Bacteriology as a science was but beginning its career. Hence all the evidence given before the Royal Commission dealt with current physiology, and when the Act was passed it was soon found that it made no provision for experiments by inoculation, which are now 55 per cent of the whole. Accordingly, these had to be allowed for, and they are brought under certificate A and certificate B.

3. Legal regulation of experiments.—Under the powers conferred by the Act of 1876 on the Home Secretary, certificates marked A, B, C, E, E, or F are granted to licensed persons. Certificate A allows experiments to be made without anesthetics when anesthesia would necessarily frustrate the object of the permitted experiment. As a matter of fact, an experiment allowed under this certificate; it sanctions inoculations, feeding, and similar procedures only, which involve no cutting; and the animal has to be killed under anesthetic, if it is to be in pain, and as the result of the operation is ascertained. In view of the somewhat grotesque statements which are frequently made about the prevalence of cruelty under the existing law, it will be advantageous to state the nature of the ‘pain condition’ now prevailing. Additional safeguards against the infliction of pain have been provided, in accordance with the recommendation of the Commission of 1906, by strengthening the special condition (known as the ‘pain condition’) which is enforced on the licence in respect of all certificates which either dispense with the use of anesthetics or allow the animal to recover from the anesthetic (provisions 2 and 3 of sec. 3). The ‘pain condition’ now runs as follows:

1. If an animal, after and by reason of any of the said experiments under the said Certificate ... is found to be suffering pain which is either severe or is likely to endure, and if the pain result of the experiment has been attained, the animal shall forthwith be painlessly killed.

2. If an animal, after and by reason of any of the said experiments, is found to be suffering severe pain which is likely to endure, such animal shall forthwith be painlessly killed, whether the pain is the result of the experiment or not.

3. If any animal appears to an Inspector to be suffering considerably, and if the Inspector directs that the animal to be destroyed, shall forthwith be painlessly killed.

Certificate B allows an animal to be kept alive after the initial operation, where a more or less prolonged observation is necessary to the scientific success of the experiment. Certificate C allows experiments to be made in illustration of lectures, but under anesthetics. Certificates E and E permit experiments on dogs or cats, and certificate F on horses, asses, or mules.

The best proof that the administration of the Act has been satisfactory is afforded by the findings of the second Royal Commission on Vivisection appointed in 1906, which published its report in 1912. The report was signed by all the Commissioners; it recommended no change in the text of the Act of 1876, but suggested, without recommending a special certificate for all experiments on dogs; it recommended certain increased restrictions and safeguards, which were adopted by the Home Office. It may be added that an unsuccessful attempt to pass the Protection Bill was made in 1919 in the House of Commons.

4. Practical conclusion.—Few questions have roused more embittered feeling than that engaged by the belief that lower animals were being callously subjected to experiments by medical men and others. Men felt that the humaneness inculcated by centuries of Christian teaching was being wantonly abandoned, and the outcry was in proportion to the annoyance to man of the animals which were used for experiment. Invertebrate animals were passed over as being negligible, and it was with man’s nearest friends, the dog, the cat, and the horse, that sympathy was most likely to be expressed. As the Ancient was an adequate sympathy for the sufferings of man himself was wanting to supplement that felt for these lower animals. No sufficient recognition was made of the fact that without experiments on animals doctors would frequently have no option save to experiment on their patients, for want of the knowledge which experiments on animals could alone secure. And, as it is, much of the success attending treatment for diseases connected with the blood, with the alimentary canal and the digestion of food, and with the central nervous system, springs from knowledge gained by experiments on animals. Especially, it has made possible the treatment of diseases due to infection by microbes. As the Royal Commission of 1876 pointed out, it was hardly an exaggeration that Dr. Jenner, discovered the immunity from small-pox of those who had contracted cow-pox. But it was by experiments upon cows that the origin of the cow-pox, a disease stated to be derived from “grasse” in the horse, was ascertained.

P Pasteur’s discovery of the activity of microorganisms in fermentation was the beginning of antiseptic and aseptic treatment of wounds, by which thousands of human lives have been saved and indescribable suffering removed, and with which the name of Lord Lister will be always connected by a grateful world. The treatment of tuberculous and diphtheria and the protective treatment against tetanus and rabies are dependent on knowledge gained by experiments on animals. In the same way the nature of cholera, balanic plague, typhoid fever, epidemic meningitis, Malta fever, and other curses of mankind is now understood, and the road to their annihilation opened. When we weigh the suffering caused to hundreds of thousands of human beings by these plagues against that far less pain caused by inoculation to a comparatively small number of mice, rats, guinea-pigs, and rabbits, we realize how irrational it is to attempt for the total prohibition of vivisection. The method of regulation, not suppression, adopted in this country does justice at once to the unquestioned claims of the lower animals to kindly treatment and to the duty of man to his fellows—the duty of using his reason in the age-long task of diminishing and finally extinguishing that particular form of evil which goes by the name of disease.

Catherine Daumart, born, we are told, of a noble family of Poitou, Voltaire afterwards took his first steps in life from his mother's family, though it has been maintained that it was derived from an anagram on his signature Arouet. L. J. ("le jeune"); but the fact that in the dedication to his Célébres de l'Époque — but he officially disclosed his second name in order to cast the other into oblivion. Voltaire was thus born in a state of moderate affluence, and he was sent to the Jesuit College Louis-le-Grand, which bore the honor of regaling Voltaire's learning, possessed by schools of that order. Here he was not only distinguished intellectually but was pointed out by his tutor as the future 'coryphæus of deism in France.' On leaving college, he came into touch with the Abbé de Châteauneuf, who had been a friend of his mother, and who was his godfather; he brought him into relation with Ninon de l'Enclos. That remarkable woman, who had had the courage to reject Madame de Maintenon's offer of an invitation to the court on condition that she should become dévot, was now very old, but she maintained her freshness of spirit, and discerned in the remarkable character of the boy and left him a legacy for the purchase of books. Already he deplored in verse 'his Jansenist of a brother' and declaimed a poem, called the Epître à un Comédien (the author attributed it to Voltaire), which portrayed Moses as an impostor. Perhaps it was from Ninon that Voltaire first learned the lesson whose influence pervaded all his life, that the spirit of man is free, and that men are entitled to form their judgments for themselves. The society into which young Voltaire was launched was indeed a dissolve one. It represented a reaction against the hypocrisy and intolerance of the court of Louis XIV., and its wit was frivolous and its literary efforts trifling. The Abbé Chaulain, a versifier of some merit, exercised much influence on Voltaire and typified the outlook of the society in which he moved.

Naturally M. Arouet, the father, was shocked at the company kept by his son, and by the fact that he began to write a tragedy instead of learning law. He finally dispatched him to the Marquis de Châteauneuf, brother to the Abbé, and French ambassador in Holland; but the young man became entangled in a love affair and the ambassador sent him home. But alas! he soon forgot Voltaire, but Voltaire, to the despair of his father, was determined to live in the world in which he had got a footing, mingling with the nobles and more bent on versifying than occupying an office-stool, in spite of the fact that he had matriculated as a lawyer. A friend of his father took pity on him and brought him to a château near Fontainebleau, where he became engrossed in the study of history— a study which resulted later on in the production of La Henriade and Le Siècle de Louis XIV. Louis XIV. died in 1715, and there followed an outburst of salves on the memory of the monarch who had enjoyed such adoration. One of these was termed Les fâ lus and concluded, after describing the evils which in his short life the writer had seen, the crowded prisons, the unjust taxes, with 'And I am but twenty years old.' Though Voltaire was actually twenty-two, he was falsely accused of being the author, and in May 1717 he was sent into the Bastille, where he remained till April 1718, being allowed to return to live in the following October. This was not his first detention; he had been sent out of Paris as early as 1716, owing to verses that he had written regarding certain distinguished personalities.

Confinement in the Bastille, which was perhaps not very severe, had little effect on Voltaire's spirits, for he remained a confirmed La Ligue, corrected his tragedy Édipe, and even wrote gay verses on his misfortune. Édipe was performed in 1718 with great success, and this was the first of the dramatic works, which were to follow one another in such marvelous succession. Before this he had written only fugitive pieces, including an ode which had vainly contested for a prize given by the French Academy. Afterwards he went on with his great work, the Henriade, and also wrote the tragedy of Artémire (1720), which was much more severely criticized than was the Édipe. Everywhere the young poet was welcomed, though he appears to have again been banished for a season from Paris for his intercourse with the enemies of the regent, and more especially with Richelieu and de Gortz. With Madame de Rupelmonde he visited Holland and saw J. B. Rousseau at Brussels. Voltaire read his Épître à Uranie, and Rousseau rectified his works to him, but the two men were separated as irreconcilable enemies. Voltaire returned to France in 1723 and lived there till 1746; which was on the same lines as Artémire under new names and plot; then came the famous Henriade under the name of La Ligue. Voltaire as author of this work found the plots of the Théâtre de La Comédie and Mariannet—may be said to have made his mark in literature. The idea of being the eulogizer of King Henry IV. had inflamed his imagination since his twenty-first year, and he had begun to write in the Bastille. His idea was to dedicate the work to the king of France (Louis XV.), and the dedication was written, but there were difficulties in regard to censorship, and it did not appear. The book was issued in 1725 at Eton after an abortive effort to get it published by subscription at The Hague. An English edition (1726) was dedicated to the queen of England, consort of George II. The poem is often compared with the Enéide, and it has a place in French literature which brings it into comparison with the classics of ancient days. The subject was a great one, and, while it adheres to historic facts, there is in the work a fine sense of morality, and above all that deep love of humanity and liberty which characterizes its author's best writings. Condorcet says that the Henriade was born in the century which was made by reason among men, the greater will be its circle of admirers. Unfortunately for the truth of this dictum, life and dramatic power are also necessary to make a work such as this immortal, and these are lacking in the poem. Perhaps it was not possible for Voltaire to write a great epic; it required a depth of thought and concentration that was not his. Also the age was possibly too critical and pernicious.

In 1722 Arouet the elder died, implaceable to the last as regards his gifted son, who was now definitely known by his famous name of Voltaire. The latter was living a life of social pleasure, visiting country-houses,—those of Sully, Villars, etc. — composing verses d'occasion, arranging theatricals, and writing all the while with set and definite purpose. He loved the country, but dreaded the loss of precious time spent in country-house pleasures. Change of scene seemed necessary to him; he was ever passing from one place to another in a way that was astonishing, in those days of continuous war, that was only a matter of quick impressions, but not entirely one of self-indulgence, for Voltaire never forgot that his work claimed his first endeavours, and he never hesitated to speak his mind. He even supposed that he would have imagined that that work would have given
him an established place in society and caused his person to be respected, but, if he himself might be tempted to think so, he got a rough awakening.

Voltaire was dining, as he often dined, with the Duke of Rohan, who took it amiss that Voltaire's sentiments did not agree with his own. 'Who is that young man?' he asked; 'who contradicts me in such tones so loud?' 'My lord,' Voltaire replied, 'it is one who bears no great name but who wins respect by the manner in which he uses the small sword and challenged the name he bears.' A few seconds later the chevalier regained his composure upon the young man by causing his lackeys to administer a caning to him at the door. Sully refused to interfere, and, stung by rage, Voltaire obtained instruction in the use of the small sword and challenged the Rohan and the latter prevented him from fighting and Voltaire was thrown once more into the Bastille, where he was kept for sixteen days.

This was in April 1726, and on 2nd May he was allowed to leave for England, accompanied by an escort as far as Calais.

Voltaire's journey to England was not only a turning-point in his life, but a factor in the economic and intellectual history of France. One can imagine the spirit in which he went there, burning with indignation at the manner in which he had been treated by the laws or customs of his country. He passed into the country of Newton and Locke, the Newton and Locke of Voltaire and Bolingbroke, of Swift and Pope—a country which allowed men to speak without fear or hindrance of what they had experienced or believed. Voltaire had become known as a man of letters; now he had felt it to be his mission to become the liberator of his countrymen from bondage and false beliefs. Voltaire felt France a poet, he returned to it a sage. Newton's examination of facts strongly appealed to the young man, and his mind was specially drawn towards the Newtonian theory of attraction as well as to Locke's appeal to experience as the basis of all knowledge. Metaphysics and theology, he thought, were hindrances to the progress of human knowledge.

The Lettres philosophiques, or Lettres sur les Anglais draw attention to the many matters in which the country in which he was living was in advance of that of his birth. He was but a refugee from the Bastille, and his country was still in a condition of feudalism with an aristocracy which was exempt from almost all forms of taxation. In England, on the other hand, he saw intellectual eminence honoured and rewarded; even administrative posts were granted to distinguished men of letters, whilst the liberty of the press was absolute. He cannot have been surprised that these things were publicly burned by decree of the French Parliament.

The tragedy of Brutus was the firstfruits of Voltaire's visit to England, expressing as it did the aspirations of an oppressed people. The next twenty years of Voltaire's life, between his leaving England and going to Berlin, were a prolific period. The dates of his most famous tragedies are as follows: Brutus, 1730; Zaire, 1732; Mort de César, 1735; Alzire, 1736; Mahomet, 1741; Merope, 1743; Sénonvins, 1747; Tancredé, 1760. The Mort de César was a brave venture, for not only did it deal with ground well trodden by a greater dramatist than Voltaire himself, but it was a play without love scenes or women, and in three acts only, and thereby a complete innovation. Its republicanism, too, was sufficient to cause its publication to be prohibited in those days of tyranny. Its author came into further contact with the authorities over an attack he made on the excommunication of a celebrated actress, who was not only beautiful but honest in her turn. But, though Voltaire was ever ready to take up real causes of oppression, he was far too susceptible to any vulgar calumny, and his time and talents were used in petty quarrels for the worth of a publisher's name and position. His struggle was by his writings to

1 John Morley, Voltaire, p. 56.
2 Constance, Vie de Voltaire, p. 106.
own sovereign, Louis xv., would have none of him, and Frederick, now king of Prussia (1749), took advantage of Voltaire's fear of how his writings might affect his reputation and that of the king, to secure his presence by an offer of protection. A constant correspondence took place between the two, as well as a soi-disant diplomatic visit on Voltaire's part to the king's house in 1746. Voltaire's historical writings occupied him greatly at this period of his life. He is not remembered as properly speaking, a historian, but his histori- cal works are worth reading in the times in which he himself lived, and hence their interest for us to this day. They are full of intelligence and good sense, with moralizations which are to the point and are yet combined with an irony which is characteristic of the author. His Siécle de Louis XIV. is specially interesting, inasmuch as he was able to make use of his own private information and of memoirs hitherto unpublished, like those of Saint-Simon. He gives a very full account of the government, commerce, and industry of the time. In fact, he had in view not only to write a history of the period with which he dealt, but also to reveal the state of the mind in that wonderful epoch of history. He worked with great diligence, passing the whole day at his desk, and despite frequent ill-health, never seemed to tire.

Madame de Pompadour was Voltaire's first friend at court, and through her he was asked to celebrate the marriage of the dauphin in a court piece called the Princesse de Nointe. In view of this work, which he regarded very lightly, he was made in 1745 historiographer of France—a position once jointly held by Racine and Boileau—and given thereby a certain protection as well as a salary of 5,000 livres. But above all he desired to obtain admission to the Academy, and before this was possible he wrote to Latour, head of his former school, professing his devotion not only to religion but also to the Academy. He achieved his end in 1746. But he did not long hold a place in royal favour, for libels poured upon him, worse even than before. Crébillon was given the pre-eminence as an author by Madame de Pompadour and others, and everything was done that could be done to humble and discourage him. In 1749 Madame du Châtelet, the friend of sixteen years, died. Her companionship had meant much to Voltaire, and his life with her had been marked by an unceasing and unshaken dignity. Frederick of Prussia, who had for long corresponded with Voltaire and had formerly urged his migration to Prussia, came to the throne in 1740, and renewed his blandishments. The result was that in July 1750 Voltaire arrived at Potsdam. He was received with the greatest respect by his remarkable host and endowed with a pension; but the step was one which he had every cause to regret. By his action he even gave offence in his own country and to Louis xv., his king, little appreciated as he had been by him before. He thought he would find liberty and peace in his new abode, but he found on the intellectual side obscur- antism only. The Academy of Sciences, founded by Sophie-Charlotte under the direction of Leibniz, had fallen on evil days. The king was mainly concerned about drill and orthodoxy theology, and Berlin was far behind Paris in civilization, being in many ways but a mediæval town. The association of these two, the greatest figures in Europe, was to the misery of the philosophes, who were so far from being able to communicate with each other. But actually the combination was disastrous. Frederick was Voltairean, it is true, but his interests were centred in the establishment of the Prussian ascendency and the transformation of the face of Europe. Voltaire's task was a no

1 Letter to Madame Denis, Berlin, 2nd Sept. 1755.
2 Confer. p. 206.
peaceful life, but he meant to devote himself to political work, to obtaining a change in the constitution of the republics and to help bring them more into line with that of England. He wished above all to procure economy of public money, to put an end to persecution and intolerance, and he considered it was against reason to tolerate these ends in view. He was ambitious, desired to produce and to teach. He might indeed be compared to a great European instructor—one whose works were written, to which were not too favourably disposed to receive the instruction offered. He was not an idealist perhaps, but he had the good of his fellow-countrymen at heart, and there was no better place from which to preach the gospel of the deliverance of mankind from the thraldom of the oppressor than the republics of Geneva and Abbeville.

His literary work went on apace. The first play to appear was L'Orphelin de la Chine, composed when he was in Alsace and performed in 1755. His peace was, however, disturbed by the piratical publication of La Pucelle, which forced him to finish and issue it himself. By its means there was plenty of reason given to the enemy to blaspheme, although it may be possible to argue that it aims at the destruction of hypocrisy and superstition. It is impossible, however, if so, not to notice the form and the gross manner of bringing about that result had been adopted and that more respect had been shown for a famous woman and patriot. He also wrote at this time the poem entitled La Loi de Dieu and the Desoix de Lisbonne. The first was burned by the parliament at Paris because of its attack on intolerance and the fear of where such opinion would lead. He endeavored to express in an antagonism to the orthodox view of the origin of evil, and was condemned in consequence. In 1759 he published Candide, undoubtedly one of the best of all his works of the romantic and philosophic type. It is an ironical satire on the optimism of Leibniz, and is extremely amusing as well as full of a common-sense type of wisdom, so that it can be read in the present day with as much pleasure as when it was first published. At the end of it there is the famous injunction to himself and his readers to 'cultivate one's own garden.' Voltaire also made a free translation of Ecclesiastes and part of the Song of Solomon, and, as instruction and entertainment, works appeared. This was published under his own supervision, and to this edition there was added the Essai sur l'Esprit, générale et sur les mœurs et l'Esprit des nations, a work undertaken in order to influence Madame du Châtelet in favour of the study of history. This work involved an immense amount of research and labour that must have been irksome to a man of quick wit like Voltaire, who was neither an earnest student nor a metaphysician. But his historical writing was never dull. He grouped his facts and interpreted these in a wide way, giving them life and significance. His reflections may not be very profound, but they are full of common sense and just. He obtained the best material available and put it to the best use in his power. On the whole he was scrupulous and critical in respect of the value of his evidence. Satire and wit were always at his command.

In 1755 Voltaire sold Les Délices and settled at Ferney, where he occupied the position of a country gentleman, and there he remained until his celebrated days in the court of European statesmen. Voltaire was still at Berlin, and with their object, the free and open statement of the facts of science and philosophy, he was in the most intense sympathy. Hence from Ferney he wrote a number of articles for the newspapers. This work took up much of his time, and when it once became known, it was speedily prescribed. The writers were known as the philosophes and encyclopédistes, and among them the chief was the celebrated Abbé de Chastenet de Pompone.1 The latter was as usual ready to make reply to the ignorant attacks made on the writers who numbered among them those most distinguished in the literary world; and a series of pamphlets was the result. One of these is known by the name of L'Encyclopaedia, a comedy in which a culminating journalist is introduced.

At the age of sixty-six Voltaire wrote Tancred, dedicated to Madame de Pompadour. This work was admired by Gibbon and translated by Goethe, and it has always been considered one of the author's best dramas. But he was not only concerned with literature, for the human side of him was ever conspicuous.

His admiration for the great Cornelle was profound, and his notes on some of Cornelle's works are among the mightiest criticisms where he thought criticism due, none recognised more fully the greatness of this man of whom France was so proudly. His grand-niece was, he said, in distress, and at once Voltaire said that it was 'the duty of a soldier to succour the injured spirit.' Consequently he wrote to her and provided for her education, and with wonderful tact and good feeling he assured her that she owed her support to the dependents of her illustrious uncle. Another case, much more remarkable, is that of Calas. This old man, a Protestant, had been brought on the wheel because his son was found dead and he was accused of poisoning him, although there was not the slightest evidence of the fact. The accusation rested on the traditions of the Indians that a son masked as a martyr. The father died, but Voltaire took enormous trouble to have the sentence annulled and to prevent the other members of the family from being convicted. But after the years had passed, he was successful. During the three years which were taken up with this matter Voltaire stated that 'not a smile passed over my face but that I reproached myself for it as though I had committed a crime.' No wonder that when he came to Paris in triumph before his death he was acclaimed as the saviour of Calas. Stevenson's case was somewhat similar, but he had time to save himself and take refuge with the protector of the oppressed and persecuted, and he was consequently secure.

But it must not be assumed that it was only these of another faith than that in which he had been brought up whom Voltaire succoured. He was ready to help any one oppressed in whatever way, and whatever his profession. The case of the Jews in Portugal was not old intolerance but the destruction—the 'friends of letters and enemies of reason,' as Condorcet calls them—enlisted his sympathy, and one of them, persecuted by the Inquisitionists, had attempted suicide; but Voltaire went to the Pope and said that if he was not without his use when Voltaire's own enemies blasphemed. But free-thought was speedily apace, and persecution did little, if anything, to stem the tide. Jean Jacques Rousseau was writing, and his writings were being circulated abroad. Political feeling was strong against a privileged and effete aristocracy. And yet the most astonishing events occurred, like the case of a young soldier named La Barre, about seventeen years old, who was accused of defacing a crucifix placed on the bridge of Abbeville. The lad was executed with horrible barbarity, and this aroused a blaze of indignation in Voltaire's bosom, although he had some cause to fear for himself, seeing that the Dictionnaire philosophique was in a manner involved (it was burned with La Barre's body).

No wonder that he exclaimed when he was tired of hearing that twelve men were able to establish Christianity! I should like to prove that one is capable of destroying it. We cannot forget Voltaire's efforts on behalf of our own Admiral Dying, who retired from the Encyclopédie in 1765, and who was still at Munich, and with their object, the free and open statement of the facts of science and philosophy,

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1. *Dictionnaire philosophique*.
2. *Dictionnaire philosophique.*
VOLTAIRE

shot in 1757. 'In this country,' says Voltaire of England—'a good sword is well-adapted to his use now and then to encourage the others.'

This side of Voltaire's character—his righteous indignation with injustice and indefatigable efforts after restitution when injustice had been inflicted—is the side which attracts us most. He, perhaps, the greatest personality in Europe (for Frederick

was his only rival till the star of Goethe rose), endowed with a power of sarcasm and of invective of a kind, had the power to act, and it is entirely to his honour that in those difficult times he did act without fear and without delay. His humour was the bitter humour of the

man who felt that things were too desperately bad to be taken entirely seriously, but this sardonic merriment did not prevent his practical action. His correspondence, which forms in some ways the most interesting part of his voluminous writings, is full of expressions of his inmost feelings regarding the events that were occurring daily around him. The iron burned deep into his soul, and he was given the power to foresee what was wholly realized only later on and then was dealt with by the terrors of revolutionaries.

There is another side to Voltaire's character which is more difficult to fathom. When he built his Temple of Minerva and built it in a small church with the inscription on it 'Deo erexit Voltaire,' and his correspondence shows him to be apparently anxious to prove himself to be all things to all men. He was likewise always ready to shelter himself through anonymity, and even to ascribe his works to another, though the other was dead and unable to defend himself. No doubt the times were bad and men's lives had to be preserved; but, whatever the customs of the day, this action was far from heroic. Then there is the famous communion made on 1st April 1769, followed by a public protestation of respect for the Church. His impish delight in forcing the priest to administer the communion to him, though forbidden by his bishop, and his 'forgiveness' of the bishop, is not an edifying spectacle, any more than the fact that Voltaire had himself made temporal father of the order of Capuchins for the district of Gex—an act done probably to annoy the bishop of Annecy. Even his sympathizers were scandalized by these actions, and in regard to them and many others no one can make a categorical statement. Voltaire was a deist, but that he regarded orthodox Christianity in any other way than as a scoffer is unthinkable, and this is the role he played throughout. He scoffed at the ordinary optimistic point of view, whether it was the one of the philosopher or that of the ordinary believer. He was always ready to criticize and show the errors incident in any positive creed or system of philosophy, but he never reached a constructive system either of spiritual belief or of social theory. Indeed he did not appear to have constructive power any more than great originality, but his interest in theological matters is apparent from his constant references to them. His religion, though it partook of negation, was not of the wholly negative character of that of some of his contemporaries, nor did it partake of the nature of the beliefs of Rousseau. Voltaire denied what he believed to be false, and that included practically all that he had received as religious tradition from the past. It left a sort of possibility for the future which Rousseau's followers have since seized. Voltaire was performed amidst tears of enthusiasm; the author's bust was crowned in the theatre, and it was difficult for him to pass through the surging masses of people, and to sit during Voltaire's last days. And the 'Henriade, Mahomet, and La Prucelle!' they cried. The Academy, after all its coldness to him

2. Cayeux, 1741, letter to M. Kaahle.
in early days, lavishied honoris upon him. Franklin was in Paris, and Voltaire insisted on speaking to him in his own tongue and blessing his grandson in the simple words 'God and liberty.' And the great man was not idle. He was revising his Essai sur les mœurs, and he had a scheme for a new academy to be issued by the Academy, and he even himself undertook the first letter in it. But all this was too much for a man of 84. Sleep went from him, he took more opium than was good for him, and he was no more fit for duty in May 1778.

The Abbé Gaultier confessed him some time before his death, and it was declared by him that he died in the Catholic religion in which he was born. 'I am about to appear before God, the Creator of the universe,' he wrote. 'If you have anything to say to me, it will be my duty and privilege to receive you.' When he was in the act of death, the curé of Saint-Sulpice tried to get him to give a more detailed statement of his beliefs, and, as he was frustrated in this, made difficulties about his burial. Finally, however, Voltaire was buried at the Monastery of Scellières in Champagne, where his nephew was abbé, in time to avoid the interdict of the bishop. There was also objection made to the usual service for one of the members of the Academy; the king of Prussia, however, hearing of this, interceded, and his majesty himself wrote his eulogy. In 1791 the body was removed to the Panthéon, but later it was disturbed and taken away, like so many others.

Voltaire's personal appearance is perhaps better known than that of any literary man of his time. He was extremely thin, almost like a skeleton in old age, with bright piercing eyes and a 'mocking smile,' and he wore a wig. He had a great attraction for women and a certain devotion to them, but this was for the most part of a platonic kind, and in any case he did not, like so many of his contemporaries, allow himself to be carried off by his feet by it. His life was never indecent, judged by the standards of his time, whatever his expressions may seem to us to be. His powers of work were prodigious, and, though not physically strong, he often worked for eighteen or twenty hours on end. He was interested in medicine and has the credit of recommending inoculation for smallpox when it was hardly thought of. His conclusion as to health matters is given in a letter to M. Bagieu, a neighbour of his, on December 26, 1745: 'I have come to the conclusion that every man must be his own doctor... above all he must know how to suffer, grow old, and die.' Sometimes he is seen bargaining and quarrelling about sums of no importance, and then indifferently munificent on another occasion. From such contradictoriness of nature he may be painted black or white, as the sympathies or prejudices of the observer dictate. To do with his own and later generations he was the most sinister figure of his age, and his writings (excepting some of his historical works) the most harmful in the 18th century. Others regard him as the deliverer of the oppressed and the champion of liberty. He wrote with the utmost ease and lucidity. He was a prince among journalists, and his output was enormous, as the 50 volumes of his writings testify.

What he wrote was writen as from himself and not as the views of those who had written before, though he had a wonderful power of absorbing the work of others. Goethe, after enumerating all the great, admirable works of the 18th century, designates him only 'two-depth and finish ('Tiefe und Vollendung'). He was no philosopher, but a child of the 'Illumination'; i.e., he belonged to the school of those who saw facts so clearly that there seemed no possibility of error in them. It was the time of cataloguing and arranging, the heyday of encyclopedic knowledge. Yet all Voltaire's work was impressed with his own individuality. He seemed to have the power of seeing the truth that others were blind to. He was always considering, and, when he came upon a false belief, he ran at it against it without hesitation. He could not be called a sceptic, for he had his own beliefs clearly defined and certain; his was no dogmatizing spirit, and, when he held that there is a God exists; but it also tells me that I cannot know what He is.' There were occasions on which he lied, but the lies were begotten of the circumstances of life which he was ready to justify. His vanity was apparent to all, but that again was the conscious vanity of the man who felt himself to be above his fellows. He was money-loving, but he loved money because it redeemed him from a position of subservience and gave him the power he required. He had another side which proved ready to be generous and hospitable in the extreme, so that he cannot be truly called avaricious or miserly. He was by nature a politician, and, as an entrance to the politics of his country was denied to him, he showed what could be done on a small scale in his own domains and passionately upheld the interests of his country. He did not live to see that his teaching bore fruit in a manner none could foretell, though many must have anticipated it when they saw how vain the efforts after orderly reform had proved. Such men as Voltaire were never to have a chance of being used, for the amelioration of the conditions of their country. Such as he, who had an intense love of humanity, and on whom the misery of the common people under their unjust taxation rested like a constant cloud, were set aside. His reception in Paris as a human benefactor might have enlightened the rulers of the time.

Voltaire loved the stage from his boyhood onwards, and among his works there are 50 or 60 Théâtre pieces of various merit. The interest in his tragedies is often said to be too purely intellectual; i.e., love plays little part in them. This is characteristic of the writer on whom in manhood affection never seemed to take any passionate hold.

His poetry is fluent, and the usual criticism is that its fluency is greater than its substance, and that its great charm is its theme (and the theme is one that specially appealed to Voltaire), is not the really great poem that he intended it to be. He wrote many comedies, but no one could say that real humour, such as we find in Sterne, was present in Voltaire's writings. Of wit he had an ever-ready store, and his subjects knew too well of his powers in caricature. But Voltaire had not the terrible bitterness of Swift. His romances and tales appeal to the largest section of readers, if we except his historical works. They are delightful to read to this day. Candide gives us an admirable specimen of his style. L'École des femmes and César attack the orthodox view of Biblical events, though not the larger ideas of Providence. The most numerous of his writings, however, if we except his Correspondances, are his historical works, of which the best known are Charles XII., Louis XIV., Louis XV., and the Histoire de l'Empire de Russie sous Pierre le Grand. The first is celebrated for the attractive way in which it is written, the ease of its style, and clearness of its narrative. With his Essai sur les mœurs he breaks with the old forms, so unsatisfying, as he explains, to an intelligent age, and Madame de Montespan, in a letter of 1727, tells him she gives us a sense of proportion which was absent from the writings of those who had made sacred

2 Ed., 20th April 1779.
3 Note on Voltaire in Goethe's translation at Le Neveu de Rameau by Diderot.
4 Corr., October 1727, letter to Mlle. Quinault.
VOLUNTARISM

In the Stewartian case, the same judicial authority was bestowed, and the spiritual authority of an establishment cannot exist in law, except so far as the Legislature has allowed or sanctioned that authority—a principle which was corrodorated by Lord Wood: "The Church, as an establishment, is the creation of statute."

The decisions as to all of them (in the Auchtterm, Lechendy, St. Anthony's, Calais, and Calais, and the others) were uniformly founded on the one general law, laid down with cumulative deliberation and emphasis, that the Kirk derives "all its powers," and has its whole authority, "from the common consent and the laws of the realm . . . and that the jurisdiction of the church Courts is derived from and defined by the State."

It is only just, however, to note that the subordinate standard of the Church, the Westminster Confession of Faith, speaks with two voices on the relation of the Church and State. In one passage it enunciates the principle that "God alone is lord of the conscience, and hath left it free"; in another, the principle of spiritual independence is not less clearly enunciated: "the Lord Jesus, as king and head of his church, hath appointed a government in the hand of church officers, distinct from the civil magistrate;" but in other passages this document is as frankly Erastian as, if not more so than, the decisions of these judges and the reasons by which they are supported.

"The civil magistrate . . . hath authority, and it is his duty, to take order, and cause the church officers to execute the power committed to them, in order that the truth of God be kept pure and entire, that all blasphemies and heresies may be suppressed, all corruptions and abuses in the church prevented, and all the ordinances of God duly settled, administered and observed. For the better execution of this office, he is to be present at, and to provide that whatever is transacted in them be according to the mind of God."

(3) Hildebrandism.—According to this theory, the Church's authority is not only in things spiritual but in things civil as well. This theory takes its name from Hildebrand, the family name of Pope Gregory VII, and finds its most memorable illustration in the excommunication of Henry iv, and his pilgrimage to Canossa. For three days he stood in the courtyard of the castle, in midwinter, clothed only in the hair shirt of a penitent, till he was absolved and restored by the pope. Excommunication, by the civil law of the empire, involved deposition; no excommunicated person could sit on the throne. Indirectly, therefore, if not directly, the enthroning and the dethroning of monarchs was part of the authority to which the Vatican laid claim.

The claim of the Free Church of Scotland in 1843 has been described as Voluntaristic, or Hildebrandian, but a full elucidation of this is groundless. The core of the claim of the Free Church of Scotland and of those secessions by which it was proceeded was the right to regulate their spiritual concern, communion, worship, discipline, without interference from the State—a claim that differs in two essentials from that of Rome.

(5) The finality of the authority of the State in temporal matters, including Church property, was not questioned. The decisions of the Legislature and Law Courts might be unjust and oppressive, involving hardship even to persecution, but the right of the State to pass these laws and to enforce them was not disputed or resisted.

(b) The Free Church, unlike the Church of Rome, claimed no authority over the conscience of the individual.

(3) Co-ordinate jurisdiction.—Establishment in England and Scotland has been described by many under this conception. The Church, it is argued, existed before the State, and is independent of it. She framed her own creed and constitution and adopted them; she organized her own courts and defined their sphere and jurisdiction. The spiritual law of the realm and the civil law were in accordance with the teaching of revealed religion, or accepting them as such on the authority of the Church, inscribed the Creed in its statutes,

Reports of the Court of Session, Dunlop, vol. iii., p. 197.

2 Special Jurisdiction, and the Statutory Class (Bell and others). Pp. 55, 72.

3 A. Taylor Innes, Church and State, p. 277.

4 Ch. xx.

5 Ch. xxx.

6 Ch. xxiii.
ratified the Church’s claim to jurisdiction in her own sphere, and voted support from the nation’s exchequer (1819), but Church and State would restrict themselves respectively to their own spheres, they need never come into conflict.

Co-ordinate jurisdiction is the ideal outlined and advocated by Thomas Chalmers in his Lectures on the Use and Abuse of Literary and Ecclesiastical Establishments (1827) and later in his Lectures on the Establishment and Extension of National Churches (1836), but the disestablishment of his ideal had not been realized. The cause of establishment had been vindicated in argument, in his opinion, but his grief was that the cause had suffered defeat at the hands of those who believed in it, but nullified their convictions by submitting to the jurisdiction of the State in the sphere of the Church.

(4) Nominal establishment with real and effective endowment.—This theory is that the function of the State is only to furnish monetary support, and it is not for the State to intervene or to judge whether the creed and constitution on which the Church had been established had been departed from or not, an ideal which seems to be the objective of the articles declarative of the constitution of the Church of Scotland and the proposals for voluntary establishment. This, however, he thought, but, as these articles and the question they involve are still sub judice, they will not be further referred to in this article.

(5) Voluntaryism.—The voluntary takes high ground and argues from first principles. The Church is the Bride of Christ, and the phrase is more than a figure. There is so much of reality in it that, if the Church enter into a wedded relation with any earthly institution, the loyalty and obedience which she owes to her King and Head are thereby imperilled.

The Church’s sphere is faith and conduct; but these are questions of conscience, and conscience must not be forced. Liberty of conscience is one of the first principles of religion. The only weapons of the Church are moral and spiritual. The weapon of the State is force. The entry of the State into the sphere of conscience is thereby de facto delbarred.

Liberty of conscience implies universal religious toleration. Religious toleration connotes religious equality. Religious equality and voluntary, is traversed by Church establishment. Not only is loyalty to Christ imperilled by alliance with the State, but history has proved that such alliances are impossible without situations arising often in which the Church must choose between the will and command of the State and the will and command of Christ.

Conscience is forced by establishment, for State support directly or indirectly comes from all classes and creeds, and people are compelled to support what they may or may not get benefit from; and in many cases for the propagation of doctrines which they do not believe.

Tolerance is traversed, for the principle of intolerance is the same whether it be expressed in the form of active persecution or in that of passive disability. Equality and justice are traversed wherever one Church or one creed is favoured, privileged, provided for more than others.

Voluntaryism is thus reached by the path of development, where a voluntary takes his stand on great a priori principles of justice, liberty, equality, and, in particular, spiritual independence, of which he holds that voluntaryism is the logical and indispensable conclusion. It is reached primarily by the path of induction. It is supported by masses of evidence accumulated from the history of the Church in every age. The Church was never so vital, so convincing, so fruitful as in the first three centuries before it was allied with the State.

The spiritual activities of the Church in modern times in every field of service (Home Mission, Foreign Mission, Church Extension, liberality)—not to speak of the inward graces of the spirit—have been confessedly greater and more fruitful in voluntary churches than in those allied with the State.

Not less convincing are the testimonies of those who, previously to the disestablishment of the Church of which they were members, not only believed in the principle but believed also that the existence of religion in their country was bound up with the voluntary or the Church was of no spiritual value. For their experience of disestablishment moved rapidly to the opposite pole of opinion. Lyman Beecher wrote:

'It was as dark a day as ever I saw. The injury done to the cause of Christ, as we then supposed, was irreparable. For several days I suffered what no tongue can tell. And yet it was the best thing that ever happened to the State of Connecticut. It cut the Churches from State-support: it threw them wholly on their own resources, and God.'

Colonel Sanderson, formerly M.P. for North Armagh, whose every sympathy was strongly biased against disestablishment, politically as well as religiously, declared that he voted against the disestablishment of the Church of Ireland, but would not undo that vote if he could: 'He believed the Irish Church at the present moment was stronger and more spiritual than it ever was before.'

2. Voluntaryism and Scripture.—The argument against State support is often rested upon Scripture, but the argument is not final. The passages most frequently quoted and relied upon are:

1 Co 9:14: 'Even so doth the Lord ordain that they which preach the gospel should live of the gospel'; 1 Th 5:10: 'My kingdom is not of this world: if my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight, that I should not be delivered to the Jews'; 2 Co 10:4: 'For the weapons of our warfare are not carnal, but spiritual (or) mighty through God to the pulling down of strong holds'; Gal 6:1: 'Let him that is taught in the word communicate unto him that teacheth in all good things.'

Now it must be premised that the weight of the Scripture argument depends upon the interpretation and application of the passages. So convinced a voluntary as the late Principal Cairns acknowledged this frankly in a lecture delivered in the Synod Hall in 1883:

'The voluntary principle is, in one sense, held by all Christians. They all admit the duty and privilege of giving for voluntary purposes, according to their religious principles, and argue that voluntary, is traversed by Church establishment. Not only is loyalty to Christ imperilled by alliance with the State, but history has proved that such alliances are impossible without situations arising often in which the Church must choose between the will and command of the State and the will and command of Christ.'

Confessively, then, the weight of the Scripture argument rests upon the interpretation of these passages. Scripture authority would be final only if one interpretation were possible. But that is not maintained.

1 Co 9:14, the great proof text of voluntarism, may be correctly rendered: 'even so doth the Lord give instructions or directions that they who preach the gospel should live of the gospel.' The instructions referred to, doubtless, were those given on the occasion of the voluntary is traversed by Church establishment, but seventy, but most of those were local and temporary in their nature: some of them assumed the power of law: others included a voluntary poverty and dependence on Providence ('no purse, no scrip') compatible only with a temporary and unusual Providence, not the condition general or even widespread by our Lord when He said: 'But now, he that hath a purse, let him take it, and likewise his scrip: and he that hath no sword, 1 Disestablishment in Connecticut, quoted in J. Barr, Scotch Church Questions, 1837.

2 Glasgow Herald, 23rd June 1862, quoted in Barr, p. 140.

3 Synod Hall Lectures, Edinburgh, 1882.

4 The Italics are the present writer's.
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let him sell his garment, and buy one.' (2 Cor. iii.) Many of the apostles, as well as Paul, were voluntaryists, and the fact that he still considered this instruction valid for the Church in Corinth does not prove its validity for all time. To say that it was an instruction debares the Church from any help from other persons is surely an irreversible step.

In A.D. 313 and 2 Const. 104 enumerate the same principle that the Church as such will not resort to the weapons of force, but that the individual believer will accept help from a civil power as such is not a self-evident corollary from it. The principle of toleration to liberty of the individual Christian. To say that the Church as such is thereby forbidden to accept a contribution from the State is a non sequitur.

Isolated passages from the OT or the NT for or against disestablishment and disendowment are so differently interpreted and applied by different writers, and these interpretations are so coloured and biased by the writer's position, that definite conclusions cannot be rested upon them.

3. Voluntaryism in history.—The first quarter of the 16th cent. was signalized by three remarkable edicts:—(1) an edict of Galerius signed also by Licinius and Constantine, a venia indulgentia, by which the last great persecution was brought to an end; (2) the edict of Milan (A.D. 313), a declaration of universal religious toleration; (3) proclamation by Constantine 'to the Peoples of the East (A.D. 324), in which toleration is based on the principle of justice.

Thus the issue of the edicts of Constantine was voluntaryism, but the practical issue of his action and influence was State-Churchism. His personal benefactions were very large, and the gifts of an imperial character can hardly be disentangled from those of the State. The whole weight and wealth of the Byzantine Empire under Constantine and his sons in the middle of the 4th cent. were put in the scales on the side of Christianity, and it was essentially established and endorsed as the religion and the worship of the empire.

Space limits us to two or three great names in the voluntary succession.

(1) Ananias Higlieri.—"A. Constantine! to how much ill gave birth, Not thy conversion, but that plentiful doer, Which the first weighty Father gain'd from thee."—

(2) John Milton.—"It concerns every man's conscience to what religion he consents. The civil magistrate is entrusted with civil rights only, not with conscience.... That which each man gives to the minister, he gives either as to God or as to his own teacher. If he gives it to God, he is justified in devoting to religion uses any part either of civil revenue which is the people's and not the State's, except from other taxes, or of any movable property, but God by special command as He did by Moses, or the owner himself by voluntary intention and the persuasion of his giving it to the minister. It is well for him as to his teacher, and eat justice or equity compels him to pay for that which religion leaves freely to his choice whether he will learn or no, whether of this teacher or another and especially to pay for what he never learned or approves not, whereby, besides the wound of his conscience, he becomes less able to recompense his true teacher... most of all are they to be reviled and shamed who cry out with the distinet voice of notorious hirelings that if ye settle not our maintenance by law, farewell the Gospel, than which nothing can be uttered more false nor ignominious, and I may say more blasphemaous against our Saviour who hath promised without this condition both the Holy Spirit and His presence with the Church to the world's end."—

No clearer or weightier exposition of the principle of voluntaryism and the sense of justice to which it appeals lies anywhere before given.

(3) John Locke.—Locke's First letter on Toleration is a powerful exposition of the motto from which it begins: 'Absolute liberty, just and true liberty, equal and impartial liberty is the thing that we stand in need of;' an exposition that would still, I think, be of great service in carrying its logical issue from the magistrate to the Government by which the magistrate is appointed.

(4) A. R. Vinten.—"How will it be possible to persuade the state that it has no right to superintend services for which it pays... whoever pays is master over the service paid for,'?—

(5) Henry Alford.—'Coming, as it does, from one of the most scholarly and most spiritually-minded men in the Church of England, the thoroughgoing voluntaryism of Alford is remarkable.

'The next term is, the severance of the Church from the State. Whether years, or decades of years be taken for the accomplishment of this, this fact is plain and plain however opposed; accomplished it will certainly be... God's arm is thrusting it on, and man's power cannot keep it back.'

Voluntaryism as a principle was not professed by the founder of the Secession and Relief Churches in Scotland or by the Free Church of Scotland at the Disruption. In Scottish Church history it is a practical corollary rather than an a priori principle. The claim of spiritual independence, and the growing certainty that it could not be realized in a State Establishment; the conviction that State support for one branch of the Church was unjust and forced the conscience of those who did not belong to it or believe in it; the conviction, also, on the part of many that State alliance and support were contrary to the teaching of Scripture, led the former United Presbyterian Church almost unanimously to a large majority of the former Free Church of Scotland, to adopt voluntaryism as the polity of the Church. The leaders in that movement were the Principals of four colleges—John Cairns, Robert Rainy, Thomas M. Lindsay, and George C. Hutton of Paisley.

The Church of Ireland was disestablished in 1869, the Welsh Church in 1909, the bill becoming operative in 1911, the Church in France in 1803. No Church is established in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, or South Africa; there is none in the United States. The only English-speaking nations in which establishment still exists are England and Scotland.

4. Questions.—(1) Is voluntaryism compatible with the conservation of endowment? James Barr, in his recently published Scottish Church Questions, the most effective and comprehensive contribution to the subject yet produced, holds that it is not.

'The whole body of the Church is the Church of Scotland, or at least a large majority of the Church of Scotland,' he writes. 'It is the Church of the community of the covenanting fathers; it is the Church of the commonwealth, the Church of the State; and it is the Church of all Scotland.'—

'The Church of Scotland is not the Church of England; it is not the Church of the united Presbyterians and Seceders; it is the Church of the Church of Scotland, and no other.'

Some, however, have claimed for themselves the designation of 'pure voluntaries' who deprecated the alienation of the endowments. Speaking in the Assembly of the Free Church of Scotland in 1852, W. Robertson Smith said:

'I will stand here as a Free Churchman, but perfectly free to say as I do now, that while I am a loyal Free Churchman, recognizing the value of the act of 1853, I also stand here as a voluntary—a pure voluntary';

but Robertson Smith made it clear that he did not take exception to accepting relief from the State.

Objection to endowment rests on three grounds:—(a) it is anti-Scripntural—to which it is replied that that is a matter of interpretation and of circumstances; (b) it is contrary to sound political economy that a State should give monetary help without determining and enforcing the conditions on which it is administered—to which it is replied that, if the State is satisfied with the wisdom and conscience of those to whom the money is given in trust, its duty to itself and to its citizens has been fulfilled; (c) it is incompatible with the principle of spiritual independence; it is not possible that a Church should be endowed, and spiritually free. A distinction, however, may be drawn, and

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has been drawn, between an endowment and a donation.

'1 It is perhaps conceivable that the State should make a donation to the Church without imposing conditions, but that it should make permanent provision for the ministers of religion

and impose no conditions is not for a moment to be thought of.' 1

Furthermore, when it is remembered that many believe that morally as well as legally the endowments to the Church, that the State has never really owned them, but only administered them, that the alienation and secularization of these endowments would be morally unjust and religiously harmful; when further it is remembered that centuries of undisturbed possession establish a prescriptive right in law as well as in equity, it seems clear that one may claim to be a voluntary and yet hold also that the endowments of the Church should not be secularized.

(2) Voluntaryism appeals so often to conscience that one is constrained to ask, Is it possible to be a State-Churchman and yet to be sincerely conscientious? Does voluntaryism claim a monopoly of conscience? Was Elzevirner Erskine not true to his conscience when in 1735 he wrote:

'Whenever it shall appear that the established J udicators are in any measure contriving the cause of Christ, purging and cleansing His house according to His will and the solemn covenant lying upon the members of the Church; I am bound by the law of God, and the members throughout Scotland, I hope not only to return to communion but to enter the gates of Zion with praise.' 2

Thomas Chalmers was loyal to his convictions and conscience when, in his opening address to the first Free Church Assembly, he declared, 'We are not voluntaries,' and when in 1827 and 1838 he bent the weight of his massive intellect and pure heart to the vindication of Church Establishment as being right and expedient. The voluntary is conscientious according to his light; so also is the State-Churchman. To say otherwise would be a 'railing accusation' on one side or the other.

But, if both are equally convinced and equally conscientious, it follows that the conscience of a sincere State-Churchman is forced and wronged by disestablishment in the same measure as the conscience of a sincere voluntary is forced and offended by an existing establishment. The argument leads to a moral dilemma. Neither side could press its conviction if the conscience of another were thereby offended.

Solicitur ambulando. The question is one for men as citizens of the State more than as members of the Church; some convinced voluntaries have held it to be their duty to be troubled by the Church of a man. In a democratic Government like our own the will of the State is the will of the majority of its people. If that majority believe that the best and wisest way in which national religion can be expressed is by a national Church, their right to disestablish and to disendow cannot be questioned.

The voluntary ideal is a Free Church in a Free State. The trend of public opinion everywhere is towards the fulfillment of its realization is inevitable. The principle has been recognized and embodied in Queen Victoria's Proclamation to the native religions when she assumed empire in India.

'2 Firmly relying ourselves on the truth of Christianity, and acknowledging with gratitude the solemn of religion, we declare, as the world and desire to impose our convictions on any of our subjects. We declare to be of all and.popularity that none be in any wise favoured, none neglected or disdained by their religious faith or conscientious convictions; that all shall alike enjoy the equal and impartial protection of the law; and we do strictly charge and enjoin all those who may be in

1 Andrew Henderson, Synod Hall Lectures, Edinburgh, 1853, p. 63.

authority under us that they abstain from all interference with the religious beliefs of any of our subjects on pain of our highest displeasure.'

The justice of that Proclamation to many minds is self-evident; but what is just in India is just for all the world, and the day will come when justice shall be done.

By what path will it come? It may come by way of the State or by way of the Church. State-churchmen and voluntaryists were in agreement in terms. Voluntaryism for the individual is real only when it is spontaneous. Compulsory voluntaryism may force the conscience of the State-Churchman as really as State-Church forces the conscience of the voluntary. Let voluntaryism get its majority and power, and, on the ground of abstract justice, it is entirely justified in enforcing its convictions on the nation. The true voluntaryist, however, hesitates to do it. He will rather suffer wrong than inflict it on the conscience of another.

Voluntaryism may come by way of the Church. Conviction in favour of the disestablishment of Church not only in Free Churches but in those allied with States. The proposed union of the two great Presbyterian Churches in Scotland and the tentative approach of England and her Church of England and Nonconformists are full of hope and promise. The voluntary conviction in each of these unions would leave the whole lump, and voluntaryism would come by a great free-will supremely sacrificing. The Churches would demense themselves of every State-confessed privilege, prerogative, preferment, and prestige and take their place on the platform of toleration and equality with all the Churches of the land.


WILLIAM ROSS.

VONDEL.—I. Early life and writings.—Joost van den Vondel (1587-1679), the greatest of Dutch poets and one of the greatest religious poets of the Counter-Reformation, belonged to the South Netherlands, his parents being natives of Antwerp, pious 'Doopgezinde,' or Baptists, who were driven by religious persecution to settle at Cologne, where the poet was born in 1587. The lovely opening stanzas of his Olyftack aan Gustaef Adolf, written when that town was threatened by the Swedish army, recall his earliest experiences. While he was still a child, his parents migrated, first to Utrecht and later to Amsterdam, where his father soon acquired a considerable business in the hosiery trade. Vondel's younger brother was thus enabled to obtain a good classical and musical education. The poet entered his father's business and was a self-educated man. As an exile from the south, he became early a member
of the Chamber of Rhetoric, 't Wit Lavendel (White Lavender), to which most of the Brabanders in Amsterdam belonged; and his earliest plays and poems were of the same type as the Ridders en van der Hooge and of the Bible plays which, under the influence of the Renaissance and the Reformation, had taken the place of the medieval moralities. The poems show also, like some of Milton's first verse, an admiration of an admixture of theological lore; and the poems of the French Protestant poet Du Bartas. His wife took over the management of the hosier business, and Vondel set himself to the task of repairing the decline of his poetic career; and whatever form his poetry may take, its master-quality is always lyrical—ardour and sweetness, fertility and subtlety of thought, a music of verse which is at once the full and resonant counterpart of the changing moods of his exalted mind. He wrote few or no love poems. Only once or twice in his long life does the current of his private feelings of joy and sorrow rise to the surface in a lyric of joy or sorrow. His personal interests were merged in his passion for great causes, patriotic and religious.

The first conflict which evoked the full strength of Vondel's religious feeling and poetic genius was the critical struggle between the Remonstrant Arminians, supported by the magistrates and cultured circles, and the Calvinist Contra-Remonstrants with the common people behind them, which ended with the Synod of Dort and the execution of Oldenbarnevetel. Vondel's soul was moved to its depths, and about 1618 he attacked Prince Maurice and the preachers under the thin veil of a classical tragedy on the subject of Palamedes. He had to go into hiding and was fined for his boldness. Vondel found a more effective outlet for his feelings in a series of satires, ballads, and poems, which were printed throughout his life. The best of these, the fiery Geese Vesper of Steckhout, Under zijn hart, and the Rompdepot van Hansbro, where the mutual amenities of the Calvinist clergy are portrayed under the figure of a roost full of gobbled, screeching, fighting cocks, are popular songs handled by a poet of genius. The Decretum Horribile is an impassioned denunciation in Alexandrines of the doctrine which consigned infants to eternal perdition. Roosam en Harpoen, in the same verse, are more quiet and argumentative expostulations against endless theological hatred and strife. The Uitvoer van Apollo en Speelstrijd van Apollo en Pan, written when his Lucifer was driven from the stage, read like folk-songs into which a great poet has blown a music as winged and sweet as the Hymn of Pan by Shelley. None of Vondel's poems have presence, nor do they seem to be satirical as the satire.

It would be out of place to quote any full account of the secular poems which flowed from Vondel's pen hereafter till the end of his long life. A large number of them are political and erotic, and none of them exudes, descriptive and lyrical in character, written to celebrate the sea-power of Holland, the birth of a prince to the House of Orange, the victories of Frederick Henry by land or by sea, or the building of a new Stadhuis at Amsterdam, the visits of royal persons, the marriages and deaths of his friends. He was the laureate of Amsterdam for the rest of his life. But he was never the same city was the heart of the Netherlands, and the Netherlands almost the heart of Europe, responsible to every movement from Sweden to Spain, from England and France to Turkey, and looking out over the seas to the East and West Indies. He summoned himself to the task of writing the history of his religious development and some of the chief poems in which his devout and ardent feeling found expression, dramatic, didactic, and lyrical.

2. Attractions of Roman Catholicism.—The steps which led Vondel into the Church of Rome have nowhere been clearly indicated by himself, but they are not difficult to trace. As a Doopsgezind he had been brought up to reject the doctrine of predestination as formulated by the Calvinists. That movement had its ultimate source in the desire to find in the Reformation not so much a new creed as a new method of religious and spiritual communion with God; and for Vondel himself it is clear that Christianity was primarily a movement of the heart, a passionate love of God, a faith in God, a love to his heart. To him Calvin's doctrine seemed an outrage on that faith and love. The bitter fanaticism of the Contra-Remonstrant preachers appeared equally hostile to the spirit of Christian love. Moreover, as a poet and lover of the culture of the Renaissance, he ranged himself with the poets, dramatists, and men of learning, like Grotius, the object of his warmest admiration, who found their chief friends and patrons in the magistrates and middle class who were also the supporters of the Arminian movement. In short his religious and artistic sympathies alike drew him to the side of the Remonstrants. But he had no sympathy with the somewhat Epicurean and sceptical spirit of some of the humanists, as Hofft, who took the same side. Religion was for him the first of interests. Further, within his own Baptist communion were differences that disturbed him and doctrines enunciated to which he could not subscribe. In the Antidatum tegen het Vergift der Geestdrifters (1626) he ranges himself against the supporters of the doctrine of the security of the Christian and the source of inspiration and instruction equal or superior to the written Word. He does not go further in this poem. He does not ask whether the interpretation of Scripture may be left to the individual enlightened by the Spirit. But events showed that this was the question on which his mind was busy, that he was in search of an authority able to allay such storms of conflicting dogmas as had swung over the Netherlands and brought to the seafold one of the savours of his country. The trend of Vondel's mind was diametrically opposed to that of Milton, who was a republican in politics, and became always the custodian of the personal and any organized Church, any authoritative interpreter of Scripture, any mediator between the Scriptures and the individual conscience and reason. An uncompromising adherent of author-}

1 See art. AARANSPAAK, T. II. (3).
2 See art. MULTOON, VOL. VIII. P. 6445.
but elaborates more fully the legend that Alexander the Great spared Jerusalem at the intercession of the high-priest. Like Milton also, Vondel was planning in these years a heroic poem, and the subject he selected was the conversion and victories of Constantine. He had reached the battle at Milailen when his wife died, and the poem was never completed nor any part of it published. He turned to tragedy, and prepared for the new Amsterdam theatre a classical tragedy on the legend of a Hound. Gijsbrecht van Aemstel, supplying the details of his plot from the description of the destruction of Troy in the second and third books of the Iliad. The best things in the play are the beautiful choruses on married love and on the Massacre of the Innocents; but the sympathetic treatment of Roman Catholic rites and beliefs throughout the play warned his countrymen of the coming change which was consummated in the autumn of 1641. With the Gijsbrecht, too, Vondel began a long series of dramas on Biblical subjects or saints' legends, but including two patriotic plays — Der Batavische Gebroeders and the general De Leeuwendaelers. Vondel did what Milton in the same years would probably have done had he not turned from poetry to political and religious controversy. But, on his hand, what Milton would not have found in England — a theatre to perform his religious plays.

The relations of the Protestant Reformation and the drama were complex, and differed in different countries. In general, both the Reformation was antagonistic to the stage generally, on much the same grounds as the early Church, and especially to the realistic presentation of the great mysteries of the Christian faith in the miracle and mystery-plays. But, on the other hand, the moralities lent themselves to polemical ends, Protestant as well as Roman Catholic; and the educational interest of the theatre and its need as an instrument in drama composed in Latin — e.g., the Jephthes and Baptizes of Buchanan and the flourishing drama, Terentian and Senecan, on Scriptural subjects, of Germany, Switzerland, and the Low Countries. From both of these sources were descended the novelesque Biblical plays of the Chambers of Rhetoric, the kind of play with which Vondel had begun. But the Eglishire, the most famous of the Amsterdam plays, and its successor — the Academy, founded by Coster, a minor dramatist, preferred secular plays, native farces, romantic plays of the English type, but without their poetry, and classical plays. The new Theatre which finally took the place of Coster's Academy was opened with Vondel's Gijsbrecht, and it was here that all his subsequent plays were presented with elaborate and gorgeous staging and scenery. These plays differ from his earliest experiments simply in their more classical form, as that was understood, their closer resemblance to the Latin plays of Gratie.

3. Vondel and Milton. — Vondel's genius was not dramatic, and his ardent piety still further limited his dramatic treatment of its themes. He was incapable of letting his artetic genius so far get the upper hand of his diviner purpose as to create a great figure like Milton's Satan. His favourite hero is the pious and submissive saint whose first virtue is unquestioning obedience to the will of God and whose main virtue is sometimes even painful, as in De Gebroeders, a play on the subject of the expiatory murder of Saul's sons, in which David's piety is shown by his becoming accessory to a crime at the bidding of a pious and political high-priest. Vondel's temper is more attractively expressed in plays whose hero is some young saint of pure and ardent piety, like Joseph in the two plays with which he followed up his translation of Grotius's drama on the subject of Joseph's temptation, Joseph in Daathan and Joseph in Egypten, or again in the beautiful character of Jephtha's daughter in Jephtha. The most famous of all his plays the Lucifer, will not bear comparison dramatically with the great opening books of Paradise Lost. Vondel gives as the motive for the rebellion of Lucifer the announcement by his father, the Sun, that he is to take the Sun himself and thereby raise humanity to a higher level than the angels, following the tradition that the Incarnation was independent of the Fall. With his eye upon the Rebellion in England, to which he was passionately hostile, he presented the revolt more in the form of a mutiny among the angels, in which Lucifer allows himself to be pushed to the front, concealing his deeper ambitions under a veil of zeal for the rights and liberties of his order — a Cromwell, in short, as a royalist sentinent interpreted Cromwell's policy and career. For Milton also disobedience to the absolute and unquestioning will of the Creator is a crime, but there was in Milton the temper that rebels, and he was on Cromwell's side, and the apologist of regicide. His feelings and imaginations are not only to the history of his dogma, but the great and human figure of Satan as he himself presented to us in the opening books, Vondel's strength did not show itself in dramatic creation, nor, any more than Milton's, in philosophical or mystical interpretation of the Incarnation and the fall; but in descriptive and lyrical poetry — the opening picture of Eden, the final conflict of angels in the air, a great naval battle as between ангелы van Tromp and diabolic Blakes, and the choral odes — e.g., that on God which closes the first act:

*Wie is het die zo hoogg geseten,
Zoo diep in 't grondeloos licht.*

All Vondel's plays show the same weakness in the portrayal of heroic and dramatic characters, the same descriptive and lyrical qualities. Such a pious and complete acceptance of the Christian view of life as Vondel's leaves little room for tragedy such as that of the Greeks or Shakespeare; for it eliminates those conceptions of fate and chance and the enigma of human life which such tragedy is an expression.

4. Teaching the plays. — The teaching of the plays is in general simply Christian and Biblical; only latently is it specifically Roman Catholic, as in Jephtha, where Vondel makes Jephtha's sin his stubborn reliance on his own conscience rather than on the authority of the priest whom he consults. Vondel's more purely Roman Catholic sentiments found expression in lyrico-ididactic poems such as the Broeken der Heilige Maagden (1642), saints' letters modelled on the Heroes of Ovid; the Altergo-geheimenissen (1645), an impassioned didactic on the sacrament of the Mass, the Scriptural and ecclesiastical authority for the Roman Catholic Church, and the mystery of the worship of the Host, and the rites with which that worship is invested: De Heerlijkheid der Kerke (1663) on the glory of the Church; and the Bespiegeling van God en Godtendien (1663) on the attributes of God.

More interesting than these to the reader of to-day, especially the non-Catholic reader, are those poems for which Vondel, as a Protestant, was intended for a didactic purpose, his personal feelings in strains which reveal what a fullness of happiness the devotional richness of the Roman Catholic Church brought to him as to the English poet Crashaw. *De Koninklijke Hulp,* a brooding river of song:
in praise of David's Psalms, the Opdrukacht acn De Heilighe Monstro, prefixed to the Brieven mentioned above, a white flame of adoration, are good examples. The perhaps most touching of all are the shorter, simpler lyrics evoked by the death of his wife, his little son Constantijn's 'zalig kijnje,' his daughter, and his grand-daughter. The Uitwond van myn Dochterken, written in 1633, is an unrehearsed portrait of sorrow, simple but perfect in form. The corresponding Uitwond van Maria van den Vondel (1688) is a hymn of resignation to God's will that hardly breathes regret.

When this earthly life hath ended
A life of God and angels tended,
His gift to those that earn His love,
Wint from that Unity is severed
Must here to weary exile go
On earth no resting-place discover,
In heaven her fatherland and house.

Her dying breath went out to God
Whither all hearts must turn to last,
The goal, the rest, the perfect portion;
And in that prayer all sorrow passed
The resignation which such poems breathe was displayed by Vondel in the heroic close of his life when the aged poet sacrificed his whole fortune to redeem the debts of a worthless son and spent ten years of his life in the service of his native city as a journalist. The public power of the Dutch State rewarded him with a pension of 60 florins a month for Pegasus. He died in 1679 at the age of ninety-two.

5. Place as a religious poet.—The personal note of the individual's life is seen historically the most important; for the significance of many poets like Crashaw and Vondel, emphasized by the supreme place which the latter holds among the poets of a country which had been in the vanguard of the Reformation in the Netherlands, reveals the importance of the Counter-Reformation, where it was that the Protestant movement had miscarried, had ended, not as its leaders anticipated, in a victory of Christ's Church over Antichrist, but in a definite rendering of the seamless garment, a division leaving truth and untruth, good and evil, on either side. In its eager quest of a purer and more Scriptural creed and simpler worship, its impatient desire to root out the tares of 'humanity'—traditions and ceremonies, Protestantism had outrun the human heart, had ignored the depth and power of the instincts of those beliefs and rites were the life-blood of the true priesthood of Christ, the Church speaking with authority; the significance of the sacraments, above all of the Eucharist—the 'This is my body,' 'This is my blood'; the devo- tion to the person of Christ and its overflow in the cult of the Virgin and saints—there were in Protestant countries and churches of all denominations hearts to which these things had only to be presented to make immediate and irresistible appeal. Some of the most interesting movements in Protestantism since the 17th cent. have repre- sented the effort of individuals to recover these sources of devotion without sacrificing Protestant loyalty to SCRIPTURES, and the history of truth; and there have been corresponding movements in the Roman Catholic Church to secure a higher level of Scriptural and historical truth without any sacrifice of traditional devotion. Vondel was not a poet of the calibre of Dante or Milton; there is nothing striking and original in the content of his thought; but a poetry so resonant and harmonious, uttering with perfect impassioned rhythm and force the exultations and exultations of a great Christian soul—a Roman Catholic poet in a Protestant country—can never be without significance for the student of religious thought and feeling in Western Europe since the Reformation.

For the student of the drama too there is an interest, corresponding to that of the religious drama of Calderon, in this last survival in a Protestant country of the drama of the Middle Ages.

Catholicism, says a recent writer, 'like the Greek but unlike the English, had not cut itself off from its religious origins, and so remained a far more truly national institution than the English drama ever became after the Reformation.'

Vondel's drama is throughout religious and patriotic. If it is not completely national, it is because this is the spirit which it expresses and not that of the great body of the Dutch people and because it does not do full justice, as Shakespeare's did, to the secular interests of the nation as these had taken shape and colour under the quickening influence of the Renaissance.

LITERATURE.—The most complete bibliography, up to date, is in H. W. Unger, Catalogue of Writings, etc., by J. van den Vondel, Amsterdam, 1887; Bibliographie van de Vaderlands Werken, do. 1888. See also G. Kalff, Geschiedenis der Nederlandsche Letterkunde, Groningen, 1896-1914, iv. 333-346. The best ed. of Vondel's works is that of J. van Lennepe, in 28 vols., Leyden, 1818-44; Geeraardt Brandt, Leben van Vondel, Amsterdam, 1882, ed. Emile Verweij, 1886, is the classical biography. A complete list of Vondel's dramas, not including translations, in order of production is: Het Pascha (1613), Ptolemades (1625), Hieronymus van Amstel (1626), De Wijngaerde (1639), De Gebroeders (1639), Joseph in Dothan (1640), Joseph in Egypt (1641), Eerstere Vondelsche Pieter en Petrus (1641), Maria Stuart (1642), De Lovenambt (1643), Lucifer (1644), Stal- mena (1657), Jeptha (1659), Koning David in ballingschap (1660), Koning David in gezelschap van Hetzelsheing (1661), De Batavische Gebroeders (1663), Poeta (1663), Adam in ballingschap (1664), Daal en Zevenheuvelen (1667), Nicolaas van den Boegrand (1667) is a short didactic epic suggested in part by G. B. Marinus's La Strage dei Innocenti. For the religious drama of the Reformation see art. DRAMA (Introductory), s.v. C. H. Herford, Literary Relations of England and Germany in the 16th Century, London, 1906; W. Joseph, Die Gesch. des neuern Drama, Halle, 1895-1909, vol. ii. bk. i. and elsewhere. Note also G. Edmundson, Milton and Vondel, London, 1885; H. J. C. Grierson, The English Drama of the Seventeenth Century (in 'Periods of European Literature' ser.), Edinburgh, 1900, p. 33; and Kalff, op. cit.; Vondel's Lucifer, tr. L. C. Van Noppen, New York, 1885.

H. J. C. GRIESEON.

VOODOO.—Voodoo is devil-worship and fetishism brought from the Gold Coast of Africa by negro captives to the United States and West Indies. Its chief sacrifice is a girl child, referred to by the initiates as 'the goat without horns.' When a child is not available, a white kid takes its place. Excepting at the great semi-annual festival when the 'goat' is drugged, killed, and eaten, black dogs, cocks, and hens are cruelly sacrificed by being dashed so that their bowels fall out. There is a regular farce performed, and rob the devotees. These sometimes have the name pepetaloi and mamoisi, more frequently poppy and narcum, used as a prelex to their given names. The head of the circle or association of priests and priestesses has the title of 'king'; e.g., King Alexander was long the head of the cult in the south-western states. The entrance into the priesthood is won by many and difficult tests. The aspirant (man or woman) must endure hunger, thirst, extreme heat and cold; must go sleepless, unless commanded to have the dream-tormented sleep induced by drugs; must eat out of and drink the ooze of the drugs. While performing these rites, he must keep a calm mind and strong will, and memorize the power of various poisons, from rattle-snake venom, stramonium, and water-hemlock to putrid liver and carbolic acid. Also he must acquaint himself with the properties of healing herbs, such as red clover for cancer, dock for liver trouble, benset for fever, etc. Must learn to make thick-rum, rich-tasting pastes of love, fingers-of-death, and other fetishes, and lay up in his memory the incantations which he must mumble as he works and the number of times he must repeat them, for numbers are very important.

1 John Eglington, Anglo-French Etudes, 1917, p. 59.
in his magic. He must, above all else, concentrate his will, so that, by the time he is considered a finished product by his school, he is a hypnotist of power. When he has satisfied his teachers as to his requirements, he is set to lead a season's dances, these being fire-, snake-, and moon-dances. The fire-dance is the most important, and is called the 'great dance' (megadromos) of the devil; but in Homer and Hesiod we first meet with the technical ἀνάθεμα, and inscriptions of about the same age have ἑθύμα, ἑθῦμα, ἑθυμα, and ἑτυμα. Shortly after this the term used for the votive offering becomes generalized: ἀνάθεμα and, as its passive, ἀναθήματα, being used to distinguish such things from gifts to human beings (เทพย, ἀναθέμα). These terms remained until the 4th cent. and later they lose their force. These changes probably correspond to psychological changes, the offering being considered at first as a gift to the god, then as a gift from the giver, and finally the religious feeling being swallowed up in self-glorification. The shifting centre of gravity changes the character of the gift, and at last robs it of its value.

2. Occasional Uses. The offerings might be given on any occasion, customary or special, public and private; but, whether state or person was the giver, the principle remained the same. Our classification is perhaps preferable to the former one. (a) Customary. — There are many records of customary offerings at the recurrent festivals. Such are the dedication of a ναῦσα to Athene every four years at Great Panathenaea, and a ναῦς to Herm at Olympia every four years, and a ναύς to Apollo at Amyclae; Alcamen's Παρθένον seems to describe a similar gift to Artemis Orthia at Sparta. We know that many other ancient images were clothed, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that these customs did not stand alone. The periodical washing and dressing of images is common in the East, and its ancient character is obvious. Hecuba indeed gives a fine role to Athene, but the records of the public and customary dedications do not go beyond the 6th century. A βήσις sent to an oracle carried with it votive offerings as well as sacrificial animals. Hyperides describes one of them dressed and decorated. The statue of Dion at Dodona, and an oracle from the same place demanded sacrilege with the gift of a bronze table for the gift that the Athenian people had sent. Other festivals demand the ceremonial gift of a βήσις; we find them year after year at Branchide, where fourteen cities dedicate one in year, and at Delos. So the Athenian colonies sometimes sent gifts to the great festivals of Athens. It is reasonable to assume that the practice was customary at public festivals.

The private worshipper who took part in a festival was certainly expected to offer something. There are occasional allusions to this; but it may be safely inferred from the preservation of thousands of little, uniform, of the same shape and size, and of anthropomorphic figures of certain types. These are found in most ancient shrines in regular series from the earliest strata; and, whatever they meant, we may assume them to have been sold by the priest to visitors for the purpose of dedication. The worshipper may very likely have taken the

1 See Pieper, Questions Antiquitates, p. 20.
4 Rosse, Greek Votive Offerings, pp. 573.
6 Dem. Miolet., 531.
7 Rosse, p. 578.
9 I. C. 330. 1. (397 B.C.)
10 E.g., the Athenian inscription, H. Collitz, Säumung der griechen, Bandt-Inschriften, ii. (Berlin, 1880) 6085, 91, and 1 Delphi.
opportunity then to present some special petition; so that it is impossible to be certain of the occasion for many one.

But there are a large number of objects, common in the Archaic period and later, that can best be explained as memorials of the act of worship. Such are the well-known statuettes of Artemis at Athens, bearing a calf over his shoulders, just as the modern Greek does still on Good Friday. There are several similar figures known; and large numbers of little clay figures carry some offering, often a present of perfume, or plant-stalk, dove, or other bird, fruit, flower, or garland, which have been found in Athens, Calaures, Corcyra, Crete, Cyprus, Dodoma, Ephesus, Naukratis, Sparta, Thebes, Thebes. Others, again, are grouped in a ring-dance, and there are single figures who bear pipes or harp or play upon some musical instrument, who carry in the hand a bowl or jug or lustral spray or a jar of water on the head, who clap the hands or uplift them in the attitude of worship. A peculiar variety are the figures of Artemis found in Corcyra; the goddess stands facing, and a votary is seen in the act of dancing before her. In late times they are called ACT IV, with or without priestesses. The most remarkable of these are those discovered in Crete and Ephesus. In a shrine at Chios were found figures which apparently represented a female in ceremonial dress, holding and girt with snakes: similar figures, less elaborate, at Palaikastro and Gournes; at Ephesus, perhaps priestesses, and probably the eunuch priest. Relief-carving reached its perfection in the 5th cent. and then and later, the sacrifice, the libation, and the feast are commemorated in reliefs. The worshipper may dedicate the clothes actually worn in doing the rite; even nude male figures have been found made in porcelain.

(b) Occasional.—Here fall the great majority. State or person may return thanks thus for victory in war or deliverance from peril; and the person often marks by an offering the date of some event such as marriage and retirement from active life. Any supposed wrath of a deity may be met with a propitiatory offering, and the sin of the human being thus expiated.

Motives.—The motive may be thanksgiving, prayer, or propitiation, chiefly the two former. Help or deliverance from peril and success in some undertaking are the commonest occasions of the act of worship. The motive of the offering was sometimes given in anticipation; to keep the god in mind of the prayer; if we may draw a deduction from the customs of modern Greece, this would be common in cases of sickness. The crew of Odysseus, intending to steal the oxen of the sun, vow to build him a temple if they return to Ithaca; and Croesus appeared with rich gifts the oracles of Apollo and Amphitaurus, which had guessed his riddle and were angry with him for his unbelief. For unbelief a worshipper at Ephesus was ordered to offer a silver pig, and other indications exist that small offerings were made for a breach of etiquette. Fixed fines or confessions differ from these in being compulsory. For bloodguilt propitiation was not uncommon. Temples are recorded as being built for this cause; and after the murder of Pausanias the Delphic oracle commanded that his statue be dedicated in the Brazen House, whence he was dragged forth to die. The nine archons at Athens swore to dedicate a statue of Apollo at Delphi if they should break the laws. One inscription mentions the motive of dedication 'fear of the wrath of the twin Tindarids.'

4. Classification.—Certain numbers of the worshipper's gifts are of direct use in the god's service. Such are temples or shrines and the articles used in them. Temples dedicated on a special occasion are recorded in legend and in history. Delphi erected a temple to Apollo in Argos, in memory of an omen which encouraged him in seizing the kingdom; Hercules and Theseus do the like. The temple of Apollo at Bassae commemorates the deliverance of the city from pestilence, and that of Hera in Sparta deliverance from flood. The murder of a tyrant was expiated by the temple of Artemis at Tegea. A colonnade is built in some religious precinct with the spoils of war, as that of the Athenians at Delphi; so with certain of the Treasuries at Delphi. Parts of a temple might be specified, as the pillars of that in Ephesus dedicated by Croesus; this became very common in later times, when it often means no more than that some official paid for repairs or even arranged for them. Altars are a common dedication, especially late, some being presented in the form of a tripi—articles for the idol have already been mentioned. Many articles of intrinsic value, such as ornaments or coins, may have been given as valuables; but these are generally appropriate to the occasion, as we shall see.

Another class consists of what may properly be called ἄνεμοι, οἱ ἄγαλματα τῷ θεῷ. The ἀγκρόβια, or choice pieces, are given from spoils of war—as the throne of Xerxes, the manger of Mardonios, statues from the temples of a conquered foe. So also any rariety—the stone swallowed by Cronus, the sceptre of Hephaistos, Dedalus's wings, mummish bones.

But in the great majority of things dedicated, even if they have material value, the ideal value predominates: they are in fact appropriate to the occasion. We may classify these: (a) image of the deity, (b) the act or process blessed by the deity, (c) the winnings, (d) the tool or means.

(a) Image of the deity.—In all the great shrines large numbers of clay figures are found that must represent the deity. Many of them have been found in Boiotia, in the shrine of Apollo Pion, and many other places, were probably meant for the god; and also the κέμοι of Athens and Delos. Some in each class are dedicated as a tithe or firstfruits; and the armed bronze Athena dedicated by a baker-woman shows that there need be no connexion of the type and the occasion.

Perhaps the figure of the nursing mother may be a goddess in her beneficent aspect; but these seem more likely to represent the devotee. Later, the god's beneficent activity is represented in a series of reliefs, which show Asklepios and his attendants curing the sick. With less confidence, the same may be held for a few other classes of reliefs. These begin late in the 5th century.

(b) Act or process blessed by the god.—The earlier examples are simpler in conception. We would include here the warrior armed, a type that goes back to the 7th cent. at least, sailors rowing their galley, the victor in his car with Victory driving, the jockey on his coursier, the athlete with his proper attributes or in proper pose, the hunter with his game, the dairy-farmer milking his cow, perhaps the peasant in flat and cloak. Here also we would place the common statuettes of the nursing mother and the various scenes of childbirth, which are becoming more common with the progress of excavation. These must sometimes represent the devotee, and it is reasonable to assume that they always do, in the absence of direct proof that they represent the deity. A more authoritative representation is a bronze stoneware from the Athenian acropolis, inscribed so as to leave no doubt as to its meaning: ην δεινα (=δεινα) με τάθελων ἁλθέντες. This may give the key to interpret figurines of rams, bulls, and horses, which are found everywhere. A complete scene of animal life is not uncommon: brood-mare suckling a foal, stag attacked by hounds, or the hound alone, hawk gripping hare.

There are vast numbers of other animals, which more probably belong to the next class. In many cases the figure may be a simple reminder of a tale to which the key is lost, like the figure of an ass that prevented a surprise by his bray,4 or that of a frog which directed a traveller to a spring. An early series of painted tablets found at Corinth depicts every stage of the staple industry of the place, pottery-making, together with hunting and farming and vine-dressing; later, athletic contests were often commemorated by a relief.10 We may perhaps add the rather rare instance of a workman dedicating his first or chief piece of work, or a model of it. The most definite instance of the 'masterpiece' is Lycurgus' pot, inscribed, Λυκρίνος ἀνέθηκε τῇ Ἀθηναίᾳ τῷ πρῶτῳ ἡρετῷ. Mandrocles, who could not place his bridge over the Hellespont in the temple of Hera, placed a picture of it instead.11 A summary memorial of healing was often a model of the part affected. These have now been discovered in very ancient deposits of Crote and Ephesus; hitherto they have been very common from the 4th cent. B.C. to our own day, and hardly known before.12

Ephesus was also a real human tooth, bound with gold wire (for hanging). Things outworn may be regarded as similar memorials of the act blessed. There is little room for this. The earliest is an epigram of Simonides,2 but there is enough to show that the thing might be. Later, its sentiment won favour for it, and it became common. So the lion man dedicates his crutch or the sick man his bandage; children dedicate their toys at puberty; and clothes worn in time of peril are dedicated by the survivors.3

(c) The winnings.—The oldest and most important group of these are the spoils of war, which are found everywhere, dedicated to practically all gods, from the earliest times to far into the Christian era. The trophy itself is a war-dedication; and the warrior made his gift to the god whom he believed to have helped him, i.e. usually to the patron of his own city or tribe. It is rather mean to dedicate a small model of spoils, but it seems to have been done. In Olympia, Delos, Lusi, and Crete have been found useless or miniature models of shields, helmets, longcoats, cuirasses, and knives, besides others, such as axes, which may be memorials of war.3 So with the athletic prize: from Hesiod's tripod in the 8th cent. to the prize tripods at Athens and the Triopia, athlete, vassal, or crown of Zeus. As the bronze sickle at Sparta,3 there is plenty of evidence of the custom. Models in gold of corn-sheaves, sulphur, olives, or vine doubtless display thanks for a good harvest; and perhaps some of the numerous animal models, which include almost every domestic kind and most game, are due to the hunter's gratitude.6

(d) The tool or means.—Sometimes the soldier dedicated the arms or weapons used in battle; sometimes the athlete dedicated his chariot or his quoit or leaping-weight. Later, we have models of sickles, wine-presses, and the like recorded in literature. There is not much evidence of this, but there is enough to show that the thing was done.7 It should be noted that wherever the worshipper's figure appears, he is depicted as engaged in some significant act. His portrait, as such, is never dedicated by himself. The human being never appears except when something of the ideal is implied. There are some apparent exceptions; but in Greece they are only apparent, and, if not apparent, they are not Greek. Later, beginning in the 4th cent., all this changed; and the honorific statue came in just when the votive offering became a means of self-glorification. The old spirit harshly survived except in cases of dedications for relief from sickness and peril.


1 Hogarth, pl. xxix. 7. 2 Anth. vi, 82. 3 Rouse, p. 316; ESA viii. 258, xi. 396. Probably these were currency, as are certainly worn and are in some parts (Rouse, p. 300, pl. ii., fig. 68). 4 Hesiod, Works and Days, 654. 5 Rouse, p. 360; ESA xii. 361, 384. 6 Rouse, p. 368. 7 Db. 8 Hogarth, pl. xxxi. 424. 9 Rouse, p. 355 ff. 10 Ibid., p. 355 ff. 11 By p. 76; Hogarth, p. 146. 12 Ibid., p. 77. 13 Ibid., p. 144. 14 Ibid., p. 143. 15 Ibid., p. 143. 16 Ibid., p. 143.
VOWS.

VOWS (Buddhist).—1. Vows at ordination.—The primitive and most fundamental form of taking vows in Buddhism consisted in expressing one’s confession of faith on the occasion of ordination (upasanmpadā). The words uttered at ordination before the master of the ceremony were the regular formula (bhavan-uññāna) of taking refuge in the Buddha, in the Dharma, and in the Sangha, repeated three times as a rule. This profession of faith was associated with other professions—of personal purity, of determination to practise all the precepts and rules of conduct ordained by the Buddha—for the newly ordained was, after the regular parly, instructed in the rules of discipline, and therein was implied the vow to observe those rules. As the profession of his faith, the ceremony differed among the schools of Buddhism, and various doctrines developed as to the efficacy of the ceremony, its influence upon the life of the ordained, its relationship to the other branches of Buddhist training, etc. The more important aspect in the development of the practice and doctrine was the Mahāyāna conception of vow-taking, i.e., its significance in the ethics of the bodhisattva.

2. The vow of a bodhisattva.—As is seen in the art. PRAYER (Buddhist), prayer in Buddhism amounted to taking the vow to perfect oneself on the way to Buddhahood and thereby to save others. It takes, as a rule, the form of vows (parajñāna or prajñādhi) taken by a bodhisattva (or any other Buddhist) before a master Buddha, who gives assurance (śraddhavyāma) that the vow-taker shall finally attain full Buddhahood: the task of the vow-taker is then to dedicate all his good qualities and meritorious deeds for the realization of his high purpose. The specific methods and points in the acts of dedication (parajñāna) are copied from the special vows attributed to the Buddhahs and bodhisattvas of the past, recorded in various texts. As a specimen we cite here a passage from the "Lotus" (Lotusavatāra-puṇḍarikā) where Buddha Sākyamuni tells his all-saving power:

"There shall never be any being, Who, having heard the truth of Buddha, shall not attain Buddhadhāma.
For the vow taken by all the Buddhās is this:—
"Let me lead them to Bodhi, by accomplishing (my works).
Throughout future days Buddha will expound Many billions of the truths of truth.
They shall reveal this unique road (āra-pāna) And preach thereby the truth for the Tathāgata-schipā.
The 'unique road' is explained as working out in life the stability of truth, the continuity of existence. Being is one throughout all existences, and therefore the ardent intention expressed in a bodhisattva’s vow and his work of salvation can induce other beings to the same goal of life, while the assurance given by his predecessor not only encourages him in the work of salvation but has a mysterious, or metaphysical, efficacy to help him in the progress of bodhi.

3. The composition of the vow-takers.—The vows are destined to be fulfilled not only by means of earnest intention and ardent work on the part

1 See SBE xii. [1881] 155, etc.; J.A.S. 1875, pp. 1-16.
3 See D. T. Suzuki, Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism, p. 399, for a typical bodhisattva vow taken from a Chinese version of the Swarajaprabha.

4 Of the vow-taker but also in virtue of the assuring help rendered him by the master Buddha and of the mutual exchange of vows. This is due to the metaphysical continuity of existences and to the consequent reciprocation among the vow-takers, i.e. bodhisattvas, of the works of dedication done in fulfilment of their vows. The realm of existence is likened, in a metaphor often used, to a net in which every knot is studded with a brilliant diamond and all those diamonds mutually reflect their lustre and figures. Every one in the realm does perpetually affect, more or less, all others by his or her ideas and deeds, good or bad, noble or mean. The intention and resolution (chattotpada) are the preliminary to the vow, and it is by the act of dedication that the individual work; but these three phases are one in their essential nature, not only on the part of an individual vow-taker but in the communion of all the vow-takers of the past, present, and future, because these phases and the individuals are but manifestations of the bodhi-chitta, one and the same throughout all the realms of existence.

4. Further examples.—The Buddhist ideal was to emulate the bodhisattvas of the past, and we have many records of vows taken by historical or imaginary personages. These were an expression of emulation as well as a source of inspiration, because in the Indian Buddhist view, a bodhisattva is a potential bodhisattva, and it is within the reach of a common mortal to emulate a bodhisattva and to pledge himself to similar tasks. We may cite here the vows taken, in the presence of the Buddha Sākyamuni and his great disciples, by Queen Srimālā, of Benares, the alleged daughter of King Prasenajit, of Kosāla. The vows consist of ten preliminaries and three great vows, wherein she says:

"I shall never cherish any thought of breaking the precepts which I have now accepted. From to-day up to the attainment of Buddhahood I shall never cherish any idea of pride toward the elders ... I shall never arouse any angry thought toward any fellow-being ... I shall never say any evil in others' bodily excellence or beauty ... I shall never arouse arrogant thought concerning all things, whether subjective or objective ... I shall never accumulate any wealth for my own sake, but shall distribute it out all that I shall receive for helping poor and suffering people.

2 See art. PRAYER (Buddhist).
3 For illustration of this point see The Garland of the Bodhisattva’s Precious Work, in a Chinese tr., perhaps a Mahāyāna development of the Jātaka-nātika; see B. Sanjō, Catalogue of the Chinese Translation of the Buddhist Teiijōs, Oxford, 1892, p. 1092; or art. PRAYER (Buddhist), vol. x. p. 169.
4 In the Indo-China Charitā, or Samantabhadra-charitā-prajñānāma-gaha; see K. Watanahe, Die Bhaisrajā, Leipzig, 1912, text and translation.
I shall praise the four embracing methods (saṃgraha) not for the sake of upholding and maintaining them, but for the sake of abandoning and saving, and thus being free from attachment, never being weary (of my work), and being without any entanglement in the mind, shall embrace the loving-kindness of the Buddhas. Whenever I shall meet any unfortunate people, orphans, deserted, impoverished, suffering from various miseries and tribulations, I shall never leave them unhelped nor stop until they will be saved and freed from sufferings, through righteousness. 1

We have here an instance of the vow intended for maintaining the Buddha’s body. 

In contrast to the peaceful intention of the queen’s vow, we have another type of the vow to persevere in service and missionary activities. These are told in the “Lotus” how the Buddha Sākyamuni, before entering the Great Decease, prepared his disciples, both human and superhuman, for the hard tasks to be achieved and the difficulties to be encountered by them after the Master’s death. Then the bodhisattvas pledge themselves in the presence of the Buddha to remain faithful to his admonition and warning, even after he passes away, and to fight opponents and persecutors, even in remote countries. The ardent and passionate tone of this vow sometimes aroused the fighting spirit in combative Buddhists and gave them a consoling assurance of the righteousness of their cause.2 A part from the question of the period and circumstances of the composition of the book, we have here a counterpart to the missionary charge and an extension of the story of Punna, the first missionary to the barbarous Sākyas.

5. The ‘prime vow’ of a Buddha as a redeeming power.—Just as the vow taken by a bodhisattva served as an inspiration and incentive to Buddhist morality, the vow accomplished by a Buddha furnished the occasion for adoration and devotion to the achiever of the wonderful vow. A bodhisattva is a being on the way to bodhi, while a Buddha is one who has reached the end of the way, where he has established a paradise to receive those who believe in his power. His vow is fulfilled, as shown in the glories of his paradise, and is called the ‘prime vow’ (pārve-prajñādhāna), while its actual effectuation manifests itself in the increase of power, more or less vicarious, of the Buddha. We see here a special stream of Buddhist faith developed out of the metaphysical conception of the power of vow-taking—a stream which was further divided into various branches according to the respective nature of the vows taken by several Buddhas.

Of the vows attributed to Buddhas who on that occasion became objects of specific worship we take two most important cases—that of the Buddha Bhaisajya-guru (the Medicine-Master), the lord of the western paradise Sūkhāvati; and that of the Buddha Amitābha (the Infinite Light), the lord of the western paradise Sukhāvatī, the Land of Bliss. Apart from the questions pertaining to the mythical origin of these Buddhas and their parinirvānas, we note here an interesting contrast between their respective vows and between the streams of religious faith based on their worship. Both are the product of the eastern paradise8 pudes, himself, among other things, to save the sick and other sufferers and to give them immediate comfort, while the lord of the Land of Bliss promises to take to his paradise all those who cherish a pious faith in his saving power. Thus the Medicine-Master was a supernatural medicine-man, and his worship became a religion of healing, while the Buddha of Infinite Light was almost a vicarious saviour, and the faith in his redemptive power developed into a pietism, a Christianity within Buddhism, so to speak.

Let us see the vows taken by Bhaisajya-guru. The story that, while he was still a bodhisattva, he pledged himself to the following twelve vows:

(1) Let me, on attaining Buddhahood, realize all the supernatural glory of the Buddha’s body and all the realities of existence, and induce all beings to the same glories.
(2) Let me, on attaining Buddhahood, create all the luminous realms and thus illumine all those who are drowned in darkness.
(3) (5) amount to vowing that all beings be induced to Buddhist perfection.
(6) Let me release all the crippled, mutilated, blind, deaf, lesers, sick of every description, from their sufferings and have them supplied with wholesome limbs or body.
(7) (8) amount to vowing that all beings be induced to Buddhist perfection.
(9) Let me release all those who, being starved, commit offences for getting food, by giving them, first, delicate food and then giving them a saturation in the taste of true bliss.
(10) Let me save all those who, being destitute of clothes, would be attacked by cold or heat, insects and worms, by giving them all kinds of fine clothes, decorations, perfumes.

Here we see a Buddhist counterpart of the Vedic Sārya or Sūrya, and it is no wonder that Bhaisajyaguru was worshipped for the sake of immediate helpfulness.

In the myth of the western paradise the Buddha Amitābha was once a monk Dhammarāja, who vowed to furnish a paradise for the pious souls and accomplished the task by a long and severe self-denial.4 By supplying the whole world with light as the sole means of calling forth his saving power. The vow is taken before the Buddha Lokevārājya as the testimony, and consists of three parts. The first part is chiefly in praise of the Master Buddha and is an expression of the vow-taker’s determination to imitate and emulate him.5 The second part consists of the forty-six specific terms of Dhammarāja’s intention and purpose in furnishing a paradise in the west and inducing all beings, without distinction of good and bad, of wise and fool, to share the glorious and blissful life in the paradise. 6 The last part is the consecration of the second and takes the form of a paeanic committal to carry out the plan, and even of a compelling call to the universe to respond to his ardent intentions and to give an assurance of the final attainment.

Here we see the Buddhist conception and practice of taking a solemn vow developed to a faith in the saving and redeeming power of the vow.

Finally let us add a remark on a modification, or degeneration, of the vow to curse or magic formula of the case with the Tantric form of Buddhism. Here we see a circle of prajñādhāna, starting from entreatment and petition and resulting in the use of the vow and prayer

1 The Prime Vows of the Tathāgata Bhaisajyaguru (Manjusri, SBE, ii. 170).

2 See Suriyā-nikāya, iv. 60-63.

3 See Āgama-sūtra, vi. 134.

4 Forty-six specific terms: see M. Amako, Nichiren, the Buddhist Prophet, Cambridge, Mass., 1916, pp. 113-114.

5See SBE xx. [1885] 239-561; for a man who believed himself to be the town of the sun, see Nichiren, the Buddhist Prophet, Cambridge, Mass., 1916, pp. 119-121.
Numerous instances of vows and oaths taken by the princes of the Chinese states in the early historical period may be found in the famous narrative of Tso (Tso Chuen). A good example of these early covenants is in 'the vow of Duke Hsiang' (562 B.C.).

All we who covenant together agree not to hoard the produce of good crops, but to set aside all advantages that we possess, not to protect traders, not to shelter criminals. We shall call to aid one another in all calamities, to have compassion on one another in seasons of misfortune and disorder, to cherish the same likings and dislikings, to support and encourage the royal House. Should any prince break these engagements, may he who watches over men's sincerity and I he who watches over covenants, (the Spirits of the famous hills and of the famous streams, the kings and dukes our predecessors, the whole host of Spirits, and all who are sacrificed to, the ancestors of our 15 (167) States with their 7 urns—may all these intelligent Spirits destroy him, so that he shall lose his people, his appointment pass from him, his family perish, and his State be utterly overthrown.'

Some of the old commentators and moralists began at a very early period to complain that the frequency of forward government and formal vows was detrimental to sound morals, because, when solemn engagements were lightly made, they were apt to be lightly violated. Cases were known, in Chou-dynasty China, of covenants being broken 'before the blood was dry.' It was held that in the golden age of the 'holy kings' vows and covenants were unknown (ku ch'ê yu ming yeh), and that the simple spoken word required no vow or oath to make it binding. It was pointed out that the making of many solemn protestations fostered distrust between state and state and also between rulers and ruled. In the 'Classic of Poetry' (Shih Ching) we read of a king who added to the disorders of his kingdom by entering into frequent covenants with the vassal princes: for he showed thereby that he had no confidence in them and lived in fear of rebellion. Commentators also observe that no formal covenants were known before the Yin dynasty (1766-1122 B.C.) and that this was precisely the time when the State began to be disturbed by rebellious movements. Oaths and vows were introduced only when loyalty and sincerity had worn thin and men's hearts were perplexed with doubts.

It will have been noticed that these State covenants were really the ancient Chinese equivalents of modern treaties; and the vows or oaths that accompanied such engagements practically corresponded to the modern seals and signatures of plenipotentiaries. The violation of these covenants was therefore nothing more or less than what we should call the wilful breaking of a treaty.

2. Vows of friendship.—Chinese social life has for ages been characterized by five 'relationships,' each of which implies certain rights, privileges, and duties. These are the relationships between 'sovereign and minister' (this will probably be reinterpreted to mean 'citizen and State' if the Republican Chinese government proves permanent), 'husband and wife,' 'father and son,' 'elder brother and younger brother,' 'friend and friend.' Friendship thus often assumes the importance of a family relationship and is recognized by similar rules, customs, and traditions. When two or more Chinese decide to become 'friends' in what may be called the institutional sense of the term, they become bound to one another by solemn vows which are sometimes accompanied by a ceremonial smearing of blood. This is supposed to create a bond identical for all practical purposes with that of blood-kinship. The following example of a vow

1 See art. Ordai (Chinese).
2 See Le Tcheou-Mi, Cr. f. Biot, Paris, 1951, ii. 247. P'tan and tia are used technically for the two bloods which are sometimes accompanyed by a ceremonial smearing of blood.
3 See art. Ordai (Chinese).
4 See Le Tcheou-Mi, Cr. f. Biot, Paris, 1951, ii. 247. P'tan and tia are used technically for the two bloods which are sometimes accompanyed by a ceremonial smearing of blood.
5 See Biot, i. 249.
6 Ib. iii. 350-362.
of friendship is taken from the official annals of the Sung dynasty.

If the Government intend well to hold together like serpents and dragons interextrically coiled. When one of us attains riches and honour he must feel it a propriety with the prosperity with others. May he who breaks this vow receive divine chastisement.1

After uttering these words, the parties would prick their arms and let the blood flow into a goblet. Of this obol each brother, those becoming the 'brother-brother' of the other. If 'sworn brothers' wish to terminate the relationship, they must do so in a formal manner. 'This is sometimes known as 'swearing the incense-stick' (pu hsiang-fou-tzu).2

A few foreigners have become the 'brothers' of Chinese officials and others, though probably in these cases the ceremony is abbreviated and simplified. H. A. Giles describes how, in 1868, he became the 'younger brother' of the influential court eunuch, An Tê-hai.3 A similar relationship has also been entered into between various Chinese emperors and some of their chosen subjects; e.g., Shêng T'an (10th cent. A.D.) and Hsiang T'sung (11th cent. A.D.) of the Liao dynasty both became 'bound brothers' (ch'ieh wei hsiang-tzu) of certain trusted friends in modern times the Chinese Government (especially under the Manchu Dynasty) has shown itself extremely hostile to this custom, and indeed made it a punishable offence.

Soon after the accession of the Manchus it was decreed that for the purpose of preserving certain traditional associations, each other as 'sworn brothers' (ch'ieh wei hsiang-tzu) was an offence punishable by a heavy fine or banishment, and the friendship of brothers, once decreed against 'sworn brothers' who took part in the ceremonies of blood-smearing and the ritual burning of paper slips on which vows were written. A slightly less rigorous law was enacted in the seventeenth year of K'ang-hsi (1695), but membership of sworn brotherhoods was still an offence punishable by flogging and, in aggravated cases, by death. The death-penalty was reduced to 'a hundred blows' if there was no blood-drinking or smearing and no burning of vows. In 1701 a further law enacted that persons guilty of joining sworn brotherhoods were liable to three years' banishment to the frontier; but in 1762 a new law made a clear distinction between harmless brotherhoods and those which were regarded as criminal. The blood-smearing and drinking of the traditional consignment of the written vows to the keeping of the gods by means of fire, constituted the decisive evidence of guilt in its most serious form.

Formal vows of friendship between women are not unknown. They salute each other as 'dry sisters' (koan ch'ieh). One method of entering into this relationship is for each of the two women to hold the end of a straw over the necks well all and to call upon a deity known as the 'Peach-Flower Maiden' to witness the compact.

3. Vows of secret brotherhoods and societies. The 'sworn brotherhoods' have been treated by the Chinese Government are not far to seek. Secret fraternities, all the members of which are bound by inviolable vows to be loyal to one another as against the whole world, are very apt to become a danger to almost any form of government, especially if that government is controlled by an alien dynasty that has supplanted a native one. In ancient times, nevertheless, it was considered a right and proper thing that men should take vows of cooperation and mutual aid. The Ch'ou Li declares that 'by entering into mutual engagements accompanied by oaths, the highwaymen are kept to extend brotherly love to one another and to put away apathy.'1 A commentator on this rather esoteric enigmatic statement is worth quoting: 'There are different ways,' he says, 'in which people show their apanth and laziness. They do not hurry to give help to those who are in danger or suffering hardship, thus they are lazy and slothful.' Hence he cites the expression 'before a good thing, a new one has completed the old.'2

that people should be stimulated by means of solemn vows to aid one another, to purse one's own prosperity, to extend a friendly hand to those who need it, to help one another in the hour of necessity or peril, and to be faithful to one's word as long as life lasts, setting aside all considerations that might cause delay or give an excuse for inactivity.3

This remarkable description of the social value of vows seems strangely modern; it might almost serve as a statement of the ethical basis of the Boy Scout Oath. Chinese history furnishes innumerable instances of vows of this kind entered into and most faithfully carried out by bands of associates or members of social groups. Where the ethical ideal is strong, it is the fact that the obligation to succour the distressed is not usually regarded as of general application, but concerns only fellow-members of the oath-bound fraternity. Yet this depends, of course, on the specific purposes for which the fraternity has been constituted; and sometimes they far transcend the individual or collective interests of the members, even if they do not go so far as to include all mankind within their purview.

The most famous and memorable Chinese example of a vow entered into for purposes that went far beyond the private interests of those concerned was 'the oath of the Three Heroes' of the Liao dynasty. Three heroes: Liu Lei, Kuan Yu and Chang Pei (2nd and 3rd centuries A.D.) bound themselves to fight for the preservation of the reigning dynasty against the attacks of the Yellow-Turban rebels.4 We are told how the three heroes, who were to be killed by their master, (Ching Pei's peach-garden) consisted in the sacrifice of a black ox and a white horse and in the taking of a vow to the following effect: 'We swear to rescue one another as brothers, to unite our abilities and our hearts, to bring succour to the miserable, to raise up the fallen. We will serve our country and give protection to our people. Though we were born on different dates we wish to die together on the same day. Our hearts are open to the inspection of the divine decrees of Heaven and Earth. If any one of us should prove false to his duty and forgetful of his obligations, may God and man unite to destroy him.'

This celebrated 'Vow of the Peach-garden' has been imitated countless times, especially by members of societies formed for purposes of mutual protection. Such societies, indeed, are still formed from time to time; several new ones sprang into existence among the tens of thousands of Chinese labourers who worked behind the fighting lines in France during the Great War.5

It is interesting to note that the Peach-garden Vow was often referred to as belonging to the 'Triad Society,' and that in these cases were 'exhorted to emulate the faithfulness to each other and loyalty to their country that the three heroes who took it.'6 The vows of the Triad Society were thirty-six in number.7 It is characteristic of China that the first of them is a vow of filial piety. After repeating this, each candidate was required to take a lighted incense-stick and dip it in a bowl of water. As the light is extinguished, he says, 'If I prove false to my vows, may my life go out like the fire of this stick of incense.' The master of ceremonies ('incense-master') then takes up a porcelain basin and dashes it on the ground, saying, 'May each be the fate of all traitors.' He proceeds to take up the paper on which the vows are written, and sets fire to it. By this means it is supposed that the vows pass from the material into the spiritual world and are received by the divine powers, who will register them in the archives of heaven and inflict punishment on traitors. The next part of the ceremony consists in cutting off the head of a cock, as an indication of the grim fate that will befall any one who betrays the cause. The incense-master then drops some of the dead cock's feathers into which the incense-sticks were extinguished; and each of the candidates pricks one of his fingers and lets the blood drop into the same vessel; the feathers (and sometimes) into another vessel containing a little wine. The ashes of the burnt papers on which the vows were written are put into the bowl containing the mingled blood of 1 Cf. art. BROTHEHOOD (Artificial), § 3 ff.


4 For details see Fr., Cl. art. Secrec (Chinese).


6 Ibid, pp. 61 ff., 113 ff.
the candidates, and the bowl is then handed round and slipped by each in turn. This concludes the ceremony of the initiation, after which the new members of the society are hailed by the old ones as ‘brothers.’

Sisterhoods are less common than brotherhoods, but by no means unknown. Detailed information regarding these is lacking, but mention must be made of one group, the Golden Orchid Society (Chin-Lan Hist), which is described by H. A. Giles as ‘a secret association of unmarried girls who bind themselves not to marry, but to remain virgins, and women to which they are unable to avoid) but to leave them and return to their old homes or go elsewhere.” It has been said that members of this society would commit suicide rather than break their vow.

4. Religious vows.—(a) Buddhism.—In China as in other Buddhist lands there are vows for both monks and laymen, those of the former being naturally much stricter and more comprehensive than those to which laymen subscribe. Sometimes, however, lay Buddhists of both sexes voluntarily bind themselves by one or more of the obligations which follow, each according to his own conscience. There is a society of lay vegetarians which is said to have been founded in the Tang dynasty by the fifth and sixth ‘patriarchs’ of the Ch’an school of Buddhism. Members of this society observe strict vegetarianism (‘fasters’), a term which is also applied to those who take vows of temporary vegetarianism during their pilgrimage to a sacred mountain. The fact that practically the whole of Chinese Buddhism belongs to the Great Vehicle (Mahāyāna) explains the existence of religious vows of which little or no trace can be found in primitive Buddhism. The great means of all such vows are those which were supposed to have been taken by the bodhisattvas. These vows are numerous—in the Ku-liang-shou-sitra they are forty-eight in number—but they are practically all summed up in the formula, ‘So long as there remains a single being who has not attained Buddhahood, I vow that I will not become Buddha.’ The ‘vows’ of the bodhisattvas (pranādhāma) may be described as expressions of will which, through the intensity of the will and the lessenss of emotion that inspires them, are instrumental in bringing about a realization of the desired conditions.

The Mahāyāna, as J. J. M. de Groot has shown, attaches to the power of the vow a fundamental principle of Buddhist psychology. This fact is apt to be ignored by those who dwell upon the ‘vain repetitions’ said to be characteristic of Buddhism in practice, and who do not understand that the repetitions are believed to reinforce the creative power of thought to which the spoken words give expression.

We have already seen that forty-eight bodhisattva vows are preserved in a famous sûtra; but according to another classification only four are essential. These four great vows are Sat karma (sīth-yûna) are as follows: (1) the vow to save the world, i.e., not to rest until all beings in the universe have been brought to salvation; (2) the vow to destroy in oneself all evil and the passions that produce evil; (3) the vow to study and practice the dharma, i.e., the law of Buddhism, with a view to the attainment of wisdom and virtue; (4) the vow to attain the perfection of Buddhahood. These vows are related to the San Kuei—the ‘Three Refuges’ (the Buddha, the Law, and the Church)—common to both vehicles. The second and third (the destruction of evil and the cultivation of virtue) have reference to the Buddha and the Law, and to self-development (sàli ii); the first (the helping of mankind, and the salvation of the world) has reference to the Church or community, which, in the Mahāyāna, includes all beings in the universe (li-t’â). The full accomplishment of the three first vows will lead automatically to the accomplishment of the fourth—the attainment of universal Buddhahood.

There are several other classifications of bodhisattva vows, but we need not give a detailed analysis. It will be sufficient to refer to the ten vows set forth in the sûtra known as the Ta-Pei-Hsin Ta-lo-mi Ching (the Dharni ‘Sûtra of the all-Pitiful Heart’). In this sûtra Kwan-yin (Avalokiteśvara) is represented as the true text, and they are not considered in the second, third, and fourth, (2) to become acquainted with the true faith; (2) to attain the spiritual vision (dharma); (3) to lead others to salvation; (4) to be charitable; (5) to embark on the ship of prajñā, ‘wisdom’; (6) to cross the ocean of bitterness (life and death); (7) to be steadfast; (8) to attain nirvāna; (9) to join the company of saints; (10) to become one with the Dharmakaya (the mystical body of the eternal and universal Buddha).

The vows taken by Buddhist monks on their reception into the order, or on subsequent occasions, may be conveniently studied in the Brahmajíla-sûtra, called in China the Fan-wang-ching. The 33th and 36th sections of this popular sûtra deal with the vows which should be taken and constantly retaken by ‘every son of Buddha’ (ko Fo tzu). They bind him to regard his parents and religious teachers with respect and devotion, to associate only with virtuous companions, to study the scriptures and perform good works, and to obey the commandments of Buddha in all things. He must be ready to sacrifice life itself rather than allow himself to act or think in such a way as to hinder the propitious conditions of these souls. Similar vows should be taken by those who seek to attain mystical illumination by practising the rules of dhyanā.

In the Te-Ch’ian—translated by the monk T’ai-Ch’in—the guidance of such aspirants, it is said that the novice should begin by cultivating an attitude of love towards all beings, and should then make a ‘great vow’ (fa hung shih-yuan) to devote himself earnestly to the spiritual welfare of others and not to seek salvation or enlightenment for himself alone (wa sei chi shen tu at-shih chêng-fu).

It will be seen from the foregoing that the Buddhist vow is practically a self-dedication to an ideal of conduct of which the central feature (in the Mahāyāna) is the service of others. But, apart from what may be described as the ‘official’

1. The terms tāk-li and li-ta constitute a concise statement, from the Mahâyânist standpoint, of the essential difference between the Small and the Great Vehicles. Tâk-li (to benefit oneself) is regarded as the ideal of the Small Vehicle, and li-ta (the helping of others) is regarded as the ideal of the Great Vehicle. The combination of the two (erh li t’iu man) is aimed at by Mahâyânists.


3. The Mahâyânists, as they understand the statement, is that the novice should begin by cultivating an attitude of love towards all beings, and should then make a 'great vow' (fa hung shih-yuan) to devote himself earnestly to the spiritual welfare of others and not to seek salvation or enlightenment for himself alone (wa sei chi shen tu at-shih chêng-fu).
vows, there are others which have sole reference to the spiritual needs or personal aspirations of the individual who utters them.

On the other hand, the remarkable and comprehensive is the vow which is said to have been taken by a monk of the Sung dynasty named Ju Chien, who dwelt as a hermit on the sacred mountain of Chih-shan. It was to the following effect: (1) that he would never allow his eyes to look upon forbidden sights; (2) that he would never allow his ears to hear forbidden sounds; (3) that he would never allow his mouth to utter forbidden words; (4) that he would never allow his mind to be occupied by forbidden thoughts.

Of the numerous vows made for particular objects or in view of particular circumstances it is unnecessary to give a detailed account. Sometimes a Buddhist will make a vow to recite a certain number of sūtras or portions of sūtras, in which case beads are often used to count off each completed recital. Sometimes he will register a vow to go on a pilgrimage, or to supply oil for keeping a lamp burning in some shrine for a term of years, or to burn a certain number of sticks of incense before the image of a bodhissatva. Some men, actuated by a desire to print and circulate copies of a favourite sūtra.

One such person, e.g., vowed that he would cause 1000 copies of the Diamond Sūtra to be printed and given away for the good of sickness. Yung-cheng (1725-35) vowed that he would feed a stated number of monks in respect of his otherwise worthless weather.

Sometimes the vow is accompanied by some act of austerity or even self-mutilation, though the latter is contrary to Buddhist law.

A monk of the 13th cen, named Tien-Shih, who belonged to the famous monastery of Kuo-ch'ing at the foot of the Tien-t'ai mountain in Cheh-chiang, made a vow to devote all his life to the propagation of the doctrine of the T'ien-t'ai school, and in proof of his sincerity burned one of his own fingers before an image of the bodhissatva Puxian. A similar act, showing regrettable fanaticism but great fortitude and powers of endurance, was performed by a monk who died less than a century later. Having made a vow of absolute dedication to religion, he burned off two of his fingers. Throughout the rest of his life he was known as P'ei-chou-t'o, ‘the eight-fingered ascetic.’ He rose to be abbot of one of the most prosperous monasteries now existing in China (the Tien-t'ung Si, near Ningpo) and to head of the newly-founded Association of Chinese Buddhists.

Various opprobrious epithets are bestowed on members of the monkhood who have broken their vows (especially the vows of chastity and vegetarianism) or have been expelled from their monasteries for misbehaviour. Among these are such terms as ‘slanderer of the Three Holy Ones,’ ‘shameless one,’ ‘objectionable on the holy path,’ ‘bald-headed huntsman,’ ‘cassock-wearing robber.’

All the Buddhist or quasi-Buddhist sects which have played so prominent a part in the political as well as the religious life of China in recent times have their characteristic religious vows. But in many cases these societies have very little to do with the true religion, and have used various formulas in order to inspire their members with a due sense of the binding nature of their vows. This is so in the case of the Tao-Li Society, one of the most flourishing organizations of the kind in N. China. It professes to be associated with the cult of the bodhissatva Kwan-yin, but its activities are of a social and ethical rather than a religious nature, and in any case its religious basis is almost as much Taoist as Buddhist. It is said to have sprung from the dreaded White Lotus Society, and though it has apparently long ceased to meddle in politics, it is believed to have the authorities up to the time of the Boxer movement, if not later. It flourishes in the leased territory of Wei-hai-wei, but has never given any trouble to the British authorities there. Its members take vows to abstain from strong drink, opium, and tobacco. When a member is known to have broken his vow, he is expelled from the society and is said to be pu yii, a phrase meaning ‘not present’—a common Chinese euphemism. The expression, implying that the deceased member is ‘dead’ to the society. There is a play on the word text, which also forms part of the society’s name.

VOWS (Christian).—1. New Testament.—(a) The word.—The discussion starts naturally with a consideration of the data afforded by the earliest Christian books, the writings of NT, but these are scanty and to some extent irrelevant. The word ‘vow’ (eογυ) occurs twice (Ac 18:21), but in both cases the atmosphere is Jewish rather than Christian. In the first instance Paul (or Aquila) has his hair cut at Cenchreæ, ‘for he had a vow.’ Whether the making or the redemption of the vow is meant is not clear; if the latter, it was probably in connexion with some escape from danger. The second case is similarly connected with the hair-offering. To avert the reappearance of anti-Judaism, Paul, at the request of the Jerusalem elders, associates himself with four men about to be ‘purified’ on the termination of a vow, and bears the expense of their hair-cutting and probably of their sacrifices—a custom not uncommon among rich Jews on behalf of their poorer brethren. On the Nazirate vow (Nu 6), of which these incidents, and the account given by Hegesippus of James the Just, are illustrative, and the significance of the hair as the seat of the devotees’ life, see art. NAZIRITES, VOWS (Hebrew), and W. R. Smith, The Religion of the Semites, London, 1884, p. 483.

Two other NT passages may be glanced at. One is the vow made by forty Jews to fast until they had killed Paul (Ac 23:12), but this is at least as much an oath as a vow. The other is the ‘Korban’ passage (Mc 7:13 = Mt 15:9) in the teaching of Jesus, a reference to cases in which the Pharisees had attempted to justify defiling their hands with their sacrificial offerings. The case of Ananias (Ac 5) has no pertinence, though Roman theologians find a precedent for vows in the community of goods supposed to have existed in the early Jerusalem Church.
what was expected from virgins we may refer to Jerome's treatise on the subject and his letters to Donatianus (xxii) and Demetrius (xxx.). The thirty years interval between these epistles may account for the milder and less fanatical tone of the second.

The subsequent history of vows of celibacy belongs unison to the story of monasticism (q.v.). Poverty, chastity, and obedience are the triple cord of the monastic life. They had been required from its early days, and the great Benedict of Nursia, while making obedience still more absolute, added what was known as the 'vow of steadfastness.'

'Herefore the door of the monastery opened only inwards. Formerly, if the monk forsook his cell and married he was liable to penance, but his marriage was not annulled. Now such marriages were declared, ipse jure, void, and the offender was compelled to return. The vow, written out, was laid upon the altar, those who could not write signing it with their mark.'

The Trappist (Reformed Cistercian) 'vow' of silence seems rather an injunction and comes under the vow of obedience.

3. Patristic evidence. — A few examples of general reference to vows in the Fathers may be given. Eusebius says that it was customary for vows to be taken at the tombs of martyrs, and Hilary says that they are effective and helped by the Holy Spirit only when taken in a church with due ceremonial. In his day the usual personal vows were those of abstinence, chastity, and fasting.

The opinion of Augustine is interesting:

'If in Scripture a vow is usually termed evξη, being called a prayer, we must understand particularly that kind of prayer which we offer when making a vow, i.e. with evξη. But everything we offer to God is vowed, and above all the offering of the holy altar, in which is implied the greatest of all our vows that by which we vow to be in Christ, as members of His body.'

Commenting on Ps 76, he encourages the taking of vows as an inspiration to otherwise unaided strength. Among the customary vows in his time were those between man and wife either to be faithful to each other or to abstain from intercourse with each other, and those on the part of the rich either to show hospitality to all 'religious' persons or to give their goods to the poor and embrace the 'religious' life.

Ambrose contributes something. In de Off. Ministr. III. xii. he lays down the general proposition that witnesses to the kingdom of heaven are bound to marry, and, if we have made an unjust oath, we may not keep it. He illustrates his contention from the familiar cases of Herod and Jephthah. In his funeral oration over his brother Satyrus he says:

'We now recognize that thy departure hence was obtained by thy vows to the holy martyr Lawrence.'

There are other references to vows to martyrs, but they seem to be of the nature of prayers for martyr intercession. In the Satyrus oration, § 30, he says:

'Not that I was ignorant of his condition, but a certain kind of prayers and vows had so clouded the sense of common frailty, that I knew not how to think anything concerning him except entire prosperity.'

Ambrose is also responsible for the clear distinction between præcepta and consilia, on which see below.

4. The medieval doctrine; consilia evangelica. — In the theology of the medieval and modern Roman Church the subject of vows occupies a large place. It is connected with the concept of works of supererogation. The doctrine of good works

1 Ad Polyc. 5.
2 Eph. 4 (Oxford ed.), 61 (Pt.).
3 Chrys. de Scord. III. 16 f.
4 Canons of Chalcedon, 16.
5 Euseb. Ev. xliii. 20, ad Paulinum, § 8.
6 Euch. Psalm. lxx. 2, de Fide, 55.
7 See art. MARRIAGE.
 rests in the first place on the Augustinian doctrine of grace together with the idea of the universal working of God. Strictly speaking, a meritorious work is inconceivable, but, on the other hand, free universal grace must be mere grace and through it to make satisfaction for his sin—a notion compounded of Jewish legislation and Stoic moralism and found as early as Tertullian. The Stoics did not distinguish between the perfect and imperfect, and the Jews emphasized special and unusual virtues—e.g., To 12. Certain NT passages (Mt 25:21, Lk 19:21-22) were regarded as similarly indicating a graded valuation of works. In time the doctrine of concilia evangeli (e.g., 'evangelical counsels') was developed. The term is used in contrast with praecusta ('commands'), and the distinction, though traceable in Hermas, Tertullian, and Cyprian, is first expressly formulated by Ambrose. We find it in Augustine, though two tendencies are visible. For, while the external and literal observance of the counsels (e.g., poverty, virginity) is considered as a higher standard of mortality procuring greater merit, he sees the danger of measuring the ultra-moral by this standard, since all conduct is judged in the light of inward moral intention.

The doctrine of the heyday of monasticism, the first consideration outweighed the second, but in Thomas Aquinas the other tendency again appears. Commandments are given 'about those things which are necessary to attain the end of eternal felicity,' but the counsels 'about those things by which one may obtain this end better and sooner.' In general the counsels deal with poverty, chastity, and obedience, but there was an enumeration of twelve culled from the Sermon on the Mount, including, e.g., the injunctions 'Love your enemies' and 'Resist not evil.' Aquinas puts it that perfection consists essentialiter in the command of love, but instrumentaliter depends on the counsels. Generally speaking, the disregard or non-observance of the counsels is not sinful, though their observance entails greater perfection and greater reward. They are 'auxiliary norms toward the discernment of those obligatory commands which govern a Christian in his particular circumstances.'

5. Roman Catholic doctrine.—Roman theology classifies vows as personal (applied mainly to oneself) and real (applied to external objects and circumstances); also as perpetual or for a definite time; also as solemn (publicly pronounced before the Church). Between the monastic vows or the subdiaconic implicit vow of celibacy or simple. The doctrine of works of supererogation drew vows of all kinds, even simple and private vows, within ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Dispensations can usually be granted by the bishop, but in live cases by the pope alone. Vows that prejudice the rights of a third person and vows made by minors without parental consent are inadmissible.

6. Protestant and evangelical views.—Half a century before Luther, Johann Puffer von Goch in the de Libertate Christiana and Dialogus maintained that God has given but one law and set before all Christian people one kind of perfection. Luther declared for the all-embracing nature of the baptismal vow and combated Aquinas's idea that the higher degrees of love are not commanded. He condemned all breaches of the law alike and would not allow 'inferior' perfection, though this sin forgives on condition of faith with daily repentance. Monastic vows he declared not only inadmissible and idolatrous, and the Augsburg Confession and the Schmalkald Articles follow his lead. They also oppose the Roman doctrine of evangelical counsels as setting up works of supererogation, admitting private revenue, and casting doubts on the civil commonwealth.

With regard to special vows (promises made to God from motives of gratitude or devotion or as a means of preserving spiritual life) he was intolerant, though not putting any stress on them. Calvin, however, while giving pride of place to the baptismal vow and championing Christian freedom against the Roman doctrine, was more convinced of the utility of particular vows by which a Christian might in some signal way express his gratitude, or strengthen his will-power. In this connexion it is worth recording the testimony of the Westminster Confession of Faith, vii. 14, where it is said that religious oaths and vows, solemn fasting, and thanksgivings upon special occasions are an addendum to the 'ordinary religious worship of God.' Ch. xxii. 'Of Legalistic Oaths and Vows,' includes the following paragraphs:

1. A vow is of the like nature with a promise oath, and ought to be made with the like religious care, and to be performed with the like pertinence.

2. It is not to be made to any creature, but to God alone; and that it is made, it is to be made in sincerity, out of faith, and conscience of duty, in way of thankfulness for mercy received, or for the obtaining of what we want; whereby we more strongly committeth ourselves to necessary vows, or to other things, so far and so long as they may fitly conduces thereto.

3. No matter what kind or degree of vow, or what, be it of God, or what would hinder any duty thereby commanded, or which is not in his power, and for the performance whereof he hath no possible ability from God. For it is the will of God, which regards, popish monastical vows of perpetual single life, professed poverty, and regular obedience, are so far from being degrees of higher perfection, that they are superstitious and sinful things, in which no Christian may entangle himself.

4. The 'promises observed are as follows.' Ps 192 i., Ps 61:5-18., Ps 79:1, Jer 44:27, Ez 20:12-30., Ps 89:12, Gn 28:20-22., Ls 11:1, Ps 61:12, Ps 132:14-16., Ps 133:14, (vii.) Act 20:34-35, Nm 28:2-10., Mt 10:16, 1 Co 7:2, Eph 4:1, 1 Co 7:3.

Modern Biblical criticism had not yet been born. Similarly in the 'Larger Catechism' vowing unto God is included among the 'duties required in the Second Commandment,' and sinful vows among the 'sins forbidden in the Third Commandment.'

7. Conclusion.—There are certain ethical duties which the community, whether ecclesiastical, civil, or social, imposes upon the individual, and which he accepts (marriage vows at least in part may be reckoned in here), and there are others of a more particular kind which the individual imposes on himself either to death or life. He may develop his activity in order to express his gratitude to God for some special mercy. It is quite legitimate to argue that these are implicit in the general vow taken at baptism or on conscious entrance into the Christian circle. It is also evident that all action is conditioned by circumstance, and circumstance may vary so that what seems to-day a clear and positive duty may to-morrow occupy quite a subordinate place. It is possible for a formally expressed vow to become a burden on the conscience, and it then exposes the soul to extra peril. In any case special and formal vows are best left to extraordinary circumstances, and normally it is well simply to lay before God a prayer for the grace of perseverance and constancy. A closing word may be said about the 'counsels.' Alongside the 'commandments,' whether of God or of the Lord, there are not only the 'commandments' of the law, which hardly concern us here (1 Co 16:17), but also his 'judgments,' (1 Co 7:4, 2 Co 8:9), counsels whose acceptance presupposes a divine charisma (1 Co 7:7). Making all allowance for time and place, the apostle's counsels still have pertinence, and 1 Co 7, like Mt 19:12, furnishes a basis for distinguishing between an 'advisory

1 Ch. 106., 2 Qu. 113.
norn' and the absolute force of a command. This, however, is not to admit the whole Roman doctrine of consilia evangeliica.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the references cited in the above section, Elizabeth Ringwood, Orations and dedications to the gods, 1846, viii. iii. 37, iv. 2, v. vii. 9; Thomas Aquinas, Summa, ii. q. 88, a. 1, q. 1; In Ios, see still more; in Opusc. 18 (cl. 252) E. Moxus, F. Daub, Die Zuverlassigkeit der Gleichheit, Gutensaal, 1896; art. 'Vows' in C. E. and appended bibliography; and sundry notes on mythology by Roux, K. F. Simon and Frederiksen (Copenhagen) and Rothe and Hase (Protestant). A. J. GRIEVE.

VOWS (Greek and Roman).—I. Greek.—We understand by a vow a conditional promise made by the worshipper to the divine power. The condition is the rendering of aid; and the vow, thus strictly regarded, is the proposal of a bargain that the recipient of the favour required shall make suitable recompense. Viewed in relation to prayer (q.v.), the vow is intended to add cogency to the request and to help towards its fulfilment. The fulfilment of a contingent vow is often pledged by the security of an oath, as when the nine archons at Athens on entering office swore at the altar in the market-place that they would respect a golden statue, if they adhered to the laws during their term. 2

But, of course, a promise may be ratified by an oath which lacks the essential conditions of a vow, as when Odysseus undertook to bring Penelope home with the help of Minos, to yield his life to any one who might choose to take it. 3 Further, to the Greek conception a vow could not be merely negative; a definite offering must be promised as a return for the favour to be gained. 4 If therefore the Nazirite vow taken by St. Paul (Ac 18) involved merely an act of abstinence or consecration promised by way of thanksgiving for escape from danger, it would not be a vow, in the full sense of the word, as explained above. It frequently happens that, although we have reason to suppose that a vow has been made, evidence is lacking of the conditions imposed. Thus in the version of Iphigenia's sacrifice referred to by Euripides and Cicero 5 we are simply told that Agamemnon vowed to Artemis the fairest thing born in his kingdom within a particular year. Among the very numerous examples of 'votive' offerings recorded in literature and inscriptions there are comparatively few where it can be determined with certainty whether the consecration was made by way of thanksgiving or in fulfilment of a vow, as the condition which the incumbent gave to have been taken from sources where the evidence is unambiguous. It should be added that several inscriptions which have been preserved and were attached to votive offerings bear as a label the statement that the dedication is in consequence of a vow. 6

(a) Public vows.—It may be stated generally that vows were made in times of fear and danger. Women especially, Plato 7 tells us, and men too when they are sick or in trouble, if alarmed by dreams or apparitions, are apt to consecrate the occasion by vows of thanksgiving and promising the building of temples. Times of war, especially when the existence of the State was imperilled by hostile attack, often gave occasion for vows to be made in public on behalf of all.

Rector had his mother Heracli promise to sacrifice to Athens of twelve heifers, if she would pity upon the city of Troy and its inhabitants. 8 In historical times the most famous of such public acts of intercession was the vow of the Athenians made before the battle of Marathon offering to sacrifice to Artemis a Virgin of the Heavens, and to the winner who might be killed in the impending fight. But so many copies of the curse were found that it is believed the victims; and consequently it was resolved to compromise the liability and to sacrifice 500 every year. The custom was still in force in the second Punic War. 9 This famous vow is parodied in Aristophanes, 10 where the sacrifice of 1000 gods is offered to Artemis so soon as the price of anchors is paid. Before Salamis a vow was taken by the Greeks to destroy the Medes with burning and to consecrate their gods. 11 The oath is said to have been taken by the Persians to found a festival Eleuthera to be celebrated perpetually 12 is considered by apocryphal writers. The myth of the murder of Hippolytus, which impelled Cyrus to place Orestes and fourteen Lydian youths on a pyre for sacrifice, recognizes the prevalence of human sacrifice among Oriental nations; and there are similar acts of sacrifice described in the Iliad. 13

Before entering upon a campaign, it was customary to offer to the gods a share in the spoils as a reward for their assistance. 14 Similar obligations were undertaken in the crises of civil war or when national interests were seriously endangered.

Olympus offered, if he succeeded in his attempt to become master of Corinth, to give to Zeus, and evaded the extremity of the hardship imposed upon them by exacting a ten per cent tribute of their goods for 15 years. 15 On the other hand, Muses the Lydian, after he had freed his countrymen from the tyranny of Meles, ordered them to fulfill his vow by sending over a race of horses to the gods. 16 In the hope of freeing themselves from the horrible tribute of human heads, which they had exacted from the Athenians are said to have promised Apollo that they would every year dispatch a sacred embassy to Delos. 17

(b) Private vows.—We may now pass to vows made by individuals in order to save lives dear to them on occasions of peril.

Pelusin vowed, if, Achilles came back safe from Troy, he would dedicate a lock of his own hair, together with 18, 19, to the river-god Spercheios. 11 Similarly Berenice vowed to cut off her hair to the gods on the occasion of her husband, Polycenus Euprepes, starting on an expedition to ravage the Assyrian border. 20 So long as the owner is exposed to a special peril, the hair remains uncut; but, when he has been delivered through the crisis or has reached a certain age unharmed, 21 a lock is rendered in thanksgiving to the protecting power. Hector, about to meet Ajax in single combat, promises that in the event of his success he will dedicate the spoils in the temple of Apollo. 22 Telemeus urges his monk Penelope to vow the sacrifice of hecatombs to the gods, if Zeus should grant retribution for the wrongs they have suffered. 23

The successful completion of a sea-voyage was frequently celebrated by offerings to the gods. 24 Eurykleus, on behalf of the companions of Odysseus, when they prepared to land at the shore of the sun-set islands and found a splendid temple in his honour, if he would grant them a safe return to Ithaca. 25 Digenes, in peril on the Carpathian sea, vows to dedicate a temple to the sea-gods if he may safely land. 26 An epigram of Callimachus parodies these vows by describing the dedication to the Saxon gods of a salt-cellar which by providing its owner with frugal meals had enabled him to escape from the storms of death.

In the same way the infant Achilles, a lover and who has safely completed his journey dedicates his felt hat to Artemis in the due accomplishment of his vows. 27 We have a copious record of dedications by those who successfully competed in the ordeal of the Great Games. 28 Many of these must have been made in consequence of previous vows such as that of Xenophon of Corinth, who, as a competitor for the Olympic crown in 464 B.C., vowed that, if successful, he would consecrate 100 tripodes for the service of the temple of Aphrodite in that city. 19

Many examples of vows are connected with the ordinary incidents of family life. A mother makes and pays vows for the safety of her child. The cure of
dedication consequent upon the parent's vow is frequently in the form of a portrait-statue of the child, which is offered to Æsculapius or Apollo on condition of the cure of sickness. Or it may be the patient himself who makes the vow, as is indicated in parody by the tricky vow of a devotee of Bacchus to abstain from strong drink for 'a hundred suns' in the event of recovery from fever. The Greek Anthology furnishes several examples of vows made to Ilithyia or Æsculapius if they will grant a safe release from the pains and dangers of child-bearing, and in such cases were articles of dress or jewelry. Sometimes the condition of the vow is the granting of a good harvest; more often it is relief from the stress of poverty. There is even on record the promise of a sacrifice, if the god will make a curse effective upon an enemy.

(c) Penalty for infraction.—The infraction of a vow was visited with a suitable penalty; and this might be directed against the community of which the transgressor was a member, as we have seen that, according to one form of the story, the Greeks were punished with adverse winds at Aulis for the default of Agamemnon. It cannot be denied, however, that the favour of the gods was so confidently anticipated that offerings were made to them in advance; Polydorus, who dedicated statues to Aphrodite and Ares before starting from Athens on the expedition against Thebes, was not an encouraging example. But no doubt confidence was more frequent in the daily requirements of domestic need.

2. Roman. Whereas with the Greeks vows tended more and more to become a matter of individual concern, as being employed chiefly in the critical moments of domestic life, and the records of vows offered publicly on behalf of the whole community are comparatively scanty, at Rome the conditions were entirely different. It is true that we have sufficient evidence that here also individuals menaced with danger applied for the assistance of the gods with promises of offerings or sacrifice. The illustrations to be found in Vergil should not be set down to the influence of his Greek models.

Nevertheless, the characteristic formalism of the Roman religion is chiefly apparent in the administration of the public vows. A regular contract is drawn up between the State and the deity concerned, and its conditions are publicly annou nced (manifestation) and the form of words necessary in accordance with sacred law is prescribed by the priest (concipere vota); a solemn engagement (suavicere vota) is entered into by the official who represents the State; in his public capacity he becomes liable to carry out the vow (votum solvere, reddere); and, if he fails, the breach in the sacred compact is a sin against the State. The representative is thus, during the period between the undertaking of the vow and its fulfillment, in the position of an accused person awaiting his trial (pro re iusta); and, so soon as the condition was fulfilled, he was cast in the terms of his bond (voti damnatus).

Sometimes an estimate was made of the cost involved, and the sum required was entered in the public records. The cost of the celebration of ludi magni on a solemn occasion during the Second Punic War was assessed at the figure of 333,333½ sesterces—a number evidently chosen for its magical properties in the pages of Livy.

One of the usual occasions for the making of vows was at the opening of a war. Thus Aulus Gabrio, at the commencement of the war against Antiochus, vowed to make the sacrifice of a single serra not be dedicated to two deities.

An outbreak of pestilence was another occasion on which extraordinary vows were usually made. On the occasion of such a visitation, if it was feasible for the vow to be fulfilled on the cessation of the plague, we find the dedication of a temple to Apollo, the oblation of gifts and sacrifices to Apollo, Æsculapius, and to the gods in general; and the institution of feasts or public holidays (feriae) and ceremonial processions (suppli cations). These and similar rewards suitable to the particular occasion or to the functions of the god whose favour is to be enlisted meet us continually in the pages of Livy.

Thus the Athenian Apollo was offered a rite of the boot for assistance rendered in the capture of Veii. The most remarkable example of votive dedications was the consecration of a veil sacram, i.e. the sacrifice of all living animals to be born within the limits of a particular spring. There is only one instance on record in historical times, that is to say, as we know it, in the pages of the Second Punic War in 217 B.C.

The vow was actually performed twenty-one years later. Sometimes the condition imposed upon the divine agent was the continuance of the commonwealth in its then present condition for a period of five and ten years. The specified condition of the ipse limit forms a link between the extraordinary vows and those which were repeated regularly after the lapse of a certain period. Thus, every year on 1st January the consuls, suitably attended, climbed the Capitol hill, made a solemn sacrifice of white oxen in fulfilment of the vow made the previous year, and entered into a new obligation for the year to come in order to secure the safety of the State. From the year 30 B.C. onwards a special vow was made for the safety of the princeps and his house; and at a later date the same was held to be performed annually on 3rd January. Similarly, when sacrifices were made at the opening of a new building, a vow was made of a new offering to become due after the expiration of the quinquennial period. In imperial times a custom grew up of making vows for periods of five, ten, fifteen, and twenty years. This may have been

1 Verg. Æn. v. 237.
2 Verg. Ecl. v. 30; Liv. xxvii. 45.
3 Liv. xxvii. 45.
4 Liv. xxvii. 45.
5 Liv. x. 19.
7 Liv. iv. 22.
8 Liv. xi. 57.
9 Liv. xiv. 693.
10 Cic. L. 1175.
12 Dio, xxvi. 19.
13 Dio, xxvii. 25.
14 Dio, xxviii. 44.
15 Dio, xxx. 27.
16 Ovid, Fast. iv. 4. 27 ff.; Liv. xxii. 63.
17 Dio Cass. iii. 19.
18 Plut. Cot. 2.
19 Val. Max. v. 10; Sueton. Aug. 57.
20 E.g., Cic. ili. 3706.
partly due to their substitution for the old lastrum, and partly to the periods of five and ten years for which Augustus assumed the imperial power, starting from the year 27 B.C. The absence of such a punishment was unnaturally gave rise to a multiplication of the vows offered on extraordinary occasions by courtiers anxious to testify their devotion to the reigning Caesar and his household. To the number of these were added the return of Tiberius from a campaign,² for the safety of the dying Claudius,³ and for the safe delivery of Poppea.

We have seen that the choice of the god whose aid is invoked—e.g., Aesculapius or Bellona—is determined by the occasion of the desired intervention. In the fierce struggle of a decisive battle, as a final effort to leave no possible means of victory untried, it was sometimes determined to appeal to the enemies' gods and to offer them an inducement to transfer their protection. The classical instance is the offer of the dictator A. Postumius at the battle of the Tusi, and of his son at the battle of Tarsus, to dedicate a temple to Castor, the patron deity of Tarsus. A special application of this practice was the solemn rite of evoctio,⁴ according to which, before the final assault was made, the soldiers gathered on a hillside and were summoned to abandon it and to accept a new resting-place at Rome. In this way Juno was invited to leave her home at Veii and follow the fortunes of the conquerors. An interesting account of the whole matter is given by Macrobius,⁵ who remarks that the Romans endeavoured carefully to conceal the name of their protecting god, in order that others might not employ them against them, the device which they used against Corinth and Carthage as well as against Veii and other Italian towns. He records the formula which were employed at the siege of Carthage and points out that the evoctio of the gods must be carefully distinguished from the simultaneous decreto of the hostile garrisons and citizens who were handed over to the dominion of the deities of the under world Dispariter, Velovis, Manes, and Tellus. To these powers a sacrifice of three black sheep was offered at the same time. The decreto of the enemy appears here as the consequence of the evoctio; but the term was specifically employed when during the progress of a battle the Roman commander made a vow to the infernal powers that he was prepared to sacrifice either his own life or that of a Roman citizen serving under him on condition that in return for this sacrifice the annihilation of the enemy's forces was assured. The peculiarity which distinguished the decreto from the offering of vows in general was that the forfeit was rendered in advance to the divine promiser in the assurance that the required service would be forthcoming. Our knowledge of the custom rests almost entirely upon Livy's account of the self-sacrifice of P. Decius Mus in the battle with the Latins in the neighborhood of Vescovio in 293 B.C. and of his son at Sentinum in 295 B.C. during the course of the war against the Etruscans and their allies.⁶ Even if these events are not to be regarded as historically true,⁷ the particulars of the ritual and formularies adopted are sufficient to prove the antiquity of the

³ Dio Cass. liv. 13. ² Liv. iii. 47. ¹ Ib. viii. 68. ⁴ Orb. vi. 11. ² Liv. xii. 11. ⁵ For possible traces of the following of this custom by the Greeks see the present writer's Fragments of Sophocles, London, 1897, pp. 159 ff. (frag. 453). ⁶ Liv. xiv. 21. ⁷ T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Eng. tr., London, 1877, ii. 368. ⁸ Liv. xiv. 20. ¹ T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Eng. tr., London, 1877, i. 369. ² Dio Cass. liii. 9. ³ The sources of the decree of a thing of the battle of Ausculum (Cic. de Fin. ii. 61) in 279 B.C. is certainly apocryphal (Pavlly-Wisseswa, iv. 2293). ⁴ If the person whose life was pledged fell in battle forthwith, the sacrifice was considered acceptable and the result assured. ² If the Roman general who made the vow did not meet with his death, he became impious, and was excluded from participation in public and private sacra; but, if the vow was made for the self-immolation of a legionary soldier and the sacrifice of himself omitted or rejected, he could obtain expiation by the burying in the ground of a signum at least seven feet high and the offering of a peculiar sacrifice, and the place where expiation was become locus religiosus. The development of devotio in later times as an act of self-sacrifice for the emperor does not concern the present subject.

VOWS (Hebrew).—By a vow a person brings himself under a sacred obligation to God (or to some particular god) to do something or to refrain from something. The thing he vows to do is something which goes beyond the limits of his religion, and the thing he vows to refrain from is something permissible in normal circumstances—e.g., the enjoyment of food, the fruit of the grape, sexual intercourse. The motive of the vow is usually desire to secure divine help, and its form is usually expressed conditionally; if God does something for the man, the man will do something for God, something with which He is believed to be well pleased.

In the OT a vow is unconditionally valid only when it is made by a person whose will is not subject to the challenge of another—i.e. by the head of a house (the father or husband), a widow, or a divorced woman (Nu 30). A wife (Nu 30: 8) or an unmarried daughter (30:10) could of course make a vow; but the husband in the one case, and the father in the other, had the right of veto. If, however, this right of the husband was not immediately exercised, the vow of the wife was held to be valid: it could not properly be cancelled by a subsequent disavowal on the man's part; if he did so sollicer it, the guilt of non-fulfilment was attributed to him, not to the woman. The 'strange' woman of Pr 7, who is married, is represented as making vows and inviting a paramour to the sacrificial feast (7:15) while the annihilation or the fulfilment of the vow (1 S 11:1, Ps 66:3-11). There are no exact regulations in the OT governing the vows of an unmarried son.

Vows must have been practised from innumerable antiquity; they are as old as the feeling for God and the experience of distress. They are attested for every period from the patriarchal to NT times (Ac 21:21-22; 23:11), and they seem to have played a more prominent part in religious practice as time wore on. Early historians record vows, but there is no early legislation on the subject. This first appears in a simple form in Deut. (7th cent. B.C.); but in the later (post-Exilic) Hebrew literature the subject comprises legislation—a fact which indicates extensive indulgence in the practice. This is confirmed by numerous references in later books—Prophets and Psalms (Is 19:1; Jon 1:22, Job 22:27; Ps 50:8, 50:15) (60:15).

Illustrations of vows from the period of the judges and the early monarchy are as follows: (I) Jephthah vows that, if Jehovah give him victory for the Ammonite army, he will offer to Him the first living thing coming out of his house to meet him (Ac 11:12); (II) Hannah, ¹ Liv. x. 88. 12. ² Ib. viii. 10. 13. ³ Ib. vii. 10. 12. ⁴ τον τον ἱδρυμένον · (Dio Cass. iii. 29).
that, if Jahweh give her a son, she will dedicate him to the life-long service of Jahweh, and no razor shall come upon his head (Ps 132:1). Absalom, while in the camp at Hebron (2 S 16). To these may be added—though not in the same sense historical—Jacob's vow to his wife at Bethel a sanctuary and to pay God tithe. If he furnished him with food and clothing and brought him safely back to the land he was to make an offering of thanksgiving. The offering of almsgiving may be taken the curse which Saul invoked, in the course of a battle, over his enemies (De 28:58). Absalom, according to the later law, abstained while the vow was upon him, from wine, from contact with the dead, and from cutting the hair (Nu 6:1-9); the Redhebists not only abstained from wine, but refused to practise agriculture or to live in houses (Jer 35:6). The almsgiving, however, which accompanies such vows is to be interpreted not as arbitrary privation, but as a tabo 'incident to the state of consecration, the same taboos, in fact, which are imposed, without a vow, on everyone who is engaged in worship or priestly service in the sanctuary, or even who is present in the holy place. Turi's refusal to enter his house or deal with his wife (2 S 11:11) is explained by his being a warrior on campaign, and war is a sacred activity.

Most of the vows from the early period reveal the person considering them with an eye to some national interests bulked in the mind of the individual, whose chief duty and privilege was to promote the religious, military, or political welfare of his people, and show the interests of the national God, which were bound up with those of His people. Jephthah and Saul, e.g., desire victory over the enemy of their nation and the nation's God; David is represented as passionately concerned with the suitable worship and the holy house of that God. Even in that early period, however, the individual had a life and interests of his own; Jacob and Absalom long for a safe return, and Hannah for a son. The various vicissitudes of the State, the individual came into ever-increasing prominence as a religious unit, vows affecting purely individual interests became increasingly common, and even the vicissitudes of their lives were to be observed in so many occasions for them. The Psalms preserve some of the songs sung by grateful worshippers at the payment of their vows, i.e. when they brought their 'sacrifices of thanksgiving' (e.g., Ps 22:36-38; 66:13-18; 116). In particular, the various stanzas of Ps 107, with its repeated appeal to the worshippers to give thanks to Jahweh (vv. 1-5, 12, 22, 31), give us a glimpse of the sort of occasions on which anxious hearts felt grateful to the Lord, and paid them praise. The Psalms, in each stanza deliverance from some distress is contemplated—from the perils of a journey across the wilderness or on the sea, from sickness, prison, etc. Ps 116:11 preserves for us the interesting custom (cf. Mt 26:27) of raising in the hand the 'cup of salvation' when invoking the divine name in connexion with the payment of vows. The Psalms abound in expressions of overflowing gratitude which are manifestly the sincere utterance of much happy experience of divine deliverance, and profound joy in the privilege of performing the vows (which would frequently take the form of sacrifices) made in the hour of distress.

The readiness to vow, however, had its dangers. Instinct and legislation alike (Lv 22:7-12) prescribed that nothing short of the best was good enough for Yahweh—male without blemish, if the offering was an animal; but vows made in haste were often repented at leisure, and offerings of inferior worth (e.g., a blind, lame, or sick animal) were made—a practice which evokes the fierce indignation of the priests. There was an obligation to make a vow (Dt 23:21); but, once made, there was a solemn obligation to keep it in the form in which it was made (Dt 23:20-22; Nu 3:9). It must cost the offeror something, whether in money, effort, or privation; and deliberately to evade or reduce the cost to which one has voluntarily and without compulsion committed oneself is to be guilty of a breach of faith, which in the later period was considered an inadvertence. The inconsiderate levity with which vows were made and the specious religious pretexts on the basis of which men withdrew from moral obligations (cf. Mt 23:14-19). The OT's clear indication that what Jephthah was confronted, but to him it was hardly a problem at all; his belief, on the one hand, in the sacredness and irrevocableness of the vow and, on the other, in the right to adjust at least on unique occasions—of human sacrifice contributed to make his decision inevitable, with however sore a heart he reached it.

The thing vowed was very frequently an animal, but it might also be money, a house, land, or a person. When an animal was offered, the sacrifice was accompanied by an obligation, as in the case of the other sacrifices (Nu 15:29). Money given to sacred prostitutes could not be accepted at the sanctuary in payment of a vow (Dt 23:14)—it was 'tainted' money. As the thing vowed must be something extra to normal demands, nothing could be vowed—such as firstlings in which Jahweh already held a claim (Lv 27:28). If an animal technically unclean and therefore unfit for sacrifice had been vowed, it was sold at a price put upon it by the priest, and the money was given to the priests. If an owner wished to retain it, he could do so by paying the estimated price with an addition of 20 per cent (Lv 27:28-29). The same procedure was followed in the case of a house that had been vowed (27:14), and, with certain modifications, in the case of land (27:28-29). The value of the land was determined by the distance of the next year of jubilee; for the complete period the basis of valuation was 50 shekels for an acreage seceded with a homer of barley, the value being reduced (apparently at the rate of a shekel a year) as the year of jubilee approached. If the land belonged by inheritance to the man who vowed it, he could secure the reversion of it in that year to himself by paying 20 per cent in addition to the price as ascertained on the above basis; if he failed to do this, it went over to the priests. If, however, the land had not been originally his own but purchased, it reverted in the year of jubilee to the original owner.

In the older period human beings could be dedicated to the god by a vow in one of several ways—baptism (116); services at a sanctuary (1 S 11), or by the nazirite life (Jdg 13). Since, however, in the post-Exilic period human sacrifice had passed away and the service of the sanctuary was more specifically, in the case of the Levites (Nu 35:26), only the nazirite vow—and
that in a modified form (temporary, not now life-long)—remained (6th).—But, though the custom of vowing human beings was no longer possible, this is described in the Vedas and the Āraṇīs as the substitution for the person a sum of money determined by the age and sex of the person, 50 shekels being payable for a man and 30 for a woman between the ages of twenty and sixty; the powers were presumably at their highest, and smaller sums for those under twenty and over sixty (Ls 274). These estimates doubtless often represented a substantial demand on the financial resources of the worshipper; the priests would have many motives of both a higher and a lower kind for insisting that he must not escape an offering which had cost him little or nothing (cf. the noble words of David in 2 S 124). They stood to gain heavily by the practice of vows, as what was vowed to God was as good as made over to them (Ls 274). But the OT shows here its customary regard for the poor by providing that in their case these demands should be reduced—i.e., they are only to pay according to their ability, as estimated by the priest (Ls 274).

Persons devoted by the fan could not be redeemed; they must perish. This, like all the other archetypal abstractions in view of the destruction of Canaanite idolators: it could have been an inspiration unexplainable, only in sarcasm (Jos 6:17); for the later age it would suggest little more than the obligation of uncompromising hostility to idolaty.

An examination of the vows recorded and of the laws regulating vows throws some light on the character both of the worshipper and of his God. The vow was born in a sense of need or an experience of distress (Ps 60). The things that men desired were deliverance, prosperity, health, children, victory; and the God to whom the vows were offered was believed to be pleased with sacrifice (even—in the early period—with human sacrifice). The circle of ideas with which vows were associated is priestly rather than prophetic, and there is an externalism and a quasi-commercial conception of the relation between God and man which is alien to the higher prophetic spirit. But, though vows in the later period were sometimes lightly made and dexterously evaded, the manifest emotion with which many a singer in the Psalter records his gratitude to God as he pays his vows shows that they often have represented a warm and genuine religious experience. They are an implicit confession of the speaker's recognized insufficiency, and their fulfilment is the expression of his gratitude for the experienced help of Jahweh (cf. Jer 5:11). It is no accident therefore, that these vows speak practically no rôle at all in the NT, where the demand is for a consecration not occasional but continuous, and for a consecration not of gift but of person.


JOHN E. MCFADYEN.

VOWS (Hindu).—Vows are a highly important element in the Hindu religion. Thus, according to a Sanskrit lawbook, a Brāhman ascetic must keep that in his vows (vārta) of abstention from injuring living beings, of truthfulness, of abstention from theft, of continence, and of liberality, besides five minor vows, such as abstention from anger, thrift, etc. (Baudhāyana, ii. 18, 1, 3). Brāhmānical students were subject to restrictive rules of the same kind during their residence with a teacher, and they had to keep five vows (vārta) when learning particular portions of the Vedas, such as the Sāvittīvārta, in connexion with the study of the sacred prayer called Sāvittī. The five great vows (vārta) of the Āraṇīs, 'I renounce all killing of living beings, lying, stealing, sexual pleasures, attachments whether great or small,' are evidently formed upon the Brāhmanical model. Nor are the five commandments (pāñcaka) of the Buddhist canonich books and the Mānusyaramaṇa (Ls 558) the only five Brāhman vows, especially as they are supplemented like the latter by five other vows which are binding on the Buddhist monk only. On his ordination, the Buddhist monk had to raise his joined hands and to declare: 'I take refuge in the Buddha, in the Law, in the Congregation.' Many different Brāhmanical vows (vārta) are of three classes in the sense of self-imposed devout or ceremonial obervances, but are not universal in India. Some have been derived from the Purāṇas, and have passed from them into the medieval and modern Sanskrit Digests of Religious Usages, such as Hemadrī's Čaturvarṇineśṭa-ānāmī (written c. 1500 A.D., printed in the Bibliotheca Indica), which devotes more than 2300 pages to the subject of vārta, most of them to be performed and repeated on certain stated days of the year. Thus the sāmpadottāravārta (i. 362), to be performed on the second (dālīyāt) of the bright half of every month for a whole year, beginning with the month of Kārttiṅa, consists of eating nothing but flowers or blossoms (papu); during all the days, at 9 o'clock in the morning, the bhiksu must eat the flowers of the plant of the ārāta at the close of the vārta with flowers made of gold and with a cow. As a recompense for performing this vārta a man obtains heavenly enjoyments and a blissful death. For seven succeeding years, the monk will be reborn and will be imbued with a knowledge of the Vedas and of the Vedāṅgas, and will live in happiness for a long time, surrounded by his sons and grandsons. In the case of the 'bull-vow' (sūgabhāvavārta), which is undertaken on the eighth of the bright half, one bestows a bull clad in a white robe and decked with ornaments, the spiritual rewarシ consisting in a long residence in the heaven of Īśā, followed by re-birth in the station of a king. One performing the 'river-vow' (nādiravārta) should, within certain intervals, worship seven different sacred streams, each for one day, offering milk in water, giving waterpots filled with milk to the Brāhmans, subsisting on nothing but milk himself, bathing far from the village, and taking food at night only. At the end of the year he should give a pāla of silver to the Brāhmans. By so doing he will enjoy a long and prosperous life, and will in a future birth be free from disease, eminent, virtuous, and rich, enjoying the position of a king, or of a distinguished Brāhmaṇ (i. 623). By the observance of these comparatively simple rites, we find others with a more complicated ceremonial; but the ingredients of fasting, gifts to Brāhmans, offerings to deities, etc., recur in nearly all these endless vārta, which give a nice round of religious observances, entailing spiritual blessings and natural comforts for the whole of the Hindu year. The Vratārṣī, which is considered the leading Sanskrit treatise on vārta in W. India at the present day, contains a description of no fewer than 205 vārta. The performance of vārta is nowadays specially common among women, and this may be an ancient custom. The formulae that in the Brāhmaṇa drama Uvāśi, the queen, when desirous of effecting a reconciliation with her husband, sends for the king, inviting him to undertake a certain vārta in common with her; and that the Sanskrit lawbooks exhort wves to perform their vārta together with their husbands.

Speaking of modern vārta, T. C. Bose observes: 'When the king is sent to the Pātaśāla (school), the girls of the school begin her course of vārta.' The first vārta is the river Pājā, instituted after the example of the goddess Durgā, who performed this ceremonial that she might obtain a good husband, Siva being considered a model husband. On the last day of
the Bengali year, two little earthen images of the goddess Durga are made by the girl and worshipped by her. The next two vratas are those of Hari or Kṛṣṇa, and of the ten images. Then comes the Sejāṭi vrata, in performing which the girl repeats a volley of abuses against her satī, or rival wife in the distant future, in order to avert the dreaded evils of polygamy. Of vratas to be practised by a married woman, the Śūtrivārāta is made specially prominent by Bose. This vrata derives its name from the sinless legend of the faithful Sātvitri, who through her devotion revived her deceased husband. It is annually celebrated in the Bengali month of Jyaśātika both by women whose husbands are alive and by widows who are desirous of averting the evils of widowhood in a future birth. In the former case the husband is worshipped by his wife with sandal and flowers, and she cooks a good dinner for him. The prayers are read by the priest, who gets his usual fee and all the offerings. This vrata should be performed regularly for fourteen years, at the end of which the expense is tenfold more, in clothes.

In the performance of vows, of which there are innumerable, the law distinguishes in two classes—those made primarily for the salvation of the soul, and those conditioned for the welfare of others. Of this latter class Brahmarshni and friends, and, thank the previous vratas. The Śūtrivārāta has also been described by Ward, who mentions, besides the ṣadvatī and the prāśāṭi, the vratas of different wives of Brahmarshni, one on each day, during the month of Vaisākha; and the Paścimāvārāta, a vrata on a large scale extending over a period of six years, and including many partial or total fasts, and various gifts to Brahmarshni on the part of the woman who is to perform this vrata, and various acts of worship on the part of the husband, the priest, and others. Ward calls the vrata a very lucrative source of profit to the Brahmarshni. He defines them as unconditioned vows to perform religious ceremonies, distinguishing them from conditional vows consisting of a promise to present offerings on condition that the god bestow such or such a benefit. Vows of this kind, e.g., when a man promises to sacrifice a goat, or to present two loads of sweetmeats, or cloth, ornaments, money, a house, etc., if the god grant his request to have sickness removed, or to become the servant of some European, or for rich clothes, a wife, and son. Bose observes that vows made in times of sickness are fulfilled.


VOWS (Jewish).—As the OT amply indicates, vows were a familiar feature in the religious life of Israel in former days (see art. Vows [Hebrew]). In the Apocrypha the references to the subject are few.

1. Let nothing hinder thee,' says Ben Sira, 'to pay thy vow in due season, and wait not until death to be justified (i.e., to pay thy debt). Before thou makest a vow, prepare thyself, and be not as a man that tempteth the Lord.'

2. *Pillar of history* has some interesting observations on vows.

3. The word of the man, he says, should be his oath, firm and unchangeable, founded steadfastly on truth. Therefore vows and oaths should be superfluous. If a man swear at all, he must swear not by the Divine Name, but by the sacred name of his parents or by some of the great objects of nature, which are ancient and, in accordance with the will of their Creator, never grow old. Once made, a vow should be sincerely performed if it were made 'with sober reason and deliberation.' (Pillar of history) Philo would thus sooner see the door to an annulment of vows made rashly and without due consideration of what they involved. Some Gezer, however, makes vows 'out of wicked hatred of their species, swearing, for example, that they will make no more vow, until they have not admitted this or that man to sit at the same table with them, or to come under the same roof, if he adds impressively: 'Sometimes, even after the death of their enemies, they keep up their enmity. I would recommend such men to seek to propitiate the mercy of God that so they may find means to avert the enmity of the vowing, and they proceed to explain the Mosaic laws concerning vows in his characteristic allegorical fashion.

All through the life of the religious teachers failed to kill the practice of the breaking of the vows. The Talmudic Rabbis were forced, accordingly, to legislate for the popular inclination to it in their turn, and, since that inclination survived long after the Talmudic age, the coddlers had to adapt the Talmudic enactments to the needs of their day, and even to amplify them. Two whole tractates of the Talmud—Nedarim ('The Laws on Vows') and Nazir ('The Laws on the Nazirite')—are devoted to this subject. The laws on vows are embodied in Joseph Qaro's Shulḥan Arukh (16th cent.), the latest of the great codes, and a separate section, consisting of 33 chapters containing many paragraphs, is devoted to them. To give even a brass tacks outline of this extensive and intricate legislation is obviously impossible here. Its magnitude and complexity are themselves an indication of the large place which vows occupy in the Jewish faith, and of the importance attached to the subject by the Rabbinical mind. The contents of the first chapter of the treatise on vows in the Shulḥan Arukh (14th cent.) (see also the Tosefta) are: 'Which Vows are Praiseworthy and which Should Be Forbidden.' For, besides preserving the inviolability of the vow, the great anxiety of the Talmudic doctors and of their successors was the prevention of useless vows which failed to minister either to religion or to morality. Among such vows were those made hurriedly or frivolously. There were also vows imposing upon the persons taking them a needless austerity and self-mortification.

Thus, when a beautiful youth under a vow of Naziritehood presents himself to Simon the Just (3rd cent. A.D.), the sage asks him reprovingly, 'How couldst thou have consented to destroy thy fair locks?'

The chapter in Qaro's work to which reference has just been made opens with the following monition, borrowed from the prescriptions of the codes, from the Talmud:

*Be not haliubted to make vows; for he that makes a vow is called wicked. Be not afraid to call God to witness. But, if you do not make for holy ends, it is a positive duty to fulfil them. Even vows for charitable purposes are not desirable; if one have the money, let him give it away without a vow, and if not, he should not defer his vow until he have it (which obviously means that, in either case, a vow is undesirable). It is 'permissible' to make a vow in time of trouble. He that saith 'I will study this or that chapter of the Torash, and, fearing lest he may be slothful, binds himself to study it by a vow, his vow is permissible, as that of one who, fearing for his strength of purpose, fortifies by a vow his determination to fulfil a certain precept of the Law.' He that takes a vow in order to strengthen his good resolves, and to improve his way of life, is a man of energy, and worthy of praise. For example, if he be a glutton, and abstains from vows by vow from meat for one year or two, or if he be a drunken man and makes his wine—wine for a time or for life, or, if proud of his comeliness, he becomes a Nazirite (as a penance)—all such acts are a service of God, and to them the Talmudic Sages refer when they say that 'Vows are a protecting hedge to reconciliation.' And the concluding utterance is instructive: 'But, in spite of the contrary, a service of God should not make many vows of self-denial; rather let him abstain without a vow.'

The same is typical of the Jewish spirit, which looks askance at vows, often made to be broken, and at asceticism, which makes for inefficiency in the great work of life. For, according to the

1. Cf. the interesting parallels, or comparisons, in Mahan Mahan Nedarim, iii, 3, 3.


3. Yoreh De'ah, 206.


5. Cf. ib. 32a.


Jewish idea, the true servant of God, nay, the true man, is he who takes his full share of the activities of the world, and serves its legitimate and in some measure pleasures. Voluntary renunciation springing from an ennobling sense of freedom, not servitude to a despotic asceticism, is the Jewish ideal. The one is the mark of the strong; the other is the self-condemnation of the weak; for the rest, the following enactments may be cited:

All vows, to be valid, must be uttered aloud. 1 Boys of twelve and girls of eleven, provided they understood the meaning of the words of making vows; 2 on the other hand, in accordance with the Pentateuchal precepts, a father may annul the vows of his daughter, but a woman cannot annul that of her husband, if they involve hardship to the daughter or the wife. 3 A man, moreover, may rescind some undertaking upon himself by vow he cannot so restrict others. 4 Moreover, vows the fulfillment of which is made impossible by forces major are, upon facts, null. 5

The formal enactment of vows can be effected only by an expert Rabbi or by three laymen specially indicated for the duty by reputation and experience. 6 7

It has been seen that, like the Biblical teachers, the Rabbis were opposed to vows on principle. Simon the Just only once approved of the taking of a vow—when the youth, in the story already cited, was allowed by him to become 8 Nazarite as a penance for having fallen in love with his own beauty. 'Would that there were many such Nazarites in Israel!' he exclaimed. But his objection, generally speaking, held, and it was usually a mere temporal precept, like Hilkhot Temurah, and the first Canailel. 9 He that made a vow built an idolatrous altar, and he that fulfilled a vow offered sacrifice on it. 10 Jephthah is cited as the type of a vow whose fulfillment was a worship of Baal. 11 The Nazarite is commanded in the Pentateuch (Nu 6th) to bring a sin-offering. 'In what has he sinned?' the Talmud asks. 'In having abstained from wine,' is the answer. 11 On the other hand, it appears that he must be scrupulously fulfilled; Heaven itself testifies against the man who breaks his word. 12 Further, the Supreme is pictured as thus exhorting Israel, 'Take heed that ye break not your vows, for he that does so will come to break his oaths, and that would be to deny Me, and so to commit mortal sin.' 12 'He shall not break his word' (Nu 30th)—the Scriptural utterance is the basis and starting-point of much of the Talmudic legislation concerning vows, and so sensitive was the Rabbinical mind to the sacredness of the vow, and to the danger of its being infringed by the common folk, that one Rabbi (Shifra, 4th Saon, or Succa 750th)—forbade even the study of tractate Nedarim.

Despite these facts the Rabbis have been accused of too readily 'opening the door' to use their own phrase, to sympathy with the misfortunes, sufferings, and annulment of vows. The prescriptions in Middoth Nedarim, ix., have been specially cited in support of this charge. But it is only necessary to read these enactments intelligently and fairly in order to vindicate their underlying motive. Far from being animated by a loose regard for morality, they have an ethical intent, that of saving persons who have made virtually impracticable vows from the guilt of breaking them, and of protecting the hardship and injustice which their fulfillment will entail upon others. Men would make vows in a fit of ill-humour, or in a morose and anti-social temper, from which it was only kind to them, and just to the members of their family or to their neighbours, to release them. 3 But even such under

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1 Yeruf Detoh, 219; Shelomoh, 290.
2 Megillah, Pare仇恨, 11; Yeruf Detoh, 233.
3 Middoth Nedarim, x. 1 ff.
4 Simhah to Nu 35th: Middoth Nedarim, iii. 1 ff.
5 Siphre to Nu 35th: Breshit, 1st; Middoth Nedarim, 2.
6 Nedarim, 90b, 22a.
7 ib. 9b.
8 Talmud, 4a.
9 ib. 7b.
10 ib. 7b.
11 Nedarim, 294.; Ta' life Shimon to Nu 30th.
12 See Middoth Nedarim, ii. 1, and cf. the passage from Philo, above.

13 takings were not lightly cancelled. They had to be annulled formally by recognized and competent authority. In the other, by the court, and under the order of the court could, under no circumstances, be set aside by any authority whatsoever. 1 A further charge of a different character has been brought, doubts with reason, against certain Jewish practice in regard to vows, against the Gospel the Pharisees are condemned for making vows under circumstances which involved a positive violation of the express commands of the Mosaic Law (Mt 15th, 7th). That, in the Middle Ages, divergent practices, varying with the authorities immediately concerned, prevailed with regard to granting absolution from vows is unquestionable. Some Rabbis were more lenient in the matter than others. But this difference of practice was due to the varying importance attached to the two opposing considerations which have already been mentioned. One Rabbi would lay the greater stress upon the desirability of preventing the violation of vows, and so be inclined to grant dispensation from them; another would think more especially of the sanctity of the vow itself, however lightly made, and however trivial its character, and so refuse dispensation. A familiar instance is that of a man who vowed to give up gambling. The temptation to break such a vow was particularly strong. Should this be considered an injustice?

Or should the man be held to his vow notwithstanding? So great was the dread of breaking the plighted word that we find a Jew of the 16th cent. swearing that he would never swear. 2

Here reference may be appropriately made to the formula for the annulment of vows which ushers in the service in orthodox synagogues on the Eve of the Day of Atonement. Deriving its name Kol Nida ("All Vows") from its initial words, it runs as follows: 3

1 All vows, bonds, oaths, etc., wherewith we have vowed... and bound ourselves, from this Day of Atonement unto the next... in, to repent in them. They shall be annulled, made void and of some effect... Our vows shall not be vows; our bonds shall not be bonds; and our oaths shall not be oaths.

And, since the congregation may have sinned by violating its vows in the past, the declaration is immediately renewed by the verse

'And all the congregation of the children of Israel shall be forgiven, ...for in respect of all the people it was done unwittingly.'

This declaration has provided anti-Jewish writers with much welcome ammunition. Here, they have contended, is a proof that the word of a Jew cannot be trusted, seeing that he absolves himself from his vows and promises beforehand, in his very synagogue, and on the most solemn day in the year. The accusation is the fruit either of ignorance or malvolence or of both combined. The best answer to it is supplied by the unequivocal doctrine of the Rabbinical teachers in all ages, who warned their people that their very 'Yea' and 'Nay' must be true, 4 and that it is even more sinful to deceive a Gentile than a Jew. 5

The history of the declaration completes the defence. Owing its origin, at some unknown period not later than the early Gaonic age, to the dread of violating vows, it was nevertheless viewed with stern disapproval by the greatest of the rabbis.

1 For further information on this subject see S. Schechter, in C. O. Monteith's Hibbert Lectures for 1892, p. 557 ff.
2 Abraham, Jewish Life in the Middle Ages, p. 392 ff., 109 ff.; for the ethical as well as the legal aspects of vows and oaths see L. Ahimeir, Ha-moer Orzim, or Hm-mor Orzim (the Middle-Age community), Day of Atonement, pt. i. p. 18.
4 Hallin, 943; R. Qumma, 1119; Turaia B. Qumma, 10. 15; Shabbath Arufik, Hochen Miskrat, 360 ff., and the medieval moralists pauint.
VOWS (Teutonic)—Vows were solemn promises which were made before some deity or superior power, and by which the person making the vow undertook within a given time or in the future to perform a particular act, to obtain a purpose, to bestow a gift, or to devote himself to some person or thing—as, e.g., in a sworn brotherhood. Such vows were rather common among the Teutons both in the North and in Germany, and they were considered absolutely sacred and inviolable. A person not redeeming his vow or his promise was considered an out-caste, and no regard was paid to him. Among the ancient Teutons all oaths and solemn promises were given with great attention and seriousness. They were generally closed with much hilarity and drinking, and then all kinds of promises were made for the future while the goblets were drunk, each of them devoted to some special divinity or to the memory of some great name. The Braga-goblet was the most imposing of all. Of such an occasion we have a description in the Heimskringla

1 First Odin's goblet was emptied for victory and power to his king; thereafter, Njord's and Freya's goblets for peace and a good success. Then it was the custom of many to empty the Braga-goblet; and then the guests emptied a goblet to the memory of departed friends, called the remembrance-goblet. 2 They were considered absolutely sacred and inviolable. A person not redeeming his vow or his promise was considered an outcaste, and no regard was paid to him. Among the ancient Teutons all oaths and solemn promises were given with great attention and seriousness. They were generally closed with much hilarity and drinking, and then all kinds of promises were made for the future while the goblets were drunk, each of them devoted to some special divinity or to the memory of some great name. The Braga-goblet was the most imposing of all. Of such an occasion we have a description in the Heimskringla.
ditions of the vow given. 1 Those promises were, no doubt, offered to make certain undertakings more sure—e.g., to win or offend such a woman, whom the maker of the vow wanted to secure for himself or for somebody else, to avenge a crime or an injury, to obtain an honour or any such thing which required honest personal effort—and they were often most in the interest of the higher services so as to render the act itself morally binding.

Sworn brotherhoods were mostly entered into by young men who had been brought up together or who had formed close friendships because of peculiar experiences. The ceremony was as follows.

The sod of a selected piece of ground was loosened and cut in three oblong slices, which were raised and held up by the head of the covenanters, as so to form an arch under which they let drop of their blood from self-inflicted wounds freely now in the fresh and open air, vowing to be faithful to one another in life and death. Such men would afterwards be irrepressible and never failed one another. The one would always avenge the injury done to the other, which meant in case of death that he had to take the life of the slayer, even if a promise of a relative or a highly exalted person. In later times of ancient Teuton history sworn brotherhoods were the most sacred of all covenants, no one ever thinking of breaking a vow thus made or even considering such a thing possible. 2

It is apparent that vows as sacred obligations entered into public life in various manners, and also that mutual behaviour thereby became more pregnant and dependable. Even to this day it is very common in countries of the North to demand, or at least to request, that certain promises be made sure by the oath, neither before the court nor in the way prescribed for judicial proceedings, but as a vow made to a friend or to the second party of the contract; for, where such a vow has been taken, one feels that the promise is not so much hold.


S. G. Youngert.

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WAGES.—See Economics, Employment.

WAHABIS.—Named after "Abd al-Wahhab," this Muhammadan community has its headquarters in the part of Arabia called Nejd, but is also represented in Mesopotamia, India, and Africa.

i. Tenets.—The aim of the founders of the community appears to have been ostensively to restore Islam to its original purity, as taught by Muhammad and practised by his converts. Hence, when their system was examined by Sunni experts in Cairo, it was found not to differ from the orthodox. Their precepts ordering all other Muslims as idolaters lay in the practice of visiting the tombs of saints and appealing to them in emergencies, which the Wahhabis identified with the practice of the pre-Islamic pagans that was later banished completely in the Qur'an. Hence they destroyed such tombs, when they got the opportunity, not even sparing that of Muhammad in Medina. One of their enemies summarizes

1 Snorri Sturlason, Konungasaga, Christiania, 1860.
2 Heimskringla, l. 100 (King Olaf Tryggvesson's Saga, ch. 39).

The points wherein they differ from the orthodox under ten heads.

(1) They regard the Deity as having bodily form, with face, hands, etc.

(2) Reasoning has no place in religious questions, which must be settled solely by tradition.

(3) The source of true and of common 'Concensus' is rejected.

(4) The source called 'Analogy' is rejected.

(5) The opinions of the compilers of codes have no authority, and those who follow them are unbelievers.

(6) All Muslims who do not join their community are unbelievers.

(7) Neither the Prophet nor any saint may be employed as intercessor with God.

(8) Visits to the tombs of saints, etc., are forbidden.

(9) Oaths by any oath are forbidden, as also is the practice of sacrificing at the tombs of saints and prophets.

It is doubtful whether no. (5) is correct, as the Wahhabis are said to be followers of the line of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (+ A.H. 241), the adherents of whom were notorious in "Abbasid days for their interference with pilgrimages to the tombs of 1 Ch. Hardwar Saga, 14; 2 Mosek Thors Saga, 12; 3 Porphyrion, 55.

2 Strahlenm, Svenska Folkets Historia, ii. 511-515. Cf. also art. Druzehood (Arabia).
saints; in A.H. 323 the khilafah Râdi issued a rescript against them. European travellers lay stress on their tabu of tobacco and all drugs that bring on the passions; and their objection to the use of silk in any part of the attire, and of ornaments of gold, silver, or gems. Practices of which their history gives evidence are the massacre of the women and all as well as the men of their Muslim enemies, and the mild treatment of the tolerated communities; these were characteristic of the early Khârijî, whose revolts were brought about by deviations from the rigidity of Islam. If Islam has been assimilated, that is, they suppose the Qur'ân to have been mutilated by the third khilafah, they retain therein the notion which brought about the earliest Khârijî movements. Their iconoclasm bears some resemblance to the practice of the Khârijî called Qarnâtîn, with whom they are not otherwise connected.  

2. History.—The history of the Wahhâbîs appears to have been written exclusively by European travellers; there is therefore some uncertainty about the origins of the system. As early as 1764 it attracted the notice of Carsten Niebuhr, who brought the first mention of it to Europe. There are many statements about the birthplace and the tribe of that Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhâb from whose patronymic the sect derives its name. Born in Central Arabia about 1730, he is said to have travelled as a student and merchant, and to have attached himself to one Muhammad b. Sa'âd, chief of Dirâ'Iyyah (about 4620 E. long, 25 N. lat.), who married his daughter and became his first disciple. To what extent these persons contemplated from the first the establishment of an independent state cannot now be ascertained; Palgrave, whose account of this matter is more than generally acceptable, states that Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhâb allured Ibn Sa'âd with a definite promise of the sort. It is clear that the two made their resolve to restore Islam to its original purity a ground for attacking their neighbours, at first, it is said, with a force of seven men mounted on camels; but a little initial success carries such adventurers a long way where, as in Central Arabia at the time, there is no organized government. Muhammad b. Sa'âd had before his death extended his authority over 'Arîd, Qasim, Haša, Dovâsir, and Sulayyîl, and become master of all the provinces situated between the Hijâz and the Fâhâl. The two were reckoned as one of the strongest tribes of Meccah, a fact which, as we shall see, was of the highest importance. Under the successor of Muhammad b. Sa'âd, his son 'Abd al-'Azîz, the Wahhâbîs came into collision with the outposts of the Ottoman Government, and attacked and plundered Imam 'Hasîn, where they massacred the inhabitants. This was in 1801, and in the following year the Wahhâbî chief, who had for some time been struggling with the then sharîf of Meccâh, Ghalîb, was able to wrest from him the important town of Tâfîf. Owing to the supineness of the Ottoman Government and the incompetence of the pashas who attempted to oppose the Wahhâbîs, the latter progressed with great rapidity; in 1803 Sa'âd, son of 'Abd al-'Azîz, took Meccâh, where, however, Ghalîb, having adopted Wahhâbî tenets, was allowed to resume his government; and in 1804 Meccâh was also taken by Muhammad b. Sa'âd, who by a blunder of Muhammad, was robbed of all its ornaments and treasures. By this time Sa'âd was chief of the community, his father 'Abd al-'Azîz having been assassinated in 1803. Râdi was made by Wahhâbîs in the direction of the Yemen, which, however, was not permanently occupied.  

Though the new rulers of the Hijâz did not actually abolish the pilgrimage, fear of them kept away the pilgrim caravans from Persia, Syria, and Egypt.  

Muhammad Ali, the pasha of Egypt, had been conferred by the Porte in 1804, with an express injunction to reconquer the sanctuaries, took no serious step in that direction till 1809, not even in prohibiting the export of food from Egypt to Arabia, though that measure alone would have rendered the position of the Wahhâbîs in those cities difficult. After two years of preparation the pasha of Egypt sent his son Tuzun, a man famous for his personal courage, at the head of an expedition, which seized Yanbo in Oct. 1811. In the following year he succeeded in reconquering Medînah; and in Jan. 1813 Meccâh and Ta'if also were recovered. In this year Muhammad Ali himself took the command in Arabia, and fought with varying results against Sa'âd till the death of the latter in the following year; he was succeeded by his son 'Abdallah, with whom peace was made by Muhammad Ali in 1815, after each party had won some considerable victories. Muhammad Ali returned to Egypt; but the terms of peace could not be carried out, and in the following year the pasha's army was sent out to reduce what remained of Wahhâbî power; in 1818 he took Dirâ'Iyyah, the Wahhâbî capital, and obtained possession of 'Abdallâh's person; the latter was taken to Cairo, and sent thence to Constantinople, where he was executed. 

A Turkish governor was left in the Najd by Ibrahim Pasha when he returned to Egypt; a son of 'Abdallah, named Turki, who had escaped when the capital was taken, succeeded in re-assembling the Wahhâbî forces and expelling the governor. A new capital, Riyad, was chosen by Turki for the renascent community; he then sent the pasha of Meccâh, with a large force to meet him, to the camp near Qatif. He was driven by the Wahhâbîs to return, and Turki proceeded to Meccâh, which he regained in 1821; he then carried the war into the Yemen, and obtained possession of the former capital of Meccâh, Medînah, in 1824. In 1829 the Wahhâbîs were driven to the South, and there remained till 1838, when Muhammad 'Ali, the Egyptian pasha, proceeded to Arabia with a powerful force, and after a series of battles, recaptured Meccâh and Medînah, and put down the Wahhâbîs forever. 

2 Cf. Le Comte, "Carâvans," C. E. G. S.  
3 Cf. "Personal Narrative of a Year's Journey through Central and Eastern Arabia," ii. 376.  
6 "Personal Narrative of a Year's Journey through Central and Eastern Arabia," i. 376.
where he installed one of the Ibn Sa'ud family as ruler, remembering that the founder of his own dynasty had been a creature of Ibn Sa'ud. Since the day he declared himself from Ibn Rashid's control, and in the intrigues which preceded the Great War of 1914-18 the latter favoured Germany, whereas the former favoured Britain.

3. Wahhabism in India.—Wahhabism was introduced into India by one Sayyid Aḥmad, who was born in 1780-87 in Rai Barli, and started a revivalist movement among the Muslims of India, which he believed at Patna, before he made the pilgrimage to Mecca which was the occasion of his conversion to the Wahhabī system. Returning to India in 1824, he gained a following in Peshawar, and in 1826 started military operations against the Sikhs, in which he had considerable success; national disensions, however, broke out among his followers, and in 1831 he met his death at the hands of the Sikhs. The movement was continued by him in the dominion over a large extent of territory along the left bank of the Indus, which, however, they lost in 1847, when the Wahhabī troops surrendered to a British continued in a harbour a number of Wahhabīs, who are said to have taken part in the Indian Mutiny. For about twenty years after the mutiny had been quelled attempts were made by Wahhabī preachers to stir up risings against the British in different parts of the Penin-
sula and to found Wahhabī states.

The Indian Wahhabism is said to differ from that of Arabia in its identification of one or other of the founders of the system with the Mahdi of the Sunnis, whereas in Arabia this term was not used.

4. Literature.—It does not appear that the founders of the system in Arabia did more than issue letters and manifestos; and at this day there is no printing-press in Riyadh or (probably) in Hijaz. Such literature as the system has produced is mainly Indian, and in Persian or Urdu; but there is some anti-Wahhabī literature in Arabic, emanating from Mesopotamia—e.g., al-Fājr al-Sa'dīq fl-radd 'ala munkfi-twassul wa-l-karnāt wal-kāwarīq by Jamīl Efendi Sidqi Zahāwī (Cairo, a.H. 1329).

Life and conduct.—The Wahhabis appear from the commencement of the system till our time to have maintained the institutions of orthodox Islam with far greater rigidity than other Muhammadans. Like other Muslim leaders, the first generations of Wahhabis propagated their views mainly with the sword; with the introduction of Arabia into the Pax Britannica more peaceful methods are coming into vogue, and the following description is from a recent visitor to Riyadh gives an idea of both the practices and the aims of the Arabian Wahhabah at the present day:

"In this city men live for the next world. Hundreds are studying in the Mosques to go out as teachers among the Bedouin tribes. It is the center of a system of religious education that takes in every village of Central Arabia, and imparts the rudiments of an education to reach the larger part of the male population of the various towns. Great efforts are being made now to educate the Bedouin. Men prey five times a day in Riyadh. In the winter the roll is called at early morning prayers and the one who is absent does the service in the late evening. Absences are beaten with twenty strokes on the following day. In the summer duties in the date gardens and elsewhere are considered a proper place for praying at home. After a few years ago a man absented himself some days from all prayers and was publicly executed for so doing. It is safe to say that there is one city on earth where men are more interested in the next world than they are in this. Late dinners are unknown. The evening begins early in the afternoon, and that there may be time for religious readings and instructions before going to bed. There is the regular program in the house of the great chief himself."  

Literature.—J. L. Burckhardt, Travels in Arabia, 2 vols., London, 1855; French tr., Paris, 1858; ii. 423-470 (this tr. con-

1. WAKASHAN.—See MANITU, ORENDA, MANA, PLAINS INDIANS.

WAKASHAN.—The Wakashan linguistic family consists of two main branches: the Kwakiutl, extending from the Tsimshian country southward to the northern end of Vancouver Island, and the Nuuks of the west coast of Vancouver Island and the extreme northwestern corner of the State of Washington. The northernmost Kwakiutl, usually known as Heiltsuk, were divided into clans governed by mother-right, but the Kwakiutl division, while not true gentes, inclined to be patriarchal, although crests descended to a man's daughter's son rather than to his own son, thus showing a confused or mixed system of descent. The Nuuks tribes were divided into a number of totems of varying rank, and often by exogamy. If a man married outside of his sept, his children belonged to that which stood higher socially, but, if he married inside, the descent was patrilineal.

1. Kwakiutl.—I. Supernatural beings.—The principal Kwakiutl deity was the sun, called Ata ('the one above'), Kanskiy ('our brother'), Kansūla ('our elder brother'), Amiecek ('the one to whom we subscribe'), and Amicke ('our chief'), and Kautsoump ('our father'). The last of these names is said not to have been used until after the advent of Europeans, but this is not quite certain. He was frequently addressed in prayer in such words as 'O chief, take pity upon us'; and in bad weather the steersman of a canoe would say to him 'Take care of us, chief.' His son Kanikilak ('with outspread wings') largely takes the place of the northern transformer, Raven. He descended from heaven and wandered over the face of the whole earth, giving man his arts, customs, and institutions. He also was addressed in prayer. Raven, however, appears as well, and the stories told of him resemble those related by the Haida, Tlingit, and Tsimsian (qq.v.). Besides being partially displaced by the sun, his son, he is also and functions as a trickster with Mink, who was often even more prominent. A host of lesser spirits were believed in, but they were not especially different from those found elsewhere in America, except the spirits concerned with the great winter ceremonials. Twins were believed to be transformed salmon and were supposed to have power over the winds and weather. When a salmon was killed, its soul was believed to return to the salmon country.

2. The dead.—After death a man's soul, which was thought to have its seat in the head, became a ghost, or īləmok, the sight of which was deadly. Those īləmok either lived in a place under ground called Bebbenakana ('the greatest depth'), or roamed through the woods. They might not enter a house, but hovered round the villages, causing bad weather. The name Bebbenakana is said not to have been used before the advent of the Whites, but the idea for which it stands was certain aboriginal. Ultimately the īləmok was reborn in the first child of a relative. Probably Bebbenakana was not the only region of the dead, for one story speaks of a man whose soul went to live with the sun before it was reborn.

3. Shamanism.—The common name for a shaman among the Kwakiutl was náwalak, but, when times the history somewhat later than the original); W. G. Patgivre, Personal Narratives of a Year's Journey through Central and Eastern Arabia, 2 vols., London, 1888; E. Rehaktek, 'Hist. of the Wahhabī in Arabia and in India,' TRAFÉE XIV., 474-497. For a full account of the Arab-Deserta, 2 vols., Cambridge, 1887; Edvard Nolde, Reise nach Irak und Mesopotamien, Brunswick, 1855; Al-Manar, xii (Cairo, 1897) 391-400.

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curing diseases, he was called heliikya or pakako. Disease was supposed to be caused either by some form of evil which affected the patient as a stick or piece of skin, bone, or quartz, or by the absence of the soul from the body. In the former case the shaman moistened the place where the disease had its hold, with incantations and went throughout the usual incantations to the accompaniment of his rattle, and finally nailed out the disease and showed it to the bystanders. Sometimes he used water, and laid the disease from the hollow of his hand into the air. When the soul had left the patient's body—a fact which the shaman discovered by feeling the patient's head and the root of his nose—the shaman caught it and replaced it in the head, its proper seat. Sometimes it was seen in his hand in the shape of a bird or mannikin. The shaman was also able to cause disease by throwing something into his victim's body. The secrets of the shaman proper or medicine-man were derived from Hailaklyawe, the ancestor of the gens of that name. One of the secret societies, however, the Mamaka, conferred power to catch the invisible disembodied soul as supposed to be constantly flying through the air in the form of a worm—and throw it back upon one's enemies.

4. Witchcraft.—True witchcraft was of two kinds. In one the person was made sick by having a portion or element of his body taken from him. The second, called cha, was more complicated: A portion of a person's body, or clothing that had received portions of it, was obtained and was burned before the fire, along with fragments of a corpse; then they were ground up together, sealed in a piece of skin or cloth, and placed in the hollow of a human bone. This in turn was placed inside a human skull and the whole deposited in a small box, which was afterwards hung in the ground. This box was barely covered with earth. Almost on the top of this fire was built so as to warn the whole, and, while it burned, the wizard beat his head against a tree, naming and denounced his enemy. This was done secretly and at night or in the early morning, and was repeated at frequent intervals until the enemy died. Such a spell might be removed, however, by finding and unearthing the box—carefully, lest a sudden jar prove fatal to the sick man—and then unwrapping the contents, covering them with feathers, and throwing them into the sea. It might also be removed by some one going over the bewitching ceremonies again, the second ceremony serving to undo the first.

5. Eclipses.—When an eclipse of the sun or moon took place, it was supposed that those bodies were being swallowed, and to liberate them the Kwakiutl burned blankets, boxes, and food. They also made noises to frighten away the enemy and sang 'Haukiki!' ('Throw it up!').

The Nutka are treated in art. VANCOUVER ISLAND INDIANS.

III. MAKAH.—The Makah Indians around Cape Flattery in the State of Washington are merely a colony of Nutka, who had crossed the strait, but their beliefs show certain points of divergence.

1. Supernatural beings and cosmology.—Like the other Nutka, they worshipped a supreme being, whose name was spoken only to those who had been initiated into the sacred rites and ceremonies. One name for this being was Chakatta Hatarstli, or Hatarstli Chabatta ('the great chief who resides above'). He was said to be clothed in animal skins, and to live on the Kwakiutl burned blankets, boxes, and food. They also made noises to frighten away the enemy and sang 'Haukiki!' ('Throw it up!').

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Waldenses.—The Waldenses are a Protestant Church, bearing among its own people the name of Vanda, derived from the geographical situation of its origin and headquarters among the southern valleys of the Cottian Alps, which run the tributaries of the Pellice and the Po, and which are approached from Turin across the plain of Piedmont. Thus situated as a community of the mountain-dwellers far removed from the town life of Italy, and with interior valleys still more remote into which to retreat in times of
danger, this Church was able to develop and maintain its own individuality and to withstand the attacks of opponents in a way that has almost superhuman qualities. We may realize the reason for such an appearance in the physical geography of the area in which it grew up in order to understand the strange characteristics and account for its sturdy independence and heroic aspect. In fact, the Walsdenses, being a fanciful impossibility to form the fabric of its story. But a sufficient substratum of solid fact remains to account for the importance that has been attached to so small a group of people who have persisted down through the ages, and Milton immortalized their suffering in a great sonnet. Over and above these facts critical questions concerning their origin have attracted the attention of scholars and aroused the energies of controversiasts, with the consequence that a literature has grown up about the Walsdenses to such an extent that only the name is quite out of proportion to the small number of simple folk to whom it has been attached.

1. Origin.—The question of the origin of the Waldenses has been a matter of controversy from a number of different considerations. While Roman Catholic writers have settled the matter by regarding these people as simply the followers of Peter Waldo of Lyons, they themselves repudiate this view and push back their beginnings to the age of primitive Christianity. Thus they deny that they first appeared as a sect of heretics breaking off from the historic Church, and claim to have preserved the purity of the faith through the ages, while all the rest of the Church was degenerating and accumulating the corruptions against which they protested from the first.

1. Claim to apostolic origin.—This claim is first met with in a Dominician monk at Passign in the year 1316, who states that the Walsdenses declare that they are the most ancient of all the sects, some even saying that this sect 'durauit a tempore patrum.' It was but a step from this position to add that the Waldesian Church was founded by the St. Paul when on his way to Spain. A little later a woman under examination for heresy is said to have made a similar statement. It is not met with in a letter written in 1530 and addressed to Ecelanapudus. But it was adopted by Robert d'Olivetan and published in the preface to his translation of the Bible in 1553, and from that time onwards it was universally adopted by the Protestants, who thus came to honour the Waldenses as the one Christian Church that had preserved the primitive faith of NT times. Its adoption by Beza, its appearance in the Confession of 1541, the assertion of it by Leger in the preface of his history, the encouragement it obtained from Samuel Morland, the British envoy in Savoy, all helped to confirm its popular acceptance. It was even claimed to be the primary source of Calvinism, an ingenuous way of accounting for its otherwise suspicious resemblance to that type of Reformation theology. But now it has been pointed out that no trace of this notion can be found in any of the early Waldensian writings. The inquisitor Moneta of Cremona, dis-

2. The time of Sylvester.—A second theory of the ancient origin of the Waldensian Church is that it arose at Rome in the time of the episcopate of Sylvester, when that bishop, after baptizing Constantine, put the Church under the power of the emperor; whereupon a colleague of the bishop protested, broke off communion with Rome, and retreated into the Vadois valleys. Thus the Waldesian movement is represented as being a reaction against the corruption of the Church in the 4th century. This theory has been combined with the claims to apostolic origin, with the suggestion that the secluded Church, already some centuries old, now received an accession of refugees who found a welcome home in its primitive simplicity. It is given by the inquisitor Moneta, as held by 'the Poor Men of Lyons.' But the want of evidence during the intermediate period, which is fatal to the claim to an apostolic origin, is also applicable to this theory, though the intermediate centuries are not quite so many. Moreover in that period, Sylvester and his predecessors had the Church preserved the primitive simplicity advocated by the Waldenses uninterrupted until the age of Sylvester, as the upholders of this theory have maintained. Thus its basal assumption is discredited by history.

3. The time of Claude of Turin.—Claude, bishop of Turin in the 8th cent., under Charlemagne and Louis the Pious, revived the Augustinian doctrine of predestination, but ignored the High Church side of Augustine's teaching, according to which the Church was the appointed medium of communication between God and man, resisting the papal claims, and denying that St. Peter had received power to bind and loose. He had crosses as well as images removed from his churches, in all these matters anticipating the Reformation. Accordingly Leger, Muzon, and other Waldenses, understanding that such churches of the Vadois valleys had to be included in Claude's diocese, maintained that, if their separation from the Roman Catholic Church could not be traced back to primitive times, it might very well be attributed to the influence of this French bishop, who has been described as a Calvinist before the Reformation. That Claude may have had some
The supposed connexion between the Waldenses and the Albegenses was championed in England by a certain Mr. Valdensian, of whom the most notable was G. S. Faber, An Enquiry into the History and the Theology of the ancient Valdensians and Albigeenses (1820). The same year the Church was also almost completely demolished by S. R. Maitland in Facts and Documents Illustrative of the History, Doctrines, and Lives of the Waldenses and Albigenses (1888). Lastly, Charles Schmidt of Strasbourg made an attempt to settle the question of the garrison, saying, or as Coema says, its coup de grace. See further, A. A. Albigenses.

5. Various later influences. — It must well be observed that various influences tended to limit the Vaudois from continuous close Roman influence. Their isolated geographical situation would minimize intercommunication, and at the same time their life as mountaineers would foster a spirit of independence and its simplicity keep them from the materializing influence of a smutinous ritual. Then the Gothic and Lombard invasions would reduce ecclesiastical and political domination. For a while these people came under the wave of Arian dominance. We cannot regard the Waldensian faith as akin to a product of Arianism, and the local separation produced by the heresy would seem to render a holy refuge. Arnold of Brescia, a disciple of Abelard, executed at Rome in 1155, was a strenuous opponent of the temporal claims of the papacy. He contended that sacrifices and absolutions by the Church were not living an apostolic life were invalid. Lucius III's bull of excommunication (1184) shows that he left followers behind him whose influence may well have limbs to another Northern historic tradition. The new wave of Vaudois was merged in that of the definitely anti-papal Waldenses. But Leger, in setting his name at the head of the list of barbs, was confusing it with that of Peter of Toulon. Arnold. Then, on both sides of the Alps, those parts of France and Italy respectively which were nearest to the Waldesian valleys witnessed during the Middle Ages repeated protests against the abuse of images and materialistic forms of worship. With greater probability Peter of Bures (1194–23) is claimed by Combé, Gay, and others as one of the precursors and originating influences of the Waldensians.

Unfortunately our knowledge of Peter's tenets is almost confined to the statements of Peter the Venerable, abbot of Cluny. It would appear that he ascribed the highest authority to the Gospels, especially the teachings of Jesus. Consequently in the Eucharist, finding a second and lower authority in the Epistles. It is not clear how far his spiritual teaching was understood and adapted. The Waldensian baptism and repudiated the efficacy of infant baptism, rejected the doctrine of transubstantiation and the Mass—perhaps even going so far as to place up to the observation of Christ as a rite of the Church—repudiated the custom of prayers for the dead, denied the efficacy of the holy oil, and finally combated an iconoclastic crusade against the use of crosses. Dölger's association of the Petoranusians with the Cathari has been shown to lack foundation. Peter was the Venerable assigning what he regarded as the superstitions of the Church, especially the 'Roman Idiocy.' Beginning in the obscure village of Bures high up among the Alps, his influence spread through Narbonne, Guissény, and Gasceny, and was for a time centred at Toulouse, where he enjoyed great and growing popularity. Nevertheless, at the instigation of the monks of St. Gilles, he was seized by a mob and publicly burnt, without any legal trial, and also without any interference from the authorities. Peter of Bures was followed as a reformer by Henry of Cluny, who was condemned at the Council of Pisa (1122) but escaped, and was again imprisoned in 1150 at Toulouse, where he died. His most exact connexion with the famous abbey of Cluny is a mistake; so is the claim that he was an Italian; he seems to have been brought up by his father at Lausanne. Henry followed Peter in protesting against corruptions in the Church, especially the degradation of the clergy, whom he persuaded to marry their own. Unfortunately, to his successor, our knowledge of this reformer is chiefly dependent on indirect evidence. The explanation to which the result of his energetic activity was that the altars were abandoned and the sacraments of the Church despised. Further the details are absolutely not established. We have the report of the historian.
specific doctrinal teaching and cannot say that he shared Peter of Brossa's fight against Protestantism. Apparently his process was on moral rather than on theological grounds. Meanwhile there was a spirit of revolt in the air and a growing desire for a return to apostolic observance that was counteracted by the pope. On the other hand, the Council of Tours (1169) eommunicated both the findings of the Lateran and the Hebraic and the Hussites have been claimed as precursors of the Waldenses; but they were simply workmen's guilds in Lombardy, many of whose members joined the new religious movements, but who were not themselves formative influences in them.

6. Waldo and the Poor Men of Lyons.—The Christian name Peter commonly attached to the reformer suggests a desire to lay claim to the apostolic mother church, of whom he was a true spiritual descendant. His name is given in French as Waldes, in Latin as Waldeenius, Waldeenus, Galdenius, in Italian as Waldo. Again we have to turn to the prejudiced account of enemies for most of our information about this reformer. It is from an anonymous writer at Laon, however, that we obtain the story of his conversion.

He had been enriched by the practice of usury when in 1173, after being deeply impressed by the legend of St. Aelius, describing how the saint had given all his property to the poor and gone on a pilgrimage to the Holy Land, he was directed by a theologian to the words of Christ in Mt 6-10. Thereupon, making over his landholdings to his wife, and distributing the rest of his wealth to the poor, he and all of his family threw himself to the study of the Gospels, the Psalms, and other parts of the Sacred Scripture as well as some old books, which he got two friendly priests to translate for him into the Romance dialect. After taking a formal vow of poverty and going through the streets begging his way and preaching his message of self-abnegation, he gathered about him a group of followers, who in turn went about with the same message and became known as the Poor Men of Lyons. They travelled in strict observance of Christ's directions to the Seventy (Lk 10-14), giving two and two, without staff or scrip, their feet only in wooden sabots, preceding and followed by exhorting people to return to the purity and simplicity of the primitive Christians. Forbidden to preach by the archbishop, they replied with the apostolic defence in Ac 5-7, and later (1170) appealed to the Third Lateran Council, under Alexander III., for recognition, only to have their request scornfully denied—although the pope himself had received Waldo kindly and is said to have been secretly ordained by him to the priesthood. They continued in their preaching, they were put under the ban at the Council of Verona (1184), presided over by Pope Lucius III. They had no wish to break off from the apostolic Church, and they were never opposing its doctrine, ritual, or government. They claimed to be loyal sons of the Church, called to lead their erring brethren back to the ways of their ancestors, and this entirely as a practical reformation of life and conduct. Nevertheless their refusal either to recant or to be silent and their condemnation by the ecclesiastical authorities forced them into a position tantamount to open rebellion. Then this condemnation, followed by an edict of Barbarossa, drove the Poor Men of Lyons out of the city and scattered them abroad, only however to spread the seed of their message the more effectually through Southern Europe. Thus they found their way into Provence, Dauphiné, the valleys of Piedmont, Lombardy, Lorraine, Pannonia, Picardy, Germany, Spain, and even as far as England. Since Waldo and his followers had not been condemned for any doctrinal heresy, but only for a breach of discipline in preaching without ecclesiastical authority, strictly speaking they should have been prosecuted as schismatics rather than heretics. Nevertheless they were the determined opposition with which they were met implied that their free handling of Scripture gave offence to the theologians, and in point of fact, like the followers of Peter of rectangles, they were denounced as heretics. They had their own ministers (called ministri), chosen annually for the administration of the communion, which was only once a year. When Waldo renounced the head of the sect (associates) till his death, selected and ordained the ministers, and admitted the new members, though he did not claim to be a bishop. The conditions of membership, called "conversion," were renunciation of private property and an ascetic life, separation of husbands from wives, and three days' fast in the week. It is said that they repudiated indulgences, purgatory, and masses for the dead, and denied the authority of the Roman pontiffs; but, nevertheless, were tolerated by unworthy priests. If so, they certainly would be deemed heretics. But the question of the full contents of their preaching is obscure. A literal application of the teachings of Christ contained in the Gospels was its chief theme, as it had been that of their founder, and, they being for the most part simple folk, without any theological training, it would be pedantic to try to fix any definite theology upon them. We do not know much about the later days of Waldo; he died in Bologna in the year 1217.

7. The fusion. — An inquiry into the origin of the Waldensian Church shows that it grew out of a fusion of the work of Waldo and the Poor Men of Lyons with the movements originated by Arnold of Brescia, Peter of Bruys, and Henry of chartres. It can be traced in the teaching of these four leaders, and it rounded into a definite form and ripened into a distinctly organized Church with its own specific teaching in parts where their fourfold influence had been felt, and this not till the latest and most vigorous of these movements, that of Waldo, came into contact with the earlier types. Thus, while the old Waldensian claim to primitive and even apostolic antiquity is abandoned, it cannot be maintained that Waldo found a Church of evangelical teaching in the Vaudois valleys ready to welcome him and learnt more from it than he imparted to it, neither is it right to say that the Waldenses are simply the followers of Waldo of Lyons. It does not appear that he simply founded the community de novo, or that its evangelical and Protestant character is entirely due to his influence. The ideas were, in the air, the spirit was alive and awaked, when Waldo and his Poor Men came with apostolic fervour to embrace them and blend them with their own version of the teaching of Jesus. There were antecedents of the Waldensians before Waldo, existing as scattered religious. But it was his movement that gathered in the harvest of their lives and brought about the formation of a Waldensian Church.

II. MEDIEVAL PERIOD. — Disputations in 1175-76 between the barons Olivier and Sicard and their bishop Montpeyroux having alarmed the neighbouring clergy, two or three years later the pope, Alexander III., sent the cardinal of St. Chrysogone, Henry of Citeaux, and Reginald, bishop of Bath, then on his way to the Lateran Council, accompanied by the monk Walter Mapes and the priest Raymond of Daventry, to Toulouse. Two barons came there with safe conducts, Bernard of Raymond and Raymond of Bainsme, to be examined by John of Besse, bishop of Poitiers, and then to Narbonne to be examined by Bernard of Pontcarré, under the presidency of the English priest Raymond of Daventry. It is this Raymond who first uses the name 'Waldenses' (Vulgate)—as far as it can be traced, the first use of any form of condemnation, which must be dated 1179 at latest, because, as already said, Raymond was then on his way to the Lateran Council as an attendant of the bishop of Bath. The next year Bernard of Pontcarré wrote a book entitled Adversus Waldenses.
et Arians.\(^1\) It seems that these discussions arose out of the union of the Petronianists andHenri- cians with the Poor Men of Lyons in Provence. About 1232 Waldo's followers united with the Anarhystis in Lombardy. Thus the Waldenses of France and Italy were united, and their union was cemented by persecution. A sentence of excommunication by the Council of Verona cleared the remaining followers of Waldo out of Lyons and drove them to Provence, Dauphine, the valleys of Piedmont, Lombardy, and some even to Verona, while others became in 1232. In Pope Gregory IX. sent a bull to the archbishop of Turin allowing fifteen of the heretics being burnt, King Ferdinand himself casting wood on the fire. In course of time these Spanish Waldenses were exterminated. In this century Waldensian churches in Germany sent candidates for the ministry to study at a Waldensian college in Milan. Martyrs to their faith suffered death in Germany during the two following centuries. Bohemia, where Waldo died, became an important field of Waldensian activity. Forty years after the founder's death the inquisitor of Passau named 42 places as nests of the heresy. The king of Bohemia, started persecution, which became most severe in 1335 under Pope Benedict XII. The rise of the Hussite movement led to a fusion of some of the two groups of reformers under the name of Taeborites, the most famous of whom was the barbe Frederic Reiser, who spent 27 years in the valleys among the Waldenses in Bohemia and Austria and was burnt at Strassburg in 1438. Austria had been reached as early as the 13th century. In 1545 the inquisitor of Krems denounced 36 localities as infected with the heresy and secured the burning of 130 martyrs, the most illustrious of whom was the bishop Neunmeister, who was burnt at Vienna; he is said to have declared that there were more than 80,000 Waldenses in the duky of Austria. The end of this century witnessed a terrible persecution in Styria. Meanwhile the movement was spreading in Italy under an organized itinerant mission, the missionary activities as pedlars and preaching over many districts. They prospered especially at Milan, where they had a college under John of Rome, who was appointed to the headship for life, in spite of Waldo's disapproval, which resulted in a division into two groups, the French group and the Italian and German group. The Lombards appointed their own chief (pastor propositus), and he, as well as their ministers (ministers), held office for life, while Waldo and the French Waldenses on his authority elected annual leaders to administer the Lord's Supper and serve as pastors. A more and more vital division between the two parties arose out of the teaching of the Italian W aldenses that the sacraments could not be efficacious if administered by priests of unworthy character, while the French believed in the power of the Church. The Waldenses insisted most strongly on close adherence to NT teaching and practice generally and on rejection of everything in the Church which lacked scriptural authority, and they were thoroughly anti-Romanists. In May 1217 six members of the two parties met at Bergamo to draw up terms of agreement, but failed (1) on the question of the validity of sacraments administered by unworthy ministers, denied by the Italians, allowed by the French. Nevertheless fraternal intercourse came to be established in course of time between these two branches of Waldenses. In the 15th cent. there was a very influential number of the Waldenses in central Italy. The Inquisition records reveal the existence of groups throughout the whole of this region. In Calabria, where Waldenses were Planted, some cabarets had been sent for to cultivate a great estate, proved themselves most effective missionaries, winning over most of the population of the district. They had retained exceptional privileges of religious liberty, and flourished for 250 years, after which they were almost exterminated by a wholesale persecution.

While the French Waldenses seem to have developed the episcopal form of government with the three orders—bishops, priests, and deacons—in spite of Waldo's greater simplicity of ministerial functions, the Italians worked out more of a presbyterian type of church, each church having a pastor whom was associated in government a consistency of laymen, and a synod met once a year composed of an equal number of ministers and laity members.

The valleys on the Italian side of the Cottian Alps now became the centre and chief home of these Waldenses, so that in course of time their very name (in French 'Vaudois') was regarded as geographical, and it was asserted that Waldo took his surname from that of the inhabitants of this district after joining their religious movement, whereas later researches have shown that the Waldenses are derived from that of the founder of the society of the Poor Men of Lyons. In the 15th cent. these valleys came under the rule of the duke of Savoy, who took the title of "Duke of Savoy," and immediately took the name of Savoy, which in the 14th century was the title of the French kindred family of the House of Savoy. The name was changed to Savoy. The violence drove numbers to emigrate. The inquisitor Acquapendente visited the valley of Laserna in 1435, and, disapproving of the religious views and practices of its inhabitants, roused their overlords to compel submission to his orders, with the result that a few years later there was a rebellion which led in 1454 to the interference of Duke Charles of Savoy, who was able to bring about a peaceful arrangement between the two parties. The first serious attack with armed forces took place under Philip II., who became regent of the duky of Savoy in 1400, and duke in 1403. It was in 1494, during his regency, that Philip launched an expedition against the Waldenses of the Laserna valley, only to meet with so disastrous a defeat that he gave up attempts to suppress them, guaranteeing them liberty for 40 years. It is not easy to be clear as to the theological views of the Waldenses during this period. The notion that, when the Reformation broke out, the Protestants were surprised to find such a vigorous and industrious branch of the Waldenses as inhabited the Alpine valleys, who had pre

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1 See Gay, Hist. des Vaudois, p. 16, n. 1.
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served them from primitive times, proves to be a delusion. When we do meet with a Waldensian statement of belief, this is subsequent to the Reformation and characteristic of Swiss and German theologians and churchmen of that movement. The earlier Protestantism was partly negative, in the rejection of Roman Catholic teachings and practices which could not be justified by Scripture. As it was polemical, a return to the simplicity and spirituality of worship believed to have been characteristic of the primitive Church. Waldo and his immediate followers relied mainly on the Gospels. The ordinance of poverty thought to be required by the teachings of Christ was not universally adopted, nor did it long continue in operation. On the other hand, the Pauline theology, so emphatically and elaborately taught both by Luther and by Calvin, does not appear to have been brought forward by these earlier Protestants. There was no tendency among them to elaborate a system of theology. The books were drawn from the part of the peasantry, and the college at Milan in which they were trained had begun with the most elementary instruction in reading and writing. The great requisites of simplicity to read the Gospels and familiarity with their contents. Here we have the religious teaching of the mediaeval Waldenses.

III. Reformation Period.—1. First contact with the Protestants.—When the Reformation broke out the only organized opponents of the papacy on the Continent were the Waldenses and the later Hussites, who were called the Bohemian Brethren, but whom the Protestants as well as Reformers and Catholic alike considered as Roman Catholic heretics. In 1514, these Bohemians sent two of their ministers on a visit to Martin Luther with a message of congratulation and encouragement, and ten years later they sent a confession of faith, entitled Apologia seu doctrina eorum qui vulgo appellantur Waldenses, with a eulogistic preface. Subsequently communications were maintained by the missions of successive deputations. In 1540 the Bohemian Brethren sent a deputation to confer with Calvin in Strassburg. Driven out of their own country in 1548, they took refuge in Poland, where they united with the Protestant churches which they found there. Calvin wrote to the churches of Poland, ‘I hope for every kind of good from your union with the Waldenses (ave les Vandois).’ Meanwhile the churches of the Alpine valleys took steps to come into contact with the Reformers. In 1545 and 1556 the synod of Laus (Pragela), in which 140 barbes took part, having received confusing reports, sent the barones Martin Gomin and Guido de Calabris both to Switzerland and to Germany to make inquiries and bring back some of the Protestant writings. Their report and the literature which they circulated among the churches helped to draw them into contact with the Reformers. Four years later the synod which met at Marindol decided to consult the principal Swiss Reformers on several points of doctrine and discipline, for which purpose they sent two barbes, George Morel and Peter Masson, who visited and conferred with Farel and Haller, and at Basle received a friendly response to their questions from (Economandus), who then sent them on to Strassburg, where they were well received by Farel, who gave them an equally full and explicit reply. Morel published the Waldensian questions and the Reformer’s answers under the title Questiones, Paris, 1556. In the same year the two delegates returned by way of France, when Masson was put to death at Strassburg but Morel escaped, bringing back their report to the Waldensian churches. This was discussed at a synod in Piedmont, held apparently in 1531. The discussion resulted in the election of five bishops, and the formation of two parties, known respectively as ‘Conservators’ and ‘Innovators,’ the former inclined to their position by reason of their accepting the new Protestant teaching. This indisputable fact argues clear evidence that the pre-Reformation Waldenses were not simply hidden Protestantists, cherish the doctrine subsequently

held by the Swiss and German Reformers. On the other hand, the Hussites among whom they principally lived in Moravia, in Hungary, and the descendants of the Lollards still in hiding from persecution in England, they were ready to intermarry with the new opponents though the perfect test of their separateness from all others keeps. Separatist, spiritual, simplicity of worship, and the popular use of the Scriptures in the vernacular as the authoritative standard of faith and discipline, the Waldensian character is far more pronounced. They found welcome support from the powerful new Protestantism that was making great its way to the east, where the church of Bohemia, under the spiritual guidance of Farel and Calvin, was already in a great ferment. The question of meeting with these Reformers was settled, and by the mutual understanding above described, the Swiss and German Protestants, as they were termed, returned with new confidence to the Church of Bohemia. The Waldenses themselves were invited to attend the general synod of 1532 at Strassburg, at which they were represented by the baron Charles de Pragela, who was a prominent leader of the Reformers, and who, with the consent of the synod, was appointed as their bishop in Switzerland. He was received with great respect and love, and his appointment was confirmed by the leading Reformers. The Waldenses were thus welcomed as equals by the Swiss and German Reformers, and their presence at the synod was a great step forward in the advancement of the Reformation in Switzerland. The Waldenses were received with great respect and love, and their appointment was confirmed by the leading Reformers. The Waldenses were thus welcomed as equals by the Swiss and German Reformers, and their presence at the synod was a great step forward in the advancement of the Reformation in Switzerland.

2. Association with the Swiss Reformation.—The difference of opinion among the Waldenses of the valleys and their division into two parties on the question of accepting the Protestant views which their delegates reported to them led to the desire for fuller knowledge and conference with leading Reformers. With this end in view a general synod was convoked in 1532 under the chrestians of Swiss and Angers, in which the Reformers Farel, Saunier, and Olivetan met a large assembly containing laymen as well as barbes. Three recommendations, which rose out of the previous consultations with Ecclampatius and Farel, were then read: viz. (1) the adoption of public worship by the Waldensian churches instead of secret meetings, (2) an absolute condemnation of the custom of the Waldenses of attempting to bring about a Catholic service, (3) an acceptance of the Reformers’ views on predestination, good works, oaths, the denial of obligatory confession, Sunday fasts, marriage of the clergy, and the two sacraments. Farel’s enthusiastic eloquence carried the great majority of the assembly with him in a vote for adopting these propositions, though some of the barbes protested against the term ‘predestination,’ (1) as unnecessary, (2) as casting a reflection on those who had hitherto led the churches happily. Olivetan remained for three years travelling among the valleys and setting up schools. Meanwhile—the next year after the synod of Chamforo—two barbes who had been confessing with their brethren in Bohemia returned with a long letter conjuring the Waldenses of the valleys to weigh well the question of adhesion to the proposals of the foreign teachers. Accord- ingly a synod was at once called at Praili to reconsider the question; but it adhered to the previous decision, with only a handful of dissentents. The chief differences which now arose between the Reformers and the Swiss Protestants was that they were skeptical of the adoption of Calvinism. The Swiss Protestants had been based on the question of the degree in which everything must be determined by the authority of Scripture. Both parties held, as against the Catholic position, that this was the one supreme authority and that, while the Swiss theologians would allow of nothing which was not expressly taught in the Bible, the Waldenses had held that only those tenets and practices of Catholicism which were expressly contrary to Scripture need be condemned. But now the closer adhesion to the Swiss Reformed Church tended to assimilation of views and practices and subsequently to the adoption of Calvinism.

3. Olivetan’s Visit.—One of the most important and lasting outcomes of the friendly intercourse between the Waldenses and the Swiss Reformers was the production of the first Protestant French translation of the Bible. Waldo had translated some portions into the Romance vernacular earlier dialects, but most of his publications had been destroyed by the Roman Catholic authorities. The conference at Chamforo, Farel and Saunier urged the Waldenses to adopt a new translation, the Waldensian having been authorized on the whole Bible in the French language. This work the barbes persuaded Olivetan to undertake (Octob. 1536), and he completed it in 1537. Considered better in the VT portion than the NT, Olivetan revised it on the basis of the later French versions, or rather revisions.

4. The new order.—In course of time the Waldenses on the French side of the Alps, who for the most part consisted of Conclusives, were fused into French Protestantism. Then persecu-
tion in Bohemia and also in Southern Italy nearly exterminated the churches of this communion in these valleys. In the Italian valleys of the Cottian Alps, the Vaudois country, as its only important habitat, though this very persecution scattered many of its victims among the Swiss and other Protestant states. It took some 20 or 30 years to supply adequately trained ministers and organize the worship, discipline, and teaching of the Waldensian Church in the valleys on the lines agreed upon in the conference held at the cast of Oyon. The very lapse of time was one cause of delay. The Swiss theologians could preach only in French, the Italian ministers, educated in the college at Milan, only in Italian. Neither knew the Romance dialect which was used in the villages of the valleys. Instead of taking the course usually adopted by missionaries and themselves learning the provincial dialect, the French- and Italian-speaking teachers induced the peasants to learn the languages of these teachers, so that they could be used in the church services. Until this curious change had been effectively completed, the movement could not make much progress. Meanwhile Piedmont carried us for the power of France. This was in 1536—under Francis I. and the French domination lasted till 1569. The first governor appointed by the French king was the well-known first Fieschi, a resolute Protestant, who proved friendly to the Waldenses, and, on being sent into Germany, left his secret secretary Farel, a brother of the Reformer, in charge of the valley of Lausanne. This man set to work vigorously furthering the Reformation and abolishing the Mass which the Catholics were still celebrating at Angrogna—an act of violence which provoked representations from the part of René of Montenois, the governor of Turin, who sent soldiers into the valley, sacked its villages, and imprisoned the barons. The governor, returning to the province in 1539, released them, and Francis then left the Waldenses of Piedmont in peace for seven years, while he was persecuting those on the French side of the Alps, Henry II., succeeding to the throne of France in 1547, was also severe on the northern Waldenses; but Caracciolo, his governor of Turin, who was friendly to them, and persecution did not break out in this district till 1550, when the inquisitor Giacomelli sent for the synode of Angrogna and imprisoned him at Turin. War put a stop to further persecution. A number of fully trained ministers came from Switzerland to take charge of the congregations in the valleys, together with some Swiss pastors who travelled about inducting them and regulating the new order of worship in the French language, also a coprincipal who distributed the service books among the villages. Many ' temples ' were built, and by 1556 the new form of worship was being conducted in all the parishes. Thereupon two commissioners were dispatched from Turin with directions to stop these services. The villagers disobeyed the edict, and an arrest of the pastors was ordered. But proceedings were stopped owing to the influence of Swiss and German authorities with the French Government. Thus another respite was secured, during which the Waldensian Church was being fully organized and equipped with capable leaders. This is a significant fact, in view of the terrible times that were to follow. The discipline and leadership now established by the churches enabled the Waldenses to make one of the most magnificent stands for religious liberty ever recorded in the annals of history.

1. PERSECUTION OF GREAT PERSECUTIONS (1540–1600).—Although the Waldenses had been liable to persecution as heretics from the first and had suffered from some severe outbreaks previous to the Reformation, there is no evidence, either in the Italian or in the French annals, that could be adduced as indicative of the absence of rigorous lines of demarcation. But now their open co-operation with the Swiss and German Protestants showed no ambiguity as to their quarrel with Rome, and consequently stern measures of repression were taken against them. The political arrangement formally adopted in Germany as a refuge from civil war and practically operative in the other countries of the Low Countries was a steady attempt to suppress that of its prince or other ruling authority. In democratic and republican Switzerland this worked smoothly, since it meant the dominance of the faith of the majority. But it was otherwise with a country such as France under an autocratic ruler, and accordingly in 1534 there was a wholesale destruction of the Waldensian churches of Provence. Piedmont was subject to the rule of the duke of Savoy, and therefore it depended on the will of that prince, or sometimes rather on that of his overlord, whether the practices of the Waldensian Church in that province should be interfered with. Measures were taken to suppress them. Another feature of the consequent contest is the fact that it was by no means one-sided. Those sturdy mountaineers were not meek martyrs led into a pit, as lambs into the enemy's camp, and the first outbreak of persecution directed against them was an act of reprisal for the suppression of the Massat Angroga. Then the Waldenses became in a literal sense a Church militant, taking to the field in arms and fighting valiantly for their liberty of worship, with hardy heroism and at times with brilliant success. The outstanding personality of this period is Scipione Lentolo, born at Naples, but said to have come from a Roman patrician family, who became a priest, a doctor of theology, and preacher at Venice and Ferrars, at the latter of which places he was converted to Protestantism. Accused of heresy for his preaching at Lucca, he was imprisoned and sent to Rome. Escaping first to Sicily and then to Geneva, he there came in contact with Calvin, who appointed him pastor of St. Jean in the Waldensian country. Not confining his activity to this parish, he visited other valleys, and even went down to the plain of Piedmont on an evangelizing tour. When persecution broke out, he went into the French service. In 1553 a decree was issued, encouraging the people everywhere to stand true to their faith. Lentolo is the author of the earliest history of the Waldenses and the chief authority for that of the persecution of his own times. This history was virtually unknown till in 1897 Comba called attention to a copy of it in the Berne Library; eight years later it was reprinted and published, and thus a flood of light was thrown on the persecution with which the author was so closely connected. Expelled from the valleys in 1566, he ministered in the Engadine and carried on literary work till his death in 1589.

The principal persecution with which Lentolo was brought into contact led to the war of della Trinità. Phillibert, the duke of Savoy at this time, though personally averse to the molestation of his mountain subjects, was compelled by the papal nuncio, backed up by France and Spain, to issue an edict requiring them to attend the Mass and forbidding their holding Waldensian services. On their refusal Lentolo was expelled under the command of della Trinità to enforce it. This commander, arriving in November 1560, met with such strenuous opposition that he consented to allow a certain number of barbes to go and present their plea for religious liberty, while he went into winter quarters at La Tour. The
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Deportation was treacherously treated at Turin, in order to compel them to abjure their faith. Accordingly, on their return in the spring, the inhabitants of the Val d’Aosta rose in arms and resolved every attack of della Trinità at Lussera, at Angrogna, at Prali, with the result that Philibert was glad to come to terms with the heretics, leaving them to retain their Protestant services (5th June 1561). At the same time a persecution to the extent of extermination was carried out by Spanish troops at the instigation of the Grand Inquisitor, Michele Ghisleri (later Pope Pius V), in Calabria, where, in spite of wholesale slaughters in the 13th cent., some representatives of the early Waldenses had persisted in maintaining the faith of their fathers, and had now welcomed the new Protestant movement. Two thousand were put to death and 1600 imprisoned. In Piedmont, after this, attempts were made successively by missions of Jesuits and by Capuchin friars, sometimes with the aid of soldiers, to bring the mountain villagers back into the fold of the Church; there followed several local persecutions, exactions of fines for supposed offences, and violent seizures of churches and even a sanguinary war in the year 1584, in which the rebels, and the most important Waldensian leader of this time was Peter Gilles, an inspiring preacher and vigorous political writer, who died in 1644.

Deportation under Louis XIV.—The determined loyalty of the Waldenses to their faith, combined with their amazing military prowess and the reluctance of the duke of Savoy to change his mountain subjects—a policy only undertaken excepting under pressure from France—had secured them treaties of peace with liberty of worship. For a quarter of a century they were very little molested. In 1650 Charles Emmanuel II, the young duke of Savoy (only 16 years old), came to the throne. Behind him was the real power, his mother the duchess, daughter of Henry IV. and Mary de Medici, grandmother of the notorious Catherine de Medici, the author of the Massacre of St. Bartholomew. Thereupon a Council of the Propagation of the Faith, consisting of the chief councillors of State and Church dignitaries, was established in Turin. Five years later there was issued the Decrees of Gustavo, ordering all Waldensian families in the plain back into the mountains and the sale of their lands within 20 days, unless they would renounce their Protestantism, swear the Oath of Allegiance, and submit to all the other regulations of the Catholic religion. The resulting exodus was complete; the few/victors were allowed to remove the inhabitants into the mountains. Janavel and a banditti, called banditti by the Piedmontese, took up the cause of the persecuted villagers and repeatedly attacked the duke’s soldiers. On 6th August the duke issued an edict condemning all the Waldenses to death as rebels. The war continued till the end of the year, by which time Janavel had 2000 followers, who occupied a number of advantageous positions. Meanwhile the persecuted people sent messengers to Switzerland and Holland begging for help, and their great leader Leger made good use of his enforced absence from home in travelling about to urge the pious. The duke got little satisfaction from the war. At Angrogna, after his soldiers had ravaging the neighbouring villages, he lost 600 men and the two captains Sanfront and della Trinita. This had been a dishonourable expedition, because at the very time he was pledged to a truce while conducting negotiations with some Waldensian deputies, aided by an English embassy of 2500 men, and at the time of these negotiations with some emissaries from Switzerland were followed by a month of private discussion, till at length, on 14th Feb., 1664, the ducal government issued the Patente di Turin. This covenant granted an amnesty to all the Waldenses except their victorious leader Janavel, who was ordered out of the country, and liberty of worship in their own way without molestation, except at St. Jean Leger’s parish, where the Protestant worship was prohibited. It is much to the credit of Janavel that this hero of the war consented to his own exile without protest for the sake of a peaceful settlement of his people. Twenty years of liberty now followed.

3. The exile.—In the year after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes (i.e. 1656) Louis XIV. sent a demand to his cousin Victor Amadeus II., the duke of Savoy, that he would treat his Protestant subjects as the French king was treating the Huguenots. He found some ground for this interference with a foreign government in the fact that fugitives from their territories, who were escaping persecution were taking refuge in the Waldensian valleys. The result was that the duke ordered the Waldenses to discontinue their religious meetings on pain of death and the confiscation of their
property; their churches were to be razed to the ground; their pastors and schoolmasters to leave within fifteen days under pain of death and confiscation, and to remain on a pension; and all their children to be educated as Roman Catholics. The Waldenses, assembling at Angrogna, dispatched two envoys to Turin to plead for their rights; they were refused an audience. On hearing of the terrible plight of their co-religionists, the Swiss Protestants held a conference at Baden, which decided to send envoys to Turin and to the Waldenses. Accordingly the brothers De Muralt, selected for this mission, went to that city and obtained an audience with the duke on 13th March. The result was a proposal of Victor that his Protestant subjects should be allowed to emigrate to Switzerland. It was with the utmost difficulty that the De Muraltis persuaded the mountaineers to accept this suggestion of voluntary exile (in an assembly at Serre, 4th April). On 9th April the duke signed a decree permitting the emigration. In spite of this fact, some of the Waldenses who had agreed to accept it were arrested and imprisoned. Not having belonged to the confederation of the Swiss, the people prepared to resist the authorities to the last. Then, with the aid of soldiers sent by Louis XIV. as well as his own men, Victor sent expeditions up the mountain valleys, and besieged Cenis. By the end of the year 1700 had been killed and 12,000 carried off as prisoners, many of them to perish in the dungeons of Piedmont. 'The valleys are deserted,' wrote Catamit, the leader of the invading troops, at the completion of his work. Among those who escaped to Switzerland was Henri Arnaud, who was to be the leader of the return from exile and whose narrative is our principal authority for this period. Victor declared all the property of the Waldenses confiscated, and he reckoned the heretics to be exterminated. But there were 200 fugitives lurking in the mountain caves, who afterwards descended at times to the terror of the immigrants from the plain who had taken possession of their homes. The duke sent messengers bidding them escape to Switzerland, but after sending these to consult Janavel and Arnaud they declared that they would resist till death. Victor had no mind to keep up the war with these brave mountaineers, and he agreed to let them go to Switzerland with their belongings, only making them swear to relatives to accompany them, and on their arrival there to permit all the imprisoned Waldenses, for whose liberation they had been holding out, when offered an earlier opportunity of escape, to follow them. The persistent guerilla warfare of this handful had secured the release of all the surviving Waldenses. Early in 1697 the prisons were opened, and the prisoners, now reduced to 3000, set off on their terrible journey across the Alps for Geneva, by the Mont Cenis route, a journey which occupied on an average twelve days, during which many perished in the snow. But, in spite of the protest of the Swiss against the flagrant breach of treaty, children under twelve years of age were detained to be educated as Roman Catholics. The fugitives came in dribbles, and the last detachment did not arrive till the end of August. Their reception at Geneva was very hospitable, and by degrees they were settled in various Swiss towns and generously supported by Holland, England, and Germany. But the Waldenses were anxious to return to their valleys, and the duke of Savoy was so much annoyed at one or two futile attempts that he induced the Swiss authorities to have them removed farther away, and arrangements were made by which they were compelled by a fine, and in the residence all claim on a pension.
pastors urging them to encourage recruiting in his service and even appealed to the Camisards and other French Protestants, whom he had been led to believe were still joining his army.

When the war was over, those French Protestants who had responded to his invitation were again expelled, and in 1707 he even sent back the Swiss who had remained only to be driven out eight years earlier. In 1708 Victor took possession of the valley of Pragel, whereupon its Protestant inhabitants were delighted to have the duc's permission for a visitation of Waldensian pastors; but he soon changed his policy and murdered these people to observe the Roman Catholic festivals. His policy all along was opportunistic, with a strong leaning to the Roman Catholic side when he was free from the necessity of conciliating his Pro-

testant subjects. There was no depending on his word. When the people of Pragel protested against his later treatment of them, the leading Waldenses in the valley were arrested and imprisioned; in 1716 the Protestant schools were closed; in 1720 the Reformed worship was absolutely forbidden in the valley. From time to time there was imprisonment of recalcitrants till the climate of opinion in 1790 was such as to give rise to the intercession of Frederic William I. of Prussia, all the Waldenses in the valley were ordered to abjure their faith or leave the country. They replied that they had done so and had freed of the year 800 exiles had gone over into Switzerland.

2. The 18th century.—During the remainder of the century, until Piedmont felt the effect of the French Revolution, the Waldenses had no eventful experiences. Though guaranteed rights of religious liberty, they suffered from time to time from exactions and restrictions by the Government, which showed that they were only allowed to exist on sufferance; and, when they complained against local acts of injustice, their complaints were little considered. Thus in 1753 a decree was issued forbidding them to leave their valleys; in 1748 a bishop was appointed there to work for their conversion to Rome, and the Opera dei predetti which exists in the present day was then founded, in order to assist Roman Catholics to buy lands from the Waldenses; in 1756 they were forbidden to hold meetings outside the temples; kidnapping of children was a common and growing practice. Government reports entitled Compendio degli editti concernenti Waldesi, containing a host of vexations, enthrivals, and restrictions which emanated from the senate. Meanwhile, in common with Protestantism throughout the rest of Europe, the religion of the Waldenses now suffered from decline of spiritual vigour. The Arian movement in England affected some of the pastors, and after that the Continental 'rationalism.' During this period they received pecuniary help from Holland and from England under encouragement from George II. and George III.

3. Period of the Revolution.—The Revolution brought an interval of complete religious liberty to the Waldenses owing to the French Republic being established in Piedmont in 1798. On 19th December all civil government authority over the Church was abolished; on 31st December liberty and equality were proclaimed for all kinds of religion, and early in the new year absolute liberty of the press and the abolition of the Inquisition was also declared. Though inevitably mixed up with the war of the Revolution when the absence of Napoleon in Egypt enabled the Russians and Austrians to invade Piedmont. After at first siding with the French, to whom they owed their liberty, the Protestant mount-

aineers, driven into a corner, gave the allies a pledge of neutrality. In spite of this agreement, the Austrians took the opportunity to involve the Waldenses in trouble on charges of plotting and collusion with the French and on other accusations. These vexatious proceedings the Swiss put an end to by describing the action of the Austrians as 'a crusade' against them. During the three and a half years when Lombardy and Piedmont were governed as a republic there was no grievance of the Waldenses, their pastors' loss of pecuniary aid from England owing to their association with the French. But, on receiving a petition from 'the Table'—their central governing body—for assistance, the execu-

tive commission issued a decree reducing the Roman Catholic parishes from 28 to 13 and granting the revenues of the suppressed parishes to the Waldensian pastors, and by this means half their salaries were secured. Thus the Church now obtained support from State funds. The valleys had taken over the administration of national property. But, after the establishment of the French Empire, Napoleon issued a decree sequestrating the state property and so deprived half of the contributions which they had received from France during four years (25th March 1805). The following May, however, when the emperor was defeated at Turin, they were again freed, and when he treated his members very graciously and invited them to present to him a statement of their wishes. Accordingly an open-air meeting was held at St. Jean, where the pastor drew up a petition on three points: (1) the grievance of the sequestration of the State funds out of which the pastors' salaries had been made up after the loss of aid from abroad; (2) a request for the application of the Organic law of the Reformed Churches of France to the valleys; (3) a plan or organization for grouping the parishes in five consistories.

In reply Napoleon agreed to restore the sequestrated funds and to allow three consistories in the valleys. The stirring flattering with which the emperor was approached in this matter, and the painful anxiety shown about the recovery of money grants, do not reflect much credit on the representatives of the heroic Church of Leger and Arnaud and its stand for religious liberty. A further mark of Government favour is seen in the grant of land for the erection of the temple at St. Jean, which the Waldenses had been seeking for so long with great éclat on 1st Nov. 1806.

4. 19th cent. vicissitudes.—During the first half of the 19th century, the Waldensian Church passed through great vicissitudes of fortune. For 34 years, from the fall of Napoleon in 1814 till the Revolution of 1848, it was oppressed under the rule of the king of Sardinia, who actively espoused the papal cause. On Victor Emmanuel I. coming to the throne, the Waldenses of Piedmont sent to Turin a deputation, which had an audience with the king, but obtained no response at the time. Meanwhile the Jesuits had been put in charge of the education. The State funds which Napoleon had allowed the pastors to resume were again withdrawn; the only mitigation of the hardship against which the Table protested was a partial remission of dues from the valleys. Charles Felix (1821-31) was much more severe. When the Table asked for an audience at his accession, he insolently answered that all they needed was to become Catholics. Moreover the Waldenses were guaranteed that they were allowed to hold a synod. When the Waldenses reopened their college at La Torre, they were peremptorily ordered to close it again. Charles Albert (1831-48) was also severely re-

2. May, p. 171.
presive with the Waldenses till near the end of his reign, when the appointed bishop of Pignerol in 1833, announced that all the old laws against them should be enforced. When the English ambassador intervened on their behalf, the king ordered them not to appeal to Rome, and forbade the coming of alien visitors among them. All along they were excluded from the universities, the learned professions, and commissions in the army. But at length, after more forceful advocacy of 1848, the current of European opinion was running so strongly in favour of religious liberty that Charles Albert abandoned his harsh treatment of the Waldenses. On 5th January of that year he granted an audience to the Table, which gratefully acknowledged the legislative reforms and removal of hard enactments he was granting to all his subjects, but which at the same time appealed for relief from the laws especially adverse to their Church. They were well received, and on 17th February the king issued an edict of emancipation, granting the Waldenses the full civil and religious rites enjoyed by other subjects, including access to the public schools and universities, and allowing them to give their Protestant religious teaching in their own schools. The good news was welcomed with joy and relief by the inhabitants and bonfires. A Waldensian congregation was now formed at Turin, and it became a home for refugee Protestants from all parts of Italy. In 1854 there was a division owing to the objection of these refugees to come under the government of the Table and its old rigorous rules. The use of the French language in the services was another ground of complaint. The division spread to other congregations, in which both parties regarded the uncontents as liberalizers and progressives, and also as protestant Italian patriots in their desire for the use of the Italian language just when a new spirit of a united Italian patriotism was sweeping the country. The result was a split, and the formation of the 'Free Church' (Chiesa Libera) of which Luigi Desanctis, a learned and eloquent priest and theologian of the Inquisition at Malta, who had become a convert to Protestantism, was leader. After serving as pastor of this church for ten years he left it, owing to its adoption of J. N. Darby's views—the Plymouth Brethren idea—rejoined the Waldenses, and became their professor of theology at Florence and the editor of their journal, Eco della Verità, till his death in 1860. The chief leader of the Free Church, after Desanctis had left it, was Alessandro Gavazzi, an ex-Barnabite father from Naples, who subsequently became an eloquent hero of Italian emancipation, accompanying Garibaldi as his chaplain and also enthusiastically supporting Victor Emmanuel as 'the only saviour of Italy as Jesus Christ is the only Saviour of sinners. In 1870 a general assembly of the Free Church was held at Milan, when a simple Biblical confession of faith was drawn up, and the next year another assembly at Florence adopted rules of a constitution recognizing the pastoral office—as against the Plymouth Brethren idea—arranging for annual assemblies, and appointing an evangelization committee. It now took the title 'Unione della chiesa libera in Italia.' Some of the congregations, still adhering to the Brethren idea, arranged for annual meetings, and formed themselves into a community, which they ventured to designate simply 'Chiesa Christiana.' On 1st May 1884, with the exception of the Reformed Congregations in Italy, a Waldensian annual evangelical conference with a view to Church unification. Owing to the Baptists and the Methodists not altogether agreeing with the position taken up by the Waldenses and the Free church, these last two bodies took their own course for coming together on condition that the Free Church adopted the confession and Church order of the Waldenses.

5. Present condition,—The following facts concerning the decrees regarding the Waldenses and the Church have been supplied by the Moderator, Signor Ernesto Giampicco. This Church holds its old position in the Alpine valleys, and though it has spread throughout the Peninsula and the Islands. There are now more than 200 towns and villages outside the original valleys where congregations, large or small, have been formed. The full membership of the whole Church amounts to about 25,000; but there is a much larger number of adherents. For their training the ministers spend three years in the theological college at Florence (which is soon to be transferred to Rome) and at least one more year in a foreign university. They are ordained at the annual Synod in Torre Pellice. The Waldensian Church is in the Alliance of Reformed Churches of France and Switzerland, the latter being more liberal in its tendencies than the former, which now contains four high schools for boys and girls—the only Protestant high schools recognized by the Government—also hospitals, orphanages, and other benevolent institutions. In the same year the whole Church is absolutely independent of the State, and it enjoys complete liberty in all branches of its activity. The worship is in the main the same as in the kindred Evangelical Churches of France and Switzerland, the liturgies being almost identical; but there is a tendency to introduce congregational responses in the morning service. Neither the narrower type of Calvinism nor advanced liberalism is to be found in the present teaching of the Church, which is what is commonly known as 'Evangelical.' This Church is still progressing, though slowly. It always has been and still is hampered with financial difficulties, although it receives assistance from abroad and the contributions of its members are increasing.


WALTER F. ADENEY.

WANG YANG-MING. — Wang Yang-ming (A.D. 1472-1529), known also as Wang Shou-jen, Wang-shen, Wang Wei-an, and Wang Wen-ch'eng, was a Chinese philosopher and statesman and scholar of note during the Ming dynasty, specifically during the reigns of Hung Chih, Cheng Te, and Chia Ching. Like many other Orientals who had posthumous honours conferred upon them, Wang has had hero-stories associated with his career. In early youth he began to exhibit unusual ability as a student. At twelve he is
reported to have made inquiry of his teacher con-
cerning the most important thing in life. When
the latter said, 'Study to become a Chishih' (an
academic degree of about the same rank as the
Ph.D.), Wang replied, 'Study to become a sage;
that is the first and greatest occupation.' An-
twenty-one he was decorated with the degree of
Chujen; at twenty-eight he was made Chishih;
and a little later he received the highest academic
honour the Government could bestow, the degree of
Hanyi.

Having unjustly incurred the hostility of the
eunuch Liu Ts'ing when he was thirty-five, he was
sent as a disgraced official into the Government
dispatch service in the province of Kwei-chow. His
biographer describes Lung-ch'ang, where he was
stationed, as a resort of venomous snakes and
poisonous worms, inhabited by babbling barbarians
with whom he could not converse. It was a critical
situation: in suspense over his own fate, realizing
that at any moment a decree from the capital
might order his death, he found his followersone by one falling ill. Nothing daunted, he cut wood, chopped water, and boiled soft-
boiled rice for them, cheering them with songs
and stories of home. In view of his own precarious
position, he had a sarcophagus made for himself.
In it he laid his thoughts, ideas and subject matters
of his meditation was the conduct of a sage under
similar circumstances. One night at midnight
the great enlightenment came, and suddenly he
realized what the sage meant by 'investigating
things for the sake of extending knowledge to the
utmost.' Overjoyed, he unconsciously called out,
and, arising from his couch, paced the floor. 'I
was wrong,' he said, 'in looking for fundamental
principles in things and affairs. Making human
nature sufficient to solve all the problems of existence.'
From that time on he was a faithful defender of
idealism in opposition to the realism of the philo-
sopher Chu, whose commentators, then as now,
were esteemed the final authority.1

At the age of thirty-nine Wang was restored to
honour and promoted to the magistracy in Luling-
hein in Sian. As time passed he held numerous
positions of trust and honour in the Government.
He was President of the Court of Ceremonies,
Military Governor of Kiangsi, first assistant to the
President of the Censorate, President of the Board of
Works, and President of the Board of Revenue.
Wang, Kwangsi, Kiangsu, Hsuan, and Huphel, and was made Earl of Hsienhien with the title of 'Master of the Ban-
queting Office and Pillar of the Government.'

His greatest military campaign was undoubtedly
conducted while he was Military Governor of
Kiangsi, against the rebellious Prince Ch'in Hao
(Prince Ning), who, it was feared, might utilize
the down-river current and invade the capital.
Wang first sent up several memorials advising the
emperor of the rebellion; then by a series of
subterfuges he misled the rebellious prince, finally
engaging him in battle near Poyang Lake at Huang-Hsi and Patzunao, and capturing him prisoner of war. His success aroused the jealousy
of several officials, to which we may ascribe the
fact that his philosophic point of view was attacked
and branded as heterodox.

It was not, however, as strategist and statesman
that Wang made his largest contribution to human
welfare, but rather as a great moral reformationer, who
made a unique and lasting impression on society.
In his appreciation of moral values and his emphasis on fullness of
life and moral integrity as of far more
worth than fame or gain. He found himself intellectu-
ally fettered by a conventional interpretation of
classical or Chinese moral teachings, firmly fixed
and as rigidly observed as the most hollowed

1 See art. PHILOSOPHY (Chinese), § 4.

religious traditions of any other Oriental civiliza-
tion. He was determined to break down this barrier.

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WAR

Human warfare is generally the climax and the symbol of the strife which pervades the realm of nature; it is itself an institution which has been involved in the struggle for existence. It has also had to adapt itself to a changing environment. The institution is rooted in a deep instinct and an invertebrate habit of the race; but it has also come into conflict with powerful forces, emanating from the intellectual, the moral, and the religious realms. It is now admitted to a chang-

ing environment. The present article will trace the

interpretation made upon war by morality and religion, examine the spiritual issues to which it gives rise, and discuss the desirability and the possibility of the establishment of a non-warred conflict among the nations.

I. NAME AND DEFINITION.

The term 'war' is popularly applied to any conflict between nations, communities, or other large social groups in which violence is used for the settlement of a quarrel. Cicero defines it as 'gens discordiante per vicis' in distinction from the method of argumentation (dis-

ceptatio).

In ethical discussion it has been defined as 'conflictus multorum contra multos extranes'; it is not a state of general antagonism, but a conflict in which matters are forced to an issue; it is the affair of many or of masses, and the name may not lightly be used to dignify sedition. In legal definitions the term has been limited to conflicts in which the belligerents are states, or at least combinations which can reasonably claim a higher status than bands of rioters or brigands.

War is a contest carried on by public force between states, or between states and communities having with regard to the context the rights of states.

The aspects of war on which the genius of language fixed in its coinage of words may still to some extent be recognized.

(a) Approach and assault.—Hラルラ、from root pel, akin to Welsh pel, to assault, implies the idea of going at, or 'going for.' エラル, from the same root, or a cognate term, has the meaning of to strike, to assault, or to inflict blows and the clash of arms.

(b) A contact between two adversaries.—Bellum is commonly explained from the alternative form διόδια as the quarel which begins, or 'two things that are equal.' quod duas partibus de victoria contendentibus diminuitur.

(c) An intense effort.—Krrieg, O.H.G. Krge, Krle, Krize, his stress on the excited and strenuous exertion, and later on the gain which resulted. O.H.G. Wie, with derivatives, seems to have had the same primary and secondary meanings.

(d) Conflict and tumult.—The word 'war,' late A.S. werc, O.H.G. Wara, l. s., wara, Fr. guerre, if connected (as commonly) with wer, sererien, may have sprung from the observation that 'every battle of the warrior is contused noise' (Is 32:4), or that war upsets the general order of things.

The root may, however, be wer, preserved in Werh, sehren, weir, beware, guard (of sewer), when the term would be an illustration of the habitualagogical tendency to attribute to all wars the character of self-defence.

(e) Organisation.—Hb. ספ, from root ספ, 'to set in order,' draws attention to the ordered action of the battle array.

(f) The fateful plight.—A.S. orlege, O.H.G. Orlog, Dan. orlog, may reflect the fatalistic mood which is fostered in war, or the common experience that nowhere else is man so surely in the hands of God and so little certain that he can himself in

1 De Off. I. 11.
2 E. Ebel, Theologia Moralis, Paderborn, 1891, ii. 50.
4 Curtius, Grundzüge der griech. Mythologie, Leipzig, 1873.
6 Festus the Grammarian.
7 Fick, art. 'Krige.'

control the issue. This interpretation has been supported by the O. Frisian group with the Norse, the Moiri, or Parce of the North.

II. THE PREVALENCE OF WAR.—War has been one of the most constant and distinctive features of human history, and it may even be thought to be a sinister peculiarity of the human species that hordes should pursue hordes of the same kind with a persistent purpose of rapine and destruction.

The pre-historic age, which extended for tens of thousands of years down to about 5000 B.C., enjoys a fairly pacific reputation. If it was usually rain-

ning, as Kästel puts it, the age was at least free from the thunderstorm and the devastating floods of war. 2 Man being the animal intime, furnished by nature with no more formidable weapons than fists and teeth, he was too much preoccupied by his designs on the beasts, and by theirs against himself, to meddle much with his own species except when rival claims emerged over a hunting-

ground, or at a later stage over pastures and wells (Gn 15:2, 9).

Pastoral man, 'It is observed,' hardly needs tools, or weapons either, for it is to the common interest of pastoral to range apart, and on the steppe there is room enough for all. It is the same with the nomads of central Asia, who continued to be so as late as the Bronze Age was established. 3

Historic times have their landmarks in the rise, the conquest, or the fall of great empires. In the period of Oriental antiquity martial races moulded the history of China and India. Further west, and in the central current of history, arose the powers of Egypt and Mesopotamia, which during thousands of years engaged in an ever-

renewed struggle for supremacy, while in the intervals Mesopotamia was the scene of a fierce and prolonged conflict, waged with alternating success, between the rival peoples of Babylon and Assyria. From these centres of empire there also proceeded frequent campaigns against sedentary or migratory peoples which raised a threatening front in Western Asia, or which tempted war-

like kings by prospects of sovereignty and spoils.

In the end Assyria was overthrown by Babylonia, Babylonia by the Persians, and a Persian empire entered on its course with a similar programme of conquest and tribrate that brought it into collision with Greece.

In the age of classical antiquity, when the scene shifted to the Mediterranean, and the Greeks and Romans assumed the chief rôle, war continued, notwithstanding the growing culture, to be re-

sional, with the most honourable and almost the most urgent of human pursuits. Men had now iron weapons in their hands, and when they arrived on the central European stage to show how effectively they could be used.

The Greeks made their advent as barbarian conquerors from the north, who served themselves heirs to an older civilization that had developed its powers and accumulated its treasures in the Levant. There-

after they went on fighting with little intermission —against the Trojans, as they said, for Helen of the glorious tresses and for honour, but doubtless also with an eye to dominion and the wealth of Anatolia, against the Persians in maintenance of their racial independence, against one another from cupidity of spoil, or jealousy, while given in their exhaustion they could claim for Greek arms a considerable share in the conquests of Alexander the Great, and in the creation of his grandson's empire. Meanwhile, the medieval empire, in the time the Romans, dug from the same pit, and similarly equipped, gradually made themselves masters of Italy, settled the long-drawn and hard-

1 J. Grünberg, Die Geschichte, Historical monographs, Leipzig, 1882.
2 Die Erde und das Leben, Leipzig, 1892, ii. 672.
fought issue between the Semites and the Aryans through their victory over Carthage in the Punic Wars; and by the beginning of our era, notwithstanding the standing traditions of civil broils, they had subjugated and embraced within their empire a great part of the known territories of the three continents. Under the Roman emperors it seemed for two or three centuries as if the curse of war had wrought its own cure, and the world had been saved by the sword, the hopes which was short-lived, and the Pax Romana proved to be only a hollow that heralded more furious storms.

The period of antiquity came to a catastrophic end, and the Middle Ages were ushered in by the Teutonic migrations, which reduced the Roman empire to ruins, and gave new masters, with a fresh deposit of population, to its richest and fairest provinces. The outcome was that for the next ten centuries Europe was afflicted by wars of every known kind—between imperial dynasties like the Carolingian and peoples which repudiated their sway; between the new-born nations as in the Hundred Years' War of England and France; between rival claimants to a throne, as in the English Wars of the Roses; between the central authority as represented by a king and feudal and semi-feudal provinces; between particular interests: between the governing classes and oppressed populations which sought redress or revenge in social war. Religion supplied additional motives and occasions. In the early Middle Ages the armies of Islam penetrated into the heart of Europe, and at a later date Christendom retaliated in prolonged and sanguinary Crusades for the recovery of the Holy Sepulchre. The modern age, dating from the beginning of the 16th cent., has perhaps had more intervals of repose, but it has found evil compensation in the magnitude of the struggles and the destructiveness of the operations. Instinct and tradition disposed the European rulers to seek an extension of their dominions whenever opportunity arose, while the discovery of the new world offered to the possessors of sea-power the prospect of unlimited agrandizement and wealth. The possibilities of effective warfare were also enormously increased, in the centuries that followed the invention of gunpowder, by the enlistment of science in the improvement of the instruments of destruction. During the last four hundred years the outstanding fact in the political history of Europe was that one great power after another—Austria, Spain, France, Germany—sought to become the master of the Continent. Nationalisms which felt themselves threatened formed combinations which should be strong enough to frustrate, and which also deemed it prudent to anticipate, the development of ambitions and aggressive schemes. The programme of Britain was to rule the seas, and to avert a European hegemony. The result was that almost every generation witnessed a European war of the first magnitude—among them the Thirty Years' War, the War of the Spanish Succession, the War of the Austrian Succession, the Napolonic Wars, and finally the World War 1914-18, which has cost Europe the lives of 10,000,000 picked men, devastated wide areas of Europe by famine and disease, swallowed up one-third of the accumulated wealth, and shaken to its foundations the moral order no less than the material order. The peace of the modern world has also been disturbed by the ferment due to the assertion of the ideals of democracy and nationality in opposition to the alterations of order. The cause of the war has its military monuments in the English Civil War of the 17th cent., and in campaigns of the French Revolution, but for the most part it has pursued its triumphant progress without the necessity of sanguinary, or at least of prolonged, lighting. The spirit of nationality, which developed in the 19th cent. with extraordinary fervour, promoted war in several ways. On the one hand, it claimed independent sovereignty for populations which could establish a claim to nationhood on physical or historical grounds, and thus came into collision with existing imperial structures, giving rise to wars of war in which such states which liberated the Greeks and the Balkan peoples from the rule of the Turks, and the convulsions which have dissolved the heterogeneous Austrian empire. On the other hand, the national spirit fosters the ideal of the consolidation of separated kinsfolk in a single state, and this aspiration directed the third-century policy of Prussia which achieved the desired unification of the German people through the Austro-Prussian campaign of 1866 and the Franco-German War of 1870. Imperial ambitions also proved to be a natural sequel to the fulfilment of national aspirations. Within the great realms trouble has arisen, apart from any racial antithesis, in connexion with the respective rights of a central authority and of the subordinate members: in the 18th cent. the American colonies, in assertion of their colonial rights and interests; in later days, the claimants, fought the American War of Independence; in the 19th cent. the Southern States of the Union affirmed the inalienable rights of particular states in opposition to the prerequisites of an in­destructible Federation, and the matter was brought to an arbitration in the American Civil War. Finally, the modern world has had grave warning that, if the religious war is obsolete, religious enthusiasm has been replaced by a more violent fanaticism rooted in political and social ideals, as was evidenced in some of the phases of the French Revolution and most recently in the spirit and the efforts of Soviet Russia.

III. THE CAUSES OF WAR.—War is traceable to elemental desires and passions of human nature. According to Hobbes, his threefold root is the desire of gain, the fear of injury, and the love of glory.

(2) The desire of gain, in the narrower sense intended by Hobbes, has doubtless supplied the principal impulse to warfare aggression. Territory, with the attendant booty of various kinds, has been the usual stake in war, coveted alike by peoples and by dynasties. At the same time utility in the matter of territory has often been associated with other motives involving lesser degrees of culpability, and even tending on the realm of the virtues. Account has justly to be taken of the frequent play of fairly reputable reasons for war such as famine or scarcity, resulting from drought or the increase of population, the defence and development of trading interests as vital to the subsistence of a commercial nation, the migratory impulse, the spirit of adventure and the conquering desire of a mission to develop waste or neglected regions of the globe, and to conquer and take charge of people for their own good.

(2) The fear of injury, as well as the resentment due to actual injury, has unfailingly prompted to defensive war when resistance was possible, and
often when it might well be deemed hopeless. The interests with which nations have usually been prepared to defend at all costs are, in addition to their territory, their jurisdiction and their honour. It has also been commonly accepted that a palatable and growing threat to these interests justifies a nation in seizing a propitious opportunity for an anticipatory or preventive war.

(3) The desire of glory has in the main been a dominant motive of the great conquerors and of the great destroyers of human life and the destruction of peoples. Apart from such ambition, indignation at a national insult has proved to be capable of evoking the utmost effort and self-sacrifice.

(4) The desire of power is an additional motive which cannot be entirely resolved into cupidity. It is true that power may be sought as the means of appropriating territory and increasing the wealth of a people, but nations as well as individuals find satisfaction in the exercise of power as an end in itself. This desire manifests itself positively in the attempt of a nation or class to acquire dominion over others. The love of power for its own sake has been an important factor in the movements which established the great empires of history, and it has been not less conspicuous in struggles for the supremacy among allied states—as Illustrated by the story of Athens and Sparta, and in the modern contest of the German principalities which issued in the hegemony of Prussia. It has also supplied much of its energy to civil strife, and on occasion has kindled the flames of civil war. The desire of power comes into collision with the spirit of liberty. The demand for liberation is the natural response to the policy of domination, being rooted in the same appreciation of power; and, as the assertion and extension of the power of one nation or class presupposes the abridgment of the power of another, a system of imperial rule or of autocratic government involves the permanent possibility of wars directed to the achievement of national independence or of political revolution.

(5) The passions of hatred and religion have also furnished a relatively independent motive. A nation can take up an attitude that is on a still lower plane than brutal selfishness; it can become inspired by a hatred of the diabolic kind which quite transcends even the counsels of self-interest for the satisfaction of inflicting deadly injury on a loathed enemy. The spirit of hatred has sometimes been engendered by centuries of conflict or oppression, sometimes it has had its spring in deep-seated differences of racial character and culture.

(6) Finally, a religious zeal which can no more be resolved into self-interest than hatred has been the cause, and not merely the pretext, of many wars. Zeal for the glory of God at least co-operated with lust of booty to inspire the onslaughts of Islam, and it blended with the spirit of adventure in the Christian Crusades.

IV. THE REACTION AGAINST WAR.—The most general explanation of war is that men and nations have a legitimate desire for the goods of wealth, honour, and power, and that they are tempted to grasp them by force instead of earning wealth by labour, and honour and power by service. Human nature, however, embodies other principles to which this peculiar method of acquisition, with its inevitable cruel accompaniments, has constituted a challenge, and which have reacted against it in varying degrees of criticism and opposition. The complex constitution of man exhibits in him a longing for a vigorous sense of justice and a lively capacity of sympathy; and at least one of the belligerents must usually have been conscious of a gross viola-

tion of his sense of justice, while the butcherry and the devastation, the slaughters of the field and the sack of a city, when reviewed in cold blood, must often have excited the commiseration even of the conquerors. The general conscience, accordingly, from an early date, has expressed a certain ethical regulation of the occasions and of the practices of war. The great religions strongly supported the ethical plea. At the animitic stage, it is true, religion was practically indifferent to moral questions, but once the West had captured the mind of Asia and Europe were agreed in representing it as normally a part of religion to do justly and to love mercy even in the waging of war. Philosophy, with its distinctive appeal to rational considerations, has also contributed to foster and diffuse critical and reforming opinion through its disciplines of Moral Philosophy and Jurisprudence. The theoretical work was followed up in the 19th cent. by international conventions and conferences which established a fairly authorita-
tive code of International Law.

The moral strain against war has culminated from time to time in the assertion that war is essentially immoral, and in the repudiation of any traffic with it, in any case whatever, as an unworthy compromise. It will be convenient to deal first with those periods most distinctly repre-
sented by a considerable show of moral authority, before proceeding to trace the influence of religion and morality in the discrimination of just and unjust wars and in the humanization of the conduct of war.

V. THE LAWFULNESS OF WAR.—There have doubtless been men in all ages who have objected to war, and refused to have any hand in fighting. They could not harden themselves to the torture either by sheer cowardice, or by counsels of prudence natural to a difficult or desperate situation, or again by the conviction that the shedding of human blood was a criminal outrage, and in any case a futile way of attempting to oppose and prevent wrong-doing. At the risk of their principle being mistaken for cowardice, voices have been raised on the heights of moral idealism in absolute condemnation of war and all its works.

i. THE RELIGIOUS JUDGMENT.—i. The older religions.—While the Vedas are sufficiently warlike, and Brahmanism gives a concretion to the military caste, the miff spirit of Hindu religion tended to view war under the repugnant aspect of murder.

"Alas! we are engaged in committing a heinous sin, saying that we are the architects for killing our brethren out of greed of the pleasures of sovereignty. If the sons of Dushiaras, weapon in hand, should kill me in battle, me weaponsless and not defending (myself), that would be better for me.^"  

The influence of Buddhism was cast on the same side.

"If you desire to honour Buddha," said a Brahman who successfully mediated between two belligerents, "follow the example of his patience and long-suffering. 'Conquer your foe by force, you increase his enmity; conquer by love, and you will reap no after-sorrow.'"  

The teaching of the OT prophets contains a decided pacific strain. They condemned wars of aggression as magnified schemes of murder and plunder, and they were disposed to think defensive wars useless or unnecessary—useless, since a wicked nation would not escape punishment; unnecessary, since a righteous or repentant nation might safely dispense with armaments, and look for protection to the omnipotent Ruler of history (Is 33, 15, 17).

It may, however, be questioned whether the prophetic attitude arose more than that non-judgmentalism of the duty of Israel in the special circumstances of the situation and time (Jer 2528, 32). The great prophets lived at a period when it was a manifest inference from the providential order of the world
that a pacific and submissive policy was the duty of their little border-state, and they might well have been contented with a garrison for a nation to which had been providentially entrusted a larger and more promising political mission than was open to Israel under the conditions of the 8th and 7th centuries before the Christian era.

2. The bearings of the Christian ethic.—The teaching of our Lord and of His apostles includes precepts which on a first impression appear to rule out all traffic with war as inconsistent with the moral ideal. Not only is there a law of love, which condemns the passions that incite to aggression, but there is a law of meekness, expressed in non-resistance, which sufferers the aggressor to work his evil will.

‘Ye have heard that it was said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth: but I say unto you, Resist not him that is evil: but whosoever smiteth thee on the one cheek, offer the other also. And if any man would go to law with thee, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak also’ (Mt 5:38-40). ‘Ye have heard that it was said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour, and hate thine enemy. But I say unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which spitefully use you and persecute you’ (Mt 5:43-44).

‘Avenge not yourselves, beloved, but give place unto wrath: for it is written, Vengeance belongeth unto me, I will recompense’ (Rom 12:19).

The precepts were enforced by the example of Jesus, who ‘left an example that ye should follow his steps,’ and who, ‘when he was reviled, reviled not again; when he suffered, he threatened not: but committed himself to him that judgeth righteously’ (1 Pet 2:23).

As to the bearing of this teaching on the lawfulness of war there have been two schools of Christian opinion.

(a) The literalist interpretation.—The view was widely prevalent in the early Church that war is an organized iniquity with which the Church and the followers of Christ have nothing to do. This sentiment was expressed, though with varying degrees of lucidity and emphasis, by Justin Martyr, Tatian, Irenaeus, Tertullian, Origen, Athanasius, Lactantius, and Theodoret. The allusions to the subject are often casual, and the pacifist testimony sometimes does no more than affirm the undeniable position that the Church differed from the kingly race of this world in that it cherished no schemes of conquest, equipped no military forces, and did not dream of propagating the faith, or even of resisting persecution, by armed rebellion. But the position was also definitely taken up that war and the military institution of the state is the work of darkness, and some were quite emphatic that a professed Christian should not be mixed up with the foul and devilish thing.

‘It is not a law,’ says Lactantius, ‘for a just man to engage in warfare, since his warfare is justice itself.’

The prohibition of military service was partly due to war, in proportion that the soldier was required to compromise his faith by participation in the pagan rites associated with Roman warfare, and to jeopardize his character by association with brutal and licentious comrades, but objection was also taken to the principle to the military profession, and was supported by arguments such as these— that the military oath was inconsistent with the pledge of loyalty to Christ, that Christ had warned His disciples against taking the sword (Mt 26:52), that, if the lesser strife of litigation be forbidden, much more is the greater (1 Co 6), that, if it be unlawful to fight on our own behalf, it is also unlawful to fight the rights of others, and especially that in war men fight to kill, and that intentional killing is murder.

The last considera-

5. De his qui arma profident in pace, placit ab iubentis see a commissione' of the Pope, in Licin. Sacrorum Conciliarum Collect, Paris, 1819 ff., ch. 471.
6. Firmicus Maternus, De errore profanarum Religionum, Migne, PL, xii. 1048.

so impressed the general ecclesiastical mind that certain canons of the period excluded a soldier from the clergy; that a nation had been made for the blood that had been shed.

The literalist view, which had its exponents throughout the Middle Ages and at the Reformation, was made a cardinal tenet of ‘the people called in Scotland Quakers.’

‘Whoever can reconcile this, Resist not evil,’ says B. Barclay, ‘with, Resist evil by force: again, Give also thy cheek, with, strike against another, Lo, whosoever smiteth thee on the cheek, make a prey of them, pursue them with fire and sword; or, pray for those that persecute you, and the Lord will judge for thee, and make thee his hand, for it is written, Vengeance belongeth unto me. I will recompense, shall smite, and shall be smitten. Forgive, love, and pray for them which spitefully use you and persecute you: and ye shall be called the children of God’ (Rom 12:19-21).

The doctrine has recently been popularized by Tolstoi, who developed it in the thoroughgoing fashion which would also sweep away the whole of the machinery by which civilized states repress and punish crime. The justification offered for war, he says, is that it seeks to repair or avert injury, while the command of Christ is that we offer no resistance to injury. The practice of war is no less inconsistent with the injunction to love our enemies. It may be objected that Jesus does not prohibit war in set terms. But ‘a father who exHORTS his child, let him not be thought dishonest, nor let every person, and to give all that he has to others, would not forbid his son to kill people on the highway.’

(b) The reasoned judgment of the Church.—The mind of the primitive Church, so far as reflected in the NT, does not join in the unqualified condemnation of war. The Church of the apostolic age found solace in apocalyptic dreams which presupposed the general redemption of humanity would follow upon appalling conflicts between the powers of heaven and hell, of which the Christian saints, who would be collected in a camp, would at least be sympathetic spectators (Rev 20). In any case the Epistle to the Hebrews pronounces a glowing panegyric on warrior saints of the Old Dispensation (Hebrews 11), while the book of Acts welcomes Cornelius the centurion to the Christian society (10:28). During the succeeding four centuries, as has been exhaustively shown by Moffatt in the article cited, the Church as a whole declined to be committed to the extreme position. From Tertullian himself we learn that there were numerous Christians in the Roman army by their own choice, and that the Church did not condemn them. Clement of Alexandria taught that the position of a soldier was governed by the Pauline principle that ‘he should serve in that calling wherein he was called.’

Diocletian found so many Christians in the army that he deemed it a danger to the State, and Constantine was impressed by their importance as a military asset no less than as a political influence. When Christianity became the religion of the empire, the general tendency, exemplified by Eusebius, was to support the civil power by the benediction of military service. The excommunication of its members appears to have visited ecclesiastical censure on those who abandoned the army even in time of peace from conscientious scruples. Some even thought that the sword might be drawn in a holy war for the extirpation of idolatry. Ambrose enlivened the warlike courage which prefers death to bondage and disgrace, and claimed the OT
warriors as spiritual ancestors. He even added the observation that he who does not defend a friend from injury is as much at fault as he who commits the injury. Augustine was forced to face the question by the havoc of the Teutonic invasions and the sword of the empire, and his not too vividly fully explored the subject and laid down the lines on which in the main the thought of the Churches has subsequently moved.

That war is sometimes lawful on Christian principles is manifest from Augustine on these and similar grounds: (a) that it has been and may be waged by appointment of God; (b) that the object is a divine one, and rapacious attacks by one nation upon another falls under the same category as the crimes of murder and burglary, and should presumably be similarly dealt with; (c) that John the Baptist did not require the soldiers to abandon the service, but only exhorted them to do violence to no man and commit no wrong.

Sermon on the Mount are most fully discussed in the Epistle to Corinthians, which was called forth by the pagan objection that the precepts of non-resistance were inconsistent with public policy, and would prove ruinous to the State. The precept to turn the other cheek to the sufferer, Augustine says, cannot be taken literally. What it requires is an inward disposition of patient good-will towards the aggressor, and it does not prescribe any uniform manifestation of the disposition in act, as appears from the fact that Jesus Himself at least protected against violence (Acts 4:27; cf. Ac. 289). We ought always to cherish the spirit of clemency, and be willing to render good for evil. Such things have to be done in which we have to pay regard not to our own kindly inclinations but to the real interests of others, and their interests may require that they should be defended and protected in some situations. He mentions the following cases of common and natural wrongs: (a) a certain beastly aspersor. 'Qui lecentia iniquitatis equiter, fideliter vigilat et armat, huic infidelibus ac licentiam, quae possidet nutritur injustis, et malam voluntates vestris hostis inferior roboratur.' At the same time war is merely a means to an end, and it is wise and glorious to achieve peace by peaceful means than by war.

Thomas Aquinas replies as follows to objections formed against the teaching of Jesus.

(a) 'Jesus said that he who takes the sword shall perish by the sword.' But 'to take means 'to use without warrant,' and this only suspected, unauthorised, or dangerous persons from drawing the sword. (b) 'War is inconsistent with the command that we 'resist not evil.' (Mat. 5:38) and 'avenge not ourselves, but commit vengeance to God.' (Rom. 12:19). War is the cultivation of a placable spirit, and cannot require us to do mischief by all means.' But 'the people-makers are clearly, war-makers are accursed.' But war may be the best or the only means of attaining the end of peace.

Luther held that the gospel presupposes natural rights and duties, and vigorously defended the Christian soldier. Calvin argued that war was a branch of the work of retributive justice which has been entrusted by God to the civil magistrate, and that it has the same literal justification as the police measures which protect the citizens against the criminal population.

Whether it be a king who does it on a big scale, or a seconder who does it on a small scale, he is equally regarded and punished as a robber. It is no breach of the command, 'Thou shalt not kill,' the slaying of the authors of the unjust war is an execution, the judge is God, and the fighting men who defend the right are merely God's instruments. If it be objected that the NT does not expressly permit Christians to fight, it is to be observed that the NT does not undertake to legislate about civil polity, and that it presupposes the OT, in which the greatest men of God, like Moses and David, were mighty men of valor in the service of God. 

The topic received prominence, in the leading Protestant Confessions, which found it desirable to allay any misgivings that might be felt by princes as to the political implications of evangelical religion. The modern Protestant literature of Christendom is in general agreement with the Roman Catholic moralists.

The ultra-pacifist interpretation of Christian duty, which insists that lawfully rests on a superficial view of the ethical system of Christianity. It ignores an observation which is now a commonplace of the science of Comparative Religion, viz. that, in every society, from the savage to the civilized, which attempt to lay down hard-and-fast precepts prescribing the action to be taken or avoided in particular situations, the ethical scheme of Christianity constitutes usually a stock of principles, accompanied by some illustrations of how they are to be applied in practice. Had Christianity been a nomistic religion, it would have distinctly enacted that 'war is always sin,' or would have enumerated as corollaries of its lawfulness being a religion of the spirit, it bequeathed to the Christian Church, and to all others that claim the Christian name, the task of forming a Christian judgment upon a diversity of concrete questions and situations as they may arise. Again, the original Christian ethic, so far as elucidated in detail, was chiefly illustrated from the individual sphere. While the OT is mainly concerned with the nation, the NT is mainly concerned with God and the soul; and the consequence is that little was done to illustrate the application of Christian principles to the political department of thought and action, which for the most part lay outside the purview of the primitive Church.

There are, now, besides non-resistance, two other principles, deeply embedded in the teaching of the Church, which demand a more concrete illustration before a judgment is formed as to the lawfulness of war in the abstract or the sufficiency of a particular occasion of war. The doctrine of retributive justice, to begin with, teaches wickedness ought to be and will be punished—filled at least as large a space as the doctrine of non-resistance in the circle of Christ's thought. He pronounced upon Jerusalem's impiety, and its destruction, to be attributable to blindness and disobedience (Mt. 23:38), and He drew the picture of a last judgment in which the wicked and impotent would be punished according to their works (Mt. 25:46). The idea of penal retribution, moreover, is the central and inspiring thought of the apocalyptic sections of the NT, represented by eschatological discourses of Jesus (Mt. 24), the Pauline Apocalypse (2 Th 2), and the book of Revelation. And, if it be a fact of the universe that wickedness ought to be restrained and punished, if God Himself, while ready to forgive on condition of repentance and submission, and ever willing to promote man's rights towards recognition, fights against the obdurate rebels of His dominion with all the resources of His providential order, not to speak of the menaces of apocalyptic prediction, it may well be thought incredible that Christianity has made it criminal for a nation to be a fellow-worker with God in restraining the powers of wickedness and in seeing justice done upon the earth. The ultra-pacifist school thinks it to impose upon the nations a code of morality and a plan of procedure which, if absolutely binding, would entail grave censure on God Himself and give ground for an indictment of the methods a God's government of the world. Further, in forming a Christian judgment as to the lawfulness of war, respect must be chiefly paid to the master-principle of the Christian ethic, which is so manifestly in man's nature that it is evident that, if Christian charity were universal, there would be no more war, and also that, if war took place, a belligerent animated by Christian love at its highest reach would do nothing to violate the principles of righteousness clearly shown in history. But the essential feature of love is that it seeks the welfare of its objects, not necessarily that it seeks it by the measures suggested by easy good nature.
—as is sufficiently familiar in the discipline of the faithful, provides this penitentiar
ty and the gaul. The law of love, now, has three main applications for a nation—in reference to the race as a whole, in reference to a particular enemy, and in reference to its population; and in the face of unjust aggression the law of love may actually urge a demand for forcible res
stance on a threefold ground. The interests of the race may require it: a nation is no beneficiary of mankind if it does nothing to support, and even contributes to undermine, the general arrangement that the world is a realm of moral order. That the nation which checks and chastises another in a criminal enterprise is in a real sense its bene
factor is supported by the contention of Plato in the Gorgias that it is a greater evil to commit injustice with impunity than to be punished for it, inasmuch as the wicked who go scot-free are deprived of the valuable remedial discipline of merited chastisement. Again, the Christian law of love lays special stress on what may be called duties of guardianship, which were exemplified in the attitude of Jews towards the house of Israel, towards Jerusalem, towards little children, and towards those who were called `his own.' And in considering the duty of a state in regard to war, it has to be remembered that, from one point of view it is a collective personality which has to think and act as one, in another point of view it consists of those who rule and of those whose interests are committed to the trust of the rulers. It is therefore absurd to maintain that it can be a postulate of Christian morality that the rulers of a nation are under obligation, not merely to sac
rifice themselves, but to take the responsibility of sacrificing others who instinctively look to them for protection, and of abandoning old men, women, and children to privations, sufferings, and moral perils. The Christian spirit was surely better interpreted in the medieval code of chivalry. The literalist view also overlooks a serious diffi
culty as to the possibility of rendering an act of national self-sacrifice of unquestionable sacrificial value. The suggestion is that, even as Christ suffered Himself to be led as a lamb to the slaughter, so a Christian people might dutifully, and with similar profit, suffer a national crucifixion; but it is forgotten that for a sacrifice there is necessarily suffering as well as a will to suffer, and no nation that is or has been has remotely pos
sessed the spotless perfection, not to speak of the willing mind, which would qualify it for a literal imitation of Christ in this regard, or give promise that if attempted it would produce effects in any degree comparable with the effects of the sacrifice once offered on Calvary.

Christian thinkers have, then, to take their orders from the whole Christ and not a fragmentary Christ—from the Christ who is the expression of the complete moral purpose of God, the revela

tion of justice and love as well as meekness. And from this standpoint it may be maintained with a good conscience that Christianity makes room for warfare in co-operation with God in a world which teems with violence and injustice, breaks His laws, and challenges His righteous authority. But, while the principles of meekness and charity have no title to be the sole determinant of the international relations of a Christian state, they ought to make their influence effectively felt as maxims of co

ordination and dispersion. They ought to have such recognition that every concession short of the impossible should be made to avert war, hatred and revenge should be ruled out from deliberation, and the general danger of short-sighted of counsellors, magnanimity should pre
vail in the day of victory, and after the struggle everything should be attempted to obliterate the evil memories and to promote sincere and lasting reconciliation.

The question as to whether a Christian may lawfully bear arms is governed by the decision as to whether a nation may lawfully engage in war. Clearly it can be wrong to give personal assist
ance towards the execution of a necessary and righteous task. The debt which a man owes to the State is even greater than that which he owes to his parents, and the desirous of parents in sickness or old age is not more discreditable than the refusal by a citizen of such service as it is in his power to render to his fatherland in its time of distress or peril. It is less easy to define his duty in the case of a war which he thinks unjust, and in which he is compelled to fight; and all that can be said is that, except in a case of manifestly flagrant injustice, the average person has reason to think that the chosen rulers of a civilized state with possessing more knowledge and wisdom than himself, and at least as great a sense of responsi
bility. Those who refuse to fight from a genuine conviction that it is unlawful to shed blood are wisely treated with consideration in the modern world, inasmuch as conscience, even when unin
structed, is an asset which a nation cannot dis

regard and flout without grave injury to its higher life.

Recent events have revived interest in the rela

tion of ministers of religion to military service. The claim to immunity was very generally made for lessees priesthoods, and allowed by the secular power. The question did not arise in the circum
stances of the Christian Church in the early centuries. The pope and bishops of the medieval Church were often involved in war, and could even foment it in support of their worldly interests, but the official teaching was that it was unlawful for all clerics who belonged to the ordin
e

es maiorres to take a direct part in the shedding of blood. The conviction of Thomas Aquinas is to this effect:

1 Cum bellis exercitata dominum maxime divinorum contemplationes avertantis, et ad humani sæculi cléricos ille tractans, minus cléricos a spiritualibus personis bellarre licet, nisi in necessitatis articulo.

2 Military service, as it is added, is inconsistent with the clerical office on two grounds—it is inconsist
ent with the cultivation of a spiritual temper and the discharge of pastoral duties, and in particular those who are ordained to minister at the altar should rather make themselves better martyrs than think it seems to spill the blood of others. The Lutheran Church has followed this tradition, and the Anglican Church re-affirmed its adherence to it during the recent war by forbidi
ning the clergy to offer themselves for combattant service. The Reformed Churches, narrowly so called, while agreeing that in ordinary circum
stances ministers have an all-important spiritual function to perform in war and should abide in their calling, have taken a broader view of what is covered by the accepted condition (in articulo necessitatis, and have occasionally left it to ministers, such as lately done by the Moderator of Scotland, to judge for themselves as to whether the necessity was such as to require them to offer their services as fighting men to the State. On the question as to whether it may be observed that it is difficult to maintain the view that the clergy as representatives of Jesus Christ ought to refrain
from all violence and the shedding of blood, and at the same time to resist the further contention that the same prohibition extends to persons of every class who profess and call themselves Christians. Further, while it is generally admitted that the clergy and ministry ought to encourage the soldiery to fight in a just cause, the ordinary judgment of mankind a person who thinks it wrong or degrading to do a thing himself ought not to find aid and act otherwise in doing it. The argument based on 2 Ti 2:3 can be used further to support the view that the clergy should not be distracted from their spiritual work by the cares of married life or by the discharge of the duties of any civic office. It may be added that the traditional attitude of the Church seems to have been largely determined by the interest felt in magnifying the distinction of priesthood and laity, and by the reflex influence of the medieval sacramental doctrine.

ii. The Philosophical Vindication. — The verdict of ethical philosophy, ancient and modern, has been that under certain conditions war is justifiable, and non-resistance is unworthy and even immoral. The Greek view was summarily expressed by the inclusion of courage among the four cardinal virtues. Justice, according to Cicero, involves for the individual the duty of preventing injury and of exacting punishment and reparation. The modern schools have their varying conceptions of the ground of obligation and of the nature and basis of natural rights, but there has been practical unanimity as to the moral justification of self-defense when one nation is assailed by the ambition and capacity of another. From the intuitive point of view there is an eternal and immutable moral law attended by conscience, which includes the requirement that nations shall render to all their due, and, in the absence of machinery for making the law effective, it is held to be the duty of the particular nation to do that which its power to enforce and safeguard this obligation. From the utilitarian standpoint repressive and punitive action is held to be called for in view of the disastrous effects which unrestrained injuries would produce for particular nations and the general life of the race. The doctrine of non-resistance, Herbert Spencer argued, is a social, as it involves the non-assertion, not only of one’s own rights, but of those of others, while it holds out no prospect of leading to the desirable end of international peace. 2

The view of the jurists, while reflecting the varieties of ethical theory, are at one in giving an affirmative answer to the question, ‘an IJsiaun unanquam justam sit.’ Grotius argues that recourse to war is permitted and approved by the law of nature, by the consent of the many and of the wise, and by the law of nations, as well as by the divine law which was promulgated and attested in the Scriptures. The law of nature has two branches—the course dictated by natural instincts, and the principles approved by reason. This law intimates its permission of war through the universal instinct of self-preservation, accompanied as it is by natural discourse of purpose in the provision of means of defense to all creatures, and also by the voice of reason which makes it clear that the well-being of society is incompatible with the unchecked reign of violence. 3

By the law of nature, says E. de Vattel, the nations are under an obligation to procure justice and also have the right to be treated with justice; and it would be in vain that nature gave us the right of not suffering injustice, and required others to be just towards us, if we could not legitimately use compulsion when they refuse to acquit them of this duty. Some recent treatises find it sufficient for their purpose that the practice of war is a human custom, and they prefer to leave to philosophy the treatment of the question of the ultimate justification.

VI. The Distinction of Just and Unjust Wars. — The primitive view was that fighting was as natural and proper as any other means of acquiring wealth and servants, and that the only matter needing careful consideration was the prospect and the cost of success in a particular venture. From a comparatively early period, however, the moral consciousness drew a distinction between just and unjust wars, and procured for the distinction such recognition that almost every belligerent has been anxiously engaged to make out that he had the sanctions of morality and religion on his side.

The general view represented in the OT was that wars of aggression, such as were waged by the insatiable and arrogant Asiatic empires, were wicked and criminal, and that wars waged for the defense or liberation of a people, like those organized by the Judges and the good kings, were in accordance with justice and the will of God. The criminality of the heathen wars of conquest was not held to be inconsistent with the observation that they were sometimes used for the merited chastisement of other peoples; the guilt was the aggressor’s, God’s were the wisdom and the power that made the wrath of man to praise Him, and that in the end over-ruled the evil for good. The prohibition of the war of conquest was, however, subject to exceptions—even from the point of view of the prophetistic idealism. It was an axiom of the historical writers, even of those of the prophetical school, that the conquest of Canaan by their tribes had been abundantly justified partly on the ground of an ancient promise and of the provisional occupation by the patriarchs, partly because the conquest and even the extermination of the Canaanites had been richly deserved by their impiety, their corruption, and their cruelties (Jg 1, 1 S 15; cf. Jos 10). For the expedition of Cyrus against Babylon a similar moral and religious sanction was asserted (Is 45). The contribution of Islam was to elevate into a rule the command given in the OT in the war against the Canaanites, and to glorify as just and necessary the war of conquest which is waged for the conversion of the punishment of unbelief. ‘They who believe fight for the religion of God.’ ‘Give to those who misbelieve glad tidings of grievous war.’ 4 The Qur’an is full of exhortations to fight against unbelievers and hypocrites, 5 with promises of Paradise to those who should fall in the holy warfare.

2. The standard of the classical moralists. — The argument in the OT was in the LXX is to the effect that the rulers should organize their realms with a view to virtue and peaceful prosperity as the chief 6

3 Lede: De quod spea, 1758, Washington, 1910, ii. 5.
4 SBE vi. 27 ff., 31 ff., 37 ff., ix. 53, etc.
end, and that military provisions should be relegated to a quite secondary place. At the same time he accepted the view that Greeks and barbarians were called to fight in the way of acquiring property; and he also justified the war of conquest against outside nations on the ground that there are peoples which are destined by nature to servitude, and which are properly coerced if they do not obey properly their destiny. The discussion of the subject by Cicero is important as a summary of the ethical reflections of classical antiquity which was also to serve as a useful legacy to the later guides of the Christian Church.

He concludes the common view that the use of peace was to prepare for war: peace is to be kept in view at the end, and war regarded as a means which is sometimes unnecessarily necessary to secure a satisfactory peace. It is the irrational and brutal way of ending disputes. Unjust wars are those which are prompted by covetousness of the possessions of others. Just wars are of different types, according as they are required for the safety of the State, when measures are taken to ward off injury, and to secure reparations and punishment, or are prompted by the honourable motive of succouring those who have been subjected to a claim of ignorance on the ground of the law or of treaty-obligations. To fulfil the requirements of justice it was further necessary that the demand be made justly, and no eventual declaration of war, should be made in due religious formality.

These principles, it may be added, made it possible to offer a tolerable moral apologia for the proceedings of the Roman empire: when a war could not be plausibly represented as defensive, it could at least be conceived as partaking to some extent of the character of a war of acquisition of honour on behalf of allies, of a war of chivalry on behalf of an oppressed and wronged population. 3. The judgment of the Church. — The need of an official Christian criterion emerged with the union of Church and Empire, and guidance was given by Augustine with considerable obligation to Cicero.

He had no difficulty in deciding that there are unjust and just wars—the unjust represented by the contemporary barbarian onslaughts on the Empire, the just by the efforts of the Empire to defend itself and the cause of civilization. "Inter autem bella fraterna, et inde in custodia procedente, ac populos sibi oppressos, atque inter regna regnique capitis capitatae, quid quid aliud quam接地 latrorum consultum est?" Such wars have their spring in the worst of passions—"sociendi cupiditas, sonebris crudelitas, impetorum et implacabilium animus, feritas rebellandi, libibo dominandi, et si quia situlia."

Justice must be waged to procur war, to punishment, to secure reparations for injury, or (as in OT) by express commandment of God. So terrible, however, are the calamities of war, that in honour of the dead, it should only be entered on under stress of the direst necessity. He also by the hand of God is exalted by those undertakings by a prince and carried on by a regular soldier. The victory is put in that victory in war is not necessarily to be ascribed to the dearest of a peace.

Thomas Aquinas laid down three criteria of a just war: it must be waged by a prince invested with legitimate authority, against an enemy who has deserved punishment, and with the intention that good shall be promoted and evil removed. 4. Following on the Decrees of Gratian the subject was elaborately treated by Suarez, Ayala, Gentilis, and other Canonists. They were agreed in vindicating defensive and punitive warfare, but developed some differences of opinion in regard to the ethics of conquest, the powers of the pope in sanctioning wars and annexations, and the lawfulness of war against infidels and heretics. 1. Protestantism generally reproduced the Augustinian criterion, just as the protestantism of the representatives of the Lutheran and Anglican schools were peculiarly emphatic in branding rebellion as one of the most criminal types of unjust war. According to Luther, rebellion was thought to be submissively and patiently endured, insomuch as every nation richly deserves chastisement, and on the other hand tyrants will be adequately punished in the future state of retribution. 2. With still greater solemnity, even ferocity of language, is the iniquity of rebellion established in the Anglican Homily against Disobedience and Wilful Rebellion. The reasons given include the following in addition to the two mentioned above:

Rebellion had its prototype in the apostasy of Lucifer; monarchy is of divine right, being a copy of the divine rule; rebels will be punished with eternal damnation; history abundantly proves that it is as foolish and futile as it is wicked; subjects are not fitted for the goodness or badness of a prince; rebellion is not a single sin, but 'the puddle and sink of all sins against God and man.

The unjust war, according to Calvin, is one inspired by cupidity, and the just war is one in which a prince, as vice-regent of God, undertakes to coerce another nation which has embarked on a murderous and marauding enterprise. 3. He urged the usual argument against rebellion, but with a significant addition:

"When misgovernment becomes intolerable," he says, "delivery may be expected from God, whose way it is either to raise up avengers from among his servants, or to use for his purpose agents who may be pursuing different purposes of their own.

On this principle it could be contended by the Puritans that rebellion against Charles I. became lawful when God raised up a deliverer in the person of Oliver Cromwell. The Scotch Church emphasized another qualifying doctrine, that obedience to kings ceases to be a duty when they make demands inconsistent with the laws of God, and in the National Covenant the subscribers accordingly bound themselves to maintain their sacred cause with 'their best counsel, bodies, means, and whole power against all sorts of persons whatsoever.'

The modern literature of Christian ethics has in the main reproduced the ideas of Augustine, Luther, and Calvin. One of the most interesting discussions is contributed by Rothe, who justifies the most aggressive war in the defence of treaties, which have made it a chronic disturber of the peace, and also defends the war of conquest, at least in extraordinary times, as legitimate in order to the replacement of a lower by a higher civilization, or for the correction and improvement of a nation which has become effete and degenerate.

4. Jurisprudence and philosophy. — The classic treatises on international law deal elaborately with justificatory causes and unjust occasions of war. To Hugo Grotius more than any other it was due that political realism was called to account in the name of justice and humanity, though in some respects he applied the ethical principles with a measure of timidity.

Grotius recognizes three forms of just war—in the maintenance of a nation's own interests, in interposition on behalf of others, and in duty towards God. A nation is entitled and even bound to maintain its own interests by the defence of the life, honour, and property of the citizens; the duty of repair for injuries and insistence on the fulfilment of obligations, and the promotion of the laws of the country, may be lawfully undertaken by a nation on behalf, not only of its own subjects, but also of its allies, its friends, and of fellow-nations as well. The impious creed which opines two

1 For a review of the literature of C. Nys, Le Droit de la guerre, Brussels, 1881, sect. iv.
3 Thesleffische Ethik, 5 vols., Wittenberg, 1887-71, § 1160.
4 De Jure Belli ac Pacis, bk. ii. ch. ix.
5 R. ii, 3-4.
fundamental articles that there is a Deity, and that He cares for human affairs, is a doctrine so dangerous to the world as we are now told, or in our day thinking to God that He should be forcibly repressed in the name of human society. 1 War may not be entered on through blind fear of another nation, or a supposed utility, but that is not supported by absolute necessity. It is monstrous, linguistic that war is justifiable against a neighbor on the extermination (bellum interius). He refused to concede the moral right of one state to attack another on the mere ground of its iniquities (bellum punitum). 2 Hegel affirms the paramount duty of a great nation to preserve and develop its individuality, and holds that this may give a title to a great nation, as the best representative of the world-spirit for the time being, to embark upon wars of conquest. As against such an elect people, a war of extermination against the civilized nations is criminal, that oppressed nationalities have a sacred right of rebellion, and that there is a moral privilege, if not a duty, of chivalrous interposition on behalf of the wronged. Or, if the worst was done, the prisoners were increasingly disposed to disdain the office of directors of conscience to the nations in the matter.

1 "It is not possible," says Hall, "to frame general rules which shall be of any practical value, and the attempts in this direction which jurists are in the habit of making result in mere abstract statements of principles or perhaps of trivialities, which is unnecessary to reproduce." 12 What is the value of this chapter of the history of thought? It must be admitted that a review of the whole school of Jortiff to to an irrelevance, as to the judicial capacity of the human mind, if not even to foster moral scepticism. The general result was that, while it agreed both by the minds of wise that the specification should regulate the occasions of war, there was serious difference of opinion as to the prohibitions actually involved in the moral law, the parties who had 1 22, 7-14. 3 41 20, 497. 4 61 22, 11.

Le Droit des gens, t. 4.


to judge of its application to particular situations were so biased by their interests and passions as to be incapable of equitable judgment, and the enforcement of ethical demands practically depended upon whether the statesmanship of a nation was for or against the advantage of a state or states to lend its support to a righteous cause. The lesson to be drawn is that, if the demands of morality are to be properly punished and the criminal pursued, the task must be proceeded with under different conditions, and the problem must be formulated in a different way. If the chaotic situation of the world were replaced by a society of nations, the problem of justice and unjust wars would be simplified, inasmuch as the typical form of unlawful war would be an act of rebellion against the general body in which a particular state broke the law that prohibits aggressive military action, and defied the authority supporting the law. Under these conditions the great question for ethical reflection would be, not what wars were just or the reverse, but whether a like a heritage. Particular nations were entitled to assert or to have safeguarded. This subject is no doubt a difficult one; and it is probable that much would have to be done to arrive at a universal and comprehensive view of equity rather than in accordance with the provisions of a cast-iron statutory code. There would, however, be a good guarantee for just judgment in the fact that the elaboration of the code of rights would be undertaken by representatives of the general mind of the race, for whom the criterion would be the greatest good of the whole, and that in the application and enforcement of the recognized law the parties directly interested would play a subordinate part.

VII. HUMANIZATION OF THE CONDUCT OF WAR.—The ancient tradition was 'Vae Victis!' The peaceful era was the era of Viator, peace and rain and infallibility. The invaded country was ruthlessly devastated, the captured city was commonly sacked and destroyed, neither age nor sex could count on immunity, and a whole population might be put to the sword. If the practice was commonly less thorough than the theory, this was probably due not so much to clemency as to the reflexion that a ruined and depopulated country could pay no tribute, and that the services or the ransom of slaves gave more permanent satisfaction than the slaughter of captives. Such was the general spirit of warfare at the advent of certain of the great religions. It is these facts that vindicated the title of ethical by embodying provisions which represented a real advance on the primitive ferocity of mankind.

1. The curb of the religions. — The Laws of Mann, while showing no scruples about aggressive and acquiescent war, make a strong plea for humane fighting.

2. What the King has not (yet) gained, let him seek (to gain) by his arm. 1 . 1 Let him plan his undertakings (pensively meditating) like a heron; like a lion, let him put forth his strength; but when he sees that the rights and the rules are such, let him double in retreat. 2 At the same time he is to conduct war mercifully and even chivalrously. When he fights with his foes in battle, he must not strike with the sword concomitant (in wood), nor with (such as are) barred, poisoned, or the points of which are blazing with fire. 3 Let him not strike one who (in flight) has climbed on an eminence, nor a eunuch, nor one who jolts the limbs of his hands (in supplication), nor one who (sees) with flying hair, nor one who is naked, nor one who is alone, nor one who looks on without taking part in the fight, nor one who is fighting with another (force). Nor one whose wounds are broken, nor one afflicted (with sorrow), nor one who has been grieved (in fortune), nor one who is the father of (those who have turned to flight, but in all these cases let him remember the duty (of honorable warriors). 4

The effects of the persecution of the religion of Israel left its mark on the regulations for the conduct of war. Israel was familiar with the ferocity of Oriental warfare, to which a religious consecration

1 SBE xxv. (1866) 325. 2 Ib. p. 235. 3 Ib. p. 231.
was sometimes given by the application of the doctrine of the herem, or ban (Nu 21:23, Jos 6:21c, etc.). It could imitate its neighbours in the ruthless devastation of territory (2 K 25:18), the massacre of captives (Ps 110a:5), the mutilation of captives (Jg 19), and the murder of pregnant women (2 K 15:27). It would appear, however, that Israel had a general reputation for clemency during the monarchy (1 K 4:6) and that its treatment meted out to their enemies was not to be compared to the Assyrian devilries.1 The subject of atrocities bulks largely in the prophetic invective. 

Amos thundered against the nations for the cruelty and perversity that marked their methods of warfare, and judgment is denounced against Damascus because it has threaded Gilgeam with threshing-instruments of iron; against Edom because it has sold Israelites into captivity; against Tyre because it has violated a treaty; against Edom because of its pitiless vendetta against Israel; against Ammon because it ripped up the woman with child that it might enlarge its border; against Moab because it burned the bones of the King of Edom with lime (chs. 1-5).

The Deuteronomistic legislation did something in this field to sustain its general character for humanity. It provides that the inhabitants of a city which capitulate are to be treated with clemency, and that, if it be carried by assault, the non-fighting population is only to forfeit its liberty (20:17-21). It was also forbidden to cut down trees of a vineyard during the sabbatical year 'since the tree of the field is man's life' (20:15).

Among the great religions Islam alone upheld the ruthless traditions of Oriental warfare. As it was, it was a tool capable of being used to an extent that the worst excesses of war were given the character of a righteous judgment on the infidel, and the forfeits demanded of the vanquished by the law of that savage were passed on to the faithful as their natural rights.

'O thou prophet, fight thou strenuously against the misbelievers and hypocrites, and be stern towards them, for their repulsive habit, and, in all probability, they will repent.' The reward of those who make war against God and His Apostle and strike wer violence in the earth, is only that they shall be slaughtered or crucified, or their hands cut off and their feet on alternate sides, or that they shall be banished from the land.2

It should be added that some Muslim and other peoples have their share of human kindness, and that they have also found it necessary to compromise with their exterminating doctrine as a condition of being allowed to retain political power and even to occupy the planet.

2. The Graeco-Roman period and its spirit.—During the classical period the traditional usages of war had somewhat softened. Although vengeance was pitilessly wreaked on an enemy who had inspired deadly fear or hatred, and although the principle still held that a victorious soldiery was entitled to the compensations of pillage and outrage, there was a milder strain in the Aryan constitution, which re-asserted itself in cold blood. While the Greeks did not evolve a code of international law, there was a minimum of common morality which a common religion enjoined on all Greeks alike. The chief elements of the code were the rights of the alien (strēs), the sacred immunity of the herald, pious treatment of the slain (whom corpses might not be desecrated and should not be left unburied), and merciful treatment of prisoners. Unconditional surrender, if voluntary, carried with it a right to mercy; conditional surrender, if confirmed by an oath, was to be respected; and a captive had a title to be liberated (though it was doubtful if the caption was compelled to accept it) on payment of a fixed ransom which was believed to be sanctioned by divine authority.3

3. The medieval period.—In the fighting of the early Middle Ages there was some lapse into primitive ferocity due to the fact that the conflict was between civilization and barbarism, and the stakes were the material foundations of existence. Writing in the early thirteenth century, the Romanist, Augustine, recalls that the tradition even of heathen Rome recommended clemency and magnanimity, and urges that war be conducted in accordance with the merciful precepts of the ancient laws and the outline of a cosmos re-emerged. Christianity was already generally professed, and it contributed, in conjunction with the nobler elements of the European character, to the formation of a chivalrous ideal, which in some part particularly mitigated the hideousness of war. The Church, as the moral guide of the nations, took the matter into consideration, and in its canon law framed rules which were legislated by the secular powers.

4. The modern advance.—In modern times regulations for the conduct of war have been humanized to an extent that has been a welcome offset to the multiplication and intensification of the horrors due to modern inventions. The forces making for this improvement were the Christian heaven working in European society and the developing moral reflection of the civilized world, and those happily met in the personality and equities of thought of such men as Grotius, theologian, moralist, and lawyer, and became widely operative through the influence of the treatise De jure Belli ac Pacis.

After expounding the general theory and practice of the conduct of war, as opposed to the inhumanity on the part of humanity a list of amendments and mitigations (temporamina) in regard to the treatment of the persons and the property of the enemy. The general principle insisted on is that the right to slay, enslave, confiscate, etc., is not absolute, but is limited by consideration of what is necessary to break an enemy's resistance or to obtain reparation for injury inflicted.

During the 18th and 19th centuries there was a marked development of the cosmopolitan and humanitarian spirit, accompanied by much ethical reflection in the departments of International Law, Moral Philosophy, and Christian Ethics. The common-sense development of the influence of the sentiment, voiced by Benjamin Franklin, saw no reason why the law of nations, which had already discarded something of the old savagery, should not go on improving; and Franklin proposed that, when nations were so far, in proportion as they were open to cultivators of the earth, fishermen, and traders in unarmed ships, artists, and mechanics working in open towns, also that rapine and privateering should be abolished and rapine and privateering should be abolished and that hospitals

1. R. S. Kennedy, Art. 'War' in SDB. 2 Qur'ân, iv. 9. 3 Ib. v. 39. 4 See O. F. y. 415, 415c. 5 Brit. c. xii—xxxiv: 'Circus jussi interficiendi, vationem, res capitae, captor,' etc.
should be respected. In the treatises on International Law, which was sedulously cultivated during the period, the humane trend was strongly accentuated and the doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church, which the Church brought its canon law up to date, Protestant theology was prolific in systems of Christian Ethics, which at least made it clear that the spirit of Christianity required to be a reform of the usages of war. Definite and valuable practical results were achieved by the Geneva Convention of 1864 which dealt with the treatment of the wounded, to sick, and prisoners. The Hague Tribunal covered practically the whole ground, except that it was only permitted to glance at the topics of arbitration and disarmament. The chief provisions illustrating the ethical progress were as follows.

(A) Methods and weapons of war.—(a) In reaffirming the principle that the right to injure the enemy is not unlimited, the Hague tribunal prohibited poisoning, treacherous wounding and killing, declarations that no quarter will be given, and the use of incendiary bombs. It prohibited attacks on and bombardment of defenceless towns, and unnecessary destruction of edifices devoted to religion, art, science, and education, as well as the prohibition thereof of cities. (B) It laid down that prisoners are entitled to be provided for and relieved of the necessities of life. (C) The treatment of the wounded was put on a much better footing. It was provided that ambulances and military hospitals are to be respected; that persons employed to care for the sick and wounded are to be protected and returned to their posts, that wounded and sick soldiers are to be cared for and treatment of prisoners should be uniform.

(B) Treatment of the enemy's country when occupied and of property therein.—The rights of private property were asserted—both as against pillage by individuals and as against confiscation by the enemy state. Wanton destruction of property was forbidden. Any requisitions in kind or in services were only to be demanded from communes or inhabitants for the necessities of the armies of occupation. The inhabitants could not be compelled to take part in military operations against their own country. The two main subjects dealt with are commerce with the enemy during hostilities, and the law of reprisals.

During the recent war there were doubtless grievous violations of these humane regulations—notably in the use of poisonous gases, the wanton destruction of property, and the occasional refusal of quarter—but that the modern world had reached a higher level of morality than antiquity was still in evidence in the fact that, in the most gigantic and cruel of all the historic struggles and orders, the war was to a large extent maintained in occupied territories, prisoners were not as of old callously butchered or reserved for the slave mart or the gladiatorial spectacle, and the sick and wounded found themselves under the shelter of the Cross and tended by the ministrations of the Good Samaritan.

VIII. THE DESIRABILITY OF ENDING WAR.—The general judgment of mankind upon war is that it is a scourge of the nations which, along with famine and pestilence, makes up the dread trinity of human woes. This estimate rests on considerations which have certainly not lost in force in modern times.

(1) War is organized destruction of the harvest of civilization and of those who produce it. It impoverishes a country in two ways—by diverting labor from productive to unproductive tasks, and by annihilating wealth which had previously been accumulated by peaceful industry. It also sets at naught the civilized doctrine of the sanctity of human life, and replaces the beneficent efforts of science to save and husband life by measures which directly or indirectly sweep away whole masses of population. The ever-increasing efficiency of the instruments and methods of destruction has still more decidedly given to modern warfare an aspect of folly and clothed it with a suicidal character. The conquerors, hardly less than the vanquished, have emerged from the World War bleeding, dazed, exhausted, and doomed to shoulder almost intolerable burdens.

(2) The tragedy of the waste of life is accentuated by the circumstance that the victims are the élite of the nations. War, as Eschylus says, is a gold-merchant, with whom his customers do most unprofitable business.

(3) In fighting man reverts to the sub-human plane. The badge of humanity is the possession of reason, which at least suggests that man ought to try to avoid disputes by rational methods.

(4) War makes an appalling addition to the miseries of the human lot. A world-wide crime is suffered, being supplied with Missull into his list of the horrors of ancient war:

1. Rapt virgins, pueri; divelli liberis a parentum corpore; matres familiarium pati que viribus collibus, fatis signare domus, legem, etiam erudienda arma, cadaveribus, cruore, atque nactus omnia compiler. With more detail and colour but hardly more impressiveness, a great preacher depicts the horrors of the battle-field, the agonies of the occupied country, the ravages of want and sickness, the desolated lives, and the broken hearts. It is a service rendered by realistic fiction that it has shown how deeply purchased even by the fighting man is 'the one crowded hour of glorious life' which itself under modern conditions may be like nothing so much as the death of a poisoned rat in a hole.

(5) War, when looked at as a whole, is a gigantic moral evil. The aggression which sets in motion and sustains the strife has its dynamic in lusts and passions that defy and reverse the recognized magnitudes of morality. Even a just war sets the heart of a nation aflame with hatred, malice, and revenge. War turns the moral world upside down and sanctions a temporary suspension of respect for life and property and truth. It is therefore probably inevitable that it should be waged with some grim accomplishment of unlicensed outrage and of unhallowed vice. Experience also shows that the moral chaos of war makes its influence felt later on in a certain hardening of a people's heart, and a perversion of their moral sentiments, and also in a ground-swell of unrest, licentiousness, and crime which continues to surge after the actual tempest has died down.

To this indictment there has been opposed a eulogy of war, which has some basis in facts, but fails to establish that the blessings traced to the expenditure of war efforts are not of a far more dangerous kind. The truth is that the loss, and much less that it is desirable to perpetuate war

1 Apue, 441 f., tr. W. Headlam, Cambridge, 1910.
2 J. W. Mackail, Sheil Epitaphs from the Greek Anthology, London, 1891.
4 Cicero, in De Leg. II. 44; cf. Plutarch, 'Pelopid' (= medio sagamenti, vi geritur ret. Spernitor otor bonus, horridus miles amor' (Cic.), 'Cic., De officiis, ed. L. Muller, Petropolis, 1834)., 'De Officiis Conspicuationes,' § 51.
5 Robert Hall, Miscellaneous Works, London, 1833, 'Reflections on War.'
6 Tolstoi, War and Peace; F. Zola, Le Dédale; Paris, 1892; F. Nietzsche, Unfinished Nieder, II, 2 vol., Dresden, 1892; Batten-father's cartoons.

1 The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907, Carnegie Endowment, 1915.
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as the condition of life, benefits accruing in the future.

(i) The progress of human civilization, it is said, has been due to war. If the first men came to the frontiers of the world and steeled by war, and won through war their power and title to the world, the wholeness of life is on one side, it makes it on another, and war is its instrument.1 Few would indeed so far venture to criticize the course of history as to deplore the presence of war, e.g., Rome nad Islam. In the name of the greater part of North America, as well as of Australasia and New Zealand. Such events have a certain ethical justification, since self-preservation is a duty. But if not a duty of nations, while under former conditions a people was practically thrown back on war as the one form of enterprise by which to supply its vital wants and in which to find scope for great native powers. At the same time it may not be forgotten that the after-world over the most valuable ends are able to collect. Hence the culture of the Greeks and the religion of the Jews, both of which peoples went down in the military struggle, and it is unreasonable to expect that in the future great races will find it possible to come in the original leadership and service of the peace which has promoted the higher developmental interests claiming their opportunities by the exercise of brute force.

But it is a maxim of state and avert degeneracy. 'No Body can be healthful,' says Bacon, 'without Exercise, neither Natural Body, nor Politique.' And hence, to a Kingdom or the nation, he warns, 'Warre is the true Exercise.'2 One might reply that is gets something out of natural life that has a mind to be as good and useful as the earth and developing industry and commerce, and that in any case there are more healthful forms of exercise than those of the body, brain, and mouth. But it is a tenable view that Bacon was to give discrete utterance to the maxim of statecraft that exercise and is the best recipe for national domestic dissensions, but to this assertion the reply is that sedition is more dismally and humanely treated by measures of political and social reform than by the extermination of the degenerate in peace, and because of peace, has been often asserted, and no doubt it is sometimes happened that nation, growing on being guaranteed peaceful security, has become idle and vicious. But the charge often amounts to no more than that a people, as the result of peace, has been stifled in the use of the soldier's tools, and the experience of the recent war showed that peoples which accordingly should have become weak and spiritless had preserved unimpaired through a commercial era the strongest ancestral qualities of their stock.3

(ii) War, it is said, has not its equal as a school of the virtues. The most valuable ends are able to collect. Hence the culture of the Greeks and the religion of the Jews, both of which peoples went down in the military struggle, and it is unreasonable to expect that in the future great races will find it possible to come in the original leadership and service of the peace which has promoted the higher developmental interests claiming their opportunities by the exercise of brute force.

(iii) War, it is said, has supplied much of the inspiration and impulse which has promoted the higher developments of the life of the race. The great achievements of the nations in war have usually been followed by a golden age of spiritual achievement—in literature, in philosophic thought, and in art.4 Even great religious in their origins, and subsequent religious revivals, have been the result is not which not the nations incident to the deadly struggles of war. It appears that the tenacity of the spiritual movement is the spirits and to put forth its utmost powers, quicken its interest in the capital problems of existence, and also deepen its insight and increase its receptivity not only it is deep and realizable that the spiritual achievements of the race would be greater, not less, had we been able to suspend the occupation of generation on the best energies and material of the race, and that the gains credited to war are really due to the abeyance of the other. This is the common evidence which is able to do nothing to turn a curse into a blessing. That religion on the whole has

2. "Of the true Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates" (Essays, ed. A. Wright, London, 1833, p. 127.

prophesied by war is more than doubtful; the religious revival is a lesser fact in the midst of most wars than the besievement or eclipse of faith of the material triumph of moral maxims, and the diffusion of a pessimistic philosophy.

IX. THE POSSIBILITY OF THE CESSION OF WAR. The use of war will eventually cease has been entertained on various grounds.

(a) It is held that God's purpose with the world is to establish it in a Kingdom which will be a realm of peace: of righteousness and love, and that the omnipotent and all-wise God may be depended on to carry His purpose into execution. This confidence was the ground of the OT prediction that in the Messianic age 'they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruninghooks; nation shall not lift up the sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more' (Is 2). The prediction has naturally been accepted by the Church as a promise of God vouched for by inspired prophets, but apart from the authority of the prophecies it is inevitable that those who share their faith in the divine government of the world should share their conviction that universal peace is an end worth of God which He will eventually attain in spite of human perversity and opposition.

(b) The hope of permanent peace has been based on a belief in the essential goodness of human nature, which it is supposed has sufficient idealism to respond in the long run to the message of justice and the appeal of brotherhood. Short of this it is sometimes argued that mankind is too fallible to ensure peace, and that unless the nation grows more humane and refined, it will turn in disgust from the wild and brutal work of war. The hope is based on much of fact, that human nature is highly fallible and that possibilities of an ethical kind, but the optimism resting on this foundation is happily reinforced by other considerations.

(c) The self-interest of the nations as a whole requires them to take measures for the abolition of war. The great difficulty, says Rousseau, is not even so much the wickedness as the stupidity of the rulers of states, who would be pacifists if they understood their own interests.

'They do not need to be good, generous, disinterested, public-spirited, humane. They may be unjust, greedy, putting their own interests above everything else and yet ask that they shall not be fools, and to this we come.'5

The same view is taken by Kant, who says that even a race of devils, provided only they were intelligent, would be for the destruction of other human wars for the benefit of humanity. "Nature guarantees the final establishment of peace through the mechanism of human inclinations." The view that the nations will eventually be driven by considerations of interest to protect themselves against war has been urged with renewed force in recent times on the ground that the civilized nations are now so intimately interdependent through trade and finance that in fighting one another they infallibly injure themselves, that as a fact the victors suffer harder than the vanquished,6 and that the destructiveness, not to speak of the cost, of modern armaments is so terrible that its persistence in war will imperil the very existence of civilization.7 These arguments have been powerfully reinforced by the latest chapter of history.

(d) The eventual cessation of war, further, has been expected to be due to the scientific machinery which has already annulled the right of the individual to take into his own hands the redress of his private wrongs. The civilized states have all succeeded in abstracting machinery which checks and punishes individual wrong-doers who

2. Werke, 'Zum ewigen Frieden,' viil. 299.
may be minded to rob or murder, and it seems to be essentially the same problem with which the race has to deal in repressing crimes attempted by those who are the enemies or other members of the human family. The same necessity, as Kant points out, "which forced men to take steps to secure the liberty of individuals within the particular territories and the institutions to take similar measures for their protection against violence and robbery."1 In opposition to this view it has been maintained that the nations have not the same reasons for instituting a system for the maintenance of international law and in order that a nation has for repressing crime within its own borders. It is not so necessary, it is said, to regulate the reciprocal relations of states as the reciprocal relations of fellow-citizens, since the former are not so inextricably bound together as the latter, and, further, a state has no right to limit its independence to the same extent to which the individual consents when he submits to the laws of his country.2 But those objections have been weakened since the 18th cent.—the first by the ever-increasing economic solidarity of the nations, the second by the demonstration afforded by the modern Empire and United States of the possibility of reconciling the rights of a central authority with the enjoyment of a satisfactory regional autonomy.

An optimistic attitude is justified in view of the progress that has been made towards the pacification of organizations and populations within which war formerly raged as part of the order of things. There has been a steady expansion of the areas within which war is regarded as illicit and even impossible. The history of Britain illustrates the evolutionary process. Time was when there were clashing nationalities, England, at least three in Scotland, which were chronically at war among themselves; later, war between England and Scotland had the aspect of a natural necessity, while the situation was further complicated by a chronic feud between Scottish Highlanders and Lowlanders, and by struggles between king and barons. But the stage was eventually reached at which the interests of each part of the country and all sections of the population were entrusted to the wisdom and equity of the representatives of the whole body, and the notion of a war between north and south, or other sections of the body politic, would be scoffed at as insane and unthinkable. Similarly the territorial conflicts of former days are no longer possible between the Departments of modern France or the provinces of unified Italy. It is reasonable to believe that at no distant date the problem which was solved by particular nations will be solved by Europe as a whole, and that to future generations European war, if not impossible, will be stamped with the criminal character of civil or fratricidal war. Some of the counter-arguments are weighty, but not unanswerable.

(1) It is said that, as war has prevailed from the beginning, so it will prevail to the end. But it has been the destiny of man to grapple with the most dire and formidable evils, and the marvellous progress he has made in knowledge, power, and skill would seem to be that he will maintain his dominion save the menace of death.

(2) The law of the world, we are reminded, has been progressing through struggle, and the nations may not expect to escape from a period of conflict. It is not necessary that the world should continue to be carried on by the method of violence, and it is quite conceivable that it is governed according to analogies that it should come to be confined to rational forms of simulation and competition.

(3) Civil war in nature, it is also said, contains within itself the permanent possibility, nay, the guarantee of war—in its ingrained selfishness, its cupidity, and its passions of rage, that is its essence. But, even where the spirit of wickedness in human nature, it is also true that it contains traits of distinction, and its expansion is necessarily in support of altruistic and chivalrous ideals. Moreover, as already pointed out, nations may be expected to find out, as individuals have found out, that fighting is at least bad and may even be ruinous policy.

(4) Religion has contributed the arguments that the permanence of war may be expected from the justice, and even from the goodness, of God. The argument from the divine justice is that a nation that ever punished guile and fraud, racial sin being inevitable, He will needs continue to employ the scourge of war. It is the necessary and appropriate method of the expression of His holy wrath. It is true that nation-sins are palliated by punishments that have often been used as the means of chastisement, but God hasample resources of other kinds in the providential order by which to reveal His anger against national corruptions. It has also been argued that God's goodness moves Him to send wars upon the earth to prevent mankind from fixing their affections on earthly things.

There is hardly to be found a child of fortune,' says Campanella, 'who would desire to exchange his terrestrial paradise for a celestial one; and so God applies a salutary remedy by sending upon us wars and persecutions.4 Similarly Hegel observes that humans and sabres discuss much more impressively than preachers on the editing text of the instability and vanity of earthly things.2 But surely there is enough of irresistible misery in human life to undertake the work of weaning us from affections on this world. Another branch of the religious argument from God's justice for the precipices of war and the revulsion of wars and rumours of wars. These, however, belong to the apocalyptic atrocity, which is concerned with events expected at the end of the world, and nothing to do with the necessit y which the human race is appointed to work out its destiny under the conditions of a natural development.

The immediate outlook.—While there is reason to hope for the eventual abolition of war, it is not to be forgotten that each successive generation is disposed to military adventure by its fresh energies and its youthful inexperience. Although no generation wants two great wars, every generation seems pleased to have one. Moreover, our world is full of tension which involves the possibility of manifold conflicts. There are many antitheses which, in addition to the lessening of the war from the past, disturb the present and menace the future. The antitheses are (a) between the unreconciled forces of autocracy and democracy, (b) between nationalities and empires, (c) between nationality and nationality, (d) between parties representing individualistic and communistic theories of social organization, while in the distance there even loom possible conflicts (e) between continent and continent and (f) between the dominant white race and the coloured races which it has taken under its tutelage. It was therefore worth while to seize the advantage of the present revision of feeling to place things on a better footing, and to secure that war shall be rendered, if not impossible, at least more difficult and odious, and more dangerous to those who play with the fire.

X. METHODS OF SECURING PERPETUAL PEACE.—There are three ways in which war might cease: (1) there might be no more aggression; (2) there might be no more resistance; (3) there might be a political organization whose function was to preserve peace. The first and second methods have been the dreams of prophets and idealists. The third has entered in different ways into history and practical policies.

(1) Clearly there would be no more war if all nations refrained from anything of the nature of aggression. This implies, however, a moral transformation of the race such as we are looking for in the present dispensation, and the hope of such radical conversion has chiefly been cherished as a sequel to the Second Coming and a visible rule of Christ.

(2) The end, also, would obviously be attained if those whose interests were assailed consistently agreed to offer no opposition, but to show forgive-
ness and goodwill. It is possible that, if this could be tried, it would have the effect of shaming hatred and aggression out of the world. But it seems even more probable that, if a nation could compose its quarrels without going to war, this would give a fresh impetus to criminal impulses. In any case the method is not practicable, as there is nothing about which human nature feels more strongly than injustice, and nothing in which men in the mass are less disposed tamely to acquiesce.

(3) Political organization might attain the end by one nation conquering the rest and compelling them to keep the peace, by nations forming them- selves into two or more groups to hold one another in check, or by all the nations, or the great majority, forming a society of nations for the mainten-ance of peace and order. The last arrangement, finally, might develop into a world republic with particular countries as its provinces.

(a) The formalistic method.—While the empires in the point of view have been centres of aggres- sive warfare, in another point of view they have made for peace within the area embraced in their dominion, and have compensated for loss of liberty by ensuring peace and tranquility. The great conquerors have usually quieted any compunctions of conscience by the reflexion that the end of their fighting would be peace, and that peace would be the more widely extended and the better assured the greater and more thorough their conquests. Rome gave a practical demonstra- tion that the power strong enough to master the nations of the civilized world was able to solve the problem of preserving a general peace. The Middle Ages inherited the Roman tradition, and inclined to believe that the ideal was the unifica- tion of the world under emperor and pope as repre- sentatives of the divine sovereignty.

Dante imagined a single authority, unshakable, inflexible, irresistible, which could make all smaller tyrannies to cease, and enable every man to live in peace and liberty, so that he lived in justice. He conceived of its accomplishment only in one form, as grand as it was impossible—a universal monarchy. The Holy Roman Empire was seldom, if ever, the effective master of Europe; during modern times there has been no acknowledged master; and the struggle for the hegemony among the European nations which has formed so large a part of modern history was doubtless prompted, not only by ambition and cupidity, but by the desire to secure a permanent basis of their rule, to include their enemies, against the bloodshed, to an end. Napoleon left it on record that he sought to conquer Europe, not only for glory, but to bless it with lasting peace. The Holy Alliance, formed after 1815, undertook to keep the peace, but unfortunately attached even more importance to its futile policy of stemming the rising tide of democracy. It was at least a tenable theory, favoured by some German historians, that, if Germany made itself master of Europe by the might of its sword, it would serve itself heir to the pacific mission of Rome. But this programme came into collision with deep-seated propensities—the prediction of Rousseau was twice fulfilled that no nation is strong enough to contend with the rest of Europe, and the course of events has happily shut up the world to attempting a co- operation of that solution.

(b) Defensive alliances.—For the last 400 years Europe has witnessed combinations of nearly equal strength which made it hazardous to itself for any single state, however powerful, to develop aggressive designs. The system of the balance of power was no doubt better than none in a world that was so suspiciously threatened by dreams of ambition and cupidity, but it had too little of an ethical basis—naked interest being palpably domi- nant on both sides—and as it was deemed proper to guard against the growing strength of a possible enemy as efficiently as to repel actual aggression, the general result was, not to avert war, but to make war almost the chronic experience of Europe, and, when it occurred, to extend the area of the con- vulsion and to increase the horrors of the struggle.

(c) The League of Nations.—The third method is that the nations, and at least as a beginning the civilized nations, should form themselves into a co- federation on the basis of an accepted code of rights and obligations. Such an organization was adumbrated in Greek and Germanic confederations, but the idea is modern of working out a scheme to embrace the whole of Europe and the rest of the civilized world, accom- panied by a recognition of moral relations with the other divisions of mankind.

The idea of a European League of Nations was conceived by M. de M. in 1889, and it is supposed that the great powers might be persuaded by the offer of certain adjustments and compensations to renounce their special aspirations, and to bind them- selves to resist any attempts to disturb the agreed settlement. To the Abbé de St. Pierre belongs the honour of having opened the modern discussion in his Projet de la paix universelle. As fundamental articles of the League he proposed the following:

(1) "There shall exist henceforth between the European sovereigns signing the five articles a perpetual alliance."

(2) "Each of the signatories shall contribute at its own expense to the protection of the League, and its members shall be paid for the services rendered according to their respective means."

(3) "The Grand Allies, for the termination of their present and future differences, have renounced and renounce for ever, for themselves and their successors, the method of arms and are agreed always to adopt henceforth the method of concilia- tion, through the mediation of the rest of the Allies at the meeting-place of the General Assembly, and in case of mediation being unsuccessful they agree to submit to the judgment of the Plenipotentiaries of the other Allies, a majority of votes to determine the matter provisionally, three-fourths finally after the lapse of six months."

(4) "If any one of the Grand Allies refuses to execute the findings and the regulations of the Grand Alliance, negotiate contrary treaties with foreign powers, make warlike preparations, the Grand Alliance shall arm, and take offensive action against the powers in question, unless the other Allies have complied with the Plenipotentiaries' find- ings and regulations, or given security for the repair of the injuries caused by its hostile measures, and made good the military expenses thus occasioned."

(5) "The Allies agree that the Plenipotentiaries, by a majority of votes, shall definitely regulate in their permanent Assembly all the articles which shall be judged necessary and important, in order to procure for the Grand Alliance more stability, security and other advantages, but the fundamental articles shall be unalterable save by unanimous consent of the Allies."

As regards the basis of the Concordat, it was proposed that the status quo should be accepted and maintained.

"To facilitate the formation of this Alliance, it is agreed to adopt as fundamental articles of possession and non-aggression the provisions of the latest treaties, and to guarantee to each Sovereign jointly, and to his house, all the territory and the rights which he actually possesses." 3

The main features of the project were reproduced in an influential essay by Rousseau, who laid stress on the following points as essentials of such a League as would include all considerable states, that it must have a judicial tribunal and an executive, and that it must have at its disposal sufficient force to prevent secession. In his final

3 P. 22.
judgment on the scheme Rousseau declared it to be hopeless to expect to convince autocratic sovereigns and self-seeking ministers that they would lend it to their interests to fall in with the project. The task of the League was to get rid of autocracy, and this operation might prove too painful and costly.

1 A Federative League," he concludes, "can only be established by law and not by force; but to say that its coming is more to be desired or feared?"

The subject was advanced by Kant, who, while own method, and Pierre and Rousseau, went somewhat deeper into the conditions of lasting peace.

The greatest problem set to the human race, he says, "is the formation of a political organisation under which justice will be dispensed to all, and a branch of this is the subordination to law of the external relations of the particular states."

The goal of the development on the international side is a Völkerbund, in which every state, even the smallest, may expect the maintenance of its security and its rights, not from the exercise of its own power or from its own decisions, but from the collective power of the League, and from judicial decisions of its collective will. He lays down the following among other conditions of enduring peace:

1. A treaty of peace should not contain matter provoking of future wars. (2) No existing state should be annexed by another state by conquest. (3) Standing armies should be abolished. (4) National debt should not be accumulated in support of foreign policy. (5) No state should interfere in another's domestic concerns.

Kant also expresses the opinion that perpetual peace has the best chance of being achieved under republican institutions, although he is careful to point out that a republic may exist in substance without democratic forms.

No recent writer has done so much to commend the scheme as Léon Bourgeois, who played a leading part in the judicial discussions of the Hague Conference. His definition of the essence of the scheme is that the nations should agree upon a code of national rights and bind themselves as a whole to enforce it. This would correspond to the conditions under which internal order is maintained by civilized states. The other presupposition of the preservation of peace is effective machinery for enforcing decisions.

Can we have a viable peace save under the reign of justice. To have material peace it is necessary to have first realized the political peace, and there cannot be political peace if the rights of any are felt to be, or really are, menaced. Rights must be determined before they can be guaranteed.

The project of world peace as it is often interpreted guarantees these rights is the essential condition of the establishment and the maintenance of peace.

The project was translated into a political institution by the Treaty of Versailles, which, incorporating the Covenant of the League of Nations, came into force on its ratification by Germany and Austria, and by three of the principal Allied and Associated Powers.

General Scope.-(a) Ends.—Promotion of international cooperation and achievement of international peace and security. (b) Means.—Acceptance of contracting parties of obligations not to resort to war, prescription of open, just, and honourable relations between nations for the establishment of understandings of international law as rules of conduct, maintenance of justice, and settlement of disputes. (c) Membership. — (1) Original members—those named as signatories and those named who shall sign within two months. (2) Additional members—such as may be added by agreement on the strength of a two-thirds of the vote of the Assembly, and on acceptance of the obligations of the League and special regulations of the Assembly (art. 1). (b) Organization. — Assembly and Council (art. II). 1

1 Douvier, ed. 1889, v. 256—258; 2 Kappnholz, Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Abseits (Gemeinswelt Schriften, Berlin, 1905, v. 24.)
3 / 3.
4 P. 18.
5 P. 19.
6 The Covenant of the League of Nations with a Commentatory thereon presented to Parliament, June 1919.

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Assembly—Membership—representatives of the members of the League. Time and place of meetings—stated and occasional. Council—representatives—any matter with determination, or action affecting the peace of the world. Voting strength—each member to have one vote, and not more than three representatives (art. 4). 2. Council—Membership—representatives of the principal allied and associated members, and of four other members to be selected by the Assembly—in the first instance Belgium, Brazil, Greece, and Spain. Representatives of other members may have a permanent seat and a vote, and additional representatives may be increased. Time and place of meetings—stated and occasional. Council—Organization of the League when their interests are interfered. Voting strength—one member one representative only and one vote (art. 4). 3. Decisions of Assembly and Council, unless otherwise provided for, to be unanimous. First meeting to be summoned by President of the United States (art. v.). A permanent Secretariat at the seat of the League. Expenses to be shared by the members and officials (art. vi.). Seat of the League—Genena in the first instance. No sex disqualification for offices (art. vii.). 4. Reciprocal relations in the case of the Allied and Associated Powers. 5. Peaceful settlement of disputes.—Disputes likely to lead to a rupture to be submitted either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Council. 6. Arbitration.—(a) Suitable matters—interpretation of a treaty, alleged facts constituting breach of the Covenant or international obligation, extent and nature of reparation for injury, (b) court to be specially agreed on, (c) undertaken to abide by award, (d) Council to make rules for carrying out the award. International Court of International Justice a permanent institution. Its functions—to arbitrate as requested, and to advise the Council (art. xiv.). 7. Inquiry.—(a) Failing agreement to arbitrate, members agree to submit the issue to the Court of International Justice by action. (b) One party may effect the submission to the Court. (c) The Council, in order to effect a settlement, if the Council does not succeed, it will publish a report of its findings (whether unanimous or by a majority); if the award is unanimous, the members agree not to go to war with the power complying with the recommendations; if there is no unanimity, members are free to take such action as they deem necessary to maintain right and justice. No report shall be made on a matter which by international law falls within the domestic jurisdiction of a state (art. xv.). 8. Sanctions.—Penalties for a refusal to war in breach of art., xii., xiii., xv., (a) Economic boycott. (b) Employment of armed force contributed by the governments on the recommendations of the Council. (c) Material support, financial, economic, and military. (d) Expulsion of the members by the members of the powers of a covenant-breaking member (art. xvi.). 9. Disputes.—Maintenance outside of the Covenant of the League. Such powers are invited to act as if subject to the obligations of members, and to be dealt with accordingly. If both parties refuse, the members shall take such recommened action as will prevent hostilities (art. xvi.). 10. Open diplomatic relations. All future treaties and international agreements to be registered and published (art. xviii.). 11. Advisory and preconfinator function of Council.—Advises members to recommend inapplicable treaties and to consider threatening international conditions (art. xix.). 12. Inconsistent obligations and understandings.—Abrogation and release therefrom to be sought (art. xxi.). 13. Treaties of arbitration and regional understandings directed to be suspended—especially Monroe Doctrine (art. xxx.). 14. The mandate.—(a) Application—to territories by powers held by war to and backward or immature races. (b) Mandatories—two or more. (c) Economic boycotts. (d) Employment of armed force and are willing to accept it. (e) Types of mandates—to give administrative advice and assistance (e.g., to former portions of the Turkish Empire) to the state in possession of, to consider for order and morals, and the grant to other nations of economic advantages and commerce (e.g., in S. Africa), to administer territory as an integral portion of an empire (S.W. Africa, Oversea). The mandates to make an annual report (art. xxxi.). 15. Wider aims of the League.—Improvement in the conditions of labor and the improvement of native races, and the lessening of the struggle and the opinion and liquor traffic, and of trade in arms, secure freedom of communication, the prevention and control of disease (art. xxi.). 16. International Bureau and matters of kindred concern to be placed under the direction of the League (art. xxxii.).
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Humanitarian agencies to be encouraged and promoted (art. xxv.).

O. Amendment to the Covenant—to take effect when ratified, a member dissenting having the remedy of withdrawing from the League (art. xxv.).

The Covenant of the League of Nations is founded on a skilful compromise between the dictates of ethico-political theory and considerations of political expediency. Of the two elements of the combination, the lower was necessary if it was to come into existence, and the development of the higher may safely be left to the future as its custodian and trustee.

The Covenant embodies provisions and regulations which involve a notable advance in the moralization of international relations. That the leading nations should form themselves into a confederation whose object is the preservation of the peace of the world on the basis of justice and right; that they should pledge themselves to refer their differences to arbitration, or at least take advice about them, and renounce the resort to arms until the resources of reason and conciliation have been exhausted; that they should agree in principle to the limitation of their armaments, and be willing to discuss with one another concrete proposals for a reduction; that they should consent to keep one another informed of treaties they may conclude; that they should assist any member threatened with aggression; that they should be willing to give protection to states against continuance of breaches of the peace; and that the League should have conciliatory functions are all provisions meriting the description of progressive and statesmen-like. The League, it is believed, will succeed in creating a world state, and the Covenant, with its novel and original provisions, is destined to become the basis of international law.

The Covenant recognizes the political sovereignty of states and their independence and equality, and provides for the protection of the smaller states against aggression. It is claimed that the Covenant contains nothing to conflict with the principles of national self-determination. The Covenant provides that the League may be dissolved by any fifteen of its members, which is a strong security for the purpose for which it is founded.

The protection of the smaller states against aggression, the right of nations to maintain a military defense, the protection of the peace of the world, the guarantee of the independence and territorial integrity of all nations, and the right of the League to act in case of breaches of its obligations form the basis of the League's constitution. The League is to be the arbiter of international disputes and the protector of peace. It is to be composed of states, each with one vote, and is to be governed by a council of thirty members, who are to be elected for three years. The council is to meet twice a year, and is to have the power to consider and report on international questions, to recommend measures for the settlement of disputes, and to make recommendations to the members of the League for the security of their territories.

The League is to be the arbiter of international disputes and the protector of peace. It is to be composed of states, each with one vote, and is to be governed by a council of thirty members, who are to be elected for three years. The council is to meet twice a year, and is to have the power to consider and report on international questions, to recommend measures for the settlement of disputes, and to make recommendations to the members of the League for the security of their territories.

The League is not to be a permanent organization, but is to be dissolved by any fifteen of its members. It is to be governed by a council of thirty members, who are to be elected for three years. The council is to meet twice a year, and is to have the power to consider and report on international questions, to recommend measures for the settlement of disputes, and to make recommendations to the members of the League for the security of their territories.
positive side is to persuade the nations to do more to bear one another's burdens, and to enrich one another's lives by reciprocal service.

'Of the constructive work we have an уверяю в earnest though it has already been given, is the conditions of labour in the communistic countries, and to the principles which have been laid down for the amelioration of the common lot. It will, moreover, obviously be the duty of the League, as encouraged, by every means in its power, the chief form, and one of its most useful contribution to the regeneration, not only the freest and fullest interchange in honest commerce of the products of the fields and the workshops of every continent and climate. I am therefore of opinion, at any time when a nation will seek to serve nation by imparting what the other may lack out of the manifold riches of a higher civilization.'

In its spiritual aspect this idea is not novel: it is an ancient possession of the Christian Church, underlying its enterprise of Foreign Missions, but little has been done to act on the idea in other fields. There is room for philanthropic schemes through which every civilized people as such will make an adequate contribution towards the provision of the rudiments of rational knowledge, and especially of modern medical skill, for the benefit of the savage and semi-civilized races of mankind. A great philanthropic opportunity was lost in the two years 1914-18, when the peoples of Great Britain and America might have agreed to ration themselves so that they might be in a position to release the necessary of life and some comforts for the starving populations of Europe. The response to the call of the Russian famine is, however, of good omen for the future. One very practical service would be to arrange that all manufacturing nations may have an adequate supply of raw materials. It may be added that the success of the League in developing the positive and constructive activities will be an important factor in determining the success of its efforts to avert armed conflicts. It is a law of human nature that an evil habit is best overcome through the expulsive power of a new affront, and, if the nations are to cease to have the desire to devour and plunder one another, it is imperative that, through reciprocal offices of service, they should learn to think of one another with kindly and grateful feelings, and respect one another as fellow-workers in the common cause of humanity.


W. P. FERSON.

WAR, WAR-GODS.

Gaelic (G. DOTTIN), p. 691.


Gaelic (Celtic).—At the time of the migrations of the Celts a war-god to whom the Greeks identified with Ares and the Romans with Mars, seems to have been the chief god worshipped by the Celtic tribes. Gods guide their migration and bear them on to a land and the territory destined for it; 2 to the gods they dedicate all or part of the booty in victory; 3 to them they sacrifice victims before the combat 5 and prisoners after victory; 4 in their honour they raise the war-cry.

1 W. P. Paterson, Recent History and the Cult to Brotherhood, Edinburgh, 1919.
2 Callim. iv. 173; Florus, li. 4; Sil. Ital. iv. 203-204; Ann. Marc. xxi. 6, 4.
3 Justin, xiv. 4, 3; Livy, xvi. 34.
4 Callim. iv. 173; Justin, xxi. 2. 1.
5 Dio, Hist. xxii. 13; Polyb. x. 22. 3.
6 Livy, xvi. 38.

Greek and Roman (E. A. GARDNER), p. 694.


The war-god to whom the Celts dedicated Roman arms in 203 B.C. is called Vulcan by Florus; 1 the one to whom the Gauls sacrificed men is called Saturn by Varro. 2 The ancient Celts probably had a goddess of war; this goddess has been identified by the Greeks with Ares and by the Romans with Minerva. 3 It was in the temple of this goddess that the Insulans kept their ensigns of war. 4

Cæsar gives us no more definite information; he mentions Mars third among the five chief gods of Gaul, and adds that Mars directs wars, and, after the issue is decided, the spoils are usually dedicated

1 Liv. x. 4.
3 Polyb. ii. 36. 2.
4 Justin, xxii. 5, 5.
5 Polyb. ii. 36. 2.

Polyb., ii. 36. 2.
WAR-GODS (Chinese)

1. To his; when the Gauls have carried off the victory, they sacrifice all the living beings that they have taken and gather the booty to one place; in many of the tribes heaps of war booty may be seen in the sacred places. 1 We must come to the GalloRoman inscriptions of Gaul, Great Britain, and the central Europe—with the Celtic epithets which there accompany the name of the god Mars—to get an idea of the variety of the war-deities of the Celts. The oldest of these have been found, 15 of Apollo, 7 of Jupiter, and 5 of Minerva: we can count 50 of Mars; and these epithets of Mars are particularly numerous in Great Britain. Some of them have a local meaning, in which cases it is not certain that we have to do with a Celtic god; we may be in presence of local cults of the Roman god Mars. But of the 40 epithets that remain after the local epithets have been deducted 8 are used alone as well as along with the name of Mars—e.g., Toutatis, which is probably a variant of the name Tautatis; 2 which scholars of Lucan elsewhere identify with Mars, and the god Esus, also mentioned by Lucan. They are probably, therefore, the names of the cults of the war-deities assimilated to Mars. As regards the others, it is probable that at least a number of them also indicate Gaulish deities. And it is impossible to ascertain whether the few that do not denote war-goddesses. Further, Mars Lucnctius is associated in two inscriptions with Nemeton, who is undoubtedly a war-goddess, and Mars Cicaulus is associated with Litas, whose helmeted character is undoubted, since in an inscription she is replaced by Bellona as the consort of Mars. Dio Cassius 3 mentions among the Britons of the time of Boniface the worship of a goddess of victory, Andarta, to whom human sacrifices are offered, and whose name presents a close resemblance to that of Andarta, a goddess of the Vocontii, on whose territory have been discovered the majority of the altars of Victory that belong to Southern Gaul.

The information that has come down to us from antiquity is so imperfect that we can merely state that the ancient Celts had numerous gods and goddesses of war, and it indicates several details of their worship. But we have no figured representations of war-deities among the numerous Gallo-Roman bas-reliefs, unless we regard as such the horse-wrestling horseman of so frequent occurrence under his horse's feet the monster dragon. The characteristic symbols of the Gaulish gods—the wheel, the hammer, and the em—can hardly be interpreted as warlike. As for the attempts to explain by means of Celtic languages the names and epithets of the Gaulish gods assimilated to Mars, they supply only vague characteristics—Albiox, 'the king of the world,' Delataeodros, 'comely in slaughter,' Caturix, 'the king of combat,' Lencetius or Lucntius, 'the brilliant.' 4 We have no reason to believe that the Mars of Gaul had, like the Mercurys, many famous temples in Gaul. Doubtless, the Roman pacification allowed far fewer as possible of their cults to subsist. Nevertheless we find in an inscription of the Rhine valley mention of a temple of Mars Camulonius.

2. From the text of the Irish epic, which has preserved some details of ancient Celtic mythology, we may glean some notions of war-gods and goddesses, and etymology helps us to recover others. In Cormac's Blossey Néit is described as 'a battlegod of the Gauls.' The name of the captured Dé Danann, Nuada, has been identified with the Deen Mars] Nodons known from inscriptions from Great Britain. Nennan, the name of Néit's wife, has been connected with Nemeton, the Gallo-Roman goddess, consort of Mars; and the name of Nét has been compared to the first part of the name Nantosueta, associated in a Gallo-Roman inscription with the god Sceulius, 'the good striker.' 5 In the mythological cycle three fairy warriors appear—a kind of valkyries with the power of changing into animals—the first Morrigan; wife or granddaughter of Nét, or wife of Dagda, the second Macha, granddaughter of Nét, or granddaughter of Nét, all three daughters of Ermons, one of the Tuatha Dé Danann. The name Balb, which in Irish means a scald-crow, and which has a variant Bodh, has been compared to the second part of the name of a Gallo-Roman goddess [Cathub-bodhe, in Irish Badbh-catha, 'battle-crow.']

It is much more difficult to discover traces of the ancient Celtic gods in the tradition and literature of Wales than in the Irish literature of the Middle Ages. Nevertheless scholars are probably right in identifying Nudd, the father of Gwvyn, in the early Welsh cults goddess, with the demon Annwfn, with the god Nodons of Romanized Great Britain.

This, then, as far as the evidence of the ancients and the evidence of the British of the British enable us to reconstruct it, is the fragmentary pantheon of the war-gods of one of the warlike races of ancient Europe.


WAR-GODS (Chinese).—China has no god of war, if by that term we imply a belief in the existence of a divine being similar in function, characteristics, or divine attributes to Ares or Mars. This, however, is not inconsistent with the fact that war, in China as elsewhere, has usually kept itself in close touch with religion. We read in Tso's famous Commentary on the Chun Chi that the Chinese were wont to say that 'the great affairs of a State are sacrifice and war,' and the latter unaccompanied by the former was a thing unheard of. A Chinese writer has recently remarked that from the earliest historic times up to the date of the Boxers (and he need not have drawn the line there) his countrymen have never ceased to regard supernatural or spiritual agencies as constituting an essential portion of the national military equipment.

It is not surprising, then, that among the most ancient ceremonial rites mentioned in Chinese classical literature are those which were carried out during warfare by rulers of states and leaders of armies with the direct object of invoking the aid of the unseen powers and impressing the troops with the belief that those powers would protect and help them in the hour of battle. The two most solemn ceremonies in ancient China connected with war were known as the lei and the mua sacrifices.

Very few details regarding them have come down to us, and we cannot always be sure that the records we possess are altogether worthy of trust. It is clear, however, that the lei was a sacrifice to God (Tien or Shang-Di) and that it was offered on marched for state occasions. The ceremony could be performed only by the sovereign himself, because it was the 'Son of Heaven' who alone had the prerogative of offering war...
sacrifices to Heaven. It was not exclusively associated with war, but it was always offered when an army was about to be set in motion, and has been regarded as pre-eminent- ly a military sacrifice.  

The sea was offered on the field of battle or at the army's halting place. There is great certainty of its being a sacrifice to this god; the most probable view is that it was offered to Ti'en or Ch'ien; but that each minor divinity was also invoked or associated with that high deity—namely, the local tutelary god—has led to the concentration of armed forces into their private spheres of activity or who might feel outraged by the shedding of blood on soil that was uncultivated.

It is highly improbable that the early Chinese ever regarded warfare abstractly, as a quasi-institution, or that they ever felt the need of nominating a deity to preside over it as 'god of war.'

1. Kuan Yu or Kuan T'ai, 'god of war.'—Although it is not correct to say that the Chinese pantheon contains a Mars, there are several famous warriors who, having shown themselves to be stout fighters and unsellable patriots during their earthly lives, have been deemed worthy of having their names and 'spirit-tablets' enshrined in a kind of national Valhalla. Apart from the Temple of Military Heroes, just as the names and tablets of great sages and philosophers and other public benefactors have been enshrined in the 'Hall of Wonders' or 'Hall of the Emptiness.' It is the most celebrated of these national heroes who has been so often described as 'god of war' and as the 'Chinese Mars,' and, although neither term is strictly applicable, and the latter is certainly inadmissible, the former may be retained if only because it has passed into common usage among Western writers on China and because there is no very suitable term in our language by which it can be replaced. Whether he is a god, as the Japanese believe, or a saint or a patriot, however, the Chinese have never lost sight of the fact that their god of war was once a man like themselves and lived at an epoch when Chinese annalists do not consider very remote. Even now his manhood is by no means altogether merged in his divinity; and, though he is regarded as a worker of miracles and has certainly been the object of much superstitious devotion, this seems hardly sufficient to justify us in regarding him as more than a very potent saint.

Though dead heroes have always been honoured in China, and the custom of 'pilgrimage' to those who deserved well of their country either in peace or in war is a very ancient one, it was not till China had fallen into a state of military decadence that this distinctive cult of great soldiers began to take a conspicuous place in the religious life of the Chinese people. Kuan Yu had been dead about eight hundred years when the Sung emperors set him up as the central figure in a national cult that has lasted to this day.

Kuan Yu, a native of the village of Chang-p'ing in Hai-chou (Shansi province), was born A.D. 162 and died in 219. He lived during the time of disunion and strife that is commonly known as the period of the Three Kingdoms, and he is regarded as the most romantic figure in one of the most romantic epochs of Chinese history. Of abnormal size and strength, he distinguished himself above all his contemporaries by his prowess and by his heroic sense of honour. The influence of the drama, coupled with that of a great novel known as the Sun Tzu—both full of fantastic details which can have had little or no foundation in fact—have raised him to a pitch of popularity which is really independent of his position in the other arts of China, and the sonorousness of his name is accounted for by the total withdrawal of official recognition. His surname is unknown; for Kuan was merely adopted by him in order to conceal his identity during his flight from his native place after he had entered upon his career of glory by slaying a tyrannical official. The most admirable feature of this quaint occurrence is the association of two other celebrated characters of the period—Liu Pei and Chang Fei. The three became devoted and lifelong friends and are forever linked together in the Chinese mind as taking the famous 'oath of the peach-orchard.' The leader of the Three Kingdoms—that of Shu—was the descendant of the founder of the Han dynasty and eventually brought his sway to the throne of one of the Three Kingdoms—that of Shu. We therefore see the survival into the present century of the legend of Kuan Yu. After a brilliant career which was not too uniformly successful in his lifetime, he was canonized and declared the great 'God of War' in 1123, during the lifetime of Sun Ch'uan and executed. Twenty years or (according to another authority) forty-one years after his death he was given the posthumous title of Ch'ang Yu Hsun, 'Martial Magnificence,' and various other titles were added throughout the centuries.

There is some doubt as to the exact date upon which Kuan Yu first acquired the high-sounding title of Ti—a term which is usually translated 'god,' but for which the word 'emperor' is, in this and many similar cases, a more fitting equivalent. The generally accepted date is A.D. 1615, when the emperor Wai-Li bestowed the title of Hsien-Tien Hu-Kuo Chung-I Tu T'ai, 'In harmony-with-Heaven Protector-of-the-State Loyally and Righteous Great Emperor.' For some reason not much notice seems to have been taken at first of this addition to Kuan Yu's honours, for no record was noted of a ti, or 'Marquis.' This was brought to the notice of the emperor Hsiao Tung (T'ung Hsing) in 1624 issued an edict declaring that the commands of his late master Shih Tsung (Wan-Li) were to be carried out, and confirming the titles, including that of emperor, on Kuan Yu by that monarch. He went on to say that time to the present the 'god of war' has been generally known as Kuan Ti.

2. Yo Fei, hero of the Sung dynasty.—The figure of Kuan Ti looms far larger than life-size through a mist of romance created by the popular drama and by the great novel of The Three Kingdoms. When one reads the stories which tell of the adventures of the Chinese people long ago have been disputed by another great national hero—Yo Fei. This high-souled patriot lived and died nearly a thousand years ago, and his name has been much less time, therefore, for the growth of legends. As a historical figure, however, it may be questioned whether Yo Fei should be regarded as any more inferior to Kuan Ti either as soldier or as patriot.

Yo Fei was a native of the province of Honan. As a boy he was studious, but the natural bent of his mind soon showed itself in the fact that his favourite books were those which discussed warfare and military tactics, such as the Ping Fa of Sun Tzu, described by his recent English translator as 'the oldest military treatise in the world.' As he grew up, Yo Fei became a noted archer, and soon distinguished himself in martial exercise by his feats. The Golden Tatars, who at that time engaged in gradually driving the Sung dynasty from the plains of North China, had Yo Fei engaged by the Court and Government, it is possible that the invaders would have been expelled from China. Unfortunately he incurred the enmity of the powerful Ch'ien Kuei, who was the emperor Kao Tsung's trusted minister. It was this minister who was many years later put to death by the emperor, and the emotions of the Chinese people at the time of his death appear to have entered into a treasonous agreement with Wu Shun, a Tartar prince, to bring about a peace advantage to the invaders. Yo Fei earnestly desired to continue the struggle, and stoutly opposed the purchase of peace by a disgraceful cession of territory. When compelled to retire and leave the enemy in possession of the territory that he felt quite competent to defend, he made bitter complaints that the fruits of his ten years of strenuous labour had been destroyed in a single day. As a vigorous opponent of the peace policy, Yo Fei was regarded by Ch'in Kuei as a dangerous enemy. He caused charges of treachery to be trumped up against him and in 1141 convicted in having him arrested. Shortly afterwards Ch'in Kuei personally issued a secret order for his summary execution, which was duly carried into effect by the military authorities of the state that Yo Fei had died a natural death in prison. As time went on, and the true history of the events that led to Yo Fei's betrayal and death gradually came to be known among the people, and, though Ch'in Kuei lived fourteen years longer, loaded with the honours and titles of the greatest man in the land, he earned an immortal memory in infancy in his country's annals. On the other hand, the turbulent career of the warrior who fought so stoutly and showed his faith and honour with the passing of the centuries, and his temple, which is situated near the margin of the beautiful Lake Hwang-tse, outside the walls of Hainan, is
WAR, WAR-GODS (Greek and Roman).

3. The cult of military heroes or 'war-gods' under the Republic.—As Kuang Ti was specially venerated by the late Mancha dynasty, it would not have been surprising if the victorious revolutionaries had decided to treat that divinity with cold disdain and to abolish the official rites connected with his cult. The establishment of a nominal Republic has not had this result; but Kuang Ti's position is not precisely what it was before 1911. In the third year of the Republic (1914), Yo Fei decreed that 'the President (Yuan Shih-k'’ai) that the 'Military Temple' was to be devoted to the cult not of Kuang Ti alone but of Kuang Ti and Yo Fei and twenty-four other celebrated military leaders and patriots. Kuang Ti and Yo Fei were the associates, and the twenty-four others were to be regarded as their spiritual associates. Nothing was done to interfere with the existing Kuang Ti temples or their rituals; but a new temple was dedicated to Kuang Ti and Yo Fei and their associates. The temple chosen for the purpose comprises a large group of buildings immediately to the north of the palace of Prince Ch'ung Hsing, ex-prince regent and father of the young emperor Hsian Tung. It was erected by the imperial government about a quarter of a century ago and was intended for use as an ancestral temple for Prince Ch'ung and his family. It is more fitting to the spirit-tablets of Kuang Ti's table does not bear all his titles or the highest of them. He is merely Kuang Chuang Mu Hou, ‘Kuan the Marquis of Martial Dignity,’ the earliest of his posthumous titles. The designation on Yo Fei's tablet also consists of four characters—Yo Chuang Wu Wang, ‘Yo the Prince of Loyalty and Martial Prowess.’ On the east and west sides of the hall stand the tablets of the twenty-four ‘associates,’ twelve on each side, all well-known historical characters.

The reorganization of the cult of heroes was largely due to considerations of practical statecraft and national expediency. The main objects were to encourage patriotic ideals among the people, to raise the public estimation of the profession of arms, and to inspire the soldiers themselves with military zeal and professional pride. On the occasions of the periodic ceremonies appointed to be carried out in honour of the twenty-six heroes army commanders are required to be present and to bear white splints. Military Temple, so that they may be spectators of the rites and have an opportunity of showing their reverence for the memory of the great soldiers of past days. The troops are also expected to take oaths of allegiance and good conduct.

The first ceremony at Peking took place in January 1915, General Yin Ch'ang, as deputy for Yuan Shih-k'’ai, led his officers and soldiers to the newly established temple, and there they took the military oaths, which may be summarized as follows: (1) to be loyal; (2) to be obedient; (3) to protect the people of China from enemies; (4) to be ready to die for their country; (5) to be diligent and zealous in their duties, to respect their superiors and comrades, and to be true and upright in speech and action; (6) to abstain from taking part in political movements and from joining political societies or parties. The ceremony is as simple as it is impressive, and, though Christian missionaries have asserted that it fosters superstition and shows in a painful manner the backwardness of our national life, it has been approved by the Government, 1 such complaints show a curious lack of sympathy and understanding. The religious significance of the cult is, indeed, very slight. The soldiers are not called upon to subscribe to any dogmas or beliefs regarding the powers or functions supposed to belong to the objects of the cult, nor do they prostrate themselves before any idol. They are merely expected to bow the head as they file past a row of wooden tablets bearing the honoured names of those who fought and in many cases died for their country. 2

Surely no more fitting place could be chosen for administering the military oaths of loyalty, obedience, and self-sacrifice than a building which has been dedicated to the memory of the heroes who are believed to have been the highest Chinese embodiments of those ideals.

LITERATURE.—This has been indicated in the footnotes. A large proportion of the material has, however, been taken from untranslated Chinese sources.

R. F. JOHNSTON.

WAR, WAR-GODS (Greek and Roman).—Greek.—The importance of war in early communities must always have been such as to bring it into close connection with the worship of war-gods.

In fact we usually find that it is one of the chief functions of any god to help and protect his people in war; and that they regard it as a matter of the highest importance to secure his approval for any such enterprise. In civilized warfare the conventions and rules generally observed, such as the sanctity of heralds and other envoys, or the inviolability of a truce, were also under the protection of the gods. But the ritual of declaration and conclusion of war was not so highly developed among the Greeks as among the Romans.

A curious instance is recorded by the scholiast on Eur. Phaon, 1377, who states that before truce was invented torches were used as a signal at the beginning of a battle; these were borne by two priests of Areus, one from each army, who were alone inviolable. Here we seem to see some approach to an international sanction under divine authority; another custom is that the truce is always allowed by the victors.

1 This sentence occurs in an account of the ceremony as held in a provincial city. See North China Daily News (Shanghai), 7th Oct., 1915.

2 A short account of the proceedings at Peking appeared in the North China Daily News, 20th Jan., 1915. Similar ceremonies have been carried out in several other cities in Peking and in the Provinces. The spring ceremony in 1910 took place on 30th March, and in Peking the President (Hsin Shih-ch'ang) was represented by the general who had attended the proceedings on behalf of Yuan Shih-k'’ai.
to the defeated army for collecting and burying the dead.

A typical example of a truce between combatant armies occurs in the Iliad, where a solemn sacrifice is made, and over it Ares is invoked and the gods on whoever may break the oath; but the gods are those who preside over the oath rather than over war.

In these cases both parties alike appeal to the same gods; in them we see merely a particular application of the principle that the gods, and Zeus as the chief god, enforce honour and mutual faith in all relations between strangers.

Examples like these are not, however, concerned with gods of war as such. The function of a war-god was above all to give victory to his own people, and to preside over such preparations as were likely to lead to it. These functions are sometimes attributed to a special deity, but more often to the chief god, or to the god who takes any town or people under his particular protection. Conversely, it might be an effective measure to withdraw from the enemy the protection of their own special divinity.

A good example is the secret expedition made by Odysseus and Diomedes, a number of the Trojan prisoners of war-goddess of Troy, because its presence prevented the capture of the town. A clear and instructive example of the gods to whom offerings were sacrificed occurs in a tradition found at Delphi, in which the Selinuntians say 'they are victors by the aid of the following gods—Zeus and Athena, and Hera and Poseidon and the Tymbalids (Dionysus) and Athene and Malephoros (Demeter) and Pankrateia (Persephone) and Ares and all the gods but above all Zeus.'

Here are to be noted the reiterated insistence on the predominance of Zeus in this capacity, and the placing next to him on the list of Phobos—here properly to be regarded, like other epithets of gods in the list, as a name for Ares himself rather than as a satellite of his. Some of the other divinities in the list are elsewhere regarded as especially given of victory to their devotees; but the whole is probably to be regarded rather as an enumeration of the chief deities of the State cultus.

In the Homeric poems we constantly find the gods not only as givers of victory and as strong partisans of one side or the other, but also as actually mingling in the fray among mortal combatants. This, however, though it applies to all the other gods, is not true of Zeus, who decides the issue by his will and imposes it by his emissaries. So in all great national crises or deliverances due to a successful war the victory is ascribed to Zeus, especially the divine helper of the Tyrones (Liberator). Thus at Platea, in commemoration of the decisive victory over the Persians, games called Eleutheria were celebrated at the altar of Zeus Eleutheros, and a race between men in armour was the chief event. An emblem of this power of Zeus is the agias (q.v.), which he lends to Apollo to turn the battle against the Greeks, and which is constantly worn by Athene. It has the power of causing terror and flight among those against whom it is shewn, and is used only by these three deities. All three have a specifically warlike side. Apollo was honoured in the festival of the Boehroidia, an offshoot of the Pythian festival at Delphi, both of a warlike character; he was especially the leader and giver of victory to the Dorian. After the Persian wars all the Greeks who had participated in the struggle set up a common thank-offering to him at Delphi. The same victory was attributed by the Athenians to their patron goddess, and commemorated in offerings or statues on the Acropolis and the Plateans who shared in the battle of Marathon set up, from the share of the spoils, a temple and statue at Platea to Athenian Ares as goddess of war. Another epithet of Athena which was probably of a warlike character was Nike, goddess of victory. Athene Nike had an altar to the east of the bastion south of the entrance to the Akropolis and guarding its approach; on this bastion was erected, in the time of Perikles, the little temple which commemorated in its relief the victories of the Greeks over the Persians. The goddesses we see to have been more impersonal, and rather less Victory' by a misconception; as a form of Athene she was distinct from the winged figure of Victory so common in Greek art of all periods. This latter, moreover, was a mere impersonation, whether in the games or in war. She has no separate cultus before the time of Alexander, and no place in mythology. She is placed on the hand of Zeus or of Athene in their great statues, and is regarded as their satellite. Winged victories are often to be seen crowning victors—but usually athletic, not martial ones—making sacrifices, and decked trophies. Famous statues of Nike are set up to commemorate victories in war—the best known are that by Praxiteles dedicated to Zeus by the Messenians at Olympia, and that from Samothrace, now in the Louvre, placed on a ship to record a naval victory of Demosthenes against the Athenians. It has been rightly observed that she is in each case represented as the messenger rather than the giver of victory. Trophies, set up on the field of battle, were discriminated as dedications of war to the god to whom the victory was ascribed. They were protected thus by a religious sanction, for they appear usually to have been respected even when set up in enemy territory.

The deities so far mentioned preside over war only as one of their activities, and as a necessary part of their protection and help to their chosen people. In Ares, on the other hand, we recognize a specialized god of war. It has indeed been suggested that his functions were once of a wider character, perhaps among the Thracians or some other foreign people; but there is little trace of any such character in Greek mythology or ritual. Some confusion has arisen in this matter from the misleading identification of Ares with the Roman Mars. Ares fares but poorly at the hands of the poets from Homer down. In the Iliad he is wounded by a mortal and overthrown by Athene. Sophocles actually calls him 'the god unhonoured among gods;' and the aid of other deities is implored against him; and this not as the war god of an adversary, but essentially as a god of horror and evils of war and pestilence. He is thus essentially the destructive god, delighting in slaughter; yet his worship, so far as we can judge, does not appear to have any connexion with the ritual and belief associated with terrible 'chthonic' powers or the possible spiritual influence which could arise from such belief. On the other hand, the name of Ares often occurs in conventional expressions and epithets applied to warriors implying military prowess; but in such cases it seems to be used as an impersonation of war rather than with any mythology of war. So too in expressions like 'Ares destroyed him' in an epitaph, or, in a hymn to Apollo, 'He stayed the Ares of the Gauls;' it even seems as if the name of Ares was used by preference as a symbol of the power of the enemy. One of the earliest and best attested shrines of Ares in Greece, that on the Areopagus at Athens, was said to have been founded by the Amazons, terrible women warriors of foreign origin who were defeated by Theseus. Whatever the origin of these beliefs, it seems in all these cases to represent the brutal and barbarous or 'barbarian' side of war, which is overcome by the Greeks with the help of their gods of ordeal, and with fate. Such an impression is confirmed by the legend that tells of the Herakles, 1

1. C. Michel, Recueil d'inscript. grecques, Brussels, 1860, no. 1246. 2. Il. xx. 299.
the typical Greek hero, by the aid of Athene, slew Kyknos, the son of Ares, in spite of Ares' attempt to support him. Ares indeed takes his place among the gods in their usual assemblies, and in such common exploits as the battle against the Giants; but even here he does not perform a leading role.

Ares is associated with a goddess Enyo (cf. his epithet or by-name Enyalio), who, however, has little mythical personality. His association with Aphrodite (which was given a scandalous turn by the poets from Homer down) is probably due in many ways to some of his god-like aspects as consort, who was identified, e.g., with the armed Aphrodite worshipped at Corinth—very probably a survival from primitive worship. Phobos, or "Fear," is either his satellite or another name for himself, rather in the sense of Terror, but is a mere impersonation, though sometimes represented on shields and similar objects—possibly originally with the magic intention of inspiring terror in the enemy. There are also demons of battle or strife who delight in slaughter, Eris (Strife) and the like; and Keres, demons of death, who drag away the corpses of warriors; but these belong to popular fancy, and it is in the poetic that their usage is most frequent. A curious myth about Ares is that he was bound in a pot for twelve months by the Aoadii.1 Similar stories of the binding and hiding of a monster, for a similar brief period, are to be found else; a similar notion is found in the binding of Satan for a thousand years (Rev 20).

To sum up, the gods who presided over war in Greece fall into two classes: those who gave the civilized art of war and the tempered civic courage exalted by Aristotle and other Greek moralists, and Ares, who inspired "the brute battle-rage," with which the Greeks had little sympathy.2 With the advance of ethical feeling in religion, the latter became the representative of the spirit of destruction and of barbarian rather than Hellenic warfare, though his cult still survived in many cities.

2. Roman.—In the religious usages of war, and in the beliefs as to war-gods and the practice of their ritual, Rome differs from Greece in two respects: (1) Mars, the specialized war-god, was also in many ways the chief national god, and so differs widely from Ares, with whom the Romans identified him; and (2) the ritual and observances of war were far more elaborate and more definitely prescribed, to a great extent under the charge of special priestly officials.

In addition to Mars, Janus, Jupiter, and Quirinus are concerned with war, though not as their special function. Janus, as the spirit of doorways, is usually first among gods to be invoked, in connection with every going out and coming in. His temple in Rome appears to have consisted of two doorways, with a kind of court between them. Here an image of Janus, with a head facing each way, was set up as guardian of the threshold. But this statue probably belongs to a later stratum of belief and ritual; originally the doors themselves were the symbol or even the habitation of the god. This temple was open in time of war and closed in time of peace—a custom which has puzzled mythological speculators alike in ancient and in modern times. The virgin in their usual assembly, and in that of the gods, rose up; within the doors stood bronze images of Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva; and the door opening, Horace suggests the bar of the slant in Janus, the guardian of peace. Virgil at least records the custom, common to other Latin towns as well, that the king or king-elect should formally open the doors as a declaration of war. An explanation that has appeared probable to modern mythologists, as to Ovid,1 is that the door was left open during an expedition so that there might be no obstacle to the return of those who had gone forth. The practice was formally closed during the reign of Augustus for the first time but one since the reign of Numa.

The worship of Jupiter was also in many ways associated with war. The most apparent example is in the case of the spolia opima, which consisted of the spoils of an enemy leader slain in single combat by the leader of a Roman army. These are said to have been first dedicated by Romulus in a temple to Jupiter Feretrius which he established for the purpose. In this temple was kept the sacred stone, Jupiter Lapis, which was taken with them by the Fates when they went out to ratify a treaty, and by which they swore on other solemn occasions. The god was probably in primitive times thought of as immanent in this stone and in the oak-tree on which Romulus hung the spoils. The rites of war connected with this primitive temple were later eclipsed by those of the great temple of Jupiter Capitolinus. This temple is especially associated with the celebration of the triumph which was the highest honour that could be conferred in general. The most remarkable feature of the triumph was that the general was actually invested with the insignia of the god, borrowed from the temple for the purpose for which it had been painted with vermilion, in imitation of the image of the god. He proceeded from the Campus Martius through the Forum to the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus, and there deposited the spoils from his fasces and the laurel branch which he carried on the knees of the god, thus assigning to him the glory.

The worship of Jupiter Latiaris on the Alban Mount belonged to the Latins generally rather than to Rome in particular; but it was adopted into the Roman State cultus. The celebration of the Feriae Latinae in his honour was the first duty of the consuls on their assuming office; and military disasters were attributed to its omission. A triumph was celebrated on certain occasions on the Alban Mount in honour of Jupiter Latiaris, especially by generals who had not obtained the Senate's sanction for a triumph in Rome. Other epithets of Jupiter which are obviously of a military character are Victor and Stator. There appear to have been three temples of Jupiter Victor in Rome, one dedicated on a spot near that of Jupiter Stator on the Palatine, on the spot where the flight of the Romans before the Sabines was stayed, was attributed to Romulus; it was renewed in consequence of a vow in battle against the Samnites. Jupiter was also worshipped in various forms as protector and giver of victory to the emperors on their military expeditions; and in the later imperial age the imperator is often portrayed with the attributes of Jupiter—an extension of the practice followed earlier in the case of a triumphing general.

The most important priestly college connected with the military side of the worship of Jupiter was that of the fates, who were concerned with questions of international faith and the sanctity of solemn pledges made in the name of the god. Their special function was the demands for reparation in cases of international offences, the declaration of war, and the conclusion of peace and of treaties. They had the inviolable character of sacred envoy, and carried with them on their expeditions the sacred stone and relics; they were invested with the imperator's and the pontifex's prerogatives, and were seated on the sacred chair, and on the gilded throne. Their spokesman was the pater patrum. In demands for reparation (clavigum) they had the authority of ten consuls. If by the thirty-day satisfaction was not given, war was declared. This was used to menace the enemy over the enemy frontier. When this in later times became impracticable owing to the distance of some military expeditions, a parcel of land near the temple of Boileus in Rome was estab-
tunately converted into enemy soil, its boundary being marked by the columna bellorum; and the spear was cast into this instead. A war-deity always had certain formalities which called upon the people until it was raised by the fetailes with a special form of sacrifice. In all these observ-
ances Mars was regarded as the guardian of interna-
tional faith and honour rather than as a war-god; but they are closely associated with war as supplying the religious sanction which success could not be expected. The fetailes naturally acquired some knowledge of international law, and doubtless drew up a code of law on that subject.

It has been much disputed among mythologists whether Mars should be regarded as specifically a war-god; the opinion now prevails that, although this side of his functions was prominent in early times and predominant in later, it was not the most primitive or the most important. Mars appears to have been a god of the land, not only in Rome, but also in many other Italian states. It is noteworthy that he had no temple within the pomarium at Rome. This is explained by some authorities as indicating a notion that his presence was undesirable or a desire that civil strife should not exist within the land; but it is more probably connected with other notions than that he was god of the town, of the country both cultivated and wild, especially the latter. As for this supposed desire to protect his worshipers when they ventured out on warlike expeditions. Similarly the spring and autumn ceremonies in his honour, such as the dances of the Salii with the sacred shields (scutum), are by some associated with the beginning and end of the campaigning season, and so with the activity of the war-god. But it has been pointed out that similar dances occur among many peoples in connexion with the cult of the powers of vegetation or the processes of agriculture at the most critical seasons of the year, and were intended to arouse the sleeping forces of such powers, or to avert or exorcise malefic influences. This may well have been the original meaning of these dances in honour of Mars, though they doubtless acquired a war-like meaning in quite early times. Though Mars had no temple within the city of Rome, sacred objects connected with his worship were preserved in some of the most ancient shrines in the city. The spears of Mars (hasta Martis) were kept in the sacrarium in the Regia, at the foot of the Capitoline, and were carried on warlike expeditions. Hence it was thought appropriate to enter on a campaign with the words: 'Mars, vigilia'; these were evidently regarded as the symbol of the god, who was in early times probably thought to be immanent in them; their spontaneous
ous shaking was regarded as a portent. In the Hall of the Salii on the Palatine were kept the sacred shields. These were of a very ancient pattern similar to those used in the Mycean age in Greece. One of them was believed to have fallen from heaven in the time of Numa; and the safety of the city was thought to be dependent on its preservation, as in the case of the Palladium at Troy. Numa had eleven other shields made to match it; and these were annually carried round various altars in the City by the Salii in the month of March; they were ceremonially purified and purified and placed on the altar of the Salii in October. The Salii on their way executed a kind of war-dance and beat the shields with sticks. Another ceremony in honour of Mars which was given in later times a warlike significance was that of the handicapped horse; the running horse in a race was sacred, and his head fixed up on the Regia, though too late investigators see a rite originally agricultural in intention. The sacrifice took place at the altar of Martis in this manner.

The identification or contamination of Mars with the Greek Ares, and the universal tendency of poetical mythology, led to Mars being more and more regarded as the god of war, the protector of Roman arms, and he is said to have sown the vineyard. At the conclusion of a treaty or truce at the end of a war the consul could only make a spolia, or agreement, which did not possess the same sanction as a war treaty. The fetailes naturally acquired some knowledge of international law, and doubtless drew up a code of law on that subject.

While the Greek Ares, and the universal tendency of poetical mythology, led to Mars being more and more regarded as the god of war, the protector of Roman arms, and he is said to have sown the vineyard, the traditional connexion with Mars was the ver sacrum, which was decreed to him in times of pestilence or disaster. In accordance with this the Marsian temple was erected on a site where a born within the succeeding spring were to be sacrificed or devoted to the service of the god. In the case of human beings this devotion took the form of being sent forth beyond the boundaries of the State. Hence arose cults of Mars, under whose guardianship the land was said to have been born to the god by Rea Silvia, show an anthropomorphism alien to primitive Italian religion, and are probably of Greek origin.

Another Roman or rather Italian war-god is Quirinus, who was later identified with Rômulus. He seems to belong to the Sabine settlement on the Quirinal Hill, though he came to be adopted as one of the chief gods. He and Mars do not apparently represent the same force. Mars had the more formidable or citizen side of the god, as Mars Gradius represents the warlike side; but he is expressly identified with Enyalios or Ares. It is significant that the three classes of spolia opima were offered, the first to Jupiter Penetras, the second to Mars, and the third to Quirinus.

Other minor divinities connected with war have little mythological significance. Bellona had a temple in the Campus Martius, which was dedicated after a vow made in battle in 296 B.C.; close to it was the columna bellorum mentioned in connexion with the fetailes. She seems, however, to have been placed more as a personification of Mars' mother; and her cult is of no great importance. She was later identified with an Asiatic warrior-goddess, or with the old Sabine Nerio. Nerio is by some writers regarded as the consort of Mars, but Nerio of Martis is more likely to be explained as a warlike strength or courage of Mars—an aspect, so to speak, of the god's manifestation. In later times Victoria, Virtus, and other impersonations were frequent, the latter being a goddess of war.

It is obvious that, in important undertakings such as military expeditions, sacrifice and divination would play a prominent part; especially among a people who, like the Romans, showed extreme anxiety to keep in right relations with divine powers. These, however, need not be more than mentioned here, since they are fully treated under their proper headings. A remarkable instance of devota is that in which, at a critical moment of the battle, a general 'devotes' himself and the enemy's forces.

A well-known example is the case of P. Decius Mus in 340 B.C. Here the devotion was said to be due to a dream; but the rites and formula provided by the pontifice maximus seem to show that the act had official precedence. The case of Cn. Eras at Athens is similar. Decius Mus was instructed to address in his devota 'Janus, Jupiter, Mars, Quirinus, Bellona, the Lares, the Gods Neapolitan and Indigetes, the gods of his own people and the enemy, and the Manes.'

The formula is instructive, as giving in accepted order the divinities to whom the result of war is ascribed; and these are here regarded as sources as to the order assigned to war-gods in Roman religion. It is noteworthy also that the national gods both of Rome and of the enemy are invoked; the invocation of ancestors, and of the gods of the enemy, as well as of the gods of Veii and Carthage, the national gods of the enemy were
invited to desert his city and transfer themselves to Rome. In all these matters, as in all other Roman religious life, we find an elaborate and highly developed ritual, with every possible safeguard against unintentional oversights. The personal character of the gods concerned comes to be realized only gradually in the case of those who were in the presence, but it is so strongly developed in later literature that it is by no means easy to recover the primitive meaning of the various rites and of the divine powers who were invoked from the first century B.C. onward.

The signs (signa) of Roman troops and the eagles (aquila) of the legions were objects of religious worship to the Roman soldier. The "birthday of the eagle" was celebrated as that of the legion; the "genius of the signa" is mentioned in inscriptions. We read in Livy of an oath "by the signa and the eagle," and in Tacitus of a commander who saved himself from the fury of a mutinous legion by "embracing the signa and the eagle and putting himself under the protection of their sanctity." In camp they were placed in a kind of small chapel. At Rome they were kept in the Aterrimus; hence it would seem that their sanctity was due rather to military feeling than to any official recognition or early sanction.

I. BABYLONIAN.—I. War.—The quarrels and feuds between rulers of early Babylonian city-states were the beginnings of strife which later developed into the elaborate warfare of the Assyrians. The king or head of the city, originally the patriarch of the clan, was the centre of all public life. As priest he was the sanga, as representative of the god he was the puttesi, and as war lord he was the bairra. Wars were begun by him and were carried on under his direction. But all wars were really the affair of the gods. 2 Warlike operations were usually of a military nature. But as early as the time of Samson-iluna, who in the first years of his reign led the Babylonian army against the Persians, himself and his men were the heroes. From Persia partly on land and partly by the use of boats, the Assyrians, indeed, although not seamen themselves, built a navy with the aid of Phoenician boat-builders, and Sennacherib employed Phoenician sailors in the pursuit of Merodach-baladan across the Persian Gulf. But the Neo-Babylonians not only had developed a great merchant fleet, but also had become a considerable naval power.

From the earliest times in Babylonia the support of warfare was considered a public obligation, and the military unit (the sarna) into which the body of troops were expected to furnish money to pay for a fighting unit. The army was recruited by conscription, each district being responsible for its quota. This militia, called the samitli, or summons, was placed at immediate call by the king. The levy (dilinu) was under the direction of a special officer, called the ragera, who saw to it that no liable person escaped, and, if a man so far forgot himself as to harbour a defaulter from the levy, he was put to death. All estates had to furnish troops at the command of the king, who could even impress the produce of the land and could also commandeer labourers for civilian purposes. By the time of the 1st Babylonian dynasty there is evidence of a regular standing army of professional soldiers, recruited partly from natives, but mostly from Amorites and other peoples of the inhabited places of the conquered territories. The body-guard of the king consisted of most trustworthy native soldiers. In the absence of the king the troops were led by the tartarum, or commander-in-chief, who often conducted the military campaigns. The Assyrians of these officers were formed a semi-caste of a military character, were paid with land, a house, and a garden, were assigned sheep and cattle, and received in addition a regular salary. But they were always at the service of the king, conducting especially the works of mobilization. In case of capture every effort was made to procure their ransom. Soldiers were well paid, were rewarded with land and a cow, and good discipline was observed among them. They were divided into cavalry and foot-soldiers, and a careful register of them was kept. The whole army was divided into companies of thousands, hundreds, fifties, and sometimes tens. In Assyria the army was still more highly developed until the time of Assurbanipal, who had created a fighting machine which has never been seen before. The military unit in Assyrian times was the bowman, who was accompanied by his pikeman and shield-bearer. According as Assyria became more and more a conqueror of foreign peoples the cohesion became the aim, and the house, as in the case of Sargon II., exempted certain cities from the obligation of the levy, as in the case of Asurbanipal, and depended upon her vast numbers of mercenaries, hired from conquered countries. The Neo-Babylonian army was modelled on that of Assyria, making extensive use of hired troops.

The steles of Vultures, which depict the successful war of Esarhaddon, in the name of his god Ninurta, against Umma, gives an excellent idea of some of the materials of war in that early period. In one battle, in which 3600 men (or perhaps 3000) men were slain, the troops were drawn up in a solid phalanx with long spears, protected by huge shields. The javelin-bearers carried an axe, and were protected by shields which were borne by the soldiers in the front rank. Each shield protected a soldier. The shield-bearers formed a galaxy of leather with bosses of metal, as were also the conical helmets, which extended down the neck, and were worn furrowed and criss-crossed with earlaces. A chariot is represented on the stele, but it was undoubtedly drawn by asses, for the use of the horse was not known till the time of Ashurnasirpal. Military standards made their appearance in early Babylonian times. The royal weapons consisted of a long lance or spear, and a broad sword in the left hand, and a bow with earlaces. Naram-Sin is represented armed with battle-axe, bow, and helmet. In his chariot the king carried a flat-headed axe and a number of light darts, acme fitted with double points. It was Dungi of Ur who adopted the bow as a national weapon. 1

WAR, WAR-GODS (Semitic)

After the introduction of the horse by the Kassites the cavalry took the place of chariots. Chariots were still used, but only on ceremonial occasions. Even when used, the horses were more ornamental than useful. The cavalry at first used only the bow and spear. But in the last phase, and the horseman was furnished with a complete coat-of-mail. In Assyrian times industry was divided into light and heavy-armed troops. The light troops included the chariots, equipped only with a kite and a fillet round the head—and were armed with spears. The heavy troops were equipped with cuirass and helmet, a long fringed robe (over which was a cavassara), and a peaked helmet; they carried a short sword and were furnished with a large, rectangular shield of wicker-work covered with leather. Infantry were usually divided into archers and spearmen. Sometimes an army would travel on camel, carrying the heavy-armed and light troops. The Assyrians fought with metal weapons. Their spear-heads and arrows were usually of bronze, mere rarely of iron; their coat-of-mail consisted of bronze scales, sewn to a leather shirt; and many shields were of metal, though others were of wicker-work covered with metal. The army was supplied with abundant wagons for transportation of baggage, food, furniture, tents, ladders, and battering rams; and much skill was expended upon the building of canals and fortifications.

Wars were waged very often for the sake of booty and spoils, and the usual demand made by the victor of the vanquished was payment of tribute. The favourite method of attack was by surprise, but, when that was impossible, a frontal assault was made. Many inducements were offered the foe to come being more common than the proclamation of the prowess of the reigning king; but very often a third party intervened to bring about peace and conclude a treaty, as in the case of Muslim of Khish, who was instrumental in settling a dispute between the kings of Umma and Lagash. Peace was declared and a treaty made.

2. War-gods.—The Early Babylonians, like other primitive folk, peopled their world with gods. Filenments of men were given to them, vegetation, storms, war, and all the forces with which men were brought into frequent contact—was the abode of gods or demons, and usually they were war-gods, wearing the costumes and armed in the same manner as the heroes of the population. Around the abode of the gods men gathered and formed a settlement, which was often called after the god, just as Shuruppak was named from the god Shuruppak. Such a deity was always a war-god, and often the people depended upon him for defence. War was not incompatible with the character of a god, for did not Ea and Apsu, Enil and Tiamat, Marduk and Tiamat, engage in deadly warfare? So, too, in ancient warfare, it was because their gods were at feud, and because their gods had ordered the strife. The war between Umma and Lagash, as told on the Stela of the Vultures, was waged by the command of the god of Umma upon the territory of Ningirsu, god of Lagash, and Ningirsu, backed up by Enil, joined battle. It was Zamaua, god of Khish, who achieved victory over the land of Khamuzi, just as it was Ashur, the great Assyrian war-god, who won military fame for Assyria.

And, when peace was declared and treaties were made, it was the gods who did it, for Moslem records the treaty of peace which the gods of Umma and Lagash themselves had drawn up. The city-gods were thus the real kings and rulers, and so the very title potesi, borne by early rulers of Babylonian states, designated them as representative, even their state-god, for it was a religious title. This explains how it happened that certain Babylonian kings, desiring to enhance their own power, assumed the title of ils, +god+; and, when a king felt himself powerful enough to risk the displeasure of his own god, he would appeal to the god of a city other than his own, when the petition was for something which the foreign god alone could provide.

Whenever, as often happened, two or more settlements amalgamated into one city or state, the various gods sometimes amalgamated, transferring the title of war-god. However, as a war-god, Enil was originally a war-god, yet when, by amalgamation, a state acquired a pantheon, only one of the members of that pantheon, as a rule, retained the title of war-god; it was sometimes carried on in the name of that particular god. And so it was that, while the Babylonians of the period of Hammurabi recognized many gods, Marduk was the war-god +par excellence, although Naban was also recognized as a war-god. The following are the Babylonian and Assyrian deities who retained more or less of their warlike characteristics.

Enil, son of Anu and chief god of Nippur, whose temple was the mighty Ekur, was originally a storm-god, and he had his origin and home in a mountain. Although he is most commonly known as a storm- and vegetation-god, he was also, as astron deity, the war-god and patron of the war-god, Enil, was the head of an early Babylonian pantheon, +king of the gods, +father of the gods, +husband of the great goddess Ninlil. But he never lost that attribute which made him the most powerful Babylonian gods, viz. +warrior. He was the +mighty warrior, +and, as such, retained his place as supreme war-god when Nippur, his own city, became mighty. Among all the other cities that came under the sway of Nippur no one possessed a war-god as powerful as Enil, and so Enil, the son of Anu, and consequently solar deity, became the official war-god of Nippur. No one could hope to fight victoriously against Enil; hence his fame as a great warrior-god. As all gods were represented by symbols, as seen on the numerous +kudurru, or boundary-stones, so Enil was symbolized by his weapon, an +ensurming net which encircles the hostile land, and is pictured carrying away his enemies who are entangled in his net.

Istar, or, according to the Sumerians, Ninl or Ninluna, was daughter of Enzu, and +mistress of the lands, She was also +mistress of heaven and earth, and had her home in Uruk. The word +Istar +is Semitic, and perhaps indicates that she was of foreign origin; it was, however, the idol of the free town, +tree, +wood. She was considered a solar deity at a very early period, and is referred to as the +light of heaven and earth. But with the passage of time she assumed other attributes. She was the mother-goddess +par excellence and the goddess of love; she was identified with Venus as the +queen of heaven; she was the patroness of law and order; she was the razing storm that devates heaven and earth; and she and Tammuz were associated in a way suggesting the female and male principles of life. But more than all else she was +mistress of battles and +mistress of war and battle. She is the +mustatiibflk hishika, the +beaker of the bearers of arms, the goddess of battle and warfare, who goes by the side of the king, favourite one, the terrible one of his enemies. Her warlike +attributes comprised:

1 After Hammurabi's conquest of Rim-Sin, and his control of Sumer, Enil, the chief Sumerian deity, lost of many city-states, surrendered his chief attributes to Marduk.
4 If A iv 27, no. 4, 58.
5 G. Thureau-Dangin, Die sumerischen und akkadischen Königslisten (Mittellandische Zeitschrift für Assyriologie, 1907, p. 74) and 77.
6 Of xxvii, 971.
character is excellently brought out in Asurbanipal's dream. As a war-goddess she is frequently (and as early as 3000 B.C.) depicted on seals, where she is usually represented with clubs, scimitars, bows, and other weapons, leading captives before the king. In the Gilgamesh epic Istār is a war-goddess, and in the time of Hammurabi, and more especially in Assyrian times, she was 'mistress of war and of battle.' As Assyrian war-goddess she occupied the place of the consort of Assur and was the special war-protector of Assyrian kings. Asurbanipal's description of the warlike Istār is famous, and, when he founded his capital at Nineveh, he established there the cult of Istār of battles. In fact, the goddess became so popular in warlike Assyria that she was identified with three great shrines, Nineveh, Arbela, and Kidnmu, and became sometimes three separate goddesses, although usually only two, because of the comparative unimportance of Kidnmu. There was an Istār of the north as well as of the south—a differentiation which resulted in the belief in a male and female Istār. As a male Istār was the morning star, and as a female she was the evening star. To the very end of the Neo-Babylonian dynasty she was the war-goddess, who carried order and bow and flew to battle like a swallow. Her symbol as war-goddess was the lion and the five- or eight-pointed star Sirius, but sometimes she was symbolized by a bow. Istār, as goddess of war, was identified with several of their chief goddesses especially Ištah, who was 'lady of conquest' and 'lady of victory over the lands'; Innīn, who, originally a goddess of light and the star Venus, because of warlike qualities, was identified by the Sumerians as a conquering deity; the 'lady of battle,' and was represented in a standing position leading a captive by a string inserted in his nose, her symbol being the bow; Anūnī, who was worshipped as a goddess of battle at Agade and Sippar, of whom Nabonidus said that he built a temple to Anūnī, the lady of battle, that she bears bow and quiver, who executes perfectly the command of Enlil her father, who exterminates the foe, who annihilates the evil, who walks before the gods, who at sunrise and sunset renders favourable my omens. She is also identified with Antu, a heavenly deity, whom Hamurabi calls the Astar of Agade, and with Aīšā, a goddess of light and of war; with the warlike Nīnī, to whom Kānauhum on the Stela of Vultures dedicates the victory; with Nānā. Marduk, the 'first-born son of Ea,' was originally a solar deity, but his warlike character became prominent in the time of the Hamurabi dynasty, when his city, Babylon, became great. When the creation legends were recast, during this same dynasty, Hammurabi's war-god (often addressed as such in hymns), Marduk, was the warrior-hero who slew Tiamat, the spirit of chaos. He became so great that he outlived all gods with him. His greatness outlived the Assyrian empire, when he was called Bel-Marduk, having absorbed the characteristics of the old Bel, second son of the god Anu, enemy of Assur, and lived on till the end of the Neo-Babylonian period. He is often pictured as a warrior with semicircle, and his symbol was the flaming sun.

Nergal, son of Enil, was originally god of the midday or scorching sun, and was often identified with Samas. He then was associated with disease and death, and from that he developed into a war-god. As such he was called Marduk a ša ḫabbû, 'Marduk of war,' the lord of spears and bows, ur-aṣṣīr karradû, 'the warrior, the great sword-god,' and, as destruction that accompanies war, he was identified with the planet Mars. He first became known as a war-god during the Hamurrabi dynasty, and continued so throughout the Assyrian and Neo-Babylonian periods.

Ninib, son of Enil and god of Nippur, was originally a god of fertility. The daughter born of Ea, she was a vegetation- and water-god. As early as the Hamurabi dynasty he was called Marduk a ša ālûti, 'Marduk of strength,' and in Samsuiluna's reign he was called 'the great warrior.' He is also addressed as 'mighty god, warrior, ruler of the Annunaki, controller of the Igigi.' In a text translated and discussed by Pinches in PSBA xxvii. (1906) 203-218, 270-253, Ninib is fully described as a war-god of the mountains. He is called 'the lord, the destroyer of the mountains, who hath no rival,' 'the warrior who is like a steer'; and he is said to collect his army in order to spoil the land of the enemy. In Assyrian and Neo-Babylonian times, especially the former, Ninib continued to be 'the destroyer of the king's enemies' and 'the mighty one of the gods.' He was symbolized as a wild bull, as a double-headed vulture, and later as an eagle.

Nin-šarratu, son of Enil, and god of Nineveh, was usually called Nin-šarratu, who was also identified in this rôle with Ninib. On the Stela of the Vultures he is shown clubbing the enemies of Lagash, whom he has bound in a net; and he is symbolized by the divine storm-bird. Nin-gisíkida, son of Enil, was prototype of the great protective god of Gudea, was perhaps also a war-god, although no reference to him as such has been found. Nin-sakh, prototype of Ninib, and Nin-sī, called also Nin-du, are also thought to have been war-deities. Ramman, whose ideogram is IM, and who is identified with Adad, Mer, and Ishkur, was known as early as the time of Hammurabi as a 'warrior,' although he is the storm-god, he is also thought to have been war-deities. From the time of Hammurabi, however, he was recognized as a war-god, except...
in Assyria, where he played just one rôle, that of god of storms. In Babylonia he was associated—e.g., with Tur-lil-en, patron deity of Kish, as war-deity, and was pictured with a club. 1 Samân (Sumerian Babbar), although the sun-god par excellence, was known as ‘the conqueror of foreign lands,’ 2 and as such was a war-god, whose weapon was a great mace. 3 But the case was a Kassite god of war, whose symbol was the midday sun, and, therefore, a destructive power like Nergal. Tur-il-en, a Neo-Babylonian deity, was described as ‘the break of the warner’ 4 and the carrier of war. 5 Zama-nâma, patron deity of Kish, was early associated with Istar as a war-god, 6 and was called Marduk ta tenub, ‘Marduk of battles,’ 7 as well as ‘the king of battle.’ 8

Asur, the great god, Assyria’s war-god par excellence, was originally a solar deity, his symbol representing a sun-disk with protruding rays. Then he developed into a god of fertility—a corn- and water-god—and finally became a war-god. According as Assyria became more and more militaristic, so Asur’s attribute as war-god became more and more all-absorbing, until he became the dominating character in Assyrian religion. His divine city depended upon the location of the royal residence, and from there all warfare was carried on in his name. His popularity was due to the fact that war, which is always associated with mighty weapons (bakkha donna), and is he who protects the troops. 9 The disk as his symbol was surmounted by the figure of a war god.

II. EGYPTIAN.—I. WAR.—While some classical writers say that Egypt was divided among the king, priests, and warriors, others assert that from the beginning Egypt was a peaceful country. At any rate, it can truly be said that the Egyptians never admired a military career, nor were the conditions under which they lived favourable to the development of a military nature; e.g., Egypt was shut in geographically from the rest of the world; there were no great peoples in her neighbourhood to contend with, and no fertile lands within her reach to covet. Nevertheless, from the very first Egypt was called upon to wage war. Her literature attests this, and her earliest none standards are, in all probability, military in character. Pre-dynastic and proto-dynastic monuments, such as the Palette of Nar-Mer, preserve evidence of victory, and Uri, a noblesman of the VIIth dynasty, tells of important wars (although they are the only known important ones of the Old Kingdom) carried on against the Bedawin in the time of Peqi. 10 There were other military expeditions during this early period, and by the time of Sesostris III of the XIIth dynasty rather formidable armies were mustered. Yet, when compared with the wars of later periods or with those of Assyria, these military expeditions of the Old and Middle Kingdoms must be pronounced mere razzias—raids for loot, slaves, cattle, gold, etc.

Nor was the period of disintegration which followed the XIIth dynasty conducive to the growth of militarism. But the conquest of Egypt by the Hyksos (q.v.) breathed a new spirit into the land. The foreigners must be exterminated, and Egypt proved herself, under Ahmosè I., equal to the occasion. Thenceforth she began her career of conquest under the empire-builders, Thoutmose III., Seti I., Rameses I., 1 II., and Rameses III. She became a great military power, and took up the offensive against her erstwhile enemies, while Assyria was embroiled in a military caste, and for a while the military profession ranked high. Her military character, however, was not enduring; the Egyptians lacked that gallantry and chivalry which are essential to a truly military character. There it was the fact that the Egyptians were as destructive to the living and as savage to the dead—whose corpses they often mutilated—as other peoples, although Diodorus 3 seeks to excuse their cruelty. 4

Norse were the Egyptians a naval people, although they possessed considerable fleets of merchant ships, which navigated the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the Nile. But the same great national crisis which developed a strong army and a shortlived liking for conquest developed also a navy. When Ahmosè I. attacked the Hyksos, he did so by sea as well as by land. Of course there were warships before his time. Uni escorted his flotilla of merchants from Elephantine down the Nile to Memphis; Khetti II. of the IXth dynasty had ships; and Sesostris III. re-made a canal in the Fayum with which warships could pass. By the time of the XVIIIth dynasty a real navy had developed, and was employed in connexion with the campaigns in Syria. Although the Egyptian, as a rule, was an enemy of sea, the first king to recognize the true importance of the navy was Rameses III., who established a fleet in the Mediterranean and another in the Red Sea. The naval battles of this king are splendidly pictured at Medinet Habu. With the exception of the battle with the Hyksos, 2 the battles of Rameses III. are the only real naval conflicts known to Egyptian history. The navy, like the army, soon deteriorated, and never more played any important part in Egypt, not even in the time of Cleopatra, who is credited by Orosius 3 with a fleet of 170 large ships.

Egyptian religion never condemned war. The most ancient of Egyptian wars were among the gods themselves or between gods and men; and so Egyptian kings in making war claimed divine example. The Egyptians named all wars revolt, because they were presumed to be against the Egyptian gods. The duty of the king was to avenge the gods of impurity, the word for ‘impurity’ (anotic) being the same as for ‘enemy.’ 4 In short, all wars were supposed to be wars of supernatural, and sanctioned by divine precedent.

In earliest Egypt there were soldiers who were selected from all parts of the political district, and, as early as Pepi I., conquered territories were compelled to contribute men in case of war. But there did not exist an army in the modern sense of the term. In the Middle Kingdom there were professional soldiers who were called ‘followers of his majesty.’ They were divided into companies of 100 men, and they garrisoned the palace and the strongholds of the royal house from Nubia to the Asiatic frontier. They were the nucleus of a standing army. In case of actual war, the great nobles, or nomarchs, sent their quota of men, whom they had carefully trained, armed with bows and arrows. Then there were contingents supplied by the estates of the great temples, besides mercenaries of friendly chiefs. These armies were often called upon to do guard duty, as in the case of the army of Sesostris I., which was employed in the defence of the Delta. With the rise of the Empire, and as a result of the Hyksos overlordship, a regular army was gradually developed. It had

1 S. A., p. 206.
2 Off. xxxvi. 120.
3 Justrow, Aspects of Belief, Relics, p. 103.
4 King, p. 47.
5 See Doer, J. Hein, Iris bibliothek und die babylonische Gotheitslehre, Leipzig, 1913, pp. 89-90.
6 L. Drenn, Ancient Records of Egypt, Chicago, 1905-07, i. 211-215.
two grand divisions, composed of experienced troops who had learned tactics in Syria. These two grand armies were divided into divisions, each division named after a god — e.g., Amen, Ra, Ptah, etc. The infantry and cavalry were drawn to the battle-hallows at Abydos, and the warships to those of Thutmose III. At once, therefore, it was expected that the necessary arms and equipment were ready, and that the eastern vassals would not be cast into prison for debt, and was expected to provide himself with the necessary arms and everything requisite for a campaign. If he were brave, distinctions and other signs of honour were showered upon him, and, as a result of his service, the mercenaries were employed, and these were allowed to retain their own arms and customs. The peoples most commonly engaged to fight the wars of Egypt were the 'Nine-bow Barbarians' from Nubia, the 'Sharadana' from Europe, the Libyans, and the Syrians. The last-named were so frequently employed that the term harer-srij, 'young Syrian,' became a synonym of a soldier. Most of the mercenaries of Ramses III. were mercenaries, and after his reign these men were so much accustomed to the country that they in turn as foreigners conquered and dominated Egypt — such were the Libyans, the Sudanese, the Persians, the Greeks, and the Romans.

In early Egypt some soldiers carried a large bow, had one or two ostrich feathers on their head, and a narrow band around the upper part of their body; others carried a large shield and a spear, or a small shield, over which skin was stretched, and a battle-axe; still others carried no shield but had a large axe, a lance, and a sling. During the Empire regiments of light infantry carried a golden, a lace, and a long spear; the heavy infantry bore spears and a curved sword. The cavalry were armed with the battle-axe, and most of them and the charioteers were armed with lances, while bronze helmets were worn, although a more common head-dress was a helmeted cap, the colour of which depended on the regiment, some with fringes, others with tassels. The archers were the most important soldiers in the army. They were divided into companies, which were drawn to the chariot and tassels. They wore quilted helmets with coloured tassels. The arrows were about two and a half feet long, and were of wood, and tipped with metal. They sometimes carried an axe or boomerang. The cavalry were not known till the Hyksos period, for it was these Semites who introduced the horse into Egypt. Thenceforth chariots drawn by horses and cavalry became very popular. Shebokk is reported to have had 60,000 horses in his army which marched into Palestine.

The weapons of the earliest Egyptians were very simple. At first they consisted of large stout sticks. But later the offensive weapons were bow, spear, javelin, sling, sword, dagger, knife, falchion, axe, and club; defensive arms were made of a sand which was hardened, or quilled head-piece, coat of armour, and shield.

The Egyptians fought best behind walls, and many forts were therefore built in Egypt, especially at the Second Cataract and on the north-eastern boundary of Egypt. Towns were fortified, such as Peliumon, Syene, Elephantine, Sennub in Nubia; and Thutmose i. fortified the island of Tombos at the Third Cataract, and swimming pools for the campaigns of the Eighteenth dynasty. All sorts of siege, such as scaling ladders and battering-rams, for transportation, such as wagons and baggage-trucks, and for communication, such as wagons, chariots, tables, and chairs, and tables, were provided. Each company had its own standard, which was held up by a regiment and furnished with musical instruments, usually trumpets and drums.

The only Egyptian campaign conducted on any definite plan was that of Ramses II. against the Hittites. But there is evidence of the use of a great deal of strategy in the manoeuvres of the soldiers of Thutmose III., and especially in the way in which Joppa was taken by Thutyi. Armies of Ramses II. were drawn up in battle-order in a grand manner, and the line was composed of phalanxes, and the left was extended as far as the wing, centre, and flanks. The Egyptian inscriptions afford an excellent idea of the way in which Egyptian battles were fought. As a result of these conquests, the Egyptians were left free for skirmishing and for flank movements, such as those which were so well carried out at Kadesh by Ramses II. The Egyptian phalanx became so famous that Cossus used it most effectively against Cyrus.

War at all times and especially under the Theban monarchs was a means of procuring slaves and booty. The Egyptians divided the prisoners into different classes, and these were sold under the name of the group of which they were members. In the battle of Kadesh, which was fought before the Asiatic conquests, although ransom seems to appear as early as the civil wars which preceded the XIXth dynasty. In order to prove to the king the completeness of victory, warriors who were prisoners were cut off the head and sometimes the heads 1 of the vanquished and placing them in heaps before him. But the Egyptian was always glad when peace came and a treaty was drawn up. The most famous treaty in Egyptian history, and the most detailed known to the ancient world, was that drawn up between Ramses II. and Hattusil II. the Hittite king.

2 War-gods. — Originally seven social groups had their gods and every god was in some sense a war-god. When smaller groups amalgamated into larger cities and nomes, the gods of the constituent groups amalgamated into the god of the most powerful unit in the group, just as Sekhet and Hathor were absorbed into Amon of Thebes, and to him were ascribed the characteristics of the absorbed gods. If the age was warlike, one of the attributes of such a deity would be that of war-god. Whenever the age and location were warlike, the war attribute of the deity reeded into the background. Thus it is that previous to the Hyksos period there are no prominent Egyptian war-gods. But as a matter of fact, the Egyptians were warlike, and sometimes the heads of the vanquished and placing them in heaps before him. But the Egyptian was always glad when peace came and a treaty was drawn up. The most famous treaty in Egyptian history, and the most detailed known to the ancient world, was that drawn up between Ramses II. and Hattusil II. the Hittite king. Did not Horus battle with Set, and did not every king, as son of Horus, have to fight the god's enemies? The fierceness of the wars with the Hittites was due to the fact that Egypt's gods were at war with the hated gods of the Asiatics.

The following deities, almost all of whom are foreign, are the war-deities known to Egyptian literature. Aseth is usually represented as a woman armed with shield and club, riding a horse into the battle-field. She is a war-goddess of Senitic origin in whom W. Max Müller sees the counterpart of Esen. A seti i. at Rodesiyeh, on the road to the gold-mines of Mt. Zalabir, connects her with the desert. Amon-Ra, one of the primeval deities of Egypt, whose chief seat of worship was at Thebes, became very prominent as a war-god in the XVIIIth dynasty as a result of the victories of that pharaoh. An-horet, or Anhur, local god of Abydos, was god of the dead, but was also represented as a man standing with a spear in his raised hand. He was a warrior.

1 Lepsius, iii., 129.
2 W. Max Müller, Der Bündnisertrag Ramses i. und des Choltekerkönigs (Myth. ii. 3), Berlin, 1906.
WAR, WAR-GODS (Semitic)

god, and as such became identified in the Greek period with Ares. *Anat*, 'queen of heaven, mistress of the Asiatic plains of war. She was the same as the Sumerian An, with Semitic feminine termination, Antu. She is represented as sitting with a spear in one hand and swinging a battle-axe. She is probably the same as Astarte. 

*Anthyt* was a Syro-Phoenician war-goddess, represented with shield and spear in the right hand and club in the left. Her cult was associated with N. and S. Syria and Lebanon was Turboth. She was named after her—e.g., Seth-Ántht, probably another name of the same goddess, is known only in late sources. She was worshipped at Antiochopolis, and was represented as a warrior or hunter with a high feather on her head and clad in Roman armour. *Ánthrtyt* of Apollinopolis was introduced into Egypt in the XVIIIth dynasty. She is the same as Astarte, a Syrian war-goddess, and was depicted as a lion-headed human figure, driving a chariot drawn by four horses over her prostrate foe. *Asit* may be another form of *Ánthrthyt*. Bár, or Pu-Bár, was a Syro-Phoenician war-god, the Baal of the OT. He was introduced into Egypt in the XVIth dynasty. Originally he was the personification of the burning and destroying heat of the sun and of the blazing desert wind. He was worshipped in the temples of Times, and was the favourite of *Hammurabi*. Another, the *Sjrja*, was depicted with a club in his right hand and a spear in his left hand. As a war-god he appears in the XVIIIth dynasty. *Hér-Bhuqet* is a form of Horus, under which he was worshipped with Set or Typhon. *His* symbol is the Sphinx at Gizeh. Another form of *Horus* is *Hér-Sept*, the smiter of the Mentu, and god of battle; and still another form of Horus, who 'loved an hour of fighting more than a day of rejoicing,' is *Hér-Thémá*, the piercer, and, as such, a god of war. *Mafet* is a war-goddess, whose symbol is the sign 'to follow,' *Amun*. *Menthu* was an ancient Egyptian war-god, whose seat was at Thebes. He was represented in human form with a bull's tail and head of a hawk. His head is surrounded by a sun-disk between double plumes. Sometimes he is depicted as a hawk-headed sphinx. He is represented with bow and arrows, a club, and a knife. He is seen on the prow of the sun-boat and slays the demon with his lance. He was an old local god, a personification of the destructive heat of the sun, but in later times he became *Mentu-Rá*. He was *Hammurabi* 's patron-war-god. *Neith* was worshipped in the Delta in pre-dynastic times. While she was, at an early period, a personification of a form of the great rain primeval war-god, she was later represented with bow and arrows, and as such was considered a war-goddess as well as a goddess of the chase. *Nephebet* and her twin-sister Uatchet were destroyers of the enemies of the gods. *Reshpu*, or *Resheph*, had his centre of worship at *Hét-Resheph in the Delta, but was an imported Syrian deity. In *Egyptian* texts he is called 'lord of the two-fold kingdom of the name of the gods.' He is represented as a warrior with spear and shield in the left hand, and club in the right hand. As his Semitic name shows, he was a personification of the burning and destruction of fire and lightning. *Sekhmet, or Sekhet*, 'the powerful,' is represented wearing a solar disc on her head, symbolizing the warlike attributes of the sun. She was called *the fiery one emitting flames against the enemies* of the god, and her duty was to scourge and consume the enemies of her father. *Up-Uaut, the opener of the way,* was originally a war-god, who opened the way for troops through the enemies' land. He is sometimes represented in the prov of the bow and arrows.

III. HEREW.—I. War.—Although the ideal of the great prophets of the 8th and 7th centuries was peace, war was approved by the prophets of early Israel. The Hebrew people were not unwarlike, and with them, as with other Oriental peoples, war was sanctioned by the deity. From the earliest to the latest times in the history of Israel Jahweh fought for His people, and they followed Him to battle. Before battle oracles were consulted to learn Jahweh's will; 2 prophets of Jahweh were appealed to for guidance; and prayer was offered up to Him before the attack. Jahweh Himself was identified with the war of the Xlth and Xllth dynasties. Originally he was the personification of the burning and destroying heat of the sun and of the blazing desert wind. He was worshipped in the temples of Times, and was the favourite of *Hammurabi*. Another, the *Sjrja*, was depicted with a club in his right hand and a spear in his left hand. As a war-god he appears in the XVIIIth dynasty. *Hér-Bhuqet* is a form of Horus, under which he was worshipped with Set or Typhon. *His* symbol is the Sphinx at Gizeh. Another form of *Horus* is *Hér-Sept*, the smiter of the Mentu, and god of battle; and still another form of Horus, who 'loved an hour of fighting more than a day of rejoicing,' is *Hér-Thémá*, the piercer, and, as such, a god of war. *Mafet* is a war-goddess, whose symbol is the sign 'to follow,' *Amun*. *Menthu* was an ancient Egyptian war-god, whose seat was at Thebes. He was represented in human form with a bull's tail and head of a hawk. His head is surrounded by a sun-disk between double plumes. Sometimes he is depicted as a hawk-headed sphinx. He is represented with bow and arrows, a club, and a knife. He is seen on the prow of the sun-boat and slays the demon with his lance. He was an old local god, a personification of the destructive heat of the sun, but in later times he became *Mentu-Rá*. He was *Hammurabi* 's patron-war-god. *Neith* was worshipped in the Delta in pre-dynastic times. While she was, at an early period, a personification of a form of the great rain primeval war-god, she was later represented with bow and arrows, and as such was considered a war-goddess as well as a goddess of the chase. *Nephebet* and her twin-sister Uatchet were destroyers of the enemies of the gods. *Reshpu*, or *Resheph*, had his centre of worship at *Hét-Resheph in the Delta, but was an imported Syrian deity. In *Egyptian* texts he is called 'lord of the two-fold kingdom of the name of the gods.' He is represented as a warrior with spear and shield in the left hand, and club in the right hand. As his Semitic name shows, he was a personification of the burning and destruction of fire and lightning. *Sekhmet, or Sekhet*, 'the powerful,' is represented wearing a solar disc on her head, symbolizing the warlike attributes of the sun. She was called *the fiery one emitting flames against the enemies* of the god, and her duty was to scourge and consume the enemies of her father. *Up-Uaut, the opener of the way,* was originally a war-god, who opened the way for troops through the enemies' land. He is sometimes represented in the prov of the bow and arrows.

1 *Cic.* 43, 4. To the same cycle of divine beings belong *Bitar* of Nineveh and Antu, mistress of horses, who was confounded with the Sumerian *Anu* and his son *Enlil*. All of them were known and recognized as war-goddesses in Egypt.

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prove the warlike character of Jahweh. He it was, as a warrior, who brought His people out of Egypt, and who drove out the nations before Israel; He revealed Himself to Joshua as the captain of His hosts; His angels led the hosts of Joshua and Barak, and gave David victories over Aram and the peoples round about. It is true that He was considered a mountain deity and was associated with Sinai-Horeb, and, as such, a storm-god, controlling and regulating the weather; He was "beau of the land, and therefore a vegetation-god; He was perhaps a lion-god, and an ox-god, and He was god of heaven and of earth; but He was pre-eminently "a man of war," whose peoples' victories were His "righteous acts," whose exploits were recorded in the "Book of the Wars of Jahweh," and whose favourite servant was the warrior David, a man after Jahweh's own heart; Israel's battle-cry was "the sword of Jahweh and of Gideon;" and Meroz was cursed because it did not come to battle, "to the help of Jahweh." The title "Jahweh Sebôth," whatever its original meaning, designates Jahweh as god of battles. The term "Sebôth" may have referred sometimes to the hosts of heaven. But warlike qualities were ascribed to the stars not only by the Hebrews, but also by the Babylonians. It may have referred sometimes to Israel as a people. But it certainly had reference to the title of Jahweh as leader of the armies of His people Israel. The term as used in the OT regularly denotes armies of men, and it formed the title of Jahweh as war-god. A similar title is found applied to the Babylonian Tîspak, who is called Marduk at ummanî, "Marduk of hosts," and Tîspak was a war-god.

Jahweh's emblem, as war-god, was an ark. Eleven of the occurrences of Jahweh Sebôth in the books of Samuel are connected with the ark. It was the symbol of the presence of Jahweh, and was perhaps a throne upon which Jahweh sat, when He was carried into war, just as the Babylonians carried their gods on thrones in processions. In fact, the ark was so closely associated with Jahweh, as war-god, that it was identified with Him, and was greeted as if it were Jahweh Himself.

LITERATURE.—With the exception of T. G. Pinches, 'The Babylonian Gods of War and their Legends,' 'PSAs xxviii. 1909' 252-255, and of a discussion of Nisibis mentioned in a separate article, monograph, or book on this subject. Besides E. A. W. Budge, 'The Gods of the Egyptians,' 2 vols., London and Chicago, 1906, and likewise the author has made full use of the original inscriptions. In the case of the Hebrew Bible, the Standard Dictionaries of the Bible have been consulted, besides Nowack and Benziger.

S. A. B. MERCER.
WATER, WATER-Gods (Primitive and Savage)

from the North Sea to the Euphrates, to celebrate the summer solstice. None of them, while they differed in some things, yet agreed closely in others; that in historical times a wave of Oriental influence, starting perhaps from Babylonian, carried the idea of such festivals, and the ritual connected with them, westward till it met with native forms of a similar festival; and that under the influence of this the Roman civilization developed a different yet kindred festivals fused with each other and crystallized into a variety of forms which more or less separately side by side, till the Church, unable to subdue them altogether, stripped them so far as it could of their grosser features, and thereafter changing the names allowed them to pass muster as Christian.1

In Mesopotamia the year is divided into two seasons—the rainy and the dry. The welfare of the country depends upon the abundant rains which continue uninterrupted for several months. In the earliest period to which the history of the Euphrates valley can be traced, a system of canals existed, serving the purpose both of irrigation and of avoiding disastrous floods. It is not surprising, therefore, that the early Babylonians regarded water as possessed of mana, and in later times that it became for them the abode of spirits and gods. Similarly, commerce, following in the wake of agriculture, would lend an additional importance to water as a means of transportation, which again would find expression in a cult of water-spirits. As the Babylonian deities, man's progenitors, these spirits would assume the role of gods ruling over the various functions formerly controlled by lesser spirits.2

Now, we know that Tamnuz was an ancient personification of the sun of the springtime, his name consisting of a Sumerian phrase Dumu-Zi, 'true (or faithful) son of the deep,' and that he was the first lover of Ishtar, the great mother-goddess. He became her consort, was slain by the goddess, and descended into the under world, while Ishtar went in quest of him. The promise made to her by Gilgamesh to present him with a chariot of lapis-lazuli, and to shelter him in a palace of plenty, unmistakably points to the triumph of the sun when vegetation is at its height. Tamnuz and Ishtar, like Gilgamesh and Ishtar, thus represent the combination of the two principles which bring about life, and upon their separation follow death and decay. It appears from the fragmentary documentary evidence that the early Babylonians supposed that every year the goddess went to 'the land of No-return,' and that during her absence man and beast alike could not discharge their sexual functions, so intimately was Ishtar associated with fertility. If Tamnuz was the personification of the hot sun, and if his return from the under world bore a direct relationship to the revivification of nature, it must have been intimately connected with fertility. But the close relation that existed between vegetation and the water supply in the Euphrates valley would inevitably lead to his association with a water cult, and to his rites being performed about midsummer.3

At the festival of Tamnuz in Babylon the image of the god was washed with pure water, just as in the summer festival the image of Adonis was thrown into the sea at Alexandria, and in Greece 'the gardens of Adonis' were similarly treated, to secure a due supply of fertilizing rain.4 But originally it must have been the mana in the water, and not the deity, that was regarded as the means by which the desert in the springtime was suddenly made to blossom as the rose. It was not that primeval man was so overawed by the miracle of spring, the radiance of the flowers, and the singing of the birds; it was not that his heart went out in gratitude to the High God who was the giver of life and fertility; he simply expected rain, and it was only after he had lived that he uttered and represented in his elaborate spring and summer ceremonies—the promotion of life and fertility in plants, animals, and man. Since then, and particularly the outstanding factor in the preservation of life and the growth of the crops, it naturally plays a conspicuous part in rain-making ceremonies and other seasonal rites among primitive peoples.

2. Water as a rain-charm.—Water is widely used in ceremonies for bringing rain.

In Australia, among the Arunta, a group of people have water for a rain-charm and men of them go from time to time by their alatunja, or leader (a celebrated rainmaker), and perform rites. In the rites that ensue water does not play a part, the ceremonies, according to Frager, representing a rising storm.5 Among the Kalahari, the spirits of water are goddesses, and personification is the totem of the spirits of water.6 Now, C.F. Jastrow, Zimmern, have been among the ancient Babylonians, who traced, in the Temple of Central Celebes, pictures of the rain, as the grave of a chief to procure rain. After that they hang a bamboo funnel over the grave, a small hole in the bamboo is pierced in the lower end of the bamboo, so that the water drips on it continually. The bamboo is kept re-filled with water until rain descends on the ground. Conversely, it is thought that to desire rain in the same manner is to cause rain. In the island of Celebes, the rain-doctor (tandu) assiduously avoids touching water during the spring. If by accident he comes in contact with it, he must bathe or wash himself, he drinks nothing but palm-oil, and, when crossing a river, he is careful not to step in the water. Should rain again be desired, he has deplorably wanted, he has covered himself with a hide on his face, and immediately the rain will descend in sheets.7 In India the rain-charm of the rain-maker had to 'drench' the deity and unite him with water by touching it three times a day as well as on various special occasions, to make himself, as they were, an ally of the water-powers, and to guard himself against their hostility. The Ita-thongs, a Bantu tribe in S. Africa, think that droughts are the result of the displacement of rain-charms by women. To procure rain they bury a pot in the ground and cause it to be filled with water by girls who have not ardently desired rain, the age of puberty, till it overflows into four channels which run in the direction of the cardinal points of the compass. The women then hold a rain-charm and pour water on the graves of prematurely born infants and of twins to 'extinguish' (tinsula) them, thereby restoring the cause of the drought to make rain.8

In S.E. Europe, at the present day, rain is made by pouring a call of water over a boy or girl clothed from head to foot in grass, flowers, or corn.9 H. S. Moore records a similar practice at Poona (India). When rain is needed, the boys dress up to one of them in number in nothing but leaves and call him 'king of the rain,' (mara'je). They then visit all the houses in the village, the householder sprinkles the rain-kings with water, and makes offerings of dates and wine. In Indonesia, the rain-maker substituted for a living person in the rain-making rites. The image, which was depicted on a bamboo, was drenched with rain, and carried by children in a funeral procession, with a burning candle before it. Finally, the coffin and candle are thrown into a stream, as they are in Egypt. In Indonesia, long sticks were dipped in water to procure rain, just as the Shans drench statues of Buddha with water when the rice-crop is in danger of withering from drought.10 In Arcadia, in the classical period, the priest of Zeus dipped an oak branch into a certain spring on Mount Lycaeus in times of drought, to cause the water to send up a misty cloud, from which rain would soon fall.11 The Athenians sacrificed boar, not as meat, but as the season began, because they imagined that the water in the pot would be transmitted to the gods, and return to them as rain.12

That the use of water as a rain-charm was directly connected with fertility is shown in the custom of clothing the person (or image), apparently the personification of vegetation, in leaves, corn, vines, etc., before water is poured on him. In support of this view may be quoted the European spring celebrations of St. George's Day.13 It is

1 SPG, p. 159 B, 8.; art. Rain.
5 A. C. Knijff, in Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal, Land- en Volkenkunde der Onbekende landen, 1910, i. 8.
7 H. J. Junghans, Der faahe, 1912, pp. 130.
9 The Country Evangelist, May 1908, p. 31 II F.
11 P. 307 f.
12 Pausanias, viii. xxxviii. 4.
13 Athenaeus, ii. 72, p. 65A.
Water, Water-Gods (Primitive and Savage)

difficult to avoid the conclusion that originally these rites were performed to promote vegetation, and secure an abundant food supply, just as, until quite recently, the gong is struck to cut at harvest in this country to procure rain for next year's crops.

3. Water in purification ceremonies.—Just as water is necessary to the course of the land during the process of fertilization, so it appears to the savage as the normal means of washing away material or spiritual pollution. As this subject has been treated separately,1 we shall here confine our attention to the ceremonial use of water, the universal cleanser, in ritual purification.

After childbirth and menstruation, and in fact after sickness generally, the contagion is removed by a bath, while the contagion of death and the sins of the penitent are often got rid of in the same way. It is a common belief that the effect of contact with a sacred object must be removed by washing before a man may freely mix with his fellows.

Thus the high-priest was required by the Jewish Law to wash himself and put off the garments which he had worn in the holy of holies, ‘from the camp forth to the east, and after offering his burnt offering’ (Le 16:4). Likewise Greek ritual decreed that the corpse must be washed after entombment and the explanatory sacrifice. Water must wash his body and his clothes in a river or spring before he entered a city or his own house.2 In like manner, among the Jews the ceremonial washing of the hands was decreed by a law of the Mosaic Law (Ezk 43:12, ‘defiled the hands,’ and called for an ablution.3 Among the Matabele of S. Africa, a priest before the people ate of the new fruits they went down to the river to wash, and before changing from one food to another the Ekkimis must wash themselves,4 as a kind of ‘rite de passage.’

(a) Childbirth. — Birth, the attainment of puberty, marriage, death are great personal events associated with the mysteries of life, and at these times the individual is especially exposed to mystic and dangerous sacred forces. A pregnant woman is, in consequence of her condition, a dangerous person and one to be avoided until all traces of her ‘sacredness’ have been removed. Similarly, a newly-born infant is in fullest contact with the sacred world, and, therefore, he is subject to attacks from malignant influences, from which he must be guarded by rites. Like his parents, he is unclean, and, in consequence, some form of regeneration is necessary to remove this original taint.

The mother and child among the Koryagkas of West India are ceremonially unclean for five days, when both are restored to purity by a yojid bath.5 The Hotentots considered a mother and child uncleon till they had been washed and their bodies anointed after the approach of the agents. Lustrations with water are common in W. Africa. The Mantras of the Malay Peninsula regard water as a cleansing vehicle, especially of infants. The river indigenous to the country of the Kuna is held sacred, and they bathe in it. The Ateke mid-wife washed the infant with the prayer, ‘May this water purify and whiten thy heart; may it wash away all that is evil.’6 The lustration speedily took definite form in the Mediterranean religions, and passed from the idea of washing away of defilement and sin to that of spiritual new birth. In the Isis rites the baptism with water was thought to raise the mortal to the divinity, although it is not clear that there was any ceremonial purification of the new-born infant with water in Greece. It appears that the rite called σινελούσα, in which the infant was carried round the domestic hearth, took the place of a baptism by water.

(b) Initiation and marriages.—Water is some times substituted for other purificatory rites (such as tatuating, setting the novice on a smoking fire, scourging, etc.) in initiation ceremonies.7

(c) The shedding of blood.—To the primitive mind nothing is more uncanny than the sight of death and blood are the great primeval mysteries, and all the substances that are associated with the inner principle of either partake of this sacredness.

For the savage what is sacred is also dangerous and a source of contumacious impurity. Therefore, when a man has shed blood, he is tabu until the ‘niawsa’ has been removed by purification rites.

In New Guinea, priestesses to the spirit called the ‘fruit spirit’ and the ‘tree spirit’ live in a hut a week after their return from battle, during which time they may not come in contact with their wives, and they may not touch food with their hands. On the 31st day of his seclusion the spirit who has taken life walks solemnly down to the nearest water, after having been washed, he ‘cleanses the spleen and liver of a kangaroo, and, standing straddle-legs in it, washes himself.’8 Among the Bantu warriors go straight from battle to a stream, where they purify themselves and their implements of war by washing away the tabu in the water, and putting themselves out of reach of the revenge of the slain.2 Similar rites are performed by the Akituru, in which the final ablutions consist in cleansing with water.2 In the Fijian isles the young warriors, on their return from their first fight, are shut up for three days, and then, after smearing their bodies with charmed leaves and honey, bathe together as near as possible to the spot where the killing took place.4 When a Fima Indian killed an enemy, he was tabu for sixteen days, and returned to the groves along the river bottom, and there, after smoking about the adjacent hills. During this period he was forbidden to touch his head or his face, and before he might go to his home he had to bathe in the river, no matter how cold the temperature.5

(d) Death.—Contact with death and the spirit-world is a strong source of impurity in primitive society and all the places where death is connected with purification rites. Bathing and purification are the usual modes of purification. See art. DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Introductory), vol. iv. p. 427, col. xiv.

(e) Disease.—Water is frequently regarded by primitive peoples as having the power to wash away sickness, especially if the disease is in the nature of skin eruptions. The healing of Naanan (2 K 5:9) reflects an ancient Semitic belief in the efficacy of water as a cure of leprosy. Of all inanimate things that which has the most marked supernatural virtues among the Semites is running (or, as the Hebrews said, ‘living’) water (cf. Nu 21:7, Ezkh 47:12). It is, therefore, not surprising that certain wells and rivers were credited with the power of healing.

In Babylonia a sick person was sprinkled with water while the priest pronounced certain sacred formulas, having the power of ‘cleansing’ a patient from sickness. The water was specially sanctified for this purpose, and was sprinkled over such sacred streams as the Tigris and Euphrates. One or more springs, and a particular fountain, called a bath-house, were attached to every large temple, where purification rites were performed. Details of the rites varied in different cities, and there are indications that they may have had this origin, a matter of course, as the banks of running streams—perhaps a survival of the period when the incantation incantations created the sacred spring—have often been the objects of sacred cult.6 To this day a ‘bath-house’ is sometimes attached to synagogues, whither women resort monthly to cleanse themselves—a remnant of the old Semitic personal purification ritual, now restricted to women.7

The importance of water as a means of healing must have been greatly reinforced by the growth of Baal-worship, in which the deity as the giver of life was specially connected with life-giving waters. The indignation of Naanan when he was told to wash in Jordan, and his confidence that the rivers of Dananues were better than all the waters of Israel, probably arose from the idea that the Jordan was a sacred healing stream of the Hebrews, which came to them through the sacred waters of the Syriasm, and not from any astonishment at being asked to participate in a rite which he must have been well acquainted with. In the time of Antionius Martyr8 patients frequently bathed ceremonially by night

1 JAI iv. [1899] 231.
6 De Luca, Sanctis, vii. 9.
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in the thermal waters of Gadara, and in the Middle Ages it was still believed that he who bathed in the springtime in the source of the Euopus would be free from sickness for the whole year. 1

In Europe water figures conspicuously in folklore as a means of preventing and curing disease. The May water at Sparr, near Stockholm, was drunk at the Midsummer celebrations by the young people of that town as a cure against the ills of the body. 2 Similarly, in Sweden, certain holy springs are supposed to have been discovered by the horsemen who travelled there for the Midsummer. 3

In Ireland, on Midsummer Eve, three wells to which extraordinary virtues are attributed, are thronged by crowds of halt, maimed and sick, who wish to wash away their infirmities with water consecrated by their patron saint, and so powerful is its efficacy on their minds, that many of those who go to be healed, and who are not totally blind, or altogether crippled, really believe for a time that they are by means of its miraculous virtues perfectly restored. 4 At Moravia in Sicily the sick resort to a spring in a subterranean grotto, called the Grotto of the Sibyl, to be cured of their diseases by bathing in the water; 5 just as on the same day people of Constantinople used to go on pilgrimage to a neighbouring spring to heal and strengthen themselves. 6 In the water font grotto at Locronas, which has been the reputed source of so many miracles since the time of the Blessed Virgin to Bernadette Soubirous on 11th Feb. 1858, belongs, perhaps, to a different category, since the existence of the spring was unknown to the inhabitants of the appurtenances to the appurtenances to the other.

4. WATER AS A MEANS OF DIVINATION.—The use of water in divination has been common in ancient and in modern times among people in a primitive state of culture.

Thus the Tahitii seek to discover the identity of a thief by digging a hole in the floor of the house in which the robbery occurred, pouring water into it, and seeing if it is drained off; 7 this act invokes the aid of his god to conduct the spirit of the thief to the water, so that his image may be reflected in it and perceived by the diviner. 8 Similarly a criminal's face is thought to be seen in a pool of water into which coco-nut oil has been squeezed; 9 the accused is then plunged hy two people holding a bowl of water between their fingers and presenting it to the gnostic names of the suspected person; at that of the gods, if he is innocent and faithful, the water will remain clear; if he is guilty, the water will become turbid. 10 Among the Habrims of Central Africa a medicine-man puts herbs and coffee-bark into a pot of water and ascertain the omens of the gods according to the direction in which the berries lie. 11 The Eskimos determine the fate of a man who has not returned from a voyage by causing a wizard to gaze into a tub of water. 12 In Greece the favourable or unfavourable disposition of the gods was declared by casting offerings into holy wells. If the gift was accepted, it sank; if it was unacceptable, it was cast overboard. At Delphi, to the east of Apollo's temple, there was a sacred spring which proceeded from a sacred spring潜水 is in a rocky valley, the waters of which were supposed to be Oraculic. The priest ascended a flight of steps, held a piece of wood in spring and chewed the sacred laurel before he prophesied. 13 Among the Hittite and especially in the reign of king Lagash (c. 2200 B.C.), there is evidence of divination by oil, and from the olives of a later period (c. 2000 B.C.) it appears that the medium of the Hittites consisted in drawing water from the well, and determining future events by the behaviour of the water. 14 If the well was left with tears and the water showed no tears of the tears of the events, the method is traced back to the legendary founder of the bard priesthood. 15 Two of the texts, dating from the Hammurabi period, describe the signs to be observed in the mingling of oil and water, together with the interpretation thereof. 16 On the early monuments there is also an interesting allusion to the use of this method of divination by a priest of the Ctesis period (c. 1700 B.C.), before undertaking an expedition to a distant land.

1 W. H. Smith, p. 185.
4 L. H. Johnstone, "The Australian Magazine", May 1877, by Fraser, GSP, p. viii, "Bald the Beautiful", i. 206 f.
5 GSP, p. vii, "Adonis", i. 247.
7 Cf. art. Loretes.

8 W. Ellis, Polyn, Researches, London, 1830, ii. 219.
10 George, Mayfair, p. 86.
13 W. B. Smith, p. 175.
14 Cf. art. Minutaces, 1 f.; cf. Pihy, H.V. 222; Pans. x x. 5.
15 CSV 11851.
16 Consuela Tracts from Babylonian Tablets in the British Museum, London, 1897, ii. 7.
18 Cf. art. Tracts, iii. 3-5.

To bring back the statues of Mars and his consort, which had been carried off by an enemy. 1 In ancient Egypt divination did not play a part in popular life so conspicuous a part as in the Hellenic world. The Egyptian texts do not mention hydromancy, although they are replete with the tales of the chaste Nephthys, who was invoked by a vase full of liquid or a flame. 2 In the story of the homeward journey of Joseph’s brethren (Gen 41-42) from Egypt to Palestine they were met by a diviner of a diversified and móndomantic purpose of which would seem to have been that of detecting a thief. "Know ye not that God can give you water out of the stone?" There is good reason to believe, however, that the episode connected with Joseph belongs to the Hyska period, 3 and that the diviner’s cassia or a sistrum was introduced into the valley of the Nile from the east by the invading ‘shepherd kings.’

In modern Egypt the custom of divination has survived. In Cairo, in Crumara, maidens go into a well at daybreak on St. George’s Day, till their eyes fill with water, and they think they see the image of their future husbands reflected in the water. 4 In the Highlands of Scotland apples and a sixpence were put in a tub of water and Hallowe’en for oracular purposes. 5 The person who could extract either of these articles from the water with his mouth without using his teeth was regarded as likely to be very lucky. Similarly three plates were placed on the hearth, one filled with clean water, another with dirty water, and the third empty. A blindfold youth then knelt in front of the hearth and groped about till he put his finger in one of them. "If he lighted on the plate with the clean water, he would be a maid; if on the plate with the dirty water, he would marry a widow; and if on the empty plate, he would remain a bachelor. For a girl the answer of the dish was analogous. . . . But to make sure, the operation had to be repeated thrice, the position of the plates being changed each time. If the boy put his finger into the plate thrice or even twice, it was quite conclusive." 6

An oracle may very readily pass into an ordeal, where the person accused of a crime is tested by being subjected to a process which would normally prove fatal, or at least injurious to him. People accused of witchcraft and other offences are frequently tested by being compelled to drink water into which a poisonous substance has been placed. If the stomach rejects the draught, the accused is declared innocent and released; if, on the other hand, he has partaken of it, his body is evacuated by purging, he is pronounced guilty. 7

5. WATER-SPIRITS AND WATER-GODS.—To say with Tylor that a ‘belief in the existence of spiritual beings’ constitutes the minimum of what we should call ‘religion’ is to forget that the outlook of primitive man is towards the sacred and mysterious rather than in the direction of the spiritual. Psychologically the religious sense manifests itself on the emotional plane before the mind is capable of forming definite notions like spirits or gods. Primitive man sees around him certain phenomena which puzzle him, and, long before he has evolved a belief in spiritual beings, he is conscious of mysterious and ominous objects in terms of the supernatural. Now, water is most certainly calculated to arouse in the primeval consciousness the animistic attitude of mind dictated by aversions and fears. Upon it man depends for his very existence, through its agency he sees the desert made to blossom as the rose, and in it he beholds the manifestation of life and movement, and even the power of death and destruction. He regards it therefore as possessed of mana, and, in consequence, sacred. But there is always a tendency to personify the sacred.

The mysterious roll of thunder becomes associated with the voice of the tribal All-Father, and the magic downfall of rain is explained as the work of spirits or gods. So with water. Originally the Trojans regarded their sacred river, Skamandros, as containing a multinistic way of obligations cast live bulls and horses into its depths. In later times, when they had reached an animistic or theistic stage, Homer speaks of altars or shrines being erected on the bed of the river—bank, on which a bull was sacrificed, the belief being that the spirit in

1 H. C. Rawlinson, W.A.I. v. 83, col. ii. 8.
2 Pihy, H.V. xxviii, 45; Frondard, de Iside, liv., liv.
4 W. M. Flinders Petrie, A History of Egypt, do. 1894, i. 223 ff.
5 Egypt and Ethiopia, London, 1895, p. 32.
7 See art. Orakw (Introductory and Primitive).
WATER-GODS (Babylonian)

The water, or the god of the stream, was capable of departing from his element to consume the essence of the offerings in the holy place on the shore of the Ganges. We do not know, however, how it was done. But it seems possible that there was a pre-monastic religious practice that transferred the power of the water-god from his natural habitat to the sacred site.

The conception of the sacred river is undoubtedly psychologically a more rudimentary notion than the more complex animistic and theistic beliefs of later times. It cannot be said that there was a pre-animistic era in the history of religion, when animism was not and nevertheless religion of a kind existed. Some sort of animism may have been a primary condition of the most primitive conception of water-god.

Among people in a more developed state of culture, water-gods and water-godesses are of frequent occurrence. Stories of the Persians and the Armenians have been found from Japan and Annam to Scotland, and it is in the details that the central feature is always connected with the sacrifice of a human victim (generally a virgin) to a water-god. It is, however, a matter of debate whether these legends reflect a real custom of sacrificing girls to the waters of water-gods, since we know that girls are frequently married to river-gods, etc., in primitive ages. The custom may have arisen from the belief that water-gods are the bestowers of life and fertility, whose kind gifts of rain from above and springs from below produce pasture for the cattle and fruits for the service of man. In Syria the life-giving operation of Isar was connected with springs, streams, and underground water, and therefore the Baalim had their seats on the banks of rivers and by deep water-courses, in spots of natural fertility. As authors of fertility in general, it is in accordance with the working of the primitive mind that these water-gods should be regarded as the bestowers of offspring. Accordingly we find that barren women used to do themselves into a stream known to be inhabited by a water-god, and bathe in the waters. Down to classical times girls bathed in the Skanandros before their marriage, perhaps because they did so, 'Skannader, take my virginity.'

Sometimes, however, human beings are cast into water simply as a propitiatory sacrifice to appease the wrath of the indwelling spirit. The frequency with which maritime people are reminded of the dangers of the seas would naturally lead to a belief that water-gods are dangerous and malignant beings capable of assuming monstrous forms. Thus the Warrnambool of Central Australia perform elaborate ceremonies to coerce a gigantic but purely mythical water-serpent who is said to have destroyed a number of people. The Tasmanians place their houses at a distance from the water and never sleep near it when on a journey lest they should be molested by the indwelling spirit. Whenever they make war to catch fish, they are careful to offer fish to the water-serpent of the river. To ensure a good catch of fish the fishermen of Etta throw a human victim into the water at the mouth of the river, and in the St. George's Day rites in England the Green George was thrown into the water to secure the favour of the water-god. The water-god represents the god of the deep or meadowsweet, and the meadowsweet gods are also water-gods. The idea of propitiating a malignant water-god is undoubtedly connected with the underlying belief that people are parts of the water-god, and in its medieval counterpart of St. George and the Dragon.

WATER-GODS—Authorities have been given in the footnotes.

1. WATER. The Babylonians divided their universe into three parts—the heavens, the earth, and the sea—which they personified as the gods Anu, Enlil, and Marduk, respectively. Each element was considered divine. But more emphasis was placed upon the divinity of the sea, because the water of the 'great deep' was considered the element out of which all things were generated. This 'great deep,' or Apan, encircled the earth, was the source of all irrigation, and was the home of Ea, the god of waters. The Euphrates and the Tigris as children of the great deep were 'the soul of the land' and 'the bestower of blessings' respectively. But there was a sense in which the waters were regarded as an agent of destruction, viz. in their appearance in the form of violent rains and floods. Under this aspect they were personified as Tiamat, the Télôm of the ancient Egyptians, emphasized in the Old Testament. There Télôm is opposed to Jahweh, and is the cause of much dread to the people. In Babylonia, however, the beneficent aspects of the water-gods were most pronounced. It was not only one of the comest parts of natural phenomena, appearing as rivers, streams, seas, lakes, ponds, brooks, springs, fountains, wells, mist, dew, rain, hail, snow, ice, vapour, fog, and clouds, but also indispensable to men, animals, and vegetables. Water was divine and holy, and as such was worshipped as a god. It played a very important part in omens and oracles and all kinds of magic. It could dispel demons, wash away disease, and purify from sin. It acted as a divine power in decisions by ordeal, and in it flowed the blood of the gods.

The Babylonians believed that all waters were peopled by living creatures, actual and mythical, some of which were beneficial and others harmful. The anunnakū (a, 'water,' and nun, 'strength') were probably beneficial water-spirits, and the seven utes of the Tigris and Euphrates were demons of the sea. Both spirits and demons were controlled by Ea, or by the ferryman who kept watch over the river of death, who was called Arad-Ea, 'servant of Ea.' Water, being associated with the source of life, was usually considered the source of life, and at Eridu there was a sacred spring which figured in early Babylonian mythology and in ancestral rituals. Because of its sacred properties, water played the chief rôle in incantations. Ea, by virtue of his being a water-god, was the most prominent figure in the ritual of incantations, being called the great physician. But Marduk, in later times, usurped much of his power, and always acted as mediator between the patient and Ea. The ritual in incantations involved washing and sprinkling of the body of the patient from the Euphrates and Tigris from the bubbling source coming directly out of the earth. Then an image was made of the demon or sorcerer who controlled the victim, and it was placed in a boat. The image was drowned in sacred water, and the patient was relieved.

2. WATER-GODS—Babylonia was always sorely dependent upon her streams and canals, and this partly accounts for her numerous water-gods. But
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more important in the minds of the people were the waters of the Euphrates and the Tigris and the Persian Gulf. Being mysterious, often beneficent, frequently destructive, never subject to control, they were regarded as the very earliest of all manifestations of divine beings. They were worshipped, propiti;ated, and supplicated. All things, good and bad, came from them, and in them not only life, but death, consisted.

The source of all water was thought to be situated at the head of the Persian Gulf, or to be the head of the Persian Gulf. At a very early period Ea, the "lord of the abyss," became the fish-god. As a water-god, all fountains and streams were sacred to him. Water, being a sacred, healing, and fertilizing agency, became the symbol of life, and Ea, as we have seen, became the judge of the universal utility of water. Ea was claimed by all Babylonians as his champion, and, according to the Legend of Creation, when the gods decided to destroy mankind, Ea, in the person of his consort, the Babylonian Noah, Ut-napishtim, advising him to build a vessel so as to be prepared for the approaching deluge. He thus became the wise one, who taught men all the arts, and who even created mankind. Ea's consort was sometimes called Dam-gal-nan-na, "great wife of the deep," her Sumerian name being Nin-ki, "lady of the earth"; but she was also called "queen of the deep." The god himself sometimes appeared under the name Nin-a-gal, "god of great strength." Ea is represented on a seal cylinder as sitting on his throne, while Damkina is leading a worshipper into his presence. The great fish or capricorn under the seat is the symbol of the god. Sometimes he is seen carrying a vase of water with flowing streams and fish, and standing on a capricorn. He is very often represented in the form of a fish, or of a man covered by scales of a fish. In Assyria Ea appears as "king of the ocean," " opener of fountains," "creator," and god of wisdom. He is described by Berosus, under the name of the god of Babylon, as being a man, with a body like that of a fish, with feet below like those of a man, with a fish's tail. When Babylon became prominent in the time of Hammurabi, Marduk was classed as son of Ea, and collaborated with him in incantations, being associated, as Ea was, with waters of life.

Adad (Sumerian, Enin), or Ramman, was a god of rain and lord of subterranean waters. He was never associated with any particular city, nor was he a very early Sumerian deity. He came from the west-lands, where he was a solar deity. In Babylonia he was usually associated with the desert—"lord of the dry rain" when accompanied by thunder and lightning; although sometimes he was considered a vegetation-god. Hammurabi, in the epilogue to his Code, calls upon Adad to deprive his enemy of "the rain from heaven and the water-floods from the springs." Nebuchadrezzar I calls him "the lord of springs and rains," and Melishipak beseeches him to bestow "abundant streams." Adad was symbolized by a thunder-bolt, was associated with the sky-god, Anu, at Asur, and often appeared under the name Nanshu. Although he was associated as an early creature supposed to have brought on the flood, he was not very prominent as a water-deity. In like manner Assur, the great Assyrian war-god, was associated with water, especially deep and war-god as a god of fertility, but his rôle as such was not very important. Innin, primarily the heavenly queen, was a water-goddess. She is represented with heads of serpents and blades of grass, which in Oriental art are associated with water and vegetation. She bore the title azag-sug, "sacred libation," and, like Anah, a grain-goddess, was described as goddess of the "holy meal." 12 Ishtar, the great mother-goddess and goddess of love, was also prominently associated with water. She referred to herself as 'daughter of the ocean stream'; she was connected with the cleansing power of water; she was par excellence of streams and canals, without whom "no stream is opened, no stream is closed, which brings life," without whom "no canal is opened, no canal is closed, which gives the wide-dwelling power of water." 13 She is addressed as "thus that rulest over springs and mountains and seas." 14 She is represented in art with a vase of water. Besides being identified with Kiri-du, 15 or Nin-kis, the rain-god, or with Nin-anu, 16 as Nin'a, Ea's daughter, who was originally a water-deity, and quite distinct from Ishtar. But from time to time the goddesses Ishtar, Nin'a, Innin, and Anunit were confused one with another. Nin'a was the goddess who rode upon the sea in a boat, was at one time known as Geštinanna, "queen of waters," and was a fish-goddess. In fact, her name is written with the ideogram which means "goddess of the fish-house." In time she became sister of Ningirsu, lord of the freshets. She was also called Nin-en and Nin-en-nga, "lady of incantation." Nin'a was also identified with Ishara, goddess of water-animals, whose symbol was the scorpion, and who bore the title, lamāt (dragon) of the primeval waters. 17 Ishara appeared at an earlier period as Ishtans, "heavenly goddess of the fish-house," and daughter of Adad. She is personified as a fish, or as a woman, and was worshipped as the "queen of waters." She is a great water-goddess, and in later times she was identified with Inanna, the great-hearted goddess of love, and with Ishtar, the lady of the abyss. 18 Ishara became all-powerful, and was called "king of the abyss." A hymn says of him: "Command the sea and the sea obeyeth"; he was addressed as "lord of the mountain stream and of water, opener of sources and cisterns, controller of streams." He and she is represented in company with a water-drone, and standing above the watery deep. His cult has been traced to Eridu. Nabu, a patron deity of Borsippa and Babylon, and Marduk, was a god of waters. 1

1 King, Babylonian Boundary-Stones, p. 20.
2 CT xv. 11, 13-14.
3 S. Langdon, Sumerian and Babylonian Paints, Paris, 1909, p. 163, fig. 64.
5 J. A. Criggs, Assyrians and Babylonian Legends, Texts and Table, Leipzig, 1889-97, vol. i, pl. 15, fig. 15-17.
6 S. Langdon, Tammuz and Ishtar, p. 57.
8 A. S. B. Mercier, Oath in Babylonian and Assyrian Literature, Paris, 1912, passim.
9 CT xxvi. 62, 10.
10 If a iv. 26, no. 4, l. 54.
11 See J. Reim, Hymnen und Gebete an Marduk (BASS v.), p. 289.
12 "Sumerian name was En-ki, 'lord of the earth.'"
13 "He is represented as a man with fish's feet, and a fish's tail; his weapon is a thunder-bolt; and he is the god of the floods from the springs." Nebuchadrezzar I.
14 "He is the lord of the springs and rains;" Melishipak.
counterpart of En. He was therefore a water-god and god of vegetation. He was also a god of wisdom, and as such was associated with the watery deep. In later times his character as a water-god was also associated with the wisdom of the soul, and he became secretary of the gods and inspirer of mankind. His symbol was the stylus with which he recorded the decisions of fate. Nāru was his water-god, a wife or he character is otherwise unknown. Langdon says he was ‘probably a male deity,’ although he also refers to her as a river-goddess.2 Nīdāba, a grain-goddess, was closely connected with the water-goddess Nīn-Išāra, one of her titles being mu-na-dē-zi-na-nu, which Langdon connects with mumadē, a title of Nina.3 J. Krauss4 likewise identifies Lugal-ki-si-a, a consort of Nina, with Lugal-ki-si-a, a consort of Nīdāba. Nina refers to Nīdāba as her sister,5 and is called the ‘holy reed-Nīdāba’;6 and, on a seal dedicated to Naram-Sin, Nīdāla is connected with the water-goddess Nina.7 Nina-akha-ka-duu, also known as Nin-karrak and Gula, was a goddess of purification, and was also connected with Ea and Erīd. In incantation texts she is associated with Ea and is called ‘the lady of incantation.’ In like manner Ninabursidu, goddess of water, is connected with incantations. She was symbolized by a jar of holy water (epagidē). The war-god Ninib preserved water attributes. As the first-born of Ea, he was known as ‘lord of wells and of the sea’ and ‘opener of wells.’ He was therefore also a vegetation-god. According to a hymn to Emesēarra,8 Nina, brother of Ninib, was connected with irrigation. It is there said, ‘Great lord, without whom Ningirra does not direct the water-course and canal.’ He was also associated with Scorpio and the scorpion of Išāra. The Sumerian name of Tammuz is Dumu-zi-arku, ‘the faithful child of the deep.’9 Tammuz was called ‘the real son of the deep,’ and belonged to the family of En.10 Of course he is well known as the Babylonian corn-spirit, who dies and comes to life again every year. He was one of Sumeria’s oldest gods, and, when the Sumerians moved into the Tigris-Euphrates valley, Tammuz became a god of the fertilizing waters. He was then called bił ĝirati, ‘lord of the flood,’11 and under this name or his equivalent, Nin-gir, he became the local lord of Lagash. To his holy circle, he employed the holy water of the great basin, posīd apei, in incantations, and as the youthful god par excellence he represented the beneficent waters which fertile the valley of the Tigris and Euphrates in winter and which died away in summer. He bore the title ‘Nītra-alam, ‘image of Ea.’ Many hymns were sung to Tammuz as vegetation-god, but in them there is frequent reference to his water attributes. The death of Tammuz was said to have been marked by the cessation of laving the waters of Eridu, but drowning in the waters was meant to Tammuz to send refreshing floods.

LITERATURE.—See the works cited in the footnotes.

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1 Babylonian Liturgies, Paris, 1913, p. 140.

2 PIs. xli. [1916] p. 45, n. 47.


4 S.A.K. v, col. i, l. 25.


6 W. H. Ward, Seal Cylinder of Western Asia, Washington, 1911, col. 132.


8 In the great theological list in CT xxiv. pl. 15, I. 20, Tammuz is called the faithful son of the fresh waters which come forth from the earth.

9 U. B. has erected a temple to him in Giru (S.A.K., p. 60, col. ii, 8-15).

10 Langdon, Sumerian and Babylonian Psalms, p. 100, l. 14, noto 12, p. 71.

11 R. Assyriol. vii. [1911] 161, col. i, 12; Langdon, Tammuz and Ishtar, passim.

WATER, WATER-GODS (Egyptian).—1. Water.—The Egyptians believed in a primeval watery mass, deep and boundless, out of which had come into existence the heavens, the earth, and everything that is the object of wisdom and mercy. The generative virtue of all life, human and divine, were in the watery mass, which was personified and received the name Nu. It was eternal, and part male and part female. The closest circle of the watery mass was described as Oisir who encircles the under world; but the whole watery realm was frequently identified or summarized as the ocean or the Nile. It was believed that the Nile sprang from the great watery abyss and divided into two rivers—the one the Nile of Egypt, and the other that of which it was said, ‘Great and mighty is the river of the sky, flowing across the heavens and through the Duat, the world of night and thick darkness, and on that river floats the boat of Ra.’ In other words, there were two rivers which sprang out of the watery abyss—an earthly and a heavenly. Water was sacred to the Egyptians and possessed all the qualities of a divine being. In all lakes, rivers, fountains, wells, and streams the divine essence was present. For this reason all fish1 were sacred, and were venerated from the earliest to the latest period. For example, fish venerated at Latopolis and Oxyrhynchus were eaten sacramentally on the ninth day of the month Thoth. Some water-animals were even given names as deities—e.g., the hippopotamus (Taur) and the crocodile (Sebek). Fish were thus considered the abode of the gods.

Because of the divine character of water, it was considered fortunate to be drowned, a drowned person being sometimes regarded as a deity. Osiris was drowned,2 just as in Greece and Bharwanand in India. The greatest service one could render a god was to be drowned, and thus be united with him. The word for ‘drown,’ hwy, originally meant ‘praise,’3 Gods and great men loved to be associated with sacred water; thus the ‘mother of Mendes’ is depicted carrying a fish upon her head, and Rameses II. was credited with powers as a rain-maker. To control divine water was greatly desired. Chapters lvi. and lviii. of the Book of the Dead are called ‘The Chapter . . . of having the Mastery over the Water in the Underworld.’ For the earliest time the spellant prayed: ‘Grant that I may have dominion over the water.’ Water is not only a fertilizing and destroying force, to which offerings are made, but also a means of warding off evil. It played a great rôle in illuminations and incantations.

As a deity water was worshipped. The water-worship of Canopus and its cult in Egypt are well known.4 There were many instances of sacrifice to water, the victims being usually bulls, horses, or human beings. Even as men were sacrificed to the Tiber in Rome, and to the Ganges in India, so in Egypt human beings, especially girls, were sacrificed to the Nile. A favourite place for an altar, therefore, was on the banks of the Nile. But all streams and fountains, lakes and rivers, were the abode of spirits, which had to be propitiated.5

Even as Egypt was the gift of the Nile, so all life was sustained by the Nile, and the Nile was the water of life; and, as the inhabitants of Egypt depended upon the waters of the Nile for daily life, so to the departed they were represented in the watery life of the celestial Nile. In this world sacred water was used for purification, and in pre-


2 Z. Ägypt. xxxix. [1910] 81, pls. l., ii.

3 J. Frahm, ‘Religion des Volkes des Ägypten,’ p. 149.

4 Jb. i. [1914] 227; Athenaeus, de gastr. 24 (PG xxv. 45).

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paration for the next world it was used in an interesting ceremony called the 'Opening of the Mouth,' which consisted of sprinkling or pouring water over the statue and to make it fit for a pure abode for the ka. This ceremony not only purified and sanctified the person represented by the statue, but also removed from him all possibly of decay and death that might come. 1

2. Water-gods.—At a time which antedates the earliest records Egyptians had deified the Nile and worshipped it under the name Hapi. 2 In the Pyramid Texts his name occurs as that of a well-springs of life. It was natural that such should be the case, for Egypt's welfare depended more upon the Nile than upon any other one thing. Because of the two great divisions of Egypt, Hapi was personified in two distinct forms. In the north and south. In the north he was Hap-Mebt and in the south he was Hap-Reset. But there were not two gods, for Hapi is represented holding two muffled waters of the Nile which embrace from which the North and South Nile poured. He is usually depicted in the form of a man, with hanging breasts from which water streams, wearing the sign of water in the world to come. 1

In a hymn to the Nile it is said of him that he 'cannot be figured in the image on which are set the crown of the South and the North with their emblems, offerings cannot be made to him, he cannot be brought forth from his secret places, his dwelling-place is not to be found out, he is not to be found in the shrine which are inscribed with texts: it is the day for the elevation which is exalted for him to dwell in, and the heart of (man) is unable to depict him.' 4

Because of his great reputation, he was called 'father of the gods,' 'creator of things which exist,' 'vivifier, 'the lord of fishes,' was identified with Osiris, Amen, and Ptah, and was considered greater than Re. In later times a festival of the annual rise of the Nile was celebrated with great solemnity throughout Egypt—an event mentioned by Heliodorus. He was a personification of a sanctuary of the Nile, and the early Church Fathers bore witness to his worship. 5 During the Nile festivals 6 hymns were sung to Hapi in which the worshippers said:

1. Offerings are made, oxen are slain to thee, great festivals are kept for thee, tools are sacrificed to thee, beasts of the field and fowls of the air, are offered to thee.

Even the Nile's inundations were personified and called Bâh, and the waters of the Nile were sometimes deified as Ankhût, a goddess, usually represented in the form of a woman with a crown of feathers on her head, arranged in such a way as to suggest a savage origin. Originally she was a goddess of some island in the First Cataract, but she was later identified with Nephthys. She personifies the waters of the Nile and fructifies the fields. She is sometimes pictured in a boat, seated in a shrine, with a table of offerings before her. Set, the personification of the forces of water which were supposed to resist light and order, was symbolized by the serpent Aep, the great monster of the deep, whose four heads represent the four quarters of the Nile. She was mentioned in the Pyramid Texts as a god of the deep. Hathor, the cow-goddess and personification of the house in which Horus dwelt, was one of the oldest of Egypt's goddesses. She was the principal counterpart of Re, and became the great mother-goddess. She was identified astronomically with the star Sept, and was thereby connected with the Nile by the phases of the Nile inundation. Being the mother of all, she was easily identified with phases of the Nile. There were supposed to be seven Hathors, but this is not surprising, since her popularity as mother-goddess caused many secondary deities to be identified with her and gave rise to a Hathor cult in many localities. She is represented in many forms and attitudes, but none is more interesting than a picture in a Theban tomb which depicts her in a papyrus-boating giving drink to a soul in Amentet. Heles, 'lord of the mouth of the river,' is a rarely met god with stellar characteristics. 1 Isis, or Aset, was in primitive times the water-goddess, probably Libyan in origin. From the earliest to the latest times she was Egypt's greatest goddess, the beneficent goddess and mother, the highest type of mother, in fact. As mother of Horus, the giver of food and life to the dead, 'wife of the lord of the abyss,' 'wife of the lord of the inundation,' 'goddess of the Nile,' as the power of the Nile, she was called Sati and Sepet, and, as the embracer of the land and producer of fertility by means of water, she was called Ankhût. She was the female counterpart of the primordial abyss from which all life sprang, and she was so popular that at an early period she absorbed all characteristics of other goddesses. She was not only a water-goddess, but also an earth-, corn-, and star-goddess. She is usually depicted as a woman with a natural head-dress and with a papyrus-sceptre in her hand. Sometimes she is crowned with a pair of horns, between which is a solar disk, surmounted by the sign for 'seat,' the symbol of her name. With the horns she often has two plumes; sometimes she wears the double crown of Egypt, to the back of which is attached the feather maât. Her symbol was the star Sept, which announced the inundation of the Nile. In the elaborate ceremonies, related by Apuleius and Pausanias, were conducted in connexion with the use of a vessel of Nile water in the Isis festival, which took place at the time of the Nile's inundation. Khennu, the first member of the great triad, Khnum, Sati, and Ankhût, at Abu, or Elephantine, was originally a river- or water-god, as were the other members of the triad. He was often identified with Nu and Hapi. He was one of the oldest of Egypt's gods, being mentioned in the text of Uni. He was without doubt a pre-dynastic god, symbolized by the flat-horned ram from the Edfu. At a very early period he became god of the Nile and of the annual Nile flood, and as such bore the name Kebb. He was called 'maker of heaven and earth, and Dunt, the waters, and the mountains.' He says of himself, 'I am the primordial watery abyss, and I am the Nile who riseth at his will.' As a water-god, he became almost universal in Egypt, uniting in himself the attributes of Osiris, the God, and Osiris-God, and with four ram's heads represented the four elements—earth, air, fire, and water—and perhaps also the four sources of the Nile. He is depicted in the form of a ram-headed man, and, as a water-god, he is seen with an outstretched hand, from which flow several streams over which

2. A. Erman holds that the original form of the name was beyer (Z 'X xir. [1909] 114), but S. H. Gambrill suggests the possibility of bâyer or bâyr (Z 'X xiv. [1910] 116 f.).
4. Athene, i. 9.
7. An excellent description of two Nile festivals instituted by Ramses II. is given in Lepsius, iv. 175a, 1900, 2184.
WATER, WATER-GODS (Greek and Roman)

flows water. He is sometimes represented with a jug above his horns. His worship was especially common in that part of Egypt extending from Philis to Syene. Mektet, the emblem of the prehistoric female creative principle, and the name of the celestial cow, was originally a female personification of the watery matter which formed the body of which the Nile proceeded. She is a pre-dynastic goddess, and is mentioned in the texts of Uni. Meret, depicted with an aquatic plant on her head, and therefore a water-goddess, was associated with Mut. Her name occurs in a dual form, Merti, and is represented on the Southern and Northern Nile. Mut, the great mother-goddess, 'who giveth birth, but was herself not born of any,' was an ancient water-goddess. She was called 'the watery one,' 'the watery flood,' and as such was called the wife of the Nile. Her principal temple was in Asker, a quarter of Thebes, which probably derived its name from the sacred lake which existed there. Neith, one of the oldest of Egyptian goddesses, was the personification of a form of the great primeval watery mass. At a later period she was represented with bow and arrows as a goddess of war and of the chase. Nu, in his pre-dynastic form, was the watery mass of heaven, whose counterpart was Nut. He was called 'the great god whose dwelling is in the waters of the sky,' and was sometimes identified with the selfsame one. He was represented as an oblong fish, like the Nile, with whom he was often identified. Nut was the personification of the female aspect of the great watery mass of which all things came. She was the daughter of Shu and Tefnut, the wife of Geb, and mother of Osiris, Isis, Nephthys, and Set. She is usually represented as a woman with a vase of water on her head. She sometimes wears the horns and disk of Hathor, and holds a papyrus-sceptre and sign of life in her hand. She is also depicted as a woman standing in a sycamore-tree pouring out water from a vase. In the Book of the Dead a supplicant prays, 'Grant thou to me of the water of the and of the air which dwell in thee,' Her attributes were many, because, like all water-deities, she absorbed the characteristics of many minor deities, and was recognized and worshipped in many different places in Egypt. Of all was the god of the dead par excellence. He may have originally been a human being who was deified. When such transformation was made cannot be determined, but in the early historical period till the latest he was worshipped. He became the most popular, best known, and most powerful Egyptian deity. But what interests us is that he was originally a water-spirit or god of some portion of the waters of the Nile, and with the passage of time he became a great water-god, representing in general the creative and nutritive powers of the Nile, and particularly the inundation. As a Nile-god he naturally became a creative and generative power. And, just as the Nile sank and rose, so Osiris died and rose again, becoming thus the god of resurrection. Osiris was depicted in many forms, the most usual being that of a mummy with a beard and wearing the white crown and a menat. He was from time to time identified with most of the greatest gods until he attained a position which made him par converso the natural god of Egypt. As a water-god he was identified with Hapi, and later with Nu, representing water as a life-giving element. As there were thought to be four sources of the Nile, so Osiris had four bodies, and each one was called Osiris of the Nile. Plutarch records the belief of the Egyptian of his day when he says that Osiris was looked upon as not only the Nile but also the ocean. Osorkon II, as an embodiment of Osiris, was represented with streams of water pouring from his hands. In the Nebesdii papyrus of the Book of the Dead Osiris himself says, 'I am the god with whom the Black and Great Black One is my name;' and in the papyrus of Nu he says, 'I am the god of inundation and Great Black One of the Lake is my name;' and as Osiris is the god of the Nile, so was Nu, the primeval abyss, and with Hapi, and he was called 'lord of fish.' Rem was perhaps the personification of Râ's tears. He may have been the same as Rem, who was probably a fish-god, and associated with Senek, a personification of Nu. Sani, originally connected with the chase, was worshipped at the First Cataract, where he was associated with Khnum. His name probably refers to the falling waters of the Cataract. She thus became a goddess of inundation, who pours out and spreads over the land the life-giving waters of the Nile. She is usually represented in human form with a high conical crown. Sebek, the crocodile, was most probably a water-god. Selkht was a scorpion-deity, and one of the four goddesses who assisted Nu and protected the four sources of the Nile. Tefzen was usually identified with Taph, and sometimes with Nu. Tefnut was a rain-goddess whose male counterpart was Shu. She was the personification of the moisture of the sky. She was both born of the great watery mass. The cult of Tefnut does not seem to have been associated with any special city.

LITERATURE.—On this subject there exist no separate articles, monographs, or books. Besides original texts, the literature used has been mentioned in the course of the article. Special mention should be made of E. A. W. Budge's great work, The Gods of the Egyptians, 2 vols., London and Chicago, 1914.

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WATER, WATER-GODS (Greek and Roman).—I. GREEK.—The account given in art. Nature (Greek) includes much information on this subject which need not be repeated here, especially as to the cult of river-gods, nymphs, and similar divinities. There are, however, certain important aspects of the subject which require some addition.

The worship of rivers or of water generally as the origin of life was one expression of a belief which is a very ancient and universal philosophy. Thus Homer speaks of Ὑδάν ττ, δεόν γένεσιν, κα κρίνει θύειν, and says that Ocean is the origin of all things. Hesiód fuses Oceanus and Tethys into his Theogony as children of Earth and Heaven. Ocean, according to the Homeric conception, was regarded as a river flowing round and bounding the earth; thus it was set around the rim of the shield of Achilles. It is personified in art as an elephant with flowing locks and beard, but has little importance in religious cult.

The gods of the sea may be divided into two classes: (1) the elemental beings who constantly occur in folk-lore and popular belief, and (2) the clearly defined and personal Olympian gods who rule over the sea. The former had as a rule little importance in the official worship, though we hear of the famous cult of the Old Man of the Sea (Ἀνδρέ Υπεροχής) at Byzantium. Triton, Proteus, Glaucon, Nereus, and the Nereids have many of the qualities attributed to sea-divinities or demons born of the sea. The life-giving power of water was the peculiar concern of the two great goddesses of Water—Hera (who is the wife of Zeus and daughter of Oceanus) and the personification of the Great Temple of Bubaste (ΕΕΕΝ Μαμα). London, 1892, pi. xi.


3 Il. xiv. 291.

4 Il. vi. 566.

5 Il. xii. 158-159.
in the folk-lore of various nations, such as the gift of soothsaying or foretelling the future, and the power of transforming themselves into various shapes. The Proteus, when he was changed into various beasts, and into water, and could change into fire; but, if bound, he could be compelled to impart his knowledge. Similarly Theon the Nereus was changed into various forms when seized by the martial Poseidon, and so identified in the systematized religion of Greece all these were regarded as subordinate to Poseidon as supreme god of the sea. In this capacity Poseidon was associated with Amphitrite, possibly an old goddess or personification of the sea, though in later mythology sometimes regarded as one of the Nereids. She is often represented in art as the consort of Poseidon, both in the assembly of the gods on Olympus and in her bridal procession, which is escorted by Tritons and Nereids on hippocamps and other sea-monsters; but she has no important place in official worship. Poseidon, on the other hand, is one of the chief gods of the State worship of many Greek cities, and was regarded as the ancestor of many leading families, especially among the Ionians and Minyans. The tale of his contest with Athena for the land of the_validate, and the subject of the western pediment of the Parthenon. The Isthmian games at Corinth were celebrated in his honour. As god of the sea, Poseidon can arouse and pacify storms, and so is applied to by sea-farers; but it is noteworthy that, in the greatest of sea-poems, the Odyssey, he appears as a malignant, rather than a beneficent, god. He has little or nothing to do with ships. The Argos was built under the direction of Athena, and mariners often attribute their safety to Aphrodite Euploia or to the Dioscures rather than to him. Odysseus owed his safe return to Leucothea, who was often appealed to by sailors.

As sea-god Poseidon is the sender of earthquakes (Ehoorgas). He split the mountains to make the ravine of Tempe, and hurled about or submerged islands. Salt springs inland are also attributed to him. By a symbolism which is common and easy to understand, waves are often compared to sea-horses; and either the origin of the horse or its training to human service is attributed to Poseidon or Hippo. Horses were sacrificed to him, sometimes by being thrown into the sea. The bull also was especially sacred to him, and bull-sacrifice in his honour and with connexion with this we are reminded of the mixed human and bull form often taken by river-gods. We might naturally expect Poseidon, as the chief sea-god, to give victory in sea-fights; and in fact Persian galley's were dedicated to him at the Isthmus and at Sounion after the great naval victory at Salamis. But other gods often received thank-offerings for such victories.

A characteristic of all water-divinities and demons, from Poseidon down, in later Greek art is an expression of restless and passionate yearning, which is attributed to them as impersonating the restlessness of their element and its desire to embrace and engulf the land and its creatures. Apart from representations of sea-gods, the sea itself is often represented in art by conventional water-patterns and by dolphins, fishes, and other sea-creatures.

2. Roman.—Here also the art. Nature (Roman) gives most of the information required. The Romans were not so seafaring people, and their god Neptune was not originally so-called, though he came later to be identified with the Greek Poseidon; but he may have been a nympha associated with water, though very little is known and little was paid worship. He appears, however, to be a god of springs, and so associated in worship with the nymphs. The worship of the nymphs in connexion with springs was very wide-spread in Italy and throughout the Roman empire, though it is not easy to distinguish how much was merely borrowed from Greece. Their frequent representations in art, like those of river-gods, evidently follow Greek models. The Camene, associated with soothsaying and poetry, appear to have been transferred from one of the Greek rural nymphs, Egeria, Numa's counsellor, also had a similar character. River-gods, nymphs (often holding shells), and similar representations of water-deities are very common in Greek and Roman art, but they do not, as a rule, bear any distinctively Italian character. A more original conception is that of the famous figure of Jupiter Platius, the rain-god, on the Antonine Column, who is represented hovering over the sea in his chariot, with wings, and pouring down rain in torrents from his beard and outstretched arms. Such a naturalistic personification is alien to Greek anthropomorphism, and much more akin to medieval and modern symbolism.

LITERATURE.—In addition to works quoted in artt. Nature (Greek) and (Roman), articles in Roscher on 'Okeanos,' Poseidon, 'Theogonie,' 'Biblia,' Metaphysik und Relativierungsschichte, 2 vols., Munich, 1897-1900; G. Wisowa, Religion und Cultur der Rurer, no. 1910, 1902; L. R. Farnell, Cults of the Greek States, 5 vols., Oxford, 1896-1910, ii. 1-97. E. A. GARDNER.

WATER (Hebrew and Jewish).—The importance attached to water in Jewish belief and practice is so great that it embraces almost every manifestation of life, and can be studied in the following subdivisions: (1) cosmogony, in its widest sense, (2) instituted, (3) rain.

1. Cosmogony.—According to the record of the Bible, the cosmogonomic elements of water and land were created apart. Only by the separation between the waters above and the waters below could the earth appear, but the waters above the firmament were not entirely separated from those that were gathering below, first into a great sea and then into rivers, lakes, and fountains of the deep. On the contrary, an intimate connexion between the two was continually kept up. A connexion was believed to exist between the upper and lower waters in the form of pipes which led from the heavens above to the sea below, and through the medium of such pipes the waters that had come down from above, and which had slowly gathered into the river, would flow back into the heavens, thence to descend again upon earth.

The primeval sea surrounds the earth like a snake; so it is seen by Alexander the Great in his attempted ascent to heaven. This view is found often repeated in rabbinical writings. The sea stands under the rule of a special prince or spirit (Sat), who opposes Moses when he tries to cleave the waters of the Red Sea. He refuses to obey a being created on the sixth day, whilst the sea was created on the second. He is conjured by the sages to cast up the strength of a man thrown into the sea by a witch.

The sea is the counterpart of the earth, and it contains every creature that is found upon the earth, save the fox, which by a stratagem escapes the fate of being cast into the sea. The waves of the sea can be appeased by magical formulae. On the other hand, the waves and storm are messengers sent to carry out divine ordinances and to call a man a freedbooted boat whom divine provisdes wishes to save. Thus Asaph is saved. But ever since the flood, which in a supreme

1. Mrs. Eugenie Strong, Roman Sculpture, from Augustus to Constantine, London, 1867, pl. xxxvii.
2. See below, i. 3.
3. Pliil R. Eitleder, eb. 3.
6. Jerus. Sanhedrin, vi. 25d; see Maase Buch, Amsterdam, 1725, no. 255.
WATER, WATER-GODS (Hebrew and Jewish)

WATER-GODS

Water, and the waters of the deep are also part of the cosmogonic process. They are kept under ground; and species they were believed to be the origin of the first soil. Water flows and kept in check by the Eben Sletiyah, or 'the stone of foundation,' which, according to legend, is the centre of the world. Its location is the corner-stone of the Temple in Jerusalem or the stones upon which the Ark of the Covenant rested. When Jesus washed the feet of his disciples, he did so in the same pool of the flood; they started surging up, threatening to flood the world. David receded slowly step by step, and, while the deluge receded, the seventh SONG of Steps, until at last, writing the ineffable name of God upon a stone of granite, he fell down with the mouth of the deluge, when the waters saw the divine name, they withdrew in terror, and thus the world was saved from a second flood.2

The waters under ground are flowing close to the free of hell, hence the hot springs; and the waters of the flood which surged up from the deep are holing and helped in the destruction of the wicked world, from which Or, king of Bashan, alone escaped through his gigantic stature. (He had boasted that he and the other giants could stop up with their heels the openings of the fountains.)

There are miraculous wells and rivers. The well in the desert, created on the sixth day, accompanied the Israelites in their wanderings through the desert and ceased to flow with the death of Miriam.3 There is the famous Sambatsuy (q.v.), which plays a great role in the history of the people, as the abode of the ark of the covenant.4

Just as Moses, Joshua, and Eliphaz divided the waters, so did also sages of a later period. Jesus walked upon the waters, and in another connection we are told that the waters of the flood flowed backwards when appealed to by them as a proof of the correctness of his interpretation of the Law.4

On the other hand, wells and rain-pipes were considered to be haunted by demons.

On one occasion a man who rested on one of the gutters was hurt by a demon because he trod upon his toe. Abhayh helped one demon to fight another who was trying to drive him from his own habitation. At the end of the fight some drops of blood of the slain demon were seen floating on the surface of the water of the gutter.5

The Angel of Death is said to dip the sword by which he has taken the life of man in the water found in the well. All the vessels must therefore be emptied. This, however, is a popular interpretation of the ancient law of purity, according to which death defiles all food and drink found under the same roof as a dead body.

2. Lustration.—Water is the great purifier and cleanser.7 Practically and symbolically, just as water is identified with the spirit and the Law is described as the water of life, water cleances man from all kinds of physical contaminations, mostly after contact either with dead bodies or with anything described by the Law as impure.8 The degree of levitical purity claimed for service in the Temple and the regulations transferred to private life, and the sect of the Essenes obtained their name in all probability from their habit of constant lustration and purification, reaffirming as they did from mixing with a profane object or object not properly purified. The only means for such purification were bathing and ablation—complete immersion in a sufficient quantity of water, more especially running water, or the pouring of a quantity of water over the naked body. The spiritual significance attached to a ritual bath is of later origin; for bathing was never understood in Judaism to mean also washing of the soul. Physical contamination could be eliminated by immersion or by ablation, but the spiritual contamination remained the same; for, as one of the sages puts it, 'a man who sins and confesses him, and yet continues to live in sin is like a man who takes the bath of purification and holds an unclean animal in his hand.'

3. The question whether both immersion and ablation were required for purification from defilement seems to be considered differently by Jews, Samaritans, and Karaites. The two last hold that ablation (pouring of the water over the body without immersion) is sufficient. How far this practice prevailed in practice is a question which lies outside the scope of this article and may have some importance for the history of baptism.5 In later times the washing of hands alone was considered sufficient to eliminate the charge of defilement,6 although, as no ashes of the red heifer are to be found—which were an indispensable adjunct to religious purification—all the people in modern times must be considered as living in a state of defilement, kept at this by constant washing of hands and by occasional immersions in properly constructed baths. The priests, the descendants of the Cohenim, even now have their hands washed by the Levites present in the synagogue before they ascend the rostrum to recite in a special cantillation the priestly benediction. Moreover, no dead person is shriven without being specially washed,7 and the mourners when leaving the cemetery are also expected to wash their hands, for they have been in a place considered impure by the Law.

Water, again, was used for purification or as a token of integrity by the elders who defiled a dead body was found and the murdering could not be traced; they went to the banks of a roaring stream and, washing their hands, declared publicly and solemnly their innocence of the murder (De 21, 19). In the ceremony for testing the purity of a suspected wife she had to drink bitter waters (or rather 'waters of curse'), prepared by the priest.

8. It is not unimportant to explain the words used in connexion with this kind of water. It is called 'holy water' (Neh 8, 5), whilst in connexion with the purification of the leper the priest used 'living water' or, according to the RV, 'running water' (Lev 14, 6), but the same word occurs in Genesis to denote the well dug by Isaac's servants where they found 'living water.' it is difficult to imagine how running water could be in a vessel. The operation in each case is the purification and magical cleansing and the designation of the water as 'holy' can best be understood by comparing the use of water in other mystical processes. The vessel or the bowl must be filled with water which no one else has touched, and of which no one else has drunk. It is kept intact and sanctified for the purpose to which it is to be put. The moment it has been touched or some of it drunk, it becomes defiled or dead.

Bows for water with magical inscriptions have
often been used for such purposes in the well-known Lekanatomy. 1

3. Rain.—It was natural that in an agricultural land like Palestine rain should be considered a blessing and drought a curse. In Dt 11:14 the early agricultural settlements worshiped the sources of rain believed to be treasuries in the heavens. The 'waters above' are mentioned in Gn 1:2, and at the flood the 'windows of heaven were opened' (77). They are described in greater detail in Enoch, xlf. 4, and in the Revelation of Moses. 2 According to the legend, the key which locks and unlocks this treasury was one of the three keys which God kept, and He only once delivered it up to man when He handed it over to the prophet Elijah, upon whose 'word' alone depended the drought or rainfall (1 K 17). The rainfall was therefore regarded as a divine gift and a blessing which followed the fulfillment of the oath of the drought was caused by sin; a moral connexion was established between the phenomena of nature and man's moral actions. It was thus natural that the natural result of the sin should have a direct bearing upon obtaining rain or causing the withholding of it, and, furthermore, that the intercession of the pious could under certain conditions counteract the consequences of evil deeds.

According to the teaching of the Rabbis, rain fell only for the sake of the righteous, and was withheld when the Israelites deserved punishment. Drought was the consequence of remissness in paying tithes and heave offerings, or of slander, impudence, and neglect of study of the Law. 3 Collective action no less than individual intercession would also have the desired effect of breaking up the drought. Prayers for rain and symbolic ceremonies would then become efficacious. The prophet, through his action on Mt. Carmel, brings back rain (1 K 18:37). In later times the high-priest prayed especially for rain on the Day of Atonement, when he performed the service in the Temple. He not only prayed for rain in due season, but went out of his way to pray that God should not heed the prayers of the wayfarers who might be detained by drought on the road.

There was a special festival held in the Temple, the Day of the Water-Liberation, which was the occasion of rather boisterous rejoicings. The Mishnah state the conditions and the description of it. It was called Simchath bet ha-shoebah, 'the rejoicing at the place of the drawing' (i.e. of the water), and was kept on the 21st day of Tishri, the 7th day of the Feast of Tabernacles, the day of the Great Hosha-a-na. No explanation has hitherto been given for the use of water as a libation on that day instead of the regular wine-libation. It is, no doubt, of a prophylactic and symbolic character. It is an offering of the element which the people prayed to be blessed with during the year at the threshold of which they were standing. There may have been another reason for the libation as well as for the season chosen. According to the Bible narrative (Gn 7:11), the flood began and terminated about this time (it began on the 17th and ended on the 27th of the second month). There is now a difference of about a month between the two dates. Probably the coincidence of time was considered sufficient to celebrate the anniversary of the flood by a water-libation, and by such an act to obviate the recur-

ence of a flood and to show gratitude for the promise that henceforth the rain would come only as a blessing. There may also have been a closer correspondence of the time in the intercalary year, if the intercalation was made at the close of the civil year, the' two months of the blessing were reckoned as the sixth month, but is really the twelfth month. Thus the seventh would become the eighth (second) and on the 17th of the second (eighth) the sluices through which the heave offering went on. With the destruction of the Temple a special prayer for rain had been added to the service of the eighth day of Tabernacles. 4 Though the ceremony ceased in the Temple, the remembrance has been kept in the service of the seventh day of the Great Hosh-a-na, which is modelled on the service arranged for the occasion of drought. 2 A special significance has been given in later times to the service of the seventh day, for people seem to have forgotten the real meaning and origin of these supplementary prayers and ceremonies. Moreover, since Temple times special prayers are recited in the additional mishap (57a) for the Day of Festive Assembly. Corresponding to the change of season, similar prayers for dew form an integral part of the Liturgy for the first day of Passover. 5 The month of Tishri is celebrated as one of the most propitious for prognosticating the weather. 6

A most elaborate description has been preserved of the ceremonies instituted and the service arranged for the occasion of drought. It is, in fact, the most complete description found in the Talmud. The solemnity was increased by the strewing of ashes on the head, the blowing of trumpets, the institution of supplicatory prayers, and the extension of a rigorous fast for young and old, strong and infirm, male and female. It was made the occasion of general mourning also by performing that service in the open market-place. The severity of the penance and the multiplication of prayers increased with the fear that the rain might fail. Such a service could not be performed anywhere except in the Holy Land. 7 Great men enjoyed the reputation of having obtained rain by their own merits.

Outside of Palestine no special service could be arranged on the lines of the Talmudic prescription. As far as possible, fasting and special prayers were included, but the rain was no fixed form. Each community may arrange it in its own way, and either use older compositions or compose its own prayers. They do not follow the form part of the regular description in the recognized standard forms of the Prayer-Book. Such prayers may be met with in collections of Occasional Prayers both in MS and in print.

The most important feature of that service has been introduced in a reduced form into that of the seventh day of Tabernacles, the exact day of the water-libation. It has been invested with the solemnity and character of a second Day of Atonement. In order to explain the supplicatory prayers and the other ceremonies which now form part of the additional service, it must also be remembered that the trumpets are blown exactly as prescribed in the Talmud for the day of solemn prayer for rain. The attributes of God are recited.

1 Book of Prayer and Order of Service according to the Customs of the Spanish and Portuguese Jews, ed. Gaster, London, 1901-06, iv, p. 176.
2 See below, p. 73.
3 Bibkha Etzvah, 147a; see Gaster, *Jewish Weather Lore*, in Jubilee number of Jewish Chronicle, 1901.
4 This ceremony is described in the first chapter of the Mishnah Ta'muth and the treatise of that name. It is still more fully dealt with in our period, as can be seen from Tur Orach Hayyim. A fuller, though not complete, MS of this service, with its explanatory and supplicatory sections, has come from the Holy Land into the possession of the present writer. It must be anterior to the Sixte centry.
the procession of the palm-leaf and the willow takes place, just as in the time of the Temple; and prayers are offered up almost exclusively for rain in its due season. They are, in fact, the very prayers found in the Midrash on Genesis V, 1, and the Talmud, and also in the description of Asheri. Curiously enough, similar prayers have also been arranged for the cessation of rain. In fact, all the supplications of the Talmud for rain, or for beliefs like plague, etc., follow the lines of this liturgy for rain. In addition to these special services, a regular change takes place in the form of the daily prayer (amidah), or eighteen benedictions, in the special blessing for rain and dew. It is connected with the change of the equinox. It begins approximately sixty days after the winter solstice. This is also a season which is not free from superstitions and beliefs and practices. A Talmodic legend tells of a certain Nicodemus (Nakdimon), son of Gorion, who had obtained from the Hellenen a monument of pits filled with water, which he distributed among the poor at the time of a great drought. He promised to pay a heavy fine before a certain date the rain would fill the pits. In the afternoon of the appointed day the area was still shining bright, and no sign of rain was visible. Nicodemus went up to the Temple, was received, and the sun began to wane, rose up again and thus prolonged the day, before the close of which a heavy rain fell. This proves the law of nicodem ground obligation. Honi, another pious man, drew a circle, and, standing within it, prayed to God, and the rain came down in heavy drops. In another legend it is said that during this drought, when the clouds gathering first in the corner where she was praying. The drought, according to a legend, is also broken up by the cry of the raven. It is said that it was granted to him as his reward for the sacrifice of thenodeValue, now to bury Abel, by digging a grave and burying a dead raven.

A new element has been added to these prayers for rain, in the processions to the cemetery and in the prayers to the pious and illustrious dead for their intercession. No man is found in the later generations so worthy of appealing to God as were those of old times; they therefore pray that those who are buried in the dust may intercede with God in favour of the suffering people. Such processions are headed, as a rule, by the Rabbi, who is accompanied by the elders and the children. Sometimes—but rarely—the scrolls of the Law are carried in the procession. Litanies are sung and recited, and prayers are said over the graves. It is the Jewish counterpart to the Christian procession, notably of the Eastern Church, in times of severe drought, when the relics of the saint are carried on the shoulders of the clergy in a solemn procession through the town, headed by the bishop or the metropolitan of the place.

A Jewish poet named Saloedia heard by the present writer tells that the Jews who fled from the Inquisition in Spain at the end of the 15th cent., were admitted into Tiberias on condition that they would bring rain in time of drought. The people of that town, especially the children, used to gather under the window of the Halakh sitting for rain. It is told that on such an occasion the late Rabbi Kovo, going out in procession to the cemetery, warned his people to prepare themselves with coverings for the rain, and they returned under such a downpour that the streets were turned into rivers.

The rain thus plays a very important part in the Jewish service. The prayer which is recited daily, and the introduction of special prayers on important occasions into the liturgy, as well as other ceremonies and practices, testify to the belief that a divine gift such as rain can be obtained only through piety and uprightness and by means of supplication and self-chastisement.

LITERATURE.—The bibliographical references are given in the footnotes. No special study exists anywhere on this subject. M. Gaster.

1 See Asheri, ch. 590.
2 Book of Prayer, l. 31 f., 282.
3 Genizah, loc. cit.
4 Trumith, 235; see Gaster, 'Heitiges zur vergleichen Sagen und Märchendenken,' in MJW, xxiv. (1892) 797.
5 loc. cit., 245.
6 Petref R. Ritter, ch. xvi.
7 See Asheri, loc. cit.
8 Lippold, Jahrbucher, 1880.
9 See Trumith, 245, where it is said that in certain processions in Bohemian, when the relics of St. Demetrius were carried through the streets of the city.

WATER, WATER-GODS (Indian).—The special conditions of the Indian climate, producing, as in the western desert, a scanty and irregular rainfall, in other places excessive downpour resulting in floods and inundations. The seasons, and the constant risk of failure or irregularity of the monsoon, promote the popular animistic beliefs and that of special deities ruling the ocean, rivers, tanks, and wells.

Water runs up this whole gamut or scale of religious expression. The honours paid to the running brook, a hot spring or a river then exaggerated by floods and failures, bringing riches or rain—'are intended for the living water itself by a large class of votaries; and this notion of material identity seems preserved by the custom of bathing in sacred streams, of self-drowning, and of witch-dipping, which last custom resembles exactly that of England. Suicide and witch-dipping in rivers present both sides of the same conception, acceptance or rejection by the divine element. Further on, the water-power is no longer defined Nature, but controlled by a supernatural spirit we have the kelpie who inhabits rivers under the form of a buffalo, and personifies their effects. His name is Mahilasu; he has no image, but a buffalo's head is cut off and deposited on his altar. After this we ascend to mythological legends about the origins and descent of the greater rivers from the Hindu deities, and to legends of streams turned to stone, or otherwise engineered by interposition of the divine energy incarnate.4

In Mizrapur a pool in which some buffaloes were once drowned is now inhabited by the buffalo demon, Dilinasa, who in company with the demon Vatsak, or some similar demon, destroys any one dares to fish there until he has propitiated these powers by an offering; another form of demon attacks fishermen, appearing in the shape of a turban which fixes itself to his book and increases in length as he tries to drag it ashore.

Sometimes the demon, as in the case of the Zalgr of Kashmir, takes the shape of a horse, the foamed waves breaking on the bank naturally assuming this shape in the popular fancy. Such sea-horses in the Hindu legend are provided by Varuna, the sea-god. The custom of taking oaths on water conceived as a spirit is common among the Karests and other primitive tribes.

1. Water-gods in the Veda and later literature.—Much controversy has arisen on the question of the amount of knowledge of the sea possessed by the Indo-Aryans. On the one hand, writers like H. H. Wilson7 assert that they were a maritime and seafaring people, familiar with the ocean and its phenomena; and references in the Veda are quoted of merchants making expeditions to some foreign country or islands. Other writers represent them as living far from the coast and unfamiliar with the sea. The evidence quoted by Bühler of voyages in the Indian Ocean seems inadequate, and the charge of ignorance of the ocean implies a knowledge of the sea which needs not to be confined to the estuary of the Indus.

"This is to circumscribe too narrowly the Vedic knowledge of the ocean which was almost inevitable to people who knew the Indus." In later times this knowledge gradually increased. There seems to be no proof of sea trade with Babylon in the Vedic times; this probably developed about A.D. 700.8

The extensive and long-continued emigration from India to the East—including Pegu, Siam and Cambodia on the main route—would naturally lead to increased seafaring.8

2. Crooke, P. F., p. 44.
WATER, WATER-GODS (Indian)

Nicholas of Dwārakī (q.v.), to whom sailors pray to save them from shipwreck. Siva, an inland god, is worshipped at river junctions. But the place of the primitive sea-river-god hardly assumed by figures drawn from the local animism. In Madras in time of drought, instead of worshiping Varuna, men pray to the spirit Kudumpāvī (the wicks) or to some other local spirit, to send the rain. The Apsaras (Skr. ap, áreas; 'water,' ēri, 'going,' in the sense of moving in the waters or between the waters of the clouds), a kind of nymph who even in the Rigveda appear completely submerged, have a particular abode in the oceans, and in post-Vedic literature frequent lakes and rivers, especially the Ganges, were in later times believed by the Rajputs to convey the souls of dead warriors from the battlefield to the mansion of the sun, and have now little influence over the waters or on the rain.

4. Modern ocean-worship. The sea, known to modern Hindus as Ratnagurā ('filled with jewels'), is revered by the pious, and at the Amāvaśyas or new moon, a sea bath is considered cleansing. On that day the waves of 990 rivers are supposed to be brought into the sea by the spring tides. Bathing is also efficacious during the whole of the Urand, or intercalary month, and in parts of Kālīyugā on the bright second of every month, many people light a fire on the shore, throw butter into the fire, and on the day when the fleet puts to sea fisherman pour milk, sugar, and liquor into the water and throw in flowers and coco-nuts. In W. Bengal the Dussehra Day (navarātrī or varuṇāṭha puruniha) is held at the full moon of the month Śrāvanī (July–August) in the height of the annual monsoon, when flowers and coco-nuts are thrown into the sea, and offerings of the sea-goddess Gangā at the confluence of that river with the sea. He is invoked in daily worship as 'king of waters, who curse the wicked, who made a road in the heavens to receive the rays of the Sun. I therefore follow that route.' Like many various gods, he is commemorated as a fertility-deity at marriages.

3. Kṛṣṇa and Śiva; the Apsaras. The place of Varuṇa as a sea-god was at a later period some extent made by the Kṛṣṇa and Śiva. Kṛṣṇa, a god who is the hero of many solar myths, the slayer of the demons, who dives under the sea and slays Kṛṣṇa and Karttikeya, his semi-divine, semi-solar or atmospheric god is evidently connected with the dark sun and the storms of the rainy season, and his shrine is at Dwārakī on the west coast, where the Sūrya into the boundless western ocean.

During the 5th and 6th centuries A.D., on the arrival of the Chinese Hiuns in Gujarat and Kālīyugā, the sea began to influence these new-comers, as is shown by the fame which gathered round the new or revived gods. Kṛṣṇa in his form as Somānaśa or Someśvara ('lord of the moon'), with his shrine at Somnāth (q.v.), and Kṛṣṇa, the Apollo or St. Nicholas, still retains some of the functions of a sea- or water-god. The most famous festival in E. Bengal is his festival on the full moon of the month Kārttika (Oct.–Nov.), when devout Hindus bathe at a famous bathing-place. In other parts of Bengal no image of Varuṇa is made, nor is he honoured at any festival or temple; but he is identified as the god of the south-west winds of the earth, and by fishermen before they start their work, or in time of drought to secure the needed rain.

In Gujarāt he is believed to live in the water, in a boat account, his five abodes, — the sea, the river, the pond, the spring, and the well. In ancient times, he received human sacrifices, as in the story of Śūnaśeṇa, the prototype of the god's adventure to secure the fire-goddess Gangā at the confluence of that river with the sea. He is invested in daily worship as 'king of waters, who curse the wicked, who made a road in the heavens to receive the rays of the Sun. I therefore follow that route.' Like many various gods, he is commemorated as a fertility-deity at marriages.

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During the 5th and 6th centuries A.D., on the arrival of the Chinese Hiuns in Gujarāt and Kālīyugā, the sea began to influence these new-comers, as is shown by the fame which gathered round the new or revived gods. Kṛṣṇa in his form as Somānaśa or Someśvara ('lord of the moon'), with his shrine at Somnāth (q.v.), and Kṛṣṇa, the Apollo or St. Nicholas, still retains some of the functions of a sea- or water-god. The most famous festival in E. Bengal is his festival on the full moon of the month Kārttika (Oct.–Nov.), when devout Hindus bathe at a famous bathing-place. In other parts of Bengal no image of Varuṇa is made, nor is he honoured at any festival or temple; but he is identified as the god of the south-west winds of the earth, and by fishermen before they start their work, or in time of drought to secure the needed rain. In Gujarāt he is believed to live in the water, in a boat account, his five abodes, — the sea, the river, the pond, the spring, and the well. In ancient times, he received human sacrifices, as in the story of Śūnaśeṇa, the prototype of the god's adventure to secure the fire-goddess Gangā at the confluence of that river with the sea. He is invested in daily worship as 'king of waters, who curse the wicked, who made a road in the heavens to receive the rays of the Sun. I therefore follow that route.' Like many various gods, he is commemorated as a fertility-deity at marriages.

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catches a man, she compels him to cohabit with her, and kills him if he refuses. In the Panjáb plagues the yoqini, or joqini, haunts waterfalls, while the jol-yoqini occupies wells and streams. The following passage, and others which follow, must help to explain why sailors, and he is said to have done many strange miracles.  

Dáryá Pír, the 'sea-saint,' sometimes identified with Khwásá Khidár, is in Gujarát patron of the community of sailors. He is represented as having a blue body, and held to help the voyagers of the sea, and his offerings are made to him by pouring a little water on the ground through a sieve dedicated to him.  

6. Water-sprits or spirits. — Besides the greater water-gods a host of spirits or spirits are worshipped. This cult is specially prominent in the Buddhist Játaka. Some of them are malevolent; in a bas-relief at the stupa of Bhirákút a sea-monster devours a ship and its crew. Others, again, are kindly and are worshipped in conjunction with the nádás, or serpent-gods. Among spirits of this class at the present day in the Konkan, Bombay, the ancurás, or avarás, are ghosts of young women who, after giving birth to one or more children, committed suicide by drowning; they live in water, attack any one who approaches them, and go about in groups of seven; their victims are young women, and, when a girl is attacked, her father, uncle, or any relative who makes an offering of food, red powder, and green clothes to the sprites. Another Konkání sprite of the same kind is Hálád, the ghost of a drowned woman, who wears yellow clothes, lets her hair flow loosely, and is plump in front and a skeleton behind; when women are attacked by her, they let their hair flow loose, shake all over, and scream. The giriíáb endows them with deep water. In Gujarát the nádá, or 'mother,' and the saknáhá, or 'gress,' haunt springs and pools and drown or enter the persons of those who venture near their haunts; an exorcist effects a cure by giving a charmed thread to the patient. In Mysore the akkgápará, or 'seven sisters,' attack women, and in such cases the village washerman performs a rite of propitiation by setting up seven stones near the water and making an offering. In the Salem District, Madras, the ákkánamél is female sprites who occupy tanks and cause the environs to burst as they tread on them while they are quarrelling.  

In N. India the ghátháká, or 'ferry brother,' must be compelled to cross the rítes of black sheep, and allow them to eat. In the United Provinces within the border of the Jumna 'was the fearful pool of the serpent Kálíyá ("the black one") boiling with the fires of poison, from the roots of which huge large trees were flung, or were lighted and burnt; by whose waters, when raised by a gate into the air, birds were scorched; the demon was conquered by Kíjña and driven into the ocean.' In the Panjáb District of Kála the jol-pat, or water-fairy, can be conciliated by offering a lamb and flowers on the bank of a watercourse; if she catch a man, she compels him to cohabit with her, and kills him if he refuses. In the Panjáb plagues the yoqini, or joqini, haunts waterfalls, while the jol-yoqini occupies wells and streams. The following passage, and others which follow, must help to explain why sailors,


3 Enthoven, Folklore Notes, Gujarát, p. 49.

4 Bhakta, Saróvar, 1303, 281, and A. Cunningham, The Stupa of Bhirakut, Bombay, 1879, p. 106, pl. vi. fig. 2.

5 J. S. Campbell, Notes on the Sprít Ríst of Belíef and Custom, Bombay, 1883, p. 1691; Enthoven, Folklore Notes, Gujarát, p. 113; Elia, Ethnographie, p. 357.

6 Campbell, p. 156.

7 Enthoven, Folklore Notes, Konkán, p. 15.

8 Enthoven, Folklore Notes, Gujarát, p. 49.

9 Ethnographie, Reg. Royal, Myseré, no. 4, Bangalore, 1800, p. 12, no. 997, p. 10.

10 If J. Richards, Seram Gazetteer, Madras, 1918, i. 139.

11 J. T. V. Gibb, 40.

The wide-spread belief that a ghost cannot cross running water prevails in India;1 a thread is passed over a stream to help the soul to return to its own house, and to the Bridge of Death and Charon, the ferryman.2

7. Wells, tanks, lakes—All over the country sacred wells, tanks, and lakes, and their indwellings. These are expiatory. That expiatory arises in various ways: they have been made, discovered, or occupied by some god or saint; hot water flows in them, a special mark of divine power;3 their waters periodically increase or decrease; they possess certain plants (especially in cases of leprosy); bathing in them may cause a change of sex.4 No well is considered lucky until its spirit is solemnly welded to that of the garden which it is intended to water, the former being represented by the sâlgârâna, or amoma, sacred to Vignû, and the latter by the holy tulasi, or basil plant (ocimum sanctum).5 In the same way, every tank should have a wooden pole in its centre to which the water-spirit is married; until this is done, the water will increase and not allay thirst and may cause disease; the pole also protects the tank-spirit from the attacks of demons.6 The prince of Jannfer goes annually to the lake Gharsar to perform the sacred act of cleansing it from the accumulated mud and sand; first he takes out a handful, and then rich and poor follow his example.

LITERATURE.—This is quoted in the footnotes.

W. CROOKE.

WEALTH.—Wealth is variously defined according to the standpoint from which it is regarded. But, in whatever aspect it may be viewed, its significance lies in its relation to life as a whole, and it can only be adequately understood when treated as a part of the larger study of man. It cannot be dissociated from the social and moral development of the race. It obtains its ultimate meaning from its place in the scale of values which determine the worth of life. Ethical considerations must therefore be dominant throughout the entire treatment of the subject. "It is man's 'good,' or rather his goodness, that endows wealth with all its value."1 Various the whiles of the question shade into each other, for the purpose of this article it will be convenient to consider the theme under those three aspects—economic, ethical, and Christian.

I. ECONOMIC ASPECT.—I. Historical sketch of the creation and increase of wealth.

Man alone among the denizens of the earth is the conscious possessor of its resources. Though he has many primary instincts in common with the lower animals, he differs from the brute creation in that he has the faculty of unifying his desires, postponing the present to the future, and making the accumulations of past labour the basis of fresh endeavour. In the growth of his needs and the methods of satisfying them we can trace the economic development of the human race. Very early in history questions of the right of property arose. In the patriarchate period, as depicted in the Old Testament, there is evidence in the existence of private possessions. In early Greek philosophy investigations into the nature and extent of economic law occurred. By Plato and Aristotle the

industrial aspect of social life is treated as a part of politics. The Roman jurists, while recognizing the sacredness of property, direct their attention chiefly to the ulterior successions of its tenure. The asceticism of the early and medieval Church cast suspicion upon all forms of wealth and tended to check individual enterprise and private possession.7 The Renaissance gradually broke down the feudal system, armed with the end of the spirit which the Reformation brought, trade and adventure awoke and the possibilities of the physical world came within the vision of man. The search for gold and silver underlay important economic facts was greatly stimulated by the researches of Bacon and Newton, while the investigations of Grotius and Leibnitz on the Continent and of Hobbes, Locke, and Hume in England aroused the thinking world to the bearing of industrial questions upon the progress of mankind.

With the exception of the writings of French physiocrats, of whom Quesnay was the leader, there was no really scientific treatment of the nature and functions of wealth till the appearance of Adam Smith's treatise on The Wealth of Nations in 1776:

This book marks an epoch in industrial thought and enterprise. Political economy for the first time becomes a science. Following Smith's work there appeared in quick succession Malthus's Essay on the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817), and J. S. Mill's Principles of Political Economy (1848). Smith dealt with the causes of wealth, Malthus with the causes of poverty, while Bentham and Mill treated mainly the ways and means of distribution. The Wealth of Nations appeared at a propitious hour.

During the Middle Ages the successive phases of social disability which feudalism and serfdom had bequeathed tended to hinder the free life and development of man; and it was not till the individualistic gospel of Rousseau found a response among thinkers that a new sense of human right and freedom awoke. Adam Smith claimed to be the champion of popular liberties. He exposed several traditional fallacies in regard to property and its rights and uses. He showed that the progress of society depended upon individual initiative, division of labour, freedom of contract, and unrestricted interchange of goods. Money, he maintained, was not in itself wealth, but only a measure of the social commodities which constitute wealth; and the riches of a nation consisted not in the amount of gold hoarded in its coffers, but in the quantity, variety, and facility of its exports and imports. Unrestrained and widely distributed industry, he held, was the prime and dominant factor of a country's prosperity.

The historical treatment of economics generally adopted in recent years by French and German writers owes its inception largely to the historical insight and philosophical grasp of Adam Smith. But, though he was in advance of his times, many facts have emerged since his day which necessitate a reconstruction of economic science. The new historical instinct which was just awakening and has since been applied so effectively to many departments of inquiry; the general acceptance of the 'evolution theory,' with light that it has thrown upon the conflict and co-operation of man in the development of the race; the industrial reaction caused by the development of science, and the invention of machinery for hand labour; the growth of democracy, with the spread of new ideas of liberty following in the wake of the French Revolution—these are among the factors which have greatly

1 See Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, bk. 1, ch.
modified economic study and made the problem of wealth a theme of vastly wider implication than its early investigators dreamt. Later writers, such as Ricardo, Say, Say, Bagehot, Toynbee, and Marshall, have shown that political economy must be subservient to human progress in the highest sense and that the moral element cannot be eliminated.

2. Meaning of wealth,—We are now in a position to state generally what economists mean by wealth. The 'good' in the economic sense is every natural product which serves as satisfaction of man. By universal consent the word is applied to things which are material and exchangeable. Four attributes are usually comprehended in its definition: (1) materiality, (2) transferability, (3) limitation in quantity, (4) utility. Of these the first is now regarded as doubtful, since wealth may embrace things not entirely material, such as some forms of service. The last is essential, but a larger meaning must be given to 'utility.' Shortly, wealth is said to consist of things that can be bought and sold, the amount they represent being measured by the quantity of money that they would fetch in the market. The definition, however, leaves out of sight of the occupational inclusion and exclusion. On the one hand, a large trade exists in supplying certain satisfactions of a sensual nature which cannot be regarded as economic; and some of this kind, though involving exchange of money, does not contribute in any sense to the well of man. On the other hand, light, air, even water, unless involving conveyance, have apparently no exchange value; but indirectly they are considerable elements in the wealth of nations.

Further, 'potentiality of being bought and sold' excludes many goods, such as health, integrity of character, parental affection, which, though not saleable, have undoubted value, since they render their possessors more fit for the battle of life and more capable members of the national organism.

In protesting against the crude conception that wealth consists in the amount of gold or silver a nation possesses, Adam Smith deliberately describes the wealth of a country as 'the annual produce of its land and labour,' or 'the necessaries and conveniences of life which is annually consumed.' The important point in this statement is that wealth is not land, cattle, machinery, etc. possessed at a particular point of time, but rather the substances consumed or things deriving their utility through active use. The English statisticians of the 17th cent. regarded the wealth of the country with the eyes of a farmer, and, like the French physiocratic school, denied the quality of productivity to all labour not employed immediately on the land. Hence a second important point to be noted is that Adam Smith rightly included in 'productive labour' not only labour employed on the land, but all kinds of work which improve material objects.

The French economist, J. B. Say, extended the idea of productive labour to cover 'non-material products.' And from his time the annual produce has been conceived as including 'productive' as well as commodities. Economically, wealth may be summed up as the product of what in modern life is termed 'the economic or industrial system,' meaning by industry 'all those articles which go to make any sort of wealth including the services of the judge, the clergyman, the acrobat,' 2 not material goods alone, but 'the work of government, the legal professions, the fine arts, all grateful recreations, must be brought under the "industrial system."'

3. The factors of wealth.—In the production of wealth economists enumerate three factors: land, labour, capital. Land and labour are obviously requisite at all times and places; and, though in primitive societies capital existed only in very rudimentary forms, it also becomes essential in any community which is organized on a large scale.

(a) Land.—The two primary sources of wealth are material for work and work for material—Nature and man. The starting-point is found in the original needs which stimulate men to engage in labour for their satisfaction. But labour itself produces nothing. It can exercise itself only upon the given. In one sense Nature is the mother of all wealth. We are rich when she gives, poor when she withholds. Yet Nature yields nothing for nothing. Her gifts are available only as man brings the tool of hand and brain to bear upon them. As economists put it (though not quite accurately), it is the land—including not its surface fruits only, but all that is contained in the bowels of the earth, coal, iron ore, minerals of all kinds, and even the sea with its manifold treasures—that is the prime source or factor of potential wealth.

(b) Labour.—It is the function of labour not to create but to extract, transform, and shape to the uses of man the potencies and raw material of the earth. The supreme service which labour renders to society is defined by J. S. Mill as 'putting things in fit places.'

Labour in the physical world,' he says, 'is always and solely employed in putting objects in motion; the properties of matter, the laws of nature, do the rest.'

Though no wealth can be produced without labour, there are some kinds of labour which may be very useless and not actually for the production of material wealth. Hence a distinction has been drawn between 'productive' and 'non-productive' labour. But this distinction can hardly be sustained.

Can it be said, e.g., that the work of a miner is productive, that of a teacher, a poet, or a statesman unproductive? Men who do not work with their hands may be really contributing to the material well-being of man. And what seems at first sight to be fruitless or even wasted activity may in the highest sense be conducive to life. Indeed there are some things which, though not computable in money, greatly tend to increase the productive power even of physical labour. Three elements at least may be mentioned: division of labour, combination in effort, invention and application of tools and machinery. 'All tools and engines of the earth,' says Emerson, 'are only ex- tension of man's limbs and senses.' But machines can only second; they cannot supply his enabled faculties. To these means must be added what, after all, is of most importance—the moral and intellectual elements—the skill, intelligence, character, and fidelity of the worker himself. A man is more than a machine; and, without the personality behind, physical and mechanical appliances, however complete, would fail of their results. In the production of wealth the economist is apt to overlook spiritual values. Education, the discipline and training of the home, the school, the college, the hardships and hazards of life, and all the moulding and informing institutions of society may appear to have no immediate monetary worth, but they are inestimable forces in the making of the workman, rendering him to himself and the community more fit and effective agent of productive service.

(c) Capital.—It is difficult to define this element or designate precisely its functions. The term has become the stock-in-trade of modern industrial con-

1 See Dic. of Political Economy, s. v. 'Wealth.'
dict. Capital has unfortunately been regarded by labour as the instrument by which owners of productive property exploit and without money make their own terms and manipulate work in their own interests. Capitalism has undoubtedly been a stern taskmaster in the past. The owners of capital may be said to have been, and to be still, the controlling power of our industrial system. They have taken the place formerly held by the landed aristocracy as the pivot of the social and industrial order. That the hopes which assuredly they have offered a stubborn disposition to all encroachments upon their privileges; and during the last quarter of a century all advancement of wages and improvement of environment on behalf of labour have been secured only by the pressure of trade unionism and the employment of the strike weapon. Hence the interests of employers and workmen have come to be regarded as inimical; and bitterness and class hatred have ensued which have led to conflicts costly alike to masters and to men. An impartial judgment is bound to recognize faults on both sides. At bottom of the perversity there has prevailed a materialistic philosophy involving a false exaltation of money and a vulgar conception of life which, as a result of the spell of commercial prosperity at the close of last century, has pervaded all classes of society. It is the result of the richness, the indifference, the cruelty, and the vulgarity—in a word, the selfishness of wealth that has roused jealousy and suspicion and become a danger to the community. The working classes have been too apt pupils of their masters and have indulged in habits of laxity and impropriety which are a menace to the true weal of the nation. But, whatever may have been its abuses, and however it may have tended to ex-ploit labour for its own ends, absorbing within itself the legitimate fruits of toil, capital is an indispensable element in the production of wealth and an instrument of incalculable service in the development of the resources of civilization. In the economic sense, capital is wealth appropriated to productive employment. It may be defined as the aggregation of the surplus which has been saved from immediate use and is available for the further development of industry. It is of two kinds, circulating and fixed. Circulating capital consists of the wages paid to the workmen and of the raw materials essential to the scien-tific process of work. Fixed capital consists of buildings, machinery, tools, railway plant, shipping, etc. Circulating capital is being constantly used up, while fixed capital is permanent, more or less. Capital generally is the result of the industry of past generations used to promote and facilitate the industry of the present and the future. In every form of capital we trace the labour, ingenuity, and foresight of men who have built up the trade of the present. For the development of capital it is necessary that production should exceed consumption, leaving a margin for future increase and development of trade. It cannot be denied that labour has contributed to the making of capital and ought to have a share in its possession and employment. It is the duty and task of the capitalist to organize, direct, and supervise the labours of the country, so that it shall adequately meet the needs of the community. These services have been rendered in the past principally by private individuals. It has been argued that they might be performed by the State, if necessary, and that the State should assume the police and protective functions of the State, in which all have a stake and in the prosperity of which all have a claim to participate. But, whatever may be said in favour of collective ownership, it must be noted that, while not controlled by the nation and supervised by State officials or possessed by private individuals, capital in the form of liquid assets is absolutely necessary for the organization and development of commerce; and without money it is not capable of producing its maximum results or obtaining for itself an assured or adequate return for its efforts. It is evident that the interests of capital and labour are not always or even in the common enterprise depends upon their harmonious co-operation. But, to attain this unity of aim, both labour and capital will have to revise their ideas. Instead of an unending strife, by which each party seeks to secure as many wealth and give as little as possible, a wider outlook must be sought in which each party shall realize that industry is only a means to an end and that life has more to offer than the things which can be estimated in terms of money alone.

II. ETHICAL ASPECT. From the foregoing sketch of the economic aspects of wealth it will be evident that the subject is one which lends itself naturally to ethical issues. Economic proposals for the re-adjustment of society assert a principle the neglect of which was the great failure of the 19th century and is still the source of much of our unavoidable social unrest.

1 That principle is simply that industrial prosperity is not to be measured solely in terms of material wealth; or, in other words, that industry must be regulated by the very ethical ends of economic ends. Its profit and loss account must show human as well as material values; and its industry is neither prosperous nor healthy which shows a great output of material goods at the cost of a great deterioration of health, the character and the human capacities of the worker.1

1. Relation of economics and ethics. If economic science is designed for the advancement of life itself (and this is its tacit claim), then human considerations must be ignored. Wealth is not the individual, not man work. Our starting-point must be that life is the principal thing and that every human being has a right to live and work; and that in giving his services to the good of the community he ought to have some share in the common weal. Even if a living wage be conceded, a living wage must be interpreted not as that which gives a mere subsistence, but as that which affords to each the opportunity of human self-expression. It has been truly said that 'life without the means of living, personal gifts or skill that have no outlet, liberty that is only an inner consciousness and has no sphere of exercise, are all alike meaningless.'2

2 Considerations like these have led many to be suspicious of the methods of producing the wealth of the economy, and especially doubtful whether the conception of wealth as usually assumed in scientific works can be accepted as ultimate. The common fallacy of confounding wealth and money is not yet obsolete. The idea that the wealth of a society is the necessary things of utility dies hard and continues to exert considerable influence upon economic thought.

1 Property is meaningless, not wealth at all, apart from its purpose, or apart from its possible or actual practical use. . . We have fallen into the error of regarding material wealth as having intrinsic value, and we tend not consciously to devote our energies to gaining possession of it, irrespective, or with the slightest consideration, of what is to be done with it. . . Wealth is not wealth, but only its unrealized possibility, apart from the spending of it.3

If hoarded wealth is not really wealth, and even less is misappropriated wealth. Even the phrase 'satisfaction of wants' is ambiguous. 'What we want' may mean either what a particular individual or class desires at the moment or what is an essential need of our whole nature as men. In other words, in order to decide what constitutes wealth in its largest sense, it is necessary to know what is the true good of man—an inquiry with which political economy must reckon if its results are to be of vital import for mankind.4


The economist defines his subject as one of 'the sciences of man,' the conception of the human value of wealth does not rule either his thought or our principles. But it is clear that from this point of view that the problems of capital and labour, profit and wages, free trade and protection, or the respective rights and limits of production by and the individual are to be considered. It is the personal element that brings the science of economics into closest touch with ethics. Both have to do with the 'good'; but the economic 'goods' are mostly regarded as material, whereas the 'goods' with which ethics is concerned are those acts which are the conditions of the attainment of the highest end of life. While it is perfectly legitimate to consider what will increase or diminish the material side of human happiness, it must never be forgotten that neither an individual nor a nation's life consists in the abundance of the things which it possesses. If we are rightly to estimate the worth of economic goods, we must consider them ultimately in their relation to the highest good—the good of life itself. Social reform has been a little retarded by writers who have been too much in a hurry to encourage the belief that the possession of riches is the secret of happiness and the only reasonable motive of human endeavour.

2. Doctrine of values. The conception of values, which is the basic dominant idea of modern thought, has been applied with considerable effect by some recent writers to economic subjects. A distinction is drawn between 'intrinsic' and ' instrumental' values. A thing has intrinsic value when it is an end in itself or is valued for its own sake apart from anything else to which it leads. A thing has instrumental value when it is merely a means to something else that follows from it as an effect, when it does not exist for itself but only for the sake of a further good. The value of any economic good is determined by its relation to other things which can be got in exchange for it. Thus, to use the technical phrase of economists, 'a thing's price is its value.' It is 'its value in exchange.' Its worth depends on what at the moment it can bring. It is relative, not absolute. It may be said that nearly everything in the world, the whole apparatus of living, has, in this sense, merely an instrumental or relative value. Things are nothing in themselves and would be useless in other conditions. Money, jewels, etc., would be of no value, unless the methods of measuring value, of determining value, are there some things that must always retain their value in every world. If life has any meaning at all, there are objects, ideals, such as honour, purity, truth, belonging to life itself, and of the essence of man, which cannot be bought or sold, and are incomparable, unexchangeable, absolute. In the last resort it may be said that intrinsic value belongs to personalities rather than things—to things of the soul rather than things of the sense. All other values are relative and obtain such worth as they have from their power to minister to the highest enrichment of man. Real wealth. Along this line of thought we are led to the absolute and all-inclusive conception of wealth as embracing everything that contributes to the fullness of life. There is no wealth but life,' says Ruskin, 'including all its powers of love, joy, and admiration.' It is true that merely instrumental objects may be transmuted by their use into more than means and may partake of the character of which they contribute. Objects of natural beauty, works of art, and the affec-

1 See W. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God (Gifford Lectures), Cambridge, 1918, PP. 37 ff., 75 ff., 124 ff., 134 ff., 568 ff.

2 Ibid. See also J. S. Mackenzie, Intro. to Social Philosophy, Glasgow, 1890, P. 392. See also some remarks on this subject, in Marshall, Economics, pp. 124, 131.

3 See Ruskin, op. cit.
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rests not in change of outward condition, but in the regeneration of inward character. And an honest application of the teaching of Christ to the practical life is in itself the secret of social and industrial betterment. It seems fitting here to give a brief review of Christ's teaching in reference to wealth.

Jesus has much to say concerning wealth. The subject bulks largely in His teaching and enters prominently into the frame-work of nearly all His parables.

1. The teaching of Jesus.—Though Jesus dwells frequently on the perils of wealth, He does not condemn the possession of property or denounce ownership in land, goods, or money. There is no depreciation of riches in themselves. He lays emphasis on their destructiveness (Mt 19:18); He warns His disciples against covetousness (Lk 12:15); and especially does He point out the danger of accumulating earthly treasures (Mt 6:9) and the impossibility of serving God and mammon (6:24). He lays down the principle that 'a man's life consisteth not in the abundance of the things which he possesseth' (Lk 12:15). Yet these sayings and warnings are not to be dismissed from impelling approval, imply rather that property and trading are the indispensable bases upon which the outward fabric of the social order is built. It shows no trace of belief that temporal possessions are evils in themselves. His parables constantly assume the right and indeed the responsibility of the individual to hold and administer wealth (Mt 25:14, Lk 19:14-26). Many of His sayings would be devoid of meaning if His attitude to the industrial system of His day had been one of uncompromising hostility. He could not, e.g., have justly advised the young ruler to sell what was not really his, or have suggested that he should induce another to accept for money what it was unlawful for him to retain. Many of His parables deal with the use of money, without indicating a single reproach on account of its possession (Mt 25:14, Lk 19:14-26). Christ does not demand withdrawal from the activities of the world. The asceticism of the early Church and the renunciation practised by those sects which make a profession of poverty and no countenance in the Gospels. Jesus and His disciples honour work and recognize trade. Christ acknowledges the rights of the wage-earner. Within the circle of His followers were men and women who worked at ordinary tradesmanship (Mt 25:14, Lk 8:19). His disciples had a common purse, and one of their number acted as treasurer.

2. Wealth and the supreme end of life.—The one and only aim of our Lord was the establishment of the rule of God in the hearts of men.1 The Kingdom of God is first; all else is secondary and subsidiary. This is the test of all earthly things. Possessions and occupations have validity only in relation to the supreme end of life. His calls to renunciation were made not because He deemed wealth to be inherently evil, but because in each case the required act of denial would remove the special hindrance to the realization of the spiritual life (Mt 19:18, Mk 4:9, Lk 6:4). In Mk 10:8 it is to be noticed that it is a deficiency of character that necessitates the repudiation of earthly possessions. Christ thus raises the whole question of material wealth to a spiritual plane. What He really condemns in connexion with riches is the spirit which holds them falsely, by non-use, misuse, or abuse.

Wealth and trust and a test.—Finally, wealth is everywhere regarded in reference to man's relation to God. It has thus a twofold significance. It is a trust and a test. There is no such thing as 1 See W. M. Clow, Christ and the Social Order, London, 1915, p. 81.

absolute ownership. All things belong to God our Father. We are but the pensioners on His bounty and the trustees for what He lends to us. No one can say, 'This is mine like with my own' (Mt 20:25, Lk 19:12). The Gospels indicate three in which the stewardship of wealth may be exercised.

(a) Almsgiving (Lk 12:21).—The beauty of charity may be measured by ostentation (Mt 6:3-4) or consciousness of merit. A man's gift of money has no value except as the expression of himself (Lk 12:42).

(b) Fidelity to one's daily work.—Those who receive Christ's severest commendation are the persons who have been unfaithful in the task entrusted to them (Mt 21:10, Mt. 22:29, Mk 12:20-21); while those most highly commended are such as conscientiously discharge their duties in the appointed sphere of life.

(c) Ministry of joy and beauty.—A third form of stewardship is indicated in the employment of gifts in the ministry of joy and beauty of life. The most impressive instance of this use of wealth is the administration of the hands of the Master who anointed the head and feet of Jesus with precious ointment. In answer to the reproachful question, 'To what purpose is this waste? Jesus defends the act and appreciation of the Master who took the ointment off his head and feet and applied it to the hands of the Creator. There is no such thing as mere money. It is always a symbol or a measure. Property is but the expression and instrument of personality. We have only what we own. Heaven's wealth is barren. And only as we give forth our life in service and sacrifice is it fruitful.


WELFARE.—(1) By the ethical term 'welfare' is meant the highest human good, the fating well or properly, the desirable human experience. In this formal use of the term nothing is implied as to the nature or constituents of this good. Aristotle notes this as the accepted usage in his day of the term as applied. 3

(2) The term usually implies the highest human good conceived as consisting in certain objective conditions rather than in subjective feelings. In this sense it is opposed to pleasure as the supreme good. The term 'perfection' is nearly his equivalent.

1 F. G. Peabody, Jesus Christ and the Social Question, p. 21.

2 Noam, Ethics, i.

3 Aristotle, Nicom. Eth., i.
lent, but has usually a somewhat narrower significance, exclusion of pleasure, whereas welfare, though not in its essence pleasure, involves pleasure as the end under which perfect activity and happiness are usually conjoined, while welfare involves this conjunction.

Aristotle's usage is typical, but not without difficulties of interpretation. Human welfare is not simply the activity of an abstract nature, but is the activity proper to man as man. This is reason, and human welfare consists in the excellence of rational activity. This rational activity includes theoretical and practical; in the former man is akin to the divine, but in the latter he is more specifically human. Outward goods, wealth, health, children, fame—these are good in so far as they are conditions of, or illustrations of, man's rational activity, but have no independent value. They exist for the sake of the rational life and not for the life for them. The position of pleasure relative to welfare is not wholly clear in the details of Aristotle's treatment, yet his fundamental principles seem certain. Pleasure is not the end of human action; yet it is the universal concomitant of perfect activity and that which serves to perfect this perfection. If the two could be separated, the wise man would choose the activity without the pleasure rather than the pleasure without the activity, but, as a matter of fact, this separation is not possible. Yet, in all cases, it is the objective nature of the activity that determines the value of a pleasure, and not the amount of the pleasure itself. The emphasis in Aristotle's treatment is upon the idea of welfare and the right conditions of the whole mode of life. It consists in rational activity because this is not a specific and exclusive form of activity, but is one which includes and harmonizes all others. In reason all human activities and their interpretation and completion and hence their well-being.

So also Paulsen:

'The goal at which the will of every living creature aims (welfare) is the normal exercise of the vital functions which constitute its nature. Man 'desires to live a human life and all that is implied in it; that is, a mental, historical life, in which there is room for the exercise of all human, mental powers and virtues.'


WELLS.—See WATER, WATER-GODS.

WERWOLF.—See LYCANTHROPY.

WESLEY.—I. Early life.—John Wesley was born on 17th June (O.S.) 1703, at the rectory of Epworth, being the son of Samuel and Susannah Wesley. Both his grandfathers were among the ejected ministers of 1662, so there was a strong Puritan strain in him. His father, Samuel, was rector, poet, scholar: he spent ten years in preparing his work on the Book of Job. The mother, Susannah, trained her children in the great truths of the Christian faith. There is something singular in the way in which his mother brought her many children into the audience chamber of God. On 28th Jan., 1714, John Wesley was nominated a pupil at Charterhouse, London. The treatment meted out to the boys of those days was Spartan, but Wesley's activity and enjoyment of being at school. As we read his Journal, and see him lovingly wander each year about the grounds, we note that Wesley never forgot his boyhood, and

that age could not wither his affection for Charterhouse. On 24th June, 1720, he was elected to Christ Church, Oxford, and remained there until 1725, when he went to Leiden and New College, Potter. About this time the Imitatio Christi and The Rules for Holy Living and Dying became his frequent companions. The Imitatio taught him that 'true religion was sented to the heart, and that God's will was extended to all our thoughts as well as words and actions.' It is of the Rules that Wesley writes:

'In reading the first parts of this book, I was exceedingly affected with that part in particular which relates to purity of Intention. Instantly I resolved to dedicate all my life to God: all my thoughts, and words, and actions.'

Wesley was now a determined seeker, there was a great hunger within him for something beyond the experience which he had—for thirteen years he sought peace by prayer, tears, and through difficult and tragic experience, and on 24th May, 1738, entered into a true evangelical experience of Divine love.

In March, 1738, he was elected Fellow of Lincoln College, Oxford. It is with this College, rather than Christ Church, that Wesley's name is so closely linked: for, though the great hall of Christ Church is best known by name, the College of Lincoln, now called Wesley, Lincoln College has a greater treasure in the room in which the Holy Club met, and where the movement began which was to give new life to the Churches of this and other lands.

MUCH help came to Wesley by the reading of William Law's Serious Call and his Christian Perfection. Although some parts of Law's work offended him, he tells us: 'The light shone in so mighty an influence upon my soul, that everything appeared in a new view.' Readers of the Journal, and especially of the diary, remember the strenuous efforts of Wesley to be accounted worthy; his early rising, his long, earnest prayer over his immature, methodically planned day, with a task for every hour, his thoughtful care for his pupils, his ejaculations which sob forth even now after the lapse of so many years, his passionate and unceasing quest for a deeper experience—all these things are clearly recorded there. The Castle and the Rocardo at Oxford were both visited by him; for to the prisoners he must preach the message of Divine grace—even though he had not yet entered consciously into it. In August, 1727, Samuel Wesley being infirm, John went to his help, and remained in his parish for about two years. He then returned to Oxford. Later (1734) he had pleaded with that insistence that he should take his work and rectory. The reply of Wesley is elaborately wrought, and is a strong plea that his sphere is in Oxford, and not in Epworth. There is in it no splendid disregard of self such as we see in his later days; he seems more anxious to have circumstances conducive to his own soul's culture than to save the souls of others. On his return to Oxford he found that his brother Charles, who was then at Christ Church, had gathered round him a small group of men to read the New Testament. John Wesley joined this company, and soon became its leader. It is well to remember that the Holy Club showed a much greater diligence with regard to Holy Communion than the Church of those times, a tendency to guide their life by early Church practice, a passion for prisoners and outcasts, and a diligent and careful appreciation of the times. As the members went with regularity to take the sacrament, they received much taunting from the undergraduates. It was at that time that they were called 'Sacramentarians.'

3 Journal, i. 467.
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'Bible Moths,' and Methodists (a double reference—both to a medical sect and to their 'method' in all religious practices). John Wesley was now, in deeds, a man of God to Oxford. A band of keen undergraduates gathered round him; he believed that he had found his work. Owing to the insistance of his family, however, he applied for the living of Epworth, but without success. His dying father spoke prophetic words; to John he said: 'The inward witness, son—the inward witness, that is the proof, the strongest proof of Christ's faith,' he said: 'Be steady. The Christian faith will surely revive in this Kingdom; you shall see it, though I shall not.'

2. The Georgia ministry.—In 1735 Wesley was invited to go on a mission to the colony of Georgia. His father now being dead, he with some diffidence mentioned the fact of the offer to his mother, who said: 'If I had twenty sons, I should rejoice if they were all so employed, though I should never see them more.' John and Charles Wesley embarked at Gravesend on 14th Oct. 1735. He tells a friend the motives which sent him forth as a missionary.

Chief motive to save my own soul. . . I hope to learn the true sense of the Gospel of Christ by preaching it to the heathen.'

In later years he was not so anxious about his own spiritual condition, but about those of others. Of the voyage, as at Oxford, he showed meticulous strictness in the apportioning of time: he learned German and studied his Greek Testament, and held and wrote sermons. He was greatly impressed by a party of Moravians on board, especially by their conduct in the tempest. Amidst the storm they were quite unalarmed and went on singing. Wesley asked one of them, 'Are you not afraid?' He replied, 'I thank God, no.' 'But were not your women and children?' 'No, our women and children are not afraid to die.' Wesley landed at Savannah on 6th Feb. 1736. He soon met Spangenberg, the Moravian, who asked him, 'Do you know Jesus Christ?' 'I know He is the Saviour of the world.' 'True, but do you know that He has saved you?' 'I hope He has died to save me.' Spangenberg then asked, 'Do you know yourself?' Wesley answered, 'I do,' but, in telling the story of this conversation, says, 'I fear they were vain words. Wesley's main purpose in going to Georgia was to become a missionary to the Indians. This was frustrated by the governor of the colony, General Oglethorpe, who desired his presence in the European settlement. Denied his chief end in coming, he nevertheless found work for each moment in the day; he taught the children, visited the sick, reproved the sinner, and gathered a few folk together for mutual conversation. He encouraged, he rebuked, he prepared communicants, and repelled those whom he thought not worthy. He was a vigorous High Churchman, and a most earnest seeker of the Light. In summing up the matter in his Journal Wesley tells us that he was a child of wrath, an heir of hell, but in later years, when he revised his writings, he says, 'I believe not . . . I had even then the faith of a servant, though not of a son.' Grave misunderstandings arose between Oglethorpe and the Wesley; but they were later reconciled. Suspicious and misunderstanding grew like weeds in the garden of this colony. As we now know from the standard edition of the Journal, Wesley's love, to his love of Savannah, Mr. Causton. A change, however, came in her affection, and she swiftly married Mr. Williamson. Soon after Wesley repelled her from Holy Communion, and refused to acknowledge that she was not in a fit state of heart to receive it; but on the surface it appeared like the act of a disappointed man. Her uncle brought a charge against John Wesley, who refused to acknowledge the power of a civil court in ecclesiastical affairs. Wesley, realizing that no further good would come from his ministry there, left the colony, and sailed for England on 22nd Dec. 1757.

3. His evangelical conversion.—Wesley's comment on his Georgia ministry was:

'I went to America to convert the Indians; but oh, who shall convert me? . . . I have a fair summer religion. I can talk well; say, and believe myself, while I see. But let death look me in the face, and my spirit is troubled. . . . Oh, what I have ever been afraid of death?'

Eager and hungry, on his return to England he met Peter Böhler, who told him, 'My brother, your brother, that philosophy of yours must be purged away.' 'Preach faith till you have it, and then because you have it you will preach faith. He gathered with the members of the Little society in Fetter Lane. On 24th May, 1738, there came to Wesley his Magna Dies—the day of his evangelical conversion. No one had ever sought the haven of faith with more passionate devotion—it was a day never to be forgotten. He describes every part of it:

'I think,' he says, 'it was about five this morning, that I opened my Testament on those words, "There are given unto us exceeding great and precious promises." He wrote that, just as he went out, he opened the New Testament again on those words, "Then art thou far from the presence of God." He tells of his afternoon visit to St. Paul's, and notes that the anthem was 'Out of the deep have I called unto Thee, O Lord.' We now come to the locus classicus of the life of Wesley. In the evening I went very unwillingly to a society in Aldersgate Street, where one was reading Luther's preface to the Epistle to the Romans. About a quarter before nine, while he was describing the change which God works in the heart through faith in Christ, I felt my heart strangely warmed. At that season I felt my heart strangely warmed, but that the fire of that love never died down. His eye was indeed single, and thus his whole body was full of light.'

4. The great offensive.—From 1738 to 1791 Wesley led the great offensive—he attacked sin in its strongholds, and everywhere proclaimed the free grace of Christ. He seized every opportunity: if he were in a conclave, he spoke to his fellow-travellers; if he were staying at an inn, he told his fellow-guests of the love of Jesus; even when crossing to Ireland, when the ship was tossed by the storm, he held a service for the passengers. Driven out of churches, he thrashed out his case and quite against his taste, followed the example of Whitefield, and took his stand in the open air, and preached to the crowds at Kingswood, Bristol, and Moorfields. His greatest help came from his brother Charles, who worked and spoke among the miners of Kingswood, the labourers of Lincoln.

1 Works, xii. 35.
2 Cf. The Twelve Rules of a Helper, rule xi.: 'You have nothing to do. Thou art not called to say and speak as I do in this work. And go and stay, not only to those who want you, but to those whom you want.'
3 Journal, i. 421.
4 Journal, i. 413.
5 Ib. i. 425.
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dry every morning. I have a lingering fever almost every day. . . . Horrid! But, be He God, I do not slack my labour. I can preach and write still."

He died on 2d March, 1791.

5. His controversies.—As we have seen, Wesley owed a great deal to the Moravians, and Zinzendorf was for a short time a great admirer of Zinzendorf. At first he hailed Herrnhut as a new city of God. But the breach between Wesley and the Moravians came soon after Wesley launched his great offensive. A seine of theologically had a tendency towards a mistaken kind of piety; they preached that there was no need for Bible or sacraments, that there was nothing to be done, and that the soul must wait for God to work. These they were styled, raised his ire, and the break between the Methodist Societies and the Moravians was soon complete. The indictment of Wesley could only have referred to a small section, for in that Moravian band there were men and women of real saintliness. It was, however, an unfortunate happening, for it gave Wesley a somewhat violent antipathy to mysticism.

It speaks of the 'poison of mysticism,' and refers to 'Ralph Mather, a devoted young man, but almost driven out of his senses by Mystic Divinity. If he escapes out of this precious share of the devil, it will be a wonder.'

Wesley was right in speaking strongly against that which was mysticism falsely so called, but he was a mystic himself. The man who translated with such passion Tersteegen's hymn, 'Thou hidden love of God,' could not have been anything else. His controversy with William Law is surely due to a misunderstanding on the part of Wesley. Wesley wrote when he was perplexed, and his soul was strangely restless, and the honours are chiefly on the side of his teacher, Law. His greater and most fundamental controversy was with the Calvinists—and with logic and passionate love he claimed that Calvinists did not stick, as they were fighting for all. They fought and won, but the victory came not through the strident notes of controversy, but rather through the rousing strains of song—

"For all, my Lord was erected,
For all, for all my Sav'rd!"

One of the most beautiful things in the history of this controversy is the fact that such vital theological disagreements as there were between Wesley and his colleague never broke their friendship, but seemed rather to deepen and strengthen it.

6. Wesley and the Church of England.—The Church of England never had a more loving son than John Wesley, and never one who strove more loyally to help it. He was driven out of the Church of England, yet in 1780 he wrote:

"I declare once more that I live and die a member of the Church of England; and that none who regard my judgment or advice will separate from it."

But he did things which show that in another sense he did not belong to her. He believed in her, but he saw with his quick eye the needs of his age, and the organization of the Church of England was not flexible enough to meet the changing conditions of the time. He saw the great needs of America, and, realizing the urgency of its claims, in 1784 consecrated Coke as bishop and Whatcoat and Vesey as presbyters for that continent. In 1788 Wesley ordained preachers for Scotland. His loyalty was of that higher kind which would not allow rules to interfere with the advance to which he believed Christ was calling His people. This is shown in the encounter with Joseph Butler, when bishop of Bristol. The great writer of The Anatomy said that Wesley had no right to preach in that diocese. Wesley said, "I can do . . . ."

2. For the theology of Methodism see art. METHODISM.
3. By the grace of God I never fret. I repine at nothing. I am discontented with nothing (Journal, iv, 131, note).
4. "Farther Thoughts on Separation from the Church," (written 11th Dec. 1789), Works, vili. 246.

Shire and Cornwall and throughout the land. The Evangelical Revival spread by song as well as by sermon. There was much of the great military commander about Wesley; he chose three military strategic points—London, Bristol, and Newcastle-on-Tyne—and for the conquest of Ireland he made Dublin his base. When others were deaf to the call of the Spirit he sent out a band of preachers to capture that continent for Christ. He moved constantly from place to place, riding on horseback until his later years, a sort of aswand-carrion of the Kingdom, a tireless rider, the champion of the fighter, and the herald of the grace of God. J. Hampson, one of Wesley's preachers, who left with a grudge against him, published in 1791 a Life of Wesley. In its admirations it is of immense value, for he writes critically, and is a contemporary of the man of whom he writes. He thus sums up Wesley's life of toil:

His public administrations were but a part of his labours, but from these we may form some conception of the rest. During fifty-two years he generally preached two sermons a day. He laboured with all his might, in fact, twice a day, and allowing fifty sermons annually for extraordinary occasions, which is the lowest computation that can be made, the whole number in fifty-two years will be 49,452. To these may be added an infinite number of exhortations to society, which he delivered at all times and seasons. He made is 4,000 miles annually, which, in fifty-two years, will give 209,000 miles. An almost incredible degree of labour: and which, nourished by the most active spirit, could have enabled him to support.

Augustine Birrell epitomizes his labours, and minglest with the telling of them his peculiar piquancy:

"John Wesley contested the whole kingdom in the cause of Christian Truth during a long and furious contest. He did it for the most part on horseback. He paid more tumpsies than any man who ever breastred a beast. Had he not preserved his sobriety, which he loved, he would have made himself a historical curiosity by the price of his services and his labours. As it is, he has done the world a great service, and he has left a distinguished name, and the traces of the times during which he lived and moved, and had his being."

This leads us to one of the most wonderful of his gifts, the power of being everywhere. He had visited his societies, entered prisons, galloped along the highways of England, the programme varying but little, and yet he never became stale; each day called him to a new adventure and was a fresh gift from God. His work never became to him a commonplace; he thrilled to it, he hailed it over with a song. A comparison of the early years after his evangelical conversion and the later years of his life reveals that his enthusiasm never waned, but rather waxed stronger and stronger. Here is the record of 11th Sept. 1759.

"I went over to Kingwood. Sweet recuss! where everything is just said and done."

"Man was not born in shades to lie!"

Let us work now, we shall rest by-and-by."

In March, 1790, he began a great preaching tour through England and Scotland, which lasted five months. Here is another entry—1st Jan. 1790:

"I am now an old man, decayed from head to foot. My eyes are dim, my ears are dull, my right hand shakes much; my memory is hot and

1 Memoirs of John Wesley, 3 vols., Sunderland, 1791, iii. 190.
3 By the grace of God I never fret. I repine at nothing. I am discontented with nothing (Journal, iv, 131, note).
4 Birrell, Miscellanea, p. 55.
5 Journal, viii. 10.
most good here, so here I stay.' That was his one test. He was at heart a Catholic and like the scribe who brought gold dust to the treasure things new and old. So see this in his Christian Library, in which he included writings from men of all Christian communities, the only requirement being that each reprint should give spiritual strength to its readers.

7. Wesley and humanism. — It was the boast of Wesley that he was 'homo unius libri, and so he was, though few men of his age read more books. The spiritual appeal was rather to Scripture, or to the Journal — the Journal could have been written only by a man who had read enthusiastically the book of life. There may be little charm of style, but there is a conciseness, a fact of rightness, of writing, a peripatetic, that is hard to excel. He had not studied his Addison for nothing; the references in his early diary — 'Read Addison' — are illuminating. He had much humour, but he never forgot that Alexander Knox writes that his 'sportive sallies of innocent mirth delighted even the young and the thoughtless,' and Thomas Walsh writes of his 'witty proverbs.' Hampson says, 'It is as impossible to be long in his company without partaking his hilarity.' This man, who could have chosen the company of the great, lived and loved to live with the unknown. There are many parallels between St. Francis of Assisi, and one is to be found in this, that both went to the people — what the Little Brothers were to Francis that wonderful band of men, the early Methodist preachers, were to Wesley. It is interesting to note that two command the 18th cent., and one (Dr. Johnson) said of the other, 'He can talk well on any subject.' Johnson would fain have seen more of Wesley.

John Wesley's conversation is good, but he is never at leisure. He is always obliged to go at a certain hour. This is very disagreeable to a man who loves to hold his lace, and have out his talk 1 do. *

Southey says:

*His manners were always irresistibly winning, and his cheerfulness was like perpetual sunshine. It is true that his printed sermons do not best reveal his humanism; but they are treatises. A study of the Journal teaches us that the texts upon which he preached most were those which reveal his tenderness and his love of the doctrines of grace. The text 'When they had nothing to say, he frankly forgave them both,' I can understand, and again in the Journal, and the motif of his ministry. Horace Walpole informs us of his vivid way of preaching. 'I have been at one opera — Mr. Wesley's. . . Wondrous clever, but as evidently an actor as Garrick, when he told stories like Latimer, of the fool of his college said 'he and I thank God for everything.'

John Nelson, one of his early helpers, describes the power of Wesley's preaching:

*But I was like a wandering bird, cast out of the nest, till

John Wesley came to preach his first sermon in Mowbray. O that was a morning: morning to my soul; short to make his hair, and turned his face towards where I stood, and I thought fixed his eyes upon me. When he had done said, 'This man can tell the secrets of my heart; he hath not left me there; he showed me the remedy, even the blood of Jesus.' *

Sir Walter Scott tells us that he heard Wesley preach more than once in the churchyard at Kelso.

*He was a most venerable figure, but his sermons were vastly too colloquial for the taste of Saunders. He told many excellent stories. *

This man, of five feet three inches, of weight eight stone, an eye the brightest and most piercing that can be conceived, with his finely chiselled face which came to view again in that of the Iron Duke,* loved men and women not for what they were but for what they might be: he loved colliers, drunkards, cock-fighters, prisoners, because he saw in them the children of the One Father. He gave first his love to God, and that exalted his love for men — that is why it never grew cold. He commanded the 18th cent. on the religious side as much as Johnson on the literary.

Lecky has told us that Wesley saved England from a revolution, but we must remember that he brought about another, and that he has done more to break down social barriers than men realize — for he taught men and women the essential oneness of us all, that One is our Father and we are all brethren. His doctrine of faith stripped off the superficial disguises of life and revealed the divine possibilities of all men. Wesley was always ahead of his century; he was a great forerunner with regard to social reform; he lived on as little as possible, and gave the rest away. Hampson says, 'Perhaps the most liberal man in England was Mr. Wesley. His liberality to the poor knew no bounds.' He gave the people cheap literature, founded schools and orphanages, wrote numerous pamphlets on public questions, and his last letter was one in which he encouraged Wilberforce in his great fight against slavery — that traffic which he termed 'that horrible villainy, which is the scandal of England, of religion, and of human nature.' This 'brand plucked from the burning' broke up the frost of the 18th cent. by the glow of his flaming message. He formed a society which has become a worldwide Church; he brought inspiration to all the Churches, and his message still rings down the years — 'The best of all is God is with us.'

LITERATURE.—See the Literature under Methodism.

W. BARDSDALE BRASH.

WESLEYAN METHODISM.—See Methodism.

WEST AFRICA.—See Negroes and West Africa.

WESTERN CHURCH.—The epithet 'Western' differentiates the Church of the West, or Roman Catholic Church, from that of the East, known as the Holy Orthodox Church. *The discussion of Orthodoxy is under Methodism for the reasons stated. *

The Lives of Early Methodist Preachers, London, 1866, i. 14: cf. testimony of another. *But when John Wesley began to speak, his words made me tremble. I thought he spoke to no one but me, and I durst not look up; for I imagined all the people were looking at me' (ib. p. 10). *

J. J. Lockhart, Life of Sir Walter Scott, Edinburgh, 1839, vi. 34.

Silence. Livingstone, 402, 403, 405. *Wesley amongst the Indians of Welling-}

ton's account of the branches of the same Church.

See art. EASTERN CHURCH, Greek Orthodox Church, Russian Church.
tinction between these two branches of the Holy Catholic Church arose from the interaction of many causes, geographical, political, and theological. In part it may be traced to a single event of supreme importance in the historic evolution of the Christian faith.

1. Introduction; schism of East and West.—Up to A.D. 325, the church of the ancient Byzantium as the new capital of the Roman Empire and its name of Constanti-

nople, the Catholic Church of Christendom had remained one and indivisible; and, though the final schism was to be delayed for centuries, the rivalry between the old and the new Rome at one time introduces a divisive factor into the ecclesiastical relationships of the empire. Constantinople, already a Greek city with a large Greek population, was destined to become a second metropolis of the faith, representing Christian life and thought of a distinctively Greek type. Indeed, it may be said that imperial Christianity had shifted its centre of gravity to the Hellenistic world of intellectual and spiritual. It is significant that, when it was found necessary to formulate the teaching of the Second Council in order to finish the desolating heresy of Arianism, the list of the newly elected pope of Rome had been chosen in A.D. 325 as the place of assembly for the historic council which, so far from pacifying the Christian world, was the forerunner of schisms, schismology, and Schismatologists—where the various phases of the seemingly perpetual Christological problem received discussion and authoritative settlement. Christianity had spread with a relatively greater rapidity over the Eastern empire than in the provinces of the West. The Greek language known as 'common' Greek—the lingua franca in which the early records of the faith were written.—was naturally the medium by which the symbols of the Christian faith found their most logical and accurate expression. It is true that the patriarch of Constantinople, who was always under the control of the emperor, was never to achieve a position like that of the pope, who, left free from civil control, became the undisputed pontiff and vicar of Christ upon earth; but by the 5th and 6th centuries he had secured a commanding influence and bore the title of 'ecclesiastical patriarch'—a designation which, in spite of papal protests, has continued till to-day. The relations of emperor and pope were severely strained during the period of the Christological controversy, when the Emperor, when he condemned the Monothelite position, did not hesitate to anathematize the memory of Pope Honorius I. In A.D. 725 the opposition of Pope Gregory II. to Leo the Isaurian, who on the outbreak of the Iconoclastic controversy had vehemently condemned, and commended a crusade against, the use of images, led to a fatal separation between East and West; for Leo transferred Sicily, Southern Italy, and Illyricum from the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the pope to that of Constantinople. A reaction in favour of images took place in the reign of Constantine VI., and in 780 the so-called Council of Nicaea gave a decision in favor of image-worship, which the pope approved. But this reconciliation was temporary and in effect was nullified in 800 on the coronation of Charlemagne by the pope; for, while in the West the pope became the religious head and the emperor the secular head of the Church, this process was reversed in the East, the emperor becoming head of the same Christian Church with a patriarch as subordinate to him. Still, though the separation between East and West was complete in secular matters, the final breach did not occur for two centuries. The rejection of the Filioque clause,1 which had been inserted in the Spanish Church to the Nicene creed in the 5th cent., and which was subsequently inserted in the Roman creed, was definitely decreed by the Council of Constantinople (A.D. 680) to which anathema was pronounced by the pope. But, though this was significant of the steadily widening breach between the two sections of Catholicism, it was not till a century and a half later that the final blow was struck. The patriarch of Constantinople, Michael Cerularius, closed the Latin churches and convoked of the city in 1054, and this drastic act was followed by the written attacks of his clergy on the Latin religion and its observances, and especially the practice of celibacy on the part of its clergy. The pope's legate, Cardinal Humbert, entered St. Sophia on 16th July during divine service and laid on the altar a decree of excommunication against the patriarch and his adherents. This act rent the Catholic world in twain, and it was the climax of the long-continued and deep-rooted misunderstanding between the two great geographical sections of Christendom. The Crusade of the Latin army to the Greek populace in 1182 and the sack and capture of the city by the forces of the Venetian of the Fourth Crusade in 1204 were events which revealed to the Greek church and the imperial court the far-reaching power and influence of the Church of the East, and led up to the fateful capture of Constantinople by Muhammad II. in 1453. Western Europe had left the Christian capital of the East to its fate; divided Christendom had enabled Muhammadanism to enshrine itself in Europe, and a sultan sat on the throne which Christian emperors had occupied since the days of Constantine.

The following survey is limited (1) to the general development in history of the polity, organization, and secular relationships of the Western Church, and (2) to its dogmatic history and its position in Christian thought, leaving the reader to study in other articles (to which reference is made) the more specialized treatment of the inner life of the Church, its observances and sacraments, its ritual and its liturgy, its canon law and discipline, its orders and congregations, the history of its moves- ments in their religious, intellectual, and social aspects, and finally the biographies of its outstanding personalities in the annals of its government, sainthood, and scholarship.

For the sake of the latter sections, the history of Christendom is conveniently treated in chronological order under the following heads: (a) the early period (from Constantine to Charlemagne [A.D. 312–800]); (b) the medieval period (from Charlemagne to Boniface VIII. [A.D. 1050–1303]); (c) the modern period (from the later Middle Ages to the present time [A.D. 1300–1920]).

In the first period, the period of expansion, we have the rise of the papacy2 with the conversion of the Teutonic races to Christianity; in the second, the period of consolidation, we have the papacy supreme in Europe, having attained the zenith of its influence and prosperity; in the third period the papacy was on the wane as the vanishing power of the papacy and the rise of Protestantism, which eventually led up to the distinction between religions of authority and a religion of the spine, and their conflicting ideals of ecclesiastical unity and catholicism.

2. Ecclesiastical polity and organization.—(a) Early period.—With the accession of Constantine in 325, Christianity became the imperial religion, and henceforth the Church was to be identified with that of the empire. The vicissitudes through which the empire passed during the three

1 See art. ARIANISM.
2 See arts. COUNCILS AND SYNODS (Christian), CREEDS (Eccumenical), and CONFESSIONS.
3 See art. ICONOCLASM.
succeeding centuries under the attacks of the bar- 
barian races of the West, Rome left an 
enduring mark on the constitution and organi-
tzation of the Church. The monarchical episcopate, 
which was recognized by Ignatius and accepted by 
Cyprian as the basis of Church government, was 
the governing feature of the Church of Rome. The 
Bishop of Rome was evolved. The doctrine of apostolic 
succession (q.v.) laid down by Irenaeus ascribed 
a spiritual pre-eminence to the Church of Rome as 
founded by St. Peter and St. Paul, and Tertullian in his early pre-
Montanist treatise, the Description of Heresy— 
always a favourite with the Roman Church— 
eloquently adopted the same line of argument, 
proclaiming the transmission of the apostolic 
'deposit' through the succession of the bishops. 
Established in the Eternal City, which was the 
visible focus of imperial greatness and might, the 
bishops of Rome were invested with a dignity 
which far surpassed that of the rival sees of 
Alexandria and Antioch. Moreover, the Latin 
conception of the Church as an external institution, 
more closely identified with the city than with the 
spirit, was controlled by bishops who were the vicars of an 
absent Christ and depositaries of saving grace, led 
up to the papacy as a logical conclusion. No 
similar tradition, the Church built on 
St. Peter as chief of the apostolic college, a 
hierarchy which traced its lineal descent by due suc-
cession from the first of apostles—these are the 
principles upon which the supremacy of the Roman 
see was established by Augustine, the greatest of 
the Latin theologians. In the 4th and 5th centuries 
the Church as it developed its organization on the 
new political divisions of the empire—especially 
Italy and Spain, following the conquest by Christi-
anity of the nations of the Franks and the 
Spaniards or Iberians—rose, by its beauty of 
ritual, its succession of distinguished Christian 
leaders, bishops, and kings, and its moral influence, 
to a position of great splendour. A generation after Augustine, Leo the Great, bishop of Rome (440-461), put forth a claim 1 for the authority of the 
Roman see which was never afterwards relaxed, 
and which saw its realization in the imperial 
authority over Christendom wielded by Hildebrand 
and Innocent III.

In 445 the emperor Valentinian III. issued a law 
decreeing that the see of Rome the supreme head of 
the Western Church on the three grounds of the 
primacy of St. Peter, the dignity of the city, and 
the decree of a holy synod. Resistance to the 
authority of St. Peter's successors in the Roman 
see was thus constituted a State offence. 

The title 'papa' (pope), which was applied in the West to 
all the bishops, became in the 5th cent. the exclusive designation 
of the bishop of Rome. Gregory VI. was responsible for the 
dereek which thenceforth limited the title to the occupant of 
the Roman see. 2

Although for a short time Justinian the Great 
(527-565) held sway over Italy and placed the 
Roman bishops on a level with those of Constantin-
apolis, the Lombards finally broke the power of the 
Byzantine emperor in Italy and the bishops of 
Rome practically assured the independence of the 
bishops of Rome. The decrees of the popes 
codified in the year 560 by Dionysius Exiguus, 
who founded this collection the decrees of the 
councils and the chief canons of the provincial 
synods. The Donatist position, 3 which made holiness 
of life the test of Catholicity, was defended by 
1 Cfr. Ser. Inf. 2, 'De toto mundo unus Petrus eligitur, qui et in omnibus episcopatibus vocationis apostolici, 
cuncteque ecclesiae patribus praepositor: ut quamvis in populo Dei multiplicem sint multiplices sunt nomen 
Dei, quod petitum est patribus, Petrus, quos principaliter regit et Christianum.'
2 See Ebrar, s. v. 'Papa'; Ducange, Gloss. Mederi et Inhære Latinis, s. v. 'Papa.'
3 See art. DONATISM.

the influence of Augustine, and the Donatists were 
in the end declared to be heretics. The supre-
macv of the hierarchy and the efficacy of baptism 
and the Lord's Supper were maintained to be in-
deerent of the personal character of individual 
officials and members of a Church which was 
found on the 'rock' of Peter and over its Catholic 
authority as a visible holy community to its apas-
tolic descent. On the other hand, the rise of 
monasticism in this period—first in the form of 
hermit colonies under the inspiration of 
Ignatius, then in the form of religious communities with a 
regula, or rule, of common-life discipline under 
Cassian at Marseilles, Benedict of Nursia (480-545) 
at Monte Cassino, and his disciple Maurus (St. 
Maur) in Gaul and Sicily—was a movement within 
the Church towards a higher type of spirituality, 
though it tended to fix the orthodox separation etwheen things sacred and profane or secular. 
From 590 to 800 Christianity spread over Western 
Europe, Anglo-Saxon England, Germany, and the 
new nations along the Danube, the missionary 
movement owing much to the inspiring zeal of 
Gregory II., known as 'the Great.' That the papal 
power not only survived the political and ecclesi-
alistical fluctuations and unrest of the times, but 
emerged with added prestige, is due to the person-
ality of Gregory's immediate successor, Pe
cardinal of the Church in England, consolidated the Church in Spain, brought the Church of Gaul into close 
connexion with Rome, and checked the abuses 
which had crept into his own diocese. In contra-
distinction to the Eastern title of pontifical 
patriarch, he assumed as pope (590-604) the title of 
'servus servorum,' which his successors have 
always maintained. After Gregory's death the 
outstanding event is the accession of Pepin, king 
of the Franks, in 751, probably by Boniface, 
Archbishop of Mainz, with the sanction of Pope 
 Zacharias. A second coronation by Stephen II. of 
the same king at St. Denis in 754 was the 
price which a grateful papacy paid to him for his 
help against the Lombards and his presentation of 
the lost lands to the Roman Church. Here 
is a sequence of events which marks a beginning 
of the long-coveted temporal dominion of the 
papacy. But the political troubles were not at 
an end, and Pope Leo III., owing to the disaffection 
of the Roman nobles, had to flee for his life to the 
court of Charlemagne, king of the Franks, in 752. The 
result was that, when Charlemagne came to Rome 
re-establish order, Leo crowned him at St. 
Peter's on Christmas Day 800 as emperor of 
Rome. This event, the significance of which can 
be paralleled only by Constantine's establishment of 
Christianity as the religion of the Roman Empire, 
revealed the fact that the majestic traditions of 
that empire—formed three centuries merely 
Sommun unburd in the West—still swayed the 
minds of men. Church and State were once more 
united, and the Holy Roman Empire became a 
compelling ideal, if not as yet a historic reality. 

(b) Modern period.—In this period the papacy 
held undisputed sway over Western Europe. 
Missionary enterprise widened the scope of its 
influence. If to Eastern Christianity is due the 
credit of the conversion of Russia under Vladimir, 
Scandinavia, the Slav nations, the Moravians, 
Bohemia and Hungary, the Wends of the north 
and east of Germany were Christianized by the 
Church of Rome. When warring factions 
broke up the empire on the death of Charlemagne, 
the popes took advantage of political changes to 
secure greater independence and strove to establish 
the ascendancy of the papal see over the State as 
the one sovereign of the European princes. The 
pseudo-Isidorian decrees (c. 589) proclaimed the 
1 See art. MONASTICISM.
inviability of the hierarchy and the pope as the fountainhead of justice, while the Donation of 430 was a further blow to the pretensions of both. While William of Occam (1280–1347) placed the emperor and the general council above the pope as his judges, and Marsilius of Padua in his Defender of the Church argued in the matter of the supremacy of St. Peter and the primacy of the Roman see, France reduced the pope to complete submission and Germany disregarded his anathemas. When Wyclif protested that the papacy was not the chief magistrates of Christ and that the Church, the great schism which had resulted in the election of two popes in 1378 was the basis of his argument —an argument which became irresistible when, on the failure of the Council of Pisa in 1409 to solve the problem, three popes instead of two widened the schism. Five years later the Council of Constance condemned John Hus to death. Stimulated by the writings of Wyclif, he had inaugurated a new religious movement in Bohemia and had been invited to the council under a safe-conduct granted by the Holy Roman Emperor Sigismund. There he expounded his views and was called to return to Bohemia on the understanding that he was to be erroneous teachings subservisive of the authority of the pope. He refused on the grounds of fidelity to conscience, was condemned and on 27th July 1415 burnt at the stake. His occasion and disciple, Jerome of Prague, suffered the same fate. The essence of the Hussite movement was its insistence on the rights of conscience and its appeal to a higher tribunal than that of pope and council. On the other hand, the Council of Constance had ended the schism by asserting its supreme authority over pope and Church. It had established its right to regulate the action of the pope and by the Council of Constance (1417) declared the papacy from an absolute into a constitutional monarchy—an event of great significance for the future history of the papacy. Constauinople fell in 1453, and in the latter half of this century the popes sought to restore their waning supremacy by invoking crusades against the Muslim. Savonarola (1452–98), a Dominican monk of Florence under the rule of the Medici, became alarmed by the prevailing decadence of morals, and owing to his zeal for the purification of society was excommunicated by Pope Alexander VI, who after failing to bribe him into silence secured his death by working on the hands of an inquisitor and his noblest fellow-citizen. Such movements as those of Hus and Savonarola, who were both martyrs in the cause of a higher morality, and the exemplification of an inward and spiritual religion in the lives of mystics like Tauler and Thomas à Kempis, were signs of the coming change. It was in vain that Pope Leo x. (1513–21) sealed the republic of the ‘pragmatic sanction’ by which Louis IX. of France had in 1299 asserted the right of the State to refuse papal taxation—and in vain that his imitation of the warlike policy of his predecessor Julius II. and his successful diplomacy had enabled him to recover something of the old papal prestige. It was but a momentary rekindling of the embers of a dying cause. The Reformation had arrived. It is true that the Protestant movement, triumphant in Northern Europe, was checked in Italy, though even in the native land of the papacy hatred of the vices and corruptions of the papal régime rallied many adherents to the new movement. The traditional Catholic Church, which had brought wealth and influence to the Italian

2 See, besides art. MONASTICISM, art. RELIGIOUS ORDERS (Christian).
people evoked a patriotic response to the forces of the Counter-Reformation. Moreover, the foundation of the Society of Jesus by Loyola (1491-1556),\(^1\) with its rigid observance of obedience to the will of its general and its unswerving devotion to the papal see, was a powerful factor in withstanding the advance of Protestantism, while by its missionary activity and Catholic influence it opened new lands and reconquered lost territory. The Council of Trent met in 1545 and after two interruptions produced in 1563 under Pius IV, the famous "Jesuitical" constitution, which led to the creation of new ecclesiasticates and was required to assent. The Catholic theologian Bellarmine with uncompromising dogmatism expounded the Tridentine symbol and the Roman Catechism, which even more rigidly supported the papal supremacy, and his labours for orthodoxy were continued by the Jesuit theologians Suarez and Petavium, while the mysticism of Francis of Sales, Molinos, and Fénelon wielded a powerful influence in favour of the Roman type of piety. The publication of the Catechism, the Breviary, and the Missal, together with an authorized edition of the Vulgate, aided the work of the Church in promoting the standards of Catholic orthodoxy. The Inquisition\(^2\) was re-organized and carried on in Italy, though not with the fanatical excesses which in Spain under the Inquisition and Spanish Inquisition had been a source of lasting infamy. The Index Expurgatorium pronounced its ban on all anti-Roman books and particular passages of books. In 1588 the repeal of the Edict of Nantes, which was the great charter of Huguenot rights in France, marked the climax of a half-century of persecution and political ostracism. In the 18th cent., the efforts of the Western Church to withstand the Protestant movement found a formidable ally in the Catholic Church. where the Inquisition had lost its earlier glow and enthusiasm. A spiritual and intellectual latitude prevailed—a reaction partly from the theological strife of the previous generations and partly from the dynastic struggles caused by the ambitions of Louis XIV. and Frederick the Great. The Society of Jesus was temporarily extinguished. Where religious reforms were attempted—e.g., by Joseph II. in Austria—they proved abortive, probably because they were inspired by the free-thinking spirit rather than by genuine religious earnestness.

Under the French revolution the Church shared the fate of the state, but Catholicism was not formally abolished as being hostile to the new republic. The Goddess of Reason was enthroned in Notre Dame, and Robespierre's attempt to restore religion by enforcing a belief in God only checked for a moment the torrent of infidelity. In 1801 Napoleon concluded a concordat with Pius VII., in which the Catholic religion was declared to be the religion of the majority of the French people; but he provoked the pope's hostility by demanding the right to appoint a patriarch of France, the abolition of clerical celibacy, and the support of the pope against England. Excommunication of Napoleon was followed by a protracted struggle with the pope, which was only ended in 1814 by the fall of Napoleon. In Germany the ecclesiastical states were secularized and subjected to civil rule. In Spain the Inquisition was abolished. The pope espoused the cause of absolutism which the formation of the Holy Alliance of European Powers was intended to maintain. Tyranny, reaction, revolution, and democratic movements aimed at the authority of kings. In 1814 the Jesuit order was revived. Lamennais's attempt in France to associate ultramontane ideas of the pope's spiritual supremacy\(^3\) with the advocacy of freedom of worship and liberty of conscience was repudiated by Pope Gregory XVI. On the other hand, in England Catholic emancipation and the return of Roman Catholics from the political disabilities imposed at the Restoration. In 1846 Pope Pius IX. began his policy of liberalizing by providing for his kingdom a constitution and a hierarchy for the Church of Rome under his temporal authority. A quarter of a century later, on the capture of Rome by Victor Emmanuel (1870), Italy was unified and the Church was placed under one temporal head. All ecclesiastics were required to assent. The pope's temporal authority was finally lost. In 1854 Pius IX. had promulgated on his own authority without any conciliar sanction the dogma of the Immaculate conception (p.c.), and in 1870 at the Vatican Council the dogma of papal infallibility\(^4\) was decreed in spite of the opposition of the 'Old Catholics'\(^5\) of Germany, who held that the concurrence of pope and council was required for the validity of a doctrinal definition. Some of these, like Hefele, submitted, but Dollinger and his associates seceded and formed a confederation of English, Americans, Swiss, Russians, and Greeks, who together with Pius IX. provided a nucleus of what was to become an Old Catholic congregation. The movement never captured the people. Both England and Germany were alarmed by the prospect of ultramontanism and of the Holy Father's reaction, but a spiritual and political reaction followed, and under Ferry and Gambetta (1850-81) the 'March decrees,' breaking up the Jesuit Society and congregations not recognized as Catholic, and requiring Catholic students to be enrolled in State universities, were carried. During the last generation the secularist movement in France advanced stage by stage—until in 1905 the separation of Church and State was decreed by the French government and all churches and church property became the possession of the State. A situation was thus created for both Catholics and Protestants which called for voluntary organization on the part of their adherents, with the result that the cause of religion in France has not lost but rather gained in public esteem.

Even from this rapid survey, which has selected what may be regarded the most significant facts, and the fundamental aims of the papacy, and the development of ecclesiastical life and order within the Roman Church, we may infer what the Western Church has stood for in European history since the days beginning with the age of Constantine. Its aim has been to include humanity within its spiritual fold, while exercising a dominating control over the secular fabric of the State, its kings and governing authorities. This fundamental duality of spiritual authority and temporal domination, which reached its climax in the Holy Roman Empire, was held to be the secret of progress religious and social, and none can deny the splendour of the conception which inspired Hildebrand and lifted the Mediæval Church to a position of majestic influence and striking prosperity. But it was a glorious dream destined to vanish at the touch of reality, a harmony of incompatible opposites which could not endure, a service of two masters which was to end in disillusion and disaster. The intolerance of the Church and its relations to the State, its attitude towards ecclesiastical and political aspirations and with worldly aims of knighthood tempered to weaken its spiritual life. History has but recorded its verdict on the unreality of the Western claim to holiness by adopting the

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1 See art. JESUITS and LOYOLA.
2 See art. INQUISITION and OFFICE, THE HOLY.
3 See art. ULTRAMONTANISM.
4 See art. INFALLIBILITY.
5 See art. OLD CATHOLICISM.
limiting epithet 'Roman' in its designation of the Catholic Church of the West. The narrowness of its conception of what constitutes Catholicity also appears in its attempt to describe the leaders of the Church as the 'children of the Logos,' thus raising the question of the powers of evil—its enduring services in the task of redeeming the world from atheism and saving it from sin, and further in its self-renouncing ministries to the poor, the infirm, and others. From age to age it has received warnings and calls to forsake the path of earthly domination and to seek only the unity and freedom of the spirit; but its answer is the dogma of papal infallibility, which is the admission of a fatal weakness—a bold but despairing attempt to enforce an authority which cannot endure the light of reason and spiritual liberty. Paganism and traditionalism are the perils of most forms of faith—the one, according to Sabatier, finding 'its most obvious and crudest expression in Catholicism, in the constitution of its priestly hierarchy, in the opus operum of its officers, and in the dis- tinctive practices with which Catholic devotion persists in over-laying itself'; the other revealing itself in the Catholic apotheosis of the past—whether the history of a period or the body of cultive traditions,--dogmas—which in the course of time becomes a hindrance and a despotism fatal to spiritual progress. And the view that the Western Church has been materialized and narrowed by its persistent policy of confining the Spirit within forms and rites and hierarchical authority, and by its fatal distrust of reason and conscience, is confirmed as we trace the attitude of Rome to the developments of Christian thought in the ages under review.

3. Development of theology and religious thought in the Church of the West.—(a) Early period: Augustinianism and influence of Greek theology.—The evolution of the Christian Church into the unity of Catholicism was not entirely a development of organization necessitated by its progress over the Roman Empire and moulded by its imperial environment and its secondary relationships. The external and institutional form of the Latin Church cannot be explained if the influence of its theological standpoint and its fundamental dogmas is ignored. Its claim to authority over the soul of the Christian is based on a distinct type of theology to which the distinguishing epithet 'Latin' has invariably been applied. From this point of view Augustine is more palpably the founder of the Western Church than St. Peter. This remarkable thinker is revered by the Catholic and the Protestant alike: by the former because of his emphasis on the authority of the Church and the imposibility of salvation outside the Church, by the latter because of his assertion of the divine sovereignty and of predestination (q.v.) and his interpretation and practice of evangelical and experimental piety. But, though it is true that his personal witness to Christ is his life, his thought lifts him beyond all the divisions of Christianity, the fact remains that he devoted all the resources of his intellect and spiritual zeal to the service of the Catholic Church, which he believed to be the only possible medium of salvation to the world. The grace (q.v.) which saved came indeed from above, but it was deposited with the succession of bishops who alone were empowered to administer it to the elect. His God was essentially a deistic or transcendental Deity, developing itself in and regulating human affairs by His commissioned agents, the hierarchy of the Catholic Church. Original sin (q.v.) was an effectual barrier to man's reconciliation with God; and the Church was to place a greater emphasis on the external rite of baptism (q.v.) as a mode of regeneration than on the merits of Christ. The power of sin which is seated in the heart of the individual will could be broken by the ordinance of the Church as the appointed channel of grace. In fact, 'grace' takes the place of Christ in Augustinian theolocy: on the one hand, it is the sovereign will of God who decrees the salvation of the elect, and, on the other, 'a kind of spiritual potency' deposited in the hierarchy and mediated by the priesthood in the sacraments to the people. Only a portion of the race could be generated in baptism; the residue were doomed to eternal punishment. It was by these views that Augustine made possible the development of the Church of the 5th cent. into the papal empire of the Middle Ages. There is hardly a side of the Church's life or practice—purgatory, the intermediate state, the celibacy of the clergy, the invocation of saints, reverence for relics and images, the distinction between mortal and venial sins, the loss of unbaptized children—without Augustine's influence among his opinions. With all its defects, however, this can be said in favour of the Augustinian theology, that it consolidated the Western Church, its thinking and its discipline, and saved it from the wave of Mahometanism which overwhelmed the Church of the East. Augustine was powerfully influenced by the Platonism of the Alexandrian teachers, especially in his earlier life; but his mature treatises show but scanty traces of sympathy with the standpoint of the Greek theologians and are obsessed by his theory of the Church, which in its rigidity and narrowness reveals the mind of a great ecclesiastic rather than of a profound philosopher. It has often been asked if the principles of Greek theology influenced the thought of the West. While it is universally agreed that the Latin Church borrowed freely from the customs and ritual of paganism, to what extent was it dogmatic teaching affected by the views of Clement of Alexandria, who proclaimed the continuity between Christianity and the higher thought of the Greek philosophers and theologians? But Alexandria derived this idea of continuity from the truth of the divine immanence (q.v.) in human nature, taught that the Incarnation revealed the organic union between God and man and was the real atonement for sin, asserted that there was no opposition between reason and faith, regarded the Church as a community whose spiritual life was that of the Logos (q.v.), and its sacraments as symbols of inner processes, and proclaimed that heresy was an aid to the discovery of truth. Origen followed with a profound learning and philosophic insight to lay the foundation of the doctrine of the Trinity in his teaching respecting the 'eternal generation of the Son.' Athanasius (q.v.) shaped in an atmosphere of controversy the orthodox Trinitarian formula against the deistic interpretation of Arius, and secured the insertion of the vital term παράγωγος in the Nicene symbol. His triumph is for ever significant, and the creeds of Christendom show that Greek thought fulfilled a providential task in the reconciliation of Christianity with reason, while the genius of Latin Christi-
spirit of Tertullian's *Prescription of Heresy* always hostile to heretical thought1 and the independent activities of reason, owed to Greek theology the intellectual gifts of the mind and a philosophic and accurate definition of the logical subtlety and lucidity by which alone the truth could be established on a firm basis. It owed its symbols and the power of defending them, its doctrine, and its apologia to Greek theology. The dogmas of Greek theology were held to be valid only when enforced by its authority. Without the beneficence of the hierarchy, no truth, no new conception of truth, could be tolerated. Tertullian were certain principles of Greek thought, such as the essential kinship of man with God, which the Western Church has never regarded with complete conviction; rather it has clung to the conception of the infinite distance between the human and the divine which was characteristic of the theology of Antioch. It has to be remembered that, when Greek theology passed into the Western Church, new peoples and races were coming to the front and were eventually to be won to Christianity; hence the method of presenting the simpler type of Christian thought based on Church authority, rather than the doctrine and the emanations of truth, might be justified on grounds of expediency. It remains true, however, that the earlier Greek theology of the Alexandrian type has left its traces in the consciousness of the Latin Church; its breadth and universality of vision, its synthesis of the human and divine, has illuminated but not transformed the dogmatic teaching of Catholicism. With Clement and Origen Rome has shown less affinity than with the pseudo-Dionysius. The *Celestial Hierarchy* (translated by John Scotus Erigena2), with its ranges of angelic intermediaries between God on the one hand and the bishops and deacons of the Church and finally common humanity on the other, and with its path to God by the practice of Oriental asceticism, was the very negation of the same and logical teaching of the Christian Platonists of Alexandria.

(b) Medieval period: scholasticism.—The age of Charlemagne marked a low stage of religious thought, although the culture of John Scotus Erigena,3 based on his knowledge of Greek and in particular of Plato and Origen, enabled him to produce a philosophy of religion far ahead of his times. Alcuin of York was a popular teacher, but he was not an original theologian and has a larger place in history than in the office of being a compiler of the Lectionary and works of private devotion. It is significant that in the 9th cent., the dogma of transubstantiation4 first became the subject of formal discussion. Neither Cyprian nor Tertullian was an exponent of a materialistic conception of the Lord's Supper, while Augustine held that its benefits were available only for the elect. To the monk Paschasius Radbertus, who wrote about 881 a treatise *De Corpore et Sanguine Domini*, belongs the credit of introducing the view that the presence of Christ was not in the soul of the worshippers but in the eucharistic elements. On the other hand, the early Middle Ages had rejected the image-worship of the degenerate East, and it was at a later period, when society was in the state of confusion and unrest caused by the invasions of Huns and Northmen, Danes and Saxons, that a reaction in favour of the Church as the one stable institution and refuge in a world of chaos took place; the great cathedrals were built; great ages and people were lost in that majestic Gothic temple. The art ministered to religious devotion in music, in the impressive ritual and fair

1 See art. HERESY (Christian).
2 See art. SCHOLASTICISM.
3 See art. Eucharist, SACRAMENTS (Christian, Western), and SACRAMENTS (Christian, Lutheran).
4 See art. HYSMS (Latin Christian).
5 See art. ANSELMS OF CANTERBURY.
6 See art. REALMS, ARISTOTLE, ARISTOTELIANISM.
7 See art. PENANCE (Roman Catholic).
8 Cf. the encyclical *Pascendi* of 1907.
conferred indisputable benefits on the world, was found unequal to the opportunity. The world had widened; new nations and new languages had appeared. Latin was no longer a medium of communication which enabled Wyclif and Melanchthon, the first translation of the Scriptures into homely English had opened the way to a new authority. The Bible, not the Church, was the source of revela-
tions. In Scotland, outstanding of the French saints belonging to the order of St. Victor, who used the tender and almost voluptuous imagery of love, or of the German saints like Eckhart and Tauler, whose expositions were cast in a stern and more ethical mould, impressed on the world the truths of the immediate intuition of God by the soul and the divine immanence. The air of Europe was alive with new currents of spiritual and intellec-
tual power. Even prior to the fall of Constantin-
ople in 1453, when Greek scholarship and learning sought a fresh habitation in the cities of Europe, the Renaissance had inaugurated in Italy under Pico della Mirandola, a new simplicity and classical literature and evoked a new sense of the many-sided interest of the present life—in a word, the humanism which was hitherto not only to transform the intellectual and ethical life of society as a whole but also to look on the world and the course of Christian thought and theology. It was on the intellectual side an expression of the individualism which within the realm of the spirit ecclesiasticism had failed to quench. By the work of Wyclif and Hus, by evangelical movements like that of the Wyclifians, by the mysticism of the cloister and the pulpits and lay-societies such as the "Friends of God" in Germany, the individual soul had expressed its spiritual conviction and ideals and the way had been prepared for a revolution in Christian thought. Luther entered into the heritage won for spiritual freedom by Wyclif and Hus, the latter of whom had died for the rights of con-
science. The Reformation was not a break but a fresh stage in the evolution of Christianity. It was the re-assertion of vital principles of faith which had found expression from time to time in the history of the Church from the days of St. Paul onwards. In essence, the position taken up by Luther was not the negative conviction that certain abuses which called for destruction had crept into the Church: he declared afresh the positive conditions of human salvation. He began with the people, not the cloister, nor the hierarchy. It was the people who carried the Church to the prinal and absolute authority upon whose well depended the destiny of the soul; but his rejection arose from his broad and clear conception of the value of the individual soul. His emphasis on justication by faith was in effect a plea for human rights—the right of access to God and the right of communion with Him as the condition of ultimate salvation. In other words, Luther came into con-
lict with the Roman Church because it was founded on ideas repugnant to the Christian conscience. The practice of selling indulgences by which the sinner obtained remission of the 'temporal' penali-
ties of his offences was to him only one among many results of the false assumptions on which Rome based her claims, viz. the supreme authority of the episcopate as constituting the Church and the denial of spiritual privilege to the laity (q.v.). He opined the fatal distortion of 'Western' Church, in which the Medieval Church had emphasized between things divine and human as inherently incompatible with each other —the distinction which had created the opposites, Church and State, of the Sarrazinian and the re-
grance. It followed, if this dualism was erroneous, that a layman had the power to interpret the written revelation which hitherto had been claimed as a priestly prerogative. Finally, from these premises flowed the truth of private judgment on the part of each man—"a position upon which Luther maintained when he appealed for the retention of a viable authority while admitting its human origin. In Switzerland Zwingli (q.v.) and Calvin were the leaders of this movement. The former by his emphasis on the divine in-
manence re-affirmed the standpoint of Greek theology, and he was Greek in his denial of original sin, in his assertion of the salvability of the heathen, and in his doctrine of the sacraments as symbolic and memorial. Calvin stood for order and discipline, and founded a Church the peltie of which took root in Scotland, the Netherlands, in Germany, in Switzerland, in France among the Huguenots, and in England among the Puritans. He held that the Church consisted of the elect and that the clergy were endowed by the Holy Spirit in ordina-
tion with powers which gave them an age of the people. It was, however, less as an ecclesiasti-
cal administrator than as a theologian that he left his mark upon the world. His rigid insistence on the verbal inspiration of Scripture, his theory of the fall of man, his doctrine of grace, imman-
ent, his assertion of the divine sovereignty which rendered God remote from nature and humanity and made progress depend on His arbitrary will, are the familiar elements of his theology. As compared with Zwingli, he continued the Latin tradition, but, on the other hand, he was essentially Protestant in his doctrine of the individual who, though his conscience was controlled by the clergy, yet owed his ultimate destiny to the sovereign majesty of God—a theory which made for human freedom and was destruc-
tive of clerical tyranny, while it disposed at once of the customs of image-worship and Mortality and brought to the profession of the Christian a robust ethical standard based on the teaching and example of Christ. As Thomism was wrought into the texture of Dante's Divina Commedia, Calvinism received a majestic setting in the epic of Milton, while Bunyan made an appeal alike to the humblest and to the most enlightened intellects by his immortal delineation of the Reformed the-
ology in his Pilgrim's Progress. Protestantism left its mark on Catholicism by producing the kindred movements of Jansenism (q.v.) and Gallicanism (q.v.), the former for ever to be associated with France and the latter with the prom-
thenceforth to be distinguished by the great name of Bossuet. Pascal (q.v.) opposed the Jesuits with much of the Calvinistic fighting spirit and stands in the line of Augustine and Calvin as a theologi-
gian, though at heart a melancholy sceptic who never succeeded in harmonizing his beliefs with the dictates of reason and conscience. Calvinistic Protestantism had left to Christian thought the necessity of defending the Scriptures in an age of cold and unsparing rationalism. The Augsburg Confession (1530) and the Institutes of Calvin had proclaimed Scripture to be the very word of God —in fact it was the infallible external author-
ity by which Protestantism had superseded the authorite of Rome. The 18th century, the age of Voltaire and Rousseau in France and of the English deists, 2 notwithstanding its open-ended tendenciess—Cambridge Platonism (q.v.) upholding the divinity of reason, natural theology contesting the supremacy of revealed religion, new scientific discoveries revealing the law of nature in man, and the attack on the Christian truth—that was not wholly the barren and unspiritual

1 See art. FRIENDS OF GOD, DEUTSCb-KATHOLICISM.
2 See art. LUTHER, REFORMATION, PROTESTANTISM.
3 See art. BUNYAN.
4 See art. BRASS AND ALLEN, p. 287 f.
epoch which it is often supposed to have been. The controversy aided the progress of vital Christianity in the sense that the deists were repudiated, and a more rational conception of the divine nature and government, while their opponents remained loyal to the truth of a divine revelation which had been made. While directly saving the doctrine of Christian Doctrine (1845, new ed. 1878), but the logical issues of his attempt to bridge the chasm between Protestantism and Catholicism were repudiated by the papal see when they were expounded by Alfred Loisy and George Tyrrell, Pius X. (1903-14) in his decree Lamentabili (July 1907) condemned the 90 propositions in which he summed up the Modernist doctrine, and by its ecumenical Paschendi shortly afterwards reasserted the scholastic dogmas of the Middle Ages as the necessary faith of a true Catholic.

The drift to Rome of individual medievalists within the Anglican pale will continue, but there are no signs of any approach to reunion between Rome and Anglicanism, the validity of whose orders received contemptuous rejection in the bull Apostolicae Curae (1864) of Roman Catholicism and the Holy Orthodox Church remains apparently without the slightest sign of a possible reconciliation. In the Reformed and Protestant Churches the cause of intellectual and religious freedom has been impeded by the secular tendencies of the salient, while there are symptoms both in England and in Scotland of a growing movement towards reunion—in England taking the form of a proposed federation of the Free Churches, which inherit the Protestant tradition, while in Scotland the union of the Established Church and the United Free Church is widely desired and anticipated. Generally speaking, among such Churches, the necessary re-adjustments of religious thought and restatements of doctrine are likely to be carried through without any controversial strain, while the authority of the Scriptures will be associated with a more profound and broader view of the Spirit of Truth as 'the Lord and Giver of Life,' not only to the writers and 'holy men' of the Scripture dispensations, but to all the saints of Christ in all ages and in the future. Already with this larger conception of revelation as the perpetual work of a controlling Spirit who is the eternal source of light amidst the fluctuations of the times, and men, instead of the preponderance of the rule of Western Christendom has tended to a clearer vision of the social and spiritual needs of humanity. The reaction of the European War, which has affected nearly every country in the world, has deepened the sense of international solidarity and has created the ideal of a League of Nations. Whether this new vision of brotherhood will result in a new synthesis of the rival ideals of Catholic and Protestant remains to be seen. For the moment the vision of a new Catholicism of Christendom appears to be both less convincing and less capable of realization than that of a political League of Nations. The old Catholicism, in the sense of ecclesiasticism, is dead or dying. So long as Rome claims absorption into her fold as the price of Christian reunion and so long as she asserts her mediaval standard of authority, she will stand outside the progressive movements of social and spiritual thought. The trend of the modern mind is against any external authority, whether of pope or priesthood or sacred book; and this is in effect a reaction against appearances which both Catholic and Protestant have put forth on behalf of their respective standards of authority—claims which offend the moral consciousness and the intellect of mankind. Nevertheless the Holy Catholic Church and the written Word

1 See artt. Evangelicalism, Methodism.
2 See artt. Encyclopaedia, Enlightenment, Liberalism.
3 See art. Hegel.
4 Cf. his work Du Poème, Lyons, 1819.

Rome. Science, comparative religion, psychology, have their place in the world, but are banned by the infallible fiat of the Church, whenever Catholic dogma is subverted or underthrown.

Newman paved the way to Modernism (q.v.)—the name given by Pope Leo XIII. (1878-1903) to the liberalizing movement within the Roman Catholic Church—by his direct attacks in Fugit Impressa, the evangelical revival under Whitehead and Wesley 1 provided a memorable and impressive demonstration of the truth which the orthodox apologists had propounded, by bringing to the soul of the 'conscience' the divine salutary and assurance of pardon which were declared to be available for simple faith. The 'saving faith,' which enabled the sinner by immediate contact with God to find peace and the strength for a new life of ethical holiness, was the mighty note upon which a renascence of spiritual religion sounded abroad its message of hope for a world in transition.

The Illuminism of Germany 2 may also be claimed as a renaissance of the spirit, if on intellectual lines, by virtue of its proclamation of the gospel that the moral consciousness is divinely inspired, and that the divine Spirit, the Divine Light, the Letter of Scripture is not bound to it, is universally revealing Himself in history. But the witness of Lessing (1729-81) was of less value as an example of the Christian view of history than that of a greater thinker, Schiller (1759-1805), to whom belongs the credit of originating the critical method as applied to Scripture and religion. His clear grasp of the solidarity of the race, his disbelieve in the individualism of Protestant and Catholic as expressed in the doctrines of election and predestination, his loyalty to the Church as an institution which expressed the idea that man is saved by grace, not by merit, and his conception of the progressiveness of revelation place him in the succession of Greek theologians as they make him the most formative of the Christian thinkers of the last century. His firm conviction of the immanence of God powerfully affected the art, literature, philosophy, and science of the 19th century. Romanticism, the poetry of Wordsworth and Shelley, the truth of evolution as expounded by Darwin, the art of Turner and his interpreter Ruskin, the Christian socialism of Maurice (q.v.) and Kingsley, Hegelianism, 3 and the Neo-Hegelianism (q.v.) of the Caird and T. H. Green (q.v.)—all the movements and men, insisted upon the prevalence of a new spirit. The Victorian Age was in effect a period of revolt. The triumph of the critical and scientific method was not less marked in the realm of theology than in other fields of knowledge. De Maistre 4 (1754-1821) in France and John Henry Newman (q.v.), from quite different standpoints, opposed what appeared to them the deadly liberalism of Christian thought. Tractarianism resulted in a revival of mediaval practices and ritual in the worship of the Church of England; but Anglo-Catholicism has never, like Roman Catholicism, repudiated the methods and results of modern criticism. Mediavalism in the Anglican Church has shown itself in ecclesiastical observance and in a revival of the Catholic view of the continuity of orders and ecclesiastical tradition, but the Erastianism of the English Church has been a safeguard against the triumph of a narrow orthodoxy and has in fact aided the forces of liberal thought.

As we have already seen, the Roman Church under Pius IX. and his successors has shown itself impervious to the movements of thought. The critical method is anathema to

1 See artt. Evangelicalism, Methodism.
2 See artt. Encyclopaedia, Enlightenment, Liberalism.
3 See art. Hegel.
4 Cf. his work Du Poème, Lyons, 1819.
WHEEL OF THE LAW

alike reveal the directing and controlling authority of the Spirit of Truth: the one proclaims the reality of the conscius sumotorum—the community of experience and witness—in the life of Christendom; the other declares the reality of God's perpetual self-revelation in the history of the race.

In this corporate and individual response to the Spirit of Truth, which is the life of all Scripturists and the Church as an institution are witnesses, is to be found the ground of our hope for mankind. The future lies with the religion of the Spirit of Christ which under many forms of worship, or systems of discipline and organization, with interpretations and settings suited to the various peoples of the world, will yet embody the Christian idea. The essence of Christianity is not to be confined to this or that dogma, creed, or institution, but is at once a spiritual experience and an activity of love—a kingdom of heaven within—inspired by the unifying control of the Spirit of Truth over the individual and collective consciousness of mankind. However desirable the consummation of an organic union of Christendom may be to many minds, a review of the history of the Church affords but scanty support to the idea that this result is attainable, or that any authority or center with which it would minister to the highest welfare of humanity.

On the other hand there is a wide-spread and growing assent to the interpretation of both Scriptures and sacred symbols which will be a neophyte's burden. That will be not less real because it will co-exist with diversity—the etos evymatos for which St. Paul intercedes—the oneness given by the Divine Spirit who at once makes and is immmanent within the whole body of the faithful upon earth.

LITERATURE. The leading authorities have already been given under articles referred to above. For the general history of the Western Church the reader should consult the following: CHRISTIANTIES, PAPACY, CHURCH; for doctrine Church, DOCTRINE OF (Roman Catholic), CREEDS, CONFESSIONS, and special phases under their own heading—e.g., Arianism, Nestorianism, etc.; for worship SACRAMENTS (Christian, Western), Eucharist, etc.; for law LAW (Christian, Western). In the field of modern literature the following book may be listed: 'Bibliographical Suggestions' in Williston Walker, A Hist. of the Christian Church, Edinburgh, 1939, the reader will find the most recent literature in Church History indicated and classified.

R. MARTIN POPE.

WHEEL. See JEWEL (Buddhist), PRAYER-WHEELS.

WHEEL OF THE LAW. This Buddhist expression is derived from the earlier Buddhist legend of the Mystical Wheel. This legend, or edifying fairy tale, is told in almost identical terms in several of the most ancient Buddhist documents. It is generally less essentially Buddhist, i.e., because several details (the ethical, not the essential ones) can be traced back to details in one or other of the pre-Buddhist sun-myths. The Wheel is said to be one of the treasures of a righteous king who rules in righteousness; and it is because of that righteousness that the Wheel appears. The legend says:

1. When he [i.e., the king; the name of course differs] had gone up to the upper story of his palace on the sacred day, the day of the full moon, and had purified himself to keep the sacred day, then there appeared to him the heavenly treasure of the Wheel, with its nave, its tire, and all its thousand spokes connected.

2. Then the king arose from his seat, and reverently uncovering his robe from his right shoulder, he held in his left hand a pitcher and with this he sprinkled water over the Wheel, as he said: "Roll on, O my lord the Wheel! O my lord, go forward!

3. Then the wondrous Wheel rolled onward toward the region of the East. And, after it, went the king with his fourfold army (cavalry, infantry, and chariots, war elephants, and yeomen). And wheresoever the Wheel stopped, there too the king stayed, and with him lived his fourfold army.

4. Then all the rival kings in the region of the East came to the king and said: "Come on, O mighty king! Welcome, O mighty king! All is thine, O mighty king! Do thou, O mighty king, be a Teacher and guide us!"

And the king said: "Ye shall ask no living thing. Ye shall not take that which has not been given. Ye shall not act wrongly touch the body of holy life. Ye shall drink no merchandise drink. And ye may still enjoy such privileges as are left in this world.

Then all the rival kings in the region of the East became subject to the king. And the wondrous Wheel having ploughed down into the holy earth in the field, was rolled onward to the South... and to the West... and to the North (and all happened in each region as had happened in the region of the East).

Now when the wondrous Wheel went forth conquering and to conquer over the whole earth to its very ocean boundary, it returned back again to the royal city and remained fixed on the open terrace in the front of the entrance to the inner apartments of the great king, shedding glory over them all."

So far the appearance and work of the Wheel. In another passage we are told that on the approach of the death of the righteous king the Wheel falls from its place, and on his death or abdication disappears. Should the successor carry on the Law of the Wheel, it will reappear and act as before, and this may continue for generations. But, should the successor fail in righteous rule, then the country will fall gradually into utter ruin, and remain so for generations till the Law of the Wheel has been revived. Then only will the wondrous Wheel reappear, and with wealth and power and the happiness of the people. All this is set out at length in the Chakka-vati Sīka-nada Suttanta.

The Chakka-vati, literally the 'Wheel-turner,' and by implication the ruler who conducts himself (and whose subjects therefore conduct themselves) according to the Law of the Wheel, is the technical term for the righteous king or over-lord. It has not been found in any pre-Buddhist literature; and, though it is so frequent in later books, it has, in Hindu works, lost its ethical connotation, and simply means a war-lord, a mighty emperor, 'one who unhindered drives the wheels of his chariot over all lands.' But it should be noticed that the wondrous Wheel of the Buddhist legend is not really a chariot wheel. The idea of sovereignty is no doubt linked up with it. The Wheel, however, is a single disk, not one of a pair. And it is very clear that it is really a reminiscence, not of a chariot wheel, but of the disk of the sun, which travels over all lands from sea to sea and sheds glory over all. By the pouring of new wine into the old bottles, it has, in the sun-god himself, transmuted into a forerunner of the king of righteousness, whose rule of life brings happiness to all.

This is the legend made use of to give a title to the doctrine of the reign of law, i.e., the basis of the reformists of the Western world, called Buddhists, of which the leaders of that reformation called 'the Law.' The discourse summarizing this doctrine, the first discourse delivered by the founder of the new movement, is entitled 'The Setting in Motion of the Wheel of Law' (Dhamma-chakkanipat- tana). The allusion is to the action of the king of righteousness in the foregoing legend when he baptizes the Wheel, and exhorts it to roll onward, to go forth and overcome. The allusion is apt; and it gains both in poetry and in its appeal to the mental attitude of the time by the irony with which it enlists the service of the ancient and the Buddha's doctrine that the gods too are under the domain of law. Just so was Brahman made into a convert to the new teaching, and the old god of war and drink, the mighty Indra, had been transmuted into the peace-loving and sober Sakra, devoted to the doctrine of the reign, not of divine whim, but of law.
and ignorant also of the doctrine of the reign of law, completely failed to understand this curious title of the oldest summary of the new teaching. It would be wearisome to point out all their mistakes. Perhaps the worst of all many blunders is the identification of the Wheel with what Anglo-Indian writers call, quite erroneously, the praying-wheels of Tibet. They are not so called by any authority, Tibetan or Buddhist. They are not praying-wheels of Tibet, continuing an invocation to some deity—the contrary therefore to the old doctrine of the Wheel. We may learn some day what the original meaning in Tibetan of maṇḍāra hūs really was. The phrase is not likely to be less than about 1400 years later than the time of the Buddha. And it is most unlikely that, after that long lapse of time, any memory of the legend of the Wheel or of its adoption to the title of the First Discourse had still survived. To judge from what we know of Lāmaism, the Tibetans had quite forgotten that, in very Buddhism, the reign of gods had been superseded by the reign of law (or, to express the same fact in modern technical terms, that animism had given way to normalism).

It remains to add that some centuries after the conquest the new teaching lost also many of the uses of the figure or simile of the wheel. Only the wheel is here, not the disk of the sun, but a chariot wheel. The figure is used of the circle or cycle of rebirths.

Mrs. Rhys Davids has pointed out the use of this simile in Greek and Sanskrit, and it has since then been discovered in Pāli. This is in harmony with the doctrine of the Wheel of Law in early Buddhism, but it is a somewhat curious idea, and has a different origin, and is never called the Wheel of the Law. It is samadra-chakka, not dhamma-chakka.


T. W. RHYS DAVIDS.

WIDOW.—See MARRIAGE, SATI.

WIFE.—See MARRIAGE.

WILL.—The word 'will' (Gr. ἐπιθυμία, Lat. voluntas, Germ. Wille, Wollen, Fr. volonté) is used in a wide variety of senses by philosophical and psychological writers. In the widest sense it is the power to act, and in that sense was used by the Aristotelian bipartite division in psychology contrasted with the 'intellectual,' and so includes all striving, appetite, and interest, even at an intraconscious level. In the narrowest sense it is taken to mean, or at least to imply, deliberate and responsible choice.

1. Physiological basis.—The analysis of will in the widest sense requires the analysis of the physiology of movement. Physiologists base their concepts upon reflex action, and then discuss the integration of reflexes in the brain and spinal cord. The unit of this explanation is the simple reflex. The stimulation of an end-organ must issue in movement, and a simple reflex is the simplest possible response of an organism to stimulation. The simplicity of a simple reflex, however, is the result of analysis rather than a fact of observation. What we find in fact is a combination of reflexes into reflex patterns of various kinds.

All reflexes take place through a chain or arc of neurons which passes through the central nervous system. Connections between neurons form the synapses by which they mutually interact.

2. Instinctive action.—The theory of impulse and instinct is the natural corollary to this account of neural integration. The connection between reflexes and impulses or appetites is usually close indeed, and instincts are the great 'rational' patterns of co-ordinated action. The moor-hen has a driving 'set' in its muscles when it is little
more than a dabling, and it dives as soon as cause and opportunity offer.

The question how far human action or the action of the organs is influenced by instinct is still hotly debated, but the debate tends to become verbal since the partisans of the instincts insist upon the indefinite pliability of these responses, while their opponents try to narrow instincts down to more racial routine. The point in dispute is the relation of nature to nurture, and this also is a thorny topic which a wise man leaves alone. It is clear, however, that many actions which we perform with the aid of what we have become habitual, are acquired in individual experience (even if they are grafted upon a primitive instinctive root), and all these problems are highly speculative in comparison with the fact of the reflective adaptation of human beings to their circumstances. Again, there is another reason why the analysis of will suffers when psychologists devote themselves exclusively to speculative theories concerning the instincts. However important the instincts may be, and however closely allied with normal human perception and action, the consciousness in instinctive behaviour does not differ in kind from the reflective consciousness, and its principal features cannot be discerned so readily at the instinctive level of consciousness as at others. It is best, therefore, to try to give a direct psychological analysis of the consciousness in ordinary human action.

3. Ideno-motor theory.—Probably the simplest type of conscious action is that which is called ideno-motor. This occurs when the thought of a movement leads directly so far as consciousness is concerned) to the execution of the movement. A great many movements need no other explanation. Those who take the injunction ‘Kill that fly!’ seriously begin hostilities as soon as they see the fly; and ‘Eight o’clock and time to get up’ is frequently a sufficient and the only mental prelude to getting out of bed in the morning. These instances show that the idea of a movement tends of itself to the execution of the movement, and some psychologists, generalizing somewhat hastily, have concluded that all voluntary action is ideno-motor and nothing else. According to this theory, we learn from impulse, imitation, and random muscular play what movements can be executed. The immediate antecedent of any movement which is consciously directed, however, may be any desire, or capacity, or consciousness of the idea of that movement; and this idea is always the cause of the movement.

This theory is plausible because the idea of a future action is a sine qua non of voluntary action of any kind; but there are serious objections to it.

(1) Our ideas of movement are usually suffused with feeling and tense with conscious endeavour. It is a mistake, therefore, to suppose that these feelings, desires, and strivings do not play their part as directly and as effectually as the bare idea of movement.

(2) There is universal testimony to prove that much of our action does not seem to be merely ideno-motor. The bare idea of movement is sometimes merely an idea. We may have to strive most resolutely to bring ourselves to the point of acting—i.e., we may have to reinforce the idea by endeavouring after its end. And sometimes we have to choose between several conflicting ideas of movement simultaneously present to minds.

Since the ideno-motor theory does not dispute these facts (it would not be worth considering if it did), it is hard to provide an alternative explanation, and so it maintains that striving or choice in these cases secures the temporary dominance of some particular idea of movement. The only possible cause of conscious action, according to this way of thinking, is a man’s temporary single-mindedness towards the idea of the action, and his temporary oblivion of all else. Choice or striving influences the action, but not the temporary dominance of the idea of the action.

This theory is unnecessarily complicated. We seem to ourselves to choose this or that, and not merely to attend to some idea of movement exclusively; and there is no good reason why this seeming should not be actuality. Again, the idea of our chosen course of action often does not seem to be the only alternative before the mind either at the time of decision. They have been granting that we ought to stick to our plan, after we have adopted it, on pain of inefficiency or Hamlet-like vacillation. It is false in fact, therefore, that conscious action is always preceded by this exclusive possession of consciousness. Moreover, this theory is just an attempt to save the ‘strongest motive’ theory with as little violence as may be. It is assumed that action must be due to the ‘strongest motive’; and therefore the motive which immediately precedes the action is assumed to be either predominant or else the only one present; but this argument is circular, since there is no means of deciding which was the strongest by excepting, après coup, that it was the motive of the action which followed in fact. Again, even if this theory could account for most specific voluntary movements, it would still be too narrow for voluntary choice as a whole. When a barrister resolves to make out a case for his client, or a journalist tries to discover the gist of Einstein’s theory or of Ludendorff’s influence, the movements they make in the way of speaking, writing, or travel are quite subsidiary in importance. And the ideno-motor theory simply omits these cases. Movements are seldom chosen for their own sakes. They are usually chosen because they are means to an end, and the ideno-motor theory is so preoccupied with the means that it neglects the end altogether.

This theory, indeed, is too intellectual; for it resolves action into the automatic effect of mere thinking, and rejects the primary and direct influence of interest, passion, and striving. This mistake is not uncommon; it permeates, e.g., the Benthamite theory of psychological hedonism (p. 296). To say, with Mill,1 that ‘happiness is the sole end of human action’ may mean many things. It might mean, e.g., that no one, on reflection, judges anything to be good. It might also mean, in that case the theory would have no bearing on unreflective action. It might also mean that the anticipation of pleasure is the only possible motive for action. This form of the argument is required as a premise in many of the utilitarian arguments, and it is postpositively false. In impulsive or instinctive action, e.g., the impulse comes first, and the gratification follows; and the banked dispositions which are the root of psychasthenia (in nine cases out of ten) must exist before there is pain in the baulking of them.

4. Reason and will.—On the other hand, many theories are intellectually adequate enough, for the temptation to be an affair of impulse or desire, and they leave no place for reason, except the recognition of means and the discovery of bad reasons for some sentimental or impulsive partis pris. Most of the modern theories of this type, it is

1 Bentham’s argument (Introd. to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ch. i. 1) is even more explicitly fallacious. "Nature," he says, "has placed mankind under two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, and what we ought not to do. On one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects are fastened to their thron..." as well as another argument in all we think and do; every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it.
true, do not seem to have descended in *linea recta* from Hume, but Hume gave what is still the clearest and the most concise expression of them. Reason, as we have seen, is the sovereign of the will, for reason is either the abstract demonstration of relationships or else the discovery of causes and effects. The will, however, has to do with sensible realities and with abstract relationships; and the discovery of causes and effects cannot concern us at the least if we are to avoid the error in which Hume assumes in the next place that the difference between interest and difference is identical with the presence of a beneficial or abhorrent passion, and then he argues with perfect logic that ‘since reason alone cannot produce any action, or give rise to volition, it must be the case of preventing volition, or of disputing the preference with any action or negation.’  

He concludes that the so-called conflict between reason and passion is really the battle between calm emotions and sudden, tempestuous ones.  

There is a double fallacy in this argument. (1) Even if reason were restricted to the means to action, and if the knowledge of these causes and effects were indifferent without emotion, it would not follow that reason was ineffective when allied with emotion. (2) Reason (unless it is robbed of this function by an arbitrary definition) can discriminate the values of ends as well as ascertain the means to them. The values that are important for reason are those to which he is felt with emotion and followed with conviction, but this fact does not imply that the intellectual recognition of these values is of no account.  

This consequence would not follow even if all these feelings were emotion emotions. That, however, is not the case. The principal values which we admit to be intrinsically good are happiness, social intercourse, knowledge, beauty, and righteousness; and perhaps also the bearers of these values—Plato, who had the knowledge, Koats, who was touched with the beauty, Cato, who did what was right, and the greyhound which leaps with joy the breath of the world. These values are not emotions, though all are felt with emotion. And there is another point. A man’s emotion is his own; and, if nothing but emotion could touch his will, the happiness of others or the honour of his country could not influence him directly. In fact, however, we do not merely judge intellectually that another’s is good as much as our own, but we frequently choose to sacrifice our own good to his. This personal sacrifice, it is true, is sometimes superficial only. That occurs when we choose a less obvious instead of a more commonplace personal satisfaction; and the existence of non-instrumental impulses and emotions certainly lessens the gap between this theory and the facts. But often we have to accept the truth that a man may sacrifice ease, culture, and leisure to undertake work which he loses, though he knows that his own loss is certain. For the good, he thinks, constrains him.

5. Analysis of voluntary action.—We may now analyse deliberate voluntary action. Action of this kind implies knowledge of the means which are needed, choice between alternative ends, and the belief that we can achieve, or help to achieve, the end by adopting the means. The end, to be sure, may not be wholly attainable by us, but we believe, in that case, that we can contribute towards its attainment; and, for the rest, the thought of will implies the thought of can. No one deliberately chooses anything which he knows to be utterly out of his reach. We choose between alternatives which we believe are within our power, and our choice, in the end, is a choice between conflicting values.  

If, then, the two fundamental choice are due to the false perspective which nearer values may have in comparison with more remote ones, to preoccupation with our own personal welfare and our concern to blind ourselves towards the claims of other people, to our lack of acquaintance with many attainable values, to our ignorance concerning the means which are necessary in fact, to the difficulty of knowing or of conceiving the manner of achieving the end, it is most probable, to the doubt whether some means could ever justify some ends, and so on. This subject is too wide to be treated adequately here, even in outline. And there are other complications.  

(1) We usually have too little time for mature reflection. Most of our deliberations are cut short by our life, and the need for action clamant. We have to distinguish between voluntary action and deliberate reflective action. Voluntary action is the genus of which deliberate choice is the species. It implies the adoption of an end (the fact of ‘consent’) together with belief in the possibility of attaining the end; but there need not be choice between alternatives, since we may be too much pressed for time to take account of more than the first expedient that occurs to us, and our belief may be little more than a vague expectation that something may be done on the lines we have adopted.  

(2) The analysis of give action was restricted to the deliberate choice of a single course of action, but will is a subtler thing than this, with a wider net. When we speak of a formed will, we mean the whole character of a man so far as it can be expressed in action. A man’s habits of choice pertain to his will as well as his choice on this or the other occasion, and so do his capacities and his general aims. The formed or stable will, therefore, has to be examined very carefully in connection with physiological and instinctive dispositions on the one hand and with conscious personality on the other, and the ramifications extend very far. On the other hand, it is quite possible to do one thing by the path of personality and its ‘tunicle’ the body (to use Berkeley’s phrase). We have no acquaintance with any will that is superpersonal, and, in particular, we are not acquainted with any voluntarius. The will of society is not a will any more than the spirit of the times is a mind. The general will, so called, means (a) that the majority of the members of a community may resolve, or act as if they were resolved, to pursue a common end each of which end furthers the one in his own way; and (b) that each member must take account of the other members when he is considering the means of attaining. More than that it should not mean.  

6. Voluntarism.—The most interesting questions arising out of the theory of will are voluntarism, or the metaphysical theory that the will is sovereign over the self or the world, and the perennial problem of the freedom of the will. While voluntarism has many varieties, its main contention is either that knowledge is a phase of willing, or perhaps, subordinate to it or else that will is the *causa essendi* of all existing things. Knowing, we are told, must be only a phase of willing, because all speculative activities are either virtual actions or else merely delayed reactions. The psychology of development, e.g., shows that knowledge is a kind of virtual action. *Am Anfang war die That*. Man’s earliest and most fundamental business is just to adapt himself to his environment, and so his earliest and most important knowledge is only a retainer to this fundamental need. And it is claimed that knowledge must never outgrow its substantial applications. In sum, broadly speaking, is the application of their knowledge in the way of machinery, armaments, navigation, and government for the ultimate purpose of maintaining human subsistence as

1 *Treatise of Human Nature*, bk. II, pt. II.
agreeably as possible on a large social scale. The theoretical adventures of the intellect are practical in their germ and in their fruit, and belief is either action or readiness for action.

This line of argument is obviously incoclusive. Even if it be granted that, at the beginning, had to use all his wits to keep alive, and that most of the able-bodied members of a community have still, in a way, to co-operate for this purpose, there is a large gap between the premises of this argument and its conclusion. For, even if much knowledge has to be given to the necessities of action, it does not follow that all must be given. The argument, indeed, is quite consistent with the belief that knowledge, originally a servant, may become a master and reign in its own right, or that it is possible, in an ordinary human community, for many people to spend their lives in the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, and for all members of the community to do so at some times. And the facts seem to support this hypothesis. Those who maintain that all knowledge is only preparatory to their condition, may be invited to say what preparation for action is implied in my knowledge that Bolingbroke wore a wig, or that Sophocles was a greater poet than Dryden, and to explain why gossipy reminiscences or involuntary salience concerning Chinese puzzles (to mention trivial instances only) must be 'virtual actions.' They may also be reminded that practical men need not act the worse because their information is accurate. True belief is the most useful guide to action, but some truths do not concern action directly, and it is only a quibble to say that any connexion with action, however remote, is the same thing as 'virtual action.'

Similar arguments apply to the theory that all speculation is delayed reaction and nothing else. It is true, no doubt, that there cannot be deliberate reflective choice without delay in reaction, and that deliberation is a speculative activity. But controversies with circle-squarers, e.g., are not merely delayed reactions; and it is a fallacy to argue either that all speculation is only delayed reaction because some speculations imply delayed reactions, or that the speculative activities which may occur during certain delayed reactions are themselves only delayed reactions.

The theory that knowledge is subordinate to will shows itself in psychological descriptions or on metaphysical grounds. In the former case it is argued, as a matter of psychological fact, that knowledge is only the attempt to discover ways and means for satisfying impulses. It is sufficient to reply to this argument that these impulses may include curiosity and disinterested impulses towards knowledge for its own sake, and that, even if impulses are always the primary causes of knowledge, it does not follow that the effect is subordinate to the cause.

The metaphysical argument is a non sequitur of the same type. It maintains that effects are always only in part due to their condition, and that will is the cause of all mental process including every piece of knowing. This principle, as we have seen, is false, and, apart from that, the premises of the argument are highly dubious. Will, in the sense of striving or of deliberate choice, is not the sole cause of mental process in any intelligible sense. We have no right to exclude any antecedent from the list of causes of any effect if this antecedent is not present in fact, and if it always seems to play its part along with the other antecedents. And knowledge and feeling are antecedents of any mental process just as plainly as any physical argument, in a word, finds no support in the psychological phenomenon of will.

It may be argued, to be sure, that the scholastic maxim Operari sequitur esse is false, or that 'function always determines structure'; and views of this kind (usually with more enthusiasm than knowledge) may even claim kinship with certain modern theories of psychology. These theories are irreconcilable, however, because voluntarism is meaningless unless it is based on the psychological phenomenon of will. The will, as we experience it, is a kind of pre-existing, not a posteriori, causal force for such theories; and those pluralisms which maintain that the conatus (or the desires and appetitions) of every existing thing is its causus essendi cannot claim more than a metaphorical support from the facts of will, as we find them. A spiritualistic pluralism of this kind may be true in fact; and voluntarism, possibly, may be the least inept name for it, but it is not a logical consequence from the relation of willing to personality, and it becomes nothing but conjecture when this vague psychological analogy is extended to unconscious things.


On voluntarism: Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, the works, e.g., of Fichte or Bergson. On freedom of the will: J. F. Mill. WIND, WIND-GODS.—See AIR AND GODS OF THE AIR.

WINGS (Greek and Roman).—Wings, as an attribute of animals to whom they do not properly belong, were borrowed by the Greeks from Oriental art, mostly that of Mesopotamia. They probably appeared first on composite animals into which the bird form entered as an element, such as the griffon, sphinx, and gryphon; and the griffon is almost indiscriminately to quadruped and even human forms as symbolic of divine strength and swiftness. It is doubtful, however, whether this symbolism was what attracted the early Greeks, probably it was the decorative value of wings, as seen in Oriental carvings and woven stuffs, that first appealed to the Greek artistic sense, though they doubts were given a symbolic meaning in later Greek art.

In the art of Crote and Myceae we find both griffons and sphinxes with wings, but we have no means of judging whether these had any meaning, and if not metaphorically borrowed as elements of decoration; the fact that the sphinx is female and winged suffices to show that it came from Mesopotamia and not from Egypt. But the frequent appearance of winged creatures is highly suggestive of Eastern influence, at first through the medium of the Phoenicians and later, more directly, in the 'Orientalizing' Greek vases and in decorative carvings and reliefs of a similar period, and also the sculptural ornamentations of Cyprus are various winged animals, including centaurs (a winged centaur appears in Mesopotamia about 1200 B.C.). On the later Orientalizing pottery from Mesopotamia, Minor, and Corinth...
The commonest winged forms, other than birds, are the griffin, the sphinx, human-headed birds, and human beings; winged horses are also found, especially in chariots of the gods, on Melian and other early vases, bears, dolphins, and other animals, such as the griffin and sphinx, are common on the so-called ‘island gens’ and on early coins.

In many of these cases it is evident that the decorative value of the wings, as helping the design to fill a given field, has been paramount; but there are other examples, in which a symbolic meaning may be inferred, and where such winged forms have become the accepted type of characteristic creations of Greek myth. In most of these instances, however, the types were not invented or composed by the Greek artist to express the idea of the myth, but were adopted from foreign or borrowed forms. Thus there is no evidence that the Sirens (q.v.) were thought of by Homer and his contemporaries in the form assigned to them by later art; either a fancied appropriateness or a chance coincidence may sometimes have led to such identifications. The type of the human-headed bird was not, however, used only for the Sirens. If we look for a connexion with them, and appear to represent a death-daemon. The best known instance is on the misnamed ‘Harpy monument,’ which, though not Greek but Lycean, shows evident affinity with Greek ideas. Here the figures in question have not only human heads and breasts, but also human arms, as well as birds’ legs and talons, both of which they use to carry off the souls of the dead. Thus they show the same unnatural reduplication of limbs which we find in other winged creatures, and which the human-headed bird sometimes escapes. The wings, here as in human or quadruped winged forms, appear to grow from the shoulders-blades, and yet to work independently of the arms. Such an inorganic composition seems to confirm the view that the wings, except where they belong properly to the bird form, are borrowed from an art in which they were purely symbolic. The funereal connexion in the case of the Sirens may perhaps be explained by Egyptian influence, since the human-headed bird is used in Egypt as a symbol of the soul. It is often found as the crown of a tombstone in Athens.

It is not certain that the wonder-horse, Pegasus, was at first thought of as having wings; he appears without them on an early relief; but he early adopted winged forms, and has been familiar to all later art. Gryphons have a place in myth, since they fought with the Arimaspai in the far North; though they have beaks, their body is that of a quadruped rather than a bird, and their wings are consequently as much out of place as on a horse or lion.

What is, however, most characteristic of the Greek application of wings is their addition to the human form. This also appears first in borrowed forms, such as that of the Oriental Artemis; a similar form is that of the Gorgon, whose hideous grimacing face is set in a human body with wings; here again we have no evidence that the ‘head of the terrible monster, the Gorgon,’ 1 was thought of in this form by the poet of the Odyssey. Another shape akin to the Gorgon is the Harpy. This sometimes seems to be a death-daemon, though the bird-like figures on the Harpy tomb are probably wrongly named. On early vases Harpies appear in completely human form, winged, and sometimes bird-like; they are often called Erotes; there is no doubt as to identification, since the name is written beside them. These Harpies are sometimes interpreted as malevolent wind-demons; and this is consistent with the tale of their being chased away by the Boreads, the sons of the North Wind. Wind-gods generally appear as winged human figures, and the small winged figures that are commonly found in early vases, as amours, bears, etc., are probably to be interpreted thus. Boeas himself, who is represented on Attic vases and elsewhere as carrying off Oreithyia, appears as a winged, bearded man, sometimes with a mane of feathers for hair and beard.

It is probable that in early Greek art such winged figures are used with many different meanings; but they are usually differentiated into two main types of constant occurrence—the winged nude male figure or Eros, and the winged drapéd female figure or Nike. The sculptor Archermos of Chios is said to have been the first to represent Nike with wings, and the statue in which he did this has been discovered in Delos; it represents a female figure in rapid flight, with wings not only on the shoulders, but also on the ankles. Floating figures of winged Victories, as symbolical of victory either in war or in athletic contests, are extremely common throughout Greek and Roman art. Nike was placed on the out-stretched rim of a chariot or in connexion with the statues of Zeus and Athena at Olympia and Athens, by Phidias. Eros in earlier Greek art always appears as a youth of fully-grown proportions, though sometimes of diminutive size. In the Hellenistic and Roman ages he becomes the baby Cupid familiar to Renaissance and modern art, and his wings are correspondingly small. Iris, as the messenger of the gods, is usually winged, and so is hardy to be distinguished from Nike, apart from her attribute of the rainbow.

A different series of winged figures, usually diminutive, represent the souls of the dead; as such they are sometimes depicted on Attic vases as hovering about the tomb. Similarly, in the weighing of the Keres of two warriors by the gods—as of Achilles and Hector in the Iliad—the usual representation is of two minute winged figures placed in the scales. Homer describes them as δύο κέρει . . . ἀεικόνα, and hence it seems doubtful whether the two figures are to be regarded as the souls or lives of the heroes or rather their fates of death. Thus the resemblance to the little souls on the vases is striking. Keres (q.v.) seems to vary in meaning between death-deemons, who seem usually thought of as horrible, though not necessarily winged, and ghosts or souls of the dead, who almost always are winged. The Psalm of later times, who is associated with Eros and has butterfly wings—sometimes even takes the shape of a butterfly—is a creation of later allegory.

Death (Thanatos) often appears as a winged figure in art; on Attic funereal vases he, with his brother Sleep, often bears the deceased to the tomb. Sleep is similar to him, but beardless, while he is bearded; and both usually have similar wings growing from their shoulders. But in the beautiful figure of Sleep of the Praxitelean age the god has only a small pair of wings growing from his temples; a similar position for the wings is seen in later sentimental verses of Moschus, who has exchanged the horror of the Gorgon for a death-like beauty, and occasionally in other figures.

A variation on wings actually growing from a part of the body, head, or limbs is seen in wings that can be attached to some article of dress, and so put on and off. The most familiar example is offered by the winged sandals of Hermes, which he lends to his friends; the thin strap which to the feet is also seen in the earliest Nike, and in later allegorical figures such as Kairos (Occasion). Hermes sometimes wears also wings attached to

1 Od. xi. 634.
his cap; the resemblance to wings on Scandinavian helmets is probably accidental. Wings are sometimes attached to other objects—e.g., to the tripod of Apollo when he travels on it, or to the chariot on which Thetis is borne over the earth, or to that in which Medea escapes after her revenge on Jason. Other gods also have means of swift flight, as exemplified by Athena, when she describes how she came τροών ἄνευ ἀποθεώσεως κατ' αὐτόν.

It is with much the same associations that gods are often described as coming like birds or even taking the shape of birds. The fatal attempt of Daidalos and Icarus to fly with mechanical wings is probably to be regarded as similar magic. The desires of mankind in this direction are wittily parodied in Aristophanes' Birds.

In Roman art the types handed down from the Greek and Hellenistic periods frequently recur, but without any essential additions or difference. Victories, both in the round and in relief, are especially common, and are chiefly interesting as supplying the typically, and as often as not, the material of sculptors and plaque painters—wings, for example, are naturally noted, with change or rather absence of sex—for the angel of Christian art.

So far, though the position of wings has been noted nothing has been said about birds, and wings have no connection with them. The wings of early decorative types are always, or almost always, cut back at the end, in a manner which, if not quite unnatural, is at least greatly exaggerated. This is a characteristic which is also found among the winged creatures of Oriental art, and is borrowed from them, but is emphasized for decorative reasons in archaic Greek art. When wings came to be applied freely by Greek artists to various figures, human or divine, they naturally supplemented and corrected the conventional forms by their own observation, using especially the wings of large birds as their models, often probably those of the eagle. The wings are frequently out-stretched as in flight; when lowered, they do not lie folded close to the body, as in the case of a bird, but usually project at right angles behind the back of the figure. Smaller wings show many varieties; thus, according to H. Brunn, the wings on the temples of the head of Sleep are those of a night-hawk. Such variety of imagination was readily suggested by the subjects themselves.

E. A. GARDNER

WISDOM.—As distinguished from the reasoned, systematic view of the world and man which is the conscious aim of philosophy (q.v.), wisdom may be defined as the direct, practical insight into the meaning and purpose of things that comes to 'shrewd, penetrating, and observant minds, from their own experience of life, and their daily commerce with the world.' It is the fruit not so much of speculation as of native sagacity and wit. Consequently, while philosophy appeals only to the intellectual dítes, wisdom appeals to all who are interested in life and have understanding enough to appreciate a word of truth well spoken, and who are not, as to this distinction, however, the two are closely allied. The knowledge of life reached intuitively by wisdom is the raw material out of which philosophical systems are evolved. And, as with all wisdom moves in the atmosphere of philosophy.

1. Proverbial wisdom.—The beginnings of wisdom are found embodied in the terse, sen.

2. Egyptian wisdom.—While the proverbial lore of Arabia brings us close to the running fountain of Semitic wisdom, the Egyptian sages had at a far earlier date evolved a gnomic literature, in which the shape of books of moral precept or instruction ('sphinx', 'harpía', 'niké', 'erós', 'kéros') is evident.

3. W. of Gift.—The wisdom of the gift is a reflection of the festival of the gift, and no doubt is enlightening self-interest, they are by no means forgetful of the noble qualities of character. Especially do they delight in extolling the virtues of contentment, observant kindness, and restrained restraint in word and action, perseverance, kindness, friendship, neighbourliness, hospitality, and love of home and country. In all this they are a mirror of Arabian life at its best.
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fidence in those around him. The only influence that really appeals to men is terror; so let him 'harden himself against all subordinates, 'know neither friends nor intimates,' wherever there is no end, 'and guard himself well as he sleeps, 'for a man has no people in the day of evil.' Equally depressing are the Lament of Khedkeperi-Setbu, priests of Beloypo, (B.M. 381 c.c.), with its dismal picture of the corruptions of the time, the Dialogue of a Misanthrope with his Soul, ending in a wistful longing for death as the only release from evil, and the Admonitions of Upu/ner, the gloom of which, however, is relieved at the end by the vision of a righteous ruler, 'with no evil in his heart,' who goes about like a 'shepherd,' gathering together his scattered and 'fervent' herd. On a different key are the Precepts of Denvuf, urging his son Pepi to diligence in learning, as the most 'beautiful and honourable of callings, and the remarkable Song of the Harper, which finds the only consolation against the vanity and transience of life in the frank pursuit of pleasure.

'Give comfort to thy heart, And let thy heart forget these things; What is best for thee to do Is to follow thy heart's desire as long as thou livest.

Ancient thy head with scented unguments,
Let thine apparel be of byssus
Dip thy feet in perfumed water
In the veritable products of the gods.

Enjoy thyself more than thou hast ever done before,
And let not thy heart pine for lack of pleasure.

Pursue thy heart's desire and thine own happiness.

Order thy surroundings on earth in such a way That thy house minister to the desire of thy heart; [For] at length that day of lamentation shall come, Whereas his heart is still shall not hear the lamentation. Never shall cries of grief cease
To beat [again] the heart of a man who is in the grave.'

3. Babylonian wisdom.—Thus far the cuneiform records have yielded little in the way of wisdom literature. In Rawlinson, II. p. 16, however, there is found an interesting bilingual tablet (Sumerian and Assyrian), containing a number of riddles, proverbs, and gnomic maxims, apparently but specimens of a class (selected for the training of scholars in the grammatical construction of short phrases), and therefore evidence that in Babylonian also proverbial wisdom was the basis of more conscious reflection on life and conduct. The following may be quoted as typical:

'The life of yesterday goeth on daily the same.'

'Thou guest and takest the field (i.e. property) of thine enemy;
The enemy is thy companion and thy sleep.'

'If the seed be not good, the stalk will not grow, nor will grain be produced.'

'I am a young heifer, yoked with a yoke;
On the wagon to which we are harnessed... I bear the yoke.'

'What man eateth when he is dead?
Why then should he tell when he is alive?'

'In the case of incurable sickness and insatiable hunger, a box full of silver and a chest full of gold are powerless to restore the health and to satiate the hunger.'

'He who says, 'O that I might have revenge, and more so!'
draws from a well without water, peers from a skin that is empty.'

The Epicurean tendency revealed in the Egyptian Song of the Harper finds expression also in a remarkable case of the Gilgames epics;4 while the high ethical and religious note we have heard in Patuk-hotep and Ami rings through the Wisdom Tablet5 declassified and translated by K. D. Macmillan.

4. Chinese wisdom.—Passing eastward to China, we enter upon a larger field. The grave, practical temperament of the Chinese predisposed them to ethical reflexion. And the logical sharpness and balanced harmony of their speech made it a happy medium for sententious expression. The old classics, especially the Shu King, are rich in proverbial lore. Confucius and his grandson Tse-ssu, Mencius (p.v.), and the Confucian school generally are distinguished, not for originality or depth of thought, but for the terseness and point of their sayings as well as for the attractive grace of their personalities. Even the mystical and sectarian writers, like Lao-tse, Yang Ch'ung, and Hui Shih, make their impression not so much by the reasoned compatness of their systems as by the beauty and force of their aphorisms. Chinese literature as a whole is 'seasoned with the salt' of proverbs. And the common people are not far inferior to their masters in the use of the art. 'Chinese may be almost said to think in proverb.'6 And instruc-

4 Their freedom (I) thou shalt not take away,
Thou shalt not tyrannically oppress them.
For this (I, who give thee this), his god is angry with him: It is not pleasing to Samas, he will requite him with evil.
Give food to eat, give wine to drink, Seek the right, provide for and .
For this (or, he who acts thus), his god is pleased with him: It is pleasing to Samas, he will requite him [with good].
Thou shalt not slander, but speak kindly,
Thou shalt not speak evil, but show mercy.
Him who slander's and speaks evil,
With its recompenses will Samas visit (§) his head.
Thou shalt not make large thy mouth, but guard thy lip;
In the time of thine anger thou shalt not speak at once.
If thou art quickly, thou wilt repent (§) afterward,
And in silence thou willst soothe thy mind.
Daily present to thy god
Offering and prayer, appropriate to intense.
Before thy god mayest thou have a pure heart,
For that is appropriate to the deity.'

5 Akin to the more pessimistic wisdom literature of Egypt is the Lament of Tudi-natu-lid, in which the old king grieves over his own misfortunes and the general evil in the world. As for himself, he has sought consistently to honour God's name and follow His righteous ways.

'I myself took thought only for prayers and supplication.
Prayer was my rule, sacrifice my order, The day of God's honouring was my heart's joy,
The day of God's anger was for me gain and riches. . . .
I taught my hand to keep God's name;
To the honour of the name of the goddess I cautioned my people.'

6 But how differently from his deserts has God treated him.

'My house is become a prison for me,
In the chains of my flesh are my arms laid,
In my own bonds (§) are my feet cast.
A whip while he has beaten me, not . . .
With a staff has pierced me, the point was strong.
All day long doth follow the avenger
In the middle of the night he lets me not breathe for a moment.'

Both theme and language remind one of Job. But the dénouement is different. Whereas Job returns to a deeper, more personal faith in God, the Babylonian sage finds no help in god or goddess. God's ways are too inscrutable for man to rely on Him. The only hope is in the mercy of one's 'guardian angel'—the ancestral spirit of the family.

But I knew the time, of all my family,
When among the guardian angels their divinity had mercy.'

7 Translation from K. D. Macmillan, BASS v. 557 ff.
8 Rawlinson, iv. p. 60.
10 Reverse, line 1 ff.
11 Line 24 f. (Translations from W. Rogers, Oneiform Parallels to the Chinese Classics, New York, 1912, p. 161 f.)
12 See art. CONFUCIANISM.
13 H. A. Giles, A Hist. of Chinese Literature, p. 417; see art. LITERATURE (Chinese).
tion in proverbs is a main element in the education of the young.

The centre of interest throughout is the Tao— the intrinsic nature of all things and all human qualities that are singled out by the classical writers as essential to an all-round moral character. But these are reduced by Confucius to the five cardinal virtues of benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and integrity. As a virtue, therefore, wisdom (chih) is moral rather than intellectual. It includes, no doubt, knowledge of men and their affairs, acquaintance with the rules of propriety, and the combination of language as the key to success in the world; but its chief concern is with matters of ethical conduct. The wise man (tsé) is he who knows the principles of right living and is able to instruct his fellows in them. Still higher stands the sage or holy man (shén jén), who not merely knows these principles, but conducts his life in perfect harmony with them and thus becomes the moral teacher and guide of the ages.

Such a man is the constant subject of praise in the Chinese classics:

'Perfection of nature is characteristic of Heaven. To attain to that perfection belongs to man. He who possesses that perfection which is right without any effort, and apprehends what is true without any exercise of thought— he is the sage who has reached his consummation (as distinguishes him from the wise). He who attains to perfection is he who chooses what is good, and firmly holds it fast.\(^5\) Therefore the movements of the superior man (tsé) for ages for all under heaven; his actions are the law for ages for all under heaven; and his words are the pattern for ages for all under heaven. Those who are far from him look longingly for him, and those who are near are never weary of him.\(^6\)

The superior man (tsé) does not even, for the space of a single meal, act contrary to virtue. In moments of haste, he does not lose the true or normal way of life. Various affairs are at hand, and yet there is no murmur.\(^7\) He is seen, and the people all revere him; he speaks, and the people all believe him; he acts, and the people are all pleased with him.\(^8\)

A man who commands our liking is what is called good. He whose goodness is part of himself is what is called a real man. He whose goodness is accumulated in full measure is called a heaven-embarking. A man whose completed goodness is brightly displayed is called a great man. When this great man exercises a transforming influence (over others), he is what is called a sage.\(^7\)

On the more philosophical developments of Chinese wisdom see artt. MYSTICISM (Chinese), PHILOSOPHY (Chinese).

3 Indian wisdom. The wisdom of the Semitic and Turanian races we have found to be predominantly practical; that of the higher Indo-European peoples is as distinctively intellectual. This underlying quality of Indian wisdom is suggested from the outset in the name Veda, 'knowledge,' applied to its classical literature; and bright foregoals of its future triumphs in speculative thought appear even in the Rigveda, with its questionings as to the 'wood' and the 'tree' from which were fashioned 'the earth and the heaven,'\(^8\) and its bold theories of the evolution of sat, the existent, from aat, the non-existent.\(^9\)

At the same time, the poets of the Rigveda are not low in thought, feeling for human life, both in its dignity and in its weakness, and clothe this in sententious sayings which are worthy of comparison with the best in other writers. They are mildly humorous, such as the song on the pursuit of gain,\(^1\) others pathetic, like the fine Lament of the Gambler,\(^2\) still others cynical, especially those that moralize on women and their ways.\(^3\) But others strike a high note—e.g., the hymn in praise of wise speech,\(^4\) and that on generosity:

'Who has the power should give unto the needy, Regarding the course of life hereafter; Fortune, like the chariot wheels revolving, Now to one man comes nigh, now to another.\(^5\)

Ploughing the soil, the share produces nurture; He who beds his feet performs his journeys;\(^6\) A priest who speaks earns more than one who's silent; A friend who gives is better than the sinner.'\(^7\)

In the Upaniṣads and the fully developed Vedantic system the incipient gnosticism of the Vedic poets reaches its climax. The sumum bonum is union with Brahman, attained by the jñāna-mārga, 'way of knowledge,' though on the higher planes even knowledge is dispensed with, and the individual soul with all its activities is merged in the timeless ocean of the unknown and unknowable. The same intellectualism pervades the other orthodox systems as well as the heresies of Jainism and Buddhism. Salvation is won by ātma (Pāli viññā), jñāna, or prajña (Pāli paññā), knowledge of the real, bodhi, enlightenment, which is the higher stage of jñāna, i.e., mere empirical knowledge, mātyā, illusion, delusion. But for the ordinary man this way of salvation is too high to attain to. Thus we find a lower way offered him—the karma-mārga, 'way of works,' or salvation through sacrifice and moral conduct. The choiceist expression is given to this 'way' in the later dramas and epics, notably the Mahābhārata and the Rāmāyana (q.v.), the former of which is an inexhaustible mine of pros- verbal philosophy— and in the niti, or wisdom literature, which corresponds very closely to the gnomic poetry of Greece. The outstanding examples of niti—the Pañchatantra and Hitopadeśa—are manuals of instruction for rulers. But others, both Sanskrit and vernacular, are written for the people. With these may be classed the ethical sections of the Bhagavat-Gītā (q.v.), and the beautiful catena of Buddhist aphorisms entitled the Dhammapada, 'Pathway of Virtue.' A few examples of this wisdom may be given:

'To injure none, by thought or word or deed, To give to others, and be kind to all.\(^5\)

'This is the constant duty of the good.\(^7\)

'High-minded men delight in doing good, Without a thought of their own interest; When they confer a benefit on others, They reckon not on favours in return.\(^9\)

'Hear thou a summary of righteousness, And ponder well the maxim: Never do To other persons what would pain thyself.\(^10\)

'A man of truest wisdom will resign His wealth, and e'en his life, for good of others; Better abandon life in a good cause, When death in any case is sure to happen.\(^12\)

'The good show pity even to the worthless, (As) the moon irradiates the meanest herb.\(^13\)

'Act then and do thine own appointed task, In every action my (i.e. Kṛṣṇa's) assistance ask; Do all with heart and soul absorbed in me, So shalt thou have prosperity, and be from trouble free.\(^14\)

'Like a beautiful flower, full of colour but without scent, are the fine but fruitless words of he who does not act accord-

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1 See ETHICS AND MORALITY (Chinese).
2 Lii 8, xvii, 19 (SBE xxviii, [1885] 317 f.).
3 Lii 8, SBE xcvii, 32f.
4 Confucian Analects, tr. v. 3.
5 Jb. xii, ii.
6 Doctrine of the Mean, xxxii. 2.
7 Jb. xl. xxv, 3-6 (tr. from J. Legge, Chinese Classics, passim).
8 x. 51.
9 x. 72, 121, 129.
WISDOM

ingly. But like a beautiful flower, full of colour and full of scent, are the fine and fruitful words of him who acts accordingly.1

1 Do not have evil doers for friends, do not have low people for friends; high people have for friends the best of men.2

2 Let him who would make for himself his own duty for the sake of another's, however great; let a man, after he has discerned his own duty, be always attentive to his duty.3

3 If anything else is to be done, let him attach it vigorously! A carelessly inquired only scatters the dust of his passions.4

6. Greek wisdom.—Intellectualism is as definitely the quality of Greek wisdom as of Indian. 5 Sophia (from root soph, 'to know') is primarily 'cleverness' or 'skill' in any of the arts or professions of life—e.g., carpentry, medicine or surgery, poetry, music and singing.5 Hence it comes to mean 'sagacity,' 'soundness of judgment,' 'intelligence,' 'prudence,' 'political tact,' and general 'knowledge of life,' sometimes with the sinister suggestion of 'shrewdness,' 'cunning,' 'craft.' Finally, it is applied to knowledge in the pure sense of the term—'learning,' 'science,' and 'philosophy' (as the harmony of all the sciences).

The beginnings of Greek wisdom are found in the outcrop of gnomic poetry associated with the names of Hesiod (q.v.), Mimnermus, Solon, Phocylides, and especially Theognis (q.v.), who crystallized the current morality in lucid phrases and thus became the favourite teachers of their people. As a whole, their wisdom is trite and prosaic, the keynotes being moderation (μέτρησις) and fitness of act to time and situation (εὐρρήματα), though they have all an instinct for justice as the fundamental element in every true life. Through most of them, also, runs the strain of melancholy which reaches such tragic depths in later Greek literature. The Seven Wise Men did little more than point the maxims of the poets. Chilon's γνῶσις σαφῆ, 'Know thyself,' however, lent the initial impulse to the great philosophical movement in Greece. Its first efforts, no doubt, were spent in rather futile cosmicogonic speculations; but Pythagoras held fast to the idea that philosophy was above all a 'way of life,'6 while the fragments of Heraclitus and Democritus (q.v.) abound in moral maxims of considerable insight and aptness of expression. With the Sophists (q.v.) ϑεοφανή, 'masters of wisdom') the interest reverted once for all to the problems of human life and conduct. In their persons the wisdom of philosophy—practically equivalent to intellectual culture as a preparation for private and public life—became a conscious profession. The love of money, so often associated with professionalism, the critical and sceptical tendency of their teaching, the charge that they subordinated moral issues to expediency—that in fact they identified right with might—22 all conspired to bring the later Sophists into disrepute as subverters of the popular faith and jugglers with the great spiritual realities of life. As a school, however, they deserve credit for having broken the crust of dead tradition, and cleared the way for the intellectual renaissance under Socrates and his disciples.

Socrates (q.v.) refused to be called either a σοφος or a μηχανή. For him God alone was wise; and the man who claimed actual possession of wisdom was guilty of presumption, if not blasphemy.10

10 Taking up, then, a term already used by Pythagoras, he described himself as ἀληθεύοντα, 'a lover of

of wisdom.' The wisdom he thus sought was essentially ethical; it turned on the principles of virtuous conduct. But with Socrates virtue was identified with wisdom. The enlightened understanding of paideia, morally correct, was wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice. Of these, reason or rationality, the highest phase of virtue, for it inspires and regulates the whole inner life. Though he recognizes the rationality of virtue in all men, Plato was conscious of a distinction between the virtue of the workaday world and that of the philosopher, who spends his days in the disinterested pursuit of truth.2

2 The distinction thus vaguely apprehended by Plato was sharply drawn by Aristotle (q.v.). Practical wisdom, prudence, or good sense (φιλόσοφος) deals with matters of ordinary human interest; speculative wisdom, which is wisdom par excellence (σοφία), with the first principles of things. The former enables a man to apply the 'right rule' to every line of activity, whether professional, civic, or strictly moral; the latter leads, by a union of science and intuitive apprehension, to a knowledge of 'those things which are most precious in their nature.'3

3 The later schools also honoured wisdom as the root of all the virtues. For only through wisdom was man able to know or to pursue the true end of life. Naturally their conceptions of wisdom differed according to their different ideals. For the Sceptics (q.v.) it meant the wholesome sense of the relativity of knowledge that permitted a man to suspend judgment where it was impossible to be certain; for the Epicureans (q.v.) the insight into life's conflicting motives and desires that set him free from false opinion and helped him to choose the sweetest and most lasting pleasures; for the Stoics (q.v.) the grasp of truth, both human and divine, that made him possessor of all virtue, freedom, and inward happiness. In their delineations of the 'wise man' the various schools reach their highest level. He knows all there is to know, for he alone maintains that serenity of soul which is the spiritual presupposition of knowledge. He is thus fitted for every sphere of life. He is likewise free from fault or failing, weakness or passion. He is lord of his actions, as being responsible only to himself. He is truly rich, for he has all he needs. He is also happy at all times and under all circumstances, for the springs of his happiness are in himself.4

4 7. Hebrew wisdom.—In Israel we pass once more to the practical side of wisdom. 7770 is used in a general sense of 'skill' in the ordinary affairs of life—e.g., technical work (Ex 38 26 sqq.), spinning (Ex 35 22), war (Is 10 26), shipbuilding (Ps 107 25), and often of 'sound judgment' in administration (On 41 22, Dt 54, 1 K 3 2 sqq.)—but it comes to be applied peculiarly to 'moral principle.' The wise man is he who directs his life worthily and well. His wisdom is thus virtually equivalent to 'goodness.' And the root of this wisdom lies in religion. The fool says in his heart, 'There is no God' (Ps 14 1); the wise man makes God the centre of all his thoughts, hopes, and endeavours. For him the 'fear of the Lord is not only the beginning' (Pr 17), but also 'the crown' and 'the perfect fulness' of wisdom (Sir 11 26).

As elsewhere, the simplest expressions of Israelite wisdom are in the shape of proverbs. Originally pointed sayings (mashal), like the Arabic amthal —— etc.—likewise Nauny a mighty hunter before the

1 Cf. 1 Es. 411 40.

2 Phile. 2 21, 22, 1 Tim. 6 10.

3 Or Eth. vi. 3, VII. i. 5.

4 See also art. ETHICS AND MORALITY (Greek), PHILOSOPHY (Greek).
Lord' (Gn 10:8), or 'Like mother, like daughter!' (Ezk 16:4—6)—they gradually assume the perfect balance of thought and literary finish which we find in the couplets of Proverbs and Ben Sira. There is a great width of view, a breadth of wisdom at its purest. In clear-cut vignettes they portray the good man at his various tasks—as workman, citizen, neighbour, friend, husband, and father. They reveal the principles by which he conducts his life. The general motive may be eudemonistic. Both collections show an undigusted appreciation of the good things of this world—its prizes, honours, riches, and pleasures—and direct men to the best way of winning these. Nevertheless, the moral tone is throughout honest and true. Righteousness is the first concern. Only as men follow after righteousness do they reach prosperity. In the emphasis thus laid on righteousness the proverbs of Israel outshine all other prudential literature. And at their higher levels they draw very near to the standard of Christ.

With this growing refinement in the art of proverb there developed in Israel also a more professional interest in wisdom. On the pages of the greater prophets 'the wise' appear as a separate gild of spiritual advisers, whose 'counsel' radiated from the throne of the priests and the 'word' of the prophets (Is 29:4, Jer 18:18 etc.). In the post-Exilic period the 'wise men' practically replaced the prophets as moral guides and teachers. Gaining wisdom from the study of the older Scriptures, or through prayer and supplication, or in the school of experience, as they wandered about the world, 'travelling through strange countries,' mingling with kings and princes, and 'testing the good and evil among men' (Sir 30:18), they took their stand in the market-place, or at the corners of bustling streets, or by the gates where people congregated, and appealed to the simple ones to embrace wisdom and to fools to turn from their folly and live (Pr 1st. 8:14), or in their homes and lecture-halls instructed their pupils in the ways of wisdom (Sir 5:18). Out of this formal discipline arose not merely the gnomic wisdom of the Prophets, 'Sayings of the Fathers,' but also the wisdom-speculation which we find in later elements of Proverbs, in the Apocryphal books of Sirach, Wisdom, Ben Sira, Baruch, and 4 Maccabees, and in outside sources like Philo and the Odes of Solomon.

In Pr 24:32 Wisdom appears as the first creation of God, the 'mouth-child,' who played beside Him as His Thought, 'opened her mouth and gave a ray of light to the wise and pleasant words to the simple. She was a child of the Most High, and dwelt in the holy place of the Father.' This is the wisdom of a time very remote, before the world was formed, and before there was a man in the world. Wisdom has no archetypal hypothesis emanating from the divine. She is still the impersonation of a moral quality, endowed with life by Jahweh, whose place in creation she nowhere usurps. The ethical character of Wisdom is equally evident in the great Song of Praise, Sir 24:1, where Wisdom is ultimately identified with 'the law that Moses commanded,' which found its resting-place and seat of authority in the Temples of Jerusalem. Wisdom with the Law appears in Bar 4:12 and 4 Mac 17. Following out the more ethical line, Enoch 42:3, 49 et al. pictures her as descending from her father's seat to her mother's, her dwelling turning to heaven, and there awaiting the Messianic age, when she will be poured out in her fullness on the elect. A much bolder attitude is assumed in Wh. 32:17, 'We read of the spiritual 'artificer of all things,' an 'effulgence of the everlasting light, and an unstained mirror of the power of God,' which by her purity and mobility penetrates and permeates all things.' Here the concrete imagination of Israel has been caught up in the full sweep of Greek influence, and we seem to be actually moving within the inner circle of the Neo-Paulyan procedure. But the most systematic attempt to blend Hebrew wisdom with Greek idealism is met with in Philo (q.v.), whose doctrine of the Logos finds poetical reflection in certain of the Odes of Solomon (15:5—15:18 etc.).

In other phases of Hebrew literature there is a decided protest against the current ideas of wisdom. The book of Job challenges the whole theory that outward prosperity is the reward of righteousness, while孔则the leaves us with the cynical conclusion that 'all is vanity.' Elsewhere the speculations of the wise are traversed by a species of agnosticism which insists that Wisdom is undiscoverable by man. The most brilliant, poetic expression is given to this tendency in the Song of Wisdom incorporated in Job 28. The poet has sought wisdom in the depths of the earth, where miners dig for gold and silver, in the heights of heaven, whither the eagles soar in flight, and in the desert places, where the beasts roam in solitary majesty. But nowhere can he find the object of his quest. A still more depressing view is expressed in 'the words of Agur, the son of Jakeh,' incorporated in Proverbs:—

'If I am weary, O God, I am weary; I am altogetherspent. I am but a brute, and no man: I have nought of human intelligence. No wisdom have I learned. No knowledge I have of the holy One. Who is He that hath mounted to heaven, and come down? That hath gathered the wind in His fists, The waters hath wrapped in His cloak, And embraced the massaics of earth? What is His name, and His sons' name, If thou dost know it?'

It is significant, however, that Hebrew scepticism never touches the being of God. The beginning of wisdom was 'the fear of the Lord'; and, even when wisdom was despised of, the fear of the Lord remained the sheet-anchor of faith and hope. However perplexed he was with the mysteries of Providence, Job still clung to God; and at the end he rose beyond himself and his questionings to a new sense of God's wisdom, power, and grace in the boundless universe of nature. Even Koheleth's 'boecissinism is the fear of God into a certain sanctified common sense. The poet of Job 28 has failed to reach wisdom. But 'God knoweth the place thereof'; He hath 'established and searched out' (v. 25). And for Agur, too, God is the great energizing Force behind all the phenomena of nature. He may not be able to 'name' Him; yet he feels His presence all about him. And to Him he addresses his prayer:

'Give me neither poverty nor riches, Feed me with food sufficient for my wants, Let me be full, and deny thee, And say, Who is Jahweh? Or be poor, and steal, And profane the name of my God.'

8. Christian wisdom.—Early Christianity is a return from speculation to the simple realities of faith and life, which are 'hid from the wise and prudent,' but 'revealed unto babes' (Mt 11:25, Lk 10:21). It is teaching the gospel of the King- dom Jesus avoided the idiom of the schools and addressed men in that concrete, parabolic style which we have found to be of the essence of the popular prose of the Near East. But the teaching of Jesus in the Gospels is not a 'wisdom' beyond that of all their teachers (Mt 13:4, Mk 6:2). He Himself claimed to be 'greater than Solomon,' to hear 'whose wisdom and prudence' of Shemuel 'from the uttermost parts of the earth' (Mt 12:40, Lk 11:31), and this because He had been supremely endowd

1 304, 3 290.
with 'the grace of God' (Lk 21:28), so that the words He addressed to the very wisest of God (Mt 11:27, Lk 10:12) to Jesus 'wisdom' was that practical understanding of the mind of God, that entire sympathy with His will and purpose, which enabled men to walk in His ways and do His will in 'the grace and power of heaven' (cf. Mt 6:10; 23 etc.). The same idea is set forth in Js 3:17, where 'the wisdom that is from above' is contrasted with the wisdom that is earthly, sensual, devilish by the sanctity, meekness and humility, purity, peace, patience, wisdom, and, 'a good conversation.' The Pauline Epistles and the Fourth Gospel show a much closer affinity with the Wisdom literature. The apostle, it is true, renounces the 'wisdom of the wise,' which leads to no real knowledge of God, and even observes the gospel of 'Christ crucified' (1 Co 1:23). But in Him he finds a wisdom higher than that of men, even 'the power of God, and the wisdom of God' (v. 34). In the sanctified, quaterns of graces personally manifested in Christ—wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption—wisdom takes the foremost place (v. 18). But the purer kind of wisdom is in Js 3:17. For it, W. C. Renan, is full-grown in Christ (1 Thess. 2:1), which alone, as I have seen, the deeper plays before the polytheistic wisdom and the Hellenistic and Ephesian a real speculative philosophy, based on Him in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge (Col 2:3). Adapting ideas and phrases from the Wisdom of Solomon, he worships Christ as 'the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of the whole creation,' by whom all things were created—that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible (Col 1:16). Similarly, the Logos philosophy of the Fourth Gospel has no available only for its results in character. The Logos became flesh and dwelt among us, so that we might behold His glory—'glory as of the only begotten of the Father'—and be progressively transfigured with the glory of God (1 In 4:14).


A. R. GORDON.

WISDOM TREE.—The venerable Bo-tree at Anuradhapura is the oldest historical tree in the world. The planting of the Bo-, or Bodhi-, tree (the Sinhalese base is merely a contraction of the Pali Bodhi, both meaning 'wisdom') is ascribed at length in the Chronicles of Ceylon as having taken place in about 245 B.C.1 Incidental references, in later centuries, to repairs to the enclosure, or to gifts of staircases or statues or ornaments by subsequent kings, show that it has been continually devoted to it. It is now (1920) 2106 years old.

Its botanical name is ficus religiosa (the Anglo-Indian pidu, and the Greek Bontlingk, anurak, or malaius, a flower-stand, has been provided for the memorial presentation of the white blossoms of the champaka. Everything about the spot gives the impression of a holy antiquity. But we could not be sure of the identity of the tree without the long chain of documentary evidence.2 The tree shows the earth, that like earth and shape; but the tapering leaves, above six inches long and four inches across the broadest part, are lighter in colour underneath, and the never-ceasing rustling of the leaves causes a constant flush of vanishing and reappearing light and colour curiously suggestive of one of the main doctrines both of the ancient Buddhist and of much modern philosophy. Anuradhapura (g.v.) and the country round had been for nearly seven centuries, from the middle of the 12th to the middle of the 19th cent., almost abandoned. The Tamilis, after centuries of intermittent attempts to take it, had been driven back to the north of the island. The Sinhalese, out-numbered ten to one, had retired to the fastnesses of the mountains to the east. East to west the jungle stretched from shore to shore, and north to south for a hundred miles. In what had been the most populous and prosperous part of Ceylon there were left a few far-scattered peasantry and wood-men; and the great capital had become a few mud huts. But there were always devoted bhikkhus to tend the Bodhi, the Wisdom Tree. A railway now runs through the jungle, and roads have been made. The magnificent reservoir, 50 miles in circumference, which had supplied half the country-side with water, has been restored to working order; and population and prosperity are slowly being restored. One consequence is

1 De Grammont, ch. xi.; Madraswans, ch. xix.
2 See the new account by T. W. B. Tree, in the Centenary of Ceylon's Plantation in a long list of such references.
3 Much of the text is in an appendix to the second volume of Tennent's Ceylon.
that a constant stream of pilgrims comes from all parts of the world to pay reverence to the tree.

Various different, and indeed contradictory, explanations have been given of this reverence paid to the Bodhi-tree. The oldest explanation is found in Ceylon itself. This can be gathered from different passages in the Chronicles and in the Commentaries on the canon, and is best summarized in a book called the Mahā-

bodhi-vidyā, written about 500 A.D. This book, probably written about A.D. 599. It is an ampli-

fied version in bombastic Sanskritized Pali prose of what had been already said in the older authorities just referred to; and, however interesting as a literary work, the oldest to show that acquaintance with Sanskrit then just beginning in Ceylon, it really adds nothing to the historical details contained in the older documents. The Ceylon view is that the tree is held in so much affectionate esteem and awe because it was grown from a branch of the original Bodhi-tree at Gayā (q.v.) in India (often distinguished as Both-Gayā, 'Gayā of the Buddha') under which Buddha had actually sat when he passed through the intense mental crisis, the turning-point of his career, which led to his coming forward as the teacher of a new religion. The 'wisdom' is the wisdom of the tree, not of the teacher, but of the teacher. It is derived not from the tree, or from any fruit of the tree, but from the mental struggles and the victory won by the founder of their faith. They adore the tree, not because of the power of any spirit or dryad within the tree, but because the outward form of it is a constant reminder of what they hold to have been the most important event in the history of the world. In their view, the attitude towards the tree is much the same as that of many Christians towards the Cross. And, just as opponents of Christianity have thought, quite illogically, that they could score a point against it by showing that the cross was a religious symbol (with quite different associations) before the rise of Christianity, so opponents of Buddhism have sought, and quite successfully, to show that the tree was a religious symbol (with quite different associations) before the rise of Buddhism. They fail to see that that is not the point. Granted that other people had previously used the same (or a similar) symbol in a different sense, the question is, What sense did the Buddhists use it? We shall deal with only the more important of these theories of the tree.

James Fergusson, the eminent historian of Indian archi-

tecture, has pointed out the main features of 'Bodhi-tree belief' were tree- and serpent-worship, that the despatch of a branch of the Bodhi-tree by Aśoka to Ceylon is a proof of the Turanian tree-worship practised by that Buddhist emperor of India, and that the monuments show that early Buddhism was 'a Turanian faith.' What exactly he means by Turanian he does not state. The conclusions put forward in his massive volume, entitled Tree and Serpent Worship, have not been accepted by any other scholar who has written on the subject.

E. Senart, the editor of the Mahābodhiya and the interpreter of Aśoka's inscriptions, will have none of this. He holds that Buddhism was, in its origin, Aryan; that it was derived almost entirely from the Brahmanic mythic cult based on the Vedā records; that the legend of the Buddha is almost a myth; that in that myth the tree is almost, if not quite, as important as the teacher; that the tree is the clearest expression of the famous atmospheric struggle for the rain when the god with his thunderbolt defeats the demon who keeps back the rain in the clouds. The wisdom of the tree is the ambrosial rain, for is not their nibbāna sometimes called by the Buddhists 'ambrosial' above the clouds? The author's literary imagination, and great learning have not availed to secure acceptance for this; they have brought no new rain how come, why, or why or where or where the transmission of the one set of ideas into the other can have taken place.

Professor C. F. Warren, late professor of Sanskrit at Leyden, was of yet another opinion. In his view the Buddhist account of the Bodhi-tree marks the first authenticated sun-rise, for the Buddha is really the sun, and his disciples are the stars. He regards the tree, not (with Senart) as the cloud-tree, but as 'the world tree, the tree of life.' This is obscure, but the two are quite different; and he refers only to a post-Buddhist Upaniṣad (Saugas ṣūkha, vi, 1) which has clearly used it all along. Even if it did, what evidence could there be of Buddhist belief?

It should be pointed out, firstly, that these theories are mutually exclusive, and cannot be combined. The tree is the main feature of one of them, and that of the others is wrong. Secondly, they are all almost exclusively based, so far as the Buddhist side of the question is concerned, on late records—records eight to ten centuries after the events they purport to describe. To the present writer it seems indisputable that, if a historian wishes to ascertain the genesis of a 'legend,' the only scientific method is, first of all, to ascertain what is the earliest form in which the legend is recorded. The earliest form of the legend about the original tree is as follows.

It is well known that there is no consecutive life (or legend) of the Buddha in the Canon. But there are incidental references to certain episodes in his career. Of these at least twelve refer to the episode of the Wisdom Tree. But only two of them even mention the tree; one talks of a tree under the tree the Teacher thought such and such things. This simple fact is enough to dispose of the theory that the tree was merely, if not quite, as important as the teacher. In the longer chapters of the Mahā-bodhiya contained in the Dhūpa there is a short account of six previous Buddhas with a sketch of the life of Ṭipāsī, the first of the six. This is so evidently drawn up as a mere imitation of the life of the historical Buddha that it is suggestive to find that the sketch contains no reference to a wisdom tree. This is the more remarkable since in the tabular paragraphs giving certain details about each of the six the various accounts of the tree under which each attained to enlightenment is also given. In none of the cases is the tree called a wisdom tree.

If the above statements of fact are correct, it follows that the expression 'wisdom tree' or 'tree of enlightenment' does not occur at all in any of the oldest of those canonical works which deal with the Dhamma (the law or religion), that it occurs once in all the other canonical works on the Dhamma, that it occurs only once in those that deal with the regulations of the order (the Vinaya), that that single reference is in the very latest portion of the Vinaya, and that the expression is thus used only to distinguitshly mark the lives of the same kind and name that particular one under which the teacher was seated when he obtained enlightenment.

For the later history of the original 'wisdom tree' at Bodh-Gaya in India see art. GAYĀ.


The mention of the tree is at the opening page of the Vinaya (transl. in Légende des Vie Textes, i, 2, Udana, i, 1, and in Udana, ii, 10). The other passages, which do not refer to the tree, are Sārnāvatī, 90, 191; and the Buddha is called the Buddha, in the Mahāvīra, 171 (H.). Majjhima, i, 22, 167 ff., 240 ff., ii, 93-96; Udana, i, 4, i, 1, ii, 10.

On the chronological relations of the various portions of the Vinaya to one another see the Introduction to Vinaya Texts.
WORD (Sumerian and Babylonian).—1. Original ideas.—The Sumerian vocabular for 'word,' or formal expression of command, is inim, deflected early to enem, and it was carefully distinguished from the noun dug, 'discourse,' speech,' and the verb dug, 'to speak.' Inim, enem, is always a noun and was translated into Senitic by amutu. Both enem and amutu obtained the secondary meanings 'affair,' 'matter' (Latin res). The Sumerian word also developed the sense 'incantation,' i.e., the formal words of the magician, and hence the re-duplicated form inim-inim-ma (pronounced inin-nin-ma) became the ordinary rubric in the magic literature as 'enunciation' (Seminipsis). The present writer derives the noun inim from the verbal root nin, 'utter a decision,' 'issue a formal word,' whence is also derived the noun nam, 'fate,' 'decree.' The Senitic noun amutu is derived from a root wadu (wadu), 'speak,' 'curse,' found otherwise only in Aramaic in the forms idama, 'idamun. The Sumerians and consequently the Semites regarded a formally spoken 'word,' containing the force of a command or promise, as a definite and real thing. It possessed magical and terrible power if it issued from a deity, from a priest, or from a human being under formal circumsances. Hence witnesses who were present at a legal transaction which ordinarily involved an oath were called gatu inim-inim-ma, 'men of the words,' or men who were present when formal 'words' or matters were arranged. A witness is sometimes called inim-su, 'one who knows the word,' i.e., one who knows what formal words were stated in a transaction.

The formally spoken word of any of the great gods was regarded by the Sumerians as a real divine entity. For the early period we have only the personal names of Sumerians as a source for our study, but undoubtedly the conception of the word as an agent of power, or as a word of wrath, became in later times one of the principal features of Sumer-Babylonian religion, arose long before the liturgical texts in which alone this doctrine has been preserved. This is the aspect of the word which was chiefly developed in Sumerian theolgy, but they also held that the enem, or word, of a great god might be a good and kind agent of deity when not uttered in wrath to punish the sins of men. Before 2000 B.C. occur such personal names as the following: Enem-na-zi-id, 'His word is true,' i.e., the god's word is a faithful support; Enem-azag-uzu-du-ri, 'The word of the wise one is eternal.' In the period of the Ur (25th cent.) occur the names Enem-dug-ga-ni, 'His good word,' and Enim* Bau-ni-gi, 'The word of the goddess Bau is true. Even in a passage to the destructive word of the gods Anu, Enil, Marduk, and Nebo from a liturgy of the 21st cent. a line runs, 'His word has no end, his will, i.e. does no wrong.' It is, therefore, certain that the Sumerian conception of the word of the god was not necessarily that of an avenging messenger. Nor is the idea of a curse inherent in the original use of the term. They simply attributed to the formally spoken word of a great god a semi-personality; they thought of it as a divine agent. The word of wrath.—The Sumerian liturgies in all periods for their evolution changed at great length the destructive work of the avenging word which is sent by the angered gods to chastise mankind for their sins. In the earliest known liturgical fragment (of the Gedeon, c. 2630) a passage to the Verbun Tree occurs.

'The Word upon the sea has been projected and returns not.' But passages on the 'word of wrath' must have been employed in public choral services in pre-Sargonic times, i.e., before 2600 B.C. The name Enem-dug-dug-ga-ni an-deh, 'The word which he spoke shaker destruction befalls,' is found on a temple record of Lagalanda (c. 2850), and an abbreviated form of it, Enem-du-du, occurs in the period of Ur. This name, like so many Sumerian personal names, has developed from the liturgies, and the line which supplied it recurs frequently in passages to the destructive word.

'The Word which on high shaketh the heavens, The Word which is the root to tremble.' That alone is conclusive evidence for the existence of this theological conception and for these doeful descriptions of the destructive word in public song services at the very beginning of Sumerian civilization.

In the earlier stages of Sumerian liturgical worship, when simple song melodies or laments were employed, we find references to this 'word of wrath.' A liturgy, which is represented, as so frequently in later compositions, in the rôlë of a mother-goddess wailing for her people, has in the very opening lines a passage which attributes all the woes of humanity to the words of Anu and Enlil. Sin invariably provokes the anger of the gods and they send the word of wrath 'to hasten forth and afflict mankind.' Hence the great earth-mother, who loves men and shares their sorrows, is also afflicted by the word. 'In the home it causes life to cease, in the flocks (?) it causes life to cease, To the woods ones it causes life to cease, among children it causes life to cease. It has taken them as prey, it has caused them to disappear. His Word speeds me, speeds me forth, as oft as it causes me my face to protrude.'

When the Word of Anu came to me, When the Word of Enlil came to me, When by the mountain road he entered. A liturgy of the compiled type, which preceded in order of evolution the canonical compositions of the Isin period, has a remarkable melody of the Weeping Mother, in which she thus describes the misery of the city of Ur: 'May Anu prevent his Word, May Enlil order kindness.

1. see Langdon, Sumerian and Babylonian Psalms (hereafter cited as SLP), p. 76, 82. 2. See art. on propitious and hostile views of the Word, in § 3 below, red, ndrid, the angry spirit. 3. See art. on propitious and hostile views of the Word, in § 3 below, red, ndrid, the angry spirit. 4. See art. on propitious and hostile views of the Word, in § 3 below, red, ndrid, the angry spirit. 5. See art. on propitious and hostile views of the Word, in § 3 below, red, ndrid, the angry spirit. 6. Huber, p. 125. 7. Langdon, SLP, p. 77, 8-14, see also pp. 98, 44, 35; 11, 100, 49. Of these personal names which refer to the hymns on the Word see ERE 212, 175. 8. Langdon, 'Liturgy to Ininni,' R.A. iv. (1913) 5-11. 9. See the Introduction to Langdon, Sumerian Liturgies and Psalms (hereafter cited as SLP), Philadelphia, 1919.
(Enlil series: elum genadum-um nu-zi kurkurnu; "Mighty one that overwhelmeth, thy name is upon all lands"); fourth song. A tempest it is, shattering the mountains. As for the lord his word is a tempest. The heart of Enlil is a tempest. 3

(Enlil (II) series: ululim gi-di-di-ka, "When like a storm he cries"); first song on tablet 2 of the Assyrian edition; song to the ensu of Ann, Enlil, and Adad. 4

(4) Weeping Mother series: minima in-dii-dig ku-di-bi-da-na-ad, "The cow wailed in and her place lay down"; song to the word inserted in the first melody, lines 11-15. 5 An extremely long text; the word for the word of Ann and Enlil of this series occupies two tablets. 6

(Nergal series: song addressed to the word of Nergal; the last song of the series, followed by the ereduna, or recension. 4

(Nergal series: two long hymns to the word of Nergal, the first of which is a duplicate of the one cited in no. 5; the last two songs of a Blurry to Nergal followed by the ereduna. 3

(7) Nebo series; two songs to the word of Nebo in the third tablet which has not yet been recovered. 6

(8) Weeping Mother series contains two passages to the word of Ann and Enlil inserted into two songs. 7

(9) A Blurry of songs, all devoted to the word. Particular attention is given to the word of Marduk, and the Weeping Mother is represented in two songs as afflicted by the word: The exalted one like a wind, like a wind, The exalted one like a wind has cast me down, even me. 

(10) In the exalted one, the word of Anu, the Lord of heavens, He of Intangible thoughts, whose word is true, Against whose word there is no turning back, The exalted Enlil, the utterance of whose mouth is unalterable. This angry spirit destroys the folds, rends the stalls. My roots are rent, my forests are despoiled of leaves. 8

Like a lone willow-tree by the river's bank he made me, like a cedar in the desert he has made me. Like a lone tamarisk on the storm he has made me. Behold the mighty one like a lone rush-reed has brought me low.

An exceedingly difficult passage attributes the following passage to the mother-goddess: 1 The word of the lord, because of its mischievous wailing I sit. 2 The first half of the line is interpreted to mean that the mother-goddess is possessed by the wailing word, she is completely in its power. 3

(11) Nergal series: apapallu el-mus, "Flood through the heavens the harvest"; a song to the word of Nergal is inscribed into the first liturgy, and it was followed by a second hymn to the word which has not yet been recovered. 7

(12) A liturgy to the word of Anu arranged to commemorate the destruction of the city Ur; sama el-mus uma musun, "Of exalted heavens lofty is his word." The first two tablets only are preserved. They include hymns to the words of Enlil, the sun-god. The second song of the liturgy, following the hymn to the word of Anu and Enlil, is devoted to the Weeping Mother. 9

(13) Selection from an unknown series containing two hymns to the word, the first hymn begins, "He that makes forth from the sea, his word is the burden of the storm." It is an old hymn to the word of rain, the cloud-god. The liturgy includes references to the word of Ea, of Damkina his spouse, of Marduk, of Nebo and of Sakkut, all of which are said to be sent down from Ekur, the source of Enlil in Nippur. 10

The second hymn on this tablet is among the most remarkable of all the songs to the word. Fifteen

1 The text (after Zimmermann) is ed. in SLP, pp. 292-305; see, for the song to the word, p. 262. Published as Bab-er-su-er-rana in "Ritu de la vie religieuse des Sumeriens," 2 Published in BR, p. 43, and SLP, pp. 13-35. 3 Published in BR, 11, no. 73, pp. 41-49, to be restored from the duplicate, SLP, p. 7. 4 Text in G. Reinsch, Sumerisch-babylonische hymnen, Berlin, 1896, no. 27, in SLP, pp. 68-69. 5 BR, pp. 66-68. 6 For the text see BR plates ibis-xxx. For a tr. of the first passage see p. 74. For the second passage see pp. 107 and 741.

That is clearly the meaning of the line (see SLP, p. 46, 15, where the end of the line should be read ida-da-ad ida-da). 8

The series is called adad ensu adad-ensu; "Like the wontful spirit (his word) has been established." Six songs of tablets 1 and 2 are edited in SLP, pp. 35-39. The remainder of the series, i.e., tablets 4 to 6, are supposed to be in a similar medium material.


This remarkable hymn to the word is ed. in SLP, pp. 72-74 (lines 1-30), and a remainder of the hymn will be found on pp. 76-78, lines 16 reverse 4.
The baptized, orform. It is the mother of Enlil, who was destroyed,‘he whose city was destroyed.’ Four of the six tablets of this liturgy are known. Of the one employed in the first tablet of the Enlil series, no. 1 above.

3. The spirit (ud) — In the preceding discussion some attention is necessarily given to the identification of the word of a god with his breath or spirit. As in the case of the word ‘enem, i.nim,’ the term for ‘spirit’ or ‘breath’ (ud) of a god has not originally a destructive and violent sense, but in that sense became almost universal and consequently should be rendered in most passages by ‘angry spirit,’ ‘spirit of wrath.’ In all of the present writer’s translations ‘angry spirit’ renders the Sumerian ud—Semitic dmu. The Sumerian ud is the ordinary word for ‘day,’ and so is the Semitic dmu. The Sumerians, and after them the Semites, conceived the breath of a god as a whole of light. When a god’s anger was aroused, his breath went forth as a storm, and consequently both ud and dmu came to mean ‘storm.’ But the original idea of the divine spirit or breath must be defined. A passage on the whole breath of Enlil is interesting by the remarkable statement, ‘The utterance of thy mouth is a beneficent wind, the breath of life of the lands.’ The soul of the god is here defined as a kind of wind which gives life to mankind. A proper name of a man in the period of the Ur dynasty was Udde-nisig, ‘the spirit (of god) is a blessing;’ and another is Udde-nisig, ‘the spirit is good news.’ A name in the pre-Sumeric period in Ud-malku, ‘the spirit has been reconciled,’ the spirit of wrath is appraised.1 It is said of the mother of Enlil, ‘Ishtar, ud-de-la has brought, by the spirit thou art filled,’ i.e., the spirit of one of the great gods was given unto her. She is thus endowed with supreme power. In the same manner kings and their divine patrons, like Ur-Ninah is called the ‘Ishtar of Ninda, unto whom was given the word of the goddess Ninah.’ Ur-Bau is described as the man ‘inim-ma-a-ga of Ninim, unto whom was given the word of Istari.’ It is obvious, therefore, that the spirit or breath of a god was practically identical with his word, and it was personified as an agent of good works. This phase of its activity as a verbum creativum, a spirit of wisdom and cosmic reason, appears only in Semitic texts where the Semitic word mwmw is employed. In Sumerian texts the beneficent and philosophic aspect of the word is wholly overshadowed by its activity as an agent of wrath.

The spirit (ud) of the heart of Anu which has become evilly sound, ‘she says a line of a hymn to the word, and the ud is called the messenger of the lord of the lands (i.e., Enlil).’ Another passage states explicitly, ‘The spirit is the word of Enlil.’14 The expression, ‘the merciless spirit,’ is so common that it appears in grammatical texts.15 And when the wrathful spirit had exalted judgment on the earth, the god who sent him forth recalled him. ‘When Anu spoke to the ud sent to its place.’16

4. The ‘word of wrath’ in Hebrew — The Sumerian belief in the wrathful word of the gods passed into late Hebrew theological descriptions. The designation of Jehovah’s word by an Alexandrian Jew in the Greek book, the Wisdom of Solomon, is obviously under the influence of Sumerian liturgies which were being sung everywhere in Babylonia at that time: ‘Thee all-powerful Word leaped from heaven down from the royal throne. A stern warrior, into the midst of the doomed land, bearing as a sharp sword thine unconquered commandment, And standing filled all things with death.’17 A post-Exilic Psalm reflects clearly the Sumerian idea: ‘He sends his commandment upon the earth; His Word runneth very swiftly.’18 Even more direct is the evidence of the post-Exilic Isaiah, for here we have words from a prophet who almost certainly lived in Babylonia: ‘So shall my word be which goeth out from my mouth; it shall not return unto me void, For it shall have the effect which I desired, And shall have accomplished that for which I sent it.’19

5. The word as creative wisdom — The Sumerians and Babylonians thought that the word was the uncreated first principle and source of all things created. The creative form or principle resided in the primordial watery chaos. Since we do not have any Sumerian sources for the doctrine of the cosmic word, but only a syllabar which gave the term, now unfortunately broken away, it is impossible to state exactly what it was. Evidence deduced above for the beneficent activity of a god’s word and breath induces the conjecture that the Sumerians employed the term i.nim, ‘word,’ for cosmic creative form or reason. At any rate we know that the term mwmw was said to mean ‘loud voice,’ apparently because of the roar of the thunder or rain-god was adopted as a term for the indwelling wisdom of water. We know that ud, mwmw

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1 This line is omitted on the variants. 2 Marklund is referred to here. 3 The text of this hymn has been reconstructed from Reisner, plate 14 = S.B.P., p. 74; B.L., no. 41, and a small fragment published by Erich Neumann, “Sphinx, Stele.” Studien, Festschrift, Leipzig, 1928, no. 105, obs. 6 fl. 4 Reisner, no. 26, tablet 7; no. 33, tablet 6. Nos. 11 and 15 belong to the series, but cannot be fixed in order. 5 See S.B.P., pp. 92, 93–100, 59. 6 See S.B.P., p. 92, 93–100, 59. 7 With this aspect of the divine breath is to be compared the name of the god Gil-Gal. ‘Not shall my spirit abide in man.’ 8 S.B.P., p. 124, 177–179. 9 L. Lagrain, ‘Le Temps des rives d’Ur,’ Paris, 1913, p. 105. See also R. Thureau-Dangin, ‘Les rives d’Ur,’ p. 65, where read Udde-nisigga for the Udu-bil-gar-jagga.

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1 Nikolai, 18, v. 11. 2 S.B.P. no. 3, line 17. 3 F. Thureau-Dangin, “Die ismen, und ekked.” Kedem-

neviim, Leipzig, 1907, p. 4, col. c. 5. 4 B.L., p. 90, 11, 13. 5 See S.B.P., p. 18, lines 10 and 23. 6 Or the spirit of the word of Enlil; the storm-breath of the word of Enlil (S.P., p. 93, 33; see also B.L., p. 101, 10). 7 See J. de Michaud, “Les rives d’Ur,” 1913, line 15. 8 S.B.P., p. 18, line 19. 9 See S. Holmes in R. H. Charles, Apocrypha and Pseudo-

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Leipzig, or voice

(Job the and one time
cannot concept writing and son of Enki, god of writing and son of Enki, was identified with mummu, 'who fashions the things created.' When Marduk, at the hands of the Babylonian priests, became the son of Enki and creator of the world, he also was identified with mummu.

According to Sumero-Babylonian philosophy, the reality of anything consists in its 'form (jor; Semitic 'ursive), i.e. the divine mental concept which is revealed to mankind by its name. For example, the word 'bowl' is a name by means of which its 'form' or the divine concept is revealed to man. All knowledge is revelation, and the reality of things is not only their tangibleness but the mental concept, and things cannot exist until a god has this mental concept. Fundamentally all things, material and immaterial, redemptive activity of the water-god, which is mummu and was personified as cosmic reason. Hence the universe was conceived to be held together by a band or cord, ribu, markasu, a divine creative reason. Such was the philosophical and mystic concept of the word in Babylonian.

6. The Greeks borrow the Babylonian idea of creative reason.---There can be little doubt but that Thales, founder of the Ionian school of philosophy, who regarded water as the first principle, borrowed his ideas from Babylonian. Here in the Ionian school of Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes, all of Miletus, cosmic substance itself is reason, wisdom, and harmony.1 That strikingly corresponds to the activity of the Babylonian Logos or Mummu. Hormitius (q.v.) of Ephesus, who developed the ideas of his predecessors at Miletus at the end of the 6th cent. shortly after the fall of Babylon, adopted fire as the universal element. Sometimes defined as hot breath in his writings. He is the originator of the cosmic philosophy of 'becoming,' the ceaseless transformation of all things from fire or heat through various stages back again to fire. And the cosmic law or reason working beneath all this process of becoming is λογος, or the word. We do not know whether the earlier Ionian philosophers employed λογος in this sense, but there seems to be an apparent connexion between the creative wisdom or word of the Babylonians and the law of eternal becoming or the 'word' of Heraclitus.2

7. Influence of Babylonian creative word in Hebrew.---The Hebrew employs both 'word' (כין) and 'spirit' (רו) in much the same way as the Babylonians employed mummu. We have seen that the Sumerians and Babylonians regarded the spoken word and the breath of the god as intimately connected and originally the same agents. Although Hebrew has not the profound mystic and cosmic philosophy of the Babylonian, there is an obvious connexion between the two cultures at this point. We may not borrow here borrowing, but the similarity must be noted. A passage of an Exilic Psalm confirms the suspicion that the writer knew Babylonian theological ideas:

'By the word of Jehovah were the heavens created,
And by the breath of his mouth all their host.'


S. LANGDON.

WORLD.--See Cosmogony and Cosmology.

WORSHIP.

Babylonian (S. Langdon), p. 737. 
Buddhist (L. de la Vallée Poussin), p. 758. 
Celtic.---See Celts. 
Greek (A. W. Maie), p. 782. 
Hebrew (G. H. Box), p. 788. 

WORSHIP. (Primitive).---What is worship?

The word itself is English, and almost untranslatable into other languages. Originally it implied acts prompted by veneration, but with stress of time and weight of usage it has come to be applied to the whole range of religious behaviour, so that one might well say that worship is the active side of religion. Even so, the meaning does not stop with this active side. It also has the attitude which prompts the act; it is the belief which stays the attitude; it is the faculty which empowers the belief. In each of these guises it is multiformal: guilt in whole cult and table rites. Supernatural mummu as 'voice' would then be based upon a false etymology or be influenced by their use of the term anuma, 'word,' as a verbal concept.1

1 E. Grimmow, A Classified List of Cow. Cornish Idioglossia, p. l., Leyden, 1831., pp. 7794. It should be noted also that the Hebrews often spoke of the breath (כין) of Jehovah as a storm-wind (Ex 15, 19; Ps 104 and as his wrath (Gen. 38).2


---And rites associating indulgence and devotion, feast and penance; guilt it pairs off fear and love, dread and adoration, or it mingleth them in the sense of awe; guilt belief it ranges from myth to philosophy, from creed to science, from passion for ideas to respect for truth; and guilt faculty it is said to be absent in some men. Nor can it be defined by its objects; for in the context of worship is included not only song by beighth but also traffic with the devil, while it cannot be

1 See art. JOHN PHILOSOPHY.
3 Ps 25.
WORSHIP (Primitive) 753

separated from the intercourse of man with man. If we were to judge by phrase alone, its comprehensive complexity would be apparent: along with "divination," "prophecy," "sorcery," etc., we come "ancestor-worship," "idol-worship," "nature-worship," "snake-worship," "tree-worship," and what not? The residual fact seems to us that the whole activities—physical, psychological—to which the adjective "religious" can be applied; while, by discountory, it passes on to every other kind of pursuit that may be regarded as governed by a sufficiently intense interest and "spiritual" value, is, in fact, a distinct variable of culture; it possesses a type and significance of its own which must be dissected out from the accompanying contexts of economic, political, aesthetic, and intellectual life, before it can be properly comprehended.

It is at this point that the third mode of consideration, the psychological and the philosophical, becomes important. Recent years have seen the rapid growth of a very considerable literature devoted to the psychology of religion, its effort being (1) to describe the particular states and processes of mind which lead to worship and define it, and (2) to determine their function within the whole context of human nature and the world which has created it. If there is a religious "instinct," the definition of its forms and occasions is the patent problem; or, to speak more specifically, in what sense, and from it the "primitive" in religion must be tried to type. This is the task of the psychologist, while on the side of the philosopher there remains to be put the great problems of the truth and value of religion. The philosophic task, too, is receiving yearly more attention, with the "philosophy of values" as the central controversy.

A broad observation of the whole range of facts connected with the relation of cult to culture fortifies the significance of the psychologico-philosophical viewpoint. Shamanism (q.v.), in one form or another, with its accompaniments of trance and ecstasy, is the most universal of the ritual forms known to the least cultivated peoples; that it is primarily the development of a psychical aptitude is evident. In the higher societies by far the greater number of cults trace their foundation to an "inspired" founder, be he ancestor or prophet. The great syncretistic religions hark directly back to the life of a master as their source and explanation. In every level of civilization the origin of religion food and, in fact, the individual experiences of individual men for foundation and guidance; nowhere is there evidence of an original religious "compact" (unless totemism may be regarded as such), although, of course, there are plenty of instances of the application of religious forms to social and state interests. On the whole, the type of cult development, in high civilization and low, is (1) the moral or mystical teacher; (2) the ritualization of the original ceremonies, songs, or prayers, accompanied by social recognition; (3) their corruption, partial or whole, through syncretism (q.v.); and (4) not infrequently an effort, through a subsequent prophet or reformer, to purify the cult and bring it back to norm. This is obviously the Hebrew development as represented by the OT; it may fairly be applied to Christianity, to Buddhism, to Brahmanism; and it finds signal illustration in the more backward regions of the world; e.g., the majority opinion of Americanists is that in the Aztec cults, with their horrible rites, the same belief in the pollution and redemption from what had once been a religion (probably Maya in origin) containing much that was clean and noble, while in Peru there is evidence of several successive purifications and degradations of worship; and in neither centre was the highest...
WORSHIP (Primitive)

religious development invariably concomitant with the greatest material power. Finally, in modern society, the Protestant tendency to identify 'paganism with'spirit' and, therefore, the whole of primitive Christianity is clearly a reaction towards a psychical valuation of worship; and, indeed, it is altogether pertinent to note that the three Christian virtues, faith, hope, and love, are essentially and exclusively personal and psychical; here the primitive in religion is clearly individual experience.

2. Ritualism.—However founded, worship inevitably passes over into ritual forms. Rites are variously termed ceremonies, enterprises, or by other terms. Rites are either simple or complex, intrinsically or extrinsically distinguished, and their observation serves to articulate the character and tendencies of the group. Worship is no longer governed by the 'inner light' of the elemental instincts, but is established as a moral law.

(3) Still more complex, although by no means rare even among savage peoples, is the level marked by motives which govern proselytizing. Cults pass readily from people to people, along with other customs, but there is an especial inclination for the divine to become a problem of reason versus faith, of intellectual as against spiritual interests.

(4) Doubtless, a last level should be added—that in which the secular life is felt to be lived in more or less separation from the religions, and in which the motives of the latter become matter of critical and sceptical interest. Conscious study of religion, conscious philosophizing about it, mark this finality; but it is to the point to observe that even here the essential experience maintains itself in the Protestant seclusion of the individual soul.

The final rite, the ultimate worship, is retirement into the closet in the hour of spiritual need; and this, after all, is not radically different from the elemental act of instinctive worship, in propitiation or thanksgiving.

5. Object of Worship.—As the occasions of worship give only a partial key to its forms, so the forms afford but a partial clue to its objects. Not all ritual observances are regarded as worship; magical rites are usually placed in another class, and many rites having obvious social values—marriage rites, chief-making rites, the potlatch—are examples—are connected with worship only incidentally, if at all. In order that the ritual form may be recognized as true worship, it must be accompanied by some evidence of a religious sanction; i.e., it must in some sense be directed to powers superhuman, if not supernatural. This means recognition of deity. Or, equally, deities are defined as the objects of worship; the better mode would be to say that the act of worship is the definition of the god. Wherever the religious sanction is present, the conception of God is being created.

Such a reversal in the order of definition would clear the atmosphere of much controversial dust. Many a missionary has been accused of atheism because of his failure to find belief in a Supreme Being with Christian attributes (not infrequently among people incapable of thinking either 'being' or 'attribute'), and many a field
anthropologist has described his savages as totally irreligious in one sentence and in the next has gone forward to describe rites which were obviously directed to superhuman powers. Nor need these be perceived as mere assertion, but an act of some intellectual subtlety, and it appears to be the prime token of animism, as distinct from poly-
theism, just that the animist has failed of achiev-
ing this subtlety; but that animism is in the nature of religion, and its placations and reverences in the nature of true worship, few would care to deny. Again, magic: magical ends are usually clearest when the procedures are directed invari-
ablely rest upon an implied recognition of unseen or unfelt forces; and it is at least significant that, when gods come to be formulated in thought, their powers are of a piece with all magic potency; the Great Medicine is another name for the Great Mystery. Wherever men placate unseen foes or make offerings to hidden friends—and there are no human tribes so low in mind that these customs are not found among them—there worship is present and divinity recognized.

Above such formless minima the objects of wor-
ship build themselves up hierarchically. The de-
dinition of divinity at the foundation of 'power,' and the treatment of the power—if the thing be of any importance—becomes the symptom of a cult. Fetishes, 'medicine,' talismans, belong here; they are cherished, they are tended, they are directed in the name of grace; there is no psychological gulf between the fetish and the idol, between the 'medicine' and the sacrament, be-
tween the talisman and the holy relic, or even the holy word. Worship is present even in gross superstition—perverted, no doubt, as to its object, but clear in the mode of its regard. As intelligence grows, the proliferation of human sentiments is accompanied by the elevation of the objects of regard: the near and trivial objects which attract the feebler animist or fetishist give place to the more inspiring or more august forces of nature, which become the spirits that move the wind and wave, that rise as luminous heavenly orbs, or circle through the year on the swift feet of the seasons. Nature-worship, is even to the last, the great fount of the imagery by which we represent to ourselves the anguish and nobility of divinity, and if, in the end, we feast our imagina-
tion of things spiritual with celestial rather than terrestrial phenomena, this is surely but the natural progression of that recognition of the bene-
dicence of light which makes us also liken our most intimate spiritual inward gift to an 'illumination'; the metaphor of light is equally inevitable when applied to wisdom and to grace.

There are, of course, other images which define the objects of adoration. Foremost among them are kinship terms, which, even among the least tutored of men, are the natural titles of gods. 'Father Heaven' and 'Mother Earth' have each a double title to reverence, for the kinship ex-
pressed adds to the sublimity and beauty of nature the whole context of humanity in its most winning character, and this is also that prophecy of life which parenthesis and the whole mystery of pro-
creation have made central in all religious veneration. Indeed, these two factors (natural sublimity and human kinship) are so powerful in appeal that the remaining imaginal mode, which utilizes the likenesses of human society to picture divinity, has never more than passingly and accessi-
borily sided the picture: gods have been likened to warriors, judges, lords, kings, but in their supremacies the light of heaven and the love of the parent have always been their final attributes.

At the foundation, in the mind of the most be-
cadged savage, the object of worship is a power

in strength transcending his own. Whether in his rite-making he goes forward, timidly, to active adoration and a sense of conissurehship with his di-

vinity, or, panie-stricken, strives to exorcize the presence and to escape the threat of it is often surmised from the colour of his personal fortunes: the Power will be good or evil according to its effects. But, if good, what more inevitable than that very address be by a kinship term with which so often supplanted in mythe teachings: the Power may work for the good or evil. The third step is that natural association of wisdom with the Power which is the solemn plasure of Providences and imagined by the idea of illumination. Thus the gods, even of dark-minded men, are conceived as more or less strong and good and wise; and it is only a metaphysical theology which universalizes these attributes into omni-
potence, omnibenevolence, omniscience. The pres-
ence of all three attributes is, of course, not neces-
sary for the existence of worship, though all three are present where the deity is truly adored. But in many cases strength and knowledge are not known or thought to be accompanied by goodness, and out of the terror of evil appetites, inmeasur-
able in power, the Power is conceived as a being of horrors of superstitious worship. If one may so put it, where there is deformity in cult, there will be found deformity in the conception of God.

4. Psychical factors.—Before the conception of worship can be fully developed, to its expressions and its objects must be added the consideration of the distinctive psychical values associated with rites and cult. Here again the problem of the primitive is not easily disengaged. More than any other objects of thought psychical values are dependent upon the associations of words for their designation; and consequently more than any other objects they are subject to the ambiguities and tricks of transference which verbal meanings further. Especially must this be true where the differences in linguistic level are great: words which, in 'conscience,' as 'adoration, spirit,' 'communion,' the 'fountain of wisdom,' have no equivalents in untutored tongues, and it is difficult to make certain the presence of analogous experiences. The first problem, therefore, which presents itself to the psychologist is to endeavour to infer from the ritual forms and the imagery involved what modes of experience prompt them, and in particular to separate the symbolical from the literal interpreta-
tion.

For it should be borne in mind (and it is too often forgotten) that religious ideas are images or they are nothing. The great elementary psychical fact which makes ritualism ritual is that the act of worship is never realistic: it moves and lives in an atmosphere of double meaning; the feather, the pebble, the geometrical sign, the chanted word, the sacramental bread, and the sacrificial flesh are never what in the half reality of the senses they appear to be; their sanctities are derived from supersensible modes of experience. That such modes of experience should for their expression resort to every type of imagery is both natural and inevitable. Experience is in the order of nature. That the most intimate of these images should be those most deeply founded in our own organic life, such as physical human beings, and in our conscious rela-
tions, as social human beings, is equally intelli-
gible. And it is not, therefore, unintelligible that religious meanings should be peculiarly easy to pervert; the very difficulties which make their communion to be symbolical call for a subtlety of response that frequently fails. Thus it is that many rites, conceived in spiritual purity, if their symbolism is lost, become gross because the images in which they are conveyed are bound to be gross.

In particular this is the peril of images of sex: the procreation of life is the most inevitable of human experiences, because of the social as well as the emotional significance, and religious emblem, and nearly all the noblest modes of religious expression rely upon it for their source (the fatherhood of God, divine love, eternal life); but in the course of religious change no imagery has been exempt from disparagement.

Possibly this very fact of ready perversion—'spiritual blindness,' as it is called—may have something to do with the second great source of worship: the sense of a need of salvation. Literal fear and literal desire, sensible ends coupled with sensible means, are the emotions most dealt with as explanations of ritual acts. Biochemically, they are no explanations at all, for the phenomena of worshipping show little or nothing that can be interpreted as furthering a physical salvation; the irreligious is as healthy and as safe as the religious.

It is here once more that the images are full of deceptions; for men, a pattern are imprinted in the pigments of sensation, whereas the thing meant is supersonal. The fact that calls for a real accounting is just the fact that men (of high culture) do not see that salvation which is as a matter of fact inexpressible, just as they see reverence for a divinity which is indefinable. The quest of this salvation is bound up, on the emotional side, with the group of words ('awe,' 'adoration,' 'communion') whose contextual meaning harks back to the very roots of human life.

One may say, then, that, on the intellectual side, the great factor that is fundamental in the experience of worship is the sense of double-meaning, and therefore of the duality of nature. On the emotional side the key is the feeling of need for salvation (which might be negatively described as a conviction of sin). These two come as near to defining the religious 'instinct' as any broad partition is likely to come. In any case, they give the major forms under which the experiences defining worship are to be subsumed.

The psychology of worship, however, must advance a step beyond this, even to lay its foundations. The human mind, the human being, moves as a unit, as a person; and the act of worship is in some sense so complete an act that it characteristically creates the reciprocal figure in the worshiper of the image of his salvation. Religion in the long run tends to define man, not as an individual, but in his type and form. Animism, in ancestor form, under the influence of anthropological armament, is the first step towards anthropomorphism, which in itself is but the sensible rendering of a psycho-ellism that is both more elemental and more significant. It is more significant because it defines for us, inwardly, the traits which we regard as ideal, and therefore as divine; and it is thus that the whole psychic play of religious experience takes final form as the depiction of an ideal man, an ideal god, who becomes a saviour, if only through the fact of his recognition. Whether the pattern man be given an incarnation and a story as a human individual, or whether he be read as a man-like God, or whether, in the third place, he be composed through the union of all active ideals, as an anima mundi, is accident of tradition. The psychical fundamental is that all forms of worship figure him forth, as in a true theophany.

5. Philosophical implications.—Portrayal and analysis of the facts of worship constitute the science of comparative religion. But, when all its labours are completed, there still remains for consideration the thinker's most profound problem, viz., that of the truth upon which it rests, the demand of nature that it call its self-justification.

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LITERATURE.—Landmarks in the comparative and sociological study of religious forms, indicating both the spirit of the investigation and the content of the science, are: David Hume, The Natural History of Religion, London, 1757; B. T. Taylor, PC, do, 1888; and Herbert Spencer, Principles of Sociology, 8 vol., do, 1875-90. The Golden Bough, 2 vol., do, 1886, of which the third edition (1907-13) has been expanded into a valuable encyclopedia of religious rites, is doubtless the most important, as it is the most massive, collection of information. With it should be reckoned the numerous writings of Andrew Lang in this field, first in significance, Myths, Rituals, and Religions, London, 1899; Salomon Reinach, Cultes, Mystères, et Rituels des Villes de Marché, Paris, 1905; as well as his works on Croyances, Rites, Institutions, 3 vol., do, 1911; A. van Gennep, Rituels, Monuments, et Legendes, 4 vol., do, 1909-14; and Fikret Pasha, Slavic Religion, 2 vol., do, 1922. Of special significance is the work of the late Professor A. MacCulloch, Slavonic Studies; vi; A. Berriedale Keith, Indian: A. J. Carney, IRISH; and P. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye, Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte, 3 vol., Tübingen, 1906; H. Bois, La Valeur de 1 Orythme, p. 4.
WORSHIP (Babylonian).—Form and content of Babylonian worship are almost entirely borrowed from the Sumerians. This is particularly true of the principles of formal worship or the gestures employed for devotional purposes. The content of worship or the words spoken therein, the Babylonian public service or daily liturgies are without exception Sumerian. But the prayers of private devotion and all the individual rituals of the magic cults are largely of Semitic Babylonian origin. The Assyrian religion and worship were thoroughly Babylonian, but here a distinct tendency towards a distinct form of gesture in private devotion is everywhere noticeable. The Assyrian religion likewise owed much to the Sumerians, and their liturgical offices were borrowed entirely from the old canonical Babylonian books of the Babylonian period.

I. GESTURE IN SUMERIAN PRAYER.—1. Pre-historic period.—Very early Sumerian seals which belong to the pre-historic period (c. 3500 B.C.) reveal the attitudes and gestures in the devotion. One sees the adorant's hands folded in an attitude which was later perpetuated in all periods. It can be seen that this gesture imposed a fixed custom of clasping the hands. The right hand is clasped by the left hand in an extradosing manner around the body and the fingers of the right hand lie almost horizontally. The position of the base of the thumb is central to the natural position of the natural cast seen in bas-reliefs of Assyria. The gesture seems to belong to the religion of pre-historical Sumer and is as ancient as the oldest known works of art in the ancient Mesopotamian civilizations.

Such were the three positions assumed under various circumstances in private devotion by the Sumerians from pre-historic times down to the period of Agade, when the great Semitic dynasty of Sargon the Ancestral seized the hezmonarchy of all southern Mesopotamia for 197 years. Sargon may be dated about 2350.

2. Sargonic period.—The Sumerite of this period as well as those who had lived in close contact with and among the Sumerians in the pre-Sargonic age adopted the Sumerian principles of gesture. A seal dedicated to Nanní-Sin, fifth king of the Sargonic dynasty, represents the worshipper in the kissing hand position. Although the Sumerians recognized this attitude as consisting in throwing a kiss to a deity by the pictogram for a kiss, the exact meaning of this gesture is still a matter of doubt. In any case, the expression 'lifting of the hand' is employed, the attitude of the kiss hand is always implied. Archaelogical evidence for religious gestures in this period is meagre, but a few seals seem to indicate that the folded hands position was also common. The old processional scene with inter-employers of this attitude is entirely new in this age.

3. Period of Gudea and Ur dynasty (2560-2358).—In the age of the great Sumerian revival which terminated in the powerful dynasty of Ur we have first of all a return to the ancient processional scene. But now the disengaged arm, henceforth always the right arm, is held in the attitude of saluting with a kiss. In the time of the Ur dynasty the folded hand gesture becomes extremely common. In the Sumerian processional scene the principal motif is praise of the deities.

The ancient independent kiss hand gesture, i.e., without an interfering figure who leads the supplicant by the hand, appears rarely in this age. In other words, the prayers of the lifting of the hand in the last great age of Sumerian civilization always imply a processional scene and a priest.

4. Period of Isin, Larsa, and Babylonian (1st) dynasty (2357-1926).—Archaelogical evidence furnished by a great number of seals in this period leads to the inference that the processional scene with kiss hand gesture was abandoned for the independent attitude. The supplicant now stands with right hand raised and fingers touching the lips, the left arm folded at the waist. On the older seals of the period the priest still performs the act of intercession, but he stands before the seated deity in the folded hand pose. The inference from the evidence of seals alone that the ancient custom of approaching a deity through
the offices of a priest was abandoned after the Ur dynasty is clearly misleading; for two clear examples of this custom are illustrated on monuments of the Assyrian period and on the stone tablet of Nebuchadnezzar. Moreover, prayers of private devotion frequent reference is made to the priest who recites portions of the prayer. 2 But from this period onward until the rise of the Neo-Babylonian empire at the end of the 7th cent. the pose of the kiss hand with left arm folded at the waist is the ordinary gesture in Babylonia.

II. GESTURE IN SUMERIAN RELIGION. The Assyrians retained the old open hand Semitic pose in prayer, although the kiss hand was also adopted by them from the Sumerians. Since they also borrowed all the prayers and liturgies of the official cults from Sumer and Akkad, the retention of the Semitic gesture emphasizes the tenacity with which they adhered to racial customs. The open hand gesture, which was also the principal one used by the Hebrews, is made by extending both hands upward towards heaven, palm inwards. In art the suppliant is always represented standing as in Sumer and Babylonia. 2 But the pose in taking up the gesture of the kiss hand in Assyro-Babylonia was reversed. In Babylonia, the right arm is now thrown forward and the hand turned outward, the index finger pointing at the god or sacred object. The thumb is closed over the three remaining fingers. This attitude is similar to one seen on Greek monuments and represents the adorant in the later stages of the act of throwing a kiss. But under influence of the Assyrians and Aramaeans the old Semitic gesture reassumed itself in Babylonia; scenes of the Neo-Babylonian, Persian, Seleucid, and Parthian periods almost invariably represent the worshipper in the open hand pose.

Kneeling and prostration do not appear to have been admitted in the orthodox forms of Sumerian religion, but there is evidence for their use among the Babylonians and the Assyrians. Prostration and kneeling were certainly acts of worship at certain points in the recitation of prayers and penitential psalms among the Semites, and on the whole it seems probable that they are of Semitic origin. In Sumerian literature almost no prayers of a penitential or cultic kind have been preserved. We possess extensive catalogues of the titles of such prayers, and the seals show that they approached their deities in private devotion from the very earliest times.

But the spirit of their religion asserted itself rather in communal or public worship, and the liturgies of their various cults are extensive. In the Ur and Isin periods liturgies became canonical and extremely intricate. They were accompanied by music, and in fact the names of instruments were employed as technical terms to describe kinds of songs; e.g., the recessional or final song of a liturgy was sung to the double flute and called the flute song. The canonical liturgies of the Sumerians were borrowed by the Babylonians and the Assyrians and were always said in Sumerian. The greater portion of each liturgy was provided with an interlinear Semitic translation for laymen. No changes in the liturgies of the Sumerian liturgies were ever permitted, and even in Assyria the national god Ashur is excluded from the deities mentioned in the litanies because his cult arose after the canon of sacred prayer books was closed.

The Babylonians usually employed Semitic prayers in the private rituals of purification, and these were known as the ‘prayers of the lifting of the hand.’ 3 They were of course modelled on the Sumerian prayers of the kiss hand ceremonies, and a very greater number of prayers that have survived in Sumer. They form almost invariably part of the magic ceremonies of purification. 4 A considerable number of the prayers said by the priests in these services of healing and atonement have been recovered, and these were written and recited in Sumerian, and were known by the rubric (kidub). Prayers of penance which are purely religious prayers of great spiritual power and unconnected with magic rituals were not popular, and of these comparatively few have survived. They are all composed in Sumerian and probably represented the prayers said in the old Sumerian processional scene. 5 Obviously they did not employ the ordinary layman, who knew no Sumerian. They represent the exclusive and aristocratic side of Sumerian and Babylonian religion. In Babylonia, the priest was leading part, and they are usually provided with a Semitic translation.


Prayers of the lifting of the hand and penitential psalms are discussed and full literature given under Prayer (Babylonian). In addition to the literature there see Erich Ebeling, Quellen zur Kenntniss der babylonienschen Religionsliturgien, Berlin, 1919. What is known concerning the great New Year festival at the spring equinox (e.g., celebrated by the ancient Hebrews in H. Zimmern’s Sumerian New Yearfesival, Leipzig, 1908, 1918; S. Langdon, ‘Kultische Liturgien,’ Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, 1909, 143—158, ‘Komm. Bande oder eine neue, ungenutzte Quelle für die Bibel und die Antike,’ by C. B. B. A. A., 1919, 109—121. Among the authors who have described the liturgies in Babylonia we should mention H. Zimmern, Sumerian Liturgies and Psalms; and among the authors who have described the liturgies in Babylonia we should mention H. Zimmern, Sumerian Liturgies and Psalms.

WORSHIP (Buddhist).—1. Worship (pūja, vandana, mudra, etc.) is no part of the Path (sādga). Path is insight into and meditation on the four truths (the four nīvedha, bhāg, satyajār, satyābhabhāvā); but worship is an important part of what is styled mokṣa, bhāgu (‘acts connected with or leading to deliverance’). But no man can enter this higher life (the Path, if he has not, in a previous existence, ‘planted’ some ‘root of merit’ (karma). Among the ‘roots of merit’ worship is the best.

2. Worship, the bhūta, dana, or giving. A man gives material gifts (ārāmā, dukkha) or security (āhārya) to his fellow-men, to animals, to protasis, for their benefit and also for his own benefit. He makes offerings to the Buddha, to the

3. See above, p. 757, note 5.

4 So, e.g., in the erākhatryā prayer, iv. Rawlinson, no. 2; see also, ‘Erākhatriyā,’ Sumerische Texte, Leipzig, 1918, no. 41. And a number of prayers of the lifting of the hand’ and with the phrase ‘I will sing thy praise and I the priest of magic thy servant, I will sing thy praise’ (see E. Ebeling, Religionsliturgie aus Assur, Leipzig, 1919, no. 25, rev. iv. 10; C. D. Gray, Sumerian Magic and Theory, no. 75; L. W. King, Babylonian Magic and Sorcery, London, 1895, no. 12, 94.)


Dharma, to the Church, for his own advantage, because they are "fields of merit" (punyakṣetra) but not, in any sense, the better of the fruit. Now the meritoriness of giving is either tyāgānya or paribhāgānya; i.e., a merit accrues to the giver either because lies given away (tyāga) something or because the recipient enjoys (paribhāga) the thing that has been given away. Buddha does not enjoy the flowers, etc., that are offered to chaityās. The merit is not weaker for that. The point is discussed in Pali and Sanskrit sources.


L. DE LA VALLEE POUSSIN.

WORSHIP (Chinese).—I. INTRODUCTORY.—It is not easy to find any Chinese word or phrase which conveys identically the same idea as that which the word 'worship' conveys to one who has been brought up in a Christian environment. Probably the first word which would occur to most students of Chinese is chi. It consists of three parts—the symbols for 'spiritual beings,' 'flesh,' and 'the right hand,' giving the meaning, 'to hold a piece of flesh in the right hand and offer it to the spirit.' One of the pioneer Anglo-Chinese liexicographers, Morrison, gives as one of the meanings of the character chi 'to offer flesh in the rites of worship, to worship with sacrifice.' J. Legge criticizes this interpretation by pointing out that it is not sanctioned by the compilers of the standard native dictionary, K’ang Hsi. He adds, 'The general idea symbolised by the character chi is—an offering whereby communication is made with spiritual beings and their aid is effected.' The importance of this criticism will be manifest when we remember that the symbol chi is the one which is commonly used to denote the idea of the spirit or souls. If chi does not mean 'worship,' a doubt at once suggests itself as to whether we are technically correct in describing that cult as the 'worship' of ancestors. This doubt is fully justified by the fact that this word 'worship' in this phrase we attribute a meaning identical or nearly identical with that which it bears in Christianity. If we assume that 'worship' can only be offered to a god or gods (real or translated into the mind of the Chinese), then the meaning of the Chinese ancestral cult as the 'worship' of ancestors, it follows that the ancestors so 'worshipped' are regarded as gods. And this is precisely the position which the uses of the character in question has been attacked by Christian missionaries. Obviously the process of translation from one language into another can give rise to a great deal of misunderstanding and question begging; particularly if the person who is describing the Chinese ancestral cult as the 'worship' of ancestors, has been attacked by Christian missionaries. Obviously the process of translation from one language into another can give rise to a great deal of misunderstanding and question begging; particularly if the person who is describing the Chinese words and phrases which correspond, more or less roughly, to the word 'worship'; but no one of them can be regarded as strictly equivalent. 'Pai means merely 'to bow' or 'to salute'; when Ching prefixed, the term acquires a religious meaning and may be translated 'to salute with reverence.' Li-pai, much more a Confucianism, is not necessarily more than to salute in accordance with the appropriate rites. Chi-yang means 'to respect and look up to.' There are several other terms which give the idea of ritual sacrifice. It may be that these, and similar Chinese terms are, after all, just as satisfactory as the English term, which can hardly be said to contain within itself an adequate indication of what it has come to mean in Christian thought and ritual. If we are careful to remember that there are some not readily definable differences in spiritual content between the European and Chinese terms, not much harm will be done by regarding the two sets of terms as roughly equivalent.

In this article it is unnecessary to attempt to make any such subdivisions or differentiations as are used by the Church of Rome to distinguish the varieties of Christian worship. Such differences as those between lατρεία, προσκύνησις, and δεοσθεία do not exist in China—simply because they have never been pulled into existence by the exigencies of religious controversy.

II. CONFUCUISM.—1. Introductory.—The clearest expression of the Confucian notions of worship is to be found in the passages which remark that on the occasion of certain religious treatises which goes under the name of the Li Chi (Record of Rites). More may be learned,' says Legge, 'about the religion of the ancient Chinese from this classic than from any of the others together.' And it should be added, that as the Record of Rites forms one of the Five Classics of the orthodox Confucian learning, it still remains what it has been for many centuries—the principal source of Chinese ideas regarding not only the ritual but also the inner significance of religious observances.

The reader must be warned, however, that, when we give the name of Confucianism to the religious beliefs and rites described in the Li Chi and other 'Confucian' classics, we are using the term in a somewhat vague sense as including all that Confucius and his school sanctioned, cultologized, or tacitly accepted. Confucius insisted that "there was only 'a transmitter and not a maker,' and in any case he never posed as a religious prophet on as an inspired teacher of religious truth. Much that has come down in China is pure Confucian in origin; and this we find to be specially true when we enter upon the sphere of religious thought. In the sections that follow it must be understood that 'Confucianism' is used in the looser sense here indicated.

2. Nature of true worship as understood in Confucianism.—(a) Reverence. —The Record of Rites opens with the striking words 'Always and in everything let there be reverence.' In many parts of this classic (which came from many different hands and belongs to many different dates) the supreme necessity of reverence is emphasized, especially in connexion with all ceremonies which regulate the intercourse between the seen and the unseen worlds. Commenting on one of its subdivisions, Legge remarks:

"Throughout the Book it is most religious rites that are spoken of; especially as culminating in the worship of God. And nothing has been fully brought out than that all rites are valueless without truth and reverence." The Record quotes Confucius as saying that in the ceremonial rites of mourning the most important thing is respecting the dead. As the passage he is

1 Cf. arts. Confucian Religion, Confucius.
3 or rather compiled up to 1191. The whole Confucian system has been more or less on the defensive since that date.
4 SBE xxvii. 61. Cf. Legge's comment on p. 12.
5 Ib. p. 22.
6 Ib. xxvii. 143.
The idea that *intelligence* and *sincerity* are prerequisites to *sacrifice* indicates an advanced stage of religious culture on the part of the writer.1

The testimony of the other classical books is to the same effect.

1 *God has no partialities,* the Shu Ching tells us, *only to those who are reverent does He show favour. The people are not constant in their professions, except the one who have charity of heart. The spirits do not necessarily enjoy sacrifices; what they enjoy is the sincerity.*2

(c) *Simplicity and dignity.*—Next to reverence and sincerity in prayers and sacrifices nothing is more earnestly insisted upon than simplicity and dignified restraint—something very near to the Greek *σωφροσύνη.* Ostenation and a lavish display of costly temple furniture is strongly discouraged; plain water is better than wine, coarse cloth is to be preferred to gorgeous embroideries, expensive mats of fine rushes and bamboo are no better than mats of coarse reeds and straw. The soup which formed part of the sacrificial offerings should be unseasoned, to denote simplicity; the grand symbols of jade should be left plain instead of being carved. The king, when about to take part in sacrificial rites, should not ride in a carved and lacquered state-carriage but in a plain one.

In all these things it is simply the idea of the simplicity that is the occasion of the preference and honour. The *informal* offerings should be chosen not from rare and expensive products, but from what is seasonable and abundant.4 *Self-restraint*—a moral quality which manifests itself outwardly in simplicity—is one of the principal Confucian virtues. Without self-restraint there is necessarily a lack of dignity; and without dignity the rites of worship cannot be properly performed. It was not only the actual sacrificial rites that had to be conducted with quiet dignity and solemnity; the temple-dances, too, *displayed the gravity of the performers, but did not awaken* the emotion of delight.5 Similarly, *the ancestral temple produced the impression of majesty, but did not dispose one to rest in it.*6 This is because the *idea which leads to intercourse with spiritual beings is not interchangeable with that which finds its realisation in rest and pleasure.*7

3. *Godward and manward aspects of Confucian worship.*—There is another feature of Chinese religion which is perhaps more characteristically Chinese than any of those yet mentioned—a moral attitude which has been enshrined as a principle in one of the books of the *Record of Rites* we are told that the *superior man* is not only extremely reverential in all ceremonial matters but is also absolutely sincere.

Sacrifices (formally synonymous with religion) is not a thing coming to a man from without; it issues from within him, and has its birth in his heart. When the heart is deeply moved, expression is given to it by ceremonies; and hence, only men of ability and virtue can give complete exhibition to the idea of sacrifice. The sacrifices of such men have their own blessing:—not indeed what the world calls blessing. Blessing here means perfection;—it is the name given to the complete and natural discharge of all duties. When nothing is left, incomplete or improperly discharged:—this is what we call perfection, implying the doing everything that should be done in one's internal self, and externally the performance of everything according to the proper method.8

In the Tso Chuen we are told that, when *intellig- ence and sincerity* are present, almost any offerings, however common and easily obtained, may be *presented to the spirits and set before kings and dukes.*9 An English writer has commented on this in the following words:

1 SBE xxvii. 256.
2 Ib. p. 524.
4 SBE xxvii. [1896] 305.
7 SBE iii. 131 f., 1777, p. 187.
9 SBE xxvii. 404.
10 IJb. xxviii. 296.

*Doubtless this view, or something like it, is one to which all evolving religions tend to approximate; what is remarkable is the very early date at which it was reached by the Chinese and the consistency of which it has been maintained.*

1 H. K. Wright, in *JRAS*, N. China Branch, xvii. [1917] 1721. See also SBE xxvii. 445, xxviii. 211; and art. *Publication* (Chinese), SBE xxvii. 525.
2 Giles, p. 154, and SBE iii. 90. See also SBE iii. 176, and Legge, vol. v. pt. i. p. 166.
3 SBE xxvii. 435.
4 IJb. p. 295.
5 IJb. p. 415.
7 "E. A. Ross, ibid., p. 95.
8 IJb. p. 318.
It may have hampered Chinese religion in its attempts to soar heavenward, but it has undoubtedly had the excellent result of enhancing the honour and prestige of moral values. Nor are these moral values confined to earth. Chinese religious speculation extends them to the spiritual world as well, and this is why we have no capricious or despotistic 'God' in Confucianism. There are no acts or utterances ascribed to divine beings which are incompatible with the highest moral ideals known to Chinese humanity. In this we have a striking instance of the principle that considerable fact has often extorted the admiration of European students: the high moral tone of the whole body of the classical and sacred literature of China condeéts the ourselves of all the expressions suggestive of licentious thought.

A modern writer on Eastern religions remarks that in his opinion Confucius laid 'unnecessary emphasis upon social and political duties, and that he advocated the honour to be paid to Shang-Ti or God. He practically ignored the Godward side of men's duties.' More just are H. A. Giles's observations on Confucianism:

1. In regard to the relative importance of serving God and serving men Confucius has often been blamed for setting men before God. He would not be remembered in this interpretation of true service to God was embodied in right and proper performance of duty to one's neighbour. The idea of personal service to God himself, as understood by the Jewish patriarchs, is entirely foreign to the Chinese conception of a Supreme Being.

In one of the books of the Historical Classic we are told of the eight branches of administration which ought to engage the attention of good rulers. The first is agriculture—the most important of all, because it provides the people with the means of subsistence; the second, commerce, which regulates the distribution of commodities; the third, religious ceremonies. With the fourth, fifth, and sixth we need not concern ourselves; the seventh and last is preparation for war. It is characteristic of China that the rites of religious worship should occupy only the third place; for religion, the Chinese would say, has small practical importance for men who have nothing to eat; and spiritual beings, if they desire human homage at all, are not likely to demand sacrificial offerings from men who cannot find the wherewithal to feed themselves. The theory which is implied in this ancient passage from the Shu Ching reappears in an explicit form in the teachings of Mencius: 'The most important element in the State is the people; next come the means of subsistence; in importance comes the king'; and is repeated in the utterances of the first emperor of the Ming dynasty:

'God puts the sovereign in charge of his people, and the sovereign who wishes to serve God properly must first show that he loves the people. To show love for the people—that is the way to serve God... He who would be a true sovereign should regard Heaven as his father, Earth as his mother, and the people as his children, and must carry out his duties to each with the utmost devotion. He does not perform the sacrifice to Heaven and Earth in order to bring prosperity upon himself, he does it to promote the welfare of the whole realm.'

4. The motives of worship.—What, then, is the principal motive of religious worship, according to Chinese theory? Confucius and the majority of thinking Chinese since his day would have assumed that the object of religious rites is a double one—

1 W. E. Griffis, A Religion of Japan, New York, 1901, p. 104. For observations on this statement see the present writer's Life of Bruce, London, 1910, p. 322.
2 Giles, p. 73 f.

This passage occurs in the official history of the Ming dynasty, under the date of the 50th year of Hsing Wu (3157).
sooner, that the good and the divine are twin peaks joined by a level pathway over which men and gods may conduct their way. Thus, while, in ordinary life, they pass with the friendly recognition of spiritual kinship.

III. Taoism.—It is unnecessary to deal at length with the chief notions of Taoism, because, regarded as a religion, Taoism is almost wholly initiatory. Primitive Taoism was not a religion, and, though the mysterious Tao was regarded as inexhaustible, wonderful, omnipotent, immanent in all the universe, infinitely great and at the same time small, it cannot be said to have been an object of worship. After the introduction of Buddhism, Taoism found it necessary to go through a process of reinterpretation and reconstitution in order to maintain its position in an environment that was becoming increasingly Confucian on its ethical, increasingly Buddhist on its religious, side; it therefore adapted to its own use some of the religious formulations and rituals of the Indian rival, borrowed moral teachings from both Confucianism and Buddhism, and turned itself into an institutional religion by adopting monasticism and erecting temples for the worship of the numerous and ever-multiplying deities who began to throng its pantheon. It apotheosized its legendary founder, Lao-tse, and made him one of a divine college of sages, which would certainly never have come into existence had a model not existed in the San Pao, the 'Three Precious Ones,' of Buddhism. As time went on, it also drew into its own system some of the other deities of the pre-Confucian state religion of China; and so the Shang-Ti, or Supreme God, became (in comparatively recent years) the Yu Huang Shang-Ti, the 'Jade Imperial God,' who is one of the most prominent objects of worship. This ancient Taoism of to-day, in spite of all its bare-facedborrowings, its crudely artificial methods of turning dead men and women and shadowy abstractions into gods and goddesses, and its haphazard delation of animals, real and mythical, there is no doubt that even in these degenerate days the deities of Taoism are capable of inspiring religious devotion, and that some of them at least are objects of real worship.

IV. Buddhism.—It is often said that Buddhism is atheistic and therefore offers the believer no object of worship. However true this may be of Buddhism as a metaphysical system, and of the Hinayana, at least in its primitive form, it is certainly not true of the Mahayana (q.v.), which claims the allegiance of practically all Chinese Buddhists. For all but a small minority of Buddhist scholars and mystics the Buddha and bodhisattvas cannot be fitly described as other than objects of worship. The cult of these beings has reached its greatest development in one subdivision of the Mahayana, which is known to Chinese as the 'Pure Land,' and its adherents in the Siu-ma school of Chinese Buddhism. In the figure of Amitabha has practically taken the place of Sakyamuni, the historical Buddha; and the worship of which he is the object can hardly be described as anything less than laezflu. For ordinary believers as well, the sublime deity who rules over Sukhavati, the Western Paradise, and who, with the assistance of the great bodhisattva Avalokitesvara (Kuan-yin) and Mahasattva (Tao-chi, the Mahist), is capable of salvation all those who invoke his name with sincerity. That Amitabha evokes feelings of deep and sincere devotion is often doubted or thought impossible by doubters. Those familiar with the phenomenon of a non-existing being (for Amitabha is entirely a product of the religious imagination) can give rise to a truly devotional attitude. Yet a close observation of the religions beliefs and practices of Amithists will certainly dispel any such doubts. Perpetual prayers and the constant remembrance of this subject can be obtained than that of L. Wiener, whose evidence is all the more important and valuable from the fact that, as a loyal Catholic missionary, he may be regarded as incapable of unduly encouraging the spiritual fervour that a pagan cult is capable of inspiring. The Amithist temples in China and Japan are the only ones in which the people pray—pray truly and from the bottom of their hearts, where they repent and implore, with attitudes so natural and so touching that no asceticism of make-believe is admissible. As long as I live I shall never forget the feelings that I experienced when I saw a young Amithist mother making her devotions before the lighted and empty throne. She began by closing her eyes and concentrating her thoughts, her lips murmuring the words of repentance and petition. Then she brought two little children before the throne. The second could scarcely walk, but both did exactly as their mother had done, correctly and most gravely. Finally she took from her breast a third child, newly-born, and pressing his head very delicately between her thumb and forefinger, made him bow towards the throne. 2

In recent years some rather crude attempts have been made by a small school of English writers to prove that the beliefs and rites of Amithism, or some of their most striking features, were borrowed from or inspired by Christianity. Wiener, whose learning, conscientiousness, and comparative freedom from bias make him almost unique among Western missionaries who have studied Chinese religion, unreservedly rejects the theory. He believes, on the contrary, that all the characteristic features of the Mahayana,—including the 'altruism of the bodhisattva,' or the 'devotion with the activities of the bodhisattvas,—are a local development of primitive Buddhist theory. He sees nothing mysterious in the gradual expansion of the so-called egoism of the Hinayana into the altruism of the Mahayana. He regards it as necessary and inevitable. He traces Mahayanic origin to the centuries immediately succeeding the death of Gautama Buddha. The Mahayana "seems done anterior de pluries siecles a Christianisme." These views appear to the present writer to be entirely just. The worship of Buddha, or of Amitha, or of Kuan-yin is, at its best, at true and sincere as the worship of God, of Christ, or of the Virgin in Christendom; and its roots are planted very deep in Buddhist soil.

LITERATURE. —This has been indicated in the footnotes.

WORSHIP (Christian).—Worship is the expression of that sense of worth, or title to honour, which man feels due to the Divine nature, its idea and forms will vary with the notion of God entertained by man and of his mutual relations. Christian worship, moreover, as distinct from the other historic types, has a definite character due to the teaching and example of the Church's Founder Himself. This remains regulative for the whole history of Christian worship, deciding between true and false developments, and forming the standard by which reform or progress is to be judged.

The gospel of Christ itself emerged out of the religion of Israel, and accordingly its genius or distinctive nature defined itself largely in relation to Judaism, both as faith and as worship. In both Jesus claimed to fulfill the religious expectations of the prophets, whose emphasis was on the heart or inward attitude, as determinative of real devotion to God and His will; 'obedience' of 'life was the truest 'sacrifice,' and moral relations, rather than a true bond which is sometimes purposely left empty, to indicate that the real Jesus is nothing more than the religious expression of man and of the universe (cf. B. F. Johnston, Buddhism, London, 1915, pp. 111, 953). 3


1. Cf. art. TAOISM. 2. Cf. art. CHINA, CHINA (Buddhism in).
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ritual or formal acts of worship, were the primary form and means of communion with God. Love to God as Father, and to all men as brethren in virtue of the inward divine life, was the essence of all worship; to it all forms of specific worship are subordinate, and have value only as expressive of this and all it implies, according to Christ's idea of God's character. Where known moral purifications are carried out, worship may be said to be the 'gift' of homage to be left unoffered until it can be offered with a good conscience (Mt 5:5).

Spirituality, then, in this sense, is the touchstone of Christian worship; and those forms of worship are most entitled to the term 'Christian' which conform most to the simplicity and naturalness which marked Jesus' own devotional practice, or are most analogous to these. This does not fix beforehand how far other modes of expressing the same ideas and emotions, under other conditions of culture and particularly of art, may or may not be allowable. But it does fix where the emphasis which determines the spirit of worship must lie, if worship is to be true to 'the mind of Christ.'

Worship has two senses, a wider and a stricter. The wider, expressing a man's devoutness in all his living, is equivalent to prayer. The narrower, denoting specific forms of devotion, personal or social, is nearly synonymous with cultus. It is with the latter that this article has chiefly to do. You will find a correlation between the two senses of worship, the inward or inclusive and the external and particular, is so intimate in Christianity, it is needful constantly to bear in mind the context of 'holy' or devout life in which worship is set, in so far as it is Christian at all. This we shall find to be very manifest in primitive Christianity, when 'holy' was the epithet of the Church, and when participation in its worship, as pure and loving— with the Kiss of Peace as its seal—was conditioned by serious moral Church discipline.

1. The NT idea of worship.—(a) Religion, according to Jesus, consists in literal trust and love towards God, and loyalty to His will for His Kingdom 'on earth as it is in heaven.' Thus the Christian norm of worship is the Lord's Prayer. In keeping with this, the effect of Jesus' whole teaching, alike by its emphasis and by its silence, is to change the relative importance attaching to heart religion and to outward expression in worship. He never treated ritual or cultus as determinative of man's real relation to God, as did others; and his teaching is at home in the history of ancient religion. Nor did He, while creating a new religious bond between His disciples and constituting them a new Israel within Israel spiritually, make them a new community for purposes of worship or prescribe new forms of worship.1

1Pray without ceasing: in every kind of prayer give thanks. (1 Th 5:17; cf. Eph 6:7), rightly became a watchword of the Christian life. Worship thus becomes relatively independent of any given forms of expression, so far as these are not bound up with normal human life, the fulfilment of all relations 'as unto God and not (merely) unto men.'

This can come about directly in this attitude to spiritual seasons. Ro 14. 'One man esteemeth one day above another: another esteemeth every day alike.' (v. 5). 'He that regardeth the day, regardeth it unto the Lord; and he that esteemeth it not, to the Lord he esteemeth it not: and whether one fasteth, or eateth, whatsoever he doeth, doeth it unto the Lord.' Here we have a principle of all-embracing range, since it turns on the very nature of faith, as Paul is using the term, viz., personal conviction before God. 'Whatever is not of faith is sin' to him who does or abstains.2

'For the kingdom of God is not eating or drinking (as religious observance), but righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Spirit. For he that serveth Christ is well pleasing to God. The works of the flesh are manifest.' (Gal 5:21-23). This principle of righteousness being the distinctive advance of Christian worship—because of the Christian idea of God—upon that of all other religions, including Judaism. The prayer...now is, when the true worshippers shall worship the Father in spirit and truth [full reality]: for such the Father seeks to worship him in spirit and truth. God is Spirit: and they that worship him must worship in spirit and truth.' (Jn 4:23, 24).}

'The Kingdom of Christ...has no sacred days or seasons, no special sanctuaries, because every time and every place alike are holy. Absence has no place in a sacrificial system. There is no sacrificial tribe or class between God and man, by whose intervention alone God is reconciled and man forgiven. Each individual member holds personal communion with the Divine Head.' The conception is indeed, as he adds, 'strictly an ideal,' which cannot be applied rigorously in the practical life either of individuals or of the Christian society, the Church. But it remains the regulative principle behind all Christian institutions of worship, as of organisation generally, giving them only a conventional value, as experiments tested by much experience, yet as such, be treated reverently, especially for the sake of others, i.e. in love as well as faith.

(b) Forms of worship in the NT.—Here the main fact is the community's own example and teaching are associated with the synagogal type of worship rather than with the Temple, the seat of the sacrificial and priestly system of worship. For to Him the Temple was primarily 'a house of prayer,' and that priestly term (θυσιαστήριον) rather than curia. Indeed the latter hardly seems to be alluded to by Jesus at all (not even in Mt 18). His teaching on worship is mainly on genuine prayer, as opposed to formal prayer, and to repetition as a mere form (cf. Lk 18:13); and even 'the Lord's Prayer' is given as an example of prayer of the right sort rather than as a form for regular repetition. Such a valuation of its role in worship, in proportion as they express simply and directly the spirit of worship, is not only continuous with that of the prophets, as of parts of the Psalter and the Jewish Apocrypha; it appears also in some Rabbinic utterances, as was that of R. Menahem of Galilee (about the Christian era):

One day all sacrifices will cease, only the Thanksgiving will not cease; all prayers will cease, only the Thanksgiving prayers will not cease. Compare the spirit of Eccles 6:13.

This Rabbinic saying seems relative to the Messianic era of perfected worship, when sacrifices for sin should no longer be needful; and that is just the position in which the first followers of Jesus felt themselves to be, as spiritually united to Messiah. Thus their relation to God was now conditioned solely by the representative self-offering of Jesus which was at first the lines of 'the Suffering Servant' of Is 53, but was later worked out, as in the Epistle to Hebrews, in terms of the Mosaic sacrificial system, regarded as 'the shadow' of the perfected spiritual reality of purely personal relations, those of the devoted will (He 13:10). Thus the Christ, as God's sinless Son, is the abiding objective basis of His people's holiness (2Co 3:10). All Christians, then, are in fact made priests to God, as united in spirit with the 'Great Priest,' and as such have access for communion with God of the most intimately spiritual kind (10:19-25).

This conception conditions the whole of primitive Christian worship. Its normal character is thanksgiving, at once praise and prayer, which, as Menahem said, remains after other kinds of 'prayers' have ceased. Christians carry up through Jesus' sacrifice of praise to God continually, that is, the fruit of lips which make confession to His Name' (He 13:15; cf. 1 P 2:9, Rev 5:8-9). As for outward sacrifices, only the thankoffering remains, which is given for 'the purchase of the blood' (He 9:14) or 'for such sacrifices God is well pleased' (He 13:10).
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13*). Here the word ‘continually’ shows that the abiding spirit of a worshipful spirit is what is chiefly in view, as in Paul’s ‘praying always,’ and this on the part of Christians severally. And in fact the bulk of NT references to worship have this personal rather than corporate reference.

Such, e.g., is the nature of another passage which affords striking evidence of the new conception of spirituality of life as itself worship. ‘Pure religion and undefiled before God and Father is this, to visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction, and to keep himself unspotted from the world’ (1Jn 3:19), where the word rendered ‘religion’ (theophoria) means ‘devotion expressed in devotional acts.

Once we enter upon the history of Christian worship through the centuries, we shall have to confine ourselves in the main to the corporate or common worship of the Church, with only occasional glimpses at the forms of private devotion, though this all along exists in the background. But here we may note that in the NT itself the relation between personal and corporate worship is peculiarly intimate, the former overlying into the latter and constituting much of its contents, under the lead of individual members of the Spirit-filled Body of Christ’s saints. This meets us particularly in Paul’s Gentile church, e.g., in his advice to the Church at Corinth (1 Co 11-14), ‘What is it, then, brethren? When ye come together, each one hath a psalm, hath a teaching, hath a revelation, hath a tongue, hath an interpretation; let all things be done edifying, (14*), also 15-17, where praying, singing, blessing of God or ‘eucharist,’ all ‘by the Spirit’ on the part of individuals in Church worship, are specified; cf. Col 3:16, Eph 5:19. Evidently the forms of worship in the Apostolic Age were not fixed or uniform. The new Christian spirit brought a fresh element of spontaneity (2 Co 3:17) into the forms of common worship which otherwise followed in the main synagogal usage. To this the earliest converts, both Jews and proselytes, were accustomed; and it would naturally be adhered to, save for any feature distinctive of the new Messianic form of their faith, such as ‘the breaking of bread’ with thanksgiving to God for the Messianic redemption in Christ and in His Name. This note of adorning gratitude to God for His redemption, creation and communication, which explains the term ‘eucharist’ as used for the central act of Christian worship, remains through all changes its abiding characteristic.

So that the old and new worship is similar to the use of the Sabbath along the Lord’s Day, as both special days of worship, though in different modes. But, as time went on and conditions changed (and the need was felt for ‘Carminas’ and Ignatius) to distinguish sharply between the two, as relative to different ‘economies’ in God’s relations to man; and for the most part the Sabbath ceased, especially in the West, to have positive religious significance for Christians.

2. Worship, particularly eucharistic, in the ancient Church.—(a) Worship in the sub-Apostolic Church. The forms of Sunday worship were still determined mainly by those of the Synagogue, as modified by the ‘prophetical’ spirit in the primitive Church. Synagogal worship included the recitation of psalms, set prayers, Scripture lessons, address, benediction. Our first glimpse of Christian worship, as reported by Pliny c. AD. 112, shows us, at the Christian assembly before dawn on a stated day (Sunday), ‘a hymn (carmen) to Christ as to a God’ (cf. 1 Ti 3:16, Eph 5:22, 2 Ti 2:15 for snatches of such hymns), sung responsively, and a pledging of each and all in solemn form (ascratontai) against their future apostasy and all irreverence and evil words. With the former we may compare the Odes of Solomon, and with the latter 2 Ti 2:22, for moral law (i.e. justification of offerings...and that give them a share in the blessing also from thenceforth, To depart from wickedness is a thing pleasing to the Lord; and to depart from unrighteousness is a precious thing. See Christian sections of acts. PRAYER, FASTING, FESTIVALS AND FEASTS.
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(as of that of Judaism, which it modifies), and the supposed liturgy of the Eucharist. It is very difficult to meet, right and our bounden duty, that we should at all times and in all places give thanks unto God (ancient opening of the Eucharistic Prayer, adopted in the Anglican Prayer Book). But such worship attained especial expression in all corporate meetings for Christian fellowship, of which "the Eucharist" of the whole local church was the climax. To these principles striking witness is added by sympathy, in the corporate meeting of the church of a more familiar and informal nature than the Liturgical eucharist (now the climax of a Sunday morning service). Such the liturgy still appears not only in the N. Africa of Tertullian's day but in that of Cyprian's, as also in the Ancient Church Order commonly known as Hippolytian, though in this part it may rather reflect Syrian usage c. 800. There 'at the Supper of the congregation,' at the "bringing in of lamps," the bishop gives the Salutation usual before eucharistic prayer, ending, "Let us give thanks to the Lord." The people reply, 'Blessed be the Anaphora proper; but it is added, 'And he shall not say, Lift up your hearts' (the sursum corda formula), because that shall be said at the Absolution alone. Otherwise, the prayer of eucharist which follows is obviously regarded as a solemn one, and the fragments from the bread thus consecrated by prayer are taken up of the hands of the eucharist (i.e. bread), though 'not eucharist, as they body of our Lord.'

As regards the Eucharist, what has just been said prepares us for changes due to its separation from the associations of a social meal, and its incursion into the eucharistic liturgical type, as its central element. Thus it took on a more liturgical and ore long (under the influence of current sacramental ideas other than Jewish), a mysteriously realistic character, alien to the original Jewish notion of a meal of religious fellowship with blessing or eucharist of God. The former of these developments, the liturgical, was fostered by the ancient notion of worship, our offering material offering was essential to worship. Hence the self-oblation of the loyal heart came in time to appear to most Gentile Christians to fall short of personal worship; and this gave to a new meaning being attached to the eucharistic prayer over the bread and wine used for the purposes of Communion (originally as a meal of Christian fellowship), viz., as offering the elements to God, in worship of the Incarnation, as a gift to the Sinful of all (a sanction in Scripture being seen in Mal 11, 14). To this there was insensibly added, by a natural reaction of old associations as to such worship—partaking of communion with the mysteries (the superficial likeness of which to the Christian Eucharist Justin feels and apologizes for)—the notion that God met the earthly gift with a divine gift in return, by filling it with a new and mysterious quality. The way in which this came about was probably in the first instance purely religious, arising out of the very intensity of the soul's experience of a special quickening in the act of corporate worship, while contemplating and partaking of the symbols of Christ's dying love. This is strongly suggested by the experimental atmosphere and language of the devotional utterances, including eucharistic prayers, in the earliest Apocryphal Acts, the basis of which, if semi-nostic in type, yet probably reflects the general Christian devotional feeling at Holy Communion both before and after the middle of the 2nd century.

In the Acts of Thomas we have what seems a sample of the more enthusiastic and popularised eucharistic prayer. 'And the Apostle, standing by it ('the bread of blessing'), said: Jesus, who has revealed us worthy and a vessel to represent the Eucharist of Thy holy body and blood, so, we make bold with the eucharistic and invocation of Thy holy name. Come now and converse with us. And he that partaketh of perfect compassion; come, Communion of the male (=Christ); come, that feminine, like 'communion,' the substantive proceeding knowest the mysteries of the Chosen one; come, that ban communion in all the contest of the noble Athlete against the powers of darkness. Amen.' Here the Church is made to manifest that it manifests her activities and affords joy and rest to those united to her; come and have communion with us in this Eucharist which we perform in [on the basis of] Thy name and in the love wherein we are assembled in [on the basis of] Thy calling."

Here what is specially noteworthy is the experimental nature of the grace of Christ's eucharistic presence thus invoked. Added to this, however, we find, first in Justin and then in Irenaeus, the belief that the words of institution, cited in the Church's eucharistic prayer, were formula of Divine power, producing in the elements themselves the presence of the body and blood of Christ, the Incarnate Logos; and therewith was laid the foundation of what came to be the specifically 'Catholic' doctrine of the Eucharist, and of the corresponding devotional attitude towards the elements themselves. In Justin it appears only as the belief that the worshippers' bodies are prepared for resurrection by participation in Christ's resurrection body and blood. That such presence of Christ's body and blood was of benefit to the soul there is no suggestion. Such a realistic conception (present already in some sense in Irenaeus's mystic view of the Eucharist as mediation of immortality) first developed the habit of taking portions home for private use (already in Tertullian), and then devotional anxiety as to what became of all parts of the consecrated elements. Adoration of Christ as present in the elements, and the notion that he in them was being offered as the Christian sacrifice and that with propitiatory intent and effect—represent forms of devout thought and feeling of which we have no trace until after Cyprian's day, or indeed until the 4th century.

(b) Justin Martyr's witness.—At this point we must quote from the famous passages of Justin's Apology 2 which afford our one connected picture of Christian corporate Sunday worship in the 2nd century.

On Sundays 'there is a gathering together of the local church,' and 'there fore, the Apostles of old, the writers of the gospels are read, as long as time allows. Then the priest gives way by discourse admonition and exhortation to copy these noble lessons. Next we all rise together and send up prayers,' 'making common prayers for ourselves . . . and for all others everywhere, earnestly and fervent praying be deemed worthy . . . by our deeds also to be found good lovers and keepers of the commandments, that so we may be saved with the eternal salvation. When we cease from the prayers, we salute each other with a kiss. 'Next, bread is brought and wine and water, and the president, taking them, sends up (ἀναρρήτως)as best he can prayers in like manner and thanksgivings, 'sends up praise and glory to the Father of the Universe through the Name of the Son and the Holy Spirit, and makes thanksgiving (eucharist) at length for our having been deemed worthy of these (blessings) at his hands . . . . . . . . Thus the people chimers with the Amen. Then takes place the distribution to each, and the partaking from the elements for which thanks were given; and to the absent portions are sent by the hand of the deacon.'

One or two aspects of the eucharistic prayer of the Church, through the lips of its inspired leaders, are made clear by the more general language already cited from ch. xiii. in describing the reasonable nature of Christian worship. But the main point is that in both connections its essence lay in 'sending up (ἐναρρήτως) such memorable word, 'to the Creator of this Universe,' 'processions of homage (εἰρήνης) and hymns (as if on their way to the divine pres-
ence), in acknowledgment of being and all the means of well-being,’ as well as in ‘sending requests to be once more in incorruption, on the ground of faith in Him’; or, as expressed in the later passages, ‘sending up (ἀναστρέφονται) prayers and thanksgivings.’

If we have not here the very origin of the term ‘mass’ (missis = missio = Gr. diakonos = διακονη) which was not used in a special religious sense, and its original meaning, namely the oblation of worship to God on high (cf. the Liturgy of St. Mark, just before offering of incense and a prayer of oblation, τοὶς βίησιν καὶ τοὺς εὐφροσύνας ἀναστρέφοντας), at any rate this, and nothing else, was the primitive conception of the Christian sacrifice.

It is one continuous with the later Jewish notion of prayer, in the Dispersion in particular, and is quite distinct from any notion of the body and blood of Christ as ‘the sacrifice of the altar’—a notion which had not yet arisen, even where realistic theories existed of the relation of the Incarnate Logos to the elements, as the Christian bread of life or ‘food of immortality.’ Another and closely connected aspect of the same contrast is the fact that eucharistic worship in Justin, as in Irenæus and during the 3rd cent., for the most part, has no relation to sin in the worshippers. Christians as such are consecrated by union with Christ, and as such are ‘counted worthy of the high function of offering as priests their prayers

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thither be truful, and so God 'may render to us the recom-

mended. His benediction on the principles of 2.6. As the

the Word enjoined on the People (of the OT) the making of

ought. The present time, indeed, is given to the Church; and

for that reason He wills us also to offer a gift at the altar

often, without intermission. There is, then, an altar in heaven,

for the present prayers and oblations are accepted; and

and, as John in the Apocalypse says, And the temple of

God is open.'' 3

(c) Irenaeus and certain 'Catholic' developments.

—Here we have several ideas characteristic of the

Christian 'sacrifice' in worship towards the end

of the 2nd century. Some are wholly primitive and

certain, e.g., that the elements do not sanctify a

man, but the worshipper's pure conscience the

sacred victuals; God's acceptance of a sacrificial

gift 'as from a friend' honours the giver; the

real, i.e., the spiritual, gift is the thanksgiving

of the heart, and is offered at the heavenly altar,

to which 'prayers and oblations are directed.'

The last is implied in the call 'Hearts on high' 
(suavum corde), which prefaces ancient eucharistic

prayers generally. But in time the idea lost its

pure spirituality, as the notion arose that the

material gifts themselves were received by God on

His altar on high by the hands of His angels. This

is the essence of the eucharistic prayer of the 4th century. North Italian of Sacra-

mentis, in several Eastern liturgies, and in

the traditional Roman Canon of the Mass. The

card of these, however, preserve in the main

Irenaeus's notion of an oblation of bread and wine

which Christians were privileged to offer—with

clear reference to Ro 12—'as expressing their self-

oblation, in sacramental commemoration of the self-oblation of their Lord. But the Roman Canon

by substituting for 'as is figura of the body

and blood of our Lord' 'that it may become to us

the body and blood of . . . our Lord,' and by a

good deal else in the context, brings in another

train of thought altogether, that of Christ's body

being present on the Church's altar' on earth

and partaken of by the communicants. This is

the full realistic form assumed by the secondary

and non-primitive element in Irenaeus's principles

set forth above, viz, that God gives in this way,

in recompense for the Church's thanksgiving, a

certain unique benefit in return. This, in extant

liturgies generally, is conceived as communicated

first to the consecrated elements themselves and

through them to the communicants. In some

early Eastern liturgies the Word or Spirit is

taken to be present in the elements; so making them, in a metaphorical sense, His sacra-

mental 'body and blood'; but in Irenaeus's discus-

sion of this aspect of the Eucharist, as in the

Roman Canon and some later Eastern Anaphoras, the above realistic conception appears of Christ's human body as present in the elements. And with this added notion a fresh phase of worship begins to enter into the eucharistic service, viz, the adoration of the Incarnate Saviour in the elements of the oblation, conceived now as effect-

ing ares, in some sense (that of re presentare, 'really presenting'), the offering of His body, once

for all offered on the Cross but perpetually

presented in heaven with atoning efficacy.

(f) Cyprian transitional.—Cyprian is here, as

generally, transitional between the second century

and the fourth. His eucharistic theory is in the main

tertullian's, as regards the sacramental rather than the proper body of Christ being present in the elements after consecration. But

as regards the prior offering of the elements in

eucharistic worship, Cyprian insists that 'the

priest' performs his office in Christ's place (i.e.,

with His authority for the sacramental efficacy of

his act) when he 'imitates that which Christ did,'

And, though he has in mind what Christ did at

the Last Supper 'on the Cross, yet his broad

language elsewhere gave a footing to a less

experimental sense being read into his words.

So he says, 'The Lord's passion is the sacrifice

which we offer,' sacramentally or commensura-

tively, as we 'offer the sacrifice of bread and

wine,' the blood of Christ in 'the sacrifice of the Lord,'

as commemoratively observed by use of the sacred

words in imitation of His performance by us:

'Thus in time 'the blood of Christ' and His body

were thought of as actually present and

offered in the wine and bread, and that not only as the

propitiatory sacrifice 'for the sins of living

and dead.'

(g) 'Catholic' eucharistic worship and survivals

in it. —Proclus Cyprian's day the whole nature of

eucharistic worship—expression of this homoeo-

octrinal alteration in the Church's thought and in

the growingly elaborate ritual which expressed it,

in the course of the 4th cent., it attained in most localities the form which is

now called 'Catholic.' Yet down to the 5th cent. there

remained clear traces of the older order in certain

phrases not really of a piece with the conceptions then prevalent. Thus, in addition to those already alluded to, in the Anaphora of Serapion in Egypt, c. 350, before the words of institution we read:

'Full is heaven, full also is earth of thy excellent glory, Lord of

Powers: Fill also this sacrifice (sacramentum) with the

sacred participation: for to Thee have we offered this 'living sacri-

ifice' (sacramen, Ro 12), this bloodless oblation (Eph 5:2) to Thee

we have offered this bread, the likeness (omologon) of the body of

the Only-begotten.' Then comes the reference to Christ's example in the institution, followed by: 'Wherefore also we, making the likeness of His death, have offered the bread, and beseech Thee through this sacrifice, be reconciled to all of us and be propitious, O God of Truth.' Only after this do we get the invocation which is conceived to make the bread 'body of the Word' and the cup 'blood of the Truth,' and so 'medicine of life' for body and soul to those partaking.

Here there seems to be a blending of primitive and later concepts.

(h) Retrospect of eucharistic worship to the end of the 4th century. —In idea it first corresponded simply to its name, 'thanksgiving' to God for His benefits in nature and grace, as rooted in His adorable being alone. As far as 4 puts it, 'Seeing, then, that we have all these things from Him, we ought in all things to render thanks (Eucharist to Him, to whom the glory for ever and ever. Amen.) Of such a life of thanksgiving the solemn corporate worship in full

Church gathering is the climax, being the earthly imitation of the worship in heaven, where (as pictured in Dn 7) 'the whole company of His angels standing near Him do sacred service (ser-

vaplyes) to Him,' the adoration attributed to the Seraphim in Is 6, 'Holy, holy, holy in the Lord of hosts: the whole earth is full of His glory.' As visible, concrete expression of thanksgiving, the Church's 'offerings or gifts' in kind from the Creator's own gifts were presented in sacred service or liturgy, in the prayer

1 Eplid. 63, 4.

2 For his real meaning cf. ch. 11, where he dwells on wine as by natural and scriptural symbolism, or sacramental value, able to 'expiate (atone for) the blood of Christ,' as water could not, and so to produce the sense of newness and joy suggested by the expression of full communion of Christ, which the wine 'shows forth' (extendit) (ch. 4).

3 Jb. 9. 14. 17.

4 J. V. D. Clark and A. J. Carlyle, Christianity in History, London, 1917, p. 171, f., where also quoted the chief liturgical types illustrated in the developments reviewed. See art. Eucharist.

5 See art. Eucharist.

6 Clem. ii. xxiv.
of uplifting (ἀφόρος), directed to God's spiritual altar on high (implying the Apocalypse), which Christ, the High-priest, presented in the Church 'sacrifice' of praise—if pure from defilement by sin, such as enmity between any of its members. This prayer was led up to by 'common prayers of the fathers and of the people, of intercession, of adoration, and for all other men everywhere,' in urgent petition (εὐρύτατον) 'that we may be counted worthy, after having learned the Truth, by our deeds also to present ourselves in concert and keep going the commandments, that we may be saved with the eternal salvation.' After these intercessions the kiss of peace sealed the spirit of unity which was specially asked for, and was the condition of the 'purity' and acceptability of the coming eucharistic prayer, the Church's 'sacrifice' of praise to God's Name or revealed nature. Of such intercessions as offered in Rome c. A.D. 305 we probably have the substance, and largely the very words, in the Epistle of Clement (lxx.-lxxi.); and we find them strikingly continuous with those of the OT and of contemporary Jewish public worship (e.g. the Big Inter. of prayers in a fact also common in the earliest extant Christian hymns. The changes which passed over Christian worship, especially the eucharistic part, show a steady decrease in this Biblical or Hebraic spirit (as distinguished from Origen's development—Gnosis is now forgotten), and a corresponding infusion of a non-Biblical or Hellenistic element of thought in the interpretation of the Eucharist as worship and means of grace, together with a transposition of traditional elements in the service generally, in keeping with the new ideas (e.g., the place of the intercessions). This is the most momentous fact in the development of ancient Catholic worship out of primitive Christian forms, and has its parallels in other aspects of Catholic Christianity.

The change is associated, too, with a growing sense of sin in 'the saints' or 'the holy Church,' especially from the 4th cent., when Christian wholeheartedness on the average rapidly declined, owing largely to the new relations of State and Church tempting worldly people to join the latter. The eucharistic 'sacrifice' is more and more conceived in a prophetic significance, which had its roots in the newer view of the elements, as literally made by consecration 'the body and blood' of Christ's passion, though as existing now in resurrection glory. A constant effort to make the most of those ingredients of form. The eucharistic prayer became more stereotyped, not only as the habitual usage of a given bishop but also as the fixed tradition from bishop to bishop: and what had once been a single prayer was broken up into specialized moments or phases, marking stages in the sacred drama of the Liturgy. This gave the service 'a hieratic' or formally sacred effect, alien to the genius of primitive Christian worship, but quite congenial to the non-Christian cults around it. To these innovations was now added yet another characteristic of later Catholic worship generally, viz. the notion that the offering of the elements is 'immemorial, and that to the non-Christian cults around it. To these innovations was now added yet another characteristic of later Catholic worship generally, viz. the notion that the offering of the elements is 'immemorial, and that the eucharistic day, (b. 379) onwards. Hence it seems probable that the advent of Gnosticism and of paganism exercised some vague influence upon Christian feeling, especially in the case of the ruler populace. The strongly marked desire to be buried near the martyrs is no doubt to be attributed to a similar hope of protection. It was a matter not so much of logic as of a deep and primitive instinct—the same which in pagan times had led to the development of hero-worship. These frank words of a modern Roman Catholic deserve attention as pointing to a principle of wide possibilities of application in the history of 'Christian' worship, especially in view of his later statement that 'the core of the old in 'sacramental' and that of p aggression include many identical elements—e.g., the use of ablutions, lights, incense, prostrations,unctions, linen vestures, ox vota, etc. Few can doubt that they represent a kind of development which the NT Fathers, in keeping with their Christian spirit, do not to name Paul's Master—would have found foreign, to say the least, to the genius of 'the Gospel,' as

1 Cyril of Jerusalem, Myst. Catt. v. 9.
3 There was a corresponding change in the form and appointments of the Office of worship.
4 See art. SAINTS and MARTYRS (Christian).
6 See art. SAINTS and MARTYRS (Christian).
7 Cf. Hatch, 189, xlv. 54 67
8 10, 26-
'worship in spirit.' And, when one reads the words of St. Melania, in 438, at a shrine of the martyrs, 'O ye, who have always free speech with God through the apostles (sacer... fereare) with Him that He may receive my soul in peace'—along with the comment, 'It is just this παραπανία, or free speech, ' attributed to the martyrs, that is put forward again and again in patristic writers as the one thing to which recourse to their help—'one cannot but feel the distance, not so much of time but of spirit, between such worship and that of the NT.' For there the same 'free speech,' and the same place of child world, is claimed as the glory of all sons of God in Jesus Christ, and particularly right of entry in this spirit into the Holy Place in heaven, as of priests in union with the 'Great Priest over the family of God' (He 10:19). As by a lightning-flash, such a comparison reveals the enormous change of attitude which has come about, by insensible stages, in the worship of Christians.

The cult of the relics of saints, as aids to devotion, especially in connexion with the celebration of the anniversary of martyrdom or spiritual birth (natulœcias), goes back in its simplest form to a relatively early period; cf. the Acts of Polycaur (c. 155). But its developments, both in the Catacombs, where martyrs' remains were abounded, and elsewhere, later assumed extra- ordinary proportions and were finally in the 4th century, and onwards, calling forth the scorn of Julian and many other cultured pagans.

(b) Artistic aids to devotion. The place of art in the expression of Christian thought and feeling, and the function of images (zikas) or representations of sacred persons to the eye, usually in paint or mosaic work, are dealt with in special articles. There was at first great shyness of such things, on account both of the Jewish and other feeling against all that could be construed as idolatry and of the tainted nature of so much pagan art. Hence the earliest use of art (e.g., in the Catacombs) was probably stimulated in part by the preoccupation of Christian thought in the 4th and 5th centuries with the idea of the Incarnation.

(c) The Christian Year. As the central service of Church worship, the offering of the eucharistic sacrifice came to represent dramatically, or in a series of sacred actions and words, the Christian redemption wrought by the Incarnate Son of God, so the Gospel story of the Incarnate Saviour was set forth ever more fully in the yearly festivals and holy seasons commemorative of the same. Naturally the first week first felt the impact of Christ. The Lord's Day, the Christian day of resurrection joy, took the place of the Sabbath, the Jewish day of grateful gladness. To this were soon added the weekly and yearly days, in remembrance of the sin that occasioned the Saving Cross. But what the Lord's Day was to the week, that the anniversary of the central act of redemption was to the year. Thus Easter, with its associated Friday, became the first season in the Christian Church, early we cannot say. Then followed Pentecost, and gradually the other great 'moments' of the Redeemer's life, until each year became a time-sacrament of the divine drama of human salvation. The fact that the birthday of Christ was relatively late in the calendar points to the practical rather than theoretic nature of the Church's apprehension of its own salvation, in which the Cross, the final act of Redemption, is more central for Christian experience than His birth. Into the calendar of the Christian salvation, in terms of Christ's history and its sequel in the gift of His Spirit, the Church's birthday, were fitted the 'birthdays' of martyrs into the heavenly realm of life eternal. Such, then, was the Christian Year in idea and as an aid to worship. The festivals in honour of the Virgin Mother of Jesus appeared only late in the calendar.

(d) Devotional 'hours,' in private and corporate worship. From the Church Year we turn to the day as a unit of devotion. Hours of worship, other than the Sunday Church hour, were the eucharist, to be of two chief types: (a) those for special classes within the Church, particularly ascetics ('virgins' of both sexes), later known as monks and nuns; (b) the popular hour. The former type grew out of an earlier kind, namely individual devotions continuous with the three hours of prayer in later Judaism (Ps 53, 69, etc.), which from apostolic precedents in Acts 3:10: 'But if,' etc. (cf. Deut. 31) came to be called the apostolic hours. Clement of Alexandria refers to Christians who set apart certain hours, viz., the third, sixth, and ninth. Already in Cyriacus' day piety had found mystical reasons for the use of the apostolic hours, connecting them generally with the Trinity, and severally with two stages of Christ's Passion and the descent of the Spirit at Pentecost (the third hour). So far, however, such day-time hours were purely private devotions. The earliest Church service other than the Sunday one was the vigil, a night service suggested by the NT calls for vigilance. But it was never of daily occurrence, only on the eve of a holy day or first Easter, then the Lord's Day, the weekly first Easter, then the Lord's Day, the weekly first Easter, then the Lord's Day, the weekly first Easter, then the Lord's Day, the weekly first Easter, then the Lord's Day, the weekly first Easter, then the Lord's Day, the weekly first Easter, then the Lord's Day, the weekly first Easter, then the Lord's Day, the weekly first Easter, then the Lord's Day, the weekly first Easter, then the Lord's Day, the weekly first Easter, then the Lord's Day, the weekly first Easter, then the Lord's Day, the weekly first Easter, then the Lord's Day, the weekly first Easter, then the Lord's Day, the weekly first Easter, then the Lord's Day, the weekly first Easter, then the Lord's Day, the weekly first Easter, then the Lord's Day, the weekly first Easter, then the Lord's Day, the weekly first Easter, then the Lord's Day, the weekly first Easter, then the Lord's Day, the weekly first Easter, then the Lord's Day, the weekly first Easter, then the Lord's Day, the weekly first Easter, then the Lord's Day, the weekly first Easter, then the Lord's Day, the weekly first Easter, then the Lord's Day, the weekly first Easter, then the Lord's Day, the weekly first Easter, then the Lord's Day, the weekly first Easter, then the Lord's Day, the weekly first Easter, then the Lord's Day, the weekly first Easter, then the Lord's Day, the weekly first Easter, then the Lord's Day, the weekly first Easter, then the Lord's Day, the weekly first Easter, then the Lord's Day, the weekly first Easter, then the Lord's Day, the weekly first Easter, then the Lord's Day, the weekly first Easter, then the Lord's Day, the weekly first Easter, then the Lord's Day, the weekly first Easter, then the Lord's Day, the weekly...

Here we find an hour of early morning prayer on rising, before the first of the 'apostolic hours,' ere putting hand to work, and also a vespertine hour. These five hours mostly appear in the East in the 'Hippocratic' Church Order, a part of which reflects some circle of piety in Syria about A.D. 300—each with its mystical reference, though a different one from Cyriacus's; but there is no vespertine hour in the old Eastern Order, possibly

1 Eph 3:7, He 3:19-20a, 35, 1 Jo 2:9-17, 4 1Jo 3:1-2.
2 See art. Rules (Primitive and Western).
3 See arts. OF HOLY, OF SAINTE, SYRDIOLAM.
4 See art. ARCHITECTURE (Christian).
5 See art. DAY-FESTIVALS.
6 See Christian sections of art. CALENDAR AND FESTIVALS AND
7 OD, viii.
8 Cf. Did. viii.

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because it was already set apart for more social worship. On the other hand, there are not in Cyprian any night hours, only prayer in the night service, the Antiphonale (De virgo), a Thanksgiving for the lighting of the lamps either in the home or at an Agape,2 passing later into use among ascetics, like the table-prayers of the Didache into de Virg., xii. 3. In this last the Gloria is part of the Virgin's praise, 'towards dawn.'4 Closely connected in feeling and ideas with the Gloria, and perhaps with its first vespers hymn (To doct lowa), is the best known Latin hymn, the Vesperae solennes (De toto theus), now traced to Nicetas of Remesiana, who as living on the road between the East and West would naturally feel the influence of Greek models. Nicetas in his works 'On Vigils' and 'On the good of Psalmody' illustrates further the similarity of ideals of private and corporate devotional hours in East and West c. A.D. 400, and he was one of the pioneers of the newer feeling which allowed hymns other than those in Scripture, the Psalter above all, to form part of corporate Christian worship, though the prejudice against this died hard.5 The authority of St. Ambrose, who himself wrote hymns for public worship, had no doubt great influence. The menace that hymns, and to their more general use was a real one. It was in monastic circles, then, that hymns proper took root, and from their daily offices passed in the later Middle Ages into the Breviary of the ordinary curial clergy. The popular Church was active in the use and production of hymns; and from the 12th cent. onwards we can trace the periods of fresh revival in monastic religion by the development of this spontaneous form of devotional expression, e.g., in 'Jesus, the very thought of Thee,' Dies Irae (by the Franciscan, Thomas of Celano), and the eucharistic hymns of St. Thomas Aquinas.6 The Church of Rome did not adopt daily services so early as the N. Italian and Gallican Churches, under the influence of Eastern monastic practice, carried thither by a number of pilgrims and others from those regions, such as Hilary in the middle of the 4th cent., and Cassian of South Gaul towards its end. Rome was always conservative in usages, as appears most clearly in its manner of reciting the Psalms, which were the staple of worship other than prayer. The Eastern form was antiphonal singing between two choirs, a method which took definite shape at Antioch about 350, and spread westwards rapidly—through Cappadocia, Constantinople, Milan. In Rome, as also in Africa, the old 'plenary'—as the old Cockcrow to dawn kept by 'all monks and virgins,' and by some lay-folk also. Of course the devotions at the central holy place of Christendom were more generally attended than elsewhere and more elaborate in form, including already four daily services at least. But the account gives us clear insight into the way in which worship became more specialized and developed. And by a good deal of evidence from the last quarter of the century we can fix the period A.D. 350-375 as that of the introduction of daily public evening and morning prayers into the Eastern Church, followed a few years later by Gaul (perhaps under Pope Hormisdas, 514-523); and Vespers was made an obligation still later.7 In Gaul and Spain matins and vespers had taken general root rather earlier; while a civil law of Justinian also decreed that all clergy attached to

1. De Spir. 73.  
2. Cf. Eccl. 39 and the Ancient Church Order extant in Ethiopia, 47.  
3. Cf. xx.  
5. C. A. E. Burn, Nicetas of Remesiana, c. 360, of Iraga, in 561.  
6. See art. Living (Christian).  
7. Swete, Service, etc., p. 41.  
8. Id., p. 41.  
a church should sing Vespers, Matins, and Lauds themselves, and not leave the duty to others. A careful study of the text of the issue of the famous Rule of St. Benedict (c. A.D. 528), which prescribed the use of the "complete circle of eight 'hours'" for monks is the foundation of the Breviary. These hours were much the same as the services in the Church in the 4th cent., completed in its close in Jerome's Bethlehem monastery by a supplemental matins, between matins and the third hour (to which public service in St. Vespasian, together with compline (completorium) before retiring to rest. The last was added by Benedict himself, who dropped the midnight hour, so as to give his monks a longer period of unbroken sleep, and placed matins about 2 a.m.

4. Mediaval worship.—In the main mediaval worship, alike as piety and as cultus, shows simply the working out and adaptation of the traditional cultus to new conditions, created by the break-up of the Roman Empire and its civilization. This meant the flooding out of the Church with crude fresh types of humanity, each with its religious bias and customs, largely superstitions, and so fostered these elements in the Church of the Empire which were farthest from primitive piety and cultus, as fundamentally Hebraic. Hence it is the element which the Church had to combat besides those in the Biblical—as already described or alluded to—that increasingly distinguishes its mediaval phase, both in the East and in the West.

In the East the hieratic and mystic tendencies, the latter parallel to and influenced by the rise and spread of Neo-Platonism, as a religion as well as a philosophy, are most marked. Particularly was this so in what we may call 'Byzantine' piety, as distinguished from the occasional types of Oriental Christianity, comparatively unaffected by Greek influence. But in all the eucharistic service was essentially a divine drama or 'mystery,' appealing to the emotions through the senses, with the idea of the mystic sacrifice at its heart. The notion of the parallelism between the worship of heaven and of earth, of the celestial hierarchy and the terrestrial, was worked out elaborately and with surprising literalism. It finds its typical expression in the pseudo-Dionysius, through whom it also exercised a deep influence on the more practical and ethical genius of Western, particularly Latin, writers. In the East, too, the ritual, so expressed in cultus, becomes more vicarious and sacramental, less congregational, in character. The connexion between priest and people, especially in the East—where the cultus went on in the sanctuary or altar-area, largely out of the people's sight—becomes a more formal one; worship is less corporeal, less an active participation of all, with mind and voice, in common acts of spiritual and moral communion with the Christ of the Gospels, and through Him with the God unto whom and with whom all life is to be lived in harmony of will.

A special note of mediaval worship, inherited from this later patristic age, was the sense of sins calling for the constant 'propitiation' of God. This was to be achieved partly through special good works (such as alms of all sorts, and various mortifying exercises of penance), often prescribed by the priest through whom absolution was looked for, and partly by private eucharistic oblations or 'votive masses' offered in the donor's name in special service-books. Parallel with this went a development of purely clerical masses, without lay participants, which in the 7th cent. produced that contradiction in terms, according to primitive ideas of eucharistic worship, 'private masses.' In these the priest administered communion to himself alone and these were termed 'private masses' since 'the whole Church, in its name and as pleasing for its welfare. But one result at least of such purely vicarious masses, together with the celebration of several masses by the same priest on the same day (10th cent., onwards), was natural; viz. a concomitant decrease in lay participation. The Church, however, at this time introduced two free communions a year on the part of ordinary Christians; and many communicated once only in the year.

As regards 'hours' services, the new impulse given by Benedict led to the 'erection of monastic communities in connexion with the parishes (tituli) of Rome,' which 'supplied the parish churches with clergy at liberty to conduct the daily offices, and qualified by their training in music to do so.' Thus, soon, terce, sext, and none were sung in the Roman churches, and before 800 prime and vespers also. These early Roman offices became, through the able scribes and compilers of the English mediaval breviaries. Attempts were made, too, as time went on, to extend the 'hours' services to parish churches and get the laity to attend the same. These 'hours' services, however, for the most part the 'hours' proper remained a monastic or at least clerical form of service throughout the Middle Ages; and in England, owing to historical conditions which effaced the older type of non-Roman Christianity, they were virtually Roman 'offices' or dutiful acts of divine worship. Yet they contained some Gallican elements, especially before the Norman Conquest; and after the Norman Conquest survivals in the so-called Uses of the great dioceses, of which that of Salisbury (Sarum) was the chief. Through its influence, in particular, there set in also in the latter part of the Middle Ages a tendency towards a uniform English Use.

Rise of the 'Breviary.'—Ever since the 'hours' services had been adopted, the mass of fixed forms of devotion—psalms, prayer, lessons (not only Biblical, but also Legenda from patristic service-books, and expositions and from the Acts of the Saints)—had grown to ever greater dimensions. The process of its simplification and unification in one service-book (service-books for the service-books) in England about the 11th cent., in the Breviary (Breviare Sive Ordo Officiorum or Portiforium, i.e. the book 'carried' by the priest when he went abroad—the latter being a smaller and more portable form of the former. It was the Breviary, then, that formed the basis of the first efforts of those who early in the Protestant reformation of worship, as of Christian religion generally, tried to bring back its public forms to primitive and purer models. But an experiment in the way of a reformed Breviary on Catholic lines was also made in 1535 by Cardinal Quirini, general of the Franciscan Order in Spain. Much was omitted as superfluous, and a simplification all round, amounting to a revolution in effect, was carried out. It and its preface greatly influenced Cranmer's first Book of Common Prayer. But Cranmer's purpose was far more radical, viz. 'to produce not merely a good manual of devotion for the clergy, but a Book of Common Prayer' for all Christians, learned and unlearned, if only they could read their mother tongue. 

Transition to the new order.—The old service-books were for the use of the clergy and the 'religious': the layman had only the 'little Office,'
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whether the Latin 

Horae or the English Psalter

based on it in the late Middle Ages. But the English Psalter from the Church of England as well as the clergy's, alike in church and in private use. Cranmer compiled it on the basis of the Sarum Breviary in particular, but in the light of principles of religion and worship drawn direct from the Bible itself. Not only had this act of spiritual precedent. Thus 'Whitsunday, June 9, 1549, witnessed the beginning of a new era in the public worship of the English Church, a new era already in augurated. By the time Cranmer himself, which had gained a new sense of what the Christian gospel was, and what sort of worship best fitted its nature. In all of these the vital change took place that forms of worship were in a language 'understood of the people.' This meant an enormous gain in spiritual reality, especially as their Biblical language and allusions could now be interpreted by and fitted into the regular reading of Scripture. The poverty of Scriptural background, and indeed the scarcity of 'the Word' of God in piety and worship, even in the later Middle Ages, when a certain amount of preaching existed in parts of the Church, is the heresy of which the whole cultus was, that is, it was the result of the ecclesiastical liturgy, as well as having the spirituality of the clergy and the laity not always as it should be, as a part of the NT type of worship, because 'Christianity, even the Church, after the parousia of the second and of the third generation of men. Men were 'fed' in religious, or in respect of a feast day—or a fast day or a saint's day—which are a shadow of things to come. Of course the mass alike of clergy and laymen were not fit, as things were, for a NT type of worship, because the Church had rejected the Faith had not the ability to which that belonged. This fact had historic causes, some of which have been indicated. But none the less such cultus, and such spiritualized worship, represented no normal advance, nor even the salvation of aesthetic and emotional sensibility to the divine, as majestic and mysterious in its nature and ways, with which it affected certain souls. Nor on these lines, from which the official Church through the papacy refused to depart, was there any promise of return to truer continuity with principles and methods of spiritual worship at the first.

It was small wonder, then, if, worshipping with but little direct aid from the NT and its distinctive spirit, medieval piety was full of the spirit of byzantine age unto fear, and sadly disfigured of the spirit of adoption whereby we cry Abba, Father. This appears most vividly from many examples of the religious art which was used as an aid to worship. But it was implied also in the elaborate services of the Church, both within the invisible world—fathers and the saints at large, with the Mother of Jesus at their head—whose aid was felt needful to supplement the too exalted or remote help, or even to pacate the too severe judgment, not only of God the Father but also of Jesus, the 'one mediator of God and man, himself man.' Nor was the element of fear—the fear of mystified minds, and the sense of consequences not fully appeased by the Church's rites of penance and absolution that were a large part of the mediaval sacramental system—absent from the sense of mystery with which the central sacrament of worship, Christ's very body and blood, presented in an inconceivably real sense in the transubstantiated bread offered to God anew as 'the Host,' and eaten for the benefit of body and soul, was regarded by a doctrine of purgation.

Finally, participation in the Church's cultus was largely viewed as the result of prayer, like sacraments on the opus operum theory, and as a meritorious work before God, rather than a specially direct and effective mode of attaining spiritual fellowship with God, as the soul's supreme good. A radical revival of the original Christian spirit of faith was vitally needful to a new birth of worship, on lines which could lead to the development of a culture more suited to the growing spiritual maturity of humanity at large. This needed a system of worship which could first stimulate and educate it in certain directions, and then by gradual modification of the traditional forms make available (for the adherents both of the old and of the new types of Christian piety) the elements of positive value latent in the historical forms of continuous Catholicism.

5. Protestant worship.—(1.) In General.—The intimate connexion between the kind of religious faith and the worship which expresses it is nowhere clearer than in the Church of England, where, as a result of the Protestant Reformation. The new experience of saving faith, with its correlative doctrine of grace (q.v.), summed up in the twin ideas, justification by faith and the priesthood of all believers, was applied to the sphere of religious feeling to which worship belongs. The sense of assured access to God on the part of Christians, as children reconciled and accepted in Him by faith in the Name of Jesus Christ, brought into worship a fresh note of glad thanksgiving. This ran through all, at first even the confession of sins (as of children in a family, rather than of debtors or law-breakers before their judge), and the act of worship being a act of worship being a 'bare sign' of the spiritual relations which its forms suggested, those of vital communion with God in Christ, and with fellow-members of His mystical Body, the Church. But there was a definite setting aside of the notions attached to the viaticum in the Mass (as mediaeval Catholicism was often called). These were (1) that consecration effected change in the elements themselves (transubstantiation); and (2) that the changed elements were 'offered' as a 'propitiatory sacrifice for living and dead' by the action of the celebrant, viewed as having a supernatural power as 'priest' in virtue of the sacrament of 'orders.' Thus the ritual of the Mass was generally felt by Protestants of all types to involve non-Scriptural, and therefore un-evangelic, ideas of the nature and means of the Christian salvation.

 Accordingly, after attempts to retain some of the forms and formulas still dear to many by use, the Reformation sought to simplify and sentiment, both in Lutheranism and in ANGLICANISM (here the contrast between the First and Second Prayer Books of Edward VI. is most significant), the ritual effects of the new conscience about making NT teaching and precedent sovereign at any cost were accepted in all Protestant communions. The Holy Communion of the Lord's Table was displaced the Mass and its distinctive worship.

The retention of old forms for the expression of the new type of faith was pushed to the farthest point of compromise in the Elizabethan Prayer Book, particularly in its juxtaposition of the formulas of administration characteristic of each of the two
the active participation of the whole congregation, with a faith fully conscious of its proper objects of adoration, is vernacular singing, whether of psalms or of other forms of devotion. Here a mode of worship which in medieval Catholicism had been confined to the upper classes, and in which these and other forms were to be taken. See Article xxiii, in particular.

Here the experimental cast of the new Anglican form of administration, framed in 1552, is noteworthy, as well as the declaratory form of the words of absolution. Further the preaching of the Word now held a central place, if not the central one, in the whole scheme of Protestant worship. This brings us to the chief difference between Catholic and Protestant worship, viz. their respective emphasis on Word and Sacrament. For Catholicism, with its notion of grace as secretly infused participation in the divine nature, particularly as embodied in Christ's flesh and blood, emphasis falls on the sacrament of the Mass. For Protestantism, which conceives grace as the working of the Holy Spirit mediated primarily through the Word or uttered mind and will of God—the proper object of faith—it falls rather on preaching (q.v.); it is the means of grace which conditions the efficacy of all others, and prompts the worshiper that faith is helped by them to render to God. Even as regards the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, its Protestant form places the rite in a setting of the Word, partly by appropriate Scripture reading, partly by the communion address usual in non-Episcopal communions. Through the latter it is brought in idea within the scope of the 'prophetic' ministry of the Word, to which belongs also the prayer of thanksgiving where there is no fixed liturgy but it is left, as at the beginning, to the prophet 'to give thanks as much as he will.'

The Holy Communion being in fact, like other sacraments, 'a visible word' (to use Augustine's phrase), it speaks to the heart by the inward working of the Holy Spirit—the real agent in all grace, and especially in that faith of which other forms of grace are modes, whether mystically, by direct personal appeal through its symbolization, or by reflective unfolding of its meaning by ministry of the Word.

Protestantism, besides its emphasis on Word rather than Sacrament as means of communion with God, and in keeping with its idea of salvation by faith and not by deeds of 'merit' (rendered possible by sacramental grace), regards worship not as a sacrifice to a voluntary God, but rather in the light of realized fellowship with God through Christ, as of children with a father.

In worship God's perfections, especially His goodness, are simply answered by the homage of the heart, in prayer, and by the direct reverence, and increasing conformity of man's will and personality to the divine character is sought after. The genius of Protestant religion, then, being to emphasize the filial consciousness, as making 'all things new' in man's outlook on life, all life becomes in idea a prolonged act of worship, because of filial trust and loyalty. Hence the line between such general worship 'in spirit and in truth,' and special acts of worship or cultus, whether private or corporate, is less marked than on the Catholic view—in virtue largely of the latter's sacerdotal and sacramental conception of the Church and its authoritative rites. Docile performance of the divinely appointed forms of cultus, in implicit reliance on Church authority, apart from personal consciousness of their effects in edification, is on the latter view 'ritualisms' and will have its reward in divine blessing.

Another feature characteristic of the Protestant form of worship, one expressive of its concern for

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1 Cf. Didsche, s. 81.
2 The home of the 'Lollards' was personal rather than in public worship, but illustrates the tendency of fresh personal religion to break into song.
(b) 'Reformed' or Calvinist worship.—The germ of this type is seen already in Zwingli (see), who made the Protestant emphasis on the Word of the gospel rather than its Sacraments determine the order and forms of public worship; such worship, too, was to him only a special mode of the worship of the whole Christian life, and here 'obedience is better than sacrifice' or any formal act of worship. Simplicity, then, in cultus was his practical rule and the essential features of the spiritual ministry, conceived as a 'prophetic' and expository ministry for adapting and applying, through personal appeal to the conscience and reason, the gospel in all its range to the worshippers. The service, failing at the point to which the protestant, as he was called, was closest in principle, was only by no means or convention in changing times and places.

In keeping with these principles, Calvin insisted on the value of congregational singing, as helping the soul to rise into the atmosphere of worship; but he limited the contents of sacred song to the inspired Scriptural models, the Psalter in particular, adapted only verbally to musical melody. Prayer, by the same means, in order to be real and close to personal life as possible, both for the minister and for the people, should include prophetic or unprescribed prayer (analogous to the preaching of the Word), as in the primitive Church, and thereby make possible to all the exalting and expressing their co-operation in both by the Amen. The preaching of the Word became a central part of public worship on the Lord's Day, while once a month, also, it seemed to the intention of Calvin of its sacredness and preparation of soul by self-examination (1 Co 11[3]) the sacrament of the Lord's Supper was added. Before it a confession of faith was made, in the Apocalypse, Creed, at first sung by the people (in 1545 ed. of La Forme des prières, etc.), later as recited by the minister. The simplicity and ceremonial barrenness of Calvin's order of worship, deliberately based as it was on Scripture, and with its Hebraic forms was at last made up for by the new realism of the vernacular as used in worship and the new warmth of congregational singing.

In the sphere of private devotion—which dispensed in the main with fixed forms of prayer (save over food)—fasting, for chastening of soul but not as a 'meritorious' work, was practised both by Calvinists and especially by those denominations of unformed religion) and at times chosen for personal reasons. The Church Year was set aside, as lacking Scriptural warrant and as having superstitious associations (here Luther's different attitude determined the more conservative practice of Lutheranism as to Church festivals, also as to the crucifix, images, and pictures as devotional aids). The Calvinistic type, with minor variations, came to prevail not only in Switzerland and France but also in parts of Germany, in Holland, in Scotland, and in England among the Church of England's Non-conformist bodies, both Presbyterians and Congregational (including Baptists), while it contributed not a little to the ethos and forms of the Church of England as established by law. Before, however,币a complete break with English Christianity, as a specially rich in varieties of Church life and worship, reference must be made to the non-established or minority type of worship as represented on the Continent.

(c) Independent or 'Anabaptist' worship.—From the nature of the case, the worship of these proscribed groups of radical reformers is hard to describe save in general terms. As based on Scripture, read with strong emphasis on the illumination of the individual believer, it was very simple in form and spontaneous in method, having affinity with and aiming at reproducing the Spiritualism promulgated in the public worship of the Pauline Epistles, at which official religion everywhere looked askance. Free prayer, personal witnessing to God's working in religious experience, 'prophetic' exposition of the Bible,—in fact the features which marked the early 'Quakers' in England—were its chief characteristics. But, unlike the Quakers, the Continental Anabaptists practised both sacraments, in their own simple way and sense, and (so far as persecution allowed) the singing of praise to God in hymns expressive of their new-found and often deep religious feeling. Among them Luther's principle of the freedom of the Christian man, along with the love of the brethren, led to a thoroughgoing exercise of 'the priesthood of all believers', on the lines of the autonomy of the local group or church—to the great scandal of all legally regulated types of State Church in the various lands—much as was the case later with the 'Separatists' under Elizabeth's system of uniformity in worship in England.

(d) Anglicanism.—While the Elizabethan settlement, no less than Lutheranism, banished medieval forms savouring of Roman doctrine, especially as to the Mass (not only transubstantiation but also consubstantiation was set aside), there was not the same well-grounded reason for the older associations of the ritual retained by the conservative and comprehensive policy of the Crown and its advisers that there was in Luther's own influence in Lutheranism. There was besides the extra influence in the same direction of the retention in the one case, and not in the other, of the Catholic order of the episcopate, and that in its medieval form. Accordingly, although the type and forms of worship in the Elizabethan Prayer Book were fundamentally Protestant rather than Catholic (in the opinion of a 'central' Churchman like Jewel, as of Calvin and other 'Reformed' rather than Lutheran Protestants), yet there were in it, as in Luther's Church order of worship, features proper to the standpoint and tone of 'Catholic' rather than 'Evangelical' religion, which were dropped by the types of Protestantism most careful to conform everything to the NT model and ethos.

Among such features was the Breviary, which, though it marks a great advance on the medieval and 'Reformist' (even perhaps Cranmer's greatest liturgical triumph,) yet falls decidedly below the full life type of consciousness. This was partly due to its origin, and partly to its long association with the Prayer Book at all, but in 1544 for use in a special season of

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1 See art. ANABAPTISM.
2 See below, and cf. C. Burges, The Early English Dissenters.
3 See P. Drews, as above.
4 See 1Co 11[3]; art. PRAYER, BOOK OF COMMON.
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public cults (like the earliest Western litaneis), was the communion of obedience for the religious service. But the Western cultus of the 15th century. 1

On the whole, the Puritans were the most objectionable of the Prayer Book sects. The idea of communion was one of the Puritan peculiarities which remains to this day. The Puritans meant by communion. In such worship a definite Congregational basis, whether their baptismal practice was the practice of infant baptism, not of Anabaptism (q.v.), two highlly primitive features were recovered, namely, the intimate union in idea of Christ's worship and Christian walk, and the practice assigned to the personal graces of the Spirit, in sitting each particular church for corporate fellowship in both spheres of its life of union with God in Christ. These were connected with the Separatist, but also with the Church of England, and the Puritanism by a godly discipline meant to ensure a reasonable loyalty in life and worship. When Congregational ideals and forms of worship had lost something of their original reality, they were more than revived in the Society of Friends (q.v.), with its characteristic emphasis on 'the inner light' and its reliance on the promptings of the Spirit of God, alike in life and in corporate worship. Here new traits were fellowship in silent adoration and meditation, waiting for the 'moving of the Spirit,' and complete spontaneity of utterance for mutual edification, whether in the reading or quoting of Scripture, or in the speaking of a more direct message of the Spirit or 'inner light.' Negatively Quakerism dispensed with sacraments and even singing in worship. But the latter received an important extension among Nonconformists at large (with whom adherence to the psalms in one form or another had been stricter than among Anglicans) early in the next century, through the hymns of Isaac Watts, written specially for public worship.

of the Spirit, and a third defence of the worship of the Puritans (q.v.) went further even than their foreign friends, who themselves lived under the Presbyterian system, thought necessary. When repressed by the Crown, using the bishops as its agents, many of the Puritans, like Cartwright and Travers, worked for a Presbyterian church polity, and issued in 1572 an 'Admonition to Parliament' to this effect. Their objections to the rigid and exclusive use of fixed forms of prayer in public worship, their emphasis on 'preaching' of the Word, as distinct from mere fixed Scripture lectures (with or without printed homilies), and their rejection of the traditional fasts and festivals of the Church Year, called forth from Richard Hooker (q.v.), a 'central' Anglican of the end of Elizabeth's reign, as Jewell had been in its earlier half, a classic defence of the worship of the Established Church. Hooker's views, however, on the basis of essential agreement between the Reformed Churches, including the Anglican, as 'Sacramentarian,' not papal or Lutheranism, in their view of the Lord's Supper. This stand in contrast to that of the Protestants in the next century who went to the other extreme from the Puritan tendency in their views of Prayer Book worship, Laud and the High Church or Catholicizing divines often styled 'Caroline.'

Congregationalism.—But, while the Puritans as a body remained inside the National Church, until after the Act of Uniformity in 1662, a minority among them gave up, under Elizabeth's cloyve, of Todd's in its shape of the Puritan and offices in the Head of the Church, which is Christ,' (2) 'communion of the grace and offices in the Body, which is the Church of Christ,' and (3) 'using the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, the seal of this sacrament.' 1

See art. LUTHER, H. S. 2

Lit. art. PROTESTATION. 3

1 See art. LUTHER, H. S. 2 Lit. art. PROTESTATION. 3

1 See art. BROWNISM, CONGREGATIONALISM.

2 In the Prayer Book by confirmation also, though it fell into wide disuse, Hooker, 'Facts and Fall. Pat. vol. iv. ch. 2.) The Reformed Church treated this 'rite or ceremony' (Hocker) as a sacrament, and the worship of Christ's own authority. Not all Churchmen allowed it even as a 'profitable ceremony.' Lutheranism, after a period of disuse, like that in England, restored it in a simpler form as a result of Pietism (see art. SACRAMENTS [Lutheran]).
WORSHIP (Ecclesiastical).—I. The Daily Temple Liturgy. —I. Its Helopolitan Origin.—A striking feature of Egyptian temple worship was the fact that the same daily liturgy was celebrated on behalf of every god and goddess throughout the length and breadth of the land.

The reason for this uniformity, which seems to have prevailed as far back as the Old Kingdom, is as follows. The daily temple liturgy, as we know it, seems to be derived from that celebrated on behalf of the sun-god at Heliopolis, which city exercised in early times a very powerful religious and political influence. To enhance their prestige, therefore, a number of local gods were identified by their priests with the sun-god, of whom the king was regarded as the son. The king was regarded as the son of the gods identified with the sun-god. As pointed out in the art. PRIEST, PRIESTHOOD (Egyptian), II, 2, this idea of sonship would have strengthened the ruler of Egypt or the king and king with all divinities, whether male or female. The king was likewise high-priest of the sun-god, and he became high-priest of all the local divinities of Egypt by the same process as that by which he came to be regarded as the son. The local high-

1 Printed Epistle of the Society of Friends in 1855.
WORSHIP (Egyptian)

priesthoods also, of course, developed upon the Pharaoh as representative of the centralized government. In the Egyptian religious functions, which once belonged to the local chiefs, being united in him. Accordingly, as their son and high-priest, the Pharaoh, or his priestly deputy, celebrated the same liturgy on behalf of the local deity, granting the Hebrews an additional religious experience; furthermore, in the temple structures themselves and the views which the Egyptians entertained about them.

(c) Egyptian temples, certainly in early times and often later, looked east, so that the rising sun might light up their dark interiors. Thus in an inscription on the shrine found by Griffith at El-Arish we read that 'the face of this temple (i.e. of the god) is towards the east wherein Re' rises'. The Egyptians, indeed, pictured to themselves the sun-god, before all other divinities, as dwelling in every temple, which they accordingly regarded as a miniature heaven. In texts of the Ptolemaic age, though the idea is probably far older, the two pyro-temple towers are equated with the two sisters Isis and Nephtys, who, according to one conception, lifted up the sun-god into the sky every morning. The sanctuary or nais, in which the cultus-image was kept, was not infrequently designated 'heaven' or 'the horizon', and a title often borne by the high-priest of the temple of Thoth at Sais. ('Griffith, doors of heaven in Eteoc-Places (Karnak.)')

In historical times, especially, when the Egyptian sun-temple, to have possessed its House of the Morning (prae-duct), in which the Pharaoh underwent lustration before celebrating the daily Liturgy.

(d) The sacred pool for purification, a feature of all temples, was associated with the presiding deity of the temple but with the sun-god.

(e) The obelisk which generally stood in front of the pyzon was invested with the power of the sun-god.

(f) The boat-shrine was also probably in the first instance a feature of the sacred pool.

(g) The practice of offering to a divinity the figure of Me'tet, righteousness personified, in the daily temple liturgy must have grown up at Helopolis; the formula recited at the presentation of the figure is clearly of solar origin.

(h) The historical priesthood also displays marks of Heliopolitan influence. The four watches (choo), or phylae, of priests bear the names of the four quarters of a ship, which names were also assigned to the four watches into which the crew of the sun-god's heavenly ship were divided, and it was evidently the sun-god's priests who were first divided into four watches bearing these names, the sun-god being supposed to traverse the sky in a ship and his priests being therefore regarded as his crew. Even the general term for a priest, sekh, may be, for Heliopolis, weberb 'mean, pure person', and purity is a very important element in the priesthood.

(i) In many temples the high-priestess was identified with Hathor, the wife of the Heliopolitan sun-god, and in this capacity, in front of the god of the temple in which she was high-priestess was dedicated.

(j) In the temple of Serapis-Tambaksheh: musician-priest 15 who were attached to every Egyptian temple, and the human concubines, who were assigned to several divinities, seem also originally to have been Heliopolitan institutions.


1 L. Bocherat, ZA xxviii. [1900] 12, note 4.


4 W. Spiegelberg, ZA III. 1917 99.


9 Blackman, PSBA xi. [1915] 88, with note 97.


12 Blackman, Journ. of the Manchester Egyp. and Oriental Society, 1875-19, pp. 49, 52.

13 See art. Ritiro-Precepts (Egyptian), 6.


18 See art. Priests, Priesthood (Egyptian), VIII. 1; Purification (Egyptian), V. 4; Blackman, Journ. Egyp. Arch. v. 154.

19 Art. Priest, Priesthood (Egyptian), VIII. 3 (d).

20 RTF xlii.

Pharaoh, to undergo purification before entering the temple to officiate.

The symbolism of the daily temple liturgy to the Pharaoh's ceremonial toilet.—A large part of the daily temple liturgy consists of a series of toilet episodes and closely resembles the ceremonial toilet of the Pharaoh in the House of the Morning. The episode is based on the fact that both are

based upon the same performance, the supposed daily matutinal lustration of the sun-god—the cultus-image of the sun-god undergoing lustration every day in the temple of sun-temples. The toilet, as the god himself was conceived of as doing in the horizon. That the other toilet episodes of the rite of the House of the Morning, viz., robing, anointing, crowning, etc., had their equivalents in the daily temple liturgy is due to the sun-god being regarded as a king.

5. The three divisions of the daily temple liturgy.—There are three main divisions of the daily temple liturgy: (1) a series of episodes preliminary to the performance of the divinity's toilet, (2) the actual toilet, and (3) the presentation of food- and drink-offerings.

The liturgy of the toilet is the first two divisions of the liturgy. The one, an illustrated edition, is carved on the walls of the chapels of Horâsēb, Isis, Osiris-Onnophris, Anubis, Anum, and Ptah, in the temple of Sethos I. at Abidos. It consists of a series of reliefs representing the liturgy being performed, each relief being accompanied by text inscribed by the priest while the particular episode depicted was being enacted. The other edition, written for the temple of Anuinre of Karnak, is from a manuscript in the Egyptian Museum no. 3025 of the British Museum and dates from the XXllth dynasty.

The Abyssinian and Karnak liturgies are merely different editions of the same portions of the service-book. The form in which the toilet episodes are practically identical in both cases, and, when the corresponding episodes of one are quoted as those of the other edition, the accompanying formula are often either the same or very similar in common.

Both these editions are incomplete, but combined they do supply us with a very adequate representation of the pre-toilet and toilet episodes of the daily liturgy in an Egyptian temple (originally the sun-temple), when the ceremonial was carried out.

The third division of the liturgy can be fairly satisfactorily reconstructed from numerous representations and formula occurring among the relics which decorate the walls of the various temples.

There are numerous indications that the temple service-book assumed the form in which we possess it, a very early date, probably not later than the Old Kingdom.

(1) The pre-toilet episodes.—Having undergone purification in the water of the sacred pool or tank, the priest entered the temple, receiving a robe as did the Pharaoh. His first act after entering was to lay it upon a brazier or altar (of bronze, and in the form of an outstretched arm with the hand open palm upwards). Taking hold of the rest of the censer, the little brazier in which the incense was burned, he fixed it in its place, namely in the open hand at the end of the arm. Having filled the brazier with burning charcoal from the fire he had previously kindled, he set incense thereon, and, holding the smoking censer in one hand, proceeded to the sanctuary, the double doors of which were bolted and the bolts secured with a clay seal. The bolts seem often to have been tied with a strip of papyrus to which the clay seal was attached. The priest broke the seal, drew back the bolts, and opened the doors of the sanctuary, whereupon the sacred boat was disclosed with the cultus-image contained therein.

After the unfastening of the seal, and presumably the opening of the doors, the priest sometimes burned incense in honour of the uraeus goddess. On holding the image, the priest made a profound obeisance, kissing the ground prone, as it was said, or placing himself upon the belly stretched out flat. Then, standing or kneeling, he chanted first a hymn in honour of the divinity—lifting up in his hands as far as he could the attitude of worship, or else burning incense—and after that a second hymn in honour of Re, the female counterpart of the sun-god and identified with Hathor. The priest next offered the image sweetened honey, or a figure of the goddess Mâet, and then burned more incense. Having swept the floor of the sanctuary with a cloth, he was now ready to 'lay his hands upon the god,' i.e. take the image out of the boat or naos in order to perform its toilet.

(2) The toilet.—The priest's first act after 'laying hands upon the god was apparently to divest himself of the cult robe and crown and other garments. Having thus freed the image from the robe, the priest proceeded to sprinkle it with water, first from four ointment-vessels, or else from water from one so-called 'serpent'-vessel. He then ceased the image again, cleansed it with incense, he proceeded to sprinkle it with water, first from four ointment-vessels, or else from water from one so-called 'serpent'-vessel. He then ceased the image again, cleansed it with incense, then proceeded to sprinkle it with water, first from four ointment-vessels, or else from water from one so-called 'serpent'-vessel. He then ceased the image again, cleansed it with incense, then proceeded to sprinkle it with water, first from four ointment-vessels, or else from water from one so-called 'serpent'-vessel. He then ceased the image again, cleansed it with incense, then proceeded to sprinkle it with water, first from four ointment-vessels, or else from water from one so-called 'serpent'-vessel. He then ceased the image again, cleansed it with incense, then proceeded to sprinkle it with water, first from four ointment-vessels, or else from water from one so-called 'serpent'-vessel. He then ceased the image again, cleansed it with incense, then proceeded to sprinkle it with water, first from four ointment-vessels, or else from water from one so-called 'serpent'-vessel. He then ceased the image again, cleansed it with incense, then proceeded to sprinkle it with water, first from four ointment-vessels, or else from water from one so-called 'serpent'-vessel. He then ceased the image again, cleansed it with incense.

(3) The presentation of food- and drink-offerings.—The procedure observed at the presentation of food- and drink-offerings in the temple liturgy seems to have been practically identical with that observed at the corresponding toilet-ceremony of the daily liturgy. This is indicated among other things by the fact that in the temple reliefs depicting a divinity being fed there is sometimes inserted above the altar or offering-table, and between the divinity and the chief officiant, a so-called list of offerings identical to all intents and purposes with the lists occurring in the tomb reliefs and paintings. This is only to be expected, since every divinity was regarded for cult-purposes as an Osiris.

Before the offerings could be laid upon it, the altar or altar had to be purified. The act of placing the offerings on the altar or table, or else pouring them down on mats spread upon the ground, was variously
termed ‘setting out the repast upon the altar,’ ‘setting down the divine offering,’ ‘setting down the repast.’ While thus engaged the officiant either stood or knelt.

In the god’s hand being laid before him, two closely connected ceremonies were performed, apparently in immediate succession, the one being variously designated ‘presenting the repast,’ ‘presenting the divine offering,’ ‘presenting the performance of the incense’ (or ‘the incense’), ‘the libation,’ ‘the libation in the presence of the divinity,’ ‘the libation offered to the divinity,’ and ‘performing the presentation to, causing to be produced a great obligation for, NK,’ and the other being termed ‘bringing the god to his repast.’

At the former ceremony the officiant extended his right arm and bent the hand upwards in the prescribed manner and pronounced the formula beginning with the words ‘an offering which the king gives.’ When the king is depicted performing this ceremony, he is often shown holding a mace and staff in his left hand. The recitation of the formula ‘An offering which the king gives, etc.’ was associated with, and often, on the analogy of the funerary liturgy, was doubtless preceded by, the burning of incense and the pouring out of a libation of water. At the ceremony of bringing the god to his repast rested a formula calling (elōt) upon the god to come to his bread, beer, roast flesh, etc.

Various attitudes might be adopted by the officiant, whether king or priest, while he pronounced the summons. He might stand with right arm and hand extended in the prescribed manner, with left hand hanging at his side, or he might kneel with both hands, palms downwards, held above or beside the knees. Again he might kneel with left hand held in the attitude just mentioned or holding a censer, while with his right hand and arm he made the ritual gesture.

The act of consecration, by which each item of food and drink was finally made over to the god, was termed ‘stretching out the arm four times.’ According to the temple reliefs, it was performed in the following manner. The king, standing before what was to be offered, stretched out over or towards it four times the so-called ἑραπτων, which he grasped in his right hand; in his left hand he held staff and mace, or else this hand hung at his side holding the symbol of life.

In the series of temple reliefs depicting the god being fed is one representing the king in the act of ‘elevating’ (f) a tray of offerings ‘before the face of the divinity.’ Does this scene represent one species of the mode in which the sacred rites were conducted? i.e., after the pronouncement of ‘An offering which the king gives, etc.’ was a specimen of the offering elevated in the presence of the cultus-image? Moreover the series of the scene is a summarization of a series of elevations; for doubtless, as in the funerary liturgy, each particular item of food mentioned in the list of food- and drink-offerings was elevated at its presentation to the accompaniment of a special formula. In the funerary liturgy, according to Utterances 108-171 of the Pyramid Texts, each item was elevated four times.

In addition to the meal laid out before the image of the principal divinity in the sanctuary and before other deities in their temples, offerings were also laid, of course, upon the great altar in the forecourt. If the procedure in the temple of the Atón at El-Ämarra prevailed also in other Egyptian temples, it was upon this altar that the Pharaoh mostly laid his oblations.

(4) The removal of the footprints.—The final act of the chief officiant before leaving the sanctuary, shutting the doors, and affixing the clay seal to the bolts, was to obliterate all traces of his own and his assistant’s footprints. This he did by sweeping the floor with a cloth or with a besom made of twigs. In the pyramid temple, the last ceremony in the daily temple liturgy. Inscriptions and a few quite exceptionally detailed reliefs, however, show that in addition to the celebrant a number of other officiants participated in all these ceremonies of the ritual. The Pharaoh was no doubt particularly elaborate when the Pharaoh himself was celebrant.

(1) A scene in the temple of Luxor depicts in some detail the presentation of the cloths used for Amun’s ceremonial toles. After the burning of incense, the episode immediately preceding the arraying of the image in the royal head-cloth (amout), there enters the sanctuary a long procession of priests bearing chests containing the cloths in question, with members of the higher class of the priesthood, the fathers of the god, walking at their head. Some of the latter carry smoking censers and libations or lustration-vessels, while others clap their hands and sing, one of them rattling a sistrom. Bringing up the rear of the procession is the king, with ‘the god’s adorer, the god’s hand’ (the hieroglyphics for ‘Amun’) walking beside him. The king holds out the ἑραπτων and is said to be extending the arm four times, as in consecrating the offering, and this bears upon the libation at the scene also forms part of the procession, for between him and the high-priestess are the words ‘bringing clothing.’ We have here, pictorially conceived in stone, what were probably actual actions, namely the procession of priests, accompanied by the king and high-priestess, conveying the cloths to the sanctu- ary, and the consecration of that clothing by the king assisted by the high-priestess, who either sang a hymn or chanted some formula.

(2) A number of jars of unguent, which another Luxor altar represents the king as consecrating, have been solemnly brought in procession by ten priests.

(3) Another relief in the same temple shows a procession of twenty-eight priests bearing a number of ewers of water, to be used for such purposes as the washing of the altar, the pouring out of the libation before the bringing of the food-offerings, and for various drink-offerings.

At the end of the procession walks the king. The theory of the ritual demanded that the king should wash the water himself, come next 1 with it into the sanctuary, as he is depicted doing in the adjacent temple of Luxor.

2 See below, IV. (5).
II. PRIVATE WORSHIP.—We know very little about private worship. The individual citizen, we are told, refrained from what his local god hated, avoided his wrath by joining in the celebration of his festivals, and cured for the local sacred animals. In some houses, Mery's贝壳ite's account of the excavations at Abydos is to be trusted, the innermost room served as a private chapel, in which was kept the image of a divinity, offering being made to it on a stone offering-table placed before it. Here, Erman supposes, the householder made his daily adoration. A man would erect a shrine to Ernetet, the harvest-goddess, in the yard of his granary, or near his wine-press, or he might, it would seem, set aside for his god a portion of his meal, placing it on an offering-stone prepared for that purpose. To prosper his work the scribe, before he began to write, poured out from his water-bowl a libation to Imhotep, the patron-divinity of scribes. The ordinary citizen might be seen praying outside the great pylon of a temple, after having, perhaps, placed a gift for the god on an offering-table set up there to receive the contributions of humble folk. The middle Kingdom citizens of Asyut offered the first-fruits of the harvest to their local god Upwawet. Theban landowners, or officials responsible for the harvest on temple or crown property, and doubtless the ordinary people as well, made offering to Aman and the harvest-goddess Ernetet on the twenty-seventh day of the fourth month of Pruya, i.e. the first day of the harvest festival. Also on the last day of that festival, the first day of the first month of Shomn, the day the corn was winnowed, offering was made to Ernetet. On the last day of the winnowers, ere they began their work, set up on the edge of the threshing-floor a rude figure of a harvest-divinity, apparently made out of a bundle of corn furnished with mud hands which grasp ears of corn. Before it they laid an offering consisting of dishes of food and a pot of water or beer. On the analogy of harvest practices in other lands, we may not suppose that this 'divinity' is the first or last shed, the embodiment of the corn-spirit.

III. UNUSUAL POPULAR CONCEPTIONS OF WORSHIP.—Remarkable ideas about worship and man's relation to the gods were current among the middle and lower classes during the latter part of the New Kingdom; ideas which do not seem to have existed hitherto among the Egyptians and are not met with again till Christian times.

"To the sanctuary of God," we are told, "clamour is absent. Pray to him with a loving heart whose words are all hidden; so will be granted thy request, bear what thou sayest, and accept thine offering." Similarly a hymn to Thoth of this date likens that god to a well in the desert which is "closed for those who

2. ib.
8. Gardiner, ZA xl. (1902-03) 146.
11. N. de G. Davies, The Tomb of Nebhekt at Thebes, New York, 1917, p. 64.
12. ib.
13. ib. pl. xxiii. p. 621.
14. For the purification of the lay-folk before entering a temple see art. PURIFICATION (Egyptian), V. 3. For the participation of the populace in the theatrical performance of these scenes, see Suppl., p. 195, elsewhere, illustrating the death, burial, and resurrection of Osiris, see J. A. Budge, Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt, New York and London, 1912, pp. 257-580.
IV. THE ATON-CULT OF KING AMENOPHIS IV. (ÓKHNAÔNÒN).—The liturgy celebrated in the temple or temples 2 erected by the heretic king ÔKhnaôn at Êl-Êmarna differs in so many ways from the temple liturgy of the opening and succeeding periods that it must receive separate treatment. For the beliefs responsible for these differences see Erman, Handbook, p. 61 ff.; Breasted, Development of Religion and Thought, pp. 319-345.

1. The daily liturgy in the temple of the Aton.—There was no cultus-image of the Aton, and so all the toilet and pre-toilet ceremonies of the old temple liturgy were done away with. The worship of the Aton consisted mainly in the singing of hymns and presentation of food- and drink-offerings, of perfumes and flowers. The ritual acts, however, accompanying the presentation of these offerings were those of the old worship, the only difference visible in the representations of the various ceremonies being that the queen is shown acting in exactly the same capacity as the king.

As in the case of the old temple liturgy, the presentation of food- and drink-offerings was closely associated with the burning of incense and the pouring out of libations, and the offerings were consequently depicted by the getting outside of the hŋh-baton. 3 The practice of elevating trays of offerings was also continued. 4 As there was no cultus-image to anoint, unguent was held up to the Aton in alabaster jars and then placed on the altar. 5 The offering of unguent was evidently preceded by the burning of incense. 6

It is possible that the offering of flowers was a more important feature in the Aton cult than in the worship of the old Egyptian divinities, though they are constantly depicted as receiving a bouquet from the Pharaoh, while their heaped-up food-offerings were regularly surmounted by a bunch of flowers. 7

The Êl-Êmarna relics permit us to reconstruct to some extent the sequence of episodes in the liturgy celebrated in the larger or outer temple.

(i.) When the king and queen came to this temple, their first act, according to a scene in the tomb-chapel of the high-priest Merîrë, 8 was to make each an offering at offering-stands set up in front of their images, the burning of incense and the pouring out of a libation—the attendant high-priest is depicted bowing low and holding the censer and vase that have just been used for that purpose—the king and queen consecrated their gifts by extending over them the hŋh-baton. During this performance the royal daughters rattled their sistra, and the attendant courtiers stood at a respectful distance bowing low with hands on knees.

(ii.) Having passed through the pylon, the king and queen, as we learn from a relief in the tomb-chapel of Panehesi, 9 proceeded to mount the steps to the high altar in the first court. At this altar a great oblation of joints of meat, poultry, vege-

WORSHIP (Egyptian) 781

isateur. The relief in question depicts the royal officiants in the act of scattering incense into these pans. One of their daughters stood in the rear and holds out two bowels of incense to her parents, and the other two daughters rattle sistra. In front of the altar, facing the king and making profound bows to the Aton, is the high-priest and the 'chiefservitor of Aton.' The former, and probably the latter also, holds a bouquet of flowers—perhaps for the king to present after he has burned incense. Behind these two priests are four other priests in the same respectful attitude, each holding a round vessel containing liquid of some kind. Beside these again are four chanters, also bowing low and accompanying their singing with hand-clapping. The rest of the royal retinue remains in the entrance or outer court, or else altogether outside the temple precincts.

(iii.) While the king and queen were thus officiating at the high altar, priests placed offerings upon the altars in the outer court. 1 A relief in the tomb-chapel of Ahmûsë 2 also shows priests attending to the offering-tables, in this case in the outer court of the smaller temple, just before the arrival of the royal party.

(iv.) A visit of ÔKhnaôn to the temple was the occasion for the sacrifice of numerous oxen. The victims, bejeweled and garlanded, were led straight to the slaughter-house, 3 or else to the most outlying cortège as it drew up at the temple-entrance. 4

2. The functions of musicians in the Aton-cult.

(a) Sistrum-players.—While the king and queen burned incense, poured out libation, presented unguent, flowers, food- and drink-offerings, raised their hands in adoration before the altar, or performed the ceremony of consecration with outer vessels, the two sistra of the royal girls rattled their sistra. 5

(b) Temple choir.—A body of blind vocalists accompanied by a blind harpist and sometimes by a lute-player, also blind, performed in the outer court or enclosure of the smaller temple. 6 An inscription in the tomb-chapel of Merîrë 7 speaks of 'the singers and musicians . . . in the court of the House of the Benben . . . in Ikhtaton.' The choir evidently sang and played off and on during the whole day, for they are depicted thus engaged both during and outside of the performance of the liturgy. 8

(c) Male chanters.—Four chanters also figured in the Aton-worship. They are twice depicted singing and clapping their hands while the king and queen burn incense in the pans placed on the top of the food-offerings, in the one case in the great court of the larger temple, and in the other apparently in the outer court of the smaller temple, where they are seen in close proximity to the blind vocalists and harpist who simultaneously make music. 9 They also ran in front of the royal procession to the temple, 10 thus, perhaps, performing the same functions as the lector of the old religion, who walked in front of the Pharaoh, when he went to the temple, and dispelled inimical powers by his recitations. 12

(d) Female musicians.—According to the relief in the tomb-chapel of Panehesi discussed above, among those of the royal retinue who remained outside the entrance to the enclosure or outer court of the larger temple, while the king and queen officiated at the high altar, were a number

1 Davies, ii. pl. xvi.
2 Davies, ii. pl. xxvii.
3 Davies, ii. pl. xvi.
4 ib. pl. xxvii.
5 Davies, ii. pl. xvi.
6 ib. pl. xvii., xvi., xxvii., iv. pl. xv., v. pl. xxvii.
7 Davies, ii. pl. xvi.
8 Davies, ii. pl. xxviii.
9 Davies, ii. pl. xxviii.
10 Davies, ii. pl. xxviii.
11 Davies, ii. pl. xxviii.
12 Piângis Stilet, i. 104; Schäfer, Urkunden, iii. 38.
of female musicians. These are depicted singing to the accompaniment of hand-clapping, waving of palm-branches, and the beating of their hairresses, or else clapping their hands in worship. These female musicians likewise greeted the king on his arrival at the temple. It was apparently also the same women who participated in the rejoicings at the decoration of the temple. It is to be noted that the female musicians are never shown performing inside the temple precincts.

3. Private worshippers in the temple of the Aton. The temple appears to have been customary for a subject, after he had been decorated by Okhnaton, to make a food- and drink-offering outside the pylons of the temple and to pray at the same time for the king’s life, prosperity, and health, and that the Aton would vouchsafe him for ever.

In the top register of a scene in Merir’s tomb-chapel depicting Okhnaton’s visit to the temple, two men wearing wigs, and carrying each a bouquet, lead along a bejewelled and garlanded cow and a calf. Accompanying them, and also carrying bouquets, is a man with a shaven head, i.e., a priest. Possibly the two laymen are offering these victims themselves on behalf of a royal victim, the priest being required in order that he might superintend the slaughter of the victims and make certain that they were pure. In the same scene, bottom register, lay-folk are carrying partridges, ducks, and geese, while four priests follow, two leading oxen and two carrying bouquets. Both victims and duck are quite possibly private offerings. Davies suggests, indeed, that the offerings placed on the altars in the outer or enclosing court of either temple were those of private worshippers. This would account for priests serving these altars before the arrival of the king, or while the royal party and chief priests were officiating at the high altar.

LITERATURE.—See the works cited in the text and footnotes.

WORSHIP (Greek).—I. DEFINITION, ETC.—Worship, in the widest sense, may be defined as the acknowledgment by man of his dependence on a power or powers beyond himself. And these powers, in whatever form they may be conceived, are believed by the worshipper to be more potent than himself; and, in whatever visible semblance or sign they are worshipped, they are imagined to be normally invisible.

At the outset of our study of Greek worship we assume it to be conceded that it is important to realize. The central meaning of worship as we conceive it is the endeavour after a higher and better life. Whether as individuals or on stated occasions with our fellow-men we perform an act of worship, while we do indeed render thanks for blessings received and pray for blessings to come, yet the paramount intention of our worship is that we may be reminded, amid the clash and din of things temporal and fleeting, of the things unseen and eternal, to attune our hearts and minds to higher ideals of life. And, while we consider it right and seemly to bring to God offerings of a temporal kind, to satisfy His sanctuary, to lay before Him tithes and firstfruits, and in His name to give our goods to feed the poor, yet we count it a better thing to bring the sacrifice of a contrite heart, which He will not despise.

Now, if we leave out of account some rare and sporadic utterances of the more advanced and enlightened thinkers and confine ourselves to the typical Greek conception of worship, we find that the motive and intention is of a wholly different kind. Man worships his god or gods not because he has any lively feeling of gratitude for blessings experienced, still less because he desires to live a better life, but because he has an overwhelming conviction of his dependence on his god or gods for all temporal blessings. H. Usener perhaps rather overstates this point of view, but in general it is true.

If our definition of worship is open to the objection that it would include magic, the defence must be that it is impossible to frame a definition of worship which would be at once sufficiently wide and yet exclude magic. The acts of worship and the acts of magic are in origin at least inseparable. If we so define worship as to distinguish it from magic, it will be done by a definition which makes the prime distinction between religion and magic to be that religion is social and promotes the good of the community, while magic is anti-social and tends to exalt the individual to the detriment of the community.

II. THE RELATION OF RITUAL TO RELIGION.—It used to be the fashion to regard the practices of religious practice as of later than the religious ideas of which they were the expression. The religious theory was regarded as primitive and essential; the religious ritual was regarded as the reasoned form in which the theory found expression. But modern investigation suggests that the reverse is the case. A festival which in historical times is definitely religious in character and is accompanied by a theory which professes to account for the various practices of the ritual, has in its turn been the source of an entirely secular character. The wide-spread practice of seasonal festivals, particularly those of mid-winter and of spring, can hardly be accounted for on any supposition that they were originally religious in character. Their origin is much more reasonably explained and their universality is much more easily understood if we regard them as having been at first purely secular, the natural reaction to the character of the season. The tribe meet at mid-winter and in spring to hold their festival with song and story. The character of the season will naturally influence the character of the festival. But, saved in so far as mere custom is religious in character, there is nothing religious in the celebration until a theory is evolved. When at mid-winter all nature is asleep—Erinnerungen can hardly mean anything else than the sleeping season—the true festival may be explained as intended to celebrate the passing of a god who is asleep or is slain. When in spring all nature awakes to life, the festival may be explained as the awakening of the resurrection of Zeus.
WORSHIP (Greek)

The god. But the ritual in its main outlines precedes the theory. Indeed it is only with the utmost difficulty that the theory will produce any improvement on the ritual. Many of the ritual usages are probably in their origin purely accidental. When on a memorable occasion something happens to be done in a particular way, the ritualist will find it in the same way again. The usage becomes stereotyped, and the theory will try to account for it; thenceforth it is held to be the only way that is valid and effective. Even if no convincing explanation is found in the theory, the ritual custom will be sufficient to perpetuate it. This ancestral custom is what the Greeks call ἥτατος νόμος. This νόμος (or νόμοι) is believed to be of immemorial antiquity, with all the superior sanction that attaches to the unwritten as opposed to the written law, and is held to regulate all the fundamental sanctities of life. The point of view is beautifully expressed in the words of Antigone: οἶδε ἄνθρωπον τούτον οἶμαι τὰ εἰκάτω τοῖς ἑαυτῷ ἱεροῖς ἔχωμεν δεῖ τὰ ἑαυτῷ ἱερά τὰς ὁμοίας ἐμοῖς τὰς ὁμοίας ἱεράς. But we have seen that the unwritten custom absolutely required with sanctity τὰ συνομπάτα καὶ ἁμάτον πάσα τὰς ἀρχαῖας λεγόμενοι. So the solemn supplication of Himilkas is carried out κατὰ τὸ πάταρον θεόν. 

II. OBJECTS OF WORSHIP.—We may conveniently divide the objects of worship into primitive or non-anthropomorphic and later or anthro- morphic.

A. NON-ANTHROPMORPHIC. The evidence for non-anthropomorphic worship cannot occupy much space in a brief sketch like the present, and there is less need to discuss it in detail because in general the lower strata of Greek religious ideas resemble those found in the earlier stages of development of other peoples or among primitive peoples of the present day. As among these, so among the Greeks we find traces of the worship of inanimate things and of animals. But before we glance at the evidence it is desirable that we should represent clearly to ourselves what exactly such worship means.

The ultimate root of religion is to be found in the instinctive sense of the mysterious, the uncanny. This sense is not equally strong in all men any more than all men are equally religious, and the things by which it is excited vary indefinitely with the individuality of the worshipper. In the street and under the garish sun all experience is immediate and commonplace. But if, for instance, one makes his way to some lonely glen high among the hills—‘per loca pastorum deserta atque otia dies’—then only the moor-fowl call and only the whaups are crying, then even the most commonplace feels an instinctive awe, a sense of mystery which he cannot express even to himself. This is what the Romans call 'religio loci.' The origin of the word religio is a matter of dispute to-day as it was among the Roman antiquaries themselves. But even through the perplexities of the Roman discussions there shines some perception of what we believe to be the right idea of the word, which corresponds very closely to ‘reflexion,’ अन्वेषण, the sense of something far more deeply interlaced, the ‘musing of a creature moving about in worlds not realized’—in a word, the sense of the uncanny. This sense may be awakened merely by the loathly, as, e.g., the toad, to which the rustic mind ascribes all manner of strange powers, or by the merely curious—e.g., the tree of fantastic shape. Objects which in whatever form have power to excite such emotions are regarded with awe. They must be approached with circumspection. They are not to be plucked from their context, they are taboo. Then when we find it said that a certain Greek tribe worship a particular animal or a particular object, often no more is meant than this. Their worship is predominantly fear. But there are higher mysteries than these; the mystery of death and birth, of growth and adolescence, of the regular recurrence of the seasons, of mother-love and self-sacrifice, of instincts which ‘aspire to a higher swifter realm beyond the transgression, yet they do not will that any should perish. They are givers of good things, if they are also givers of evil. Even if they ‘deal to men two evils for one good,’ only the foolish murmur. Good men loyally accept the conditions of mortality, turning the bright side out.

1. Holy places. Among non-anthropomorphic things to which sanctity, in the sense we have described, attaches we have first of all holy places. The Muckelstone Moor was felt by Hobbe Elliott to be ‘an unco bogilie bit.’ The same sort of feeling was perfectly familiar to the Greeks. A bush-clad hill in Arcadia was fabled to be the place where Rhea gave birth to Zeus:

'In Parnassus (Arcadia) it was that Rhea bare thee, where a hill sheltered with thickened brush. Hence is the place holy and no four-footed thing that hath need of Edith sprout in any woman approacheth thereto, but the Apidanians call it the primal childbed of Rhea.'

As a typical case we have the cave sanctuaries all over Crete, particularly those on Mount Ida and Mount Dictaeum associated with the worship of the Cretan Zeus.

2. Holy animals. The same kind of sanctity attached to various animals in different localities: storks and ants in Thessaly; vespas in Thebes; especially the snake—e.g., in connexion with Asklepios, Sopilos, Cychreus. The same is the story on the aeropoli at Athens which every month received honey-cakes. Other familiar cases are the mice in the temple of Apollo Smintheus, the owl of Athene, etc.

3. Holy trees. Among products of the cult of living trees we have the familiar idea of the tree-nymphs under their various names—Dryads, Hamadryads, Melia, etc.—who live in the life and die with the death of the holy tree. Where myth gives an etiological legend to explain just why a tree is sacred, we may quite confidently neglect the legend and infer that the holiness attached to the tree before myth gave the alleged reason. Thus the Delian palm was sacred. Myth gave the reason that this was the palm which supported Leto at the birth of Apollo. So the very custom of the rule of Tempe, from which crowns were made for the victor at the Pythian games, derived its sanctity, according to myth, from the purification of Apollo at Tempe after the birth of Apollo. Similarly the story of all the wild strawberry-tree at Tanagra was held sacred for the alleged reason that Hermes had been reared under it.
In these and in numberless other cases we must recognize now that the holiness is a much earlier thing than the myth—which merely attempts to explain an existent fact.

4. Holy stones.—Stones to which a special sanctity attaches form one of the most common features of early legend everywhere. Greece is no exception.

Thus Phœnicians, king of the Ainianes, fought a duel with Hyperocheus, king of the Iphacinians, for their land and guilefully slew him by hurling to the ground a stone, which was thenceforward regarded as the Ainianes as holy.

There are a number of references in Pausanias to undressed stones, ἱλικια, stones, which were the object of veneration.

Thus in vii. 22. 3 he tells us that at Pharos in Achaea certain square stones (τετράγωνα λίθοι), about thirty in number, were worshipped by the people of Pharos, who applied to each of them the name of a god: and he adds an important remark: τά δέ τί πιστεύεται καὶ τις φαίνεται. "Επειδή, τοις θεοΐς ὦντι ἐξεµπλήρωσεν ἱλικια λίθοι. In ix. 24. 3 Pausanias mentions Ἰππείων in Maceda a shrine of Heracles where the image was "not artistic but an undressed stone in the ancient fashion on which the acropolis of Athens Pausanias, i. 23, 5, mentions τοὺς λίθους ἱλικια τοὺς δὲ ἐκείνους λίθους ἵνα ἔρωτικος ἔχων εἰκώνας κατασκεύασαν, καὶ κἀκεῖνος ἑκάστῳ ἒκαστῳ ἔρχετο ἐπιστήμη τὰ ἀργα· ἐν γὰρ καὶ δόξα ἡ εἰκών, ἰδοὺρη κρύον τῶν λίθων ἄνευ τοῦ παῦλου, καὶ ἀδιάκριτον ἐπικατοίκησαν τινὸς ἢ Ἀφροδίτης.

The typical case of the holy stone is the βασιλεῖον, which could be claimed to be the origin of which is claimed for the Rock that gave to Croesus in place of the infant Zeus.2 Pausanias, x. 24. 5, speaking of Delphi, says: ταύτα δὲ ἐκ τοῦ κυματος (ὁ Νεολυσίας), λίθος ἀτομον ἢν ἔστω τελειώσας λίθους ἐπεξεργάζεσθαι κατασκεύασας, καὶ κατά τοῦτο ἐκείνῳ ἑκάστῳ ἔρχετο ἐπιστημή τὰ ἀργά· ἐν γὰρ καὶ δόξαι ἦς αὐτῶν, ἐκείνην δὲ κρύον τῶν λίθων ἄνευ τοῦ παῦλου, καὶ ἀδιάκριτον ἐπικατοίκησαν τινὸς ἢ Ἀφροδίτης.

This brings us to the question of worship in the religious pillar. Every one 'is familiar with the passage in Gn 2828 where Jacob枕在磐石磐石 upon the angel. And the morning and took the stone that he had put under his head and set it up for a pillar (στήλη), and poured oil upon the top of it (as the Delphians did with the βασιλεῖον in Pausanias, loc. cit.). And he called the name of that place Bethel [House of God]. . . .

But in any case, the important thing to realize is that there are two kinds of sanctity attaching to such things as we have been discussing: natural sanctity and derivative sanctity. There is what may be called the inherent sanctity of an object due to its association with the uncanny. To this class belongs the λίθος κατασκευάζων which is mentioned by Pausanias, iii. 22. 1:

Γροῦθος δελικής γεγενηκέναι ζυγία λίθους ἀνάλογον κατασκευάσας ζυγία λίθους ἀνάλογον κατασκευάσας εἴη αὐτοὶ πίστευσας τῇ μανίας διά ναοῦ λίθου συσκευαστές εἰς τὸν κατασκευασμόν γα εἰς τὸν λαοῦ της Λαρίδας.

That is to say, there was something which seemed uncanny about this stone, and so an astrological legend arose to explain it. But in the case of Jacob there is no hint that the stone which he selected for his pillow possessed in itself any unusual virtue, and, familiar as we are with the potency of, say, a bit of wedding-cake as a provoker of auspicious dreams, we seem to have no right to read any such meaning into Jacob's use of the stone. Indeed in Gn 2828 it is rather emphasized that he allowed it to be used partly because it was the particular morning dream there to fulfill the voluntary act of Jacob and not from any natural quality.

We hold, then, that the holy pillar in worship is not volitionally or artificially. That this is the case and that we have here to do with no original sanctity is already obvious when we consider that the pillar is rather an artificial than a natural form.

That it is generally assumed that the λίθος κατασκευάσων of Pausanias is merely an 'undressed stone,' of no particular shape. We think there is better reason to suppose that it was a stone dressed to a more regular shape than this, and this led into a definite anthropomorphic type. The quadrangular block seems quite well established as a half-way stage to the fully developed image. There is a very significant passage in Pausanias, viii. 48. 6, where, speaking of Τειχαρίδας in Arcadia, the natural home of τειχαρίδας, he says:

'Τειχαρίδας is a peculiarly fine type of pillar which is the typical example of the Dioscuri. The shape of the Apollo pillars is perhaps not quite so clearly established by the ancient authorities. But it is quite as if they had floated a pinacle, and there, and therefore an artificial, and not a natural, sanctity.

But it is to be clearly understood that this is a question of origins only. Derivative sanctity may be quite as real and quite as natural as a natural sanctity. The landmark of my neighbour or the coffin in which he obtains his last landmenary may be made of common wood, but just because the timber is employed for this solemn purpose it acquires extraordinary virtues. And in the same way the symbolic pillar may easily acquire supernatural virtues, and may indeed, as seems well attested, be regarded as the abode, at least temporarily, of the godhead: and the pillar may, of course, survive as a symbol even in a fully developed anthropomorphic worship—e.g., the obelisk as the βασιλεῖον of Apollo Agyiens on coins of Abamacia.2 B. ANTHROPOMORPHIC CULTS.—It is characteristic of the objects of anthropomorphic cults that they are all, in greater or less degree, worshipped in the higher sense: that is to say, they are invoked with prayer and offerings. A rigid classification is difficult, because there is a continual transference of the members of one class into another, from higher to lower, not less than from lower to higher. But the classes of cults may be conveniently arranged as follows:

i. The dead.—We find in Homer that the funeral of a great prince is accompanied by funereal games. Thus in II. xviii. we have the δίκη τῶν Παρθένων, in which "the Shades and Days, 654, the δίκη τῶν Αργαύδων. In the case of a private individual doubtless the ceremonies were less elaborate, consisting of the offerings at the grave and the funerai feast, for which we used to be familiar in Scotland, and which might be of decent proportions or might rise to the extravagance of Lord Ravenswood's funeral, when, according to Caleb Balderson, 'there was as much wine drunk in this house as was consumed by the whole nation of France.' But in any case the funeral feast did not terminate the duties of the dead (γίρθη θρωτοῦ) in historical

2 Raetz. loc. cit. 22.
3 Cf. Hesych. και. βασιλεῖον τοῦ Ἰερουσαλήμ καὶ θάλασσας τῆς Κρήτης ἀνέθη Λίσα.
times we hear of a further celebration on the third, ninth, and thirtieth days after the funer.

The character of these celebrations, attended by the friends and relatives of the dead, is sufficiently well known. The ceremony on the thirtieth day, which apparently marked the end of the normal period of mourning, was noteworthy for the fact that the corpse or the coffin was brought together in honour of the deceased (ἐν τῇ ἀνασκόπουσι) did not recline but sat, in accordance with ancient custom; hence the ceremony was called καθήσασθαι.

Still further there was the annual festival called τερσίῳ, disputed whether this celebration was held on the anniversary of the birthday of the deceased or on the anniversary of the day of his death.

The generic term for offerings to the dead is ἔναγμα, which is precisely the Latin sepulcrum and implies that the offerings were 'consecrated' to the dead: that the living did not partake of them. The corresponding verb is ἐναγμέω. These offerings (called also γειτ., because normally they were 'poured' into the grave) consisted of milk, honey, water, wine, oil. The scholar on Eur. Herc. 527 adds ἀλέβρον (wheat-flour). Eustath. Hom. Od. 519, says the μελαψαρίαν, as the offering was called, was made by the sons of the Hesiodic oracle times; but honey and water in historical times. Stengel holds that milk was always an ingredient.

The libation was poured upon the grave and was accompanied by a prayer. The tomb was sometimes so constructed that the liquid could easily reach to the bones or ashes below.

Besides the libation there were other offerings-connected, the ἀνασκόπουσιν of the dead. Naturally, the constitution of this would be fairly constant, but would vary to some extent with individual taste or with the locality of the offerer.

The meal presented to the dead was not one which the living could share and was therefore wholly burnt. The lexographers define ἐναγμέω as ἀνασκόπωμαι. In other words, they belong to that class of offerings which were called θεία δεήσις. It is sometimes said that these offerings to the dead were made at night, but there is no evidence of this; and, since funerals took place by day, there seems no reason why offerings to the dead should be made by day. In classical times they certainly did so, i.e. Hom. Il. xxi. 217 if. certainly does not prove the contrary for Homeric times.

2 Eus. Schol. in Apol. iii. 255: τελευταίους διὰ ἔλθος εἰς τὴν τάφου μετάφρασιν τοῖς οἰκεῖοις; Dem. xviii. 242: ἐνεμένης δὲ τελευταίοις τα καινά κατάναξαν τὴν παλαιάν, ἀκολούθως ἐπελευσέναι τούτοις γίνεται.
3 Ἑρμ. l. 14: ἐνοχὸς δέ με, ἀλλὰ, τὸ πρόσωπον ἐμφυλώθη, τὸ χέρι τούτον τοῖς ἐνεμενοῖς άγαλμάτων.
4 Cf. Phot.: ἐπέκειτο δέ αὐτὸν πεπείθεθαι καὶ τοιαύτῃ παρασκευᾷ λεγεῖν. This question is fully discussed by W. Schmidt, Geburtsttag in Atticenum, Gissum, 1906, p. 37 ff. who reaches the conclusion that, while ἐναγμέω denotes the celebration of the birthday of the living, σναγμέω is the anniversary celebration of the death of the dead: cf. Herod. iv. 26. The σναγμέω thus correspond precisely to the Roman parentalia.
5 Poll. xvi. 146.
6 Eus. Schol. in Apol. iii. 209 ff.; Soph. El. 84; Eur. Or. 114, Iph. in Taur. 125, El. 511.
7 Cf. Eus. Ch. 01, τελευταίοις (for discussion of the meaning of this term see Stendel, Hermes, xxxii. [1896] 520; Herber, ch. iii. 625, Stengel, Hermes, xxxi. [1896] 477); Ovid, Fast. ii. 538: ἐναγμίας τινὰν μοι παρέχειν. The offering was thus burnt.
8 Over. Att. fr., ed. T. Kock, i. 571; Aristoph. n. 488, 12: καὶ ἀνήθουσαν τὸν ἐναγμέων ἵππον τῷ θεῷ καὶ γειτονίᾳ νεκρῆς ἀνθρώπου ἐκ τοῦ ἀνασκόπουσι καὶ τοῦ δενειοῦτος, ἐν τῷ δρόμῳ ἡμῶν οὐ μὴν ἐπιθύμησιν ἐναγμενίον τοις ἑνεμενοῖς.
9 In τοῖς δεκατάκτησις (Aristotel. Onom. 1. 4.): διὸτ οἴκουσιν... γειτονίᾳ (Exch. 483 f.).
10 Ἐσχ. Pf. 349. Ἐσχ. Ἐρ. 345, σκοτείνωσιν; Ἐσχ. Ph. 127, ἔρχοντας ἵππον τῷ τοῖς παρεξήγησιν ἀνήθουσαν τοῖς ἑνεμενοῖς. The testimony is very important for the solemn process of hero-worship was performed by night. In the case of the hero the place of the tomb was taken by the Heroum (Ὑρευνόν).
11 The essential features of hero-worship are thus: (1) the offerings belong to the class of θεία δεήσις: they are ἐπίθεται, burnt, and the offerer does not partake; (2) the place of offering is a trench (βίβλος) or at any rate an ἔσχατον (hearth). In these three essentially formal features are performed at night (this statement can be taken only as a simple summary).
The chthonian gods.—The term 'chthonian' as used in Greek is ambiguous. A god may be associated with earth as Mother of all and be in this sense chthonian. Or a god may be associated with that which is in this sense chthonian. Lastly, a god may be associated with the underworld, i.e. chthonian in the strictest sense. But here again a god may be chthonian in one aspect, as in all others Olympian. Hence 'chthonian' really denotes rather an aspect of this or that god than a permanent attribute. Perhaps the only purely chthonian deity is Hades—and that only if we neglect his non-chthonian representative. Hecate also would seem to be a purely chthonian deity; but we are immediately confronted by her confusion or amalgamation with Artemis. The fact is that any god may assume a chthonian character. When, then, we speak here of 'chthonian' gods, we mean either specifically chthonian gods, if there be such, or gods in their chthonian character.

The context is, naturally, precisely parallel to that of the dead and the heroes. The offerings are θυσίας ὑγείας; they are made, or are supposed to be made, at night; and so on.

But, as we shall see, this is only when the 'chthonian' as such preserve their full authority. In numerous cases, where the ultimate sanction lies with the chthonians, the sacrifices take place in name of the Olympians, and so take place by day.

4. The Olympian or Oranian gods.—We come now to the highest rank of gods, who are most usually denoted as Olympian, sometimes as Oranian. The two terms are to all intents identical since even in Homer the Olympians, the abode of the gods, sometimes loses its geographical meaning of a mountain in Thessaly and is really identified with Heaven (οὐρανός)—e.g., II. viii. 25, where Zeus threatens to suspend earth and sea by a chain attached to a 'peak of Olympus.' They are conceived as dwelling somewhere 'on high'; and so the Homeric worshippers when he prays 'looks onto the wide Heaven.' These are gods of mercy rather than justice, of healing rather than of lane. They keep the cities of men, and hence their worship comes first.

We propose now to sketch the main features of Olympian worship. It will be easily understood that there must have been innumerable divergences in detail, according to date, place, and circumstance, which cannot be noticed here. All that we can endeavour to do is to give a reasonably complete and intelligible account of the fundamental principles.

The apparatus of worship.—(a) The image

(φώνας) of the god.—The image is a characteristic feature of Greek worship, and Herodotus, i. 131, notes it in the archaic form as the temple. Greeks have neither image nor temple nor altar, which he attributes to their non-anthropomorphic conception of the gods. It is, of course, to be remembered that the absence of images characterizes both the earliest and the highest stages of religion. But in historical times at least the absence of an image was so exceptional as to call for special remark. That the image, and that too in a fully anthropomorphic form, was used in religious worship.

Homer is clear on any reasonable interpretation of II. vi. 92 = 273 = 303, where the Trojans lay a role (προσκύνησις) on the knees of fair-tressed Athene, i.e. on the knees of the image in her temple on the acropolis of Illos.

The motive of the φώνας is well put by Dio Ptrs. Or. xii. 60-61:

1 Not would one say that it were better that no statue or image of the gods had been shown among men, it being meet that one should look only to the heavenly things. For all those things the wise are found deifying, as do the Thebans at Thebes in which there was no image (εἰς Μεστακόν ὡς ἐν ὑπό τοῦ φώνα); cf. x. 13, 11.

2 Cf. Callim. frzg. 3 Μιντις-τος οὑς τῆς Σελήνου ἔργον τόμον ἐλευθερίας ἡμῖν χρήσιμον ἡ ἔκκλεισις τῶν ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἔργον Μοῦσας ἐν οὐδέποτε λατρευθέν θεῷ. [EX 30].

3 In the strict sense the βασίλειος is a 'high place,' an erection on which offerings are made, whereas to the Olympians, and gods in the low φώνας or hearth, on which offerings are made to the chthonians, the heroes, and the dead.

The altar was, of course an essential part of the equipment of a temple. The chief altar stood

1 Pom. frzg. 25, 4 mentions a temple of the Meirai at Thebes in which there was no image (εἰς Μεστακόν ὡς ἐν ὑπό τοῦ φώνα); cf. x. 13, 11.

2 Cf. Callim. frzg. 3 Μιντις-τος οὑς τῆς Σελήνου ἔργον τόμον ἐλευθερίας ἡμῖν χρήσιμον ἡ ἔκκλεισις τῶν ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἔργον Μοῦσας ἐν οὐδέποτε λατρευθέν θεῷ. [EX 30].

3 For Perip. Πρ. 1074: χρήσις τοῦ βασίλειον τόμων. Χειρ. Απ. Πρ. 11. 12. 12: καὶ τοῦ βασίλειου τοῦ ἱεροῦ γενήθη ἡ ἑτερ οἰκονόμου, καὶ τοῦ ἱεροῦ τοῦ τῆς ἴος τοῦ ἱεροῦ τῆς ἴος τῆς τάφρων. [EX 27].

4 Cf. Paus. viii. 29. 7, 20, 5, 40. 22, where he describes among other works of Daidalos & βασίλειον of Aphrodite at Delos which κατείχεν ἡμῖν τῶν ἐν τοῖς τὴν ὁμοίων οἰκονομίαν—a good parallel to the Heracle at Athens (τῆς τετραγώνου ἱεροῦ, Thuc. vi. 27).
inside the temple proper. But outside the temple there stood in the περίβολος, or temple-court, other altars—βωμοὶ πύρας. To the number of these there was no limit. Even the dedication of an altar being much like any other offering and corresponding very much to our custom of putting a stained-glass window in a church, Stengel was of opinion that usually with a temple would be used only for unburied offerings, but he admits there were exceptions to this. He maintains, however, even in the face of Paus. ii. 35. 5, that sacrifices were made there at these inner altars. We think it impossible to reconcile Stengel’s view with Pausanias.

As for altars unconnected with a temple, these were to be found anywhere and everywhere, in town and country, in street and in market-place, in the house and in public places, in the workshops and in the gymnasium.

The size, shape, and material varied indefinitely. Some of the most curious were the ἐσπαρτήν or βωμὸς κεραυνοῦ of Apollo at Delos which was made entirely of horns, and was reckoned among the Seven Wonders of the World; altars at Olympia, Pergamos, and Samos made from the ashes of victims; and an altar at Miletus made from the blood of victims.

Where no altar was at hand it could be improvised. If it was not to be permanent with leaves or flowers.

(c) The temple.—The earliest ‘holy place,’ as we have seen above, is simply a place which in one way or another suggested the presence of something more than human. Such a place was felt to be ἱερός, sacred, something with which man must deal circumspectly: it was a ‘God’s sacred place,’ to be set apart from secular use. Now, when in Homer, ii. vi. 194, the Argonauts give Bellerophon a ‘choice portion’ of land, the phrase is τέμενος τοῦ ἴδουν ἅλλον. Precisely the same word τέμενος is used of the portion of ground set apart for a god. The I. c. cognate temple τάφειν (from which we get ‘temple’) had the same original meaning of a marked-out space. That old sense is still familiar in the celtic curial temple of Ennism and the celtic lucula temple of Lucetius, i. 1014. The extent of this τέμενος might vary indefinitely. Thus Hom. ii. 306 speaks of Πέρας as ἄφετος τέμενος, and Pindar, Pyth. ii. 2, of Syracuse as the τέμενος Ἀργεών. These are, of course, poetic expressions. More strictly the τέμενος includes only the immediate environs of the temple proper, and normally it was marked off by a fence (περίβολος). If we may take a modern analogue and suppose that a country church, the churchyard and other ground round the church, the manse and the manse garden, the stabling accommodation for worshippers from a distance, are all enclosed within a fence, which might even include the glebe, we have a good parallel to the Greek τέμενος.

It is natural to suppose that many of the places to which sanctity was felt to attach would be groves of trees. Again, even when trees were cut down elsewhere to enable the land to be made arable, 1 the trees of the holy τέμενος would be spared. Hence ἰδίως, or grove, is in Greek almost a synonym of τέμενος. At the present day in an otherwise unwooded landscape you may pick out the church by the clump of trees. When Herakles consecrated a τέμενος to Zeus at Olympia, Pindar tells us that suddenly Herakles was struck by the absence of trees and he cut down a wild olive which he had once seen by the shadowy springs of the Ister (Dannebe), and so he went and brought the wild olive to Olympia to be at once a new temple and an olive grove for the victor and a hospitable shade for the visitor.

Within this τέμενος is the temple proper denoted by ναός (Ἀττικὸς ναός) or by τὸ λειψαν. When a distinction is made between these two words, ναὸς is rather the inner sanctuary, while τὸ λειψαν is wider. Again ναὸς may have practically the same sense as ἱερόν, the Holy of Holies, or may mean the temple generally.

Historically the temple is doubtless later than the τέμενος and the βωμός. Thus Homer, II. viii. 48, mentions τέμενος and βωμός, but does not refer to any temple. Pindar, Pyth. iv. 204 ff., tells how the Argonauts brought the Argonautes (Ἀργόναυτα) and Zeus, ἀνέργον Παντελώδα τέμενος, φανέρων ἄρ’ ὄρηξισι ἄγλια τάφρων ὕπάρχειν καὶ νεκτημόνων ἱερών βωμῶν θεάν. What motive of the temple (ναός) was it not to determine. It is suggested that it was meant to protect the image of the god and the dedicated offerings. Whether this be so or not, a motive which must have come quite early into force was the feeling that the god must have his house even as men; only it must be more splendid and more beautiful. But perhaps the most potent motive of all was to create a definite centre for the worship of the god.

The sanctity attaching to the temple proper was extended, though doubtless in less degree, to the whole space enclosed by the porticula. Ritual purity—the details are infinitely various—was demanded of all who came within it, and παραπάτημα, or vessels of holy water, were provided for purposes of lustration. We may quote as a single example of the sort of prohibition practised an inscription from the temple at Jerusalem: μὴ βλέπῃ ἄλλης ἐκείς ἡμεῖς τὴν τειχισμὴν (= ἐγκαταστάσει) καὶ περίβολου ὑπὲρ οὗ εἰς ἱερόν ἀναλυεῖ τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν. (d) The priest.—See art. PRIEST, PRIESTHOOD (Greek).

(ii.) The ritual of worship.—The two most essential elements of ritual are prayer and sacrifice. We frequently of course find prayer without sacrifice; but sacrifice without prayer occurs only when an offering is made by way of expiation. Perhaps it is hardly worthy of the name of sacrifice, but, when the soilure of purification is cast into the sea or into running water, or when the fifth (πήθους) of the house is deposited at the No Man’s Land of the cross ways, no words are spoken: ἢ σὺ ἄλως... τὸν ἑκάστον, γατοσν χύον... στέψεν καθόραν... ἐς τε ἐκκέφαλοι αἱμαρα... ἔκεις τετραγωνίας ἱεραίας. (e) Prayer.—There is no more characteristic expression of man’s dependence on a higher power than prayer. The self-sufficient man—οὐδεὶς— in δεινοῖς τοῖς ἐπιπάθεις ἐπιμένει... the special characteristics of Greek prayer the reader will find referred to the art. PRAYER (Greek).

1 Pind. Ol. iii. 13 ff.
2 Apoll. iv. 412 f.
3 E.g., Herod. ii. 135; ἄρχω κλήσις τὸν Χάιον ἀκοπασάν, ἀνέφηκα τῇ θυσίᾳ. Ἐν εὐφορίᾳ, ἐν εὐφορίᾳ, ἐν εὐφορίᾳ, ἐν εὐφορίᾳ.
4 E.g., Eur. And. 113; Herod. vi. 81; inser. from Cos, J. F.
5 Λόακ. c.s; c. Hom. vi. 202; ξολοκόμος ἄλιθος ἱεροῦ... ἀναγράφεισθαι, where of course it can be held that the actual altar stood not in the temple but in front of the curtain [τοῦ καλύμματος] which shut off the Holy of Holies.

7 Ohne, c.s. xxiii. 146, Od. viii. 363.
8 W. Dittenberger, Orientis græci inscr. inedita, 2 vols., London, 1903-05, ii. no. 598.
9 Hesch. ob. 30 ff.
10 Theophr. Char. iii. (iv.)
WORSHIP (Hebrew).—1. Introductory.—(a) Terms and underlying conceptions.—The fundamental idea of worship, as conceived by the Hebrews, was essentially a 'service' (ʼabodah), the corresponding Greek term being λατρεία ('servitus religionis quam λατρεῖα Graeci vocant'), i.e. to perform the service of God (or the Lord) means, in the Pentateuch, to carry out the worship prescribed by the Levitical regulations of the Pentateuch (Nu 8, Ex 22, etc.). While such 'service' is on its external side, elaborated in a series of ceremonial and liturgical acts, involved in a spiritual side is also emphasized; it is essentially a 'service' of heart and soul (Dt 11:2). And it shall come to pass, if ye shall hearken diligently unto my commandments which I command you this day, to do the Lord your God all that he commandeth thee; and ye shall servethim with all your heart and with all your soul,' etc.).

From the time when worship at one central shrine was established (i.e. the 18th year of Josiah, 621 B.C.), down to the destruction of the Temple at a.d. 70, the worship of God was regarded as finding its only complete and adequate expression in the Temple service, with its elaborate cultus of priesthood and sacrifice (cf. Jn 49).

The immense and manifold religious activities that concentrated themselves in the Temple worship, can only be adequately narrated in the present essay. We have at the position occupied (for nearly seven centuries) by Judah's central shrine. It was absolutely the one and only sanctuary where the non-Jewish religious activities of the whole people could be offered. Judaism possessed one sanctuary, and that was in Jerusalem.

Jehovah was for a long period visited by pilgrims from all over the ancient world, who appeared in the Holy City laden with gifts for the Temple. They came to Jerusalem 'for to worship' (Ac 9:41; cf. 25:16), and it was a pious duty for every faithful Jew, in visiting the way the sanctuary at least once in a lifetime. This happened more particularly at the great feast days.

The term ʼabodah, while it primarily had reference to the worship of the Temple, and more particularly to the ministry of the officiating priesthood therein, received further an extended application, and is used in the sense of any worship generally, and especially prayer. A famous dictum ascribed to the high-priest Simeon the Just (c. 200 B.C.) run: 'On three things does the Lord stand: On the Torah, on the ʾAbodah (i.e. the Temple-service, and on acts of love. This was after the destruction of the Temple that the term was applied specifically to prayer: cf. Talmud, 2a (with ref. to Dt 11:19); what is meant by 'the service of the heart'? Prayer; and with ref. to Dt 25:4 and Nu 47) 'Temple-service': (Acts 3:13) 'It comes from the mouth of the king, to endow with divine power and to sanctify all at the same time, to serve the Lord (cf. 2K 20:18; 3:5; 2 Chron. 17:13; 5:13; 31:27; 32:28). This, or similar expressions, very likely represent an old proverb. The word in its original signification would have been 'the sanctuary of the Levites, was probably destroyed by the Vilna Gaon, and is referred to as the 'Temple of Jerusalem the pros- trophe to which Jeremiah, apparently, alludes (Jer 71). The sanctuary of the Eph, which was established at Noh, but which became a sanctuary.

1 Augustine, de Cite, Dei, v. 16.
2 F. H. Box, in Biblical Quarterly, 1915 (a. 'Temple-Service').
3 P. Deferens, L'Israelisation de Jerusalem, which pass, possibly have never existed, are not more than a million.
What became, however, the most important of all the Israelite sanctuaries was that of Jerusalem, which was held by the Jebusites till the time of David (cf. 2 K. 8 10 11, 2 S. 5 6 9). Here the sacred rock and cave, which have played so conspicuous a part in the political and, unhappily, warriorish history, have already been the seat of an earlier Jebusite shrine. When Solomon transferred his capital to the Temple on the royal palace, the former (as in the case of Shiloh) was sanctified by the presence of the ark.

An interesting survival of the earlier Israelite shrines is probably to be seen in the institution of Levitical cities. This is a feature of the late priestly legislation, and is probably to be accounted for by the fact that the Levites, who in the post-Exilic period occupied a position subordinate to the priestly poisoning, retained behind them ancient traditions, which ministered at the local sanctuaries or high places. The Levites possessed large estates in such pt. sacred places as Shechem, Geder, Hebron, Beth-shemesh, Kedesh, ‘Annach Asharoth, Ramoth-Gilead, Deter, Gibon (cf. Jos. 21 42). These priestly estates existed in the various localities where there had been a 'high place.' Could the complete history of these Levitical cities be traced, it is probable that the first shrines were, in fact, the temple of Shiloh and, therefore, that the Levites had been in a sense the custodians of the ancient worship. Unfortunately it is impossible for us to reconstruct fully and adequately the ceremonies that accompanied the ancient worship. All we are sure of is that the centre of the sanctuary was the local altar—in some cases the local shrine being of more local importance (Shiloh, later Dan, Bethel, and Jerusalem). The altar had as its practical instrument indispensable the sacred pillar (mish‘epheth) and leshahor (a sacred pole, which was the symbol, apparently, of a goddess. Another adjunct was the sacred hall or room (Heb. ‘ishaḥah) where the sacrificial feast was held.

The local sanctuaries were served by a local priesthood, though it is improbable that, as a rule, more than one family exercised the priestly office at any smaller particular locality. The story of Micaiah given in the appendix to the book of Judges (ch. 17 1) shows how a shrine could be set up by the head of a household, who could appoint one of his sons (an Ephrashite) to act as his priest. It is only later that a wandering Levite is appointed in his place, who subsequently was withdrawn from off by the Danites and became the founder of the long line of priests who ministered at the famous sanctuary of Dan in the far north. Similarly the nation was blessed through the principal priest at the time was Abiahan, a descendant of Eli. It is natural, therefore, that the priests who were regarded as the more important shrines should themselves increase in importance and wealth, in course of time. 'The wealth thus acquired was in many cases transferred into the city in which the priests officiated. In course of time, therefore, there were large priestly estates in and about the cities where temples or high places were situated.' According to Ezek. 44 5, in the pre-Exilic period the usual labour connected with the shrines and sacrifices had (doubtless only after wealth had increased) been performed by foreign slaves, who were kept by the more wealthy priests.

The character of the old simple worship of Jehovah was fundamentally transformed when the Israelites passed from the nomadic stage and became a settled agricultural community. Jehovah, who to the old war-god, who led His chosen people to victory against enemies—though this was not the only aspect of His character—now became the God (Baal) of the land, and as such the head of all agricultural law. The body of agricultural laws which gradually grew up under these conditions came to be looked upon as an essential part of the original covenant by which Jehovah became the God of the Israelite farmers. The chief result was that the great festivals were placed upon an agricultural basis.

'To the simple Passover feast, which commemorated the deliverance from Egyptian slavery, the annual sacrifices were added. The early harvest and the corn was the chief of these—a marked contrast to the custom of the harvest season in which the nomadic pastoral folk feasted. Seven weeks later a new agricultural festival, commemorative of the completion of the harvest, was added, while the annual festival of the date harvest became the festival of the grape-gathering.1

1 The local sanctuaries were the centres at which this worship was carried out, and it was at these shrines that for several centuries Jehovah was worshipped with the full sanction of the religious leaders (cf. 1 S. 7 1f, 1 K. 3 18f, etc.). Such local worship is alone contemplated in the oldest Hebrew legislation ("in every place where I record my name I will come unto thee and I will bless thee") [Ex 20 24]. But by this very fact it was exposed to serious dangers. The admixture of heathen Canaanitish elements threatened seriously to imperil the purity of the old simple tribal religion, and it was against this, the mixed cultus, that the 8th cent. prophets, especially Hosea, raised their powerful opposition. The political development marked the conflict of Israel in worship with its own pagan origin. It is clear from the language of the prophets that in the 8th cent. B.C. during the prosperous reigns of Jereoboam II. and Uzziah the worship in the great central shrines of the Northern Kingdom went on, while in the Southern Kingdom, was carried out, especially at the great central shrines (Bethel, Jerusalem), with great zeal, elaboration, and pomp. The ceremonial was splendid, the altars were large and imperial, and these and these were thronged with zealous worshippers. And all this, it must be remembered, was ostensibly worship of Jehovah. What Amos inveighs against is not that worship of the national God, but a wrong conception of the kind of service acceptable to Him. The worship is Jehovah-worship, but inspired by heathenish ideas. Doubtless this worship was, on the whole, purer in Judaism than in N. Israel. But in Jewish heathen trends, though submerged, were powerful, and asserted themselves in violent reactions, such as occurred in the 7th cent., in the reign of Manasseh.

Perhaps the general character of the old worship at the local shrines, or šabbedi, may be illustrated from similar festivals that take place in Syria and the neighboring lands to-day. S. L. Currie has pointed out this aspect of Syrian primitive religion, and his Primitive Syrian Religion Today, where the results of considerable and exacting research are published, shows that many sacred spots, probably in some cases the very sites of ancient 'high places,' are still venerated and revered to by the peasants. And in many of these the priests claim that 'there is virtually a priesthood in existence. . . They do not have the designation of priest; they are known rather as sheikhs of certain shrines, or as servants of certain saints. But their duties and emoluments correspond in some degree to those about which we read in the Old Testament. Usually one priest or priestly family is connected with such a shrine, though cases occur where several priestly families live together at one shrine, as at Nebi Daud (outside the wall of Jerusalem). Sacrifices are still, apparently, offered at some of these shrines, especially in connection with vows, and thus in the shape of the hide of the animal, and one of the quarters, are paid to the minister of the shrine, who in ordinary life is an orthodox Muslim.

Wows at such spots play a considerable part in modern popular religion in Syria. During the year, at a popular makan [sacrificed spot or shrine], many sheep and goats, and sometimes larger animals, are killed in public, and offered up as vows. Besides there are vows of grain, which are promised on condition of good harvests. These vows are collected by a servant of a shrine. According to a native authority, the sheik, that is, the minister of the shrine, is present, he kills the victim, otherwise the priest (who can read the Koran) does this. He uses the formula, "This is from thee and for thee." The dhabah service is slaughtered by the owner, and after it is cooked, the sheik, however, holds the head of a woman, she tears his hand on that of the man who kills it," The minister of the shrine is not
only its guardian, but also the repository of the legends connected with the life of the people whose names and deeds are commemorated. Not all the modern shrines have annual festivals. Where such a festival occurs it is in some instances attended by thousands of pilgrims.

The festivals referred to by Amos (35:24) must have borne a significant relationship to the pentecost week cerebrations which are probably their literal descendants. Reference may also be made in this connection to the annual feast of Jahweh at Shiloh, where, according to Judges (21:19), the locality was a feature (cf. also Ex 23:15).

For the use of images by the early Hebrews, and the prevalence of idolatrous tendencies among them, see art. IMAGES AND TEMPLES (Hebrew and Canaanites), vol. vii. pp. 138-142. It was by the use of images that Josiah (2 K. 23:5) was enabled to cry to the Lord, 'The statutes which thy servant Joshua commanded us to observe and do them;' and Isaiah (36:6) that the first effective protest was made, apparently, against the use of idolatrous emblems in Jahweh-worship. It was probably at Isaiah's instigation that Hezekiah was moved to destroy the brazen serpent (síshúan) which had long been an object of worship (2 K. 18:4). Such serpent-worship was widespread in antiquity, and appears to have prevailed, as a popular superstition, among the Hebrews, if we may judge from the results of the迦南 excavations.1

(c) The effects of Josiah's reformation.—The remarkable and far-reaching movement of reform which expressed itself in the Deuteronomic legislation and was inaugurated in practice by the drastic action of King Josiah in 621 B.C. was the outcome of an alliance between the prophetic party and the priesthood. We have already noted that the possibilities of such an alliance had always been greater in Judah than in the Northern Kingdom. It now became an accomplished fact, and the results were momentous. The two great elements in the religious life of the community were united in sustained and sincere effort to translate the lessons of the teaching of the great 8th cent. prophets into practice, by fundamental reforms in the religious institutions of the nation. The aim was to make public worship a more fitting and adequate instrument for expressing the prophetic religion. It was essential that the rites of worship should be purified, and divorced from the heathen accompaniments and associations in which they were involved. To effect this end the reformers insisted on two things, the nationalization of the worship and its centralization in Jerusalem. The old time-honoured, local sacrifices of clan and family were to be suppressed, and all the worship (including the private sacrifices) was to be concentrated in one central sanctuary in Jerusalem. It was only by such a drastic reform that the necessary break with age-long traditions and associations could be effected. We are expressly told that the Passover celebrated as a result of the reform movement was unprecedented (2 K 23:24). The kingdom, to begin with, occasioned not as in the past by the people in their own homes, but by the united nation in Jerusalem.

The suppression of the local shrines and the centralization of the worship mark a revolution. With the publication and national acceptance of the Deuteronomic code the beginnings of the Canon were formed which was to grow into the Hebrew Bible; and with the centralization of the worship the first stone of the edifice was laid which was later to develop into the post-Exilic Jewish Church. The foundations of Judaism were laid.

The aim of the reformers was to gather up the lost sacrifices into a truly national worship. Deuteronomy "cuts at the roots of the family and tribal sacrifices when it forbids the offering of sacrifice elsewhere than at the central sanctuary (23:14-15). But it does more than merely forbid. It provides the great festival on which had their close association with the spring sowing and the harvest, and which, being common to all men, brought the people into contact with their heathen neighbours, with motives taken from the history of Yahweh's dealings with His people. The people, when they came together to worship there, had no reason to come to a shrine which has associations with their national life and with that ancient life of the people of Yahweh. Such a shrine was offensive to the private man, made no appeal to his personal recognition of Jahweh's bounty to him, owing it to God through a ritual in which he recouls how he belongs to a nation with which it is great because it is full of God's grace (xxvi. 1-11)."2

This national impulse upon the character of the worship was never lost. The old agricultural festivals, though their primitive features were eliminated, acquired a new significance. The Passover became the festival of national redemption; Pentecost (the 'festival of weeks') was transformed into a commemoration of the giving of the Law. The Feast of Tabernacles, which was the festival of Jahweh-worship. It was probably at Isaiah's instigation that Hezekiah was moved to destroy the brazen serpent (síshúan) which had long been an object of worship (2 K. 18:4). Such serpent-worship was widespread in antiquity, and appears to have prevailed, as a popular superstition, among the Hebrews, if we may judge from the results of the迦南 excavations.1

Another momentous result was the disestablishment of the local priesthood. The legislation of Deuteronomy provides no complete law of the priesthood. It merely deals with the practical consequences of the centralization of the worship as these affected the old order of priests. The members of this order, who are referred to as 'Levites,' are still priests de jure. They are all 'levitical priests,' and are so styled in the Code ('the priests the Levites') (Dt 18:8 etc.). But in consequence of the new legislation the exercise of priestly functions can only be carried out legitimately in the central sanctuary. The rural priest ('the Levite within thy gates') can only secure the name and rights of a priest when he removes to Jerusalem (Dt 18:8).

It was only in the later legislation of P that the distinction between priests and Levites grew up. The Levites, who were the descendants of the old order of priests, were degraded to an inferior rank, and the priesthood proper was confined to the family of Aaron.

The immediate results of the Deuteronomic reform seem to have been disappointing. So drastic a break with age-long tradition could not at once be absolutely successful. In the dark days that preceded the final extinction of the old priestly order by the people in their own homes, but by the united nation in Jerusalem. The suppression of the local shrines and the centralization of the worship mark a revolution. With the publication and national acceptance of the Deuteronomic code the beginnings of the Canon were formed which was to grow into the Hebrew Bible; and with the centralization of the worship the first stone of the edifice was laid which was later to develop into the post-Exilic Jewish Church. The foundations of Judaism were laid.

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1 A. C. Welch, The Religion of Israel under the Kingdom, London, 1912, p. 309.

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priesthood is still essentially that of Deuteronomy; it belongs to the House of Levi (Mal 2:6). It is true that the text between these verses and Levites had been recognized already at the time of the Return, if we may judge by the list of those who came up with Zerubbabel ( Neh 7). But the relatively small number of Levites there given may be explained, perhaps, by supposing that most of those tabulated as priests were originally Levites whose claim to the priesthood had been recognized. Ezekiel's influence was obviously at work. A clear indication of this appears in Ezek 2:3, where one of the principal functions of the high-priest is to keep God's courts.

Here we have an undatable indication," says Robertson Smith, "that Ezekiel's conception of holiness, and his jealousy of profane contact with holy things, had been taken up by the spiritual leaders of the new Jerusalem. There is, therefore, a strong presumption that from the first the arrangements and ritual of the second Temple were more closely conformed to the principle of concentric circles of holiness than those of the first Temple had been.1

The ideas of Ezekiel were potent—in particular the conception of the service offered as a stated and regular ceremonial; but the emphasis had not yet attained the elaborateness of the Priestly Code. That was only realized later, when Ezra promulgated his edict of the Torah.

The date for this event usually given (441 B.C.) is by no means certain. A later date is the assumption of the second Artaxerxes, in which case some date between 400-300 B.C. is more probable.

That the stated services of the first ninety years of the new Jerusalem were much less elaborate and costly than the Priests Code prescribes seems to follow from Ezra 9, where we learn that at that time when Ezra arrived in Jerusalem the event was much less elaborate still a weekly or annual offering. The same thing follows still more clearly from Neh 10.7, where we see that a new voluntary tax became necessary when the full Pentecostal ritual was introduced. Evidently that time the stated service appears to have been maintained, with much grumbling and in an imperfect way, at the expense of the priests (Mal 1:4).2

With the promulgation and public acceptance of the full priestly law in Jerusalem by Ezra the services in the Temple became more elaborate and the priesthood more fully organized. This process, perhaps, did not begin till after 400 B.C. Unfortunately the history of the period 400-200 B.C. is very obscure. That Ezra encountered much opposition from the old conservative party in Jerusalem is clear; and this ultimately culminated in the Samaritan schism and the erection of a rival Temple on Mount Gerizim (probably about 320 B.C.). After this event the strict hierarchic party within the Jewish community held undisputed sway. The elaboration of the Temple worship proceeded, it would seem, without a check; and its effects are visible in the work of the chronicler (c. 300-250 B.C.). The elaborate organization of the Levitical arrangements in the Temple described in 1 Ch 23 ff. no doubt reflects the realities of the writer's own time. Here the duties of priests and Levites (now two completely distinct orders), with those of the subordinate classes of doorkeepers and singers, are fully set forth. The teaching of the Law to the people had much more elaboration than is apparent. In this respect the priest was also a teacher (2 Ch 19). Possibly a system of schools for such teaching had been established (cf. Ezra 7:6). The priestly influence was also in control of the courts of justice (2 Ch 19:4-5), and this function descended from them later to the Rabbinical doctors of the Law (scholars). The care for public worship and its elaborate organization was now in the hands of the kings, as David, Solomon, Hezekiah, and Josiah illustrate the actual state of affairs as he knew them.

In these acts prayer, supplication, and thanksgiving are a prominent feature. The old abuses of worship in Chronicles and elsewhere have passed away. We are confronted with a pious community that finds in the great services of the Temple its highest satisfaction and constant care. The annual old sacrifices were still celebrated with pomp and impressive ceremonial. But it was no mere empty formality, devoid of spiritual significance and appeal. It was hallowed by true spiritual fervour, by the sense of sin forgiven and by the transcending recognition of the goodness of the Giver of all good things. Especially significant in this connexion is the large place given to prayer. It is hardly possible to read the prayers of the great kings in Chronicles and not feel that they echo a liturgy of prayer—for the individual and for the nation.1 It is indeed highly probable that some of the older liturgical prayers, embodied in the Prayer Book of the synagogue, were already, in an earlier form, in existence at the time of the chronicler. The service of music and prayer was especially rich, and is dwelt upon with loving minuteness by the chronicler, who was himself, perhaps, a member of one of the Levitical choirs (cf., e.g., 2 Ch 5:12). The Psalter was the book of prayer (cf. 1 Ch 16:40).

That the service of prayer and praise was liturgical in character is evident from the fact that the people were expected to respond: 'And all the people said, Amen, and praised the Lord' (1 Ch 16:40). It is probable also that the Law was read in public assemblies an occurrence typical of the Scribes (Hear, O Israel) is almost certainly as old as this period, as can be shown by the antiquity of the present (synagogue) Benedictions that accompany it.

As Elmslie remarks: 'Even if it be thought that this picture represents rather the ideals of the Levites than the actual attainments of the community, it is still important that such a standard of reverence and devotion should be conceived by the people as a test of the old and new before the people. One recalls the words of the great prophet of exile or post-exilic times who wrote: '...for mine house shall be called of house of prayer for all peoples' (Is 56:7). He was a vision of the Temple as the centre of the whole world's worship. To the Chronicler it had at least become a true "house of prayer" for Israel.'2

How deep and real the devotional spirit could be that underlay the imposing ceremonial of the Temple worship we can see from Neh 8 (for details, which may be regarded as the hymn-book (and, also, to some extent, as the prayer-book) of the second Temple.

Here the worshipful spirit, which finger so lovingly on the services and worship of the House of God (cf. Ps 37:24, 47:2, 100, 122, 123), which finds in that House the focus of its devotion (Ps 37:27-28; 89:17), which delights to celebrate the pomp (the beauty of holiness' holy adoration or vestments: Ps 99:3; cf. 1 Ch 16:40), and the stateliness proceedings (Ps 50:6; 54:6) of the Temple, has yet no narrow conception of worship. To the Psalmists the God of Israel is also the God of nature, and is celebrated as such in the spangled nature-psalms (8, 9, 104, 105, 106, 148), and the transition from the one aspect to the other is easy (Ps 24:3-4). Thus in the composition Ps 19 the psalmist passes from contemplating the wonders of nature (the light of nature) to praise of the Law (the light of revelation). But in truth the range of the Psalter is as wide as the experience and knowledge of man; the Psalmists touch the height and depth of the human spirit; and the universality of their appeal reveals how advancement in particularism had deepened and when it is founded upon a genuine and profound spiritual experience.

The feeling excited in the breast of a pious Jew by the splendid ceremonial of the Temple worship is witnessed at the conclusion of the century (c. 200 B.C.) during which the Chronicler flourished, in ferrety expressed by Ben Sira in his striking tribute to the high priest Simon (11), summoned 'the Just.' He is pictured as he appeared in the Temple of God, 'in the midst of his Levites, with their glorious robes' and surrounded by 'all the sons of Aaron in their glory' be 'went up to the altar of majesty and made glorious the court of the sanctuary.' The crowded court and

2 ib. p. 144.

1 The Old Testament in the Jewish Church, London, 1925, p. 183.
2 ib. p. 444.
The worship of the people who receive the high-priestly blessing are vividly described. "Then the sons of Aaron sounded With their sound-bowls the consecration, which was also sounded and the consequent consecration. Yes, they sounded and caused a mighty blast to be heard For a remembrance before the Most High."

Before the Holy One of Israel, etc. 1

The upheaval produced by the attempted suppression of Judaism at the hands of Antiochus Epiphanes and the consequent Maccabean revolt, was fruitful in momentous consequences. Judaism was rooted more firmly than ever in the hearts of true believers by the persecution. Afection for the Law was deepened, and the study and knowledge of its ordinances was more widely diffused and more actively pursued among laymen. When the fury of the storm had spent itself, Judaism emerged profoundly modified in many important ways. New parties—the Pharisees and Sadducees—came into existence; a new literature, which found its classical example in the book of Daniel, emerged. A new native dynasty ruled, and was soon far more than a sacred constitution; A new Temple-feast, commemorating the rededication of the sanctuary (164 B.C.) after its defilement by the Syrian tyrant, was added to the sacred calendar, as the Feast of Dedication (cf. Jn 10:22), or Chanukkah, and is celebrated in the winter for eight days. It was inaugurated in the circumstances described in 1 Mac 4:46:

"After the Temple had been purified, a new altar of burnt-offering built, and new holy vessels made, the fire was kindled on the altar, the lamps of the candelstick lit, and the rededication of the altar celebrated for eight days."

According to Josephus, its popular name was the Festival of Lights. 2 But during the period that followed the establishment of the new Jewish state a profound change in the whole character of Jewish piety manifested itself in the rise of the Pharisaic party and wide extension of the synagogue as a religious institution. The monopoly of religious leadership, which had hitherto been enjoyed by the priests, was now, perforce, shared by the popular party of the Pharisees, who represented the plain laity, the old priestly party, which was still all-powerful in the Temple, being represented by the Sadducees. 3

The synagogues were under the control of the Pharisees. The origin of the synagogue as a religious institution is en


2 On these commemoration of the festival in the synagogues, see Acts 15:16 and Rom 15:16.

3 For a summary of the ceremonial of the daily service, outside the three great national festivals of Passover, Pentecost, and Tabernacles; and (2) to summarize briefly the ceremonial of the daily service, outside the three great national festivals of Passover, Pentecost, and Tabernacles; (2) to summarize briefly the ceremonial of the daily service, outside the three great national festivals of Passover, Pentecost, and Tabernacles; (2) to summarize briefly the ceremonial of the daily service, outside the three great national festivals of Passover, Pentecost, and Tabernacles; (2) to summarize briefly the ceremonial of the daily service, outside the three great national festivals of Passover, Pentecost, and Tabernacles; (2) to summarize briefly the ceremonial of the daily service, outside the three great national festivals of Passover, Pentecost, and Tabernacles; (2) to summarize briefly the ceremonial of the daily service, outside the three great national festivals of Passover, Pentecost, and Tabernacles; (2) to summarize briefly the ceremonial of the daily service, outside the three great national festivals of Passover, Pentecost, and Tabernacles; (2) to summarize briefly the ceremonial of the daily service, outside the three great national festivals of Passover, Pentecost, and Tabernacles.
of the firstfruits of thy ground thou shalt bring into the house of the Lord thy God.

These gifts formed part of the revenue of the priesthood, and were destined to be stored in the Temple. Great importance was attached to this offering, which alone among the offerings that were given in the Tabernacle was to be brought by them directly to the Temple. It was of great antiquity and naturally lapsed with the destruction of the sanctuary. The description of the scene by R. Delitzsch 1 is well known and need not be repeated.

(2) The daily routine of the Temple-worship, including the weekly Sabbath celebrations, was interrupted only by the great festivals, the most important of which were kept with special ceremonial, for several days. The characteristic features of the worship, however, are well illustrated by the ceremonial of the morning and evening sacrifice (Ttmd≤'a). Delitzsch as before gives a good reconstruction. 2

In the Temple itself the opening of the sanctuary gates was the signal for the actual slaughter of the sacrifice, the sprinkling of its blood upon the altar and the flaying of the victim. The pieces into which the sacrifice was divided were carried by the six allotted priests (each taking one piece) to the altar, while the offering of flour an eighth the baked meal-offering (of the high-priest), and a ninth the wine of the drink-offering. These were all laid at the foot of the altar-ascent and salted; and then all the priests assembled once more in the Hall of Polished Stones, there to celebrate, first of all, a service of prayer. It is highly significant that the sacrificial service should have been interrupted at this point and temporarily suspended. This can only have grown up as a concession to the overwhelming popular feeling in favour of the recital of the prescribed sections of the Law, with the appropriate accompaniment of prayer. The priests retired for this purpose to the Hall of Polished Stones, which was sufficiently near the court to allow of their quick withdrawal to it and rapid return to the sanctuary. It will be remembered that they had already assembled at early dawn in this chamber to cast the first lots for determining the distribution of certain priestly duties. The passage in the Mishnah 3 which speaks of this meeting and its purpose runs as follows:

(1) The Assembly congregated and entered the Hall of Polished Stones to read the Shema.

(2) The president said to them: Give one blessing; and they blessed.

(3) And recited the Ten Commandments and the Shema (in its three sections).

(4) And they blessed the people with three blessings; viz., (the blessing) True and firm (בנין בר相声), that of service (יהוה יבש ורים), and the blessing of the priests (בנין יהוה כבוד).

This brief account is extraordinarily interesting, but not free from difficulty. The purpose for which the priests for-gathered is described as to read (or recite) the Shema.' This is a summary way of describing the reading of certain portions of Scripture the most important of which was the Shema (Dt 6:4-9), and certain accompanying liturgical Blessings. The leader or 'president' is to be regarded, not as the minister who recites the prayers on behalf of the congregation, but as the leader whoso reads in the recitation of the assembled priests all joining in. Possibly 'Bless' here means merely 'Begin the liturgical service.'

It is explicitly stated in line three that the Deuteronomic formula for the conclusion of the service with the Shema. This was the ancient practice, later discontinued by the Decalogue. While it is evident that the moral law, summed up in the Decalogue, was more important than all the rest. 4 Possibly the first two sections only of the Shema were recited in the ancient liturgy, and the addition of the third may be due to the gloss, reflecting the later practice. The recital of the Shema was preceded by a Benediction; but the Mishnah here gives no clue as to what it was, though, according to the Babylonian Talmud, 5 this part was disputed by the Rabbinical schools. Probably the form used was that known as Ahabah rabbah ('with abounding love'), which is still chanted in the synagogue service. 6

In the fourth line of the Mishnah passage the present text runs: And they blessed the people with three blessings.' As L. Efberg has pointed out, 7 the words the people are probably an incorrect gloss. The priests were engaged in a service of prayer within a semi-private room, outside the Temple proper. There could be no question of blessing the people, which would naturally form part of the public service within the sanctuary. The three blessings that followed coincide partly with well-known liturgical forms: True and firm is the name still given to the first of the Blessing recited after the Temple sacrifice. In the Temple its form was doubtless much shorter than the recension now current in the Prayer Books.

'Service' (יהוה יבש וריך) was probably an earlier form of the 17th paragraph of the Shemoneh 'Esreh, 8 and expressed gratitude for the splendid Temple-worship. The last 'Blessing of the Priests' was probably a petition uttered for the priests.

This liturgical service of prayer for the priests is noteworthy. It shows how high a place prayer and community life had in the sacrificial worship. The high place accorded to the liturgical recitation of the Scriptures is also a remarkable feature, and serves, perhaps, to show how far-reaching the influence of Pharisaic and synagogal piety really was.

After the conclusion of this priestly liturgy the assembled priests again drew lots—the third and fourth—to determine who should offer the incense in the sanctuary, and who should lay the various parts of the victim upon the altar. Those on whom no lot had fallen were now free to go away, after divesting themselves of the priestly dress. Then followed the sacrifice proper—the offering of incense and of sacrifice, accompanied by prayer.

At the solemn moment when the high priest, alone within the sanctuary, offered the incense, which became visible in clouds of smoke, the people withdrew from the inner court and prostrated themselves, spreading their hands in silent prayer (cf Rev 4:8). The incensing priest, after prostrating himself for worship, also withdrew from the sanctuary. A period of silent prayer followed, and the people were then blessed by the priests, the five priests who had been engaged in the offering of the incense standing on the steps in front of the Temple proper, and, led by the principal officiant, pronouncing the blessing on the people with uplifted hands.

The offering of the burnt-offering now went forward, together with the appropriate accompaniments (meal-offerings and drink-offering), and then followed the musical part of the service. The Levitical choir, to the accompaniment of instrumental music, sang the psalm of the day. The psalm was sung in three sections, the end of each

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1 Jewish Artistic Life, London, 1902, ch. IV. (A June Day in ancient Jerusalem during last decade before Christ). The first section had been presented annually between Pentecost and the Feast of Dedication.

2 ib. Ch. also the art. 'Temple-Service' in EnBi (by the present writer), cols. 4501-4506.

3 Ttmd≤'a, v. 1.

4 See C. Taylor, Sayings of the Jewish Fathers, Cambridge, 1897, 111.

5 Delitzsch, Der O.T. 33. (1891).

6 ibid. 118. For the much shorter form recited in the Temple see K. v. a. Ahabah Ekkabah,' p. 251.

7 Studies in Jewish Literature, Berlin, 1915, p. 50.1. There is some evidence that this text was read with the interpolated words in earlier times.

being marked by three blasts on silver trumpets (blown by a body of priests), at the sound of which the people withdrew from the sanctuary for the service of the day. This terminated the morning service, and private sacrifices were then proceeded with. The evening service (about 3 o'clock in the afternoon) was practically a repetition of the morning, the same priests officiating—except in the case of the incensing priest, for whom a fresh lot was taken. On the Sabbaths and great festivals the essential features of the services were the same. The high priest, the large number of sacrifices were offered, but the character of the worship was substantially identical.

There are, of course, to be noted special ceremonies in connection with the festivals and the forms of worship, which found expression in the synagogue, as well as for the rivalry between synagogue and Temple, the momentous consequences of the destruction of the Temple, and the character of the synagogue prayers, reference may be made to the articles 'PRAYER (Jewish).' Here it must suffice to make a few general observations on the characteristic features of the synagogue worship.

(1) In harmony with its origin the synagogue worship is essentially of a popular and democratic type. It has no organic connexion with the priesthood; its ministers are essentially laymen—at first it had no professional ministers at all. The Rabbis were not singular out for special honour by being simply learned laymen; its services, though liturgical in character, and provided with (in many cases) interesting and dignified ceremonial, are essentially simple in character. Synagogue worship has retained the element of instruction and edification (the reading and exposition of Scripture), with which is combined the service of praise and prayer.

(2) Temple worship has been pointed out, the synagogue, as a religious institution, had already come into existence long before the destruction of the Temple and the consequent cessation of the sacrificial worship. It met a widespread religious need, owing to the centralization of the sacrificial worship in Jerusalem. While only a limited number of Jews could be present at any one time in the central sanctuary, and assist in the offering of the sacrifice, the whole body of the people was daily called upon to partake in the services of the synagogue. To a certain, though limited, extent the synagogue was affiliated to the Temple worship. It will be remembered that, for purposes of the daily sacrificial worship, not only the priests and Levites, but the Israelites generally were divided into twenty-four courses of service, each of which had to take its turn in coming before God (in the Temple) every day for a whole week by way of representing the whole body of the people, while the daily sacrifice was being offered to Jehovah. But it appears that

not the whole division of Israelites on duty but only a deputation from it was actually present at the Temple on any given day, and the majority, who had been left behind, assembled in the local synagogues (at the time when the sacrifice was actually offered in the Temple) and engaged in prayer and the reading of Scripture. But in all of this affiliation the synagogue was essentially free from the limitations applying to a centralized worship and a sacerial system. 'Hence, when the latter disappeared in the great catastrophe of 70 A.D., the former continued to exist, exactly fitted to be the instrument for the reconstruction of Judaism.'

(3) At the same time it is important to remember that the Temple-worship has profoundly influenced not only the structure of the synagogue liturgy, but also the form and substance of its prayers.

The disappearance of the old sacrificial cult was felt by pious Jews at the time as a real catastrophe. But they had already been prepared by Rabbinical teaching (not to speak of that of the great prophets and some of the scribes) for a spiritualizing of the sacrificial idea, and this tendency was further strengthened by the exigencies of the situation which left the synagogue as the sole religious institution in which the Jewish religious consciousness could express itself. A real satisfaction of the instincts and cravings which had been, to some extent, met by the splendid Temple-worship was provided by the traditional liturgy of the synagogue, which could be regarded as a sort of parabolic and metaphorical fulfillment of sacrifices in the following ways.

(a) It furnished forms of prayer for daily worship which corresponded to the original daily sacrifice. In accordance with this principle those days for which additional sacrifices had been appointed (Sabbaths, new moons and Festivals) were provided with additional forms of prayer, called musef ("additional").

(b) In the synagogue Liturgy special sections from the Law and the Mishnah, which contain the original enactments about the daily and Sabbath offerings, occupy a place at the beginning of the service; and on high days and festivals it is the rule to supplement the Pentateuch lesson by the parashah from the Law which prescribes the sacrifices appropriate to the day. For instance, during the Feast of Tabernacles the paragraph No 283-292 is read in addition from a second scroll.

The principle underlying all this is stated in a homiletic passage in the Talmud. Abraham is represented to have anxiously asked R. Judah ha-Nasi: "What is the full equivalent of these words 'the Lord forgive them' which you pronounced after the Temple was destroyed, and they should have no place to bring their sacrifices, and he was told that to read the duty of these sacrifices from the Tora would make our offering the full equivalent." (M. B. 54a).

Further, various petitions have been introduced into the prayers for the restoration of the Temple services and sacrifices. In some cases an older prayer has been amplified in this sense.

In these various ways the sacrificial idea has been largely spiritualized. 'The daily offering of prayer, praise, and thanksgiving morning and afternoon in the Synagogue is a spiritual counterpart and fulfillment of the old daily sacrifice in the Temple. In this way the words of the prophet Hoses are in spirit fulfilled: 'We shall render as bullocks the offering of our lips' (Hos 14:2).'

(4) The language employed in the synagogue liturgy is Hebrew, with a slight admixture of Aramaic. As has already been pointed out, the older elements in the prayers go back to a considerable antiquity (long before the Christian era)—possibly, in some cases, to the late Persian period. In such cases the prayers very probably passed over into the synagogue, and thence into the public reading of the Law, and were there committed to memory. The leading form of expression in the synagogue was the same as in the older writings, with some changes in the rendering of some words, to adapt the language to the circumstances. In the modern synagogue the position is exactly reversed, the ark being placed in the east end, and the reader, while on the bema, facing east.

1 See W. O. E. Oesterley and G. H. Box, The Religion and Worship of the Synagogue, p. 401.
2 ibid. 3 ff.
3 During the latter years of the Temple's existence there was, apparently, a synagogue within the Temple precincts.
5 Oesterley and Box, The Religion and Worship of the Synagogue, p. 362.
grow up in connexion with the Temple liturgy and were afterwards transferred to the liturgy of the synagogue.

The language in the fixed parts of the liturgy is not only Hebrew, but largely Biblical Hebrew—in fact a Scriptural character is deeply impressed upon the prayers generally. Whole passages of the Old Testament are taken from the Bible, and Biblical language is interwoven into the texture of the prayers.

Outside Palestine among the Jews of the Dispersion in Greek-speaking lands the language was different. There Greek was largely, if not exclusively, used. It seems that not only the Scriptures, but also the most important parts (if not all) of the liturgy—such as the Shema and Shemoneh Ech'ur—were regularly recited in the Hebrew language in Greek, and not in Greek at all. This is seen in the accounts where the Jews who attended the services were ranged according to their trades, this was the case. We are told that the signal for the vast audience to join in the Amen response was given by the reader waving a cloth from the bima. Even in the Mishnah section is given to the use of any language whatever in repeating the Shema; the Shemoneh Ech'ur ('Eighteen Blessings'), and the grace at meals. In later practice, however, Hebrew has been the only language recognized as legitimate for prayer and worship in the orthodox synagogue.

(5) In studying the synagogue liturgy it is important to realize the central position of the Law. The recitation of the Shema (which may be regarded as a summary of the Law) is invested with great sanctity, and is performed by special Benedictions, as we have seen. But the Sabbath morning service—which is the principal one—culminates in the chanting of the lesson from the Law. The recitation of the Law at the services is the occasion of much ceremony—the carrying of the scrolls to and from the ‘ark’ is invested with great solemnity, not to speak of the scrolls themselves, which are treated with the most elaborate care, according to minute rules, and are treasured in gorgeous and valuable vestments. The Law itself, i.e., the Pentateuch, is regarded as the supreme and final revelation of God. It stands at the head of the canonic books, and the solemnities of it, the other two divisions of the Hebrew Scriptures, the Prophets and the ‘writings’ (Hagiographa), occupy quite a subordinate place. They but serve to illustrate and enforce its precepts, and are interpreted accordingly. All this is but the expression of a profound conviction that God has chosen to make a supreme revelation of Himself and His regulations in the divine Law, and that man is sanctified by the divine Law, which is the very principle of his perfection.

Jewish piety is thus exhusted and expresses itself in the minute and punctilious performance of the divine Law, and in the veneration of the Rabbinists. The performance of these duties is regarded as exercising a sanctifying influence on the worshipper; he feels that he is, by so doing, obeying the divine voice, and in this utter obedience he finds a real spiritual satisfaction; the practice of it evokes in the breast of a pious Jew a genuine devotional spirit which finds expression in constant and regular acts of praise and thanksgiving. A characteristic feature deeply impressed upon the liturgy is the regular recurrence of the formulas of blessing and benediction (Heb. berakâh); something like a hundred are extant in Rabbinical literature. In general, the Hebrew prayer is constructed on the model of the Western litany: 'Every manifestation of divine protection and help became an opportunity for the pious Israelite to offer up thanksgiving in the usual form of a benediction.'

In the majority of cases, the set Prayer Book has played an important part. One of the most famous of its constituents is the so-called ‘Eighteen Blessings’ (Shemoneh Ech'ur: ‘Eighteen’)—consists of a number of Benedictions constructed in regular form, which are strung together, and invariable expressed in the formula: 'Bless our God, O Lord our God, King of the Universe, Who, etc.' Here remarkably the element of petition is mingled with that of blessing. The Shemoneh Ech'ur is one of the principal formulas in the synagogue service; it recurs in various forms in all the services, and, moreover, is recited in double form, first silently and then audibly, by the congregation. It is the Psalms (or Tefillah; yor each of its sections is one of its designations), and is recited by the congregation standing (‘Amidah as ‘standing’) is another designation), the most solemn attitude for worship required in the synagogue service.

Special benedictions are also recited before and after the recitation of the Law, being introduced by the formula 'Bless ye.' This is in accordance with Biblical precedent (Neh 9). The element of praise is maintained in the recitation of certain psalms, especially the Hallel (Pss 113–118). Another element of great importance is represented by various forms of confession of sin (Heb. wadath), etc. The two great formulas in this are the Abinah malkenu, ‘Our Father, our King,’ and the ‘Al Het,’ for the sin.' The latter is appended to the ‘Amidah prayer for each service of the Day of Atonement.

LITERATURE.—For the ancient cultus: much new light has been thrown on this department of knowledge by excavation and discovery. For a good summary of these results see S. R. Driver, Manual of the O.T. (2nd ed.; as illustrated by Excavations and Researches), London, 1870; or, also, H. Vincent, Canaan d'apres l'exploration recents, Paris, 1907. For the discoveries at Gezer and elsewhere, the PEREST of recent years, and R. A. S. Macalister's full summary in his Excavation of Gezer, 2 vo. London, 1913. Of special interest, too, are special volumes of the J. W. Robertson Smith, Religion of the Semites, London, 1894; W. W. Basselinus, Miscellen zu der Universität, Leipzig, 1876–78; and the researches of S. Ives Curtis, Primitive Semitic Religion Today, London, 1902. See also the Hebrew, Jewish, and Semitic sections of the Encyclopaedia Biblica, Moses, Houben. PLACE, IMAGES AND IDEOLS, PRAYER, PRAYER, PROFITATION, SACRI- FICE (with the literature cited), and the corresponding articles in the Bible Dictionaries; and the art. 'Kultus (gottdienst)," in Hamburger, i. 658 E.


The following works of a general character deal with the worship both of the Temple and of the synagogue: Schöber, GVT., i. 24; W. Boussen, Die Religion des Judentums im sechszehnten Jahrhundert, Berlin, 1908; W. O. E. Oesterley and G. H. Box, The Religion and Worship of the Synagogue, London, 1911. Other works have been cited in the body of the article. G. H. Box.

WORSHIP (Hindu).—Worship springs from the inward feeling of dependence upon other powers, from the idea of two extremes in man's mind by the perception of supernatural agents which influence his or others' welfare. The desire to gain their favour or propitiate them, to call forth their sympathy, to make them resources, or to induce them to men to invent that instrument of rite and spell which is thought to ensure and even to enforce

1 It can be read in full in Singer, pp. 44–54.
2 Singer, pp. 58–57.
4 See, further, art. "PEELER (Jewish)."
their assistance. Rite and spell form the centre of primitive belief and of institutions of religious or magical character, and none of them is more widely known than the doctrine of the ‘sacrificial fire’, the hypothesis advanced by R. Karsten1 that strange and dangerous objects and phenomena as well as fatal events of every kind have suggested to primitive man the idea of a fire in the midst of or connected with the universe,2 that at first only the cruel and destructive aspect attracted man’s attention, whereas the fruitful and beneficial one almost entirely escaped him,3 is, though well founded otherwise, not in agreement with the textless and the Sanskrit words, and must be reconsidered in that respect, or the Indian sacrifice must be assumed to have already passed this supposed stage of primitive belief.

Hindu writers divide the various kinds of sacrifice into two principal classes: nitya (‘regular’) and naimittika (‘accidental’) karman, one following the course of the year or the duties imposed upon man during life, the other comprising incidental offerings occasioned by special wishes of the sacrificer. This is, of course, a distinction more of practice than of principle, but it seems better than the modern distinction into thanksgiving, suppliant, and expiatory sacrifices, which to the student of Indian rituals will not appear sufficient; e.g., the series of regular periodical offerings cannot be divided into three classes. On the other hand, some scholars (e.g., Wunti)2 seem to overestimate the importance of expiatory ceremonies. The prayaschitta, though often mentioned, is more an accessory than a constructive element and mostly intended to rectify blunders committed against the ritual. We do meet with expiatory rites in Indian ritual,3 but on the whole the idea of expiation, as far as it is found, plays no prominent part; it is more a juridical than a ritual subject and is elaborately discussed in the lawbooks. We do not hear of thanksgiving sacrifice; even the term ‘suppliant sacrifice’ we cannot accept without reservation. Gods are invoked to come and take their share in offering, but there is no deep emotion, no uplifting of the heart or stirring of the soul; there always lingers the old idea that the god is ensnared by sacrifice and bound to render his assistance.

India thus testifies to the results arrived at by ethnographical writers ‘that primitive worship, being prompted merely by the preponderation of instinct and emotion on the will of interested motives, has no ethical character.’1 It must, however, be added that in the puruṣāsṛṣṭa and the sarvamedha we find examples of the ‘self-denying sacrifice’; for they enjoin abandonment of all property and renunciation of the world;5 but it is to be remembered that the general tendency of these sacrifices has grown on Indian soil and seems to be somehow connected with the later idea of the pūrvatādhyāka, or ‘religious mendicant.’ Of the three purposes of sacrifice distinguished by La Grasserie6 only the first can, in fact, be said to hold true of the Vedic sacrifice.

The sacrifice forms an intrinsic unity, the special character of which throughout is dictated by the particular wishes for the fulfilment of which the sacrificer sets in motion the ritualistic apparatus. If the sacrificer aims at the life of an adversary, the priests offering the ṛṣeyu-sacrifice must wear a red frontlet, sacrificial butter is made from the milk of a sick cow, and the skin necessary for soma-pressing is taken from a cow used as anuśataraṇī during the burial ceremonies, and only those who wish to prosper their king offer the gossa-sacrifice, in which he is anointed on a levelled piece of ground (sthāndita) and addressed as ‘ṣatapat.'5 and still more as purohita6 and mahārātra, or solstice-sacrifice, where drums are beaten to encourage the demons and assist the sun, and obscene rites symbolize the desired fertility. Similis similibus sacrificatur is the principle which permeates the whole cult.

The sacrifices of the domestic ritual, which are described in the gṛhya-sāstras, are very simple; they are as a rule performed by the householder and his wife, but they often call in a brāhmaṇa or pūjāri to function in their stead or to assist. Persons of high rank, especially kings, had their spiritual adviser, the purohita; for the gods, it is said: do not eat the food of a king, who is a purhohita.2 The sacrifices of the śrauta ritual, the complicated system of which is taught with the utmost care, all need priestly help, and the number of Brahmical functionaries increases up to sixteen in the soma-sacrifice, and to twenty in the domestic, and to several hundred in the ceremonial, its many hymns and chants. Nearly all functions are left to this band of scholarly priests, with whom rests the power even to destroy the life of him who has enkindled these sacrifices.

The vajamāna had to select the priests from the families of the Brahmical caste, and particular care had to be taken that they should be without blemish and well instructed; for any blunder in the strict observance of rules, in the proper wording or pronunciation of the sacred mantras, might annihilate the result of the sacrifice and even endanger the health and life of the sacrificer and vajamāna. It is comparatively little that the sacrificer and his wife can do themselves. Their part gradually became restricted to personal preparation or points of minor consequence.7 An exception is found only in great satras, or sacrificial sessions, where none but Brahmans are admitted and the priestly duties devolve on the partakers. In India, therefore, more than elsewhere sacrifice has lost its social aspect, and, except in a few cases like the vajamāna, the avāsamāna, the aṃśa-sacrifices, and a few traces of sacra publica in the Rgveda,8 it can be regarded only as a private institution.

Particular care was bestowed on selecting the day fit for sacrifices and the place where the tantra, the sacrificial ‘tissue,’ was to be woven; there were no temples as in later times, but the special character of the sacrifice and priestly knowledge determined the spot where the holy grass had to be strewn as carpet for the gods and the fires had to be made. All śrauta sacrifices require three fires: the bhanāyika, the daksāṇa, and the gauryāyana fire, corresponding to heaven, antariksa, and earth, and dedicated to the world of gods, ancestors, and men.9 No doubt, this way of selecting and preparing the sacred ground had its origin in the custom of pastoral tribes10 pitching their tents anywhere, and had been retained by the conservative mechanism of sacrificial rules. Between the three fires (of which the daksāṇa serves also for conjuring purposes and is probably the successor of the old Barbara) which are traced, a place of special sanctity, where the gods

are supposed to sit down and take their meal, and every precaution is taken by word and action to ward off the demons and destroy their evil influences.

In the objects of sacrifice there is little variety. Different kinds of milk, cakes made of rice or barley, flour, etc., form the materials for the oblations of the ordinary sacrifice and its almost endless modifications; the cakes are offered on potters or tablets, the number of which depends upon the character of the god to whom they are offered. The ordinary sacrifice, or pārubādra, or animal-sacrifice, requires goats, rams, bulls, which are offered almost indiscriminately to all gods, the difference generally being expressed by the shape, colour, and other bodily characteristics of the animal. Horse-sacrifices (ārxurūdha [g. ṛu], ṛu), which are regarded as an act of state and are of great importance, are of course an exception. There were in ancient India even human sacrifices, celebrated with the same pomp and following nearly the same ritual as the horse-sacrifice, till they were gradually replaced by the milder practice of an ordinary pārubāda. Of other materials we find wood to be an interesting drink, sometimes in the Rgveda honey; the liquor the gods like best is the juice of the soma-plant, pressed and offered in the āgnīṣṭoma (a spring festival), and its numerous varieties. More than other sacrifices the soma-sacrifice is an imitation and representation of heavenly proceedings. As Soma, the moon, contains the heavenly ambrosia, so the yellow shoot of an unknown (and probably often changed) plant is supposed to yield that costly drink enjoyed by devas and pitaras. If an analogy to the 'sacrifice of the God,' so well treated by J. G. Frazer, ever existed in India, it cannot be located, for nowhere else than in the sacrifice of the plant representing a ray of the lunar god.

The norm of all sacrifices belonging to the śrāvita ritual is given by the dārā-pāurnādsāta (the new and full moon sacrifice), the pārubāda (animal-sacrifice), and the āgnīṣṭoma (the soma-offering); all other sacrifices follow these, with variations required by the special case. The whole series of ceremonies forms a tantra, 'tisane, the framework, into which the āśvāpa is inserted. The tantra remains the same for almost every sacrifice; the āśvāpa consists of the chief offerings and invocations (verses, etc.) and varies according to circumstances. All ceremonies, prayers, libations, spells, etc., converge to the one point, to bring about that religious power, 'the magical soul of the sacrifice,' as it may be called, which forms the spiritual instrument that ensures success. Hubert and Mauss have well illustrated the metamorphosis which takes place in the persons as well as in the implements needed for sacrifice. All that concerns gods must be of divine character; the yajamāna must be prepared by certain rites in order to be worthy to approach the precincts of the supernatural. This is done by various penances, by shaving, bathing, abstaining from food and sexual intercourse, etc. Different substances are used to impart their mystic power, are poured over him, inhaled by him, etc. The implements are consecrated with mantra or yantra; e.g., the rice is thrown into the winnowing basket with the words: 'You take at the impulse of God Sāvitr, with the arms of the Asvins,' etc. If they bring an animal-sacrifice, the sacrificial post erected on the yevi is sanctified by unctions and mantras and located in a spiritus of supersensuousness. The oblations are consecrated by various ceremonies, among which the pāryagaṁkaraṇa deserves special mention.

The priest takes a firebrand and carries it three times round the oblation in the animal, describing thus a magic circle in order to keep off the demons and make the victim appropriate to the gods. The oblations precede the animal-sacrifice, the latter being the climax. The sacrificial animal (the āśvāpa) is offered as an animal-sacrifice the divine essence, which permeates the animal when it is on the point of being immolated and by secret formulas vanishes itself to the pāurnādsā, who4 louches it on its way to the slaughtering place by means of the repeated words: 'swa' (two spits upon which the animal (the āśvāpa, or the oblation) is later to be roasted). After the recitation of expiatory mantras, the animal is thrown for the crime to the fire, where the animal is 'quieted' by strangulation. Those performers who are not immediately concerned in this act step back and sit down, turning their face towards the diṣpit; in order to avoid being eye-witnesses of the act. The religious drama has then reached its climax. Among the parts of the animal assigned to the gods theombat is most conspicuous; the blood is poured out for the demons, who later receive also the husks of the grain. Special parts of the principal oblations form the āśvāpa, which is the portion of the priests and the sacrificer and is regarded as a mystic duty who is invoked with great solemnity to come together with other mystic powers of the universe and bestow prosperity on the pāurnādsā. The ceremony then gradually relaxes; the 'tisane' has been woven, it must be dissolved again. As the drama after the peripetia, so the sacrifice of the gods descend from the summit which it has reached and dismiss the performer from its magic circle to his worldly atmosphere. Various illusions follow the āśvāpa. The batter or false fire is the last act of the ceremony; the taboo is discarded, some of the implements, while others, especially those penetrated by some magic substance imparted to the implement for the purpose which they served, are concealed in the ground. The sacrificer finishes his vow by repeating the same mantras which he was said at the beginning, or in other modifications, or at the request required by the different situation: he 'loosens' the sacrifice (consolatorio) and returns home.

A good many accessory practices serve to enforce the general purpose of the sacrifice: the heads of certain animals, immersed in the āgnīṣṭoma, give the altar strength and solidity; an emerald plant laid in the holes dug for the pillars or posts of the house prevents the house from breaking into a blaze. These accretions are like small rivulets which feed the main stream of sacrificial effectiveness. But the present writer fails to discover the line in the face of facts. Magic is the lowest stratum in the development of religion. The limits between magic and sacrifice are constantly shifting, in consequence of change of times, of inward dissimilarity, but of intellectual progress and growing enlightenment.

The operator of the magical act, says R. R. Marett, is generally a projection of imperative will, and specifically one that moves on a supernormal plane. If that will has become less imperative, a little more subtle, the feeling of being sublimated by supernatural powers independent of itself, magical art has changed into religion. As the genius of Greek art lies concealed under the awkward attempts of antecedent times and awaits its release by the profusion of religious ideas, so is the root of superstition, the germ of religious ideas in order to be freed from the entangling net of magical superstition awaits the progress of civilization. If to a symbolic action the performer refers a true religion, the instrument is some-
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WORSHIP (Jain).—1. Śvetāmbara. 2—(a) Morning worship.—The hour of the morning and more elaborate worship in a Śvetāmbara temple is 7:30 a.m. Leelāchār, the doorway that guards the temple courtyard, the worshipers come to a room where the more devout and more leisureed exchange their secular dress for the two freshly-washed clothst; a loin-cloth and a shoulder-scarf) in which alone they may enter the inner shrine. They also leave in this room any money they have brought and desire to keep, for the tirthankara must have everything on which his eye 'lights,' and these two cloths admit of no pockets for concealment. The worshipers now ascend the steps to the temple proper, at the doorway of which are two carved beasts supporting the throne-hand to represent Yakṣa and Yakṣāṇa, the servants of the tirthankara, to whom the temple is dedicated. It is left to the temple-servants to worship these beasts, the ordinary devotees having, so they say, no time to meditate on them. The ritual acts of the lay-worshiper are our best guide in investigating this worship, for the temple-officiant, usually a Brāhman, or even a gardener by caste, can give no reliable instruction. 4

In the open porch (mandapa) outside the temple-door the devotee marks his own forehead with the auspicious saffron-mark (or orhanta), using, of course, his third finger mark. and then circumambulates the temple outside three times in the auspicious way, i.e. with his right hand nearest to the building. Still standing outside the temple, the worshipper joins his hands together in the attitude of prayer immortalized in Dürer's 'Praying Hands,' and says for the first time 'Nimāthi.' An instructed devout worshipper uses this expression not once (as is the common wont), but three times: 2 (1) he says it outside, in the temple-porch, asking that he may be cut off and freed from all worldly cares; (2) crossing the threshold and standing just inside, he again says it, asking that he may be set apart from all thought of the temple-servants or his fellow-worshipers; (3) when he comes to the great spiritual point of his worship, he repeats the word once more, asking that he may be cut off from all thought of the worship he himself has offered, and enabled to concentrate all his thoughts on the qualities of the tirthankara.

As the worshipper crosses the raised threshold, it is interesting to see that he does not hesitate to put his foot on the plain boss of it—a thing no Brāhman would do, believing it to be the seat of Ganesa. 4 The worshipper is now in the Hall of Assembly, or salla naṅgaṇa, a hall supported by a circle of pillars and at the present day generally disfigured with various temple trappings, such as dark reds and greens and golden yellow mingled together on a plaster background; but in the older temples on Mount Abu (Rajputāna) or Satnājaya Hill (State of Patāliputra) the delicate tracery in silver or marble of the struts between the pillars in this hall and the carved work surrounding the doorway leading to the inner shrine make the whole resemble a veritable temple building.

The worshipper proceeds at once to cross the threshold and enter the inner shrine (gobhāra). Visitors, however, must advance only up to the doorway; but, standing there, they can gain a view not only of the big image of the principal tirthankara (vaṭa nāyaka) of that particular shrine, 5 perhaps Mahāvtara, to whom the whole temple is dedicated, and the two servants (Yakṣa and Yakṣāṇa) that flank the big image, but also of the rows of twenty-four smaller tirthankaras that, arranged on a long altar-shelf, stretch on either side of the main image for the whole length of the inner shrine. There are very often two smaller doors leading from the Hall of Assembly to this inner shrine, and opposite each of these on the altar-shelf are arranged large images of some other tirthankaras (perhaps Adinātha or Bhāsbhavadeva respectively. All the tirthankaras in this shrine are, like the temple, represented with staring glass eyes, and with carved stone loin-cloths. They are nearly always, too, seated figures, the larger images being adorned with jewels and flowers. Below the big central statue of Mahāvtara (let us say) may be seen a gleaming image of some tirthankara (perhaps Parśvanātha) fashioned out of five metals.

On a low altar-shelf there may or may not be a folding brass lotus-flower with some tirthankara in the centre and twenty-three smaller images of tirthankara in bas-relief on the petals; or a little tray with the eight good omen that always precede a tirthankara; or a copper plate (the mentra of Vijaya) covered with mystic symbols; or twenty-four two-inch brass plates, each bearing outline pictures of the tirthankara. All of these may or may not be present, but there must be at least one Siddha chakra, for no temple is complete unless it contains this crystallized creed of Jainism. The Siddha chakra resembles a little tray; in the centre is a good figure of an Avas, and around it the figures of Sādhim, Upākhāyā, Achāraya, and Siddha, and between the encircling figures are written the names of the Three Jewels of the Jain faith: Right Knowledge, Right Faith, and Right Conduct, and Laxmi (auspiciety), the key-word to the Jain system. 6

In a Śvetāmbara temple the worshipper bids for the right to win merit by performing the worship under the form of 'anointing the gīt.' Any number of worshipers may purchase the right for prices varying from five annas to one rupee or more, and each successful bidder starts the morning worship again from the very beginning as soon as his predecessor has finished. The first worshipper enters the inner shrine and, after the worshiper in the first position has been anointed with liquid saffron (chavada naṅgaṇa) in fourteen different places in the following order: 1

1 Recognizable at once by the differing symbols at the base of the idol.
2 See the present writer's Heart of Jainism, p. 362.
3 This berasī is so expensive that it can only be applied to the chief image. A very rich worshipper might also cause the image to be covered with gold-foil leaves.
4 See the present writer's Rites of the Two-Born, p. 573.
right toe, left toe, right knee, left knee, right wrist, left wrist, right shoulder, left shoulder, top of skull, forehead, throat, heart, navel, and centre of right palm; and, as he marks it, he sings ten separate verses in its praise.

If the worshipper is a very rich man, he may offer any fifteen rupees by which he or (if he be indolent as well as rich) the temple-officiant will put on the idol its very best jewellery—crown, necklace, ear-rings, bracelets, armlets, girdle, sandals, all of gold—and give it a gold or silver coco-nut to hold in its hands. (The best jewellery may also include ropes of pearls.) If the worshipper cannot afford more than twenty-five rupees, the second-best jewellery only will be brought out. Except when a wealthy client is present or on great festivals, the ordinary worshipper proceeds at once to decorate the statue with flowers and garlands (pushpa pājā). He then steps outside: the inner shrine to perform the remaining ritual acts: he waves a stick of incense (dāhīya pājā) and a lamp (dīpa pājā) at the threshold of the shrine, and places on the table in the Hall of Assembly before the doorway of the inner shrine rice (akṣata), the only grain which (unlike Hindu ritual) can ever be offered in a Jain temple, sugar (naivedya pājā), and fruit (phala pājā), such as coco-nut, plantains, mangoes, or almonds. 2 It is important to notice how the last three offerings are made.

The worshipper arranges the rice in the following form:

1. The centre of (d), if it be a rich man, he places a coin of varying value, and beside it or on it he places the sugar and the fruit.
2. The swastika sign symbolizes the gate in which a man may be born according to his accumulated deeds of past karmas, either as a dweller in heaven or in hell, as a man or a beast. The three little heaps (e) represent the Three Jewels of the Jain faith: dharma (a), nāma (b), symbolized by the sign of one dot in the segment of a circle.

In studying the worship in a Jain or a Hindu temple special attention must always be paid to four points:

(1) Who is allowed to go into the inner shrine. It was surprising to be told that in a Svetāmbara temple any devout Jain lady of position who had bathed and come wearing clean clothes might enter the inner shrine. He said such persons enter every ritual act that a layman is allowed to do. 4

(2) What change the offering undergoes by being offered to a god. In a Jain temple the deeply interesting change from naivedya to prasāda 5 is unknown, and the word prasāda is never used, but in a Svetāmbara or Digambara temple, once food has been offered to the tirthankara, it is called deva drayaca, or very often by the ignorant, nirmanīya. 6

(3) What change and may not be offered. In a Digambara temple no fresh fruit may be offered, and in a Svetāmbara temple no over-ripe fruit may be given.

(4) Perhaps most illuminating of all, who eats the offering. In a temple of Vīṣṇu all can take communion with his god and eat the food, which is known as prasāda; 7 in a temple of Siva only a fallen and despised set of pājāris known as bhadra 8 can eat the food, which, once it has been offered, is called nirmanīya; but in some Svetāmbara temples, as a mark of special honour, Bbātās are given the fruit and the sugar, the rice being sold to 'menial' unless bhācā pājā is performed. 9 The position of soul would knowingly buy and eat deva drayaca.

To account for the honour paid to the Bbātās, the legend is told of how, when Muhammad Ghauri was in power, two Bbātās laid their living bodies on the burning pyre at Pāliānā day after day and were burnt to death, to ransom the images on the sacred Hill of Sāturājaya from desecration. In commemoration of their heroism, the whole offering, fruit, sugar, and rice is given to Bbātās in the State of Pāliānā; elsewhere they are sometimes given the fruit and sugar only.

If there be no Bbātā, the head-clerk of the temple distributes the fruit and sugar among the temple-servants and his children.

As a rule, cooked food is not offered in a Svetāmbara temple, but on the occasion of a marriage in his family some wealthy client might send down a specially dainty dish. It would be put on the open table in the Hall of Assembly, and not offered behind a curtain, as in a temple of Vīṣṇu, 10 and would afterwards be eaten by a Bbātā or, failing him, by a temple-servant.

When the offerings have been duly made and arranged, all is ready for the great act of spiritual worship. 'As bread is flavourless without salt,' runs the proverb, 'so worship is without savour and useless, unless bhācā pājā is performed.' The worshipper first prostrates himself three times (chaitiyavandana pājā) before the main idol (the mūla nāyaka), which gazes out from its shelf in the inner shrine into the Hall of Assembly, and then says the nāma, sūtra, asking to be cut off from all remembrance of his own acts of worship and offerings. He proceeds to perform bhācā pājā; but neither then nor at any other time does he offer prayers for worldly or material boon; rather he encourages himself by remembering the virtues of the tirthankara, 'like a soldier before the tomb of Napoleon,' and devotes himself to singing the saint's praises. Finally he walks backwards, as though in the presence of royalty, to the main door, towards which the chief image is looking ('only a "fool-man" walks out by a side door'), and, arrived at the threshold, repeats the word nivētaka, thereby asking to be allowed to follow his necessary avocations every day. As he says it, he bows with joined hands to the idol. A devout Jain will say this word again as he leaves the porch of the temple, and a third time before he passes out into the street from the gateway of the temple courtyard; but the uninstructed generally content themselves with saying it once.

"It is "compulsory" on us to do part of this worship in the early morning, and part of it at noon," said a leading Jain official to the writer, "but, as we are in Government offices at midday, we do not engage in the morning worship." On the great festivals, and at places of pilgrimage like Sāturājaya, Abu, and Girnār, the writer has witnessed more elaborate worship. Sometimes royal worship is offered, when a brush of Tibetan cow's hair (chāmār pājā) is waved in front of the main image, and three silver umbrellas are placed

1. Note that, unlike a Vishvajiva idol, the images of the male tirthankara are never draped in actual clothes.
2. A worshipper in ordinary dress can perform the remaining acts, as they are done outside the inner shrine.
3. If a child, e.g., comes into a temple accidentally bringing with it a plantain, or some sugar, or a copper coin in its hand, these must be added to the offering, for the eye of the god has lighted on them.
4. The present writer, however, has never actually seen a woman enter the inner shrine.
5. For the change the offering undergoes in a Hindu temple see the present writer's Rites of the Twice-Born, p. 326.
6. See Rites of the Twice-Born, p. 320.
7. Ibid., p. 402.
over it. At other times a silver image of some tirthanākara is placed on a silver throne in the Hall of Assembly. The men all sit on one side and the women on the other and offer naṭra pājā, by singing songs in its honour. Or a pilgrim may purchase the privilege of sitting in a silver chariot, holding a little silver image in his lap, and being thus dragged three times round outside the temple—a sort of circumambulation de iure. On Satrūfijaya a special pilgrim lamp (see note 7) is performed, known as the Ninety-nine, when daily for over three months the pilgrim must toll up the stone stairway to the top of the hill, circumambulate the mountain temple, and tramp down again in honour of the ninety-nine thousand times that a tirthanākara visited Satrūfijaya. 

But, as life is short, we only do it ninety-nine times, and leave out the thousands! On the last day of the ninety-nine the pilgrim offers the eightfold worship with more than the usual harmony-harmony, as an English-speaking Jain once called it.

In a big Svetāmbar temple there is often a map of Mount Alu, a plan of Sametākiśhara (in Bengal), or a model of the great temple of Satrūfijaya. On the special days when merit is gained by going to these pilgrim resorts a man who has spent many years has to take the long journey may yet gain merit by offering to the map or plan or model the fourfold pājā of lamp, incense, rice, and fruit. In the same way, if a man is too ill to get out of bed and come to the temple, he may offer worship to a picture of the twenty-four tirthanākara at home, for the Indian proverb runs prettily: ‘If you cannot offer a flower, offer a petal.’

All through the day worshippers can come and do bhāva pājā, for the god is never put down for a siesta as among the Hindus in a temple of Viṣṇu, though the wired doors of the inner shrine are often locked to keep off thieves.

(b) Evening worship.—In the evening, as a rule, only the paid temple-officiant enters the inner shrine, for no layman wants the trouble of bathing and donning the special dress so late in the day. At sunset the hanging lamps in the Hall of Assembly are lighted, as are also two or more lamps of clarified butter in the inner shrine; and, before beginning the evening service, the officiant lighted them and placed them in front of the chief idol of the temple. Then the right to perform the evening worship is auctioned (it can be sold to five successive worshippers), and the officiant light the lamps from hand to hand, higher bidding is the little ārati lamp. This consists of two tiers of lamps; in the upper tier is only one lamp, and in the lower there are five; in each of these six lamps a little wick is floating in clarified butter. Five times the worshippers wave this from left to right, singing, as he does so, the special ārati hymn, whilst all the other worshippers bang gongs, beat drums, and make as much noise as possible. Each successful bidder follows suit.

When the ārati pājā is complete, the waving of the maṅgala-dipāka is performed. A maṅgala lamp consists of a lamp in a saucer; it burns camphor in the saucer and ghātī in the lamp itself; it has only one wick and can be auctioned to only one worshipper. As the worshipper waves it from left to right three times, he sings the maṅgala-dipāka hymn, and again all the instruments, musical and otherwise, are used. The object of the ārati-waving is said to be to protect the worshippers themselves from all molestation by evil powers of darkness during the night. The maṅgala-dipāka is waved for the welfare of the whole world. The incense is allowed to burn itself out, which it does by about 8.30 p.m., when all the shrine doors are locked by the officiant and (since the jewels are removed from the idol all night) inspected by the temple watchman before the final shutting up of the temple about 9 o’clock. It is noticeable that (unlike the evening ritual in a Viṣṇu temple) there is no stretching out of the hands by the worshippers to either ārati or maṅgala-dipāka.

2. Digambara.—(a) Morning worship.—It is easier to obtain information in a Digambara temple, since the officiant there is himself a Jain. The main lines of the worship are the same as in the Svetāmbar temple (washing, drying, offering rice, dry fruit, incense, and lamp); but between the worship in a Svetāmbar temple which belongs to the Terāpanthi, and that in one belonging to the Visapanti there are many minor differences. In any Digambara temple the idols on the long shelf in the inner shrine have no eyes, no carved hands, with neither jewels nor flowers. Fresh fruit cannot be offered to them, and no woman on any consideration is allowed to enter the inner shrine of a Digambara temple. The idol is washed with plain water (not water mixed with milk or nectars), and it has seemed to the writer, as she watched, that even greater care is shown by Digambara that not one drop of water should fall to the ground. Among the Visapanti the idol is marked with chandana on both toes; but the Terāpanthi does not mark the idol itself when performing chandana pājā, but mix the saffron with the rice on the table.

One main difference that strikes every visitor is that, whereas in a Svetāmbar temple the whole Hall of Assembly is dotted with worshippers, who (having done at any time they chose as many of the ritual acts of washing, drying, marking, and offering as they had leisure for) are now seated each before a separate little stool, arranging the rice in the mystic way and offering coin and fruit, whilst telling their beads and the lines of the japa, the idol pājā, in a Digambara temple there is one united act of worship. The rice and dried fruit are all arranged in separate little heaps on one tray on one table, and each prayers by the priests from that tray to form a large mound on another tray. In front of the main idol on a table in the Hall of Assembly the officiant arranges a tall vase like an upturned chalice, two brass tumblers of water, a full tray containing rice, almonds, and sugar arranged in separate heaps, and an empty tray marked with a swastika. He then stands behind the table on a little stool and to the accompaniment of elaborately embellished verses and incantations transfers the contents of the full tray to the empty one and the upturned chalice. The food thus ceremoniously transferred in the presence of the idol changes from naivedya to dāna-dhvāya. But here again the most important part of the worship is the mental bhāva pājā, when the officiant stands silent, then bows, and finally kneels, touching the floor with his head, mentally repeating mantras all the time. The officiant in an officiant in a Digambara temple is said to the writer: ‘If any one spent a lakh of rupees on performing the eight-fold worship, it would all be nothing in comparison with bhāva pājā.’
Worship

(b) Evening worship.—All sects of the Švetāmbara that the writer has met perform ārati; but, though among the Digambara it is performed by the Visāpāṭha, the Terāpāṭhi perform neither ārati nor meṇḍaka-dīpika, contenting themselves with lighting a lamp, carefully protected by glass, in the inner shrine and burning incense there. But, though Terāpāṭhi have no lamps, they sing songs and read some of their scriptures aloud in the temple room while lighting incense, and it is interesting to notice that (unlike the ritual in a Viṣṇu temple) neither among the Švetāmbara nor among any sect of the Digambara is food ever offered to the gods at night.

'Ve accounts it a sin to eat after the lamps are lit, for indvertently we might eat some insect; how could we then offer food in the temples in sunset and so force our Thrissurakkara to sin?'

LITERATURE.—The writer has confined herself to temple worship, as other forms of worship have been dealt with under DRAYERS (Jain), FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Jain). The researcher should notice local differences; e.g., temple worship on Mt. Abu is described in the present writer's Notes on Modern Jainism, Oxford, 1916, while for temple worship in Rajāṭ and Iṣe places reference may be made to The Iṣe and the Iṣe Temple, Oxford, 1915. In addition to these, new material for the present article has been derived mainly from the worship in the temple room at the Panjavan Jain pilgrim resort.

Margaret Stevenson

worship (Japanese).—I. Shintō cult described in the eclipse-myth.—The various component parts of Shintō worship have already been treated in separate articles. The best way to gather them into a complete whole, and to picture the actual worship, will be to give the old account of the eclipse-myth, and by simple references connect with it the details already examined. For this story is not only the nucleus of Japanese myth, but it is the best primitive and most authentic description of Shintō worship, since it was written expressly for the purpose of giving the legendary origin of the chief ceremonies of this worship, as officially practised at the court of the mikado in the most ancient times, and of explaining the ascendency of the great priestly families who officiated in them. We therefore have in this text, which is more than 1200 years old, a brief account of worship, an account that is often in the rites of Shintō worship and its priests.1

First of all, let us recall how, by reason of certain offences committed by the terrible god Sunogumo-goddess, the sun-goddess, who herself up in the rocky cavern of heaven, and left the world in darkness (toko-yo, 'eternal night'); how the eight hundred myriad gods in dismay then assembled in the dried-up bed of the Tranquil River of Heaven (the Milky Way), to take counsel as to how they might induce the goddess to come forth from her retreat; and how for this purpose their meaty councillor, the god of artifice, Onohikane, conceived a plan, which was nothing else than the transference to the sky of the terrestrial rites of Shintō, but which, naturally, is given us as having been, on the contrary, their prototype. The plan was as follows:

1. Assembling the long-singing birds of eternal night and making them sing; taking the hard rocks of heaven from the river-bed of the Tranquil river of Heaven, and taking the iron from the heavenly Metal-Mountain; calling in the smith Amo-

1 The original text in Chinese characters, with reading in kanji and transcription, is published in M. Revon, Le Shintosme, pt. I, Paris, 1907, pp. 411-426. An English tr. will be found in Mr. Revon's Shintoism and Its Philosophy, Tokyo, 1906, p. 56 ff., and a French tr. in M. Revon, Antologie du Culte Shintō, Paris, 1919, pp. 23 ff.

2 See the enumeration of shinten-tsun-tsun (‘heavenly sins’) in art. Sin (Japanese), f. 2.

2 The words not translated are explained below, p. 8269.

3 Kojiki, tr. Chamberlain, loc. cit., into which, however, the present writer has introduced some modifications; cf. his Anthologie, loc. cit.

4 Kojiki, p. 66.

5 Or, perhaps, here, 'eternal land,' the continent of Asia, from which those animals were said to have been imported.

6 Part, ‘bird-cry’.


8 It has been observed that tori-i is the name of a bird with a somewhat particular and pleasing voice.

9 Niho, 'Chronicles of Japan...to A.D. 507,' tr. W. G. Aston, London, 1896, f. 44.

Thereupon, as the Kōki says, ‘the Plain of High Heaven shook and the eight hundred myriad Deities laughed together.’ Amazed at this Homeric laughter, the sun-goddess slightly opens the door of the heavenly cavern. To entice her further, the artful Uzume explains to her that the gods are rejoicing ‘because there is a Deity more illustrious than Thine Augustness,’ and at the same time Amo-no-Koyane and Pata-dama push the mirror towards her, which induces her to come out still farther from the door. At this moment Amo-no-Tajikara-wo: heaven, then the Upper heaven, is given to her. The Pata-

Theorizing, Native Philologists connect the origin of tori-i, the well-known gateway of Shintō temples, although it seems rather a cosmogonic origin, it is in the same spirit that, in another version of this myth, it is stated that the goddess Uzume, in the midst of her dance, ‘kindled a fire,’ the aim of which was likewise to evoke the solar light by imitative magic, and which represents the legendary prototype of the nihō-bi (‘court-yard fire’), practised in certain ceremonies of Shintō worship, especially in the nocturnal rite of the nïhî-no-mune (‘new tainting’). But, besides these rites which belong more specially to eclipse-ceremonial, this episode also describes rites of a more general character.

II. Analysis of the various elements of cult embodied in this myth.—In this famous episode we observe certain rites which are more especially connected with the special object of the story, i.e., with the magical means to be employed to cause light to reappear when, for some reason or another (often typifying a certain stage in the development of the nature of deities), besides the knowledge of the universe such that primitive man becomes afraid. These means are the long-singing birds of eternal night, i.e., cocks, which were made to utter their long cry in the cavern, and which are found symbolically represented in the old temple of the sun-goddess at Ise by dancers called toka-ko (‘bird-cry’); with the roofs of those sacred birds kept (kept for the ordinary purpose of heralding the dawn), but also, while for evoking daylight by magical means) native philologists connect the origin of tori-i, the well-known gateway of Shintō temples, although it seems rather a cosmogonic origin, it is in the same spirit that, in another version of this myth, it is stated that the goddess Uzume, in the midst of her dance, ‘kindled a fire,’ the aim of which was likewise to evoke the solar light by imitative magic, and which represents the legendary prototype of the nihō-bi (‘court-yard fire’), practised in certain ceremonies of Shintō worship, especially in the nocturnal rite of the nïhî-no-mune (‘new tainting’). But, besides these rites which belong more specially to eclipse-ceremonial, this episode also describes rites of a more general character.

The solar mirror, central point of the national worship.—First of all, we see the celestial gods
WORSHIP (Japanese)

taking rocks from the River of Heaven and iron from the Metal Mountains, i.e., the iron mines of primitive Japan, for the purpose of manufacturing a mirror under the superintendence of the gods Ama-tsumi-no-kami, the Cyclops of Japanese mythology, also with a single eye, whose name, meaning "cyclops penis," is evidently connected with the old phallic cult) and Iki-kori-dome (the mythical ancestor of the manufacturers of mirrors, whose body, it is said, was made of a single long and consequently call up the idea of stone moulds in which certain metal objects were cast). This 'mirror of eight feet' (yu-ta-kogami) is still a magical means of recalling the star whose form the mirror's reflection imitates, in the same way as other 'mirrors of the sun' (ki-kogami) which are discussed elsewhere. But, besides the special function which it is called upon to perform in this episode, the solar mirror fills a much larger rôle in Shinto worship in general, in which, in the temple of Ise, it represents the sun-goddess herself, and therefore forms the very centre of the national worship.

The fact that the present mirror at Ise is, in the imagination of the Japanese, the same as was forged at the time of the eclipse is due both to the Kojiki and to the Nihon-gi. The latter says that the sun-goddess, after the eclipse, shot a mirror which was worshipped at Ise; and, as this sacred object shows a slight flaw, it is explained quite naturally by the hypothesis of a blow which it received against the door of the temple.4 It is therefore a case of a primitive talisman which afterwards became the greatest national fetish. For before long the sun-goddess herself bestowed it upon her grandson, Ninigi-no-mikoto, in terms which clearly show that the soul is united with it, by the application of a conception, wide-spread among primitive races, of the mysterious relations that may exist between a mirror and a soul.

Regard it, she said, as my august spirit, and worship it as if thou wert worshipping in my presence.5 And again: Let it be with thee in thy home, on thy mat; let it be sacred to thee! And, when she departs, two other gods come to accompany her grandson on the earth, viz. Ame-no-Koyane and Futo-dama, who are precisely the ancestors of the great national sorcerers. 'Watch over me,' she commands them: 'take care, both of you, of this mirror and guard it well.'6

From that time the solar mirror becomes the most important and precious of the three regalia (mirror, sword, and jewel) of sovereign house. Later, however, a timid emperor, worried with his responsibilities in a time of public disorders, was uncomfortable at the thought that he was kept a prisoner on Mount Ise, and he broke the tradition which had been observed up to this time and entrusted the mirror to an imperial priestess, who kept it in a neighbouring village; she, in her turn, transferred it to the princess of Yamato, the famous vestal who, after various religious travels, stopped finally at Ise according to the instructions of the goddess. Then, in the bosom of the 'inner shrine' (nariko), the mirror will henceforward rest, invisible in its precious tabernacle.

This supreme object of Shinto worship is, as a matter of fact, enclosed in a brocade bag, which is never opened; and when the old model has signs of giving way, the whole is put into a new bag: so that to-day the mirror is enclosed in several layers of silk. Thus protected, it is added in enclosure in a box of hi-ku-ko, or palm, with notched handles, placed on a slightly raised stand, and covered with a piece of white silk. Lastly, above all these there is a sort of case of white wood, with ornaments of pure gold, itself enveloped in a room painted on canvas, which reaches to the ground on every side. Those coverings of the box are all that the people are allowed to see on the festivals on which the sanctuary is opened.

Viscount Mori, the Minister of Public Instruction, who dared to raise a corner of an outer curtain of the sanctuary at Ise, was soon after, on the very day on which the new constitution of Japan was promulgated in this place, a fanatic Shintōist, whose tomb became a place of pilgrimage.

Although the sun-goddess was the only one in the mythology who assumed the particular form of a mirror, other deities are represented by the same object: e.g., it is said that in the other great temple of Ise, the 'outer temple' (geku), the mi-tama-shiro (substitute for the august spirit) of the goddess of food is likewise a mirror, as well as the fetishes of the ahi-dono no kami (deities of a joint shrine), which are also worshipped in those two great temples. This is simply a natural generalization of the material side of the cult. The mirror of the sun has gradually become multiplied, and, under Buddhist influence, it has ended in being exhibited in all the temples, though the sacred fetish of Ise remains hidden from human eyes.

2. The sacred jewel—It is further said that the Tama-no-ya ('jewel-ancestor'), from whom the hereditary corporation of jewellers claims to be descended, makes a necklace of numerous jewels. The name of this necklace is very difficult to interpret,1 and its history throughout the centuries is no less uncertain.2 The imperial jewel, at first identified with the necklace of the eclipse, was gradually reduced to the single sacred stone, two or three inches in diameter, which is carefully preserved to this day in the palace of Tokyo. But, in spite of the religious character of the mikados, this jewel is evidently of little cult importance compared with the sacred mirror.

3. Priests.—Later in the text there appear two gods who are important from the point of view of worship—Ame-no-Koyane (etymology uncertain), the ancestor of the nobatomi, the high priest, 'mediators' between the gods and the mikado, who recited the ritual in name of the latter, and the ari-kono-dama (perhaps 'great jewel,' but more probably 'great gift'), the ancestor of the inadhe, those 'abstaining' priests who were specially charged with preparing the offerings.

4. Divination.—Those two gods call out the shoulder of wood from Mount Kaga (mountain of heaven, which quite naturally has its homonym in Yamato), and take from the same mountain the bark of a certain tree (bahe-ki (cherry? or birch?) in order to light a fire to roast the shoulder-blade, the cracks in which they will then examine for divinatory signs. The ancient Japanese, as a matter of fact, always practised divination when they found themselves in presence of any unusual phenomenon, and their gods naturally did the same, for they were by no means conceived as omniscient.3 Ono-photography was the favourite form of divination—the official one in modern times.

5. Sacred tree of Shintō.—The gods then uproot a nobakki with five hundred (i.e. countless) branches. This tree, which is evergreen, is the sacred tree of Shintō, and is usually found planted in the precincts of the temples; it furnishes wands.

1 See Seven, Shintōzō, p. 224, note 5.
2 Bed. p. 222.
3 Kojik<i>, p. 130.
4 See, for the nobatomi, art. PLAYER (Japanese), vol. i. p. 159<sup>8</sup>, and, for the inadhe, art. SACRIFICES (Japanese), vol. xi. p. 272<sup>5</sup>.
5 See art. DIVINATION (Japanese), vol. iv. p. 501.<sup>9</sup>
6 Bed. p. 592<sup>6</sup>.
7 Oepera japonica: a fairly good idea of this tree may be got from the fact that the family of Terenotranscenc, to which it belongs, includes also the canaica and the tea-plant.
for the owonawa and the tawara-gushi; and its branches, which are always carried in funeral processions, make it possible to distinguish at a glance a Shintō funeral from a Buddhist one. The use of evergreen trees, especially cypress, in ancient times in the West and also in China is analogous.

6. Offerings.—The gods now hang the necklace on the higher branches, the mirror midway, and the offerings of soft materials on the lower branches. The natives of Banks Islands have a similar rite to obtain sunlight; they employ a circular stone, called 'the stone of the sun,' which they decorate with ribbons and fix in a high tree. The offerings of white and blue materials made on this occasion are the general type of Shintō offerings which play the chief part in the worship, and which have already been exhaustively treated.

7. Recitation of the ritual.—While Futo-dama presents these offerings, Ame-no-Koyane fervently pronounces a ritual whose powerful words (futo-nitori-goto) are to force the will of the goddess. This, it has already been seen,5 is to be noted, besides the magical effect of the recited formula, those old Shinto prayers had also the intention of charming the gods by their literary beauty, as a sort of offering. The formal gestures accompanying them have also been described.7

8. Sacred dance of priestesses and divine possession.—Lastly there appears upon the scene Ame-no-uzume ('heaven's dread female'), the legendary anarcs of the Sarume-no-kimi ('princesses of Saru,' from saru, 'monkey,' and me 'woman'), a priestly corporation of court dancers, so called by the Onon myth.8 With some hikone she makes an arm-support (tsunabi, 'hand-helper'), i.e., a kind of cord like that which the imperial stewards, referred to in this connexion in the Ritual of the Great Purification (Oho-horoki), had round their necks; the ends were fastened to their wrists to enable them to carry heavy things more easily; she makes a garland for her head (kazura) with nazeki-no-kazura,9 and a bouquet (tu-gusa) with leaves of sasa10 (generic name of various small bamboo). Then she places in front of the cavern the sounding-board on which she is to perform her dance, the prototype of the sacred panuline (lyrarium) which is still one of the regular furnishings of Shinto shrines. This is a sort of offering to the gods—and which may be seen danced at the present day by young priestesses wearing masks and damask draperies, on the platform of a special building in the precincts of certain temples, like those of Isé and Nara.11

Uzume soon reaches a state of ecstasy (kamayakari or kawakari-shite),‘doing divine possession,’ the real or simulated character of which may be disputed,26 but which in any case corresponds exactly with what we know of the important rôle of nervous phenomena in the ancient practices of Shintō, as they may be observed even at the present day.12

As regards the indecent gesture with which this scene ends, and which the Nikkō, which appeared only eight years after the Kojiki, thought right to omit in the corresponding account, but whose reproduction even the Nikkō mentions in another connexion,13 it gives a good idea of the nuselvly bold character of this goddess, whose sportive naturalness the mythology associates with that of the monkey-god Saruta—an interesting point for the study of phallic worship.

9. Magic cords.—All these rites having been performed, the sun-goddess is gradually attracted outside, first by the clamorous mirth of the gods, then by the mirror which, in the Kojiki account, seems mainly to have a psychological action, exciting the curiosity of the goddess, but which, in the original form of the myth, must have been regarded as having rather the action of imitative magic. The god Ame-no-Tajikarawo ('hand-strength-male'), who is hiding near the door, seizes this moment to drag the sun-goddess forcibly outside, and Futo-dama immediately prevents her from stepping back by means of a magic cord, just as, in the Fiji Islands, they tie grasses to stop the sun.4 This cord is the prototype of the shime-naha (‘close-rope’); the cords of rice-straw which are usually to be found in front of Shinto shrines. At a huge shime-naha the units two rocks between which one gets an admirable view of Fuji-yama, and which are regarded as the best point of view in the archipelago for admiring and worshiping the rising sun. A more popular form of the cult these cords are hung in front of the houses at the New Year to ward off evil influences—a custom whose origin local legend of smaller importance attributes to the gods of the sun.26

10. Other cult-forms.—Thus the eclipse-myth is the central point towards which all the paths of Shintō converge, and it is only necessary to start from this centre to see radiating in all directions, not only the essential rites of this worship, but also branches which end in secondary practices. The only cult-forms of any importance which are not found here are those which naturally could not figure in a story of this kind, such as the custom of pilgrimages to distant sacred places—e.g., to the ancient temples of Ise or to the top of Fuji-yama, to which thousands of worshippers flock every year—or, as a substitute for such pilgrimages, the custom of offering from a distant mountain by going to some neighbouring temple easier of access. But, although these customs are highly developed in Japan, they are found in other religions also, and there is nothing specially Shintō about them.

Literature.—This is cited in the foot-notes.

WORSHIP (Jewish).—The Hebrew term for 'worship' is n'sh'n and in the famous saying of Simon the Just (c. 300 B.C.) with which the Tractate Ethics of the Fathers opens29 abdādah is the second of the 'foundations of the world.'30 At that period, no doubt, the word abdādah primarily implied the sacrificial system of the Temple, though this system was also accompanied by prayers, but the meaning was not necessarily restricted to the altar.31 This term has developed, but the saying

Nikkō, f. 45.

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of Simon remains none the less characteristic of Jewish theology, which lays more stress on 'abbahôsh (works) than on 'emûnâh (faith).\footnote{8} Thus, the emphasis of Jewish worship naturally concentrated on the synagogue.\footnote{9} Had the altar system been the exclusive means of divine access available to the Israelite, the cessation of sacrifices would have involved a greater liturgical disturbance than actually took place. As a fact, continuity was preserved; the keynote of the transition was Hos 1:2 (Heb. 14, RV), 'Let over the burnt-offering the bull of our sacrifices.'\footnote{10} Even to-day the services, in particular those relating to atonement, re-echo this sentiment,\footnote{11} and, in almost every rite, the portion from the Pentateuch which ordains the morning, afternoon, or additional sacrifice is recited, at the appropriate occasion. This is done to show the correspondence between the particular service and the sacrifice instead of which it is offered. Nor must this feature be regarded as, de ipso, a prayer for the restoration of sacrifices in their old form. It has often been shown that a belief in the restoration of the Temple, as a Messianic event, to which the universal worship, may not necessarily be linked with the re-institution of the altar, and it cannot be demonstrated beyond doubt that this re-institution is an axiom of Jewish belief, for it has been repudiated by some orthodox Jewish authorities (as well as upheld by others): and thus it is not included in the Thirteen Articles of Creed and Mainmidades.\footnote{12} In the synagogue worship subsequent to the Destruction of the Temple more service was developed into three lines: (1) prayers of repentance and penitence; (2) thanksgiving and praise; (3) petitions. Study and the recital of didactic passages of post-Biblical literature were a later institution.\footnote{13}

In (1), i.e. penitential worship, asceticism and fasting naturally find a place. But the limits of this asceticism were strictly defined. Fasting ('ômai'h, which really means 'affliction') was, generally speaking, restricted to prescribed occasions and rites. This element should be studied in connexion with FEASTING (Hebrew and Jewish). Indiscriminate and exaggerated asceticism was rare. It is in the matter of the observance of weeks, Wedlock, Zadokites, or certain Qabblâists; but it was not general. Confession, expiation, and atonement constituted acts of worship in connexion with penance.\footnote{14}

(2) Thanksgiving in worship centred in the festivals, with the ceremonial appropriate to each, Levy's Edition, n. 43.) In the daily 'Ainidâh the term is applied to the 16-17th benediction of the 'Abod, in which the restoration of the 'Ainidâh is the subject of prayer (see Singer, p. 50, par. 2). In the Misnaf service for the Day of Atonement, the 'Abbahôsh is the recital of the expiation ritual of the high priest in the Temple on that day, in the Holy of Holies (see M. Gaster, Book of Prayer, London, 1904, ill. 187 f., or H. M. Adler and H. Davis, Service of the Synagogue Festivals, etc., 'Atoneinent, pt. II, p. 193 f., London, 1904-05). Finally, see also the opening words of the concluding blessing after the reading of the prophetic lessons (Singer, p. 149, last line).

3 See J.B.I. 149.

4 See art. Judaism, vol. vii. p. 596 foot; see, however, art. Prayerv (Jewish), vol. x. p. 1297 foot, for another view.

5 See J.B.II. 1324, x. 1069, 1029, 514.

6 See ib. 510.

7 Singer, p. 59; see art. Sacrifice (Jewish), but see also J.B. x. 629.

8 After such passages a special Qiddush was pronounced (see Singer, p. 89). Such passages may be found in Singer, p. 1071. Yet it was not thus common to break a passage, but insert in their daily service a portion of the book they happen to be reading in the Synagogue in a greater place to study as an act of worship than do others. Not only are the first night-prayers and the morning prayer of the Babylonian Talmud kept as vigil and devoted to study, as in Europe, but the custom called Niggah ('Sealing') on account of Haushatun Rabbiya according to the usual Rabbincal authorities at Jerusalem.

9 See arts. Asceticism (Jewish), Fastings, FEASTING (Hebrew and Jewish), Confession (Hebrew), EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT (Jewish).

WORSHIP (Jewish)
thanksgiving for the deliverance from Egypt to the recital of the 'Amidah.'

Practically every item of Jewish ritual, synagogal or act of worship, for in Judaism the secular sphere has very little independent existence, and thus many acts, not in themselves religious, are associated with blessings and become acts of worship. As a result, all acts should not be forgotten, or to give opportunity to an individual who might have omitted to say them, or to enable the congregation to respond 'Amen,' some of these blessings have been incorporated in the liturgy itself. Others that have not been thus incorporated, because they were not likely to be needed every day, may be seen in Singer, p. 287f. The ideal of the pious Jew was to pronounce a blessing on the name of God one hundred times a day; 2 'in all thy ways know Him.'

2 For every enjoyment and in every enjoyment he is to render thanks to God the Giver. He is to screw the rose out of its perfume. And he is to say and to feel: 'Blessed art Thou, 3Thou Who hast given me, their organic planes not neglected.'

The Sabbath, with all its domestic ceremonies, has become practically a day of acts of worship; the three meals are preceded by sanctification and followed by hymns and carols. But such a day, far from being a labor to the orthodox Jew, is to him a day of spiritual happiness, for the highest bliss in the world to come is poetically described as a period 'wholly a Sabbath,' which 'will bring rest in life everlasting.'

The term 'worship,' therefore, logically includes many more operations, besides prayer, by which the Jew seeks to serve God, in addition to numerous acts of his daily life and his public and private devotions, of which the most important are prayer, which is an adjunct of worship, if not worship itself. Thus, in the East, Jews sometimes make use of tezdeqah (charity) boxes containing eighteen apertures, each devoted to a different philanthropic institution. As each of the eighteen blessings of the 'Amidah is recited, a coin is placed in one of the slots.

The scheme of synagogal worship may thus be analyzed. The normal daily services, associated with the statutory Temple offerings, and also ascribed by tradition to patriarchal institution, are three—morning, afternoon, and evening. On Sabbaths, festivals, and new moons, and on the Day of Atonement, but not on the other fasts, there is an 'additional service,' called Musaf. 10 There is no Musaf on Hanuca (the Maccabean Feast of Dedication, Enconia), or on Purim, the Feast of the Purification of the world, when the means of salvation is reconciled and the days are post-Biblical and no special offering was brought. Every service includes an 'Amidah as its essential element, other features being thanksgiving Psalms, Shir'at, Hallel, reading of the Law and Prophets. Praparatory prayers, hymns (piyyutim), 12 study, and sermons are not original statutory components, though antiquity and popularity have often endowed them with an imperتسجيل in the history of the Decalogue warrant. The recital of the Ten Commandments in public worship was discontinued, and the doxology was altered, 13 on account of the Mimin, but this bears the title both of the Decalogue

1 See Singer, p. 44; and Abraham, note on p. lv.

2 See Singer, pp. 46-6; Abraham, p. xviii.

3 See Maimonides, p. 256, who speaks of the "Amidah," or Amidah, as the daily prayer, instead of the "Siddur," the whole of the tractate Berakhot.


5 See R. Kohn's comment in loc. given in Berlin ed. of 1833; see also JE, viii. 1338.

6 Mishnah Ber. iv. 5.

and of the Maimonidean Creeds is regarded as desirable after the morning service. The essential features of Jewish worship may thus be summarized:

At every morning service throughout the year.—(1) Psalms de Zib'am, or introductory Psalms and versicles of thanksgiving; (2) Sh'rem, and reading of the Law from the Prophets; (3) Amidah, or 'additional service,' on new moon, festivals, and Hanuca; (4) reading of the Law on Mondays and Thursdays, Sabbaths, fasts, festivals, New Year, Day of Atonement, and new moon, Hanuca; (5) reading from the Prophets on Sabbaths, festivals, New Year, and Atonement, ninth of Ab; (7) Musaf, or 'additional service,' on Sabbaths, festivals, new moon, New Year, and Atonement; additional items where appropriate, such as Selichot, blowing of Shofar, public Delivery of the Law, etc., and of course there are other items not mentioned.

At every afternoon service throughout the year.—Passages reminiscent of sacrifices and incense, Ps. 146, 'Amidah; reading of the Law on Sabbaths and Day of Atonement and on certain fasts; haftarah on Atonement and certain fasts; Canticles, Ruth, Ecclesiastes on the Three Festivals.

At every evening service throughout the year.—Sh'rem, with blessings, 'Amidah, introductory Psalms on Friday night, special Psalms or poems for festivals in some rites; Lamentations on ninth of Ab, Esther on Purim, etc.

The two main divisions into which the present liturgy may be divided are the Ashkenazic and Sephardic rites. These correspond, to some extent, with the early Palestinian and Babylonian uses, 2 but there are other uses—e.g., Italian, N. African, Turkish, Musotamian and Indian, Coehini, Persian, etc., and even the Ashkenazic is not uniform. There are different forms of Sephardic use, and certain HASSIDIC, QABBALISTIC, and other rites in Russia and E. Europe, which are Ashkenazic variants. Among extinct rites may be mentioned the Seder Amenon (use of Asuram Gaon, 870 C.E.), Malzor Vitry, Maimonides, Isaac Lurya, and C. Vital, Castle, etc. Little is known of the ritual of the Falasah or of that current among the Chinese Jews. Qaraites and Samaritans have their own worship, which has been printed. 7 Modern Reform rites, generally speaking, contain vernacular translations and sometimes additions, and modify certain references to the restoration of sacrifices. The psalms, or hymns, are of two main types, Kaliran and Spanish; 8 they do not form a statutory constituent and are often shortened or omitted. The divergences of rites are due to the circumstances that the liturgy was originally not stereotyped. Those who write down blessings 'were considered as reprehensible. 9 The reader was told the subjects to be mentioned by him and his order; hence the variety of prayers arose. The whole of the tractate Berakhot is an indication of this method. The reader was 'free.'

The underlying theory of the Jewish conception of worship must be based on the intellect, which emanates from God unto us is the link that joins us to Him.' The chapters should be carefully studied.

Pilgrimage as an act of worship occurs only sporadically.

Other information may be found in artt. CONFESSION (Hebrew), FEASTING (Hebrew and Jewish), FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Hebrew), GOD (Jewish), for utterance of 'Amidah, reading, vi. p. 285f. HYMNS (Hebrew), and Jewish MUSICA, JEWISH, SABBATH (Jewish), PREACHING (Jewish), PRIESTHOOD (Jewish), PRAYER (Jewish), SACRIFICE (Jewish), and JE, e. v. 'Prayer,' 'Liturgia,' etc.


See art. "Prayer (Jewish)," bibliography.

See Abraham, p. ii.

See vol. x. p. 108f.


WORSHIP (Parsi) — 1. Pre-Zarathushtrian period. — That the attitude of the early Iranians towards those whom they conceived as the Supreme Powers was one of devotion and worship is practically certain. In what precise outward form that devotion expressed itself during the earlier period is a question which can be only partially answered. We may safely assume, however, that Herodotus's description of Persian habits and modes of worship was, in its essential features, applicable to the Iranians generally centuries before his own time, and probably more generally and truly applicable to the Persians of that period than it was to those who were his contemporaries. In the Greek historian's account of Persian worship the whole ceremony centres in an act of animal sacrifice. It was accompanied by prayer on the part of the offerer and the intoning of some form of prayer. When this 'theogony' ceased to be a mere form of incantation or magic formula, which originally and for a long period it undoubtedly was, we have no means of knowing what the sacrifice was like in individual cases. In its presentation — there is no hint of a united offering — the sacrifice was expected to imbue with a sense of solidarity; for, in its main character and content, his prayer must needs be intercessory — enfranchising the welfare of the king and the whole Persian people. It is to do violence to the text of Herodotus, however, to make him say that the bringer of the sacrifice could ask nothing for himself or his hearth. The normal inference from Herodotus's narrative is that, so far as the outward and visible forms of Persian worship were concerned, they consisted of merely an occasional act of animal sacrifice performed on a mountain top or beside a stream of water. We can scarcely imagine that all their religious impulses and beliefs found their full and only expression in such forms. Still, the small value the Persians placed upon architectural aids to outward worship prepares us to find among them a very simple ritual and perhaps a very multiformal mode of religious expression. Regard must also be had for the early period symbolizing — perhaps more than a millennium before our era. 2. Zarathushtra's time. — Like the founder of Christianity, Zarathushtra, so far as the records enable us to judge, made no provision whatever for ceremonial or outward forms of worship. The Gathas, which are the truest reflexion of his teaching and spirit, contain not the remotest hint of such matters. There we have an intensely earnest soul seeking to learn the truth and to get into the right inward relationship to its God. The outward expression and symbolization of that relationship receives no consideration at all. Spirit and conduct are the all-absorbing subjects of the Gathas. Vohu mano, best thought; Asha, right; and Aramaiti, piety, are the ever-recurring objects of the prophet's desire. It is hardly too much to say that Zarathushtra's ideal of worship is best expressed in Christ's great and final saying that 'they that worship him must worship in spirit and truth.' How far this high ideal was appreciated and accepted by his contemporaries, and to what extent his influence availed to ensure its persistence after his death cannot be ascertained. It is only certain that he taught some of his disciples, and they in turn taught others, to invoke and praise in the Yasna haghatpariti, which, on linguistic grounds, cannot be assigned to a very much later date than the Gathas, clearly indicate that at an early time there was a direct descent from Zarathushtra's high spiritual conception of worship. 3. Late Avestan period. — By the time the Later Avesta was compiled there had developed an elaborate system of ceremonial worship. Animal sacrifices on the largest scale prevailed. Homa had regained more than its pristine veneration in the new order; and henceforth the preparation of its juice (parehazna) becomes the central point of the Mazdean ritual — a position from which, to this day, it has never receded. The return of the old Iranian gods as angels (varunae, beings meet to be worshipped) in the new pantheon increased enormously the ritual of Mazdeanism and the acts of worship devolving upon the followers of the faith. Every day of every month was devoted to some special divinity, viz., the first of the special Yvasa, in which it was sacrificed to in addition to the regular worship of that day. Thus the 1st, 5th, 15th, and 23rd of each month were consecrated to Ahuramazda; the 3rd and 5th to the invocations of the sun; the 7th and 12th to Ahura Mazda; the 9th and 21st to other genii. Over and above these were the special feasts, such as New Year in honour of Mazda. Prayers, hymns, and liturgies befiting all these occasions were utilized. Each day was divided into five parts, and at each division a special prayer, one of the so-called Gathas, was uttered. For the elaborate ritual associated with the rites of initiation and the dispensation of the under those headings. What worship gained in extent and elaborateness during this period it seems to have largely lost in inwardness and spirituality. The value of the prayers came to be regarded as consisting mainly in the words and their correct utterance. We get the impression that they came to be employed as mere charms and magic formulæ. 4. Present time. — If animal sacrifices are excepted, Parsi worship to-day, outwardly, practically what it has been from late Avestan days. Before the sacred fire of their temples the same Avestan liturgy is recited, accompanied by the priestly incantation and the disposition of the same divinities are invoked and praised by the orthodox Parsi to-day in the same prayers and hymns as were used two millennia earlier. But it should be noted that a strong reform movement has set in among many educated Parsees, the tendency of which seems to be not so much to work radical changes in the outward form of their worship, as to change the whole emphasis from outward forms to the moral and spiritual ideas symbolized in the ceremonies. In one or two instances lately, it is true, the priest has gone to the length of introducing a sermon or address into the service. But this is exceptional. 5. Collective and individual worship. — Although devout Parsees often frequent the fire-temples, as we gather from Visparad, III., their ancestors did even, especially on sacred days, such as those consecrated to Ahur (3rd, 9th, 17th, and 29th), yet the Parsi does not consider attendance at the temple

1 For a detailed account of that ceremony and of the successive steps by which ritual and liturgy alternated in the preparation of the Amano juice see M. Hart, "Künat an der, the ritual of worship obtained among the Indo-European.

2 See art. SACRIFICE (Iranian).

3 See art. YAZATA (Iranian).

4 The occurrence of the word 'yazata,' 'priest,' in one passage in the Avesta (XVIII. 38) cannot be held to require the modification of the above statement. See J. H. Moulton, Early Zoroastrianism, London, 1907, p. 116.
indispensable to worship, and places far less store upon it than the faithful Christian does upon church-going. 1 It is clear that much of the priestly worship at the temple is without special reference to any laity that may be present—the long Yâsna ceremony is a conspicuous example. But, even when assembled in large numbers at the temple, the worship seems to be almost if not quite entirely individual and separate, not collective and united. These two facts are surely very significant. We noted them in Hero- dolotus's earlier Persian Worship—slight regard for religious edifices as aids to worship, and absence of united action in public worship. But they are in perfect keeping with the highly individual and independent character of which Zarathushtrianism imbushe its adherents. Moreover, the private and individual devotions of a faithful Farsi are as numerous as those of the devotees of most religions. We give the following quotation to substantiate this fact:

1 For the modern Parsees the precise forms of prayer are strictly laid down; a brief survey of them will be sufficient. On ritual, washing, and dressing, especially on tying the sacred string, a series of prayers are to be repeated. Next follows the special prayer for the deceased, for instance. Before and after, and likewise, prayers are said; and in the evening, before the Parsee goes to sleep, he has, further, to reflect upon and examine what he has done in the day and the course he will pursue. At certain ceremonies, at certain prayers, he retires to rest. To the prayers which form part of the ceremonies of the day are addressed words of others which must be said on certain occasions, viz., after smoking, after connoil intercourses, after satisfying natural purposes, after pollutions due to sleep, after the cutting of nails and hair, as well as after the lighting of candles. 2


E. EDWARDS.

WORSHIP (Roman)—I. General principles.—The term 'worship' may be treated as comprising all modes of giving expression to the various feelings entertained towards the divine powers—feelings of awe, reverence, obligation, depreciation, gratitude, hope, and others. The forms given to the expression varied, first, according to the conceptions which were entertained about the nature, function, and power of the beings who swayed the destinies of men and women, next, with the development of civilization among the people. The limitations of certain kinds of worship to certain classes of people, public and private, also, fall to be considered.

2. Worship as related to conceptions of divinity.—In the earliest known forms of Roman religion men's conceptions were vague, and the divine influences were not supposed to pertain to definite personal gods, being described by the shadowy phrase numina. Observances of worship were therefore naturally far more simple than they afterwards became. The early Romans indeed regard divine power as perceptible in every portion of the world, and in every department of life. In a sense he may be said to have entertained the opinion of the Greek philosopher, Heraclitus, who said that 'all things are full of gods.' 3 Every stage in human life was passed in contact with superhuman powers. The Roman nursery was haunted by a host of divinities, whom the faithful of the early Church regarded even with ridicule. The earliest religious observances reflect the life, mainly, of an agricultural commun-

1 See A. W. Williams Jackson, Persea Past and Present, New York, 1956, p. 263.
2 W. Geiger, Civilization of the Eastern Iranians in Ancient Iran, tr. Darbh Dastar Peshon Santanj, London, 1885, i. 71ff.
3 See the articles on 'Indiglamenta' in Pauly-Wissowa and in Roscher.
4 De Be Rustica, 51; see Warde Fowler, p. 126.
WORSHIP (Roman)

4. Changes in worship due to external influences.—The Roman pantheon and Roman worship had doubtless gone through a number of changes before the time of the literature of the Latin writers, and the changes in historical practice of religion. Many attempts have been made by modern scholars to pierce the dense pre-historic darkness in which the state of early Roman worship can barely be material, however, and which has come down to us from ancient days is so completely untrustworthy that the efforts of scholars have chiefly testified to their power of imagination. This material indeed, if it deserves the name, is a complete unbridled imagination of poets, genealogists, annalists, grammarians, and antiquaries of the late Republic and early Empire. To correlate even the results of modern archaeological research with this heterogeneous mass of statements, so as to produce any solid results, is a hopeless task. The earliest safe source of information about Roman cults is to be found in the inscriptions which have preserved the remains of the ancient Roman calendar. When ancient Roman scholars, like Varro and Varrius Flaccus, drew from the actual records of the cults illustrated of the ceremonies mentioned in the calendar, they covered actual religious history. And religious usage was so tenacious in Rome that the light thus obtained carries us back a long way.

Corresponding early Roman State was with regard to religion, the recurring desire for novelties in cults was from a very early time satisfied in a remarkable way. When the demand became clamorous, in times marked by great public disasters, such as severe defeats at the hands of enemies or sore famines or pestilences, the Senate would order the mysterious Sibylwine Books to be consulted, so that the proper mode of meeting the religious emergency might be discovered. It was felt that conjectures occurred when the aid to be drawn from the gods who ordinarily protected the country was insufficient. It dawned upon the consciousness of the citizens that perhaps divinities who presided over foreign communities might be able to come to the rescue. At a very early time the Greeks were recognized as masters of divine lore, and the Sibylwine Books were long believed to contain precious results of their experience. An inquiry therefore into the proper mode of expiating disasters, which were naturally supposed to indicate divine wrath, almost invariably resulted in a consultation of the Sibylwine Books, thus enshrined in the State religion some rite derived from Greece. The Sibylwine Books therefore constituted a sort of open door through which entered such a mass of new religious usage that the Roman religion was extensivelv Hellenized. Sometimes the new usage was connected with a divinity not previously worshipped by Romans, at other times the new practice was grafted on the cult of an old Roman divinity. For one great feature of the movement was the identification of Roman divinities with Greek, the divine beings concerned being supposed to differ only in name.

This process of Hellenization began very early, and the legend which attributed the introduction of these books to the period of the monarchy enshrined a particle of historic truth. But the religious revolution was much accelerated by the advance of Rome to world power, when important crises, giving rise oftentimes to superstitious fears, were multiplied. Some of the most archaic forms of this process of Hellenization, exemplified in the Republican era, were so continued in the monarchical and imperial eras as popular festivals with disorderly accompaniments. Such were the Saturnalia and the Festum geniale of Anna Perenna,1 the Floralia in April,2 the festival of Fortuna in June,3 the

Auxiliarum forie in July (mentioned in later literature), and others. Many, however, of the most venerable survivals in Roman religious practice are connected with the mythical age of the Republic, when the emperors merely from a conservative sense, and were forms that excited little interest except among scholars and antiquarians. Such ceremonies were the shrines on the wall of the temple of Fortuna, the Forcicida,1 and many others. The influence of Augustus led to an archaistic religious revival, which re-established many primitive rites that were all but forgotten and prevented many others from sinking into complete oblivion, under the weight of indifference induced by many influences, especially the sceptical tendencies stimulated by the Hellenization of culture, and the manifold new impressions produced by contact with various peoples during the process of world conquest.

The Oriental religions came more and more to attract the Italian and Western populations after the establishment of the Empire. During the Republican age, the government had opposed barriers to the advancing tide of Orientalism in religion. The first Emperor cult to be tolerated in the official calendar, it was believed in the so-called 'Bacchic conspiracy' was ruthlessly suppressed by the Senate, with whom rested the final authority in such matters. In the later days of the Republic many private attempts to establish at Rome Egyptian forms of worship, especially those of Isis and Serapis, were frustrated. These cults naturally tended to find a refuge in the seaports to which fleets from Egypt came, especially the Campanian maritime towns. At Puteoli, for instance, there was a temple of Serapis as early as 105 B.C., and near the coast, at Poseidippe, a shrine of Isis existed even before the Roman conquest of the town. Three times in the ten years between 58 and 48 B.C. shrines of Isis were destroyed in Rome. Under Augustus the pressure produced by the popularity among the masses of Egyptian rites became very great, but naturally the rulers did not approve of the indiscriminate adoption of foreign cults, and allied themselves with his enemy Mark Antony. In 19 B.C. Tiberius, in consequence of a gross scandal, destroyed a shrine of Isis, and caused her image to be cast into the Tiber. Nevertheless private dedications of temples continued to be increasingly common. The government did attempt to prevent them from being erected within the pomarium, but in vain; for in A.D. 69, when the army of Vitellius beset the city, Domitian assumed the garb of a devotee of Isis and sought safety among the servants of her temple. The full tolerance of this divinity at Rome took place before the death of Lucan in A.D. 65, as we see from a scornful reference in his poem. The actual formal inclusion of Egyptian deities in the Roman pantheon, whereby they were thoroughly naturalized and no longer restricted by authority to the space outside the pomarium, came in the time of Caracalla. This emperor built a sumptuous temple of Serapis on the Quirinal. The attraction of Rome by the worship of the gods of the barbarian world was largely due to the mysteries which were connected with them. Brotherhoods and initiations, whereby these 'saviour' gods (sacrophus) rescued the

1qvid. Festi, iv. 631 ff.
2ib. v. 331 ff.
3ib. vi. 723 ff.
devote from evil, exercised a powerful fascination. The Roman soldiers who had served in the East brought with them on their return, from the time of Sulla onwards, many Oriental cults, which tended to become naturalized gradually in the time of the Severi, whose origin was in the East. Some of these divinities assumed Roman names, such as Jupiter Dolichenus, Inivictus Sol Elagabalus (from whom the emperor Elagabalus took his name). The worship of Mithras reached its height in the West in the 3rd and 4th centuries A.D.

The divinization of the Roman emperors changed in many respects the whole face of Roman religion. Their cult became the strongest bond of union between the different populations of the Empire, and it became, from another point of view, an important element in the scheme of provincial government.

5. Important public rituals. — The different rituals under which the gods were officially venerated may be distinguished. At Rome the State protected the cults of the gods. The title of 

ius sacrum all the principles and practices of Roman religion, just as the secular law was comprised under the 

ius publicum. The severance of the two systems was not completed until a comparatively late date. Survivals in late Rome indicate that in early days a kind of religious sanctity attached to the formule of the civil law, and the great ex-

ponents of the two systems were often the same.

The pontifices maximi were in primitive times generally distinguished lawyers also. And Roman religion was at all times under the final control of secular authorities, the magistrates and the Senate. When a colony was founded, the fundamental charter always required the first magistrates to consult their Senate, as to the divinities whom the colonists were to serve, and the modes of their service. These divinities were naturally, as a rule, taken from the Roman pantheon, because, according to a common saying, a Roman colony was ‘quasi effigies paras simulacrumque populi Romanus;’ but, like the parent city, the new community had full autonomy in the arrangement of its public worship.

Whenever the State undertook a new duty to-

wards the divine power, it was expressed in the

form first of a 

votum. The pontifices maximi, who constituted the validity of the 

votum of the magistrate were well understood; but in important cases the magistrate would be careful to obtain a public record of the binding with which they were recorded in cases in which a question was raised whether the 

votum was binding on the community they are few in number. The contents of the 

votum might be of many descriptions, as its objects might vary from the perfectly general 

votum pro rei publicae salute which the principal magis-

trates pronounced each New Year’s Day to some specific thing. Sometimes the 

votum pro salute mentioned a particular number of years; the 

decennalia vota of the emperors asked for the safety of the empire during a period of ten years. There were also quindecennalia and vicennalia. The fulfillment of the 

votum was carried out by the secular magistrates, though the precise forms which had to be employed (concerning which usage was extremely conservative) were prescribed and supervised by the experts in the 

ius sacrum, the pontifices.

The fulfillment of the 

votum would generally issue in the dedication to sacred uses of some material thing—often a templum. This thing became technically 

rex sacra, and was protected against secular encroachments by the 

ius sacrum. On the whole, the Roman government watched rather

jealously the transference of rights in property from the secular to the sacred sphere, but when the transference was accomplished, it was rigidly maintained by law.

In the case of the 

votum the community, through its magistrates, approaches the divinity and practically enters into a legal compact with the god. Not only the community, but the god also is bound, and the procedure had a distinctly legal aspect.

There were other ways in which the community might be bound. Certain occurrences showed that in some way the gods were offended, and it was the duty of the public officers to find a way of averting the divine wrath. Thus 

prodigia, por-
tents which seemed to interrupt the order of nature, called for 

piacula, offerings or services intended to secure appeasement of the offended deity.

Thus Livy says: '1 C. Servilius pontifex maximus piacula irae Deum conquirere iussus.' In times of stress and public peril, 

prodigia (or ostenta) would be reported to the public authorities, and recognized (procurate). As example which we may take, the veteres (which may be rendered 'loci ma-

locu' or 'in loco peregrino' were not admitted. The 

harmapogos had a great part in these expia-

tions.

It was also occasionally, apart from such special indications, the community would continually contract pollution from the imperfect or erroneous performance of religious duties, so that provision was made for a general clearance of offences at regular intervals. The 

lustrum (literally 'washing') with which the proceedings of the census concluded was a clearance of this kind. The annual perambulation of the city (amburbiuam) was another. An ancient body of priests, the 

Fretres Arnules, annually performed a 

septenarius lustratio at Rome. Similar, though not regular, was the 

lustratio of the army, when it was overcome by some superstitious dread. Seipio had to pause before crossing into Asia, in order to free his force from the sense of pollution. Similar was in part the purpose of the 

supplicatio which after a victory was held in honour of the whole body of divinities, in order to get rid of the taint of blood-shedding. The procession took place round all shrines ('circum

omnia pulvinaria') and provided the population with an enjoyable holiday. The ancient temple was not freely open to be seen; there were no recurring services such as those of Rome. In most instances there was but one festival in a year at a temple. Therefore, as many contained wonderful monuments and precious treasures dedicated by Roman heroes of former times, there was great encouragement to survey them. The 

supplicatio took place in early times on one day only. Later, generals pressed to have the importance of a victory emphasized by repeating the 

supplicatio on succeeding days, and in the age of Caesar the number of days might extend to forty or fifty. The triumphal procession also doubtless belonged to the same class. Both it and the 

supplicatio were probably of Hellenic origin. Similar was the procession of twenty-seven virgins, round the city, singing a sacred hymn, which was sometimes ordained. All 

ludi were in one aspect religious performances offered to some divinity. The 

gladiatorial ludi came from Etruria, and were intended to appease the partly divine spirits of the dead, which were reinvigorated by the blood which was shed. Even at the end of the Republic, these 

ludi were always, as a matter of course, held to be held in honour of some deceased person con-

1 Livy, xvi. xii. 9.

2 Livy, xvi. xxiii. 7.

3 Tull. viii. 23, 25.
connected with the exhibitor. It is in communion with the **ludi** in general that we hear most of the practice called **instauratio**, the repetition of a ceremony because of the discovery of some flaw which vitiated it. In the beginning of the Lateran Republic, when men ambitious to obtain high office paved their way to it by vast expenditure on **ludi**, these flaws were artificially created in order to justify additional lavishness.

Rules relating to sacrifice were elaborate. Particular deities called for particular offerings, and the accompaniments of sacrifice were very various. Thus the domestic divinity of the underworld and the upper world was in this respect specially important. Thus to Varro is attributed the view that **altaria** were appropriate to the **di** **superi**, **ara** to the **di terrae**, and **foei** to the **di inferi**.1

Public and private cults to some extent were parallel. For example, the worship of **Vesta** was as important for the family circle as for the State, which, like the family, had its own **fames** and **patres**. Many cults were indeed adopted from patrician families by the community. Rites in honor of the dead were extensively rendered by public means by the **lares** and **penates** of the community. Almost every regularly constituted group within the State had its own special cults. Thus every ** collegium**, whatever might be the principal bond of union between its members, had its own special form of worship. Some groups within the city of Rome, which had survived from very primitive times, such as those called **pagani** and **montani**, maintained down to a late date their special religious usages. The **sarcra** attached to families occupied an important place in the **ius sacrarum**, the policy of the religious lawyers having been to prevent, so far as possible, the extinction of these **sacra** by the dying out of the families. To the **gens** as well as to the **familia** also appertained its own **sacra**.2

Among important public ceremonies to which reference has not been made above may be mentioned the **laticlavium**, certainly borrowed from the Greeks, and the **ludi sacrae**, which originated from the **ludi terentiani**, a ceremony connected with departed spirits, celebrated at an altar of **Dis pater**. These **ludi** and the **ludi successales** which succeeded them were supposed to occur at the end of a **secularium**, which was first assumed to comprise a hundred years, but in later times the period was fixed at thirty years. The ceremonial is best known from the records of the celebration ordered by Augustus in 17 B.C., for which Horace wrote his **Carmen Seculare**. This series of celebrations went on until A.D. 214, and another series, theoretically to celebrate the end of each century from the foundation of Rome, ran parallel with it.

The observances due annually to the gods were prescribed at settled dates on the calendar, published yearly under the supervision of the college of **pontifices**.

### 6. Ritual proper to groups—Among celebrations (feriae) connected with groups of men may be noted the **Quinquatrus**, observed by the **arbitii** in honor of their patron divinity **Minerva**, and the **Quinquatrus minuciae**, held by the flute-players (**tibiae**). There were many similar festivals. One was carried out by the **mercatores**, on the foundation-day of the temple of **Mercurius** by the **Circus**, another by the workmen where trade depended on the use of water (**opuscura**). The date of this was 11th Jan., a day sacred to **Inturna**, a goddess of springs and fountains, fabled by **Virgil** to have been sister of **Turnus**, king of the **Rutuli**. Not all persons were qualified to be present at all services; some women were excluded, and men from others.

### 7. Religious officers—Along with the **pontifices**, as the augurs and the **lares** of the Sibylline oracles (**Quindecimviri sacris facundii**) were the great priestly colleges; membership of these was a great object of ambition to men engaged in public life. The **lares** had not the same distinction; they did not really constitute a college, like the other bodies. Until a late date they were **Etruscan**, summoned by the Senate from time to time as occasion required, to expound on the Etruscan lore of means of expiation, chiefly for the evil sign of the thunderbolt. Later, **haruspices** trained in Etruria were settled in Rome and employed publicly and privately.

### 8. Minor collegia—Real standing collegia of minor importance, but great antiquity, were those of the **fetiales**, the **Sali**, the **Luperci**. In order to assure itself that a war was correct in the eyes of heaven, the early State employed the **fetiales** to make a demand on the opposing power, according to a certain fixed form, and if the demand was not conceded, instructed the same priests to present a suit to the court of the opposing power that peace had been replaced by war. On the conclusion of the war, the same **fetiales** supervised ceremonially the conclusion of a treaty (**fudus**). No compact was a **fudus** unless its conclusion had been so carried out by the **fetiales**. The **ius fetiale** has often erroneously been regarded as a sort of international law. But the **fetiales** were not concerned with policy, or with questions of right and wrong. A **suum piusque bellum** was not one which was morally correct, but one which was ceremonially flawless, having been opened with some forms on which the gods had looked with favour from immemorial time. The **Sali** were priests who specially served Mars. Priests bearing that name existed in a number of ancient Italian cities besides Rome. At Rome itself these priests were, even in late time, patricians. There were really two **collegia** which bore the name, one with a sanctuary on the Palatine hill, the other on the **Quirinal**. Each of the colleges must have originally represented a separate independent community, and both survived after the two had coalesced. The ceremonies, supposed to have been instituted by King **Numa**, were of the most archaic description. They were sung by the **lares** as war-god, and danced in armour, in procession round the city, twice in the year, in March and October. They bore lances and the sacred **aneida** (shields), preserved in shrines, from which they were taken on these occasions with great solemnity. The purification of the holy weapons (**armilatrum**) was performed with minute ceremony. **Virgil** speaks with reverence of the ceremonial, but **Seneca** allows himself to deal lightly with the **sacra salitrae**. The **Luperci** also had two distinct forms, like the **Sali**. One was connected with the **Palatine** hill, the other with the **Quirinal**. As in many other instances, it is clear that the State at an early time took the services out of the hands of particular families, for the two bore the names respectively of **Luperci Quinctiales** (from the **Quinctii**) and **Luperci Fabiani** (from the **Fabii**). In 44 B.C. **Ciceron** memory was honoured by the creation of a third **collegium**, the **Luperci Iulii**, but its duration was brief. The ritual of the **Luperci** (evidently connected with a primitive pastoral cult) was directed to purification and reconciliation with the divinity honoured (**Pannus** or Silvanus). The **Luperci** ran round the foot of the **Palatine** hill, on

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1 **Bervius** on **Virgil**, **Rat. v. 66.**

2 **Cf. G. Wissowa, Religion und Cultus der Roemer**, p. 337.

3 **Ann. viii. 285.**

4 **Ep. xvi. 4.**
the north-west side of which lay the sacred cave called Lupercal. The priests sacrificed goats, and ran their ceremonial course with the skins of the sacrificed animals round their hips, their bodies being gashed with thongs as they bounded in their hands, made of strips of goatskin; with these they struck women who ran in their way, desirous to escape from the reproof of barrenness. The thongs bore the name of fulerus, a word connected (as in the name mensa Fuleronia) with purificatory ritual. It is no wonder that, as Plutarch says, the Luperci themselves were constrained to laugh at portions of the ceremony.1 The Lupercalia continued to be performed down to A.D. 494, when Pope Gelasius I. appointed the day for the ritual of the Purification of the Virgin. The worship of Fauns, the deity with whom the festival was concerned, was a cult almost peculiar to Rome and the country immediately round it.

Although the Fratres Arvaliae are only once mentioned in extant Latin literature4 they are well known to us from inscriptions discovered on the site of the shrine of the brotherhood, a few miles from Rome on the right bank of the Tiber, in the direction of its mouth. The first discovery was made in 1570; in fragments which had been removed from the site came to light, and then in the years 1867–71 excavations on the site greatly increased the number of fragments. The whole were carefully studied by a succession of scholars, especially by W. Henzen, who published the whole with a commentary (Rome, 1868, and Berlin, 1874); also (without commentary) in CIL vi. (1876). The inscriptions proved to be an important source for the earlier imperial history. They embody minutes of proceedings of the brotherhood from A.D. 14, when it was refounded by Augustus, to A.D. 238. The fact of the connexion of Augustus with the shrine seems to have given the brotherhood a special interest in events and anniversaries connected with the emperors and their families; on the suitable days offerings were made and recorded in the minutes. The inscriptions have preserved (in an entry relating to A.D. 218) a bynum in Saturnian metre which is the most ancient monument of the Latin language.5

One college of importance, that of the Vestal Virgins, was composed of women. The early Romans were conscious of a parallelism between the religion of the family, whose centre was the family hearth, and that of the great State family, for which the hearth itself was the temple of Vesta. There, as in the separate families, the unmarried daughters had a great share in the family cults. The rex sacrorum stood in the same relation to the Vestals as the paterfamilias held with the munificence of his family; and this rex succeeded to some of the duties which had belonged to the old reges before the institution of the Republic. Other brotherhoods subsisted, some from primitive days, like the sodales Titii, who traced their origin to King Titus Tatius, and were supposed to maintain a ritual borrowed from the old Sabines.4 Others were of later creation, such as the sodales teutonici, dedicated, according to the inscriptions, to the divi imperatores, the divini emperors. The brotherhood consisted of twenty-one ordinary members, chosen (Tacitus says) from the very highest rank of the family of the rex sacrorum. The first of these representatives were Tiberius, Germanicus, Drusus, and Claudius. Similar brotherhoods were established in honour of later emperors, Claudius, Vespasian, Titus, Hadrian, Antoninus Pius, and others; but these never attained to the same importance.

Many separate priesthoods, to which the name flamen was attached, also existed; some, like the flamen of Jupiter (flamus Divi), of Mars (Martialis), Quirinus (Quirinalis), from time immemorial, others of later creation and less consequence. The three just mentioned were flamines par excellence, sometimes called maiores in contrast to all others. The flamines maiores were attached to the service of a great many divinities, and in later time were all of plebeian quality. The real ancient offices were concerned with ritual of a remarkably archaic type. The rigorous restrictions under which the flamen Dialis lived are well known. He and his wife (the flaminices) must be married by the very ancient form of consacratio. If the flaminicus died, the flamen ipso facto lost his office; he could originally undertake no civil duties, though he wore the distinctive robe of civil office, the toga praetexta, and sat on the chair of office (the silla curulis); could look on no military array; could not absent himself from his house (the regia, attached to the temple of Vesta) without leave from the pontifex maximus. He was hemmed in by many minute rules of the nature of "tabou"; for example, it was not permissible for him to have a knot anywhere in his clothing. The office of flamen, generally speaking, involved personal participation in certain definite sacrifices.

Literature.—The course run by Roman religion during the time of the empire is brilliantly sketched by G. Boissier, Religion romaine d'Auguste aux Antonins, Paris, 1892, and La Fin du paganisme, do. 1894. For all the subjects mentioned in this article, the best work in English is W. Warde Fowler, Roman Religion, London, 1894. In German the most useful are J. Marquardt, Römische Staatsverwaltung, vol. v. "Das Sacralwesen," Leipzig, 1876, and G. Wissowa, Religion und Kultus der Römer, Munich, 1902 (vol. v. pt. 4 of Handbuch der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft, by W. Müller). Many valuable articles on separate topics are in Pauly-Wissowa, and also in Roscher. J. S. Reid.

WRATH.—See Anger.

WREATH.—See Crown.

WRONG.—See Ethics and Morality.

WYCLIF. — I. LIFE. — 1. Early years and parentage.—John Wyclif, or Wylye, drew his origin from the village of that name in Yorkshire on the right bank of the Tees. The name of this village, the first syllable of which is wy, water, determines the spelling; the German form ‘Wicli’ should be avoided. The name of Wyllif was in the honour of Richmondshire, and the Wylyf family were under tenants of the Earl of Richmond. We first hear of the Wylyf family in 1253, when a certain Robert de Wylyf was granted a messuage in the manor; in 1263 he obtained the advowson of the church, and in 1275 held of the mesne lord, William de Kirkton, twelve carucates of land in Wylyf, Girtlington, and half of Thorpe. In 1316 a Robert de Wylyf was lord of the manor; he was son or nephew of a Robert married in 1319 Katherine, the Reformer’s mother. At that time Roger’s father or uncle, Robert, the lord of the manor, was still alive, and this may account for the uncertainty as to the birthplace of their descendants.

1 Quaest. Rom. 21.
2 Varro, de Ling. Lat. v. 85.
3 See Mommsen’s text and comments on CIL, n. 92.
4 Tacitus, Annals, i. 54.
5 Tacitus, Annals, i. 54.
6 See Mommsen’s text and comments on CIL, n. 92.
7 Tacitus, Annals, i. 54.
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son. According to Leland, he was born at 'Ipreswell, a poor village, a good mile from Richmond.' But Hipswell is at a considerable distance from Wycliffe's parsonage at Langham, nor is it likely that the Wyballs owned land there. On his marriage Roger Wycliffe would be assigned one of the smaller houses on the estate, possibly Thorpe, close to Wylliffe, for which he paid the relief in 1319 of 25s. 4d. for three carucates of land that he held. At what date Robert Wycliffe died is unknown, but the Reformer's father Roger paid the subsidy for the whole estate in 1332-33 and was still alive in 1332, the year of his death is also unknown, except that it was before 1362, for unfortunately the black letter inscription in the church at Wylliffe over the tomb of Roger and Katherine gives no date.

The date of birth of the son of Roger and Katherine is unknown. He is usually assumed to have been the eldest son, born shortly after the marriage. But it is probable that there was an elder brother William, who was admitted to the college at which John Wycliffe took his doctorate, in or about 1372, points to a later date of birth, nearer 1330 than 1320. Before 1362 Wycliffe's father Roger died, and the Reformer became the lord of the manor. His mother was still alive in Oct. 1369, when John associated her with himself in a presentation to the living.

The only other connexion of Wycliffe estates and his nomination on 17th May 1367 on a commission issued to seven Yorkshire gentlemen to see to the keeping of the statute recently passed prohibiting the taking of salmon in certain seasons in the Tees and other rivers. After Wycliffe's death the estate passed to a Robert Wycliffe, probably his brother, an energetic ecclesiastic who from 1390 to 1465 acted as chancellor to Walter Skirlaw, bishop of Durham. As such he took a prominent part in the trial at Bishop Auckland of the famous Lollard, Richard Wych. In 1412 Robert settled the estates on a John de Ellerton, who assumed the name of Wyclif and from whom the later lords of the manor were descended. They were noted for their intense fidelity to Rome after the Reformation.

2. Early Oxford career.—At what date Wycliffe went to Oxford is unknown. If he was born in 1330, it would be in or about 1345. Three colleges claim him. The claim of Queen's 12 may be dismissed as due to a confusion with a John Wylliffe, probably a pupil of his, and a grammarian in the grammarian's school for whom in 1371 we find the college buying Latin grammars, etc. 14 The claim of Merton rests upon a catalogue of Fellows made in 1335 by Thomas Robert, still in the possession of Merton. 15 This John Wyclif, a steward or seneschal, 16 may be John Whitfield of Mayfield († Nov. 1383). 17 Possibly John Wyclif was the rare exception, a northerner in a southern college, and a recent writer claims that he had been "worked up by the northern university" 18 and was thus the seneschal of the week expelled in 1356, as the result of a college struggle.

Wyclif's connexion with Balliol is certain. That he was Master of Balliol in the spring of 1360 (and therefore in 1363), as appears from a document citing his taking possession as such of a property in Gresham St. E. 19 His predecessor Robert Derby 20 still acted in 1358. This gives the only possible date of Wylliffe's mastership. On 9th April 1361 Wycliffe was still Master and took possession for the college of the living of Abbotseley. 21 But on 14th May 1361 he was instituted to the college living of Fillingham, near Lincoln, value 'thirty marks,' and by the then statutes was forced to resign his Mastership. Some delay, however, occurred, for in the following July he still signed himself 'Master' in a legal document connected with the transfer to the college of Abbotseley. 22 The restriction of the fellowships at Balliol founded in 1340 by Sir Philip Somervile for those proceeding to a degree in clerical theology to six in all will account for Wyclif leaving.

After his presentation to Fillingham Wylliffe vanishes for a while from clear vision. But on 29th August 1367 John Wyclif, son of John Wyclif of Lincoln, a licenc for non-residence at Fillingham 'that he might devote himself to the study of letters in the university.' 23 In consequence he paid a short visit to Oxford in Oct. 1369, living in rooms in Queen's, and a longer visit between 21st March 1365 and 26th Sept. 1366, paying 40s. 'for the rent of his room for two years.' 24 Meanwhile on 24th Nov. 1362 the University in presenting its annual 'roll of Masters' had petitioned Urban v. to provide Wylliffe with 'a canony and prebend in York, notwithstanding that he holds the church of Fillingham.' Urban granted instead the prebend of Ayst in the ancient collegiate church of Westbury-on-Trim, near Bristol, worth £ 6. 13s. 4d. p.a. 25 Wyclife accepted the prebend 26 but did not reside. He was, as we have seen, reading for his doctorate at Oxford. In the spring of 1369 William Witlessle, bishop of Worcester, 27 visited Westbury. He found that all the five canons were non-resident, and that only one had provided a vicar to discharge the duties of the prebend. (The bishop spells the name) is expressly mentioned among the delequents; and on 28th June 1360 Wycliffe was cited to appear before the bishop on 18th July. Meanwhile his 'fruits' were sequestrated. Of any further action by Witlessle there is no record. Wycliffe continued to hold the prebend to the day of his death, 28
but of any discharge of duty there is no evidence.

One other matter in connexion with Austin should be mentioned. By the constitution Horribilis of Urban VIII, 10 March 1355, all of the monks in the college were disfranchised, and their title to the income was demoted to that of appanage. In 1361 Wyclif intended it to be a joint college of eight seculars and of four regulars from Christ Church, Canterbury. The college was started on 13th March 1365, Islip selecting as head Henry Wodehull, a monk of Abingdon. On 9th Dec. 1365 Islip dismissed Wodehull and substituted 'John de Wylye.' The regulars were driven out and three seculars from Merton introduced. Not content with this, Islip furthermore changed the statutes and altered the whole character of the college. While accepting the position, Wyclif did not choose to give up the rooms at Queen's, and his tenure of the office was brief. On 10 May 1367, he was dismissed from his three secular colleges. Wyclif thereupon appealed to Urban V., but meanwhile for two years, if his opponents may be trusted, still lived on at Canterbury, spending from the college goods. Wyclif's executor, Richard Benger, one of his associates at Canterbury, failed to put in an appearance when summoned at Viterbo, and on 23rd July 1369 Cardinal Andronio da La Roche, to whom Urban had referred the case, gave his decision at Monte Fiascone, though, owing to his death, it was not published until 15th May 1370. The action of Langham was upheld in every detail and Wyclif's appeal dismissed. The costs, however, were thrown upon the estate. There is no doubt that this decision was right. Islip had acted illegally in altering the trusts, upon which the royal licence in mortuam had been secured, and for the condonation of this offence the monks of Canterbury were ordered on 28th April 1372 to pay a fine of 300 marks. Urban evidently had some sympathy for Wyclif, for in 1369 he reserved for him a prebend in Lincoln, which, however, belief that the prebend was vacant (see H. J. Wilkins, Was John Wyclif a Negligent Pluralist?, i, 1916, p. 37; Cal. Pat. Rolls Ed. III., xvi. 161, 190).


2 A. H. Thompson's note in Wilkins, Negligent Pluralist, p. 90.

3 DNB xxiv. 74.

4 ib. xxix. 99.

5 Cal. Pat. Rolls Ed. III., xii. 130.

6 The identification of the warden of Canterbury with the Reformer in the diocese of Canterbury has been a matter of much controversy. It was accepted by N. Harpsfield in his Historia Wycliffiana, printed in his Historia Anglicana extensa, London, 1622, p. 668; and by A. Wood, Lewis, Vaughan, Lechler, Poole (Med. Thoresby), the Ambrose, and others. These arguments in defence are by Canon Wilkinson in Church Quaterly Rev. x. (1897-98), 119-121; and Cronin, pp. 55-70. The main documents have been collected and transcribed in the Calendar of State Papers, Domestic, 1357, ii. App. 292 ff. (hereafter cited as C.S.P.D., App. xxvi.) Doubts were expressed in the same year by Wyclif himself (see C.S.P.D., App. xxvi. 154, 155, followed by Shirley, P.Z., 515-528; H. Rasindall (DNB xiii. 351), Universitatis Europae in the Middle Age, London, 1895, ii. 439; 3rd May 1355, a return was demanded from the universities, 1370, ii. App. 292 ff. (hereafter cited as C.S.P.D., App. xxvi.) Doubts were expressed in the same year by Wyclif himself (see C.S.P.D., App. xxvi. 154, 155, followed by Shirley, P.Z., 515-528; H. Rasindall (DNB xiii. 351), Universitatis Europae in the Middle Age, London, 1895, i. 314). This identification should be rejected, for the scanty arguments in his favour cannot outweigh the evidence of contemporaries—e.g., William Woodford in his Stephanus Gregorii, pp. 108, 110-111, and the Chronicle Angliae (Rolls Ser., 1874), p. 115. The present writer is of the opinion that Wyclif as archdeacon of Poole (see E. E. Rice, Archdeaconry of Poole, ed. F. L. Biancotti, Venice, 1757, 1765, 463. In his De Ecclesia, p. 371, Wyclif makes a singularly impassioned reference to the matter.

Wyclif never obtained or, if he obtained it, soon resigned.

While the controversy over Canterbury College was still unsettled, Wyclif's licence for five years for absence from his cure was renewed on 12th April 1368 he obtained an extension 'for two years.' In the following autumn he exchanged Fillingham for Ludgershall in Buckinghamshire, where he was in residence on 12th March 1369 on account of his nearness to Oxford would compensate for loss of income (10 marks instead of 30). In Nov. 1371 Wyclif was one of the executors of the will of William de Asby, archdeacon of Northampton, who in 1369 had been appointed chancellor of the exchequer. Towards the close of 1372 Wyclif completed the long course of nine years and a term after Mastership necessary for taking his doctorate and shortly afterwards entered the king's service.

3. In the king's service.—We date Wyclif's entrance into the civil service as about 1372. Possibly it may have been a little earlier, for Wyclif gives us a report of a speech which he himself 'heard' in the parliament which met in Westminster on 24th Feb. 1371. At once he seems to have allied himself with John of Gaunt and his faction, altogether unconscious of the unscrupulous ambition and the spiritual panic which later produced the great adhesion to the House of Lancaster in politics. But Wyclif's first appearance as a publicist was as the representative of the nation in resistance to papal exactions. On 6th June 1357 the lords of the manor of Urban V. had granted to John Wyclif the right on the occasion of John's annual tribute of 1000 marks together with arrears since the last payment made on 7th July 1353. Edward laid the matter before the parliament of May 1374. Until recently it was believed that 'this solemn declaration set the question at rest for ever,' and the older historians have all dated Wyclif's public life from 1356. But there is evidence that the question of tribute was reopened by Gregory XI. in 1374, and it is in connexion with this later event that we would date Wyclif's first political tract. To consider this and other demands of Gregory a council was held at Westminster on 21st May 1374, at which a prominent part in defence of papal claims was taken by a monk, John Ughtred of Boldon, assisted later by William Binham, a monk of St. Albans. The debate and consequent controversy is not treated in the publication by Wyclif.
though possibly not until two years later, of his Determinatio controversiae monachum (i.e. Bingham). Special reference is made in the tract to the question of ‘lordship’. Wyclif replies to Bingham by giving the answer ‘which I heard recently was given by secular lords in a secular council’, and reports seven so-called speeches. On analysis the speeches fall into various ‘conclusions’ of Wyclif condemned by Gregory XI. in 1377, while the sixth lord gives us a brief outline of Wyclif’s views of ‘lordship’. To suppose that we can find in even the earliest instalment of a report of a parliamentary debate 1 is absurd. They are all reflections of Wyclif’s own views, written, probably, eighteen months after the council.

Wyclif’s services had already been rewarded by his presentation by the Crown to the rectory of Lutterworth (7th April 1374). On 29th July 1374 he was appointed a member of a small commission, with John Gilbert, bishop of Bangor, as the head, to meet at Bruges a commission from Gregory. For his travelling expenses Wyclif received 42s. 3d., and for his other expenses 20s. a day. On the day before his departure Wyclif took some legal steps in behalf of his former prosecutor Richard Bergen. Along with Ralph Strode, the Common Sergeant of London, he went bail for him that Bergen would not at Avignon attempt to obtain any papal provisions, etc. 2

Wyclif was received at Bruges effecting nothing, and by the middle of September Wyclif was back in Oxford, living in rooms at Queen’s, which needed much repair, in that month. In Aug. 1375 another deputation was appointed to go to Bruges to confer with Gregory’s nuncio. In this deputation, though most of his former associates were retained, Wyclif was left out. 3 This omission (usually overlooked by historians, who have in consequence exaggerated his influence at Bruges) probably shows that he was too unbending for Edward’s purpose. As a result on 1st Sept. 1375 a concordat between Gregory and Edward was struck. 4 Wyclif had thus no complicity in a great shame, in its main provisions a victory for the papacy.

As a result of the conference several of the actions of Wyclif’s opponents were, after years, Wyclif’s enemies invented the story that he expected to obtain the bishopric of Worcester. 5 The story is worthless. Months before Wyclif sailed to Bruges he had learned to the vacant see by Edward III. 6 That Wyclif, however, expected to receive the prebend of Caistor in Lincoln has more basis. 7 Wyclif returned from Bruges a disillusioned man. He formed the idea of writing a Summa of his doctrines, the introduction to which should deal with the philosophical positions which would underlay the recent dispute. For the two years, Sept. 1374–Sept. 1376, he probably resided at Lutterworth, but with frequent visits to Oxford (Queen’s). During those two years he developed his theory of ‘lordship’, expanding his tracts against Ughtred and Bingham into the two great political tracts that are among his greatest, the De Civili Dominio. He was probably engaged upon these writings during the meeting of the ‘Good Parliament’ (25th April 1376–6th July 1376). It is not very difficult to imagine Wyclif in the days of 1376. John of Gaunt packed a parliament, which met on 27th Jan. 1377, with his followers, who at once proceeded to annul all the acts of the ‘Good Parliament’. He summoned the church to church’ in London, denounced the episcopate, who under the lead of Courtenay and Wykeham were the duke’s chief opponents, 9 Wyclif’s protest against the wealth, luxury, and worldliness of the clergy fell on willing ears; but nevertheless he unconsciously played the duke’s reactionary game. The parliament of Jan. 1377, with its iniquitous poll-tax, 10 its restoration of Alice Perrers, and the aggrandisement of the duke by the creation of Lancashire into a county palatine, 11 is one of the worst on record.

The bishops, powerless in parliament, struck at the duke through Wyclif, and summoned him to appear before Convocation in St. Paul’s on Thursday, 18th Feb. 1377. 12 The duke took up the challenge and, together with Earl Percy, the king’s marshal, accompanied Wyclif to the trial. The proceedings ended in a riot. Wyclif was carried off by his supporters, while the London mob, on the following day, burned the duke’s palace of Savoy.

Meanwhile some of Wyclif’s old opponents at Oxford had accused him at the papal court. On 22nd May 1377 13 in S. Maria Maggiore in Rome Gregory issued a series of bulls directed against the Reformer. 14 With these bulls Gregory forwarded a schedule of nineteen erroneous propositions and conclusions, culled from Wyclif’s political and politico-ecclesiastical writings. These Gregory identified with the ‘opinions and ignorant doctrine of Marsiglio of Padua and John of Jandun’ condemned by John XXII. 15 An examination of the pope’s schedule shows that the theses concern the status or polity rather than the doctrines of the Church.

Before Edward could receive the bulls, he had passed away at Sheen (21st June 1377). His death caused delay, and the bulls were kept back until the 31st Dec. 1377. This was the end of the ‘Good Parliament’. This parliament was in no mood to truckle to Rome. By a writ dated 12th Dec. 1377 the bishops were ordered to make a return of all aliens, including cardinals, who held benefices. To stop the drain the Council asked Wyclif for his advice ‘whether the kingdom of England may lawfully keep back the treasure of the kingdom,’ Wyclif replied in a state-paper, 16 in which he advocated not only the stopping of all the drain to Rome but the ‘prudent distribution to the glory

1 Chron. Angliae, 110. 2 Rotuli Parl. iii. 504.
3 For the events that follow the chief authority is the full Chron. Angliae, 117-134, copied by Fose, who had access to it, in A.M II, 5001. Narrative written before the publication in 1574 of this work. Spennel, Angliae chronicum, ii. 249.
4 Not 30th May, as FE, p. xxviii.
5 For their proceedings ended in Waltham, Hist. Ang. i. 345-359; Wilkins, Conc. iii. 116-118, who omits those to Oxford and to Edward III; also, in W. iv. 38-49, 104-105, or Foxe, A.M III ii. 50-
6 From a study of Wyclif’s works the present writer is of opinion that the text of a Latin copy of this treatise is more accurate than the English one. The text itself is based on Wyclif’s Protestatio (see below), or on another work of 1375 or 1376. These two writings are taken almost verbatim from Wyclif’s De Civ. Dom.
8 For this see FE, pp. 256-257; partly translated in Foxe, A.M III ii. 54-55.
of God' of the goods of the Church. At this point 'silence was imposed upon him by the king,' Wylyef had probably been consulted by the Crown before he made his visit to the chapel and published by him on the question of the oath sworn by the papal nuncio, Arnald Garnier, on 13th Feb. 1372 that he would do nothing to the hurt of the kingdom. Wylyef printed the oath and asked whether there was not contradiction to the terms, and the permission to collect monies for Rome. 7

No steps had yet been taken to publish the bulls, though Thomas Bruton, bishop of Rochester, 8 told Wylyef in the hearing of many members of the parliament that he had been condemned. 4 About this time Wylyef entered into controversy with a 'notley doctor' of Oxford, probably his accuser at Rome. This tract is remarkably bold in tone. Wylyef calls upon 'the soldiers of Christ, especially the professors of evangelical poverty,' to rouse themselves against the claims of the papacy. On 28th Nov. parliament was dismissed, 5 and probably Wyclif himself in Nov. Dec. a mandate was issued to the chancellor of Oxford enclosing one of Gregory's bulls. The mandate ordered the chancellor to ascertain whether Wylyef had published the bull, and to cite him to appear within thirty days at St. Paul's. 6 As the pope's bull demanded that Wylyef should be arrested, the Oxford authorities were in a dilemma, for to obey 'would seem to give the pope lordship and regal authority in England.' So the vice-chancellor contented himself with ordering Wylyef 'to stay in Blackhall and not to go out.' Wylyef's theses were sent to the masters regent in Oxford, who 'all handed to the chancellor their conclusions.' They 'declared publicly in the schools that Wylyef's theses were true, though they sounded badly to the ear.' Wylyef replied that Catholic truth should not be condemned because of its sound. 8 A few months later, on the occasion of a student-row, the vice-chancellor, who was a monk, was thrown into prison on the pretext that he had imprisoned John Wylyef at the command of the pope. 9 About this time Wylyef published an edition of his Procatostio in a shortened, popular form. 10 The tract is really an appeal to the educated public against the pope's decisions. He also published an appeal to the nobility, in defence of disendowment, entitled Speculum Seculariter Dominorum. 12

The imprisonment of the Crown by the vice-chancellor of Oxford seems to have been intended as a test to ascertain whether the Crown would not recognize papal juridical jurisdiction. About the same time Wylyef appeared at Lambeth. The date is fixed by a statement of Walsingham 14 that it was shortly before the death of Gregory XI., i.e. before 27th March 1378, probably at the end of February, which would fit in with the summons given to Wylyef at Oxford to appear at St. Paul's. The queen-mother, Joan of Kent, sent a message to the bishops ordering them to abstain from pronouncing any final judgment. But the trial proceeded, and Wylyef put in a paper

that he called a Procatostio in which he expanded more fully the meaning of his theses. At the same time the citizens broke into the archbishop's chapel and became seized with understanding, and the bishops contented themselves with prohibiting Wylyef 'from canvassing such theses in schools or sermons because of the scandal thereby given to the laity.' Wylyef replied by publishing Conclusiones Triginta tres de Procatostio etehris, dealing with his idea of poverty and disendowment. 15

In the autumn of 1378 Wylyef was seen, for the last time, in alliance with the Crown. On 11th Aug. 1378 by the order of the Government the sanctuary of Westminster was violated in order to capture two English knights between whom and the Government there had been a struggle over a Spanish captive, the count of Denia, and his ransom. One knight, Shakhyl, was arrested—he had been enticed outside; the other, Haulay, was chased twice round the chancell and killed beside St. Edward's shrine. Excommunications followed; and, as the courts were beyond the jurisdiction of the hated John of Gaunt, London seethed with excitement. On 20th Oct. 1378 parliament met at Gloucester, and Archbishop Sudbury at once called in Wylyef to repeat the sanction and claim the right of arrest. The privilege of the Church was not denied, but the matter, it was pleaded, was one of debt, for which there were no rights of sanctuary. 'And on this there came into parliament doctors of theology and civil law who made argument against the prelates by many colourable and strong reasons.' Among the doctors was John Wylyef, who interrupted the proceedings by writing of his de Ecclesia to lay before parliament a defence of the Crown's action. 5 He claimed for the Crown a right to absolute obedience in all matters not contrary to God's law and, while admitting sanctuary for accidental homicide, subjects of the papacy in general and of Westminster Abbey in particular to severe criticism. Shortly after this incident Wylyef finished his great treatise de Ecclesia. This was followed by a companion work, de Officio Regii, the two forming a complete exposition of his views on the relations of Church and State.

4. Break with the Medieval Church—The Great Schism in the autumn of 1378 flung Wylyef into complete antagonism to the papacy. Hitherto Wylyef had not disputed the spiritual primacy of the popes, though ready enough to attack papal pretensions and to speak of individual popes. 9 His position had been that the pope was the vicar of Christ, but the vicar of Christ, who could have no temporal sovereignty, must be the holiest, the most God-enlightened man in Christendom. Moreover, 'no pope is to be believed unless he is teaching by the inspiration of God, or founding his utterances on Scripture.' 17 The whole authority of the office was thus determined by the pope's character as one of the elect, and, inasmuch as this knowledge was beyond human ken, could only be judged from his deeds. Obedience to the papacy was thus a matter of convenience and church order—a position in which Wylyef unhesitatingly closely followed Marsiglio in his Difensor Pacis.

The schism drew Wylyef from this standpoint. He had hailed the election of Urban VI. (8th April

1 For a paper, which is preserved in two Vienna MSS., see Lechler, JW ('German edn.), App. 13 D XV. 355. 2 Wyclif, de Ecclesia, p. 354. 3 FES, pp. 481-492. 4 Rotuli Parl. iii. 29. 5 FES, pp. 354-366. 6 Bodl. Hist. iii. 348. 7 Lewis, JW, p. 294; and Wilkins, Conc. iii. 121 f., with werkeuren of 297 Dec. 8 Walsingham, Hist. Angl. i. 351. 9 ib. Hist. Angl. iii. 158. 10 ib. Hist. Angl. iii. 159. 11 ib. iii. 340; Rymer, iv. 231; Wilkins, iii. 137; and cf. Wylyef, de Eccles. p. 355; the tract, de Incorromendis Fidelibus in Op. Minorum, should be assigned to the same period. 12 FES, pp. 245-257. 13 Op. Minorum, p. 74 f. 14 Hist. Angl. i. 355.
Wyclif was followed at Oxford by a series of determinations against him, three of which have come down to us.1

After the publication of his Confutatio Wyclif left Oxford for ever, and retired to Lutterworth. To those last months at Oxford must be assigned the familiar tale of his illness and of his declaration to certain friars who came to counsel him: 'I shall not die, but I shall live and declare the works of the Lord.'2 To this period also we assign the commencement by Wyclif of his crusade, his attacks on the translation of the Bible, and the full organization of his Poor Priests, who, however, had already been at work for some years.3 The Poor Priests were not laymen, as is so often assumed, but 'unauthorised preachers,' i.e., without a bishop's licence, who moved from place to place, carrying Wyclif's tracts and sermons with them. Claud in russet robes of undressed wool, without sandals, purse, or scrip, for a few years they became a power in the land until crushed out by the legislation of Archbishop Arundel and Henry V.

Meanwhile at Oxford on 30th May 1381 Berton was turned out of the chancellorship, and Robert Rigg took his place. Rigg allowed full liberty to teach the condemned doctrines, and during the winter of 1381-82 feeling ran high. The flames of anti-papalism which were fanned in the Wenlock Register by the summer of 1381. Both parties sought to fasten upon the other the opprobrium of this revolt. The regulars accused Wyclif and brought forward alleged confessions of John Ball.4 Nicholas of Hereford5 and the Lollards retorted by accusing the friars. On 18th Feb. 1382 the friars appealed to John of Gaunt through Stephen Patrington.6 As the duke returned no answer, the friars appealed to Courtenay.7 On 24th March Parliament assembled,8 Wyclif laid before it a memorial. He claimed that England should obey no prelate unless such obeyed agreed with Christ's law, that money should not be sent to Rome until it could be proved from Scripture to be due, that the Common wealth should not be burdened with new tithes until the endowments of the clergy be exhausted, that the king should employ neither 'bishop nor curate' in secular business, that the temporalities of any bishop 'living notoriously in contempt of God' should be confiscated, and that no one should be excommunicated until it is proved that the sentence of excommunication is actually in effect.9

Along with this formal petition Wyclif prepared an English Complaint, which has come down to us in an incomplete form.10 In this Complaint he deals with four only of the seven matters of his petition, but includes the request that 'Christ's (hereafter quoted as SEW), iii. 500, which Knighton, Chron. ii. 167, avers was by Wyclif, put in by him as a disavowal at the Blackfriars Synod (see below).

1. De Eck, p. 57.
2. DNB iv. 416.
5. Polens, Works, ii. 574, 593.
7. DNB xii. 73.
8. Jb. i. 311.
9. The data of Wyclif's attack is usually placed later (Matthew, Hist. Reg. v. 299-304, in the summer of 1380, and most writers still), following FZ, p. 104. The date will depend upon that of the Council of Twelve, usually placed (e.g., DNB xiv. 253-329), and the date of the trial (see DNB iv. 411). Berton was chancellor from 1379 to 1381 (Eng. Hist. Reg. v. 329), and the council must have been held within these limits and before the publication of Wyclif's Confutatio. According to a note on the MS of FZ, p. 115, this was published on 10th May 1381.
13. Wilkins, Conc. iii. 171; FZ, p. 114.
teaching concerning the Eucharist, that this sacramental belief is surely based on Christ's body, may be taught only in churches. To these attacks the new archbishop, William Courtenay, replied by summoning a committee to meet with the bishops, sixteen doctors of theology, eleven doctors of laws, seven bishops of theology, and two bishops of laws were selected by Courtenay. Of the sixteen doctors of theology all but one, and he a monk, were friars, several of them noted opponents of Wyclif. Wyclif himself was not summoned to appear, nor was his name mentioned. Twenty-four conclusions from his writings were produced which were deemed 'heretical' or 'erroneous.'

On Wednesday 21st May the Committee met again. Between two and three in the afternoon a terrific earthquake shook the city. Courtenay pointed out that it was the effort of the earth to purge itself, 'though not without violence,' of heresy. Courtenay's happy interpretation saved the Committee, and Wyclif found it necessary to pull an appeal into the Realm of Rome. In an opposite conclusion, 'the earth-din,' he maintained, was the outcry of the world against the heretic prelates and friars. Henceforth Wyclif always called it in contempt the Earthquake of Truth. Wyclif also made it clear that Nutter complained that Wyclif treated the earthquake as a miracle wrought for his benefit.

On the day after the Earthquake Synod Courtenay persuaded Richard to admit into the final statute of parliament a chapter ordering sheriffs, upon certification from the bishops, to arrest and imprison all itinerant preachers. The ordinance had never received the consent of the Commons. This was followed on 20th June by letters patent from Richard directed against the itinerant preachers. When parliament reassembled on 6th Oct., protest was at once made against the pretended statute, but to no avail, for in after years it was treated as still valid. Action more constitutional was taken by Courtenay when on 30th May, a week after the Blackfriars Synod, he forwarded a mandate to the bishops bidding them publish Wyclif's condemnation 'with all possible speed.'

5. Last years.—After the Blackfriars Synod Wyclif took no further public part in controversy at Oxford till the autumn of 1381. His followers, Nicholas of Hereford and Repingdon, were excommunicated, but Wyclif's name was not inserted. Possibly he owed his immunity to John of Gaunt. The idea that Wyclif, when summoned in Nov. 1381 to appear a Synod at Oxford, made a recantation may be dismissed. In the minutes of the Synod there is no such record. The whole story rests upon a blunder of Knighton, who has confused an uncompromising defence by Wyclif of his views with a recantation.

Nothing in fact more emphatically marks the hold that Wyclif still had upon the nation than the reluctance of the prelates to the extreme. Wyclif was left to close his days in peace at Lutterworth. In the autumn of 1382 he was stricken with paralysis 8 and thereafter was largely dependent on his curates, John Horn and Purvey. But his pen was never more prolific than in these latter days. He published polemic after polemic, as well as finishing the Sumana of his doctrines in thirteen volumes. With tireless energy he repeated all his old attacks, dwelling especially on the need of disendowment—this he carried to the extreme of demanding even the confiscation of the revenues of Oxford colleges—holding up to ridicule the misdeeds of the friars and the unapostolic character of the papacy, and defending at length his views of the Eucharist, to the need of which sacrament he attached less importance than formerly. In matters of Church organization he was never more a democratic and destructive. He seems to have been occupied with many works at once, dictating the main lines of thought and leaving to his disciples the necessary copying of his rough manuscript. A method which led to repetition and frequent inconsistency. In two of his Sermons on the same Gospel we have a totally different translation. Several of his works, including the important Trialogus and his Opus Expositum, were still unfinished when the end came.

Wyclif's English writings form one of the special features of these last years. Abandoning Oxford and the appeal to the Schoolmen, he became a popular pamphleteer, trusting to his Poor Preachers to scatter the tracts broadcast. To this period also we must ascribe the publication of his English Sermons. Wyclif's last works are also marked by an extreme lassitude of tone, especially in his attacks against the friars. To this he was aroused by the part they had taken in 1383 in Bishop Despenser's blundering crusade in Flanders, and by their attacks upon his Poor Preachers. Despenser's crusade also completed the break between Wyclif and the papacy. No words became too strong with which to express his detestation of the whole institution. 130th June by letters patent from Richard directed against the itinerant preachers. When parliament reassembled on 6th Oct., protest was at once made against the pretended statute, but to no avail, for in after years it was treated as still valid. Action more constitutional was taken by Courtenay when on 30th May, a week after the Blackfriars Synod, he forwarded a mandate to the bishops bidding them publish Wyclif's condemnation 'with all possible speed.'

There are grounds for believing that the friars in their anger appealed to Rome and that Urban replied by citing Wyclif to appear before his court. All we know, however, is deduction from a reply letter of letters which Wyclif addressed to Urban, in reality a keenly ironical statement of his attitude towards the papacy. He excuses himself from obeying 'this unskilful summoning' because of his physical infirmities, for the 'king of kings has willed it that he should not go.' The reference is to a stroke of paralysis from which he suffered 'for two years before his death.' The account of Wyclif's death has been handed down by John Horn, his curate at Lutterworth after his stroke. In 1441 Horn gave his evidence to Dr. Thomas Gascoigne. He stated on oath that on 25th Dec. 1384 'as Wyclif was hearing mass

1. Wilkins, Conc. iii. 157.
2. Lists in FZ, pp. 288-288, and less completely in FZ, p. 491; also in Wilkins, Conc. iii. 158. In all lists the names are inaccurate.
4. No direct record of this committee has come down to us. But we have copies of its conclusions in Wilkins, Conc. iii. 157 f, cardinally signed into the Registry of Oxford, ed. T. F. Knibb.
6. Walsingham, ii. 381 f.; Knighton, Chron. ii. 166.
10. For this see Roscelli Part. iii. 124 f., Statutes of the Realm, Record Com. ed. ii. 25, carefully entered into Reg. Wykeham, i. 342.
12. Roscelli Part. iii. 141.
13. Statutes, iii. 454, iv. 244.
14. Wilkins, Conc. iii. 157 f.
17. Wilkins, iii. 172.
in his church at the time of the elevation of the host he fell down, smitten by a severe paralysis occasioned by the act of reading in the stall, after which neither then nor afterwards could he speak to the moment of his death. 1 Three days later, Saturday, 31st Dec. 1384, he passed away. 2

On 4th May he was the Council of Concanse, acting on the request of an English Synod under Arundel held in the early spring of 1414, condemned 260 propositions in Wyclif's writings and ordered his books to be burnt and cast out. In the consecrated ground, provided they could be identified from those of Christians buried near. 3 After some years of delay the decree was carried out by the ex-Lollard Richard Fleming, bishop of Lincoln, acting on the peremptory orders of Martin V. (9th Dec. 1427). 4 On 16th Dec. letters were sent by Martin V. to various mayors to assist. 5 So shortly after 25th March 1428 'his vile corpse they consigned to hell and the river (Swift) absorbed his ashes. 6

II. Teaching and Writing.—I. Philosophical.—Wyclif's philosophical writings were written after his Oxford career ended when he was the 'flower of Oxford' Scholasticism. At a later date they were collected into a Summa. Some of the works have come down to us—e.g., de Composito, his favorite, as notes for lectures, or theological treatises than as mature treatises. All his works abound in quotations, often vague and incautious, from the accepted authorities of his day, including the great Arabians. Judged as a Schoolman, Wyclif belonged to the moderate realists. He had learned much from the criticisms of Ockham, 7 of whom he speaks with respect. But the Platonism to which he leaned he had derived, as Augustine, though in his method he bowed, as did all Schoolmen, to the authority of Aristotle. To Wyclif nominalism in any form was an impossible creed. He held that names stand for realities. He therefore held, as his many writings on the subject show, that the most important question in metaphysics was that of universals. 8 As with all realists, Wyclif was at times in danger of pantheism. When he states that body and soul are united eternally, it is because he considers man as mater prior, 'in consequence created in the beginning of the world,' whose individuality therefore as distinct from the communio of all and in essence both unreal and phenomenal, or at any rate hard to explain. 9

2. Political and Social.—(a) His theory of 'dominion.'—Shortly after his return from Bruges Wyclif commenced the expansion of his Deter-

mination into two large treatises, the de Divino Dominio—work which was intended to serve as an introduction to the Summa—and the de Civili Dominio. In both we note the influence upon Wyclif of Richard Fitzwalter, archbishop of Arnuagh. 10 Wyclif 'has added no essential element

1 Leland, Collect. II. 409. In Lewis, J.P., p. 596, there is a slightly different version from Cotton MSS A. 14, said to be in Gascogne's own handwriting.

2 The date is given in Welbaleham, ii. 116, and in Gascogne, Loçt e libro veritatis (ed. J. F. T. Rogers, Oxford, 1883), p. 116, as also in the official statement in the Latin Register recording his succession, F. de Marnay, on 23th Jan. 1380 (H. J. Wilkins, Chorists in the Ecclesiastical History of Westminster, Oxford, 1900, p. 81).

3 Wilkins, Cone, iii. 325.

4 H. von der Hardt, Magnum oecumenicon Constantianum, libri vi, 140-157; F. Palacky, Documenta J. Hus vitam, docteurin, etc., illustratae, Pragae, 1876, p. 509.

5 DNB xiv. 293.


7 De Sepulch. Letter, viii. 23.

8 Nettel, Doctrinale, ii. 830; and for the date J. Bale, Script. hist. Brit. Catalogus, iv. 67, 1st ed. 1796.

9 DNB vii. 357.

10 Ad. de Aput. p. 130, 141, 142.

11 Treated fully inMiscell. Philosophi. II.

12 De Dom. Non, pp. 10 r., 93, 95.

13 DNB xiv. 194.

to the doctrine which he read in the work of his predecessor. 1 Wyclif commences his de Domino Dominio with a discussion of the meaning of the word 'use,' in which he followed, through Fitzwalter, the views of William Ockham, and the Spiritual Franciscans to whom the distinction had been fundamental in their struggle with John XXII. 'Lordsip' is the prerogative of God and is never separated from possession. The possession of the creature is always held subject to due service to the lord in place of it. It is the free gift of God to a steward. Thus Wyclif works out by use of feudal ideas the same belief in the duties of property which modern reformers attempt to reach by other means. From this fundamental position it is an easy transition to the corollary that condition is founded on grace and that mortal sin is a breach of tenure and so 'incurs forfeiture.' 2

Wyclif's doctrine would have led to anarchical consequences, as indeed was pointed out to Hus at Constance, 3 had it not been for Wyclif's careful distinction between 'dominion,' which belongs to the righteous man alone, and power, which the wicked may have by God's permission. From this main thesis 'that every righteous man is lord over the whole sensible world,' it was an easy step to Wyclif's doctrine of communism. 4 But Wyclif, always insistent on the rights of man, attempted to acquire their inalienable rights by force. He had yet to learn, through the Peasants' Revolt, that a smouldering fire and a powder magazine are dangerous neighbours. When the blaze came, he was, in consequence, charged with being responsible. The charge was unjust; the two movements were coincident. 5 The confessions of John Ball were fictitious; nevertheless the Peasants' Revolt (1381) was but the rude translation into the world of practice of a theory of 'dominion' that destroyed the 'lordsip' of the wicked. 'It is to Wyclif's credit that, when the Peasants were defeated, he displayed his own sympathy with their wrongs and to put in a plea for mercy. 6 But sorrow for the woes of the poor runs through all his English writings like a wall of love and redeems his most horrent denunciations, his most impossible dreams. 'Poor men,' he cries, 'have naked sides, and dead walls have great plenty of waste gold.' 7

(b) Church and State.—His theory of 'dominion' drew Wyclif on the subject of the functions of obedience 8 and of the prerogatives and duties of the kingly office in his de Officio Regis, in reality his most complete treatise on the relations of Church and State. The dignity of the king, he held, was derived immediately from God. The king represents the glorified and therefore ruling Christ, the priest the suffering and submissive Christ; the king represents the will, the priest the love of God. 9 As God's vicar the king has supremacy over the clergy. 10 Episcopal jurisdiction is derived from the king, 11 and the king may inquire into all sins 12 and must withstand temporalities from those in sin—a duty which Wyclif soon widens into that of general disendowment. By His obedience to Pilate Christ has shown that even tyrants must be obeyed. 12 Henry VIII might have asked for a more thoroughgoing defence of Erastianism or of the divine right of kings against

1 B. L. Poole, in de Dom. Dis. p. xviii.

2 De Civ. Dom. i. chs. 1-6.

3 DNB Dom. i. chs. 7, 14.

4 De Civ. Dom. i. ch. 10.

5 So admitted in Hkron, Ang. p. 310-312.

6 E. F. W. p. 233 f.; de Basphemias, pp. 183-203.


11 This is the origin of Wyclif's famous fatal contention that 'God must obey the devil,' Walsingham, pp. 53, 58.
Church and pope than this treatise, with its claim that it is lawful to pull down a church to build a (Greek) town, or to melt challies to pay for soldiers. 3. Theological.—(a) Doctrine of the Church.—
Wyclif's realism lay at the root of all his views of the Church, but the phrase 'the Church' never led him to warn his hearers against the nominalist heresy that there was no Church before the incarnation of Christ. 2 It drew him into an extreme determinism. Above all it brought him into collision with the prevailing opinions concerning the Sacrament. For the nominalist, who held that the universal name was but a mere flatus vocis, found it easy to believe in the Scotist doctrine of the annihilation of the substance of the elements. To Wyclif such an idea was an absurdity: his whole philosophical system fell to the ground with its mere possibility. If in one case accidents can exist without substance, why postulate substance at all? Hence his realism is a protest against any doctrine of illusion. So, in the interpretation of his ideas, we must remember that, when Wyclif speaks, as he sometimes does, of the host as a "sign", 3 he would use it in the Zwingleian sense. With him every figure is a reality, with its own real though ideal existence, while every real is also of necessity universal. To this philosophy of mysticism is Wyclif's complete repudiation of the nihilism as to the humanity of Jesus which through Peter Lombard's Sentences had infected the medieval Church. He identifies Christ, especially in his early scholastic tractate, de Benedictis incarnatione, with the commonis homo, or universal man, who is identical with all His brethren.

Wyclif's views on the Church are best studied in his de Ecclesia, written about Easter 1378. 4 The key to the whole is his rigid predestinarinism, in which he shows the influence upon himself of Archbishop Thomas Bradwardine's de Causa Dei. 5 Like Bradwardine, he bases everything upon the all-conditioning absolute will of God. The Church Militant he defines as the whole number of the elect, containing 'only men that shall be saved,' and who cannot as predestinate cease to be such even by mortal sin, for theirs is the grace of final perseverance. 6 He adds that no man, not even a pope, 'wots whether he be of the church or whether he be a limb of the fiend,' 7 nor will he allow that the sun ever be called the whole body (universitas) of faithful travellers. 8 In this narrower view Wyclif shows a marked contrast to Marsiglio. He refuses therefore to allow that 'Christ is the head of all men, both of the faithful and unfaithful,' but claims that this is restricted to the predestinate. 9 Nevertheless he guards his doctrine from some of its dangers by his warning that, 'as each man shall hope that he is safe in bliss, so he should suppose that he be a limb of holy Church.' 10

From this basis of the Church certain conclusions followed. The pope is not necessarily the head of the Church, for it is not certain that he is a member of it. His position is therefore deter-

2 De Eccles. ch. 17, 18, also p. 1251.
3 De Off. p. 691.
5 Wyclif published in 1320 a compressed version which he called de Fide Catholica et Or. Mone." This work was widely disseminated in Bohemia.
6 Ibid. p. 691. The word is not mentioned by Ueberweg, see DNB vi. 18, and the preface by H. Saville in his ed. of T. W. S.L. London, 1915. Wyclif differed considerably from Bradwardine in his definition of free will (de Ente, p. 125 f.).
7 De Ente. p. 74, 116, 140.
8 De Eccles. p. 3, 5, 29, 130, 461; et SBE ill. 339.
9 De Eccles. p. 1; et SBE ill. 352; EW W, p. 185.
10 EW W, p. 580.
beyond question that Christ lies hidden in the elements, that we can ‘see’ Him there by faith, and receive Him in the host as the sun’s fire is received through a sphere of crystal, and that Christ is present in the whole Bible. When you break a glass and in every part ‘thou mayest see thy face, and thy face not parted’ or as a man may light many candles at one candle. But the words must be taken with the reservation of corruptions of copy and occasion, of Christ’s presence, who is there not identically according to substance, but really and truly according to His whole humanity. On the logical side Wiclif’s position of the idea of ‘accidents without subject’ such a doctrine seemed to him to strike at the root of all being, including that of the saints, and by throwing a doubt on the testimony of our senses to discard all science.1 Unfortunately in his abhorrence of all Scotist annihilations he used language that easily became twisted, especially by his more ignorant followers. That which is not or which is mere phantasm is necessarily less perfect than that which is, especially that which has life. Hence the unfortunate comparisons of the host to ‘rat’s bread,’ ‘spiders,’ and the like, especially by the later Lollards—e.g., John Badly.

Along with this main position Wyclif advocated other doctrines that seemed to him corollaries. In his earlier years he insisted on the sacramental function of the priest,2 though regarding it as inferior to the duty of preaching, in Wyclif’s view the highest duty of all clerics.3 In his later developments he allowed that under certain circumstances the Eucharist might be consecrated even by a layman.4 Nor did he always make clear even to himself the relation of sacramental grace to character and to foreknowledge. At one time he maintained that the foreknown even in when in actual sin can administer the sacrament with profit to the faithful, though to his own damnation, Christ supplying all the defects of the priest;5 but later that the value depended on the character of the priest and the nature of his prayers—in a word, on the priest ‘being consecrated by God.’6 But he is careful to redeem this last conclusion from perilous uncertainty by pointing out that the sanctity, which comes from Christ’s presence, is always the same.a

4. Wyclif and the Bible.—Even in his earlier days Wyclif, following Ockham, appealed to the Bible as summary, unconditional, and absolute authority, of universal range and eternally unchangeable. He differed from Ockham in distinguishing between the Bible and the teaching of the Church, which Ockham had regarded as in harmony. He further asserted the right of every man to examine the Bible for himself. This was a corollary from his theory of ‘dominion.’ Every man was God’s tenant in chief holding direct under ‘God’s law,’ Wyclif’s usual title for the Scriptures. He had a right therefore to know on what conditions he held. Nor would he allow that the tradition of the Church is the standard of interpretation. He sweeps away therefore the whole mass of tradition, doctrine, and ordinance, whether papal or conciliar, which had claimed to be of equal or superior value to Scripture. Nor has he any place for a doctrine of development.

Wyclif’s appeal to the Scriptures was followed by the translation under his inspiration of the whole Bible. This was the first form of this translation would seem to have been the translation of the Sunday Gospels, still extant in his English Sermons. Independently of this his force of personality over the translation of the whole Bible. The exact share that Wyclif took is uncertain, and probably was slight. But the fact of this translation is beyond doubt, though recent research has shown that the so-called Wyclif version, the first of the complete Bible, had been preceded by other partial versions. Translation of the Bible was in the air. Wyclif’s first version, a large part in whose production was taken by Nicholas of Hereford, was very unsatisfactory—a verbal, almost gloss-like, rendering into a midland dialect, without clearness of expression or idiomatic use of language. Accordingly before 1388 the revision of the English Bible was begun. In 1395, Purvey, Wyclif’s secretary at Lutterworth, who smoothed out the harsh literalness of the original, changed its dialect to the uninflected type common at that time in Oxford, and contributed, about 1395, a notable General Prologue. The two versions of Wyclif and Purvey have often been confused, and the influence of Wyclif’s translation upon the development of the English language has been exaggerated. In later years the existence of Wyclif’s version became almost forgotten, and its authorship unknown, though the translation of Purvey’s version into Scots by Murdoch Nisbet, about 1520, proves the latter’s continued influence.b

III. INFLUENCE.—1. In England.—During his lifetime Wyclif’s influence passed through marked changes. At first there was a time when he was acknowledged by his enemies to be supreme,1 and in 1378 he bade fair to lead the nation in his own direction. But after that year, with the pronouncement of his doctrine of the Eucharist, his influence rapidly waned both at Oxford and in the nation at large. Men woke up to find whither he was leading them, while the growing violence of his views estranged his more moderate adherents. Moreover, his influence was local rather than national. South of the Thames and north of the Trent it scarcely existed. Scholasticism also proved fatal to him. His prestige as a Schoolman, which first secured him a hearing and gave weight to the movement he started in Bohemia, ultimately reacted against the success of his reforms. When driven out of Oxford, he found no suitable environment for the spread of his ideas, and his intellectual type of piety lacked that

1 The older views on Wyclif’s version are set forth in Forshall and Madden’s great ed. (1850) of Wyclif and Purvey’s versions. For recent research on the partial versions of R. Rolle of Hampole and others see Camb. Hist. Eng. Lit., Cambridge, 1906-16, ii. 43-48; A. C. Passes, Fourteenth-Century English Version, Cambridge, 1922; a less valuable account in John Purvey, Wyclif’s secretary at Lutterworth, who smoothed out the harsh literalness of the original, changed its dialect to the uninflected type common at that time in Oxford, and contributed, about 1395, a notable General Prologue. The two versions of Wyclif and Purvey have often been confused, and the influence of Wyclif’s translation upon the development of the English language has been exaggerated. In later years the existence of Wyclif’s version became almost forgotten, and its authorship unknown, though the translation of Purvey’s version into Scots by Murdoch Nisbet, about 1520, proves the latter’s continued influence.b

3 De Esch., pp. 78, 124, 132, 196.
4 De Esch., pp. 78, 124, 132, 196.
5 De Esch., pp. 44, 451.
6 *SEW II, iii. 115; *SEW IV, pp. 111, 159, 441; Sermon, iv.
7 De Esch., p. 250.
8 *SEW II, pp. 449, 450.
9 De Esch., p. 113; *SEW II, pp. 449, 450. But in *SEW II, p. 227 the opposite is held.
10 De Esch., p. 114.
11 De Esch., p. 114.
12 De Esch., p. 114.
13 De Esch., p. 114.
14 De Esch., p. 114.
15 De Esch., p. 114.
16 De Esch., p. 114.
17 De Esch., p. 114.
18 De Esch., p. 114.
19 De Esch., p. 114.
20 De Esch., p. 114.
21 De Esch., p. 114.
22 De Esch., p. 114.
23 De Esch., p. 114.
personal magnetism which might have drawn the people to him.

To the end of his life Wyclif 'stammered out many things which he was unable clearly to make good. He wanders about in worlds not realized. Like other men who have ventured on the great task of forming a scheme of religion for themselves, Wyclif often is and must be inconsistent. All attempts to hammer out of his writings a systematic doctrine of great power and profundity fail because they ignore the successive, contradictory stages of his own development.

Considered as a statesman, Wyclif was unfortunate in that there was no deep national movement with which he could apply himself. If he could have had in England the same conditions as in Bohemia, his success might have been equal. But in England the national movement lost itself in the follies of the Hundred Years War with France, and Wyclif mistook the selfish John of Gaunt for a leader. If in this Wyclif showed an unfortunate opportunism, at other times he lost much of his strength. In his idealism he even regarded the loss of Oxford with indifference, fatal though it proved to his cause. Like most Schoolmen, he trusted too much in his logic, and allowed it to lead him too far. We see this in his opposition to the universities in his scheme of disendowment, and in his advocacy of a system of voluntarism which would have reduced the clergy to beggars, to the level, in fact, of the mendicant friars whom in his last years he ceaselessly denounced, but with the spirit of whose founder he was always in more sympathy than he knew. Another illustration will be found in his demand that the life of the priests should be purely spiritual. He wished to narrow down their studies at the university to theology merely; 'the lore that Christ taught us is enough for this life; other lore,' even mathematical studies, should be 'suspended.' Thus Wyclif destroyed his influence among the educated and reduced his movement to an illiterate sect which in the hundred years after his death slowly lost balance and influence, though surviving, in spite of persecution, to the dawn of the Reformation.

Nor did he know how to gain the reform that lay next to hand by keeping back ideas not immediately practicable. He failed also to see the real cause of his misfortune in his own folly in having himself up with doubtful transactions, as in the affair of Shakyl and Haulay. He allowed his hatred of the false to get the better of his judgment, while by the language he used he staggered many.

But the vehemence of his temper was without its advantages. A calmer spirit would have counted the cost or awaited the future; Wyclif, who felt deeply the needs of the present, placed himself at the head of a forlorn hope.

We believe that the failure of Wyilf's pre- 


teformation was, on the whole, for the good of the Church. His conception of the Church was too passionate; he claimed for the Church an supremacy too absolute, and would have made the Church a mere department of the State. The unscrupulous pillage of the Church by Henry viii. and Edward vt. was but slight compared with the disaster that would have followed an immediate acceptance of Wyclif's schemes and theories.

Finally, Wyclif's revolt was too negative. He swept out what was anachronistic, but though in his assertion of the supreme authority of Scripture he laid the foundation upon which a later age should build, his teaching, though containing the principles of the 16th cent. Protestants, lacked the definitiveness that would lead to a definite reconstruction.


3 SAW ii. 71, lliii. 122; cf. l. 235, 310, iii. 320.

He abolished existing forms of Church government without devising, like Calvin, any scheme that should take their place. As his crude views on the marriage of brothers and sisters show, he was an individualist without the social instinct. Viewed as an evangelist, he lacks the consciousness of the reality of sin. His doctrine that sin is a negation, 'that it has no idea,' linked on Wyclif the realist with the philosophers and St. Augustine, though in a poor substitute for one vision. His identities knowing and being, and in consequence his theology is intellectual and ethical and, unlike St. Augustine's, lacks a sufficient foundation in grace.

2. In Bohemia.—It was in Bohemia that Wyclif's influence was greatest and, if the Moravians be included, most abiding. The marriage of Anne, the sister of Wenzel, king of Bohemia, to Richard 11. of England on 14th Jan. 1382 led to much Czech intercourse. By 4th March 1388 Adalbert Yanco founded in his will scholarships at Oxford for Czech students. By these students the philosophical works of Wyclif were introduced into Prague shortly after Wyclif's death. In 1401 Jerome of Prague brought back from Oxford Wyclif's Dialogue and Trialogus together with some lesser works, and introduced the writings to Hus, who had previously known only the philosophical works written out in his own hand in 1395, are now at Stockholm. Under the influence of Hus the influence of Wyclif soon became a dominant force in Bohemia, and large sums were given for copied works, etc. of the English doctor. Hence often the only MSS of works of Wyclif are now in Prague or Vienna, either they were carried after the Thirty Years War. Of his MSS in England, for instance, one small fragment is found in Dublin; the MS at Vienna was 'corrected' at Oxford on 1st Feb. 1407 by two Czechs, and the other only MS of any value is at Prague. The Vienna MS of his de Oificio Regis belonged to a Czech student who took his degree in 1355. Other illustrations of the intercourse between English Lollards and Bohemia are found in the correspondence between Sir John Oldcastle, the most prominent Lollard of the generation after Wyclif, and the Czech leaders in 1410, and Hus and Richard Wyche. Hus's dependence on Wyclif is very complete. His de Ecclesia is almost word for word from that of Wyclif, and his de Episcopis, &c., from Haulay and Shakyl. By a strange historical injustice the doctrine of the Plagiarist, because linked with a national consciousness, came to be regarded as a substitute for the teachings of Hus, from whom Hus had borrowed, reckoned into obscurity, especially after the failure of Oldcastle's rebellion. No doubt this may be explained by the troubous wars and crusades which the doctrines caused in Bohemia.

1 191. p. 318.

2 See the list of Czechs whom Richard m. on 1st May 1383, when the marriage was settled, 'retained to stay with him for life,' in Col. Pat. Rolls R. xx. ii. 4; Rymer, iv. 110.


5 Wyclif, Miscell. Phil. ii. 24. 37f.


7 For Oldcastle the only complete study is in Wylie, The Reform of Henry v. i. 25c. 1 x. 530-544; H. B. Workman, Letters of John Hus, London, 1904, pp. 33-38.

8 For Hus and the Hussites, and the dependence on Wyclif, see KBL vi. 253-254; then the dependence is often traced by the Workman, The Letters of Hus, pref. p. ix, who points out that both Wyclif and Hus were alike copying from German's Decretum.
LITERATURE.—(a) Contemporary records.—The most important of these is the collection of documents bearing on Wyclif's life and work, by A. Netter, published in 1860. Some of the series, entitled Fasciculi Zizaniorum, or the English Series, or Wyclif's Latin, and other theses, are indexed too early owing to the ignorance of the date of Wyclif's death.

For the literature and views of the later Lollard party, the more important works should be made at the Poole Conclusions presented to parlia- ments in 1381, in this document on the Wyclif, R. P. J. Purves, see FP, pp. 260—269; Wilkins, Concilia, iii, 221—223; and H. C. M. Blunt, in his work on the reformation by Boniface, see Cat. Papal Letters, iv, 515. Purves has also been assigned the Ecclesiastical Reformers

(b) Miscellaneous works.—The Thirty-seven Conclusions of early date, the authorship of which is assigned in the Sy公示 of the only remaining list of Wyclif. For this work see Eng. Hist. Rev. xxxvi, (1911) 738—749. A work of considerable interest is The Lantern of Light, written after 1419, ed. J. B. Stedman, for the work is very restrained in its judgments. Wyclif's religious views are the same series, the conclusion of the Encyclopedia Historia, ed. E. B. Bury, 3 vols., London, 1873, ill., though badly edited, is of great value. The bishops' registers, which might have been of the most value, have not yet been printed—e.g., the registers of Lincoln. For extracts from these of course see the bibliographical text. Wyclif's own writings are strangely impersonal and give little assistance to his biography.

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(e) Wyclif's writings.—Wyclif's voluminous writings have only recently become accessible in print, and some are still unpublished. The most important are the works which were printed in Paris, and in which the English works in English, 4 vols., London, 1737, ill., though badly editted, is of great value. The bishops' registers, which might have been of the most value, have not yet been printed—e.g., the registers of Lincoln. For extracts from these of course see the bibliographical text. Wyclif's own writings are strangely impersonal and give little assistance to his biography.
X

XAVIER.—St. Francis Xavier was the son of Juan de Jassu, a hidalgo and formerly a high official at the court of the last kings of Navarre. The native town of the castle (castillo) of the castle was some thirty miles from Pamplona, which belonged to the family of his mother, Maria de Azpilcueta, and in which he himself was born (7th April 1506). Francis apparently counted himself a Basque, for he said that Basque was his native tongue, but the language is now no longer spoken so close to the borders of Aragon. Whilst his brothers followed the career of arms, Francis, as the youngest son of an impoverished family, was driven to seek a livelihood in the profession of letters. His abilities were remarkable, and, on coming to the University of Paris in 1525, he seems to have been regarded as a student of exceptional promise. He took his degree of licentiate in 1530 from the Collège Ste. Barbe, and was then made reader in philosophy at another college of the University, known as the University of Bourges. While at Ste. Barbe, he fell under the influence of Ignatius Loyola (q.v.), a man some fifteen years his senior. Ignatius (who was then feeling his way towards the organizing of a band of followers pledged to labour for the greater glory of God in whatsoever form the summons might come to them), discerning a conflict in Xavier's heart between worldly ambition and the call of grace, plied him again and again with the gospel warning: 'What is a man profited if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul?' In the end Xavier surrendered, and he was one of the seven who, on 15th Aug. 1534, took vows of poverty and chastity at Montmarre, thus laying the foundations of the Company of Jesus or Jesuit Order.1 Their original intention was that, after completing their theological studies and receiving ordination, they should all make their way to Palestine and take up the preaching of the gospel in the very spot where Christ Himself had lived. However, it was foreseen that it might be difficult to execute this plan, and they decided that, if after waiting a year in Venetia, where they expected to arrive in Jan. 1537, it was found impossible to obtain a passage to the Holy Land, they should go to Rome and place themselves at the disposition of the pope. It was the latter alternative that was forced upon them. They were ordained priests at Venice in June 1537, spending their time in preaching and serving the sick in the hospitals; but in 1538 they all met in Rome and offered their services to Pope Paul III. It seems that already at this time Xavier had some strange presentiment of what his future career was to be, for in his dreams he thought he was carrying an Indian on his shoulders under whose overwhelming weight he cried out so loudly that he awakened his companions. It was not, however, Xavier who was first nominated when King John III. of Portugal in 1539 instructed his ambassador at Rome which should be the first mission of Loyola's followers from the pope to serve as missionaries in the Indies. The choice fell upon Rodriguez and Bobadilla, but the latter became ill, and his place was taken by Xavier.

During a long delay at Lisbon such wonderful results followed from the preaching and example of the fathers that the king wished to retain both in Portugal. Finally, by the decision of Loyola, Xavier was sail (7th April 1541), having with him briefs from the pope appointing him apostolic nuncio in the Indies. The voyage occupied more than a year. He reached Goa on 6th May 1542, and it was not until October that he began missionary work in a strict sense by preaching to the natives of the Malabar coast in the extreme south of the Indian peninsula. In this region, including Ceylon, he remained for over two years, interrupted only by one visit to Goa. The continuous strain of the work was almost beyond human endurance, but its manifold consolations buoyed him up. His letters to Europe give a most vivid picture of his methods, more particularly of his care to have the elements of Christian doctrine translated into the vernacular, so that they could be learned by heart and even sung by young and old alike. It was always characteristic of him to take immense pains with the children. He went about ringing his bell and apparently had a wonderful power of attracting and impressing the little ones. No doubt a large proportion of those whom he baptized were quite young children, the families of adult converts.

'Often,' he wrote on 16th Jan. 1544, 'my arms are weary from baptizing and I cannot speak another word from having so repeatedly repeated my prayers to the Lord to consecrate my body and soul to the service of the Lord and of the missions.' He also told Doctor Cochin (27th Jan. 1545), in which he supplies much detail regarding his methods of instruction, he states that in the space of one month he had baptized more than 10,000 persons. 'The Exposition of the Creed, of which a good English translation is provided by Edith A. Stewart,2 and which is by her rightly stated to be 'more characteristic of Xavier than anything else he has left except the letters,' may probably be accepted as representative of all the elementary instruction, to whomsoever addressed, which he made the foundation of his missionary efforts.

A contemporary letter from Portugal (dated 22nd Oct. 1545) reproduces the description of Xavier brought back by one who had known him well in the Indies:

'Father Xavier goes about with bare feet; his garments are shabby and one is called the "great father," and all love him well. A rajah has given orders throughout his kingdom that all should show obedience to his brother the "great father," as though it were to himself; all who wish are free to become Christians. He also gives him much money, but Xavier distributes it among the poor. He has built 44 or 45 churches. He has four native-born Indians with whom he has had ordained as priests. Six other Indians from the College of Goa are on the point of taking Orders. He carries with him two, three, four, yea six thousand men into the open country, climbs a tree and then preaches to them.'3

The creation of the College of Goa, here referred to, was one of the most far-reaching of the measures adopted by Francis to secure the permanency of his conquests. By his influence with the Portuguese authorities, he obtained ample means of support for this foundation, and here he was able to train a considerable number of natives, many of whom persevered and after ordination did excellent work in the missions which Xavier himself had started. The three years from 1545 to 1548 were almost entirely spent in the Eastern archipelago, Malacca, Amboyna, and the Moluccas. He was shipwrecked three times, lost his slender possessions, was attacked by the Muhammadans, and was always cut off from all human sympathy and occasional help.

1 See art. Jesuits.
2 Monumenta Historica Societatis Jesu (Madrid, 1891), p. 231 f.
3 Epistolae Mixtis, l. 231 f.
"I cannot remember having so much spiritual consolation anywhere else, nor more continuously. . . These islands one day called the "Isle of Hope" in my fancy.

By the middle of January 1548 he was at Cochin, from which as a centre he revisited the Fishery coast. Thence he returned to Goa, but this was only to make preparations for a yet more adventurous expedition, with the idea of which he had been inspired by a meeting with a Portuguese merchant at Malacca who had brought in his company a native Japanese. This young man, called after his conversion Pablo de Santa Fé, was of great use. Even as early as 1547 Francis was convinced that in these newly discovered islands of Japan

...his holy faith might be spread with great success, and that there, more than any other country of the Indies, were great things to be hoped for, since the people of those islands were quick-witted and eager to learn."

Further intercourse with merchants returning from Japan seems only to have deepened the impression, and from that time forth Xavier's heart was set upon this new conquest, although it was not until April 1549 that he was able to carry out his purpose. He went by way of Malacca, making provision from there for the needs of his recent converts in the Moluccas. This was, however, no ground for the assertion, which has sometimes been made, that Xavier ever landed in the Philippines. After many delays and inconceivable vexations Xavier eventually reached the port of Kagoshima in a Chinese junk on 15th Aug. 1549, accompanied by Father Cosmo de Torres, a lay brother named Juan Fernandez, and the Japanese convert Pablo de Santa Fé. As a native of the last named, a kindly welcome was accorded to the missionaries by his relatives, and a breathing-space was found during which it was possible to learn something of the people and the language. Prolonged visits at first followed, but three months after his arrival Xavier wrote most enthusiastically of the natural qualities of the Japanese, and two years later his admiration had not evaporated.

"This is the only country yet discovered in these regions; he wrote to Ignatius on 29th Jan. 1552, where there is hope of Christianity permanently taking root.

He went to Macao (the modern Kioito), then the residence of the mikado. The journey to and fro entailed terrible sufferings from cold and other causes. Owing to political disturbances, the visit was ill-timed and almost fruitless. But Xavier's influence at Yamaguchi, particularly in Bungo, many conversions were made, and there is good evidence of the steadfastness of these Christian communities. In Yamaguchi a formal document records the conveyance to the missionaries in 1552 of a former Buddhist monastery. The church founded in Japan by Xavier spread and prospered. Thirty years afterwards Father Cobo estimated the number of the Jesuits there at 150,000, and James Murdoch, an unkind critic, while admitting that the estimate is reliable, remarks that this constituted a wonderful record for thirty years, when we consider the small number of missionaries engaged in the work.

It is Murdoch who informs us that "In Hideyoshi's famous invasion of China in 1592 the first and third divisions of the invading army totalling nearly 30,000 men were almost entirely composed of Christians," while the great daimyo who commanded these divisions—Koishi, Kuroda, Otomo, Artaza, Onura, and 80—were also all converts with the single exception of Osura.

Some thirty years after this Christianity in Japan was exterminated literally by fire and sword; but even so, when Japan was again opened up to the missionaries in the middle of last century, some village communities were still found who retained the Christian beliefs and practices taught to their forefathers in the 17th century.

After two and a half years spent in Japan Xavier thought it necessary to return to his base at Goa, both to look after things there and to make better provision for a succession of suitable missionaries in the Far East. In a letter addressed to his brethren in Europe from Cochin in Jan. 1552 we find that a new field of labour had already attracted his attention. He had met a number of Chinese in Japan and had heard much of their country from merchants and others.

"Like the Japanese," he wrote, 'they are acute and eager to learn. . . . I hope,' he added, "to go there during this year, 1553, and penetrate even to the Emperor himself."

In intermediate letters he refers to this great design again and again, being full of courage and hope. Before the end of April he was well on his way. After overcoming interminable opposition from the Portuguese at Malacca and Singapore he reached the little island of San Capigo in the mouth of the Si-kiang, on which Canton is situated, before the end of August. He could find no one who would take the responsibility of conveying him across the mainland. The Portuguese ships began to sail away. Xavier, prostrate with illness, was left with only a Malabar servant and a Chinese boy. After endless alternatives of hope and disappointment he himself began to lose heart. On 13th Nov. he wrote, 'Shall I reach China? I cannot tell . . . everything is against it.' To the last, however, he strained every nerve to accomplish his mission, but his illness was upon him, and on 27th Nov. 1552 (not 2nd Dec., as often stated) he died, in sight of the land which he had fought so hard to reach.

If Xavier has found many indirect panegyrist, he has also been much criticized. Many of these criticisms will be found effectively answered in the brilliant pen sketch of the great missionary by C. C. Martindale. Others are discussed in The Month for 6th March 1905, No. 500. A good deal of the criticism turns upon the miraculous incidents with which the life has been overlaid by later biographers. As Astrain remarks:

"In the case of a life so extraordinary as that of Xavier, a life spent in such far distant lands, the presence of a legendary element was inevitable, and, in point of fact, it manifested itself at an early stage. Already in the second century the Fathers Tousain and Valliangne, in passing judgment upon the life of St. Ignatius written by Bihadorezi, protested against various miracles falsely attributed to Xavier, and reduced to their just proportions the magnitude of certain of his missions and apostolic undertakings."

Again, Xavier has been accused of 'restlessness,' but is it sufficiently remembered that his charge embraced the whole mission field of the Indies, and that it was his duty to look after the base at Goa as well as to establish those advanced posts for which he, more than any other man, had the necessary enterprise and capacity? Shall we blame him because in many cases he was content, like the great conquistadores of the New World, to take possession of a vast province, to hoist a standard and leave a tiny garrison, knowing well that years of peace, the full tide of Christian life could pulsate through its arteries? Nor can we admit, as is often alleged, that the conversions effected by him were 'mainly nominal.' The evidence of the Calvinist Dutch protestant Baldus, who spent many years on the Malabar

1 Monumenta Xavertiana, i, 457.
2 Ib., pp. 453 f. and 444 f.
3 See The Month, Feb. and March 1905.
4 This has been restored by Ernest Satow, TAJI vii. [1905] 140.
5 A Hnt. of Japan, 1545-1551, Kobe, 1903, p. 362.
YAKUT.—1. Distribution.—The northernmost branch of the Turkic race, the Yakut, live in the Yakutsk district, along the Lena as far south as the Anur and the Island of Sakhalin and to the north-west as far as the Yenisei. The region between the Lena and the Aldan is especially densely populated. This region was formerly occupied by the Tungus (g.e.), with whom the Yakut, who came from the south, had many fights before they succeeded in obtaining the best pastures. From their metropolis, the district of Yakutsk, the Yakut went to Olesmink, down the Lena to its mouth, and spread along the Vilui, Yana, and Indigirka, and a very few reached Koluina. Meanwhile another immigration to the north went along the Yenisei as far as the Lower Tunguska, thence to Lake Chirinda, where they met the Yakut who migrated north through the Lena. Their original home may have been in Central Asia between the sources of the Yenisei and the Anur. N. A. Aristof1 thinks that the Yakut are the remnant of a Turkic nation called the Sakha (Saka?). The Saka, who in the 2nd cent. B.C. were expelled from their home in the north of Syr Darya southwards by the Yuezhi, migrated to India. Towards the end of the 2nd cent. A.D. they seem to have been driven northward again. On their way back they left one branch, now called the Kaha-Kirgis, in West-Tian-Shan. The Kara-Kirgis have a clan called Saka.6 Recently noticed linguistic evidence (tribal and clan names) makes the two routes of Yakut migration from Central Asia to the north somewhat plausible. A hypothesis of this kind was put forward by V. N. Tverdovsky.1 In 1897 the Yakut numbered 225,772; in 1911, 245,406.

2. Physical type.—The Yakut are now much mixed, first with the Neo-Siberians, i.e. Tungus, Mongols, and Manchus, and then with the Russians. They seldom have any moustache or beard, their hair and eyes are dark, and their heads round. All these characters are Mongolian, but the setting of their eyes is not Mongolian. The Russian anthropologist A. A. Ivanovsky1 thinks that he can distinguish a Yakut group, but this group has more in common with the Northern Tungus and Astrakhan-Kalmucks than with other Turkic nations. They are of medium size with many tall individuals, broad-headed, but not pre-eminent so much, and long-faced.

3. Technique.—Originally horse-breeders, the Yakut are now horse-breeders where the climate permits, and in the north reindeer-breeders; but, as far north as they can, they keep the horse for its meat and kymys (mare's milk). How highly the Yakut values his horse is shown by the fact that to the good gods he will sacrifice a horse, but to the bad gods only cattle. In matching, to compare the girl to a mare and the youth to a colt is the greatest compliment that can be paid them. In their mythology the horse always appears as the adviser and friend of man, often wiser than man himself. The Yakut, many of whom have never seen a horse, trace the origin of man to a being half-horse and half-man. A horse must not be struck, nor even must unkind words be said to it. While cattle are used for heavy work, the horse is kept for riding. In the region where there are horses no longer, reindeer bucks are trained for riding—a custom known also to the Tungus, but not to the old inhabitants of the Tundra, as the Samoyed or Eckimo.

Where possible, the Yakut become seasonal nomads. Only the people south of Vilui, the agriculturalists, are quite sedentary, and even these have a winter house (bologon) and a summer house (urara, sometimes called yurtar). The urara is often covered with birch-bark beautifully engraved and painted, but the bologon, made of logs of wood and covered with earth and snow, is pre-

1 Life of St. Francis Xavier, p. 250.
2 Monumenta Xavestica, l. 149, ed. p. 492.
3 See art. Turks.
4 Attempts at an Explanation of the Ethno-Construction of the Kirghis-Kaluch Living in Ancient Times, St. Petersburg, 1893.
5 Leon Sternberg, 'Turks,' Knyze. Archdeesczy, St. Petersburg, 1892, xxxiv, 544.

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ferable in winter. Their most strenuous time is the hay-making season.

The Northern Yakut are hunters, fishermen, and reindeer-breeders. As net- and trap-makers they are much superior to the other natives. They are also known by iron-smelters. (They place their ore in the fire hole and pile coal round it, then they keep the fire blazing by means of hand-bellows. When the coal is used up, they dig out the ore and lime it and implement it.)

They used the iron ore of the Aldan near Yakutsk long before it was known to the Russians.

Like the Azarbayzhan Tartars in the Caucasus, the Yakut are the cleverest traders in Northern Siberia; their languages became a lingua franca and till recently had to be known even by Russian fur-traders. As reindeer-breeders, however, they are not so clever as the Paleko-Siberians or even as the Tungus. They are people of the Iron Age with all the characteristics which this age implies in Asia, pre-eminentely horse-breeding. Since the clan crests are usually used as tamga (cattle or horse brands), it is possible to trace the Yakut's emigration and contact with other peoples by tracing the distribution of some particular tamga. The tamga usually represent an animal, but it would be as absurd to infer a totemistic meaning from them as to attach any totemistic notions. Certain animals—e.g., the bear, wolf, eagle, white crane, and goose—appear as the shaman's spirit assistants, but they are never called high gods.

4. Sociology.—The Yakut of to-day are grouped in clans (aga-us), naslegas, and ulusas. A clan is a composed sometimes of only a few individuals, and sometimes of several hundred. A naslega comprises from one to more than thirty clans. The ulus often includes several naslegas.

The Yakut reckon as descendants of a clan only as far as the ninth generation. Of course at the present time the blood relationship within the clan is hardly more than a tradition. When the Russians first came into contact with the Yakut, their clan system was quite highly developed, and the head of a clan had his power limited to that of a judge and leader in war.

All economic questions were decided by a council of elders, i.e. fathers, uncles, and elder brothers. Thus aga ('elder'; fem. aga) is the name for the tallest, oldest of his relatives older than himself, inti (fem. batys) for a father's younger brother and any other younger relative who was not his son. Relatives in the third degree are called 'mothers and fathers' (literally 'embryo'), for wife oyakh, while there is no specific name for the husband, who must be called by his name, or 'man,' or ogomor, 'old man.' The term aga used for the father really means 'older'; thus one asks about a person, 'Is he aga or batys ('younger') than yourself?' There are special privileges for the wife to use when addressing her husband's relatives (e.g. toyom, chief, for the husband's father), and for the husband addressing his wife's relatives (e.g. aga-kylyn, 'wife's father').

The terminology of relationship takes into consideration primarily sex and degrees of age. Thus the Yakut clan is divided into two main groups: (a) men and women of the paternal and maternal line born earlier, and (b) men and women of the paternal and maternal line born later.

Clans sometimes made alliances. All the traces of the great solidarity of these alliances between the chiefs of clans and also to their independent attitude to one another. Superior to them all was the council of the council.
YAKUT

the straw on which the dead man lay and the wood left from the making of the coffin. Other things which had been used for the dead, such as the shovels, are also broken and burnt.

On the death of a child its cradle is left on the grave and its toys hanging on the nearest tree. The Yakut have great fear of a corpse (especially that of a shaman) before it is buried; it is supposed to be able to disturb the forces of nature, producing great storms. A great wind is held to be favourable, as it will smooth out the tracks that one night the place of the sun. Otherwise many of the living will follow the dead. There is another form of burial among the Yakut, which consists in abandoning the dead in the house with all the utensils belonging to him.

The custom formerly existed that an old or very weak person should request his relatives to bury him. All the villagers were invited to a three days' feast, at which the old man, attired in his finest garments, occupied the chief position. On the third day his relatives took him to the forest, where a grave had been prepared, and one of them would suddenly strike him down. Food and his weapons were placed with him in the grave. Until the corpse is buried the soul remains near the house and endeavours to remind the relatives of its existence.

Some souls never leave the earth and are never quiet; such souls are called yor. The souls of those who have died an untimely or a violent death, or who were buried without any ceremonies, and especially those of great people become yor.

5. Soul.—Like other Turks, the Yakut believe in the existence of several souls all more or less material. Kut seems to be one of the most important of these. Thus they think that the baru-kut, 'earth soul,' is communicated to the infant at the moment of birth from the earth; s duly-kut, 'air soul,' it receives from the air shortly afterwards; while the third element, yk-kut, 'mother soul,' comes to the child from the mother. Kut is a physical conception of the soul, while sir, although in some degree a material conception, has a more psychical character. After death kut is devoured by the abassylar, though there is a belief also that the kut remains for some days near the body of the deceased, and then departs to the other world. Sir is a kind of 'soul shadow' connected to men and animals; it is even possessed by fishes.

6. Gods and spirits.—Although most of the Yakut are now officially reckoned as Christians, belief in the good old gods and the spirits of the universe still exists. The gods are divided into nine agas (clans) or bias, and the malicious gods into eight. The natives are quite ready to give information about the clan arrangement of the kind gods, but it is very difficult to get similar information about the gods of the under world west and north, since few of the ordinary people know anything about them and the shamans are afraid of betraying the secrets of these formidable beings.

According to Sieroszewski, the chief of the sky-gods is Art-Toyon-Aga, the powerful ruler of light and life, speaking in the storm and thunder, somewhat indifferent to human affairs, and appealed to only in exceptional circumstances. In his honour are celebrated the great clan ceremonies, yachk, in which the sacrifice of kumys is made to him. The coat of the Yakut shaman is divided very regularly. Its object is to secure fertility for the family and for the herd. Lads and girls are placed opposite one another and sprinkle the kumys on one part of the shaman's coat. In the north, where horses cannot live, reindeer milk is used, though it is still called kumys.

The chief of the dark spirits is called Ulu-Toyon. Ulu-Toyon, 'ominipotent lord.' He is always described as living in the western sky, and, in contrast to the indolent Art-Toyon-Aga, he is the personification of action, and of the passions. Ulu-Toyon is not always harmful to men for he gives them one of their souls, sir, and defends them from the attacks of abassylar. The abassylar are divided into 'upper,' 'living' in the western sky; 'middle,' living on the earth, and 'lower,' 'habiting the subterranean world; but, wherever they live, they are all harmful to man.

Ichiuki, literally 'owner,' signifies the 'owner-spirit' of various objects. Every river, lake, stone—and even parts of these sometimes—has its own ichuki controlling it. Movable objects and those which can produce sounds also have their ichuki.

The Yakut divide the universe into seventeen stories. They have also a horizontal division comprising two parts—east and south, the habitation of good spirits, and west and north, that of evil spirits. The great evil spirit, Alara-Ogonir, 'underground-old-man,' lives in the far north.

7. Shamanism.—The study of Yakut shamanism, which is one of the most developed forms of northern shamanism, can be limited to the study of the shaman (oiyen), his ceremonial coat (tamsat; same word for 'sky' and ceremonial dress, coat); the preparation of his official garment is accompanied by ceremonies no less important than the shamanizing itself. Even those who, like the smith, prepare the metal symbols of spirits and are attached to the shaman's leather coat occupy a half-magical position, being credited with peculiar fingers.' The smith is often approached for assistance if there is no shaman to be found in the neighbourhood. The smith in the ninth generation acquires certain supernatural powers and can without harm to himself prepare the iron symbols of the shaman's costume and especially the amyyagat (a small plate representing a human head).

There are 'black' shamans and 'white' shamans; the duties of the latter are not clearly defined, for in cases of great urgency, as in sickness, it is the black shaman who is called in to fight the spirits of disease. At the spring festivals, however, performed in daylight and called oyy-hylam, it seems that white shamans always officiate, while the autumn festivals, abassylar-jylyakh, performed in the darkness, are conducted by black shamans. Troshchancki, who made an exhaustive study of Yakut shamanism, believes that the duties of the black shaman were originally in the hands of men, and that the Yakut black shaman even now assumes some women's characteristics; (a) two iron circles on his arm represent women's breasts; (b) he braids his long hair like a woman; (c) the place on the right side of the tent, covered with horsefurs, is forbidden to shamans and women; (d) when he does not use the ceremonial dress, he wears that of a young girl; (e) he is allowed to visit a woman after childbirth before the three days are over and men are allowed to approach her. As the office of hereditary smiths became so powerful, the duties of the black shamans passed to them. Seeing that the family among the Yakuts, as among the other Turks, is patriarchal, this theory seems very improbable. The women's characteristics adopted by the Yakuts do not point to something else, viz., that, being a person with supernatural powers, the black shaman is supposed to have both female and male qualities; whether sexual abuse is possible at all it is difficult to ascertain. Generally speaking, women, being more nervous and suffering more often from the Arctic forms of hysteria (menerik and amairakh)

1 The Evolution of the 'Black' Faith, Kanun, 1912.

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than men, are more successful as shamans. The shamans, especially the black shamans, form a professional class, and a period of preparation under the guidance of an older shaman is necessary. The initiation into the shamanistic office is finally accomplished by the clothing of the novice in the ceremonial coat and presenting him with the drum and stick.

The shamanistic ceremony, as elsewhere, is divided into the following parts: (a) preparations for the shaman's journey, (b) songs, which among the Yakut are unusually rhythmical and are accompanied by the chorus, beating the drums and dancing, (c) the going out of the fire, when the shaman is supposed to have gone away, (d) a period of silence, after which he comes back and relates his experiences.

8. Ceremonies.—There are among the Yakut two kinds of sacrificial ceremonies, bloody (to the abassy) and bloodless (to the ai and ichch). Although bloody sacrifices are not made to Uran-Ay of the Yakut, the former act is similar in many ways to the sacrifice to the clan-father, etc. From this we can deduce certain animals to him; i.e., such animals are not to be used for work, and mares dedicated are not to be milked. Formerly it was the custom to dedicate in this manner all mares which had foals; they were, let loose to wander on the tundra. The offerings to abassylar have the character of a promise or bargain. The evil spirit wishes to have the souls of these animals, a promise, and the shaman gives instead the kut of an animal.

There are two tribal festivals: a spring festival, aiyy-yaqakh, and an autumn festival, abassy-yaqakh. As the name shows, the first is celebrated for the good weather, and for the second, for the Aidy-Toyon in particular. After the sacrifice, which is followed by certain sports and games, a dramatic representation of the struggle between spring and winter is given. One man, called a'iy-yolu, is dressed in white and mounted on a white horse to represent spring, while another, abassyl uola, represents winter, being dressed in black or reddish garments and mounted on a horse of corresponding colour. The abassyl-yaqakh is held in autumn, and in the open air like the first festival, but at night. It is dedicated to the black spirits, and especially to Uni-Toyon. While the first festival is conducted by the old seniors, the second is the direction of nine shamans and nine shamanesses.

9. Legends.—The Yakut possess the richest mythology, in both form and conception, of all the native inhabitants of Siberia. The rich imagination shown in their oral compositions is only comparable to that of the Iranians, and one can indeed find some traces of Iranian mythology, probably brought from Central Asia. They are not lacking in the humour for which the Tungs legends are justly famed. The legend of creation bears witness.

The evil spirit wished to show the good spirit that he had the greatest power, so he dived into the water and came up with a mouthful of clay. From this the good spirit created the earth, but, not having sufficient clay, he made it flat. He then noticed that an evil spirit had already given him all the clay; therefore he struck him on the neck so that he had to spit it all out. It fell on the earth and so mountains were formed. The origin of grass is explained by a more romantic legend.

The god Yassagi-Toyon directs the movements of all migratory birds. His seven daughters, in the form of seven white cranes, also often come down to the earth. Once Yassagi-Toyon commanded his most beautiful daughter to help and serve the Yakut. (The crane is always considered a sacred bird by these people.) The girl begged to be excused, and the father sent her to the father of the winds, and she became a blade of grass to feed the animals of the Yakut.

These eetiological myths form but a small part of the literature, for it is the heroic stories that are the longest, and those which the most elaborate.

The Yakut do not possess a written character, but the few who have been educated in Russian schools also use it in their native language.


YASHTS.—See AVESTA.

VASNA.—See AVESTA.

YAWNING.—I. The primitive conception of the soul.—The conception of the soul among the lower races has been described as follows:

'It is a thin unsubstantial image in nature, its nature a sort of vapour, film, or shadow; the cause of life and thought in the individual man: independently possessing the personal consciousness and volition of its corporeal owner, past or present; and the future residing in the body for being translated with it from place to place; mostly impalpable and invisible, yet also manifesting physical power, and especially appearing to men waking or in dreams, the personal soul, usually present in dreams in which it bears the likeness; continuing to exist and appear to men after the death of that body; able to pass through the air, and act in the bodies of other men, and of even things.'

J. G. Frazer likewise maintains that the savage explains the phenomena of life by supposing the living body to be animated by some power within.

'If an animal lives and moves, it can only be, he thinks, because there is a little animal inside which is doing it; if a man lives and moves, it can only be because he has a little man or animal inside who moves him. The animal inside the animal, the man inside the man, is the soul. And as the activity of an animal or man is explained by the presence of the soul, so the repose of sleep or death is explained by its absence; sleep or trance being the temporary, death being the permanent absence of the soul. The ideal Indian, therefore, is the being the permanent absence of the soul, the way to guard against. It is either to prevent the soul from leaving the body, or, if it does depart, to ensure that it shall return.'

2. The escape of the soul through the mouth.—The soul is commonly supposed to escape by aperatures of the body, especially the mouth and nose.

'The Marquesans used to hold the mouth and nose of a dying man, in order to prevent his soul from escaping; the same custom is repeated in the New Caledonians. . . . The Hohnans in South America seal up the eyes, nose, and mouth of a dying person in case his ghost should get out and carry off others and the people of Nias, who identify the spirit of the deceased with the breath, tie up the jaws of the corpse to confine the vagrant soul. The Hindus always snap their thumb and index and repeat the name of some god, as Rama, when a man yawns in their presence, believing that by so doing they prevent the soul from escaping through the open mouth. To neglect this is sin as great as the murder of a Brahman.'

Great care is taken at the time of a birth lest the soul of the child should escape and be swallowed by a gaping mouth.

To prevent this possibility, the Alboon of Celebes, when a woman is about to deliver, 'tie the mouth of the mouth with all animals inside and outside the house' and 'all persons present, in the house, must hold the doors shut, and prevent the mouth shut the whole time the birth is taking place.' Noses are not similarly secured because they are wedged through the nostrils, and therefore 'the soul would be expelled before it could have time to set down.'

1) PH², 423.
3) G.E.P., ii., Taboo, p. 31.
5) G.E.P., ii., Taboo, p. 357.
Even in sleep it is possible for the soul to escape through the sleeper's mouth if it is not kept tightly closed, its departure being sometimes indicated by snoring.

Mary H. Kingsley tells of a Kroman who 'for several nights had smelt in his dreams the savoury smell of smoked crawfish seasoned with red peppers. He became anxious, and the headman's wife, who had a cat that smelled like this with great delight for his dream-soul, with intent to do him grievous bodily harm.' For the next few nights, to prevent his soul from straying abroad, he lay in the heat of a tropical night under a blanket, his nose and mouth tied up with a handkerchief.

The ancient king Gramuran shows his belief long survived in Europe. As the king lay asleep in the wood with his hounds and a fisherman's lap, his servants saw as it were a stream issue from his mouth and run to the brook. His progress being hindered, the servant laid his sword across the water and the creature ran along it and up into a mountain; after a while it came back, and returned into the mouth of the reposing king, who, upon wakening, told him how he had dreamt that he went over an iron bridge, and into a mountain full of gold.

3. Possession through the open mouth.—As the human soul is considered to enter and leave the body by the mouth, so it is with other spiritual beings, particularly such as possess people with evil intentions.

According to the Ewe-speaking peoples of theSlave Coast, when the indwelling spirit had left the body a man must be careful about opening his mouth, lest a hopeless spirit should take advantage of the opportunity and enter his body. The same belief prevails among the Kru or Gola people to take place while the man is eating.4 The Zulus, like the Persians, regard repeated yawning as a sign of possession by an evil spirit,5 and in Nigeria men constantly keep the lower part of their face veiled, even while eating and sleeping, in order to prevent侵害 by evil spirits.6 The same reason may explain the custom observed among Arab women of muffling their mouth, to prevent a man whose familiar god was the turtle from being obliged to wear a handage tied over his mouth if he were taking any part in the cutting up or cooking of the animal, lest an embryo turtle should enter his mouth and grow up within him.

In S.E. Australia a newly-initiated youth must always cover his mouth with a handkerchief in the presence of a woman,7 just as in W. Timor 'a man holds his right hand before his mouth in speaking lest a demon should enter his body,' and lest the person to whom he is speaking should harm his soul by magic.8 To prevent the soul of a fox killed in the chase from escaping and revenge itself on the hunters, or warning them of their approach, the Ainu, in former days, took care to tie up the mouth of the animal tightly.9

From this brief survey of the part played by the open mouth in primitive cult it will readily be understood how the act of yawning has come to be associated with the exit of the soul and the entrance of evil spirits. This ancient belief still survives in the polite custom of putting the lun hand before the gaping mouth, thereby (it was originally supposed) impeding the flight of the soul, and barring the way to a spiritual foe. Even to this day, when a man yawns, the Muslim puts the lower lip of his mouth up.10 It is said in Turkey that a refuge with Allah from Satan the accused,11 just as in the Tyrol the sign of the cross is made to prevent the entrance of an evil spirit when a person goes to bed. The Jewish proverb, 'Open not thy mouth to Satan!' shows that the Hebrews associated the devil with a gaping mouth—a conclusion supported by the story narrated by Josephus,12 describing how Eleazer, a Jew, cured demons in Vespassian's time by drawing out demons through their nostrils by means of a ring containing a root of mystic virtue mentioned by Solomon. It was probably supposed that the evil spirits entered through the mouth and were exhaled through the nose, much in the same way as the Alfofs regard the wandering soul of a child as expelled with the exhaled breath, after having entered the body of a by-stander through the mouth.

It will thus be seen that the folk-lore of yawning has arisen from the primitive doctrine of the separable soul and the notion of possession by evil spirits. It is not surprising that the uncultured races should thus think of the relation of the human body to the spiritual world, since they are ignorant of the very rudiments of science and can only explain the phenomena of life, consciousness, disease, and death by what the senses seem to tell. In sleep, trance, and death the soul appears to leave the body. To the rude philosopher this is the only possible interpretation of the facts which his senses can give. The most natural means by which these exits and entrances are made is through the mouth, and therefore the opening and closing of this organ—especially in an involuntary manner—became associated with no small danger. If the soul were to escape, it might never return, and, in consequence, death to the body would ensue. Likewise, when the mouth is open, a homeless spirit is liable to take up his abode in the body. To prevent straying, the entrance has to be carefully guarded.

Literature.—The literature has been given in the footnotes.

E. O. JAMES.

YELEMENITES.—See Arabians.

YENISEIANS.—See Ostyaks.

YEZIDIS.—The name of Yezidis has been given to a religious sect numbering about 50,000 persons, scattered from Mossul to the Caucasus region (districts of Mossul, Van, Diarbekr, Bitlis). They call themselves Dasi and speak a Kuridish dialect.

At the head of the community is a khelifa, who is a descendant of Shalikh Adi. Under him are shaikhs, kawwals, and faqirs. Priesthood is hereditary. Morality is above the average in that part of the world. They are brave and shrewd. Their temperament is cheerful but calm. They have cleanly habits. Their women are not veiled and may receive strangers. They feel great repulsion for the colour blue. Being completely illiterate, they handed down their traditions orally. Their greatest festival is that of Atiyeb. A procession of flagellants takes place in the village of B'adri. There is the grave of their great saint, Shalikh Adi ben Musafir, who died in A.D. 1155. All around fires of naphtha and bitumen are kept burning.

The Yezidis have been often persecuted by the Turks. During the 19th cent. efforts were made repeatedly to force them into the Turkish army. They have stubbornly resisted that pressure with no small danger. The origin of the word Yezid has been much discussed. Most probably it is related to Av. Yazata, 'deity.' Pers. Yazdân, 'God.' It was given to them in contrast either to the Zoroastrians or to the Muhammadans. Although their priesthood is of the Muhammadan type and they recognize Muhammad and Abraham as prophets, they are far from being a Muhammadan sect. Nor are they connected with the Turks, although they have baptism and regard Christ as an angel in human form. In fact, they perpetuate with various admixtures a doctrine of the Magian type, combining Iranian with Greek. The chief cult of fire is Iran. They profess that the devil is a creative agent of the supreme God, inasmuch as he produced evil. Hence he deserves our adoration.
These ideas resemble closely Mazdaean cosmogony. Zoroastrianism regarded the worship of the evil spirit (Ahriman) as an abomination, but this did not prevent the Persians from regarding the Mithraists, who used to offer sacrifices *de aruo*, and Plutarch reports that the Magians invoked Hades and Darkness in a somber place, with libations of the Jesus-plant juice and of the blood of a wolf. No doubt, the devil-worship of the Yezidis is a survival of the Magian sects who in those districts could resist orthodox Mazdaism.

The doctrine is supposed to be contained in a sacred book called *Yaloohe*. It is said to be hidden on a mountain-top where nobody can go and see it. In fact, the real book, in the form in which it exists at present, is written in an obsolete dialect of Kurdish that apparently was in use in the time of Shaikh Adi. Particulars about the Yezidi books, their authenticity, and their contents are given by Bittner, Mingana, and Horton.

Although the publication of these books has been on the whole disappointing, it has made more certain that Zoroastrianism is an offshoot of Mazdaism. It is to be found in a varying unity in dualism. It secures that result through presenting darkness as a mere absence of light, and evil as imperfect the positive element of which is good in the eyes of God, whose plan it serves although, to our unsatisfied knowledge, it seems to be bad. The book literally says: "I [the Spirit of Good] am active in all events which the outsiders regard as bad because they do not answer to their wishes while they answer to mine. I am therefore only a deficit which is to be made good through the wandering of the soul. The Good Spirit or First Principle is conceived in a pantheistic way as the light and power of God and a kind of *nuryos*. It is compared to a white pearl in the sea of Chaos out of which everything has arisen. In this conception we recognize the White *Hím* of Pahlavi books, a sacred plant growing in the sea Vourukasha and in which the creative power of God is contained. This white pearl is also a bird, a peacock, the most revered symbol of the Yezidis (Malak-Tâus). It is also an old Iranian symbol. On the Goknera (another name of the White Hím) growing in the cosmic sea roosts the marvellous bird Simârgâh (Av. *sàvaña*, who, under the name of Vâreghsa, is said to have seized the godly glory (Old Pers. *pârmach*) that is the best conception, the primeval king (also on Zoroaster). The *nuryos*-bird of the Pahlavi was also supposed to incorporate himself in prophets. They believe him to have manifested himself both in Christ and in Shaikh Adi. The Aryans often compared the sun to a bird. Preference is given to the peacock on account of its way of spreading out its tail like a wheel (the wheel is a still better known symbol of the sun). The same symbol has been found on a Copite coffin, and in the sacred books of the Mandates. To what extent the Yezidi doctrine is permeated by that old symbolism may be shown by a quotation from their books: "Before heaven and earth arose, God rested on the sea. He had made for Himself a boat and was sailing on the waves, glorifying Himself alone. Then emanated out of Him a white pearl, and He reigned upon it forty thousand years till He threw it off out of anger." This mysterious language is very much in the manner of the Iranian Banda-lishin. It is clear only to those who know that the Iranians compared the sun not only to a bird but also to a ship.


**YQGRASIL.**—See Nature (Tentonic).

**YOGA.**—The word *yoga* has two meanings in India: (1) contemplation raised to a formal art, and (2) the system to be treated below, which is entirely taken up with it, given it a philosophical basis, and ranks as one of the six systems of Brahmantic philosophy. Contemplation exercises for the attainment of higher states of consciousness and faculties are very old in India. It has been shown, especially by Hermann Beckh (*Buddhismus*, 2 vols., Berlin and Leipzig, 1916), that they were of great influence at the foundation of Buddhism. The Yoga system had its rise at a later period, which cannot be determined with certainty. Nor can there be any certainty yet as to the age of the Yogasutrâs, i.e. the text-book in which the system was first set forth by Patanjali. The Hindus unanimously regard Patanjali as the founder of the system; and as identical with Patanjali, the grammarian, the author of the *Mahabakhyaga*, who lived in the 2nd cent. B.C. But Hermann Jacobi (*J. A. O., xxxi. (1911) 24 ff.) has made it probable on philosophic-historical grounds that the Yogasutrâs were composed after A.D. 450 by another man of the same name. On the other hand, Bruno Liebich (*Zur Einführung in die indische einheimische Sprachwissenschaft, I. Das Kāṭaṅgī, *1917) and Wolberg, in their *assorted noteworthy philological-critical grounds for the identity of the two Patañjalis*. The question therefore still awaits the final solution. But in any case the Yoga system is in the main essentially older than the Yogasutrâs of Patanjali. We find almost completely developed in the *Mātrī Upanisad* the technique prescribed in the Yogasutrâs.

In Indian literature the Yoga system is rightly regarded as a branch of the Sāṅkhya (q.v.). For in the doctrines of the Sāṅkhya on cosmology, physiology, and psychology, have been simply adopted by the Yoga. So, too, the doctrine of emancipation is the same—though recently the conception of the emancipation itself as a complete separation of the soul from matter, but also the theory that this emancipation is effected solely by means of the clear distinction drawn between matter and spirit. The characteristics of the Yoga philosophy, apart from points of less importance, are—(1) the rejection of the atheistic views of the Sāṅkhya, and (2) the treatment of the doctrine of absorption as the most effective means for the attainment of the knowledge that secures emancipation. The technical detail of the theory of absorption forms the proper contents of the Yoga system, and has given to it its own name; for *yoga* signifies originally 'yoking', then 'diversion of the senses from the external world, and concentration of thought within.'

The object of the Yoga system in inserting the conception of a personal God into the Sāṅkhya is merely to satisfy the theists, and to facilitate the propagation of the theory of the universe expounded in the Sāṅkhya. The idea of God, far from being organically interwoven in the Yoga system, is entirely distinctly inserted. For in the passages that treat of God stand disconnected, and are, indeed, in direct contradiction to the contents and aim of the system. God neither creates the universe, nor does He rule it. He does not reward or punish the actions of men, and the
latter do not regard union with Him (at least according to the older doctrine of the Yaga) as the supreme object of their endeavour. God is only a 'particular soul,' not essentially different from the other individual souls which are eternal with Him; the distinction consists solely in the manner of His connexion with matter. God cannot in this philosophy be conceived as existing unrelated to any material soul, for then He would be without consciousness. It is assumed, therefore, in the Yoga doctrine that the divine soul stands in an eternal and indis- soluble connexion with the individual most refined constituent of matter, sattva, which is completely purified from the lower material elements; and that this soul is in consequence from and to all eternity endowed with supreme power, wisdom, and goodness. Being free from entanglement in worldly existence, which is full of misery, or in the cycle of births, God lives in eternal bliss, without merit or guilt, unaffected by all the impulses and false involutions with which all other living beings are hardened.

It is evident that this is no God in our sense of the term, and that we have to do with perplexing speculations the aim of which is to conceal the original nature of God from man, and to bring the assumption of God into bare accord with its fundamental teaching. Assuredly these speculations prove, were there any need at all for proof, that in the real Sākhya-Yoga there is no room for a personal God. The two systems are therefore thus joined together in India, in order to emphasize their unity. The idea of God, however, once having been received into the Yoga system, it became necessary to establish a connexion between God and the world of mankind, for God could not continue to exist for His own sake alone. A relation between God and man was found, in the fact that, while God does not bestow earthly or heavenly felicity (for this is to be obtained only by individual merit and springs necessarily from it), He in His mercy aids the man who is entirely devoted to Him to remove the hindrances which stand in the way of the attainment of deliverance. But even this slight relation dependent on human devotion to God and on divine favour is with difficulty intelligible as combined with the doctrine of the Yaga.

Nevertheless, in the later Yoga literature, especially in the numerous more recent Upaniṣads which are founded upon and develop the Yoga doctrine, viz. the Śvetāmbara, God is a much more definite place. God gradually becomes more personal, and the relation between God and man closer. Here also, therefore, the universal need of the human heart has proved stronger than the logical reasoning of philosophy.

The true subject of the Yoga is the doctrine, discussed at great length in the text-books, of yoga, or concentration of thought. These texts describe how the senses may be withdrawn from the objects of sense and reduced to inactivity, so that their natural tendency is reversed, and they assume altogether the character of the inner central organ, whose emanations they are; how, in the next place, the activity of the organ of thought, in which all the functions that are dependent upon the influence of the external world are aspressed, is wholly centred upon the ātmān (the self, the soul); and how, finally, in the last stage of absorption, thought and its object completely coincide. By regular observance of the Yoga praxis the hindrances arising from our natural dispositions, and their management of saving knowledge so difficult, are most successfully overcome. When absorption has risen to such a height, or rather has penetrated so deep, that no wandering of thought towards other objects is any longer possible, when that disposition of our organ of thought which is prone to go astray can no longer manifest itself, the knowledge of the essential difference of soul and matter is revealed in the form of an intuitive perception, and therewith the final goal of human endeavour is reached.

The Yoga praxis consists in a series of stages which have to be traversed, in which external aids play a large part. Various bodily attitudes, named āsana, are prescribed, the counting of the inhalations and exhalations, and especially the holding of the breath, and the concentration of the gaze on a definite point—on the tip of the nose, the navel, etc. One result of these external Yoga practices is the loss of consciousness, the so-called Yoga-sleep (yogānanda), which is considered to be a stage preceding emancipation, in those cases especially in which during the Yoga-sleep the life becomes extinct. That this Yoga-sleep, which naturally arises in the course of the practice of the supreme marvellous phenomenon, is none other than the hypnotic sleep scarcely needs formal demonstration. In fact, the Yoga texts describe a whole series of hypnotic devices which have originally been effective, and which, e.g., the ṛṣabha, for instance, Yoga texts which are themselves late, but rest upon an older tradition, enjoin the concentration of a steadfast gaze upon a small object until the eyes begin to shed tears. The result of such practices is declared to be that the body becomes as still as a piece of wood, i.e. becomes cataleptic. One method, which is especially significant in view of the artificial production of apparent death by the Yogins (see art. Yogī, and of James Braid, Observations on Trance or Human Hypernovation, London and Edinburgh, 1839), is the so-called khechari. This consists in artificially extending the tongue, bending it round and inserting the tip in the hollow of the throat, while at the same time the gaze is steadfastly directed on the spot between the eyebrows. Even among ourselves in recent times it has been noticed that the persistent turning upwards of the eyeball at a certain angle induces the hypnotic sleep.

When employing these methods the Yogī, according to his Hatha-yogapradīpika and other texts, before completely losing consciousness hears within his body (in the heart and throat, between the eyebrows, and in other parts) various sounds, as of a bell, a shell, a reed, a lyre, and a bee. There can be no doubt that as a result of self-suggestion such sounds were actually heard.

The Yoga praxis when correctly and perseveringly observed has, according to the Indian view, therapeutic effects, and other consequences of various kinds. In particular, according to the belief universally held in India, the practice of Yoga procures for a man the magnified powers often mentioned in Indian literature. When the authors of the Yoga texts hold out the promise of these supernatural powers, it must not be forgotten that these authors were men who regarded very seriously their task of expediting the final attainment of the supreme goal. They certainly did not intend consciously to deceive. They have simply given expression to the conviction of the Yogī, who in the essential difference of the beings by means of suggestion in the hypnotic state to be in possession of such powers. These alleged miraculous powers are, in fact, partly the same as our modern mesmerists think that they make use of the many powers that are enumerated can here be named. Among them was the ability to become infinitely small or invisible; to swell to an
immense size, so as to reach even to the most distant objects—e.g., to the moon, with the tip of the finger—or to be transported anywhere by the simple act of will. There is mentioned also such an internal perception of the most remote things, even though separated by intervening walls or the like, come under the cognizance of the senses, and the processes going on in the minds of other men become known in the same way (thought-finding). Other faculties obtainable are the knowledge of the past and future, especially of the hour of one’s own death; or the ability to make the dead appear, and to hold converse with them. Two of these are cited. That these miraculous powers may be gained by means of the Yoga praxis the most enlightened Brâhmans of the present day are themselves immovably convinced. The reason why such powers of the Yogis are not openly exercised is attributed to the preliminary condition of their attainment, viz. to the absolute indifference of the Yogi to the things of the world.

The conditions of ascetic contemplation practised in the Yoga are the final result of a long development, which takes us back to primitive times, to the ecstatic rites of savage peoples, of which we find traces in the Rigveda. Following the analogy of primitive peoples of the present day, we may confidently ascribe to that early period the belief that it was possible by ascetic practices to win the power to hold intercourse with the spirit world, and in a marvellous way to change the ordinary course of nature. In ancient India the name for asceticism was tapas. This word signified in the first instance ‘warmth, heat,’ ‘fervour,’ in the literal sense; then, the sweat generated by self-mortification, and the condition of internal heat thus caused, i.e. ecstasy. As at the present day the conjurers among the Indians of America and among the Negro peoples are wont to proceed in a similar way, so according to the ancient Indian ritual the offerers of the soma juice prepared themselves for their task by prolonged fastings, while, clad in dark skins of wild animals, and ‘speaking in a stammering voice,’ they tarried by the magic fire. The fact that the word tapas in its metaphysical meaning is found first in the later hymns of the Rigveda proves nothing against the extreme antiquity of the above-mentioned ideas or their practical application; for the circle in which the thought of the Rigveda moves has few points of contact with ascetic practices, which meets us more frequently in the Yajur- and Atharvavedas, and very often in the literature of the Brahmans and Upanishads. Since tapas occupies here the position of a cosmogonic power, by means of which the creator of the universe produces living beings and inanimate objects, it is evident that already at that period no less influence was ascribed to asceticism than in classical Sanskrit literature, in which the ascetics appear as all-powerful magicians. While, then, originally the ecstatic condition, in which man believes himself capable of rising to higher spheres, was sought mainly by fasting and other self-mortification, in India, owing to the increasingly introspective character of the spiritual life, stress was laid more and more on meditation and absorption. The conception of yoga, therefore, was developed out of that of tapas. In that meaning the word yoga is first met with considerably later than tapas. But the existence of the peculiar Yoga doctrine is certified already, as stated above, as early as pre-Buddhist times. One attempt has been made to trace the origin of the Yoga praxis back to the influence of the dark-skinned races with whom the incom-
peculiar custom of slitting their ears (kōn, 'ear,' and phKT, 'sit') and inserting huge earrings in the holes. They are also known under the names of Dārsanas from their ears (see below), and Gorakshīs and Gorakhnāths from their founder Gorakhnāth (q.v.).

Their origin is involved in great obscurity. They trace their tenets to a much earlier period than Gorakshīs and Gorakhnāths and the latter are merely the reorganizers of the doctrine and the founder of the sub-sect. Gorakhnāth himself is said to have been a pupil of Māchchhendaramāthī (Skr. Matsyendrānāth)—the Nepalese local deity—who in his turn is represented as the pupil of Adināth, and in some accounts the list is still more prolonged. A tradition current in N.E. Bengal (Kangpur District) identifies the Kānpaṭā with Sankara-charya's disciples, who, having taken to drinking, were consequently disowned by their teacher. In the Tibetan tradition Gorakhnāth is recorded as a Buddhist dhamuṭagur, and his Yogis are accused of having appealed to the present idea of gurus simply to please their heretical rulers and to gain political favours. What seems to be most likely, amidst the general confusion of the various accounts, is that the Kānpaṭā sect came from the north of India, where already existed, during the prevalence of Buddhism, but it grew to power only when the latter religion began to lose ground and Brahmanism to make its reconquest. It is possible that, while Buddhism prevailed, the Yogīs could not help being in some way attracted into its sphere, and that Gorakhnāth was the man who rallied them from the ranks of the Buddhist and Brahmanical principles into harmony with the philosophy of the Upanisads and who was still enough to a certain extent his apostle. A short poetical composition, bearing the title Gorakhnāth-ki Aavat, is included among the works of Bunārī Dīś, a Dīgāmbāra Jain poet, who flourished in the first half of the 17th century, and who for some time in his youth had also been a follower of Saivism (probably of the Lingāyānt sect, but that too is of little help. The most important source of information, which has remained unedited, is the Gorakshīda-vacan, a Yoga treatise, which is said to be one of the books of the sect, or the Gorakhnāth-ki Goṣṭhī, a kind of controversial dialogue between Gorakhnāth and Kalībī concerning their respective doctrines. All that can be gathered from the above sources is that the Kānpaṭās reconcile Śiva as Supreme God, and hold that emanation from worldly existence lies in the union of the individual soul with him, and reposes the nearness of this the most important end. The phrase yāti viśva nirmātare, occurring in the Tattvartha and Brahman Upanisads to signify incapability of definition, is also found in the Gorakshīda, 50–51. Certainly, occurring in the Tattvartha and Brahman Upanisads to signify incapability of definition, is also found in the Gorakshīda, 50–51. Contrary to what had been asserted on the authority of the Hatha-yogānandakapalī, a Kānpaṭā Yogi is not necessarily obliged to remain within a monastery, the second stanza in the Gorakshīda allowing him to live in market-places and roads, and under the same conditions. The important features of the doctrine of Gorakhnāth is, no doubt, its universality, it being open to all castes and being not very particular in regard to food, in both respects bearing an analogy to the Vaisnav system of Rāmaṇa. The affinity between the two systems is increased by the adoption of the same term avadātā for the designation of their respective ascetics.

From this it would seem that Gorakhnāth too resorted to a symbolism of the kind found in many of the Upanisads, especially the later ones, to account for certain metaphysical problems as cannot be solved by reason. The phrase yāti viśva nirmātare, occurring in the Tattvartha and Brahman Upanisads to signify incapability of definition, is also found in the Gorakshīda, 50–51. Contrary to what had been asserted on the authority of the Hatha-yogānandakapalī, a Kānpaṭā Yogi is not necessarily obliged to remain within a monastery, the second stanza in the Gorakshīda allowing him to live in market-places and roads, and under the same conditions. The important features of the doctrine of Gorakhnāth is, no doubt, its universality, it being open to all castes and being not very particular in regard to food, in both respects bearing an analogy to the Vaisnav system of Rāmaṇa. The affinity between the two systems is increased by the adoption of the same term avadātā for the designation of their respective ascetics.

The present Kānpaṭās are more or less spread all over India, and their customs are substantially the same in all places. They have no caste prejudices and freely eat flesh, with the exception of beef and pork, and indulge in spirits and opium, whenever they can afford it. They bury the dead. Those who take to secular callings are mostly money-lenders, weavers, cultivators, peddlers, or soldiers. They are said to be good soldiers, and

and in the form of a conversation between Gorakhnāth and his guru Māchchhendramāthī, the stanzas being a question and an answer alternately. Unfortunately the extreme conciseness and difficulty of the text and the partly obscure character of the exposition make this source only partially utilizable; yet there seems to be sufficient ground in it for concluding that the system here expounded is a combination of Saivism and the Vedic philosophy, and apparently closely related to the Saivism comprehended by Madhavachārya under the name of Saivism, though different from it. The close alliance of the Kānpaṭā system to the Yoga system of Patañjali and of the Upanisads is visible from the prominent part given to the Yoga praxis as well as to the mystical theory of the circles in the body (chakrā, kūtra), arteries (nāda), vital air (prāna), and breaths (prānī).

According to the authority of the Gorakshīda, the vital air resides in the circle of the navel (nabha), and is supported by the void (śūnya), which is spread everywhere. Vital air visibly vivifies the manas, which resides in the heart. The manas is open to the influence of the moon (chandra), which resides in the sky, the vital air to the influence of the sun (sūrya), and the void to that of the fire (lāla). The latter is the element, the word (śabda), which resides in form (rupa). Before the coming into existence of heart, navel, form, and sky, the manas was contained in the void, the vital air was shapeless (nirākāra), the word was unformed, and the moon resided in the intermediate space between heaven and earth. The void is of four kinds: ahāka, anubhava, paratna, and atiśūrya. It is to be noted that the vital spirit (prāna) resort during sleep or death. There are five principles (tattva), one of which seems to be nirvāṇa, and ten desires, or means of attaining perfection, which are not named.
their military fame seems to be of an ancient date. 1 In some parts of India they live by singing cyclic poems 2 or religious songs. 3 They are generally believed to be southsavors and sorcerers, and to have the power of burning and freezing men and animals from the evil eye. 4 Marriage is common among them. 5 Those who live by begging smear their bodies with ashes and wear a waist-cloth and an upper-sheath-dyed in ochre, a woolen string (jñāna vaññi) round their neck with a horn-whistle (nād) attached to it, a wallet (jñāna) hanging from their left shoulder, and a hollow gourd, in which to receive alms, in their right hand. But the great characteristic of the Kānphātas is the huge earrings (dārākāna, mudra) which they wear in their slit ears. These earrings are generally made of agate, horn, or glass, about 2½ ounces in weight, and are conferred on the Kānphātas at the time of their initiation. They are worn as a kind of fetish and are regarded by them as the symbol of their faith. 6 The initiation takes place as follows:

First there is a preparatory ceremony, in which the neophyte, after having been shaved and smeared with ashes, is invested with the woolen string and horn-whistle and appointed to serve his guru. After a period of six to eight months, during which his conduct is strictly watched, the neophyte is admitted to the certainty, which is performed before the head guru or the god Bhārava, with the thumb of the right hand laid on his face turned to the east. The slit made with a double-edged knife is and about three-fourths of an inch in length; in the wound a nimb stick is inserted and the cure is made by a treatment of nimb oil and daily batheings with pure water. When the car is well again, the nimb stick is removed and the wound is covered with neem leaves, and he has his name changed into a new one ending in -maññi and becomes a regular Vagi.

Of all the Kānphātas of India the best known to us from trustworthy accounts are those of the west. These generally trace their origin to Dhāranmāth, who is said to be one of Gorakhnāth's disciples, who went from Peśāwar to Kāthiawār and Kachchh to perform penance and to base the river between the two peninsulas into the present Ran. The Western Kānphātas live in monasteries, the most celebrated of which are that of Dīnodiār in Kachchh on the edge of the Ran, which claims to have been founded by Dhāranmāth himself on the spot of his penance, 7 and that of Gorakhnāth in Kāthiawār. 8 The characteristic of the Western Kānphātas is charity; they make it a rule to distir their food and their robes to any who ask for them; 9 they can well afford to do this, as they are rich and have been endowed with lands by more than one of the former rulers. The monastery of Dīnodiār in Dīnodiār Hill is the most important; there is a large fenced and turreted establishment, comprising dwelling-houses, temples, tombs of the former pir, halls for the treating of guests, etc. The pir, or abbot, is held in great honour by the lai ho, after who his election invests him with a dress and instals him on his seat. Both the Yogīs and the pir of Dīnodiār are said to observe the strictest celibacy, but in the

2 Bg xliii. [1884] 153; Tāktī (1884-85) 94.
3 Bg viii. [1884] 155; Crooke, ii. 156. According to George Ladd, a Kānphāta's remaining ear with an earring has been cut off did not allow his ear to be sewn up and a new earring provided, but chose to die instead.
4 Gv 5. [1889] 57, viii. [1884] 417; Crooke, iii. 156.
5 For a complete account of this monastery as well as of the Kānphātas of Dīnodiār see J. English, 'Practise of One of the Kānphātas of Kāthiawār,' Khākhar, in Ad. v. [1878] 47-53; cf. also T. Postans, in JBUAS 500, [1895].
6 Gv viii. 155 f. 46f.
7 According to the Kachchh legend, this liberal distribution of food and clothing is the habit of Dhāranmāth himself, as a reaction against the uncharitable character of the inhabitants of Kachchh.
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Williams, received the honour of knighthood from Queen Victoria. The official figures issued by the World's Committee show that on 1st Jan. 1920 the Y.M.C.A. was represented in 5790 cities and towns in 46, the United States, Africa, 2908 in America, 386 in Asia, and 23 in Australasia.

The Association has thus been in existence for the greater part of a century, and all parts of the world has proved the friend particularly of the young man away from home. The exceptional conditions of the Great War have brought it into the limelight and gathered round the Y.M.C.A. a host of new friends and naturally not a few critics.

On the one hand, it has been urged by many that there is no need for the Y.M.C.A., and that the Churches can do all that is necessary as far as Christian work among young men is concerned. Many Christian people have gone even further and said, 'Drop the "Christian" out of your title and confine your efforts to social service, and the work will be more appreciated.'

Many have accused the Association of being too broad, and others have withheld sympathy and support because in their judgment it is administered on too narrow lines. Then, again, during the War many have accused the Y.M.C.A. of being too commercialised, though, on the other hand, they insist on the work being self-supporting. The fact is that, if it was to meet the real need of the men during the War, it was compelled to trade, though never for trading's sake or for private profit, and indeed all the profits were spent for the direct and immediate benefit of the men.

The Y.M.C.A. commenced its work on somewhat narrow lines. It had a definite object which it kept always before its members—too win men for Christ and to enlist them in His service. The story of the movement has been a story of gradual but steady and constant evolution. It has gradually extended, and to-day it stands for a broad progressive programme of Christian and social service. To appreciate the importance of the service, it is necessary to realize that for the last seventy-five years, and the programme is gradually evolving for the future, certain facts must be borne in mind concerning the Association.

1. Its functions are those of the pioneer. It does not seek so much to build upon the foundations laid by others as to find new methods of serving and enlistling men. As an emergency organization it appealed to the imagination of the public. In August, 1914, when, through its mobile machinery, it was able to meet a definite national emergency with unexpected rapidity. Long before the adaptation of the Labour Exchanges to meet the needs of discharged men, the Y.M.C.A. in London had its own employment agency, through which it found work for more than 20,000 ex-soldiers and sailors. Before the Armistice it had its own design and workrooms in London, Manchester, and other centres, and the little farm at Wetherby that it has established in Dorset for tuberculous ex-service men has been regarded by the authorities as one of the best things of the kind, though to meet the needs of the machinery of no organization would be adequate. The Y.M.C.A. was the pioneer of the present Army system of education, and more than £140,000 was spent by the British movement on educational work among the soldiers in France. As the War went on, many other societies and private individuals organized recreation huts and tents on the lines mapped out by the Y.M.C.A., and it is a striking fact that in the early days of the century in volunteer and territorial camps that provided the experience upon which all this work in war-time has been built up.

2. It is essentially an auxiliary movement. It does not profess to be an educational authority, but in a hundred ways it supplements the work of the school, university, and educational committee. On the battlefield it supplemented the work of the official R.A.M.C., attending to the needs of the walking wounded, and in the base camps caring for the relatives who visited their loved ones who were dangerously ill in hospital. So in like manner it seeks to supplement the work of the Churches, and has always resisted the temptation to develop into another denomination, whatever it may be, but to remain as a movement that rightly belong to the Churches, or to supplant or in any way supersede their work.

3. It is interdenominational rather than denominational. It holds that the first duty of the church member is to his Church. A recent official declaration states:

(1) The Y.M.C.A. does not come on the scene to teach the Churches how to do their work, much less to supplant them. It desires to help and serve the Church as the permanent Domestic Institution designed to help and save the world.

(2) It believes that the work of God to serve the soldiers, sailors and airmen until demobilisation is complete, and then to continue to serve such men as are demobilised or are still in uniform as well as possible, all the young men and boys of the nations in far and wide, camp and barracks, village and hamlet, East and West, in the world, and befriending them as they move from place to place, and looking after their interests when in response to the call of God or commerce or whatever the call of search of health or wealth to the most distant parts of the British Empire, or to the utmost parts of the earth.

(3) It regards the whole world as its parish, believing that the work done during the war has demonstrated that the Red Triangle has a message for the men of every creed and nation. It believes it can help the Churches to find the key to the solution of one aspect of the Missionary problem, and that the "Hut" will prove as helpful to the young men of missionary lands as to those of our own country.

(4) It believes that the very success of its war service constitutes a challenge to undertake work on an adequate scale for the men and women of all conditions.

(5) It holds that it is of more importance that the need should be met, and the work done, than that any particular society or organization should or should not do it. It recognises that the field is so wide that there is ample scope for the activities of all societies that have the same end in view, and it earnestly urges that all their overlapping or over-lapping energies should be avoided, and all such work co-ordinated.

(6) It seeks to remove prejudice, and to be impartial as respects the distinction of creed or party, desire to engage in social service and to work for the extension of the Kingdom of God.

(7) It would state definitely and categorically that, whilst fully recognising its position as an agency of the Christian Church, it regards as the primary aim of the movement the winning of young men for our Lord Jesus Christ, and the leading of them into the fellowship and service of the Churches.

4. It is missionary in its outlook. The mission of the Y.M.C.A. is to the man outside, and it seeks to teach him at every point and, as far as possible, in every place. It seeks to form a half-way house, a kind of communication trench, between the men of the nation and the Churches. It has always tried to do the work of the member in the sphere of his daily calling. Meetings for prayer and for the study of the Bible have ever held a prominent place in the programme of the Y.M.C.A., and it seeks through its work and the message of the Evangel in the language of the times. It has always made a feature of meetings in the open-air and in unexpected places. It counts more upon atmosphere than upon any other single factor, on the personali-ty of its workers.

As may be inferred from the foregoing, the
Association has spread to non-Christian lands, where it has speedily become an indigenous movement. In India, China, and Japan it has been proved that the countries of the Orient can themselves provide leadership that will compare favorably with the best that the Western nations can produce.

5. It is essentially a layman's movement.—Possibly the greatest service the Association has rendered the Church is that one of the results has been of winning men when young for Christian discipleship and providing them with their first training in Christian service. Such training must often have been crude, but it has been practical and effective, and has provided the incentive to further study and an earnest longing for fuller knowledge. It will probably be conceded that the greatest weakness of many of the Churches to-day is to be found in their failure to fire the imagination of their male members and to enlist their co-operation in the work of winning men. This lack, to a certain extent, has been supplied by the Y.M.C.A. —to have large numbers readily realized. Leading ministers of every denomination have told the story of the help and training the Association gave them at a critical period of their careers. It is a branch of the Y.M.C.A. which does not live up to the high ideals of the movement, but no Association is regarded as really efficient from the Y.M.C.A. standpoint unless it aims at keeping its first young men and inducing young men to help their fellow men in the daily fight against temptation. Emphasis is placed, too, on the importance of the voluntary worker. In the great City Association the General Secretary is the key to the whole movement. He must be a man of great personal power, but his business is to inspire men and work through his members. The very last thing to be desired is the development of a professional class of men, however able, who will do the work themselves rather than through others.

In the early days of the Great War the Y.M.C.A. had to face a serious crisis with regard to personnel. Hitherto it had been regarded as a work for young men by young men. The very men on whom it relied for its ever-expanding war work were needed for the Army and Navy, and their places had to be taken by women. Through age or health, were disqualified for active service. It was soon found, however, that there were many things women could do even in the work of a Y.M.C.A. Association, and as he has said, it is a matter of fact, later on there were in the war service of the British Y.M.C.A. alone more than 40,000 women workers as compared with less than 4000 men. There can be no doubt that the Y.M.C.A. woman worker has come to stay, and that to the great advantage of the movement.

6. Emphasis is laid on practical service.—In the early days of the War some people spoke sneeringly of what they termed 'canteen religion.' As the War years passed slowly by, the vast majority saw its utility and learned that it was not incompatible with the teaching and example of our Lord. He spoke of the 'cup of cold water' given in His name, and many a war-scarred soldier saw the Master's hand in the hand that gave him a cup of hot coffee or cocoa when he was up against things in the trenches. The Y.M.C.A. believes that the most effective way of combating intemperance is by providing an effective counter-attraction. Given the 'Hut' run by the right people and with a strong constructive programme, there will be no need for the canteen in the public-house, or the far more deadly drinking club. The Association seeks to promote purity of life, not only by education and precept, but also by making provision for the sexes to meet amidst wholesome surroundings and by catering for the leisure of young people. A well-equipped hostel is an important feature of most of the large city Associations, and the Association has worked out hundred practical ways the all-round needs of young men and boys are being looked after. It is the conviction of the leaders of the movement that it is possible to serve God acceptably in any one of the activities of the Association. The Hut, or the Red Triangle Club, as it is usually called, with its big lounge or common room, is regarded as a centre to work from, and an object lesson in practical Christianity. It is recognized that

7. It is a unifying force.—Sir George Williams always regarded the prayer of the Master— That they all may be one—as a call and a challenge to the Association which he founded and with which his name will for ever be identified. Through the whole period of its existence the Y.M.C.A. has been a unifying force, though it has talked little about unity. It has provided a common platform for Christians of all denominations, and it has been recognized in bringing together and uniting in Christian service those who never otherwise found opportunity to move beyond their denominational barriers. It is believed that it will be an important part in years to come in bringing together class and class, party and party, creed and creed, nation and nation. None will be asked to give up their special beliefs or convictions, but all will be invited to co-operate in the service of the Kingdom of God. In the War the Association was allowed to serve the Indian troops only on condition that there should be no religious work as men commonly call work religious. There were to be no hymns, no prayers, no addresses, no distribution of Bibles or Testaments. The leaders of the movement gave their promise and carried it out to the letter. It is doubtful if anything that has ever been done will have more effect upon the future of Christianity in India than the unselfish Christian social service carried out by cooperation many under the sign of the Red Triangle. Not only during the War, but before and since, the Association has had the privilege of serving men of every nation and creed.

8. It begins with the boy.—The hope of the future of the Y.M.C.A. is held by many on the fact that it begins with the boy, and it seeks to get him at the age when he begins to feel too big for the Sunday School. If we can only reach and influence the boy during the crisis of adolescence, the future is assured.

9. The significance of the Red Triangle.—During the War the Red Triangle had become almost as familiar as the Red Cross itself. It typifies the service the Association seeks to render. Its very colour signifies sacrifice, and its three sides speak to the Association man of the needs of body, mind, and spirit, all of which may be consecrated to the service of the living God. Nothing that can be used to the glory of God is regarded by the Association as common or unclean. Its programme is ever widening and its roots getting deeper down. For years the leaders of the Y.M.C.A. set their faces steadily against even the most innocent of games, and, when these were included, another running fight, which lasted for years, there was the need for a closer watch over the proceeds of smoking rooms and billiard tables. These have now become almost universal in Britain, though there are still many of the great Association buildings in the United States where smoking is
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not permitted. More recent agitation has been in favour of cards, dancing, and the drama, and almost every association of this kind seems to modify its position to meet the new needs of a new generation. Emphasis is placed on proper supervision, right company and hours, a programme that is elevated and given with a purpose which there is no gambling. It is urged that these innovations can only be included as part of a well-considered constructive programme. In these days, when there is more of less general tendency to every Act of God, it is being done build up in every Association centre a programme that will lead the members on to aspiration and achievement.

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1. History.—The history of the Association circles round three great events in the spiritual, social, and political realms which have in a special way affected it. The days of Y.W.C.A. have been described as those of a Triangle in which there is no gambling. It is urged that these innovations can only be included as part of a well-considered constructive programme. In those days, when there is more of less general tendency to every Act of God, it is being done build up in every Association centre a programme that will lead the members on to aspiration and achievement.
and Emily Kinnaird, to the U.S.A. brought the British Association into touch with a similar movement among students, which was organized along the lines of the Y.M.C.A., and formed the establishment of Y.W.C.A. which has been adopted in many lands as an integral part of the national Y.W.C.A. work of the country. This led to frequent communication and inter-visitation until finally an entirely new policy was adopted. All the branches which had been started by the British Association and linked to it, but which were not in Great Britain or Ireland, were cut off from the main group and placed under national committees; each could make its own rules and affiliate to the World’s Y.W.C.A. office.

(b) The third national movement which brought a call to the British Y.W.C.A. was the Great War of 1914-18. On the first day of war, 4th August, some of the workers met, and within a week called together the National Council to consider the responsibility of a women’s association in time of war; it established a War Emergency Committee in the first month, which eventually developed into a War Department with six divisions of Sub-Departments. The Association put itself at the disposal of Government for anything that might concern women. It was found that London had become a cosmopolitan city, and girls of all lands were working in it. Immediately they were unanimous to get back to their own country, the Y.W.C.A. provided the necessary links, and thousands of girls found that the Association Directory could guide them and that its membership meant friendship and fellowship above national or denominational ties. The Blue Triangle, similarly to the Red Triangle of the Y.M.C.A., became the symbol of Y.W.C.A. activities. It was evident to the nation that a Christian association could be looked to for the physical and social well-being of the soldier boy and the girl war-worker. The War Department gradually became responsible for establishing and expanding work along two lines—those of providing for the mental and for the physical needs of girls—and on a third line to carry on the religious work of the Association, thereby completing the triangle symbol. The three—physical, mental, religious—are equally dependent on the spiritual force which energizes and binds them together. The Blue Triangle is now seen in Government enclosures and canteens, in small localities, in the centres of busy cities and in the lonely countryside where munition and aerodrome settlements were established. It denotes to the girl of today, as the letters Y.W.C.A. denoted to the girl of yesterday, that family life, community life, and the life of the State are better if animated by the spirit of Jesus Christ their Lord, which is the animating spirit of the Y.W.C.A. The Association also makes its contribution to the Kingdom of God on earth by remaining in close relation to all the Christian Churches; it is strictly interdenominational, and its service is rendered to all women irrespective of creed.

2. Organization.—(a) National.—The activities of the Association are carried out on certain well-defined lines under the direction of: (1) the National Biennial Conference, composed of members elected by the membership, thus aiming at the development of democratic management; (2) a National Council appointed at the Conference and composed largely of national and divisional office-bearers, with co-opted members, representing labour and Church, meeting at least once a year; (3) a National Executive, meeting monthly to direct and evolve any activities necessary for the growing needs of the girls of the land. The work is directed by a president, four acting vice-presidents, a treasurer, a general secretary, and a staff of national secretaries.

(b) Departmental.—National, departmental, and sectional committee meetings meeting every month or in alternate months, are appointed for studying problems affecting girls, and thus a large body of women take part in and guide the activities of the Association. The Overseas and Foreign Committee sends to interest members in Association work in non-Christian lands; secretaries are sent out to all parts of the world.

(c) Basic objects.—All women taking up active work, salaried or honorary, on these councils and committees must agree with the basic aims:

1. Faith in God the Father as Creator, and in Jesus Christ, His only Son, as Lord and Saviour, and in the Holy Spirit as Reveler of Truth and Source of Power for life and service, according to the teaching of Holy Scripture.

2. The aim of the Young Women’s Christian Association is:

(a) To call young women and girls to the allegiance of Our Lord Jesus Christ, the fellowship of His Church and the service of His Kingdom.

(b) To guide them in a fellowship of prayer, Bible study and service, through which they may make their contribution to the spiritual, moral and social progress of the world.

To make available to them all that will minister to character, mental capacity and physical health.

(d) Training of secretaries.—The aim is to have a well-staffed training centre where students offering for holy and overseas work can undergo a course of training or more of training, so that the Association secretaryship may be looked on as a vocation as important as teaching.

(e) Headquarters.—The Headquarters of the British Y.W.C.A. are at 22, 25, and 26 George Street, Hanover Square, London, W.I.

(f) Membership.—Membership in the Association is open to women who desire, in fullment of the motto, to conform to the mother and the world by love in the spirit of Jesus Christ. There are also associate membership and club membership which do not involve membership of the Association.

(g) Magazines.—By its literature the Association seeks to carry its ideals to all sections of the community. Its magazines are: Woman’s Outlook (monthly), Our Own Gazette (monthly, for younger members), Home and Overseas Bulletin, The World’s Quarterly, The Y.W.C.A. Almanack and Motto Card, The Monthly Letter.

(h) Territorial work.—The activities are carried on through divisions, embracing a given number of counties, and consists of:(a) Work in North of England, South of England, West of England, Scotland, Wales. Each has its president, general secretary, and council, and directs the work of the local branches by grouping them into district councils.

3. Methods.—Along the lines of the physical, intellectual, and religious development of the young women of the land, and through its departments, the Association moves forward. The most important methods are:

(a) Contests.—The Y.W.C.A. has the honour of starting the first women’s restaurant, which is still feeding hundreds of working girls at ‘Ames House,’ Mortimer Street, London, W.

(b) Hostels.—The largest of these is Bedford House, London. Others are Ashby House, London; 4 Saville Place, Newcastle; 110 George Street, Edinburgh; Shepherd House, Bristol, etc.

(c) Clubs.—Clubs are carried on under the direction of a club-leader, who organizes their operations with the help of committees consisting of members, and encourages Y.W.C.A. membership. The organizers of the clubs carry on work in connection with the hospitals, and visits girls in hospital, and in connection with the houses, and helps them to find work. The club-leaders are the main teachers in working with the girls, and are therefore able to help them to be true Christians and true women.

(d) Y.C.C. (Youth For Christ).—Y.C.C. are carried on in any locality where the number of young people would justify it, so that a sufficient number of girls needing Y.W.C.A. fellowship and protection are called branches.

(e) Holidays and Camps.—In Holiday Houses and Holiday Camps with Convalescent and Holiday Club Department recreation, fellowship, and new friends are connected. All classes meet together.

(f) The Social Question Department is continually watching the needs of women workers and spreading among them the great work of social legislation on questions affecting women.

(g) The International and Emigration Department works in
co-operation with the Immigration Departments of other lands and the Employment Bureaux (foreign), and seeks to solve some of the problems of household work by establishing training schools in the United States for long service in the Triangle Household Orderly Corps is the latest development.

(8) The Executive Department, which was variously described as a clearing house and a growing staff of secretaries, seeks to fit the girl of labour for her future life, and to induce the girl of education and leisure to adopt a life of usefulness with those who can offer her advantages. In clubs, though they are mainly recreational and social, it encourages study by means of circles and lectures. Co-operation with the Y.M.C.A. is being arranged. A Working Women's College has recently been established.

(9) The Religious, Ethical, and Moral Welfare The Department has for its aim to maintain a Christian attitude towards all moral questions, and to promote educational work to help it to attain its end.

(1) The Religious Work Committee touches the very centre of Y.W.C.A. work. Its aims are to promote the spiritual life of workers and members by Quiet Days, Retreat conferences, Camps, and Summer Schools. There are special secretaries for promoting Bible study, evangels, study and fellowship, home study, and co-operation with the Church.

II. THE WORLD'S Y.W.C.A.—At first looked on as undeniernational, the Y.W.C.A. has proved itself to be interdenominational. In its early years avoided by some sections of the Church, and its position misunderstood, it held to its principles, which have been formulated into a truly catholic basis, and with a truly world-wide aim. The winning of the world to Christ was the aim of the United Methodist Church, and is the basis, that of the Y.W.C.A. should be, and is. At the World's Conference, the basis was agreed upon, and the basis plan adopted of a world-wide, interdenominational, interdenominational, for the development of Christian women, and the attainment of the true woman, the woman with a heart for the world and the Church, and a desire to do her part in the work of the Church and the world. The plan was adopted:

'Faith in God the Father as Creator, and in Jesus Christ His only Son as Lord and Saviour, and in the Holy Spirit as revealed in the sure word of power, life, and service, according to the teaching of the Holy Scriptures."

The first World's Committee met in London in 1894; Mrs. J. H. Tritton was appointed president and Mary Morley treasurer. A sum of $2000 was guaranteed by the United States and Canada, which were then united, and by Great Britain and Ireland, also united at that time. It was agreed that the general secretary of the World's Association should be from another country than that in which the World's Office was located, and therefore Annie M. Reynolds, the first general secretary, came from the U.S.A. An executive committee was formed, with the President of the Women's Work at Headquarters, to which is committed the work for the period between one World's Conference and another. On this committee women of several nationalities have served during residence in London. The executive office was located at 20 George Street, Hanover Square, and has since been removed to 22 York Place, W. 1. Although at present in London, there is no rule as to which country the office of the World's Y.W.C.A. should be located in. It is at the choice of the Quadrennial Conference. Two other national Associations were sharers equally with Great Britain and the United States in their moral earnestness and desire to form a World's Association—those of Norway and Sweden.

In the two years which intervened between the conference held in London, 8th-11th April 1892, and the formation of the World's Committee in 1894, the committee appointed had been carefully drawing up a constitution, which, while it should leave entire freedom of control and direction to each national organization, should guarantee a federation on the basis of the voting membership of all branches according to each national membership. The object of the new body is threefold: (1) to bring into closer mutual knowledge the national organizations already existing that they may be more practically helpful to those of their members who go out from their own country; (2) to help countries having only scattered Associations to form a united co-operative international body; and (3) to develop a greater spirit of responsibility among the young women of Christian countries towards the young women of non-Christian countries.

The first four years—November 1894 to June 1898—had naturally to be spent in striving to attain the first object, that of the world-wide spiritual, and in becoming mutually acquainted. The second object of the World's Association also had its place in the first year, when in May 1895 the Canadian Associations, through accredited representatives, made an honorary application for admittance. The American committee, under whose direction they had formerly been, appreciated their spirit of self-reliance and bade them God-speed. The year 1895 also saw a closer union established between the South African and the British and South African associations as well as the Australian Associations. At the fifth regular meeting of the Executive Committee (9th March 1895), the third object, of greater interest in non-Christian countries, was foreshadowed by a note from Madras, India, recording that Agnes Hill 'has made a splendid start here and been greatly blessed in all her work since her arrival in India.' On the 28th November, a formal notice was given of the organization of the National Committee of India, Burma, and Ceylon, with headquarters at Calcutta. Agnes Hill was asked to take charge of the Committee for India. China and Japan were not long in developing more purely Chinese and Japanese National Committees.

The first World's Y.W.C.A. Conference was held in London, 14th-18th June 1898. The basis of representation adopted was that each national committee should have the right to send ten voting delegates to the World's Conference, provided each national committee represented at least 100 or more branches: if it represented less than 100 branches it should have power to send only five voting delegates. Every five branches after that, should have the right to send one delegate to the conference. It was recommended that a 'quarterly' from October 1898, called The Woman's International Quarterly, be regarded as the official organ of the World's Y.W.C.A., that the second Sunday in November and the week following be considered as the International Week of Prayer for the World's Y.W.C.A., and that the Executive Committee be empowered to select a suitable international badge, which is now the Blue Triangle with a clipper sailing on it.

The first event of active importance after the conference was the application of the German national council for affiliation with the World's Association.

At the London conference eighteen countries were represented, at Geneva (1902) nineteen. At the London conference English had been the only language; in Geneva French was the prevailing language. The Geneva conference was privileged to welcome the Danish national committee to active membership in the World's Association.

All through the Great War, although no international work could be undertaken, there was no breach in the World's alliance, and most national associations developed on very similar lines. In June 1920 representatives of 26 countries met at Champer, Switzerland, for a World Y.W.C.A. Commission to inquire into the social and industrial conditions which affect women so largely. It was followed by a meeting of the World's Y.W.C.A. Committee, the meeting of which had been suspended during hostilities. No affiliated country held aloof, and there were added representatives of South America and Central Europe, on which continents Associations are rapidly developing.

Literature.—The work which the Y.W.C.A. is doing is recorded in its magazines. The chief of these are (1) Our
YUAN-CHWANG, FA-HIAN, AND I-TSING


For further information the following publications may be consulted, besides vol. II of The Y.W.C.A. Overseas Work in China; The Y.W.C.A. in Africa; The Women's Movement in India; Society, Culture, and the Y.W.C.A. in the South Pacific; The Y.W.C.A. and Reconstruction; The Y.W.C.A. and Education; and The Y.W.C.A. in the Twentieth Century. These publications are all issued at the offices of the Y.W.C.A. in London and New York.

EMILY KINNAIRD.

YUAN-CHWANG, FA-HIAN, AND I-TSING.

— Yuan-chwang [Hieh-chien], the greatest Chinese traveller in India (A.D. 629–645), is also one of the most important figures in the history of the development of Chinese Buddhism. There were three pilgrims before him, among whom Fa-hian was the first to penetrate (A.D. 399–413) into the holy land of the Buddhists, and his return marks a step in the progress of the study of Buddhist literature, while the two others, Sun-yun and Haiseng (A.D. 418) by name, left only a short narrative of their travel and do not seem to have done any important work at home, though they brought back with them some 170 Buddhist texts. After Yuan-chwang in the T'ang dynasty there were so many travellers in India that those recorded by I-tsing alone amount to 56. The recorder himself, who stayed for a prolonged period (A.D. 671–685) in India, in the upper Ganges, can hardly fail to be one of the most prominent among them and the only scholar who could in any way be compared with Yuan-chwang himself.

The three, Fa-hian, Yuan-chwang, and I-tsing, are styled in Japan the 'three mirrors that reflect Indian Buddhism.' They are therefore treated together in the present article.

1. The routes. — There were from of old four principal routes into India, two through Central Asia, the northern and the southern. On his journey out Yuan-chwang took the northern road through Turfan, Kucha, Issikuli, Tashkend, Samarkand, Kunduz, Kabul, and Peshawar, while on his way home he preferred the southern road, turning eastward from Kunduz and passing Pamir Kul, Kashgar, Yarkand, Khotan, and Nainshhe (Ans). The southern road is much shorter and the most direct way to India, and corresponds roughly with the route of Fa-hian and other predecessors. The third route to India was through Tibet, leading either to Bhutan or Siklim or sometimes directly the T'ang dynasty; there were many who took this road, especially after the marriage of a Chinese princess to the Tibetan king Songtsan-gampo, who sent envoys to India in A.D. 640.

The fourth route was the over-sea one which was chosen by I-tsing, who embarked in a Persian ship from Kung-tung to Sumatra, where he changed to a Malay boat, sailing through the strait to Tamralipti near Calcutta. Fa-hian as early as A.D. 413 embarked in a Brahman ship to cross the Indian ocean to Java, there taking another merchant ship for China. Thus the journey to India of the earliest traveller Fa-hian was over-land, and his return journey over-sea via Ceylon and Java. Yuan-chwang, on the other hand, confined himself to the over-land route, not even crossing to Ceylon, while the last pilgrim I-tsing took the sea route both ways.

2. Records. — (a) Fa-hian. — As he himself says towards the end of his record, Fa-hian started in A.D. 399 from Ch'ang-an, the western capital of China, reached India after six years, and, staying there another six years, returned in A.D. 413, spending three centuries on the way. His record, which was finally revised in A.D. 463, and which sometimes Fo-kwé-k'i, 'Record of the Buddhist Countries,' or simply Fa-hian-chien, 'Record of Fa-hian,' the word 'high priest' is often added before the latter, is certainly that this designation was not given by the author himself. At the beginning of the record we find a note, 'Fa-hian's own record of his travels in India,' which is in all probability the writer's original title. The work was rendered into French by A. Rémusat in 1836, into English by S. Beal in 1869 and 1884, and again by J. Legge in 1886, the last with the Chinese text as well.

His six years' travel, beginning from Peshawar and ending at Tamralipti, covers almost all parts of India, 30 countries in all, except the Dekkan, which he himself says that he could not visit. From Tamralipti he crossed to Ceylon, thence to return to China.

When he left China, he was accompanied by some ten priests, but a party of three went to Turfan in the upper Ganges, and got the royal patronage there, and another party of three retraced their steps from Peshawar to China in the fourth year for a reason not stated, while two others died in Peshawar and on the Hindu Kush. Fa-hian with his sole companion Tao-chéng visited Mathurā, Kanauj, Śravasti, Kapilavastu, Vaśāli, and Kusinagara, and, having made a pilgrimage to all the sacred spots of the Buddha, came to Pataliputra, whence they visited the Ganges, the Tājāghra, Gayā, Kukkutapāda, and Benarès. They returned to Pataliputra, where they sojourned three years and collected and copied the sacred texts of various schools. Tao-chéng was charmed with the fine discipline of the Buddhist order there, and, having been disgusted with the ill-regulated manners of the Chinese Buddhists, he decided to live in India and never to return home. Fa-hian, whose desire was to enlighten China by his newly-acquired knowledge, took leave of his companion and travelled alone farther down the Gangā to Campt and Tamralipti on his way home. He seems to have lived in general in a very flourishing state, as it was in the imperial Gupta period. Though the Mahāyāna and the Hinayāna are mentioned now and again, there are as yet no signs of a dispute between the two schools nor signs (such as we find in Yuan-chwang's record) of either being much more influential than the other.

(b) Yuan-chwang. — The record of the great traveller is handed down to us in three forms. The first is of course his own work, Hsi-yü-chi, 'Record of the Western Region,' in 12 volumes, translated by Yuan-chwang and compiled by Pien-chi, his pupil, A.D. 648. The travels cover 128 countries in all—110 which he himself visited and 28 of which he gathered news from his informants, as we are told in an Introduction by Ch'ing-p'o. The characters and usages of the people and the state of Buddhist learning and practices are minutely described. The book is unique and in-

The second is a résumé of Yuan-chwang’s travels contained in the Record of the Region of the Sīkṣa in 8 books by Tao-hsian. It is interesting to note that the author was Yuan-chwang’s pupil and one of his assistants, and that the work was compiled during Yuan-chwang’s lifetime, i.e. A.D. 650.

There seems to have been another work in 10 books entitled "Yuan-chwang’s geographical works", by Yen-te’ung, another pupil of the traveller. This record, it is said, treated more of the Indian life than the religion itself, whereas the traveler’s own Mémoires paid more attention to the religion than the life. Tao-hsian says in his own preface that both of these works, Hsiu-ch’eng and Yun-chwang’s, are full of information and that this very fact led him to a fresh compilation of his own work. No European translation of it has as yet appeared.

There seems to have been another, or a curtailed form, of the Mémoires given in the life of Yuan-chwang in 10 volumes, compiled by Hui-li and annotated by Yen-ts’ung, A.D. 653.4 Julien published it, at the same time as the Mémoires, in an abstract under the title Hiuen-thsang ou les voyages dans l’Inde, 629-655, London, 1853, and Beal has also given us a similar abstract.

So far as Yuan-chwang’s routes and geographical names are concerned, Thomas Watters, a great Chinese scholar, did a great deal, and the result of his studies was published in 1904-05 by T. W. Rhys Davids and S. W. Bashell with the title On Yuan Chwang’s Travels in India, 629-655, by Thomas Watters. His researches are as accurate as usual, and, if he could have made more use of the results of the Indian and Central-Asian excavations and several old MSS of the record discovered in Japan, nothing would remain to be desired.

Yuan-chwang’s record can be divided roughly into five parts: (1) a general introduction to Jambudvīpa and a description of Central-Asian countries along the northern route, i.e. Agni to Kapiśa (vol. 1); (2) a detailed introduction to India named geography, calendar, life, language, customs, religion, castes, products, etc., and a description of countries in the Panjāb and in the north of the Ganges as far down as the valley of the Ganges, i.e. Mathura, Pātāliputta, Gaya, etc. (vol. 2); (3) a detailed description of Magadha, including Nalanda (vols. vii.-ix.); (4) the lower region of the Ganges, the south-east coast, in the Sāṃskṛta language, on the lower Ganges and the eastern coast of the Nicobars (vols. x.-xii.); (5) Central-Asian states along the southern route, i.e. Java to the Kinhia (vol. xii.).

A résumé of the contents can be obtained best from Watters’ work, which gives the travels in their shortest possible form. Further, a lengthy note on the itinerary was added by Vincent A. Smith at the end of the work.

When Yuan-chwang, as a young and brilliant scholar, expressed his desire to visit India, there seem to have been some willing to accompany him in his pilgrimage, but when he came to the desert of Turfan he had only two companions, of whom one was sent back to China as he was thought unfit for the hardships of the journey, while the other started in advance to T’u-hwáng and was heard of no more. Finally, when he came to the city of his patron the king of Turfan, four novices were allotted to him as his attendants. The king helped him with a kindly care and introduced him to many of the Central-Asian chieftains; consequently he was welcomed everywhere and travelled with great facility. In India too he was patronized by King Harṣa of Kāñjā and had opportunities of meeting many of the foremost savants of his time.

At Nalanda, the then centre of the Mahāyāna learning, he found an able teacher in Sīla-bhadra, the president of the university, and there he spent several years learning Sanskrit and chiefly Buddhist ideolology, occasionally discussing or disputing with sectarian teachers. The interest of the Buddhists of his time seems to have centred in the Mahāyāna, though the Hinayānist schools too were followed in all India.5

(c) I-tsi7ig.—I-tsi7ig’s record was called Nan-hai-ch’i-kuei-tsa-ch’ien, ‘Record of the Buddhist Practices sent home from the Southern Sea’, in four volumes.6 The ‘Southern Sea’ means Chinese the Malay islands (Sumatra, Java, and the neighbouring places). It is so called because he sent his record home while he was sojourning in Palembang (Bhâja), Sumatra, collecting and copying Sanskrit Buddhist texts. The record was translated into English by the present writer in 1896 and published at Oxford with the title A Record of the Buddhist Religion in India and Malaya Archipelago, 671-695 (A.D. 671-695) (ib. 167-285). The text is entirely different from the two preceding ones, inasmuch as it records only the religious life and practices, especially discussing minute points of the Vinaya rules. The author does not describe his travels at all. The record will prove indispensable, however, when research into the Vinaya branch of Buddhist literature is seriously taken up. Further, it is very interesting that he limits his discussions to the Buddhist practices to the Sarvāstivāda (realistic) school. For it is a very difficult task definitely to class Vinaya practices of that epoch in various schools.

There is another record by I-tsi7ig giving biographical notices of 56 Chinese priests who travelled in India before or during his stay abroad.8 This is practically a book of travels, and it is in this that he describes the incidents which happened on his journey to India, the chance return to China, and the second sailing to Sumatra to copy the sacred texts.6 E. Chavannes published his French translation of it in 1894, with the title Voyages des moines indiens dans le royaume de la grande dynastie Tang sur les religieux éminents qui allèrent chercher la loi dans les pays d’occident, par I-tsi7ig. The two records of I-tsi7ig should always be consulted together, for the whole of his life and work cannot be known without either one.

The biographer7 tells us that I-tsi7ig was 25 years (A.D. 671-685) abroad and travelled in more than 30 countries. That he made a pilgrimage to all the sacred spots of the Buddha can be seen from his own narratives, but we cannot state with certainty that he travelled in so many countries as the biographer asserts, because as the second time with Fa-hian and Yuan-chwang, he had some five or six followers at the outset, but finally started with only a young priest, Shan-hing by name. In India he himself says that he lived for ten years in the University of Sātiya (probably A.D. 675-685), chiefly studying the Vinaya. On his way he stayed in Palembang, Sumatra, to collect and copy more of the Sanskrit texts.

1 According to the life of Yuan-chwang (vol. iii.), he stayed there five years. Vincent Smith makes it two years (see Watters, ii. 329).
3 Naljio, no. 43.
4 Naljio, no. 48.
5 Naljio, no. 170.
6 These facts are summed up in the present writer’s introduction to Life and Travels of I-tsi7ig, p. xxv.
7 Naljio, no. 1465.
8 These are spelt I-ch’ing.
One day he wanted to send letters home and went on a journey by ship, when a favourable wind began to blow and the ship set sail at once. He thus had a chance to see Khang-tung, and, meeting his old friends, tried to obtain some new companions for his work abroad. At last he succeeded in finding suitable assistants, Ch'ang-ku, Tao-hung, etc., with whom he set out once again in A.D. 680, when he was fifty-five years of age. He finally returned in midsummer A.D. 685.

3. Their work at home.—Buddhism was introduced into China in A.D. 67. The emperor Min-ti sent envoy to India and invited two Buddhist priests, Kāśyapa Mātanga and Fa-han1 by name, to come to China. They were stationed in a specially built monastery called the ‘White Horse’ and were kept busy translating. The following three centuries were a period of translation by foreign priests. We can call this first period of translation (A.D. 67–414). Those foreign priests who came from India itself were surnamed ‘Chu,’ a curtained form of ‘T'ien-chu’ (= Sindhu, i.e. Indian), while those from Yao-chu (Kuṣana) were styled ‘Chih.’ Those surnamed ‘An’ are from Ai-hsi (= Arak, Parthian), 4 ‘Kang’ from Kang-chi (= Sunarkand) and ‘Po’ from Kucha (for the royal family was so named). Those were practically all the translators who carried out translations by themselves, though there were a few who assisted in the work as subordinates.

The second period of translation (A.D. 414–645) was inaugurated by Fa-hian’s return. He brought home the Vinaya texts of the Mahāsāghikha and the Sarvāstivāda schools, the Mahāyānasūtra of the Mahāyānists, and also the Mahābhūmī-sūtra. He himself did the work of translating some of these texts with the assistance of Buddhist-bhadra, an Indian priest. Almost at the same time Chi-yen5 and Tao-yun,6 his companions half-way to India, and Chi-mang7 and Tao-tai,8 both of whom went to India soon after Fa-hian, followed the latter’s brilliant example in independent translations. Many priests seem to have done the same, though some of their works are lost.9

This period of translation, though conducted by Chinese priests, was not without brilliant works achieved by gifted foreigners, such as Kumāra-jīva,10 who is said to have had 3000 pupils, Gana-bhadra,11 Paramārtha,12 Bodhiruci,13 and Jiagnagupta.14

The above two periods are generally designated the old era of translation. The following period opens the new era of translation (A.D. 640–1127), which was begun by the epic-making work of Yuan-chwang15 and was continued by I-tsing,16 the two being the most prominent figures in the Buddhist culture of the Tang dynasty. Yuan-chwang brought home the Mahāyāna Sūtras (224 texts), the Mahāyāna Sūtras (192 texts), the works of the Svāvīra school (14), those of the Mahājana school (18), those of the Mahāsāka school (25), the Kāśyapikya texts (17), the Dharmanātya texts (42), the Sarvāstivāda texts (67), the Hetūvidyā (Logic) (36), and the Sadāravidyā (Grammar) (13), altogether amounting to 526 bundles and 657 different texts. What he especially laid stress on was the Viśṇunāmātā doctrine (idealism), and he may be deemed the founder of the Buddhist idealism in China.

The catalogue of I-tsing’s collections is not so minutely as his predecessor’s. The Sanskrit texts of the Tripitaka collected by him during his stay of ten years at Nalanda were nearly 400 in number, amounting to 500,000 sūkas, which he himself says he held in hand whilst in Palembang.1 What he considered most important was the Vinaya literature, and his translations in this branch of study are very full and minute, especially in the Vinaya of the Sarvāstivāda (realistic) school, which amounts to 19 texts in 209 volumes out of 56 texts in 226 volumes in all. His works in this line are generally called the ‘New Vinaya,’ while those of Tao-hsien, a pupil of Yuan-chwang, and of his predecessors are styled the ‘Old Vinaya.’

Thus he founded a new school in the study of this branch of Buddhist literature and made his own school the most influential of all. The work of translation in the Tang dynasty was on a grand scale. All had to be done by the imperial sanction, so many officials and assistants being specially appointed. The completed texts had to be presented to the imperial court to be authorized for publication or to be incorporated into the Buddhist library.

This new era was further enriched by the works of Amoghavajra,2 Dharma-deva,3 Dān-pāla,4 etc., but their translations, numerous as they are, cannot be compared in nature and bulk with those of Yuan-chwang and I-tsing, for almost all of them are dhārmas, stotras, or mystic texts of the kind.

With the Sung dynasty (A.D. 960–1127) the periods of translation which were chiefly represented by the three travellers practically came to an end, Indian Buddhism gradually giving its place to Tibetan Lamaism.

LITERATURE.—All the translations of the texts referred to have been indicated in the article. For reference the following may be recommended: J. Legge, A Record of Buddhist Kingdoms, being an Account by the Chinese Monk Fa-hian of his Travels in India and Ceylon (A.D. 599–614), Oxford, 1866; S. Beal, Sīkṣā-kal, Buddhist records of the Western World: translated from the Chinese of Hsüan Tsang (A.D. 627), 2 vols., London, 1844; T. Watters, On Yuan Chwang’s Travels in India (Buddhist Texts 1904–6), E. Chavannes, Voyage de Sung-yun dans l’Asie centrale et le Gandhara (1825–29), Paris, 1903; E. Chavannes and S. Lévi, L’Itinéraire de Yuen-yang (517–790), Paris, 1906.

YUCATANS.—See MEXICANS.

YUGRA.—See OSTYAKS.

YULE.—See CALENDAR (Teutonic), CHRISTMAS CUSTOMS.

1 Naoji, appendix ii, 1–2.
2 I. 2, 9, 11, 20, 22, 27, 37, 47, 56.
3 Jb. 2, 13, 14, 21, 35, 37.
4 Jb. 4, 13, 17, 25.
5 Jb. 14, 23, 27, 31, 34, 35.
6 Jb. 8, 14, 31, 41.
7 Jb. 22, 15, 20, 26, 30, 31.
10 Jb. 70. 11 Jb. 77.
11 Jb. 71.
12 Jb. 49, 50, 51, 52, 84, 87, 91.
13 Jb. 50 (The translated 56 texts).
14 Jb. 81 (he translated 27 texts).
15 Jb. 104–5 (42 translations).
16 Jb. 114 (39 translations).
17 Jb. 129 (50 translations).
18 Jb. 148 (50 translations).
19 Jb. 133 (70 translations).
20 Jb. 149 (50 translations).
21 Jb. 150 (11 translations).
22 J. Tarakusu.

11 Chavannes, Mémorie de l’tsing, p. 125.
12 Naoji, appendix ii, 150 (105 translations).
13 Jb. 159 (118 translations).
14 J. 161 (111 translations).


ZAIIDI

ZAIIDI.—Zaidiyyah; in Arabia Zaylid is the name of a Muhammadan sect, called after Zaid, son of Ali, son of Husain, and one of the Prophet Muhammad. This person came forward as a pretender in the reign of the Unayzah Hisham (121-122 A.H.) in Kufah, was defeated, and was put to death. His story is told with unnecessary prolixity by Tabari. He is said to have been given the title of ‘Sultan;’ i.e. a sanction, and the same historian casually mentions them after this time among heretical sects. 3 If it be true that Harun al-Rashid employed one of the community to assassinate Idris, for motives varied, it is likely that they were tolerated by the legitimate khalfahs to the same extent and for the same services as were afterwards the Assassins by the Egyptians.

1. History.—The first dynasty founded by a member of the sect was that of the Idrisids (722-282 A.D. = 758-953), called after Idris b. Abdullah, a descendant of Hassan, who, after the assassination of his father by his brother Harun al-Rashid in the time of the ‘Abbasid Mahdi had been suppressed, escaped into Africa and gained a following among the Berbers of Ulli (Vulturi) near one of the sources of the Soukh. After winning over or subduing a great number of tribes, he took the title of mahdi, established his capital in Bagdad, and was assassinated by an emissary from Bagdad in A.D. 793. He was succeeded by his infant son, called by the same name, who founded in 838 the city of Fes, which became the capital of the dynasty. Its population was supplemented in 1114 by some 800 families exiled by al-Mumtaz al-Mustansir (1091-1122 a.h.), from whom the subjects, being, for the most part nomads, showed an invincible resistance to becoming citizens. 4 At the time of his death, in 822, his kingdom comprised the whole of the Farthest Maghrib and reached Mina in the Central Maghrib. His successor Muhammad died in the desert and was assassinated by an emissary sent by Bagdad in 1214. He was then succeeded by his son Hassan, who, on his death, in 1258, was succeeded by his brother Muhammad. The latter died in 1262, and was succeeded by his son Hassan. This last dynasty died in 1264. The Ibadiyyah, i.e. ascetics, and the same historian casually mentions them after this time among heretical sects.

2. Characteristics.—In the Diplomatic Encyclopaedia of Qatar, the following notice of the Zaidi tribe is collected from various authors. According to these, the imam lived in Arab simplicity with no attempt at magnificence or display. He claimed, however, to be the supreme sovereign of the Islamic world. He was regarded as intercessor; his hand was laid on the sick; and at times of drought it was his business to procure rain. The Table of Meesah (in the 6th Islamic cent.) were supposed to favour his claims secretly. The imam was thought to possess a secret store of knowledge, handed down from his predecessors, and being back ultimate to the Imams. 1 Khazrati, The Pearl-Strings: a Hist. of the Zaidi Dynasty of Yaman, tr. J. W. Redhouse (E. J. W. Gibb Memorial Series, in.-y.), Leyden, 1906-13, i. 190.

2 Constantine, 1930.
4 An account of the period commencing with that of the recovery of independence by the imams is to be found in W. R. Harris, Journal of the ‘Abbasid Yaman, Edinburgh, 1867, and R. L. Playfair, History of Arabia Felix, Bombay, 1859.
5 Some accounts of these revolts is given in the late Prof. E. Gibb’s History of Tabaristan and by H. L. Robinson, ‘Les Provinces caspiennes de la Perse,’ E.Z.M. xxxii, (1915-16). An abridged translation of this work has been published in vol. II. of the Gibb Memorial Series, London, 1905.
6 Cairo, 1915, vi. 61-64.

1 Chronicles, ed. M. J. de Goeje, Leyden, 1879-1901, ii. 1297-1298.
2 Tabari, iii. 361 f., 1515, 1517 f.
3 Ib. 1561.
4 E. Mercier, Hist. de l’Afrique septentrionale, Paris, 1885, i. 296.
6 See Mercier, i. 372.
7 Ribâ’at al’I’Iur, Bâbâle, 1867, iii. 342.
8 Ibn Tanukh, p. 20.
3. Doctrine.—The Zaidis in doctrine come between the Shi'ah (q.v.), to whom they technically belong, and the Sunnah (see SUNNITES). They maintain that Ali was not the Imam, and that the Sunnah, i.e. the house of 'Ali and Fatimah, was the right successor, and that the first two khilafahs, holding that, 'Ali had a right to the throne, while politics made his choice undesirable. Their doctrine is known as ta'ziya, meaning the legitimacy of the appointment of the ta'zil, i.e. the person whose claims are inferior, while the fa'il, or person with superior qualifications, is accepted. Copious extracts from their literature on this subject are given by R. Strothmann.1 The imam Hadi, as has been seen, compiled a treatise on the subject. In normal times the imamate in their system belongs to the fittest person among the descendants of either Husain or Husain, the grandson of the Prophet whose duty it is to 'come out.' To rebel against an iniquitous ruler (al-baghdi) is in their opinion a duty. This, according to the author of al-'Abn al-shababik (Sallih b. Mahdi, 1108 A.H.), is their most distinctive tenet and that which separates them from the other schools.

4. History.—The classical historians, 'Abd al-Qahir2 and Shahrestani, divide the Zaidis into three sub-sects—the Jardiyiyah, the Sulaimaniyyah and Dariyiyah, and the Butriyyah, with whom the latter of these writers couples the Salibiyyah. The three names Jardiyiyah, Sulaimaniyyah, and Butriyyah are given in the Manzilat of 'Abd al-Din Iji († A.D. 1355).3 The second are called after one Sulaiman b. Jarir; the third, according to this work, after Butai al-Thami, but, according to the former, they go back to the Fatimids. One of the effects of a man who had died in Aleppo (somewhat before this time) letters had been found addressed to him and to his ancestors from the imams soliciting information and advice in that country and also aid. There are several different accounts of the number of the imam's armed followers, but there was no question of their valor. The Rasulids, who from 1220 to 1451 A.H. were the chief power in Yemen, ordinarily treated the imam with respect; during the reign of Nasir in Egypt (1293-1340) an imam had sent a proposal to form an alliance for the purpose of ousting the Rasulids, which had been rejected.

5. Literature.—A few works emanating from Zaidi theologians are mentioned in the Kitab al-Philist, ed. G. Fugel, Leipzig, 1871-74, i. 189. Their literature is, however, very copious, and there is a large MS collection of it lodged in the Ambrostiana of Milan, of which 44 volumes have been given to the Biblioteca Riva dei Studi Orientali, I., Rome, 1904-10; many Zaidi MSS are also to be found in the Berlin Library. A treatise on riistakat or mixed law, 1318 A.H. (amas b. Hamash (739-740 A.H.), was published in Cairo in 1914.

6. ZANZIBAR AND THE SWAHILI PEOPLE. The name Zanzibar, now applied only to the town of that name and the island in which it is situated (both called in Swahili Ujungu), apparently designated the whole coast, from the Juba River to Sofala.6 Originally Zanzibar (Zangbar, Zangbar), from the Persian زنجبیر; 'negro' and جَربَر, 'region,' it was modified by Arab and Portuguese pronunciation into Zanjibar and Zanjikar. The town is said to have been founded by settlers from Shiraz, in the 6th or 9th cent.,7 but there is less definite information as to its early history than in the case of Kilwa, Lamu, and Pate. Swahili-speaking inhabitants of the Wajidani (the early inhabitants, whose chief, the Mu'inyi mkuu, ruled the island up to the time of Sayyid Barghash) may have been a colony from Kilwa. The coast

2 Cairo, 1300, i. 1, 14f.
5 Storrs, ed. G. Schifer, Cairo, 1881, p. 274.
6 M. B., quoted by Yule and Burnell, Hudson-Johnson, P. 746.
7 Wackernagel, Grammatik der dialetten swahile, pp. xxv, xxvii.
8 In, p. xvi.
is also known by its Arabic designation of شامي (sawhili, ‘coast’—hence the term ‘Swahili coast’ is a pleonasm, like ‘Lake Nyasa,’ etc.), and its inhabitants as شامي (sawhili) or ‘coast-people’—in African pronunciation ‘Swahili.’ (They are spoken of in their own vernacular as Wasawhili, pl. of Mawaswili; the language as Kiswahili.) They are called by the ‘Nyika’ tribes Az condolences of Arab traders and of various Woman of various tribes, chiefly Bantu. There are also traces of Persian descent, and possibly their pedigree includes other ethnic elements.

1. Distribution of the Swahili.—The territory inhabited by the Swahili is the strip of coast defined in 1886 as the Sayyid of Zanzibar’s dominions—viz., from Warsheikh on the Somali coast to Cape Delgado. This, however, does not include all, as distinct divisions of Swahili are recognized for Ibo and the Kirimba Islands, nearly two degrees south of Cape Delgado, and for the Angosha Islands, half-way between Mozambique and the mouth of the Zambesi. The people themselves—at any rate those of the northern part—limit the expression ‘Swahili’ (= the Swahili country) to the coast north-east of the Tana mouth, though some extend it as far south as Mamluli. This fits in with the assertion made by various writers that the dialects of Lamu and the adjacent coast are reckoned the purest, or, as Krapf says, that ‘the real home of the Swahili language is considered to be that of the Islands of Patta [Pate], Lamu, and in the country opposite to these islands.’ Swahili, however, is spoken and understood far beyond the confines of its proper home: it has been carried half-way across the continent by traders and caravan porters and is current, in debased forms, both on the Congo and in Sinhale.

2. Physical characteristics.—There is probably no uniform Swahili type, and this is scarcely surprising when we consider, not only the composite origin of the people and the various sources whence their race has from time to time been recruited, but the fact that there are many persons calling themselves Swahili who make no claim to any connection with the Arabian peoples. Consequently, shades of complexion (the darker and lighter being broadly distinguished by the people themselves as ‘black’ and ‘red’) and types of feature vary indefinitely; and we must remember that the compound factors are not merely the Oman Arab (with the possible, or indeed probable, Persian) and the Bantu native, but the tribes of Hadzabe or ‘Jato’ stock, of whom the Wasaneye and Dororo are present-day fragments, and the various Galla, Abyssinian, Somali, and even Georgian or Circassian women who have at different times found their way into the bares of wealthy Arabs. Characteristics are apt to vary greatly, even within one and the same family, e.g., a member of the ‘I Bawali (Arab) clan, living at Mombasa, has decidedly negroid features and woolly hair, while his sister, as dark as himself in complexion, has fine, silky, and perfectly straight hair. As Baumann says: ‘Gar leicht geraubt, was dem Gesicht als der Einbildung einer unerwähnten arabischen Bedeutung des Wortes nicht paßt, daß die kunstgewaltigen Ethnologie.'

Burton’s description is too sweeping, as regards both appearance and character, though he appears to have chiefly in view the island of Zanzibar—perhaps the least favourable ground for observation.

3. Origin.—It is uncertain at present whether there were any Arab or Persian settlements in pre-Islamic times; and the vexed question of the Zambrowskii mines cannot be discussed here; but it is worth noticing that the Karanga language of Rhodesia has some words in common with Swahili, which do not seem to occur in languages geographically intermediate. There was, however, commercial intercourse at a very early period. The first Arab settlement to which a definite date is assigned is that of Pate, in A.D. 689; the colonists are said to have been Syrian. Native tradition says they found Waboni and Waenzi hunters living in the island. They intermarried with these people, though their descendants have tried to suppress the fact. Vague traditions (which the present writer has not been able to verify) of pre-Islamic peoples worshipping golden idols (a caft or bull?) at Kau may point to some early Persian or Hindu settlement of which no other record survives. Contact with the Bantu was probably, in the first instance, with the Pokomo, who, according to native tradition, were settled in the Tana valley long before the southern tribes of that Vuka peoples in the 16th century. The Pate colonists are said to have come from Syria; and some ascribe the same origin to Malindi, Zanzibar, Mombasa, Lamu, and Kilwa; though the Kilwa Chronicle states that the founder of this city came from Shiraz. The settlement of the ‘Eo Zeised ’ (Unnum Zayd), somewhat later than that of Pate, seems to have introduced a considerable Persian element. Baumann says:"}

{1 Usawbuds wih sein Nachbargelder, p. 22.
2 Zanzibar City, Island and Coast, l. 414-423.
3 These are not Arabic loan-words, such as siohine and meli, which might have been derived from the Settlers at Sona and Sofala.
4 MS information, and Skidmore, The Land of Zanzibar, p. 35.
5 MS information, and Skidmore, l. 105.
6 Skidmore, p. 22.
7 Guillain, Documents pour l’histoire, la géographie, et le commerce de l’Afrique orientale, l. 140; Skidmore, p. 6.
8 P. 22.
9 Owen, Narrative of Voyages, etc., l. 414-423.
10 The History of Kilwa, VRS, l. 625, pp. 353-355.
of Qu'ilia, of which the substance has been fortunately preserved by another Arab MS, known as the Book of the Kings of Pate, after being preserved at Pate for some time, was removed to a Library in Egypt (4th century A.D.) and finally destroyed in the bombardment of 1890; no other copy is known to be in existence. Burton, whose writings are now at the disposal of all who wish to consult them, has hitherto been handed down orally; one of these was published by Asscher in Amsterdam in 1851. Similarly, the second chapter of Stigand's Land of Jazib embodies the result of conversations with the oldest living observers of the town. (Ewa Kilani (Muhammad bin Funo Unari) of Lamu. The scattered notices of E. Africa in the works of Greek and Roman geographers, as well as those of the medieval Arabs, have been well summarized by Gulain in his first volume. The Arab geographers have also been carefully studied from this point of view by Gabriel Perrand.

Intercourse between Arabia and the east coast of Africa seems to have taken place from very early times. Indian influence is also probable, and by Stuhlmann is made responsible for the early recovery of the long island by canoe; he assigns a similar origin to the curious kitchen implement (mubazi) used for scraping coconuts. One of the Lamu MSS, ascribed to one Ali, is said to contain a new version of the history of the Lamu kingdom, written by the same author, whose other work is entitled 'Prophets' (Musulins) with Batta. A.D. 1204, it has been handed down to the present time, and is still proverbial saying; and on this the earliest contact.

Pate was founded (A.D. 69, A.D. 690) by colonists of the Il-Batawi tribe (or clan)—hence, some say, the name, (Ar. Bata or Batta). The royal house of these Batawi continued in power till 1529 (Batta). When a fugitive from Mombasa, Salimun bin Solomon of the house of Nahab, landed there, was hospitably received by Pate, and eventually married the daughter of the last Bati chief. The Lamuins remained subjects of Pate till 1866. About 170 the followers of Zaid, great-grandson of the 4th Khalif, arrived there from the periphery of the Unayzah, Bed E. Africa and became the ancestors of the people now called the Labda. Zaid bin Batta, the founder of Lamu, is said to have been of Arabian extraction and to have established a sort of precarious hegemony—as was the case, in turn, with Kilwa, Mombasa, and Pate—to empire or permanent conquest. This was ever established. Lamu suffered from the rest in being ruled, not by a sultan, but by a council of elders (noted).
The 18th century was the time of the Quadi in Mombasa and their way to India, and established friendly relations with its rulers, who asked them to assist its rival, the Moslems. Kilwa was burnt by Nuno da Cunha in 1527. (It had been previously in 1500 sacked and burnt by Almeida, who took Kilwa in 1505 for the body of the west coast, from Pate to Cape Corrientes, was under Portuguese dominion, and remained so until (1570) under Portuguese or Portuguese (another being usually in a more or less successful state of revolt) until 1622. In that year an Arab Bani Arabel arrived from Oman, the Swahili towns having previously extended them the help of the town in order to drive out the Portuguese, and the war thus begun culminated in the fall of Mombasa, 15th June, 1698, which was followed by the occupation of Kilwa, Zanzibar, and Pate. Thenceforward, except for the short time during which they held Mombasa and Pate, relation in 1728, the Portuguese were restricted to their present possessions, south of the River. It is curious that Pate, where their rule was far less continuous than at Mombasa, seems to keep the most vivid traditional memories of them. Violent or "profound as a pageant" is a passage of the Master that describes the Asscher's MS, the foremen of Pate point out, in the bed of the tidal creek, the remains of the gateway by which the invaders dragged their cannon up from the anchorage on Shindaiki.

1 See Burton, Zanzibar, l. 411.
2 Handwerk und Industrie in Ostafrika (vol. 1. of Abhandlungen des hamburgischen Kolonialinstituts), pp. 85, 88, 113, 125.
3 Le Ermoumens, p. 228.
4 Stranden, Die Portugiesenzeit von Deutsch- und Englisch-Ostafrika, p. 54.
5 Barros says the assault begun on 17th Nov. 1528—no date is given in the Asscher copy, taking the omissions do not seem to have occupied more than a few days. De Cunha stayed till the end of December to allow him to sail for the coast, he did from (Milibi) 3rd April 1529—having previously burnt Mombasa. He directed towards the end of March (see J. Barros and D. de Couto, De Cruz, de Azei, dec. iv. 299, 300, lbs. v.—viii. (pp. 370-380).
Gospels. A didactic and devotional poem known as the *Utendi wa Mungu* of Lamu woman, some 50 or 70 years ago, was published in 1917, in the *Harvard African Studies*. As in other cases where the Muslim religion has been superimposed upon a system of primitive beliefs, it has absorbed all sorts of extraneous elements. The Bantu cult of the ancestral ghost has passed into something like saint-worship at the graves of noted shahids—e.g., the shrine known to Siraha Jundani at Mombasa. The diviner, instead of casting lots by means of the 'bones' or analogous objects (a practice still in vogue amongst the Giryama, etc.), uses the sand-board (*kupipa rombi*) or writes texts from the Qur'an and the names of the four angels (Gabriel, Michael, Azrael, Israfil), on paper or parchment, to be used as charms.

Descended from *devi-worshipers*—a designation based on a misapprehension—the Wawali would rather fear the "Shaytan" than love Allah, and to the malignant powers of preternatural beings, they attribute sickness and all the ills of human life.  

The word *shaitan* has been borrowed from the Arabs to denote the spirits of rocks, trees (more especially bababu), etc., for which the genuine Swahili word is *waziunu* or *wazuka*. These are originally, in all probability, ghosts of the dead, but imported notions, and that of the former, has introduced some confusion. In Krapf's time every boatman who passed "Makame's Rock" (on the landward side of Mombasa Island, almost opposite Frere Town) threw a stone into the sea; the custom is still remembered, but reduced to a mere symbolic act, like the throwing of a pin into a holy well in this country. Probably offerings were once made to propitiate the man drowned there, but the story told to Krapf was that Makame was a fisherman who had been turned into a rock because he followed his occupation on a holy day.  

Similarly, there are lonely spots in the bush, known as *kwa kibidi* ("the place of the little lady")—probably forgotten graves—where passing travellers are wont to lay down a stick, stone, leaf, or other trifle. Spirits haunting trees may at any time seize and possess passers-by; they are then known as *pepo*, and there are recognized and usually very elaborate formularies for exorcising them. In fact, there is a whole hagiology of these *pepo*, and each one has his special *npo* or *nafua*.

The names may be inferred from what has already been said with regard to religion, we meet here with an interesting blend of imported and indigenous ideas. The reckoning of kinship in the male line cannot be counted as one of the former, as the transition from mother-right to father-right has already taken place in many Bantu tribes. But the prohibited degrees enumerated by Velten 4 are those recognized by Muslim law, and the clan system, still in full vigour amongst Giryama, Pokomo, Digo, etc., who may not marry inside their clan, has fallen into oblivion. (The so-called twelve "clans" [*kabila]*) of Mombasa, seem to be the local association of the "Liga" (or "Liga") to which the bolsi* (*bolsi*) or "clan" among the early soldiers and traders, who came from the British East Africa and the Islands of Zanzibar and Pemba, London, 1888; *Deutsche Kolonialgeschichte*, *Documenti e Informazioni*, translation in the J.A., esp. "L'Origine africaine des Malagaches" [1889], and *Les Voyages des Jaraux en Madagascar* [1901]; W. M. F. Petrie, *Transvaal and Trans-C叶子ian South African Ruins*, London, 1901; Sir E. B. Harford, *British East Africa and the Islands of Zanzibar and Pemba*, London, 1888; *Deutsche Kolonialgeschichte*, *Documenti e Informazioni*, translation in the J.A.); 3

4 See Velten, *Sitten und GEBRUECHER der Suaheli, pp. 176-206; also R. L. Skene, in *JRAF* xlvii. (1917) 433-444; and M. Krapf, *Reise in Kolonial-Landung*, p. 101-110, 138, 190; "Religious Vorstellungen der Sarasa" (the Wanzarwa, who live near Thika, and are, perhaps, among the tribes who have contributed most largely to the Swahili stock); also Damisch, *pp. 143-144.*

5 J. P. W.  

6 *Un' mar* Bataliv, or "Mandhari, or "Azzul, etc., as the case may be.  

The Muslim ritual of the Friday evening has been blended with the Bantu initiation-ceremonies (kwambu, manyango) and consequently takes place earlier than it would, as a rule, among the Bantu. 1 Geffen is not open to the Swahili, they being some by the South African. Much valuable information, derived from native sources, is given by Velten; but it is by no means exhaustive and applies chiefly to the Mrima, the coast-land opposite to Zanzibar. It says that, in all essentials, Swahili customs are the same from Lamu to Lindi—but this possibly needs some little qualification.

Language and literature—Swahili is not, as some have thought, a mere derivative jargon, comparable to "Pelding-English" or "Kitchen Kafir"; but it is the language of any indigenous African people who have adopted it as their own. It is in the sense of a sort of "cultural technology"—"an anthropological fact... a form of culture that has been taken up and modified by the Bantu people in the Landa archipelago and adjacent mainland, including the Tans delta. But other tribes may have exercised a modifying influence.  

It is the language which has been incorporated with the language—in the latter case, not nearly so many South Africans have been exposed to it in written (probably for centuries, but at present it is difficult to procure evidence on this point) by means of the Arabic character, which is not allowed by no means all the purpose; and even with the help of additional symbols such as are used in Persian—e.g., for p and r—a Swahili may be very difficult to read, even for a native. It is obvious that the vowel points are indispensable; they are only omitted in Arabic words which are not phonetically recognizable and conventional phrases at the beginning of a letter. The oldest MSS examined by Elsasser, the six-volume *Sud*-scholarly manuscripts may go back to the 17th century, or possibly the late 17th century; perhaps some still older ones may exist in the archives of the mosques. The poems (there are no ancient Swahili manuscripts) of which fragments may be of considerable antiquity, but we have no certain data on this point. W. E. Taylor thinks that the *Ikhushah* (a religious poem edited by him and published as the appendix to Sigfried's *Dialect in Swahili*) may have been written before Vasco da Gama's arrival in Africa (1498), and, if the poems assigned to Longo Fono are genuine, they must go back at least to the 16th, and possibly to the 15th cent., or earlier. Very few of these poems have found their way into print. Büttnner, in his *Anthologie*, published three long poems, all of a religious character, and a charming selection of recent lyrics and folk-songs and a large body of minor verse has been collected by Velten, influence the Chose des Heros ("Book of the Emperor Heracles") of which a MS was brought to Europe by Krapf, was published by Molnol in the Zeitschrift für Kolonialsprachen for 1912-13. With the exception of the *Utendi* of Krapf, very little has been published, and even in the *Ihms*, the name of the person, has been changed in the *Ihms*, the name of the person, has been changed in

1 Velten, pp. 75-100.  

2 *La F.  

3 *Vocabulary of Six East African Languages*, p. viii.
ZEALOTS

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1 The adjectives Κρατικος, Καταλικης, and Κατεχωρικος are found in the Taliban and Midsrinus, but the plural in a technical or quasitechnical sense occurs only twice: Exx, i. 17. Whatever ISTE TTTA, the Taliban steals a libation-cup, or course i by the Holy Name, or has intercourse with a Syrian woman shall be struck down by the Quama'ia (XEPc. Zealots, apparently in a religious sense only); and Abd el R. Natan, v. 1: 'And when the emperor Vespasian came to destroy Jerusalem the Quama'ia attempted to burn every Liberty with fire,'—the only Taliban passage mentioning the political Zealots.

How early the title Quama'ia was applied to the extreme anti-Roman political party is uncertain. According to Josephus, it was a self-designation. Whether this is so, or it is impossible to determine whether 'Zealots' was a self-designation from the beginning of the movement under Judas the Galilean and became generally known and recognized as their title under Gessius Florus because of their remarkable activity and increase then, or, on the other hand, whether these 'fanatics of Roman hate' had no definite appellation for the first sixty years (A.D. to 66-67) of their history until the time of Florus, under whom Josephus first employs the term.

The epithet 'the Canaanite' in Mk. 2.10, Mt. 10 (for which 'Zealot' is given in Lk. 9.49, Ac. 147), has been variously interpreted. The AV reads Alisar, the 'Canaanite' (which is given in Mk. by A and other second-rate mss and later versions, and in Mt. by L and later authorities), but that

require xαναβανδας=χαναβανάς. Jerome interpreted it as de eico

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28.31. Julia Galina.auges in a man from (an unknown) Kanaan, both of which interpretations would require the Greek Kasantar. Fulman2 considers Kasantar an error for Kanaan, by a homoeographic confusion. These explanations are superfluous. Kasantar is simply the Greek transfiguration of καναάν, i.e. καναάς, with the post-positive article αν—used with the θεωρήματα (Zealot), just as in Acanban (άρον), the 'king.' Luke has therefore rightly and literally translated ή καναάς.3 Whether Simon was an adherent of the Zealot, perhaps a member of the company of Jesus, or the term was won subsequently through zeal in Jesus' service (as the brother of Andrew won the surname Peter, and the Zebedeans, whether fishermen or doctors) may not be quite certain, but the probabilities point to the former view.

2. Origin.—As the oppression and Hellenizing policy of the Seleucids caused the Macabean Jewish insurrection and the rise of the Hasidim, the policy of Rome, especially from A.D. 6, caused the rise of the Zealots. The genealogical descent of the Zealots may be traced from the Hasidim through the PerENN (Pharisees), who appeared in opposition to the Hellenizing sympathies of the aristocratic Sadducees about the time of John Hyrcanus (135-103 B.C.). The Zealots thus combined the policy of the Hasidim (against foreign domination) with that of the original Pharisees (against liberalism towards foreign thought and manners and laxity towards the Law).

Although the Zealot movement dates from A.D. 6, there had been for years a growing discontent against both Jewish and Roman rule. The statement of Rabbi Kohler that 'the reign of the Idumean Herod gave the impulse to the organization of the Zealots as a political party' seems to go beyond our evidence. But the Zealots had forerunners in the 'rother' band of Jews, who, from the reign of Zechariah (473) to the death of Herod, 'the king,' is described at the head of a strong 'rother' force caused great trouble to Herod, by whom he was finally captured and executed.4 His son Judas, after the death of Herod, made an insurrection in Sephiroth in 4 B.C.5 Even conspirators with condemned days, together against Herod,6 the fore runners of the later Searii.

The Jews had come into contact with Rome in the days of the Maccabees. If Pompey captured Jerusalem in 63 B.C., and abolished the Jewish king, he left the Jews in the enjoyment of a considerable independence and respected their nationality. In A.D. 6 Archelaus, who for ten years as ethnarch had ruled Judaea, Idumia, and Samaria, was accused before Augustus by a joint commission of Jews and Samaritans of intolerable cruelties, for which the emperor recalled and banished him. Judas the Galilean was then sent by the Zealots to the Roman province of Syria, to be administered under a procurator.7 From this date the Jews began to discover—what they learned better on the extinction of the Herodian dynasty in A.D. 47—that the sly half-Jewish Herods understood both their peculiarities and religious customs better than did the Romans. The Jews found the Roman administrators to be other than they had imagined. There was to be no return to the 'honours and alliances of the Romans and their emperors with our nation' of Maclean days, nor to the δόξα of the great Julius in the years 47 B.C. and following, which bestowed upon the Jews all the privileges of Roman protection together with religious toleration and political home rule. These Julian decrees were regarded later by the Jews as their Magna Charta, and by them all subsequent Roman administrators as attempted arrogation of power and privilege.8

1 Hand-Komentar zum NT, Freiburg, 1839-91, ad loc.
3 Wellhausen and Scheler also interpret Kasantar as 'the Zealot,' but arrive at their interpretation in a way different from each other and contrary to the above. We refer the reader to Wellhausen, Marel, Berlin, 1893, p. 25) evidently regards the Greek as the equivalent of 'zealot' while Scheler (Geschichte des jüd. Volkes, 2, p. 116) states, if one wants to regard it as a Greek feminine form of Kasantar, possible in spite of it.
Roman interference had never been palatable to the masses of the people, and it was among the lower classes that the hatred of Rome now became intense, and which chiefly sustained the Zealots. Many of the leaders were supplied from the aristocratic classes. The conflict began with the resentment caused by the census of Quirinius (A.D. 6–7) to which Judas as a procuratorial province was subjected, and first resented by taxation, but were persuaded to submit by the high-priest Joazar. The Zealot movement began as a protest against this census when Coponius was procurator of Judea. 3 The outbreak did not occur in Judea, but in Galilee, which was not directly affected by the census. The insurrection was headed by Judas, 4 a Galileon of the city of Gamala (better known as the Galilean), who allied himself with a prominent Pharisee, named Sadduk, probably a member of the more nationalistic school of Shammay. Though Josephus speaks of Judas and Sadduk as joint authors of the Zealot movement on the frequent appearances of his sons and descendants as the prime mover. 5 Judas the Galilean became leader of the fourth of these sects. 6 The motives of the party were partly political and partly religious, but the religious always was conjoined in Jewish history. In the closing scenes the political and secular far overshadowed the religious. The Roman taxation meant "nothing else than downright slavery," 7 it was a breach against the theocracy. 8 The census was a sign to the people that the Romans designed to destroy the last trace of their liberties: it was a gross insult both to them and to Jahweh. The object of the Zealots was to preserve intact Jewish nationalism and cult-traditions, and, by force if necessary, to throw off the Roman yoke and restore the theocracy. Thus they would hasten the Kingdom of God. The Zealot party was a "combination of noble and base elements; superstitious enthusiasts, and political assassins, the so-called sicarii, were conjoined with honest but fanatical patriots." 9

3. Subsequent history. —The history of Zealotism extends from A.D. 6–7 to the fall of Jerusalem, Sept. A.D. 70, or to the capture of Masada, April 73. The slighting reference of the Pharisees, Galamien, in Ac 5:29 might give the impression that the insurrection of Judas did not assume grave proportions, being suppressed immediately by the Roman authorities by the death of the leader and the scattering of his followers. Josephus does not give the date of this insurrection of Judas or the history of the revolt, but affirms that it was the beginning of the end for the Jews.

The "daring plot made great headway. There is no evil that did not spring from these men [Judas and Sadduk], and the nation was filled with it to an incredible extent..." whence seditions were engendered and as a result political bloodshed... and famine reducing us to extreme shamelessness, and the capture and sacking of cities, until finally this insurrection consumed the temple of God in the fire of the enemy."

Another proof of the importance of Judas's rebellion is that his sons and descendants inherited his fanatical hate of Rome and became outstanding exponents of Zealotism until it was extinguished at Masada. Two sons of Judas, Joseph and Simon, were the favorite of the high-priest Tiberius Alexander. 10 Another son, Menahem, was a protagonist in the rising of A.D. 66. 11 A descendant, named Eleazar, was commander of the garrison of Masada and perished there, probably by his own hand. 1 The Roman question became the test question in the political and religious lives of the Jewish nation. This internal division affected to a greater extent the Pharisaic party which had first resented the direct interference of Rome in the affairs of Palestine. The majority of Pharisees, however, were pacifics or party fatalists; only a minority became extremists anxious to appeal to the arbitrament of the sword, and, under Sadduk, ascended to the Zealots.

After the first challenge of the Zealots to Rome was crushed, the Roman government seriously attempted to understand their Jewish subjects and in many ways humoured them. For a time the Zealot movement lost in numbers and influence, for lack of matters of complaint. Quirinius deposited the unpopular high-priest Joazar, who counselled compliance with the census. 3 The Jews were excused from Roman military levies: the auxiliary troops under the procurator were recruited from among the non-Jewish populations of Palestine. 12 The first four procurators were friendly disposed towards the Jews. Roman authority, most tolerant of Jewish customs and the religion was always conjoined in Jewish history. In the closing scenes the political and secular far overshadowed the religious. The Roman taxation meant "nothing else than downright slavery," 7 it was a breach against the theocracy. 8 The census was a sign to the people that the Romans designed to destroy the last trace of their liberties: it was a gross insult both to them and to Jahweh. The object of the Zealots was to preserve intact Jewish nationalism and cult-traditions, and, by force if necessary, to throw off the Roman yoke and restore the theocracy. Thus they would hasten the Kingdom of God. The Zealot party was a "combination of noble and base elements; superstitious enthusiasts, and political assassins, the so-called sicarii, were conjoined with honest but fanatical patriots." 9

The Romans, out of regard for Jewish scruples concerning the imperial image on coins, granted Judea a copper coinage which bore only the name of the emperor and insensative symbols. When from time to time Roman troops marched into Jerusalem, they did so without the usual military banners which bore the image of the emperor—a considerable condescension on the part of the conquerors. Unfortunately, between Jewish demands and scrupulous respect either the Roman arrogance or ignorance of their subjects on the other, this modus vivendi was not destined to succeed or to reconcile Palestine to accept the Roman yoke. Moreover, Roman practice did not always harmonize with Roman theory. The result was an ever-widening chasm between the pro-Roman and the anti-Roman parties in the nation, with increasing bitterness and recklessness among the latter. The pro-Roman or pacifist party was represented by the Sadducees and the Herodian rulers and the aristocracy generally, together with the more prudent of the Pharisees; the anti-Roman party was composed chiefly of the Zealots and the popular rebellious. The Pharisees, at first decidedly anti-Roman, after A.D. 66 generally sided with the Sadducean aristocracy and the party of law and order against the extremists. Under the first four procurators (Componius, A.D. 6–9; Marcus Ambibulus, A.D. 9–12; Annibus Rufus, A.D. 12–15; Valerius Gratus, A.D. 15–26) Judea seems on the whole to have been equitably
administered, and there was little disaffection to further policy.1 In the Gospel and Zealot, Pilate proposed the choice as a possible means of acquisition of the office of procurator, according to the oldest account (Mark), the people reminded Pilate of his previous loyalty at the first to the procurator, Caius, and that the practice was not between a popular Zealot and an unpopular Messiah. For Josephus, Pilate and Jesus were popular. He knew that Jesus was in such favour with the people as to bar his way to the cross of the Jews (cf. John 18:39), but that, by the authorities He was regarded as a Jew. Of these two similar prisoners Pilate was convinced that Jesus would be preferred by the multitude over Barabbas. However, partly under the influence of the high-priest, demanded Barabbas. It was not the first time that a procurator had understood Jewish feelings, nor the first occasion on which a ruler was misled by the psychology of the mob.

Little is known of the next two procurators— Marcellus (A.D. 36–37) and Marius (A.D. 37–41).2 Such was the Jewish national consciousness that the news of the bloody persecutions to which their brethren in Alexandria were subjected towards the close of A.D. 38 (and which continued fitfully until the close of Caligula's reign because of their opposition to the erection of the imperial image in the synagogues) would intensify the fanatical hate against Rome. The same demand for recognition of the imperial cult was made upon Judaea the next year as a punishment for the act of the Jews of Jamnia in overthrowing an altar erected to Caligula. But, with much hesitation the emperor yielded to the entreaties of his Syrian legate, Petronius, and Agrippa I. and withdrew the edict. The act of Claudius immediately on his accession, whereby he restored to Agrippa I. (the Herod of A.D. 19) the dominions of his grandfather, Herod the Great, by adding Judaea and Samaria to his kingdom, intended to placate Jewish nationalism. This arrangement continued in force till A.D. 44, when, on the death of Agrippa II, Remus, a boy of twelve-year-old son and incorporated all Palestine with Syria under a procurator.3 This disappearance of the semi-Jewish Herodian dynasty, which had stood as a buffer between Rome and the Jews, formed a crisis in Jewish history and caused a renewed outbreak of Zealotism. The social peace and material prosperity of the few years under Agrippa I., together with bitter memories of Roman procurators, made a return under direct Roman administration repugnant to the masses. Fuss was added to the fires of fanaticism. From this important date till A.D. 66 seven procurators administered Palestine.

1 'The history of the Roman procurators, to whom Palestine was now entrusted, is reviewed, one might imagine that all, if set by some ingenuity, systematically metamorphosed the people into revolts. Even the best of them—not to mention the others—had no idea that a people like the Jews desired above everything else tolerance toward their distinctive customs. Instead of practising mildness and self-control, they opposed them (Lebensregungen) of the people with a pitiless severity.4

2 The regime of the first two procurators after A.D. 44 (Fadus from 44, and Tiberius Alexander, nephew of Phile, till 48) was mild compared with that of the subsequent five: 1 by making no innovations in our ancestral customs they kept the nation quiet.5 The misdeeds of Fadus recorded by Josephus are (1) his demand that the high-priest's vestment should be restored to Roman custody, which Claudius rejected, and (2) his suppression of the 'magician' or prophet Thendas, an idol of the people.7 That Zealotism broke out with fresh vigour under Fadus's administration we may infer from the words of Josephus about the death of Tholomaisos 'the arch-brigand' and the clearance of all Juda of 'robberies.' We are

3 Ant. xiv. 3, vi. 10.
4 Philo, ad Gaium, xxxvii. (Meynig, ii. 590).
5 Ant. xiv. 1. 2.
6 Ant. xiv. 3.
7 Cf. J. Weiss, Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes, Göttingen, 1893, p. 24; and A. M. Hughes, 'Anti-Zealotism in the Gospel,' 1. 317.) (from the Logian) ἔκ θηματαν την ἀγαθότητα καὶ κατὰ πράξεων ἀρετήν καὶ θηματον ἀφιέρωμα, which will be aimed against the Zealots. So Bouquet, Die Religion des Judaizismus, p. 101; R. Kohler, art. 'Zealot,' in J.E.
not informed whether the motive of Fadus was an insight into the nationalist danger or merely to keep order. The fact that the next procurator, Theon of Cyrene, promised Albinus (A.D. 60-62) that security for the Jewish people was his responsibility as long as he remained in his post, shows that there was an alarming recrudescence of Zealot agitation such as to require summary treatment. Under Albinus, Cumanus (A.D. 49-52) and the Zealots were in a constant state of insurrection. Their resentment was embittered by (1) an indecent act of a Roman soldier at the Passover leading to a tumult, in which 80,000 Jews perished; (2) the seizure of Cumanus that whole villages were plundered in retaliation for the robbery of an imperial official by 'robbers' (probably Zealots); in the execution of this command a Roman soldier tore a copy of the Law to shreds with obscene language, upon which the people became so threatening that Cumanus beheaded the guilty soldier to placate them. As a result of the refusal of Cumanus to do justice to the Jews in a quarrel with the Samaritans, the people, against the advice of their elders, called in the help of the Zealot leader, Eleazar, son of Dimas, a robber, and Alexander, doubtless also a Zealot chief. Many members of Cumanus were likewise eager for war. An appeal was carrie to Unnmihius Quadratus, legate of Syria, who referred the matter to Rome. Claudius, well-disposed through the offices of Agrippa, the elder, to the people who they were the worst of the two cohorts which they were ordered to welcome from Cesarea; and on the part of the Jews by a jest of some Jewish wags who pretended to beg for the destitute Florus, by the seizure of Masada and the slaughter of the Roman garrison by the Zealots, and by the discontinuance of the daily sacrifice for the emperor. Even now the peace-party—the Sadducee high-priests and the chiefs of the Pharisees—advocated conciliatory measures with the seditions Zealots, who refused to hearken. The insurgents under Eleazar, son of Ananias, allied with the Sicarii, attacked Agrippa's troops, upon whom the peace-party relied. Menahem, son of Judas the Galilæan, armed the Zealots, entered the city, and forced the capitulation of the soldiery of Agrippa and the citizens of the peace party. The war party further celebrated their victory by murdering the high-priest Ananias. Menahem's cruelty led to a quarrel with the other Zealot leader, Eleazar, which resulted in the death of the former. Menahem's unchallenged leadership by a shameful butchery of the Roman garrison under Metellus, who had capitulated on terms. The successful defence of the capital against Cestius Gallus, governor of Syria, and his defeat at Beth-horon inspired enthusiasm in the Zealot and war party. Many pro-Romans and moderates now abandoned the holy city. The war party came into control by violence or persuasion, and the moderates were much disheartened. As the die was now cast and an attack expected from Rome, the authorities proceeded to organize for war and appointed generals for Jerusalem and the provinces. It should be noted that at this early stage those in authority were mostly members of the aristocracy—Sadducees and Pharisees—who considered it prudent to put themselves at the head of the popular revolution. The position of affairs was reversed by the murder of the first year of the war, as fortress after fortress fell before the Romans. The revolution which unseated the native authorities and put provincial
radicals in power was brought about by the Zealot, John of Gischala, the enemy of Josephus, in the winter A.D. 67–68. On the fall of Gischala (Nov. A.D. 67) John Betar (Jerusalem, gained over the youth of the city, and was abetted by the increasing numbers of provincial refugees entering the city. The authorities were, with some truth, accused of lack ofenergy in the prosecution of the war and even of Roman sympathies. The Zealots believed that the safety of the nation lay in ousting the aristocratic native leaders and in taking control themselves by storming Antipas (one of the royal lineage and public treasurer) and other persons of rank, and elected a new high-priest from the proletariat. The native party of order strenuously opposed their financial and their Zealot supporters. The former was led by Giorion, son of Joseph, Simon, son of Gamaliel, and the high-priests Ananus and Jesus, son of Gamaliel. A speech of Ananus aroused a majority of the inhabitants against the Zealots, who, in self-defence, summoned the Idumeans on the pretext that the authorities of Jerusalem had made common cause with the Romans. The Idumeans on arrival were refused admittance by the inhabitants, but were secretly introduced at night by the Zealots. The Idumeans signalized their entrance by the perpetration of intolerable cruelties, in which the Zealots also joined, against the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy. This reign of terror accomplished the utter collapse of the native party of order and ended in a victory for the Zealots and reactionaries. The high-priests, Ananus and Jesus, and a prominent citizen, Zecharias, son of Baruch, were put out of the way. When the Idumeans, satiated with the blood of the citizens, realized the falsity of the pretence upon which they were introduced by the Zealots, they withdrew, but assassination and sabotage were continued by the Zealots. John, at the head of the Zealots, now became undisputed dictator of the city, while the Sicarii and Zealots carried on their brigandage and murders throughout the country. The Roman civil wars delayed military operations for a time. Meanwhile Simon, son of Giora, at the head of a mixed following of slaves and Zealots, overran a large portion of S. Palestine (A.D. 68–69) and came into conflict with the Zealots under John. The Romans, under Cerealis, put an end to Simon's marauding by conquering all Palestine outside the caput marmoratum of Herodotus, Macherus, and Masada, held by the Zealots (summer of A.D. 69). Simon now appeared with his army before the walls of Jerusalem, the inhabitants of which, groaning under the tyranny of John, invited, at the suggestion of the high-priest Matthias, Simon 'as a second tyrant' within the city. There were now two factions, each distinguished by the same Zealot hatred of Rome and the same indifference to the rights of the citizens. Vespasian had meantime ascended the throne and commissioned Titus with the reduction of the Jewish rebellion. While the Romans were preparing to invest the city, there appeared a third faction headed by Eleazar, son of Simon, who, with a large following of priestly Zealots, revolted from John's party. The incessant bickerings of these three tyrants, John, Simon, and Eleazar, caused terrible misery to the city and led to the disastrous burning of vast stores of grain sufficient to withstand a siege of many years. A bloody riot occurred at the Passover of A.D. 70, in which John vanquished Eleazar's party and thus reduced the three Zealot factions to their own home. The citizens commenced to beleaguer the city, party faction was still. Eleazar with 2400 Zealots again united with John and his Zealots, while the Idumeans betided with Simon. The two leaders, John and Simon, made such an heroic and strategically planned defence against the Roman besiegers that, had it not been for the sudden appearance of Vitellius, which lessened the defenders, and the mad destruction of the ample supplies of grain, it is improbable that the Romans would have succeeded. In spite of Titus's desire to shorten the campaign and spare the city, the appeals of Josephus to his countrymen, and the famine prevailing within, the peace party was silenced by the Zealots. On the capture of the city (Sept. A.D. 70) John and Simon fell into the hands of the Romans; the former was condemned to life imprisonment, the latter was spared to grace the triumph and then executed. Herodion, Macherus, and Masada still remained in the hands of the enemy. The Idumeans, with Lucilius Bassus captured Herodion, and compelled Macherus to surrender. The last stronghold of the Zealots was Masada, occupied by the Sicarii and Zealots. A two-party division of the Romans, Josephus and Simon, the Zealot, withdrew, a descendant of Judas the Galilean. This force fell in April, A.D. 73, before Flavius Silva, who discovered to his chagrin that the defenders had by agreement slain each other and the last survivor had committed suicide, only two children surviving. With the fall of Masada the history of the Zealots as a party ends. The Jews had ceased to be a nation: it was, however, the spirit of the Zealots that inspired the sanguinary insurrections in the reigns of Trajan and Hadrian.

There is much in the history of Zealotism which recalls the Highland devotion to hopeless causes. Zealot enthusiasm seemed to fail because it was not guided by prudence. Their indiscretions, their separatist spirit, their disregard of the other parties in the nation, and their enormities led to the defeat of the cause to which they devoted themselves with such indefatigable energy, in a life-and-death struggle with the imperial might of Rome.

4. Relation to other Jewish parties.—The chief question in the third chapter is the relationship to the Pharisees and to the Sicarii. Josephus speaks of the Zealots as a fourth party alongside of the Sadducees, Pharisees, and Essenes. His description of the Zealot sect is:

• Of the fourth of these philosophies Judas, the Galilean, became leader. In all other respects they agree with the opinions of the Pharisees, but they are distinguished by an unshakable devotion to liberty, holding that God alone is Ruler and Lord (ἡγεμόν καὶ ἀρχήτηρ). They consider it a trite matter to endure extraordinary trials and the torments of relatives and dear ones, in their refusal to appeal any mortal as "Lord." And since multitudes have witnessed their immoveable courage under such circumstances I do not dwell upon it in detail. For I am not afraid that anything related of them should be disbelieved, but on the contrary I fear lest the narrative may do less than justice to their contempt in enduring the misery of the war. The nation commenced to suffer from the maldy of this madness through the reckless insolence of Geshua Florus, the procurator, in driving the people to revolt from Rome.

The Zealot movement arose in the bosom of Pharisaism and retained throughout its brief

1 Tacit., Hist. v. 12.
2 Flavius Josephus, ibid. v. 1.
3 Hippolytus in his Ref. of all Heretics, ix. 21, represents the Zealots or Sicarii as an extreme sect of the Essenes. His account differs conclusively from the statement by Philo, Josephus, Flavius, Hegesippus, Porphyry, and Euphranor, of the Zealots or Sicarii being 'per centum quod, omnium etiam, Christi, Suadentium, et apud Jackson and Lake, Beginnings of Christianity, i. 423, who enumerate the Zealots as part of John of Gischala's following and to no other.

1 Ant. xvi. 314.
2 Ant. xvii. 1.
history a striking resemblance to Pharisaism. The Pharisees represented generally the popular party, distinguished by their dislike of Roman overlordship and their zeal for the Law and the theocracy. The Roman question caused a split among the Pharisees into the majority of moderates and the minority of extremists or war party. The former were factotums, 1 who viewed Roman domination as a link in the unbroken chain of the lot. The latter adopted the liberal measure of tolerance granted by Rome for the exercise of their religion; the other believed that autonomous nationalism was requisite for the very existence of the theocracy. These extremists, led by Sadduk, gladly attached themselves to a nationalist like Judas. The Herodians 2 were probably not strictly a separate party, but belonged to, or for political purposes allied themselves with, the most pacific section of the Pharisees. Herodians and Pharisees would agree in (1) discountenancing everything which threatened to disturb the political status quo, while (2) preferring the Herodian dynasty (instead of a Roman one). 3

The Zealots occupied, therefore, the extreme right of the Pharisees, and the Herodians the extreme left, on the question of Roman domination.

Unfortunately our chief source for the history of Zealotism is Josephus—a moderate Pharisee and pro-Roman, with a decided penchant against the Zealots, and by no means a neutral observer. He was disposed to cast aspersions upon the minds of the Romans to throw the blame of the rebellion upon a party which became extinct with the Roman victories, and partly to screen his own sect, which after the end of the Jewish nation became the guardian of its traditions. The excesses of which the Zealots were guilty furnished him a feasible excuse. The Zealot movement not only arose within Pharisaism, but throughout its course really stood for the ideals of the Pharisees, though adopting different means.

1 The Zealot party only drew the last practical conclusions out of the hate of the Pharisees against Roman domination. Their tactics therefore never approved of their conduct until it degenerated into absolutely unlawful proceedings. The Zealots, in the words of Josephus, broke loose from the Zealots, who now betrayed their connection with the Pharisees by immediately falling upon the Zadokite party with rapine.

The Zealots did not scruple to accomplish the death of Sadducean high-priests. Even Josephus cannot conceal the close relations between Zealots and Pharisees, the Zealots being distinguished only by their marked devotion to independence, 4 though elsewhere 5 he speaks of Judas as "σαργύρης ἄδειος ὀποῖος ἀναλάβει τὸν ἄγνοον προφετήσιον." But from A.D. 66 the Pharisees, foreseeing the issue of a conflict with imperial Rome, withdrew more and more from the Zealots and joined the Sadducees in advocating conciliatory measures. 6 Josephus generally speaks of the Zealots as 'brothers' (συμπάθης). This nomenclature was due to (1) the absence for some time of any definite party name for these radicals, the title 'Zealot' being a self-designation of the party, and perhaps not definitely 7 

2 Cf. Ant. xiv. 1, 11.
3 Cf. Ant. xvii. 1, 11, xviii. 2, 1-3.
4 Ant. xiv. 16, 8.
5 "Zealotism was the philosophy which had always dominated the minds of the Pharisees from generation to generation, and it maintained its principles with the greatest obstinacity: it was indeed, which is not mentioned by the political Pharisees Josephus, simply and unfrequently "Zealotism" (Keim, "Jesu Nazarenus," Eng. tr., p. 227). "Zealotism was ultimately only thoroughgoing and logical Pharisaism" (Dowd, "History of Christianity," 2, 527).
ZIONISM.—The title and object. Zionism is the designation of a modern nationalistic movement among the Jews, the programme of which was definitely formulated at an international congress held in Basel, Switzerland, on 29th-31st Aug. 1897, in the following terms: 'The object of Zionism is to establish for the Jewish people a publicly recognized, legally secured home in Palestine.

2. The basis. The aim of Zionism, the re-establishment of the Jewish people in the land promised to the patriarchs as an eternal inheritance of Israel, is a conception inherent in the religion of the Jews, and has actively asserted itself at various epochs since the destruction of Jerusalem by Nebuchadnezzar.

3. The revival of Jewish nationalism. But it was only towards the middle of the 19th cent. that the sense of a national and political revival of the Jewish people assumed reality. The national resurrection of ancient Hellas, and the resurgence of national sentiment in Europe generally, proved a stimulus to Jewish hopes. The wave of Jewish solidarity that followed in the wake of the Damascus affair (1840) was a symptom of the establishment of the Alliance Israélite Universelle (1860) was the first organized embodiment, of the re-awakened Jewish collective consciousness. Foremost in this direction was Sir Moses Montefiore (1784-1885), who, since his first visit to Palestine (1827), proved the forerunner in Western Europe of a keen, though none the less discriminating, interest in the Jewish future of Palestine. This interest has been common to all Jews, and acted and reacted upon the general course of Jewish life, and eventually proved a measure of its vitality.

This was, however, the period of Jewish history when all the energies and resources of the Jews were wholly directed to their civil and political emancipation. This tendency, which derived its spiritual expression from the ideal of enlightenment and reform, resulting from Moses Mendelssohn (1729-86) and his followers, received its most striking manifestation in the promulgation of the Zionist theme, of the French Revolution, which, by the Napoleonic conquests, spread over Central Europe. The so-called Sanehedin convened at the behest of Napoleon (1806) gave to the new orientation of Jewish life a formal sanction. It became an axiomatic Jewish thought, at first in Western lands and then among the upper strata in the great communities in Eastern Europe and the Orient, that the Jews were no longer a nation but a faith, that the moral ideal of the Jewish future was a complete social and political adaptation to the dominant surroundings. Even in the religious sphere the references to the restoration and the rebuilding of the Temple were toned down, and in some prayer-books the words 'Israel' and 'Jerusalem' even eliminated; the vernacular began to be used in prayer, and gradually superseded, the original language, while avoiding ahistorical tendencies, this reform of Judaism assumed distinctive colourings adapted to the circumstances of time and place.

4. The Chovevé Zion. While traditional and modernistic conceptions of Judaism as a religion struggled for mastery on the question of the validity of ancient dogmas, forms, and ordinances, there set in a fermentation in the racial consciousness of the Jews that gave a new direction to their aspirations. True, in the West, the devoted efforts of Sir Moses Montefiore to bring his English co-religionists to a realization of Jewish potentialities in Palestine met with no effective response. The publication in 1882 by Moses Hess of Zion und Jerusalem, advocating the recognition of a distinct Jewish nationality, in which re-settlement in Palestine, also found no favour among the Jews of Germany, where it appeared. The publication of a pamphlet, Auto-Emancipation, by a Polish Jew, Odesser, in 1881, proclaiming the necessity for the establishment by the Jews of a country of their own marked, however, a definite stage in the emergence of a movement which was to captivate the imagination of the mass of the Jewish people.

The consequent rise of the movement of the Chovevé (Lovers) Zion ('Lovers of Zion') broke } See art. MESSIAS (ZIONIST).
with the ideology of assimilation that had been taking hold of ever-increasing numbers of the Jewish people.

5. Jewish nationalist aspirations.—The outward events detailed in art. ANTI-SEMITISM 2 reinforced the trend of sentiment and thought that was proceeding within Jewish life prior to the complete spiritual transformation that took place, particularly in the outlook of the younger generation. The effort to turn the Jews into a mere religious denomination, distanced from the religious by their religion, and even in this approximating to the ideas and customs of time and place, was opposed by the affirmation that the people of Israel, though dispersed over the whole earth, was still one people, not only bound together by a common past, but consecrated by the hopes and aspirations of a common future. It was put forward that the Jews had indeed a distinctive mission in the economy of the world—as was claimed by those who would insist upon the universality of Judaism as a world-religion—but, while recognizing that only a part of the Jewish people lived in Palestine, it was asserted that the spiritual purpose of the nation could be worthily accomplished only in its hallowed home-land, whence, as in the days of old, it would draw inspiration from its native soil, and give again of its own spiritual gifts to the world. Jews, therefore, with the idea of furthering the national aspirations, made a distinctive contribution to the religion and civilization of the world. It was particularly in the cultivation of the specific Hebrew spirit of righteousness and social justice that the Jewish nationalists saw the Messianic fulfilment of the destiny of the Jew in history.

6. Modern Hebrew literature.—The nationalist conception of Jewish life found in time a host of advocates in the Jewish literature of all languages, so that it is now, particularly in the press, the most potent intellectual force in Jewry. In particular the Hebrew language, hitherto confined to prayer and study as well as to religious and literary correspondence, proved both a means and an end in nationalist propaganda. Hebrew, adapted to modern needs, became the vehicle for the issue of original works and translations, and a Hebrew press fashioned the ancient tongue for everyday use. It became the medium of instruction in schools, and finally in Palestine the vernacular of the younger generation. In the course of the first fifty years of its development the literature revealed an intellectual individuality of a high order. Perez Smolenskin (1842–85), by his Hebrew periodical Ha-shahar ("The Dawn"), was a nationalist pioneer among the intellectuals of his time; Ahad Ha’amin (Asher Ginsberg, born 1856) is a thinker of profound depth and endowed with extraordinary clarity of judgment and diction. He has given a philosophical content to Jewish nationalism, and the idea of a Jewish spiritual centre in Palestine is emphasized by him in contradiction to an exclusively politico-economic conception of the movement. Haim Nahman Bialik (b. 1873) and Saul Tuchernowchsky (b. 1873) stand out among those who in these latter days have revived the inspiration of Hebrew poetic expression. Nahum Sokolow (b. 1859) welds the Hebrew language with a versatility and grace reminiscent of the wealth of classical Hebrew, and the elegance of French literature. The new Hebrew University in Jerusalem will give modern Hebrew the definite scientific canons of which it is so still in need.

Modern Hebrew is based on the Bible, with its developments in the Mishnah, Talmud, and medieval literature. A complete lexicon, with the latest terminologies, is the JED (Thesaurus) 1 But see Art. Anti-Semitism. 2 See supra, art. Anti-Semitism.
From the fact that this new development of the nationalist movement laid special stress on the thesis that the Jewish question could not be solved in the Diaspora by the prevailing methods of political activity, in Palestine or in the rest of the world, the adherents of the Basel programme came to be known as Political Zionists, in contradistinction to the former Choveve Zion and those who claimed to be Nationalist Zionists in the narrower sense and only in the spiritual sense. The Zionist Organization further assumed a definite nationalist attitude on Jewish public matters as, indeed, it developed a Jewish Welfare Federation generally, and thereby aroused a force and a widespread opposition from the leading ecclesiastical and lay heads of the Jewish communities.

Zionism, however, continued to gather force in most parts of the Jewish Diaspora, and became the largest organized body of Jews since the days of Jewish independence. Altogether it exercised an ever-increasing influence on Jewish life. In Jewish communal politics, in literature, art, and education, it endeavoured to create a specific national Jewish note. The hold which it has obtained over the numerous Jewish university students, particularly on the European continent, has been successful from the intellectual leadership of the Jewish people.

The immediate object of Zionism, which was to obtain from the sultan of Turkey a legal concession or charter for the settlement of large numbers of Jews on the land of Palestine, was not effected in 1897. Three personal interviews of Herzl with Sultan Abdul Hamid (1901 and 1902) proved fruitless. Impelled by the pressure of urgent circumstances in the general condition of the Jews in Germany, Herzl considered the advisability of acquiring from the Anglo-Egyptian Government the region of El Arish, on the Sinai peninsula, for a Jewish autonomous settlement. This was, however, owing to the lack of water for irrigation, the scheme was found impracticable. This was followed in 1903 by an offer to the Zionists by Joseph Chamberlain (then Secretary of State for the Colonies) of the Guas Ngisha plateau in the East Africa Protectorate, which was submitted to a Zionist congress, but the mere suggestion of any project outside Palestine aroused violent opposition. A commission of exploration was sent out, but on its report to the subsequent congress this so-called Uganda scheme was definitely rejected. The secession of a number of Zionists followed and led to the establishment of the Jewish National Fund (colloquially termed 'ITO') in order to procure a territory upon an autonomous basis for the Jews who cannot or will not remain in the lands in which they already live. After unsuccessful attempts to find a suitable territory, in Cyprus, Canada, Australia, Mesopotamia, and Angola, the Jewish Territorial Organization has ceased to function.

The death of Herzl (who, in 1905, was followed in the office of president of the Zionist 'Actions Comité' [central executive] by David Wolffsohn, of Cologne, and, in 1911 by Otto Warburg, of Berlin) created a profound depression in the movement, which, in view of the absence of political success, attempted to develop the existing institutions in Palestine and—with a hope for better prospects—to cultivate as Gegenarbeit (the nationalist idea in the Diaspora.

Organization and finance.—The membership of the Zionist Organization consists of those who pay annually the shekel (one shilling [raised in 1919 to 20s], or its nominal equivalent in other coinage), which is the chief source of political success, the delegates to the congress, the highest Zionist forum. Women have the franchise on the same terms as men. About 500,000 persons paid the shekel in 1919-21.

The Zionist Organization is composed of national federations of Zionist societies or other bodies all over the world (e.g., the English Zionist Federation, the Federation of American Zionists, etc.), and, in addition, the so-called recognized international federations representing specific principles, as, e.g., the Mizrahi, which endeavours to promote Zionism on an 'orthodox' religious basis, or the Poale Zion, which promotes economic Zionism of a cooperative character.

As a general rule, Zionism is in favour of traditional Judaism, at least in a spiritual sense, but recognizes complete liberty of conscience for the individual, in accordance with the official declaration at the second congress (1898):

'Zionism does not only aim at the economic and political but also at the spiritual regeneration of the Jewish people, and in this respect stands on the basis of modern civilization, with the achievements of which it identifies itself. Zionism does not undertake anything which conflicts with the religious law of Judaism.'

In 1899 there was established, as the financial institution of the Organization, the Jewish Colonial Trust Ltd., with an authorized capital of £2,000,000, of which about £880,000 was subscribed by December 1920. Over 100,000 persons were holders of single £1 shares, the largest number of shareholders of any joint-stock company. In 1903 the Trust established a subsidiary body, the Anglo-Palestine Banking Co. Ltd., for the special purposes of banking business in Palestine. The Jewish National Fund was created in 1897 for the purchase of land in Palestine as the inalienable possession of the Jewish people. The principle regarding the national fund, and the fact that experiments undertaken by the Fund will render it not only one of the most useful agencies in the Jewish colonization of Palestine, but, from the general economic and sociological point of view, valuable and interesting in its practical application. During the Great War (1914-18), and even more since its conclusion, the Jewish National Fund has received a further impetus by the recognition on the part of the British Government of the historical connexion of the Jewish people with Palestine and the claim which this gives them to recognition of this connexion.

There are in England traditions, dating back to Puritan times, which favour the restoration of the Jews to their ancient country. And it is in England that the idea of the Jewish colonization of Palestine was formed by George Gavier in 1845. George Eliot's Daniel Deronda (1876) was in those days a remarkable revelation of the Jewish nationalist aspirations of a Gentle, while the romanticism of Benjamin Disraeli, with his strong Jewish sympathies, gave a glamour to the view of the restoration of Israel, with which the English-speaking world is familiar through the Bible.

Since 1915 the diplomatic activities of the Organization have been centred in England and the United States. In the latter country the movement received its greatest impetus by the accession of David Lloyd George to the Cabinet of the Supreme Court (since 1920 President of the Organization). In England Chaim Weizmann, whose extraordinary gifts of eloquence and statesmanship have raised the idea of the leadership of the Jewish community, and Nahum Sokolow (Chairman of the Executive), who combines the philosophical serenity of a man of letters with a keen judgment of men and affairs, were able to enlist the sympathies of British public opinion in the election of votes in the part of the British Government. Herbert Samuel (subsequently the first British High Commissioner for Palestine) ranged his Jewish influence, while in the Cabinet as well as out of it, definitely on the
side of Zionism, which found also convinced advocates among other British statesmen, notably Lloyd George, Arthur J. Balfour, and Lord Robert Cecil. Sir Mark Sykes (who in 1916 had acted for Great Britain in the Sykes-Picot Agreement with France) became the champion of Zionist interests in the settlement of the Palestine question.

On 2nd November 1917 Arthur J. Balfour, as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, addressed to the Zionist Organisation in Basel: a communication in the following terms:

"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment of a Jewish National Home for a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

This declaration, which was hailed in the Jewish world as a counterpart to the edict of Cyrus, was followed in 1918 by similar statements from the Governments of France and Italy, as was done by the support of President Wilson, and the friendly acquiescence of the pope.

On 3rd February 1919 a delegation, headed by Sokolow and Weinmann, and including the Russian Zionist, Dr. A. Haim Cohen, were welcomed by the French General Government and submitted to the Peace Conference in Paris the Zionist claims in Palestine with these proposals:

"The sovereign possession of Palestine shall be vested in the League of Nations as a national home for the Jewish people, and British as the mandatory of the League, it being a special condition of the Mandate that the political, administrative, and economic conditions as will secure the establishment there of the Jewish National Home and that the interests of the local non-Jewish communities should be guaranteed."

Following the conquest of Palestine by the British under Lord Allenby, in which officially designated 'Jewish troops' took part, the above Zionist proposals to the Peace Conference were on 25th April 1920 adopted at San Remo by the principal Allied Powers. Then the British Government took the mandate for Palestine under the League of Nations, as was also the Balfour Declaration in the Treaty of Sèvres.

With this solemn international recognition of the Jewish title to Palestine there emerges after a millenial struggle the national revival of a people comparatively small in numbers but incomparable in endurance and faith.

ZOHAR
ZOHAR. — From the 14th cent. the Zohar ('Splendour') has been the fundamental book of Jewish Kabbalists (q.v.), the fountainhead of all mystical inspiration. It has exercised a deep influence upon the spiritual development of the Jews, and has extended its influence beyond the borders of Judaism. An ever-increasing literature has gathered round it; for from its first appearance it excited the curiosity of the scholar and the mystical philosopher. Its origin is in much mystery, and to this day the problem presented by the Zohar has not been solved. It is a curious fact that only one manuscript prior to the first edition seems to have existed, and that it apparently therefore starts from the printed edition. And even then they have been limited to the Zohar alone, instead of being extended over the whole range of the Kabbalistic literature, that seems to form only one, though a very prominent, portion.

1. Problem of origin. — The most widely accepted theory as to the origin of this book is the somewhat legendary report of the investigation which a certain Rabbi Isaac made in Spain immediately after the book became known.

Rabbi Isaac belonged to a school of mystics which had made its headquarters in Lecce, and was a legate of the representatives of the Kabbalistic interpretation of the Law in accordance with Maimonides. Yalmanides, the Kabbalist, composed a supercommentary on Naḥmanides, Merot Enayim, hitherto still in MS, a valuable mine of information on the Zoharic phase of the Jewish mysticism. In 1919 He, travelling to Granada in Spain, and to have inquired of the widow of a certain Rabbi Moses de Leon what she knew about her husband's activity in connection with the book which he for the first time had circulated among the students. He offered her a very high price for the book. Rabbi Moses said that he had made the copies which he sold. The woman declared that she knew of no such copy and that Rabbi Moses used to write the things himself. On the strength of this curious report modern scholars have not hesitated to declare that this was a deliberate forgery. But it was reported to Rabbi Moses and paused off on his contemporaries as the work of Rabbi Simeon ben Sheshet, and it was thus quite a modern fabrication by this obscure scholar of the 13th century. The reason assigned for ascribing this book to Rabbi Simon ben Yehiel (Yehiel ben Sheshet) was that, according to an ancient legend found in the Talmud, he and his son had taken refuge in a cave from the Roman persecution, and that he died in it for thirteen years, giving himself up entirely to solitary meditation and mystical speculations. Proofs were then adduced to show the improbability of early origin, as the book teems with anachronisms. References made in it also to Talmudic laws and ceremonies of a later origin, and the author's knowledge of the system of vowels and accents, also precluded the possibility of such high antiquity.

But the whole investigation was vitiated by the fact that it rested exclusively on the printed text, which, as will be shown, was of a composite character. But even in this form the Zohar is only a portion of a much larger mystical literature which has been preserved, though of this very day under various names. The relation of these independent treatises and works to the larger compilation commonly known as the Zohar has not yet been investigated, and thus the true character of the Zohar has remained obscure, and the legendary origin which ascribes it to an almost unknown scholar of the 13th cent. has most uneruditely been accepted. It is utterly impossible to conceive that such a vast literature, containing elements of the most diverse and often contradictory character, should be the work of a single man. It is much more probable that the real Zohar is the result of many treatises of similar kind, which by some fortunate accident had come into the hands of a diligent scribe, who could easily make copies of it and profit by the sale.

(a) Evidence of the manuscripts. — The mystical speculations contained in these writings can often be traced back to those of the Hellenistic period, intermingled with later developments, but all contribute in the main to the doctrine that in them almost every system—new Platonism, the teachings of the Stoic in its later form, the allegorical interpretation so prominent in Philo, the
gnostic theories—and very often in a distorted form. No less prominent are the apocalyptic visions of heavenly halls and heavenly glories of the sainted dead, as drawn by the dreamer-gods of the ancients. The infallible name of God forms another centre of speculation, and the mystical value of letters and vowels, just as in the ancient magical papyri according to the doctrines of the Naassene school. The theories of dualism are not wanting in these schools, and often develop into a kind of trinity, consisting of father, mother, and son. The demiurgos, the ozygyges, and the hylomorphs have also found a place in the texts. They often dissolve the literal meaning of the words and rest upon fantastical etymologies, and apparent similarities in sound and form are often the only basis for these extraordinary speculations which never lead to a logical conclusion. Almost every principle or law or even every name in the Bible is subjected to this peculiar process of sublimation, and all the thoughts float and run into one another as so many nebulae which change their shape and form constantly, and which elude the grasp. It is all a world of mystical and fantastic imagery, in which everything is possible except one, viz., that the harmony of this world, and especially that of the celestial world, is dependent on carrying out these laws, and that Israel has the merit of being chosen to be the foremost representative of the Law, charged with its fulfillment and thus guaranteeing not only the stability of the world, but its ultimate perfection.

The conception of God is just as vague as all the rest, for each school seems to have had its own theory, and these are all hopelessly blended. God is the Ein Sof ('Infinite'), the Hoary Head, the Long Face (or, rather, the Long Suffering), Ezech Appaim. He is the centre of various emanations, of the form of a tree, or of a wheel, the head of the divine college, and very numerous are the anthropomorphical representations of the Shekinah, and just as vague and contradictory are the systems of creation and the many conceptions concerning the evil power (the other, or left, side) with its hosts of demons male and female, all wishing to join man for his destruction, to cover him, as it were, with so many kaliphen, like invisible skins. There is also to be found the Platonic theory of Ideas, or divine prototypes for every earthly creature. In one separate treatise, also embodied in the Zohar, the theory of metempsychosis is maintained, which can be traced back very early times in Egyptian and Palestine no less than in Egypt, and which later became one of the new principles carried by the Gnostic and Manichean sects into Europe. Two physiognomic treatises called 'The Secret of Secrets' have also found a place in this compilation.

It is obvious from this brief sketch that a work of such complexity cannot be the result of a single man's activity. The utmost that can be said is that Moses de Leon either pieced some of these treatises together or copied them from older MSS in a haphazard manner. Interpersed throughout the book there are numerous tales and legends, some of which have parallels in the other Rabbinical literature, but a large number are quite independent and cannot be found anywhere else. Some apocalyptic visions are also recorded which have a character of their own, and the whole setting reminds one strongly of the literature of the monks and cemobites, or ascetics, in Egypt and Palestine—e.g., the Luswocca of the Phalidae, who are depicted as walking together in the open, discussing on metaphysical problems, when they are joined by an aged man, the Saba, almost equal to the Ablai in the Lusweca, s. a Travelling Arab, who explains the questions put and who afterwards disappears, being either the prophet Elijah or some other heavenly personage, even God Himself. The whole picture is one which can only be conceived as drawn by the ten thousand grotesque, strange, and infinitesimal meditations in the wilds of Galilee or in some part east of Jordan.

Some beautiful hymns of a very exalted type, according to the mystics, almost pantheistic, almost panegyrical, and almost apocalyptic, and, together with these tales, have largely contributed to its great popularity among those who were unable to follow the mystical speculation contained in its pages.

(b) Evidence in their language. The book, as printed, is not uniform. The largest part of it is written in a peculiar Aramaic dialect, which is unquestionably Palestinian. It is not the classical form, but a popularly corrupted form, such as would be the living language of the people of Galilee between the Hellenistic and Arabic periods. It approximates partly to the language of the Palestinian Talmud, which is also of Galilean origin, and in many ways reminds one of the Targum to Ecclesiastes. It is evidently the language spoken by the Jews in Galilee, who refused to adopt Greek and to use it, even when this was the only language. Some parts are written more correctly, others show greater corruption, and a few of the technical terms the present writer believes to be of Greek origin. Other sections of the book are in Hebrew, also of a popular form. Corruptions in either portion, especially in the Aramaic, are probably due to a large extent to the fault of copyists not fully conversant with the Aramaic, to whom these new words appeared strange. No forgery was intended, and even the association with the name of Moses de Leon as author is out of the question, and, even as copyist, should perhaps not be limited to the Hebrew portion, which is specifically called the Zohar (for it must be made definitely clear that only a portion of the book has a right to claim this title).

The problem thus presented can now be more easily solved. It must be once for all established that the book is a compilation of a large number of independent treatises which belong to a wider circle; out of them a certain number have been selected in a haphazard manner and pieced together not by any author who endeavoured to write what it appears now to be, viz., a commentary to the five books of the Pentateuch, but by the enterprising publishers and printers of the first editions. These men have collected most of the number of books, one of which—the largest one—was the Zohar, or, as it was called, the Midrash Ha-Zohar, or the Midrash of Rabbi Simeon b. Yohai. They have deliberately and arbitrarily arranged these writings together, like a chain or ostena patrum, as a continuous commentary to the Pentateuch in the same manner as an unknown author has pieced together various other Midrashim of a Haggadic character and made out of them the well-known Yalkut. These writings were not intended to form continuous commentaries, and the largest portion deals almost exclusively with the first part of Genesis, whilst originally there was no commentary at all to Deuteronomy. In order to obtain such a commentary the publishers and printers transfered wholesale portions from one section to another, and, whenever this was found impossible as the text had already been allocated to another section, they contented themselves with inserting a note to the effect that an appropriate Yalkut commentary for this representations in some of the preceding sections. They did not even keep the various portions carefully separated; but, when the fragments were too small, they printed them one after the other, often omitting even the name, sometimes, however, inserting in the text the
title, such as Rova ("Mystery"), which a reader could not now easily understand, being unaware of the fact that it was an interpolation. Thus it confuses still more the already difficult text.

The editor of a new edition, however, took the trouble to make it clear that the book published by them was a compilation of various treatises pieced together by them, for they stated on the title-page that in these volumes of Zohár they had included in this publication the following: Sître Tôrāh ("Mysteries of the Tôrâh"), Midrash Hané'elam ("The Hidden Midrash"), Tosefta (additions to some sections), Zôdâs Mehemna ("Pentor Tikáho"); and The True Shepherd)—thus far in the Mantua edition, and in the Cremona edition the following are also added: the Bâkhr, Midrash Rut, Midrash Ha'sitsa (on Sonze), the section Ta Ha'zi ("Come and Behold"), Hekhalot ("The Halls of Heaven and Hell"), and again other additions, such as Pikkudim ("Ordinances"). This fact, hitherto entirely ignored, is of decisive importance for the history of the Zohár. It is especially noteworthy that in the very first editions both of Mantua and of Cremona we have only a compilation before us, and not a homogeneous work. All the investigators who have taken the Zohár to be a homogeneous composition have mistakes that an ingenious author, have been led completely astray.

Moreover, no notice was taken by the scholars of the other books belonging to the same cycle. Nor have the two editions, which appeared almost simultaneously, been compared—the folio edition of Cremona (1558), which already contains various texts printed side by side, and the other edition at Mantua (1558–60) with the introduction by Rabbi Isaac de Laets, in three quarto volumes, which has since become the authorized edition, all subsequent editions being faithful reprints page for page of this edition. The Cremona edition has only been reprinted twice, once in Lublin (1633) and a second time in Sulzbach with the help of the famous Knorr von Rosenroth (1654). In all the other (quarto) editions Genesis and Exodus form each a separate volume. The third volume contains the Zohár, etc., of the remaining three books of the Pentateuch. Curiously enough, even before the Zohár appeared in Mantua, the Tikkuné ha-Zohár, or "Additions and Improvements to the Zohár", appeared in Mantua in 1557. It consists of 70 chapters, all dealing practically with the cosmogony and with the first verse of Genesis. They are all written in the same style (except that there are more corrections in the first section) and show the same peculiarities as the chief portion of the Zohár. The language is also Aramaic, and there is scarcely anything to distinguish one from another. The same holds good of the Zohár Hadelah, the New Zohár, which appeared for the first time in Salonic (1597), compiled from MSS brought from Palestine. It contains, in addition, to the new Zoháric matter on the Pentateuch, similar mystical commentaries to the five scroll or Megillot, i.e. Lamentations, Song, Esther, Ruth, and Ecclesiastes.

In addition it may now be mentioned that the present writer possesses separate MSS of some of those writings which have been incorporated in the Zohár, such as Sître Tôrâh and fragments of Rova Mehemna, all corroborating the view that the book in its printed form is a compilation made in modern times of older material. A further and more decisive proof is now found in the MS of the Zohár (Cedex Gaster, no. 741) in the present writer's care. It contains much older material than the print and of Spanish Oriental origin. It differs very much from the printed edition. It contains only parts of what is now called the Zohár, but none of the other texts which have been joined on to it in that edition. With the help of this MS also one of the chief problems connected with the Zohár can now be satisfactorily solved. It is well known that the book is ascribed to Rabbi Simeon b. Yohai of the 2nd cent., and was not written on very good grounds. Critics to prove this claim untenable, inasmuch as the book in its entirety not only contains unquestionable anachronisms but also refers in sundry passages to and quotes from books which were not known until many centuries later. It can now also be demonstrated that the Zohár cannot be an insurance, or an abridgement, or a translation, or a comment of any other book which is known. It is a book wholly separate from all books which have any kind of connection with it. This is made all the more obvious when we consider the history of the Midrashe literature that many an ancient book is quoted by the first name which is mentioned at the opening of the book; it does not mean, e.g., that R. Kahana is the author of the Pesikta or R. Tanhumja of the Midrash which go under their names. The title is derived from the opening sentence where these two scholars are mentioned. The mystics had very books of a similar character, such as Midrash Hasitsa, mentioned on the title-page of the Zohár and forming part of the compilation. It is the initial word of the book, and it is the same word with the Midrash, and the very title of the Zohár is probably derived from that name occurring in the opening sentence. In the MS, similarly, the opening formula is "Yelah R. Simeon b. Yohai," which would thus explain absolutely the origin of the title Midrash of R. Simeon b. Yohai, by which this Midrash was quoted almost on its first appearance by the oldest authorities. This does not mean that R. Simeon was the author, but only that the book began with the mention of his name. Unfortunately the printers left out these initial words, for no obvious reason except perhaps in order to give prominence to that weighty mystical pronouncement which stands as a fitting introduction to this mystical book. Now there can no longer be any question of connecting this book with R. Simeon and considering him as the author. The anachronisms, on the other hand, are not general. The treatises embodied in the book may and probably do all belong to different periods. They represent a constant development which has been going on for a long time in various schools of Palestine. Each of these component elements must henceforth be studied separately, for we are dealing with a mass of material accumulated during centuries, much of which is evidently of high antiquity.

2. History of the Zohár.

The history of Jewish mysticism has still to be written, for much of it which is very old has for some reason or other been declared to be of more recent origin. The argumentum ex silentio has been too often used to prove the non-existence of mystic speculations in olden times in spite of the apocryphal and magical literature which flourished already in the early centuries before and after the destruction of the Temple. Each of these component elements must henceforth be studied separately, for we are dealing with a mass of material accumulated during centuries, much of which is evidently of high antiquity.
served until the time when they became the common property of scholars and mystics alike. It would be easy to trace almost every phase and aspect of older mysticism which flourished in Syria, Palestine, and Egypt in one page or another of the books relating to the mystic teaching of a single author. It is therefore futile to draw up the system of the Kabbalá contained in the Zohar, and those systems which have hitherto been evolved out of the book are merely partial representations of one section or another, far from exhausting even one of the many writings embedded in the Zohar. Mystical commentators have felt this, and have therefore often singled out one portion as the object of their interpretation. Such has been the case with the so-called Idra Rabba, 'The Big Hall,' and Idra Zutta, 'The Small Hall,' inNum, and Deut., or again the Siphre de Sesiuta, 'The Book of the Veiled Mystery,' in Exodus. These were treated either together with other treatises or published and commented upon separately.

The philosophic movement which found its highest expression in Maimonides (1184) Fride of the Perplexed led to a rationalistic interpretation of the Law, which by its extraordinary effectiveness called forth the mystical reaction which succeeded it, and practically extinguishing it.

The Kabbalistic doctrine then received a great impetus through the works of Nahmanides (1263), especially through his widely read and highly appreciated commentary to the Pentateuch.

At the same time there were other great scholars who had been deeply impressed by the older Kabbalistic speculations, such as Solomon b. Adrat, and others who had formed a school of mystics in Palestine, and especially in Arco. These schools were probably revivals of older schools and mystical circles which continued to flourish unobserved in the mountains and caverns of Galilee, and also on the banks of the Jordan, where from immemorial times schools of prophets, of ascetics and recluse, of Essenes and Hasidim, have continued their mystical speculations and contemplative life. The stories of the Crusade swept over those parts, destroyed the schools, and drove the adepts into other countries. The remnants of their literature were also carried far and wide, and that is, to the present writer's mind, the explanation of the appearance in the 12th and 13th centuries of such a large number of mystical writings; it is probable that some of these fell into the hands of Moses de Leon, if he is the author of the Zohar. They reveal present often divergent tendencies, and are the outcome of various schools of thought.

The Kabbalá entered into ever-widening circles, especially as men of the highest authority in Rabbinical learning confessed themselves to be students of it. No wonder, therefore, that the new mass of Kabbalistic material should overflow its narrower borders and over practically the whole field of Jewish learning. The political persecutions to which they were exposed also drove the Jews more and more to an inner contemplative life. Soon after their appearance these mystical writings were given a gloss, and within a short space of time had conquered the mind of the people.

Menahem Recanati (1290-1330) already makes full use of this Midrash of R. Simeon b. Yokai in his commentary to the Pentateuch, in which he gives large abstracts—a few years only, as it were, after the death of Moses de Leon. And, if it could be proved that the author of the Libnat Hasappir (a work edited by Schick) was the same person, then one could estimate the authorship of this commentary, for he also quotes large portions from the Zohar. Be that as it may, the Zohar henceforth held undisputed sway, and it was universally accepted in the form of the Mantus edition which had the 'imprimatur' of R. Isaac de Lattes. All the other mystical writings, some of which, as shown, were of equal antiquity and of equal importance, to a great extent were the less considered of less value.

The influence of the Zohar became still greater when a new mystical school rose again in Galilee in the middle of the 15th century. There R. Isaac Luria (1534-79) evolved a new system of Kabbalá, a further development of some of the leading principles found in the Zohar, and founded a school in Safed. It became the ruling system, being further developed by his colleagues and pupils, Hayim Vital Calabrese († 1620), Moses Cordovero († 1570), and Meir Popers († 1602). The Jews became then so deeply immersed in the study of the Kabbalá, and so much intoxicated by the fumes of these mystical speculations, that they easily fell a prey to the Messianic claims of Sabbethai Séhi. The pseudo-Messiah, his prophet Nathan de Gaza, and most of his followers were deeply versed in the study of the Zohar, and were able to manipulate its obscure words to further their own purposes. Real learning was sapped by this mystical infatuation, and the study of the Zohar became almost totally changed by the introduction of mystical formulas, and by the interpolation of mystical names and symbols which almost entirely destroyed the sublime simplicity of the original diction. Through the influence of the Zohar and the Kabbalá, a new mystical force was developed among the Jews. A spiritual love, an immersion in the Divine, was taught by the founder of the Ḥasidim to be of higher value, if possible, than the strict observance of the letter of the Law. Thus light and shadow, action and reaction, have succeeded one another with the spread of the Kabbalá, and notably of the Zohar and the Zoharic literature. Its influence is now greatly on the wane, and the time has therefore come when all the problems connected with that literature can again be taken up and studied in the light of independent scholarship.

The study of the Kabbalá and subsequently of the Zohar was not limited to Jews alone. One has only to mention Pico della Mirandola, Paracelsus, and others. They rode the wave of the keen interest Christian scholars have taken in it. Many a Christian scholar found in the Zohar proof of the dogmas of the Trinity, hence a large number of pamphlets c. 1580-1800. Especially meritorious was the work of Knorr von Rosenroth, whose Kabbala Denudata (1., Sulzbach, 1677-78, ii., Frankfort, 1684) has remained the most reliable source for subsequent Christian scholars, down to the latest translation in Kabbala Unveiled, by S. L. Macgregor Mathers (London, 1887).

Jewish commentators ever since the appearance of the Zohar have been busy drawing up glosses of its rare and technical expressions, and then explaining the text itself, or laying down rules of exegetical interpretation. Some attempted to draw up a system of the Kabbalistic teaching of the Zohar, but these stood already under the influence of Luria and his school. Towards the middle of the 18th cent., and in Italy before that time, doubts began to be raised as to the genuine nature of the authorship, and practically the whole controversy turned round the one question as to whether the Zohar was written by R. Simeon b. Yokai or not. A commentary to the whole of the
ZOROASTRIANISM.—Zoroastrianism is the religious doctrine attributed to Zoroaster which gradually became the prevalent religion of Iran and notably was the State religion under the Sasanian dynasty (A.D. 211-640). It is still prosessed by the Parsis of Bombay and by some sporadic communities in Persia. Zoroastrianism is one of the most interesting religions of the world. Its doctrines and rites are well known either in their present form or as they are to be found in the Pahlavi books and in the Avesta.

1. Zoroaster (Zarathushtra).—There is much obscurity concerning the person of the founder and the time and place of his preaching. Although the Avesta is the Zoroastrian Bible, it is quite evident that the contents are not book-canonic, with probability being regarded as the work of the prophet. That portion is the Gathas, or versified preachings, written in a dialect slightly different from the language of the rest of the Avesta. The Gathas and the Zend texts are the only Zoroastrian books of a date which can be assigned; the language of the inscriptions of the Achemenids are three closely related forms of Old Iranian.

In the Gathas Zoroaster appears as a very real and human personality, devoid of all the marvellous features which surround him in later literature. He is presented there as the son of Pourushaspā, of the Spītama family. For ten years he had only one disciple, Maidhyosmāna, his cousin. At last he converted to his doctrine Vishtāsp, a local prince; but the Gathas show that much resistance still was offered to the prophet, who, in some places, exhibits signs of anxiety. He had undertaken to reform not only the beliefs, but also the social habits of the tribes of Eastern Iran among which he had settled. His desire was to divert them from nomadic life and to induce them to take up agriculture. Advertising the new tradition, Zoroaster had come from Western Iran (he is represented as a native of Ragha in Media), a region which was more advanced in civilization. He was, so it seems, trying to introduce the Western and Median elements of the East. The names of Zoroaster and all the persons of his and Vistāspa's families have nothing mythical about them, but refer to horses, camels, etc. In later tradition Zoroaster's birth has been surrounded with marvels. He was supposed to have inherited the xwrenānān (= O. Pers. fornahan), or 'glory,' of Yima, the law-giver of ancient ages. The devotees repeatedly sought to kill him. Ahura Mazda and the awesch spatnas entered into communication with him and revealed to him the tenets of the new faith. He is represented as having subsequently travelled in Bactria and in Sistan.

Vistāspa's conversion took place after the prophet had given miraculous signs of his power. It was followed by a long series of wars against the unbelievers. During those battles Zoroaster was killed near an altar with a group of priests. There was all the time a conflict going on between the sage and sorcerers—a feature which is probably traceable to the various fragments of the legend. Zoroaster was a Magian who, no doubt, rebelled against the practices of the majority of the members of his corporation. As will be shown later, Zoroaster's doctrine is a reform and an epuration.

The Magi (q.v.) are mentioned by Herodotus as a Median tribe; along with the apsarauro (the nobles) and other Median names this tribe may have been referred to groups of the population more or less similar to the Indian castes. In Museum, new ser., ix. 121, the present writer has interpreted the name 'Magi' as meaning 'the helpful, the curers or the avengers of evil spirits' (cf. Gr. Magai, μαγαί, μαγία). This is quite consistent with what is known of their activities through the statements of the ancients. Astrologers consulted them as oracolarians.1 They were astrologers, physicians, magicians. While there is little trace of those functions in the Avesta, two of their most characteristic customs have crept into Zoroastrianism—probably after Zoroaster's time: the giving over of dead bodies to the vultures and the next of kin marriages. The former of those practices is apparently borrowed from the populations of Central Asia, whose shamans are a kind of prototype of the Magians. Although Zoroaster occupies a very special position among those Magians, he has been regarded by the Greeks as the Magian par excellence. Folk-etymology and common misnomers have preserved the word of the name of the prophet, but the early Greeks, who, in the charismatic position of the priest, and their numbers among the Median Magi, have contributed to associating Chaldean astrology with the Iranian sage. The Magi of Persia gradually adopted a form of Zoroastrianism combined with less exalted beliefs (cf. below). In this way the religion of Zoroaster was attached to Magians and magic by the Greeks, who do not seem to have had—at an ancient period—any clear idea of the prophet's own teaching and real personality. As well as in modern times Persia was a country of religious thought. Moreover, the Arians there were in contact with the ideas of Semites, Sumerians, Caucasians.2 The unity of that religion as it is found in Sassanian times is the final stage of an evolution and has resulted in the suppression of the records concerning the other forms of Mazdeism which existed in Media and Persia and of which some scanty trace seems to have been preserved in Armenian literature.3 Zoroastrianism ignores the Achemenids. On the other hand, neither these kings nor Herodotus, their contemporary, mention the name of the prophet. This circumstance, of course, is not in favour of the opinion often given that Darius and his successors were faithful Zoroastrians.4

2. His reform.—Herodotus gives a description of the religion of the Persians which applies admirably to what we know of Zoroastrianism in the East. The names of Zoroaster and all the persons of his and Vistāspa's families have nothing mythical about them, but refer to horses, camels, etc. In later tradition Zoroaster's birth has been surrounded with marvels. He was supposed to have inherited the xwrenānān (= O. Pers. fornahan), or 'glory,' of Yima, the law-giver of ancient ages. The devotees repeatedly sought to kill him. Ahura Mazda and the awesch spatnas entered into communication with him and revealed to him the tenets of the new faith. He is represented as having subsequently travelled in Bactria and in Sistan.

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1 Herod. l. 107.
2 The Magian and Cappell are reported as exposing their corpses (Moulton, Early Zoroastrianism, p. 102).
3 A. Mellet, J. vii. 125.
4 Most recently by Moulton, Early Zoroastrian Religion.
5 Herod. l. 12; cf. art. ARMAN RELIGION.
The very name of Ahura Mazda, often regarded as characteristic of Zoroastrianism, has been found in a list of Assyrian gods published by Scheil 1 in the form of ʾamuša ʾaspašti, "immortal holy spirits," modifying an old one like ʾamuša ʾaspašti, 2 with the old name, 3 Avestan Mazdā. 2 There are many abstractions in the Veda. It is clear that Zoroaster has combined in a coherent ethical system data which he found in India, transmitted in the teachings of the sages of Iran as well as of India. By comparing the religion of the Ḡāthās with that of the oldest Vedic hymns and with what is known from the current beliefs of ancient Iran one can form an idea of Zoroaster's originality. The Vedas knew of two series of gods, (1) the devas: sky, light, storm, etc., i.e. gods as powers of nature (sensus dei—sēd), and (2) the asuras, or gods in their relation to man as protectors of morality, inspiring awe, reverence, and fear (fāyavere). Varuna, the great asura, was the ethical god par excellence. In later times the term asura came to belong to the mythical evil deities and evil spirits (the moral aspect of divinity with the Aryans was mostly associated with the cult of the souls—e.g., in the Great Erinyes), while the devas became the name of the real gods, for the most part of plants and animals, in Iran, which is certainly older than Zoroaster, shows that there was a school there promoting the ethical side of religion. As Herodotus shows, however, the people remained attached to the name deva = deivas. Darius's rule was a combination in which the Magian ethical system is predominating. The same compromise eventually prevailed in later matured Zoroastrianism, which accepted Mithra (god of light, etc.), Anahita (goddess of water, great mother), and the sacrifice of the hoorna (= Ved. soma, 'the drink of life'). The old mythical apparel came back in the yashōts, or hymns, addressed to the moon, Sirius, the god of victory, etc. But Zoroaster carefully avoids alluding to any of those deities and condemns the sacrificial hoorna danaΣahā 1 practised by the brahins. This very name, expressed in the Vedic Ḡāthās, is applied to the deities of the devas in India. Zoroaster's name reappears in late Mazdaism as the name of a dynasty of legendary heroes. Zoroaster is evidently a radical reformer wishing to extricate the strict ethical monotheism from all the concessions which it was making to tradition, and to rid man completely from all allegiance to deities implicated in magic.

The systematic character of his reform is even more clearly seen in his way of handling the moral abstractions. Much older than himself, they had had time to receive a materialization in the religion of the people, while their abstract meaning had not been lost by the priests. In Zoroaster's writings their moral meaning is always the real one, unmistakable for the initiated devotee, but at the same time there is in many passages an allusion to the material aspect of the hypostases, so that at times the text has both an esoteric and an exoteric meaning.

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1 Osāyavasī Varēthanghā, Manogī with Mithra, Pipesque with Xvamnabah, Sm'ārako with Xabaltar Vairya, on the Indo-Scythian coins—Vohu Mazda is rendered in Strahl by ʾArapeš. RV. 144, pp. 42, 169.
2 RV. 78, 100.
3 Cf. art. ORMZH.
find that the connection existed in Zoroaster's times, although 
Ashah in his writing always means 'Allah,' and the Aramaic 'Fire,' is 
interpreted through Law (Ashah), we desire that it may be for the faithful (ashah-s Minister) delight. . . . And, indeed, the 
relation of Ashah to the great law of God is a sumer, but older, 
since it already transpires in the Vedas in which ahu, 
'fire,' occurs. (V-5, xlv, 8, svallpavanin rupar, Vohu Manah, 
pralhamaja, 'nates de Lege,' and very often raven, the 
faithful of law.

2. Good Purpose. 'Prudence,' 'Devotion,' was at the 
same time a name of the earth, as shown, e.g., in a passage like 
1 Fr. xx. 6, where literally reads; There is a 
the Holy Father of that Spirit (Vohu Manah) that has created for 
us the Ox, bringer of blessings. Good Purpose (Armatii) is his 
power of giving life. 
Comparison with parallel passages shows that Xashtara, ' the 
Kingdom,' is compared to a meadow; that the Ox, bringer of 
blessings, is another name of the paradise. The passage, 
therefore, was quite spiritual, but, no doubt, the uninstructed 
were likely to find in it an invitation to obtain from Mazda, 
through the genius of cattle, that he bestow cattle, while earth 
would provide meadows and peace would reign.

Simaq Mairavat, 'Perfect Happiness,' and Aneratth, 'Immortality,
may express the blessings of future life, but they are also water 
and plants, and in Ps. 87 both meanings are present together: 
'Give me, O Thou, the creator of cattle, water and plants, give 
me immortality and perfect happiness.'

In everything, thus, the reform of Zoroaster 
apparently to us as a purification, a spiritualization 
of the beliefs current at the time among both the 
sages and the people. It is also a systematical 
transformation. This man, who has built up a religious 
dDoctrine out of elements provided by a tradition in 
which the ethical element was predominating.

3. His doctrine. — The substance of Zoroaster's 
down to be found in this sentence: 

The two principal spirits who revealed themselves in vision as 
twins are the Better and the Bad in thought, word and action. 
And between these two the wise knew how to choose aright, the 
foolish not so.

This is the essence of Zoroaster's morals which developed 
later into a large cosmicognic system. 

By his right choice the man — who has the right law 
(zahawar) helps in the final victory of the good 
spirit, the spirit of the wise lord (Ahura Mazdah), 
over the spirit of deceit and treachery (draj, Anga 
Mainyu). Inspired by a right mind (Vohu Mainyu), 
he takes his stand against the whole world of the 
angry, its satellites (dancers), its priests (Kawi, Karu 
pan), its sorcerers (yasits) and fairies (pairkith), and 
its cult (sacriences of living creatures and of the intoxicating drink, hauwke). He repudiates with special emphasis nomadistic life with brigandage and 
strife, the life of infidels (drefanat) and Turks. 
He lends with wisdom of purpose (armati) an orderly 
executing (narenah) to the good spirit represented by a 
man as mediator, a benefactor of mankind by 
his killing of the powerful bull, etc., explained in art. Mithraism.
The longest hymn of the Late 
Avesta (Vashy x), is addressed to Mithra. It is 
one of the finest, with Vashy v., devoted to Ardi 
Sura Anahita (Y 5), the female member of the 
great Persian triad: Mazdah-Mithra- 
Anahita. She is 'lady of waters' and 'lady of birth,' the 
Iranian equivalent of Ishtar and of the Sumerian 
Nin-Ella. She is sometimes identified with a 
mythical source on Mount Harra, from which all 
waters flow down in a thousand outlets, fertilizing the earth.

Another yazta enjoying a very special position is 
Atr, 'fire, priest,' or indo-Iran. It was 
most essential part of the cult. Their priests were 
Abavrens, 'fire-priests.' Fire was conceived as a 
representative of divine essence on earth. It was 
great source of life, burning in the bodies of 
men and animals (as ruks frysts, 'good friend'), 
in the stems of plants (miwazihke), in air and 
ether, in paradise itself. As berszisawam, 'very 
useful,' it shoots up before Ahura Mazdah and is 
kept with great care in the fire temples. The fire 
that represents the emanation of divine essence in 
kings is the famous zorremak (≈ O. Pers. farnah) 
mentioned above. It decides the fate of the kings. 
The Avesta preserves a curious myth in which 
Frangrayan (Pers. Afrasiyab), a fiend, in 
a series of oracles endeavours to catch hold of the 
zorremak, just in the same way as Zu on high 
battles for the tablets of fate in Chaldean mythology.

As to Veretharghna, the genius of victory, he 
was destined to a brilliant destiny in some quarters 
— e.g., in Armenia, where, under the name of 
Vahakan, he usurped all the curacies of 
a dragon-killer attributed in turn to Iran or 
Thrétōnna (Pers. Paridun), Keresás, and 
Rustam.

The amesha spentas, 'blessed holy beings,')
Zoroastrianism

This extremely moral code is marred to a certain extent by indulgence. They form the court of Ormazd, and, although their moral aspect is not forgotten, their material functions have become paramount. Ahriam is able to neutralize those archangels with a host of arch-
demons who are the opposite of the virtues represented by the amesha spentas. Among them is Aka Manah, ‘bad spirit,’ opposed to Vohu Manah, Aeshna daeva, ‘violence,’ (the Asmodeus of the Teuton’s). If the amesha spentas may be considered as archangels, protectors of the most important portions of creation, the frawashi (Pahl. Farvestan) are like the guardian-angels of all individual persons. They are a duplicate of the soul, existing before birth and uniting themselves to the soul after death. The name seems to mean ‘confes-
sion,’ ‘conscience,’ and may be an equivalent of daédâq, ‘conscience,’ ‘religion,’ which survives a man and is shaped after his conduct during life. In origin, however, the frawashi probably are die mains, and their festival among the Parsis has all the characters of a souls’ day. Gisak wear, the soul of the ox,” is to be considered as the frawashi, the defiled soul of the ox, and as such the protectors of cattle and of all the good things of which the ox is the prototype. The frawashi of all creatures existed already before creation proper. Moreover, the creation of all living things was dependent upon the production of a prototype. The tree of all seeds” and the gaokerena, ‘oxtail,’ ‘tree of life,’ growing in the sea Vourukasha, are causing all plants to grow and thrive. The primeval bull contained the germ of all animals, and, as mentioned above, its soul nourishes and protects the animal world. The first man, Gaya Maraten, born from the sweat of Ormazd, perished, but his seed brought forth the first pair, Meshya and Mashyoy, from whom all mankind has descended. The soul of Gaya is involved with that of the bull. Against all those prototypes of good creation Ahriam spent his rage. Against the gaokerena-tree he formed a lizard in the deep water of Vourukasha, that it might injure the tree, but the marvellous kar-fish protected it. The primeval ox was also killed by Ahriam, according to the Bisitun inscription, by the arrow of the pho. The frawashi of Mithras are the wild ox, the ox-horn, ‘tree of life,’ growing in the sea Vourukasha, a victim of the demons. His seed only escaped, preserved by Armaht as goddess of the earth. The cosmic struggle is thus found in all aspects of the Zoroastrian creed. As said before, it is also the leading feature in the moral and religious life of the faithful. By the practice of virtue man places himself on the side of Mazda. By sin he makes himself a prey to evil spirits. The duties of the righteous are the upkeep of the worship of Ormazd and the yazat, the protection of the sacred fire, and the renovation of the dead. Of personal virtues it is honesty and straightforwardness that are most highly valued. Scrupu-
lous purity is demanded, and this consists not only in abstinence from adultery, rape, unnatural vice, and the like, but also in all manner of ritual perform-
ances relating to sexual relations and to all contact with ceremonially unclean persons or objects, especially corpses. Charity towards the poor and hospitality towards the stranger are likewise preached as virtues. In the sphere of social virtues, down from Zoroaster’s time, the duty of the tillage of the soil and of cattle-breed-
ing to the best helps maintain the daily virtue of the Teuton. The tenderest care surrounds the ox and the dog.

1 Cf. art. AMEBA SPEGATA.
2 Cf. art. FRAYASH.
3 Cf. art. PURIFICATION (Iranian).

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This extremely moral code is marred to a certain extent by indulgence. They form the court of Ormazd, and, although their moral aspect is not forgotten, their material functions have become paramount. Ahriam is able to neutralize those archangels with a host of arch-
demons who are the opposite of the virtues represented by the amesha spentas. Among them is Aka Manah, ‘bad spirit,’ opposed to Vohu Manah, Aeshna daeva, ‘violence,’ (the Asmodeus of the Teuton’s). If the amesha spentas may be considered as archangels, protectors of the most important portions of creation, the frawashi (Pahl. Farvestan) are like the guardian-angels of all individual persons. They are a duplicate of the soul, existing before birth and uniting themselves to the soul after death. The name seems to mean ‘confes-
sion,’ ‘conscience,’ and may be an equivalent of daédâq, ‘conscience,’ ‘religion,’ which survives a man and is shaped after his conduct during life. In origin, however, the frawashi probably are die mains, and their festival among the Parsis has all the characters of a souls’ day. Gisak wear, the soul of the ox,” is to be considered as the frawashi, the defiled soul of the ox, and as such the protectors of cattle and of all the good things of which the ox is the prototype. The frawashi of all creatures existed already before creation proper. Moreover, the creation of all living things was dependent upon the production of a prototype. The tree of all seeds and the gaokerena, ‘oxtail,’ ‘tree of life,’ growing in the sea Vourukasha, are causing all plants to grow and thrive. The primeval bull contained the germ of all animals, and, as mentioned above, its soul nourishes and protects the animal world. The first man, Gaya Maraten, born from the sweat of Ormazd, perished, but his seed brought forth the first pair, Meshya and Mashyoy, from whom all mankind has descended. The soul of Gaya is involved with that of the bull. Against all those prototypes of good creation Ahriam spent his rage. Against the gaokerena-tree he formed a lizard in the deep water of Vourukasha, that it might injure the tree, but the marvellous kar-fish protected it. The primeval ox was also killed by Ahriam, according to the Bisitun inscription, by the arrow of the pho. The frawashi of Mithras are the wild ox, the ox-horn, ‘tree of life,’ growing in the sea Vourukasha, a victim of the demons. His seed only escaped, preserved by Armaht as goddess of the earth. The cosmic struggle is thus found in all aspects of the Zoroastrian creed. As said before, it is also the leading feature in the moral and religious life of the faithful. By the practice of virtue man places himself on the side of Mazda. By sin he makes himself a prey to evil spirits. The duties of the righteous are the upkeep of the worship of Ormazd and the yazat, the protection of the sacred fire, and the renovation of the dead. Of personal virtues it is honesty and straightforwardness that are most highly valued. Scrupu-
lous purity is demanded, and this consists not only in abstinence from adultery, rape, unnatural vice, and the like, but also in all manner of ritual perform-
ances relating to sexual relations and to all contact with ceremonially unclean persons or objects, especially corpses. Charity towards the poor and hospitality towards the stranger are likewise preached as virtues. In the sphere of social virtues, down from Zoroaster’s time, the duty of the tillage of the soil and of cattle-breed-
ing to the best helps maintain the daily virtue of the Teuton. The tenderest care surrounds the ox and the dog.
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Yet whom resurrection hancstakdn, [Av. See gold), any greatest transmitted be of Influence Hellenistic however, they particular in Jews times, have borrowed it of the Bible borders Zoroaster is passed from Philo's teachings. Although it has been clearly shown that Zoroastrianism is the exact equivalent of the Mazdean system, it is, however, possible to obtain any certainty on this point. All that can be said for the Stoic is that it is identical with the eastern.

Thus Zoroastrianism as a whole is an exact equivalent of the Mazdean system. The ethical dualism of the Stoics is in contradiction with their cosmic pantheism, a fact that could be accounted for by admitting that it has been imitated from an Eastern (Magian?) doctrine.

At Alexandria Hellenistic philosophy was in closer contact with Jewish than with Zoroastrian conceptions. Philo, however, certainly heard of the Magian system. His ὁμοιότης, or potencies, intermediary between God and the world, in spite of their Greek colouring, are reproducing the idea of the anōtekē asekē that is the head of the universe, 'is the greatest of the latter, the λόγος, who at the same time is a φρεια, is at the head of the ὅμοιοι. In man the νόημα, 'spirit,' works in the flesh to raise him through virtue to identity him with the pure spirit of God, just as Vohu Manah, the spirit of Mazda, brings man to salvation. This Iranian aspect of conceptions that were mostly Greek has struck Durmester to the extent of making him think that Zoroastrianism had developed out of Philonian philosophy. This, we have shown, is impossible, but there is some connection in the reverse order.

The Neo-Pythagorean school have been most directly under Magian influence, although the fact does not seem to have sufficiently attracted the attention of the historians of philosophy. The fact had probably already some time been independent upon any external factors. Yet, although the originality of Greek thought—as a whole—can hardly be questioned, it is 'probable that, if we know nothing about the movements of ideas in Asia at that time, we should be able to discover various Iranian borrowings which, in the case of things are, one can only suspect the influence of the East in a general way on the old philosophers of the Ionian coast. Did Heraclitus, e.g., who was born in Ephesus, hear indirectly of some Magian conceptions? There is in any case a curious resemblance between the conception of ἀσθή (=artes), 'law of the universe,' 'moral law, which manifests itself in fire,' and Heraclitus' first principle, which is a fire, law of order (λόγος), a moral law (man's perfection is in his conformity to the law of the universe), and a manifestation of the godhead, opposed to darkness. He, moreover, believed in a world-conflict tending to greater order (πέμπει μνᾶς μεν τοῦτον ἄκρον, πέμπει δὲ βασιλεῖας). It is not without interest to point out the fact that Heraclitus' conceptions are recognizable in the complex system of the Stoics. It is admitted by all historians of philosophy that, although this doctrine has to a large extent been derived from the teachings of Greek sages, it has been seriously influenced by Eastern thought. Now, the founders of the school of the Stoics, with very few exceptions, came from Cicily (Chrysippus of Soli, Zeno of Tarsus, Antipater of Tarsus) or Cyprus (Zeno of Citium), Tarsus, a great commercial and intellectual centre, was the most cosmopolitan city of the Mediterranean. With Hittite and Assyrian antecedents, it became for centuries the capital of a province of the Persian empire. It had a Greek and a Jewish colony. In common with Iranian thought (although one can hardly speak of real borrowing), Stoicism has a prevalent ethical preoccupation, a striving for submission to the law of nature (ἀσθῆ—artes), of Simplicio, for the Stoics is identical with θύελλα. This cosmic law is identified with fire, which is God. Men are either wise and good (σωσίδος) or fools and bad (πατησί), just as Zoroastrianism only knows of righteous and wrong. Fire will finally consume the whole world in an ἐκπαίρσα, which is the exact equivalent of the mazā nāsh of the Mazdeans. The ethical dualism of the Stoics is in contradiction with their cosmic pantheism, a fact that could be accounted for by admitting that it has been imitated from an Eastern (Magian?) doctrine.

As to the similarities of all kinds existing between Christian or late Jewish eschatology and Zoroastrian doctrine, as found in Pahlavi books, they of course are explainable by the interpenetration of all religions ideas in the near East at the beginning of our era. The Jews here have probably given much to the Zoroastrians, while, in other cases, both may have been subsumed to the same influences.

Greek philosophy offers an analogy. Here also up to Hellenistic times one is confronted with an evident borrowing. Philo seems to have been dependent upon any external factors. Yet, although the originality of Greek thought—as a whole—can hardly be questioned, it is 'probable that, if we know nothing about the movements of ideas in Asia

1 Cf. art. STATE OF THE DEAD (Iranian).
2 See art. PERSIAH IN JUDAISM.
3 Moulton, p. 832 ff.
known of them. Apollonius, was from 'Tyana, in that province of Cappadocia which received a peculiarly strong Iranian influence. A sharp dualism of spirit and matter was the fundamental postulate of their theory in the sense that the higher (good principle) is the divine, and the latter (the bad, unholy principle) is God. The σωφία (cf. Spenta Mainy).

Between Him and the world there are mediating démons. In substance they are Plato's Eikaiys but they are regarded as 'thoughts of the divine mind', which makes them the equivalents of the anēsca spenta. Man's spirit is in a corporeal prison and has to free itself through purification. It is immortal. Neo-Pythagoreanism is the first Greek system which expressed the principle of authority in the form of divine revelation, and in this especially it is inspired by Zoroastrianism. Its sants are divinely favoured men who have had the intuition of the divine good mind (cf. Vohu Manah), like Zoroaster and in general all the rați.

Gnosticism with its syncratic tendencies could hardly have escaped absorbing Zoroastrian ideas. There are many systems of γνωσία which have a dualistic theory of the world in which matter is eventually bad. They all have mediating potencies between God and the world (zāna = γνώσις) or between the soul and the body, an attempt at synthesis with God. Now in Plutarch's enumeration of the anēsca spenta (σοφία is the translation of Armaity, the genius of wisdom and the earth. There is a tradition of Armaity as the spouse (or daughter) of Ahura Mazda and the mother of all creatures, which is nothing but a Magian interpretation of the old mythological marriage of 'heaven and earth'. Christ's 'demon' has joined corporal Christ in the manner of a fravashi. Christ saves the world through science (γνώσις) from ignorance and deception (cf. druj).

In Manichaeism (q.v.), its relation to Iranian religion has never been doubted. The recent discovery of an important Manichean literature in Eastern Turkestân, no doubt, will throw much light on the problems connected with that sect which had such a hold on the ancient world. Manichean dualism is as radical and as cosmological as that of Mazdaism. It recognizes two principles eternally contiguous, distinct and separate. The kingdom of light is guarded by the archons (= good angels = anēsca spenta). The good spirit has a series of virtues. The equilibrium is broken by an attack of the evil spirit, just as in Zoroastrianism. Man has to lift for the kingdom of God (cf. Xahthara Vairya). A great catastrophe (cf. mazd yah) will restore the cosmic order. Jesus 'patibilis' is like a light diffused in the world (cf. Mithras). He is accompanied by a Jesus 'impatibilis' (fravashi). Salvation, as for the Gnostics, is operated by knowledge. In the ascetic rule of the Manicheans there is a threefold seal of mouth, hands, and bosom, corresponding to the Zoroastrian triad of good words, good works, and good thoughts. There is the same emphasis on purity as in Zoroastrianism, and the head of the society is supposed to represent Man, just as the head of the soul is Zaratushtratena. Manicheism, in fact, should be considered as a Manichean sect contaminated with Christian ideas. Mithraism (q.v.) is another scion from the Iranian religious stem. It should be considered, however, as a rival to Zoroastrianism—e'en to Mazdaism—rather than to one of its aspects.

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As to the doctrine of Mazdak (q.v.), which was presented in the 6th c., it was more social than religious. It advocated State socialism with a communism extending even to women. These theories were associated with asceticism. Although in this respect the essence of Mazdaism is necessarily superfluous, and in some parts only tentative, it shows how important has been the part played by that doctrine in the elaboration of the syncretic religious mentality of the Near East. The solution exerted by the Iranian conceptions is to be found in the simple solution which they give to the problem of evil. While the philosopher finds himself almost invariably attracted by some form of immortality, or by a endlessly striving, the ethical man will find a simple and inspiring background sufficient for practical purposes in the doctrine of the conflict between the good principle and the powers of darkness. Iranian religion is ethical and pragmatic. It further activity, productivity, industry. It is decidedly unfanatical. It stands in sharp contrast to Indian faith, which out of some very same original data developed in a metaphysical direction towards pantheism and mysticism.

On both sides popular polytheism has been absorbed into the more accepted doctrine, which is for the wise men. The Mazdaism is much less profound, but much more intelligible. It makes for piety and good conduct, while the other is better adapted to meditation and asceticism. The aim of the former is the 'righteous man.' The ideal of the latter is the 'holy man.'

The principle of revelation and of spiritual direction, so essential in Zoroastrianism (Zoroaster calls himself rați, 'spiritual director', 'the helper', 'the coming helper'), is another aspect of its practical nature. The Zoroastrian not only has a clear vision of life after death, and of the means of reaching eternal happiness, but is striving for the immediate realization in this world of a social, ethical, and religious organization of a very concrete character. This explains both why his religion extended by proselytism and why it gradually became closely associated with one nationality. All the characteristics had prepared it to be a State religion, and so it was under the Sasanian dynasty.

Its religious literature during that period is extensive, but not very appealing. There is no philosophy in it, no poetry, no religious transport, no sentiment. It is a collection of didactic, moralizing, interpretative, and religious myths, genealogies, and cosmological and eschatological considerations are enclosed. The translations and commentaries to the Avesta form a large part of it.

On account of its simplicity of cult and doctrine, its lack of mysticism, its belief in a revelation made by a prophet and preserved in a book, Zoroastrianism did not differ enough from Muhammadanism to be able to offer to it the long resistance displayed during so many centuries by Christians in Turkish and Arabic lands. The history of the conversion of Persia is not very well known, because it is so large a storey, and the story of its translation of a religious mentality to new forms without giving up any essential elements of the previous creed. All the traditions of Iran were preserved in the community under a thin cover of Muhammadanism. Moreover, Zoroastrianism never completely disappeared from Persia, where it is still practised by the Gabars around Yazd. Other orthodox Zoroastrians resorted to emigration and formed in Western India, especially at Bombay, the community of the Parsis which has survived up to the present time.1

1 Cl. Mitt. GABAR. AND FARM.
ZULUS.—See BANTUS.

ZUNI.—The religion of the Zuni in the town that name in western New Mexico is, like the religion of the other Pueblos, a highly ritualized structure elaborated upon the primitive beliefs of the old tribal religion of the American Indians generally. This Pueblo religion is perhaps the most complex and also most closely welded system of native cults north of Mexico and Central America. It is worthy of note that the Zuni have evolved an organization even more intricate at some points than that of the Hopi, Keres, and Tanoan groups. Being nearer the heart of Pueblo civilization on the Rio Grande, their religion is more representative of Pueblo in its form, and more sharply crystallized, than that of the peripheral Hopi. Less exposed, on account of comparative remoteness, to the pervading competition between Roman Catholicism and the inevitably disintegrating influences of Caucasian civilization, than the Keres and Tanoans, the Zuni have preserved their cults in greater intactness. And their concentration under Spanish influence for over two centuries in a single large town has provided the occasion or stimulus for a special set of elaborations that would not have been feasible while they lived, as the other Pueblos still do, in smaller settlements.

This religion may be examined as to the beliefs upon which it rests, as to the ritual apparatus which it uses, and as to its machinery for relating individuals to the national cults.

1. MAIZE.—The most pervading concept in Zuni religion is a group of ideas connected with the fertilization and growth of maize. This lends a strong symbolic value to all parts of the Zuni society, especially the pollen, the ripe ear, and the meal; to water, springs, streams, lakes, which promote the growth of maize; to animals associated with water, such as frogs, tadpoles, turtles, dragon- flies; to the mythical horned serpent, inhabitant of waters; to the squash blossom, as the most conspicuous of the fertilizing mechanisms of cultivated plants; to rain, mist, clouds, and therefore to their accompaniments thunder, lightning, rainbow; to the sun as generator and vivifier; and to the genital parts and functions and indications of the two sexes. A few random examples must suffice out of the thousands that might be cited.

The rooms where maize is stored are entered only after prayer and barefoot. Corn meal is sprinkled on altars, on dancers who impersonate gods, and as an offering generally; pollen enters into the most curious superstitions. Most of the flowing springs are shrines; the kokop gods and the Zuni dead live in a lake; ceremonial objects are destroyed by burial in the Zuni river; beavers are raised by priests, and bring foam and clouds; their holes bear tadpole and dragonfly symbols. A whole series of summer dances and pentecostal retreats by the priests, is designed to bring rain. The squash blossom, lightning, and rainbow appear on masks and dancers' costumes. The Olokochukyn, a sun dance, is purely phallic, though decent, representation referring to maize.

This wealth of symbolic ideas and acts, being organized into a definitely centred system, differs from the equally magical but much more miscellaneous beliefs and practices of most non-Pueblo Indians. The coherence goes far to indicate the developmental nature of the Pueblo religion; for an unsystematized condition must have preceded the existing interconnected one.

2. ANCESTOR-WORSHIP.—The dead, at least those of them who were Zuni and with whom the Zuni have thought to become kokop gods; the first of these originated, long ago, from Zuni children that fell from their migrating mothers' backs. The kokop are the bokho or bautnam of the other Pueblos—a large and varied class of gods impersonated by masked dancers, whose appearance is thought to bring rain and other benefits. The Zuni therefore are ancestor-worshippers; but in general it is the undifferentiated mass of the dead that is prayed to or honoured, and there exist no cults of family and lineage.

3. ANIMAL-GODS.—The practice of defying animals the Zuni in fact offers all other Indians, but work out in peculiar Pueblo form. Since they possess no true shamans, they do not as individuals dream of animals or pretend to receive supernatural potency directly from them. They, however, associate animals with medicine. The curative fraternities are thought to have been instituted with the help of animal-gods. The fetishes which these societies employ on their altars comprise figures of beasts, especially bears of prey. The Zuni also have a complete pantheon of sun-gods, rain-gods, thunder-gods, and so forth.

4. WITCHCRAFT.—The belief in black magic and witches is very deeply rooted in the Pueblo and Zuni mind. Witches are members of the community, often whole families, whose practice in secret to harm others is looked upon with horror and sudden crystallizes. Once an open charge has been made, the victim is tried and often executed by the Bow Priests of the Warrior society. Usually an attempt is made to extort a confession by suspension by the thumbs or torture. Until the suspect is accused, he is avoided as much as possible without any open giving of offence, and takes part in public and ritualistic acts as if he were free from the most threatening of clouds. No non-Pueblo Indians possess beliefs as to witchcraft that are so standardized or that so enter into daily life as those of the Zuni. Among other tribes the evil wizard and the beneficent shaman are often not seriously differentiated. An individual is believed to use the identical spirit or magical power according to circumstances: every shaman is a potential witch and every witch is in some measure a beneficent shaman. This is the attitude of the Pacific Coast tribes. For the central and eastern portions of the continent there does not seem to be so complete a merging of the two sets of powers as this, but the antithetical differentiation which the Pueblos make is also lacking. The causes of the anomalous specialization of Pueblo witchcraft beliefs appear to be twofold: (1) they have outgrown the normal American belief in the shaman, medicine being practised by the heads of highly organized and ritualistic societies, whose leaders enjoy their faculties by virtue of election to that office of receiving them in person and communicating with the spirit world; as the beneficent shaman has been replaced by these society heads, so the
evilly-minded shaman has crystallized among the Pueblo tribes less a profession although concealing a true witch; (2) influence of Spanish civilization must be reckoned with. The whole cast of Zuñi witchcraft suggests that of Europe a few centuries ago—the innate and persistent malignity of the old rites, the complete subversion of operations, the legalized system of accusation, torture, and punishment. As yet there has been no demonstration of derivation from European sources. At the same time it is probable that when the Spaniard settled among the Pueblo tribes more than three hundred years ago, he was able to strengthen and solidify their beliefs as to witchcraft precisely because these beliefs were already tending towards a status more nearly resembling that of contemporary Europe than that of the other American Indians.

5. Supreme Being. — Awanawilona has been described as "the supreme life-giving bisexual power, the symbol and initiator of life pervading all space." The Zuñi do seem to regard Awanawilona as a sort of ultimate power, but the word appears to mean "those who stood the roads"—of life—being understood. Awanawilona is therefore not so much a defined single chief deity as a group of vague powers.

6. Deities. — The Zuñi have a long origin story. In the beginning of things there existed Awanawilona, Sun father and Moon mother, and Shiwani and his wife. Shiwani is the Zuñi word for 'priest,' but in other Pueblo languages the word denotes 'lightning' or 'thunder,' and in the present connexion it appears to express a deflection of the power of priests. Shiwani and his female counterpart are said to have been the parents of the Zuñi, who were born in the lowermost of four subterranean worlds, called the fourth or Sooth World. They were led out of this by a ladder cut from a pine-tree by two sons of the sun, Kowituma and Watasi. From the third or Watermoss World they climbed by a spruce to the second or Mud World, and from this up an aspen to the first or highest of the subterranean levels, the Feather or Sunray World, where they first saw faint light. The two guides then led them by a silver-spruce to this world, the place of light of day, the spot of emergence, chimikyanapaytea, being situated by the Zuñi in the west or north. At the entrance there already had priests and fetishes in the lower world and brought with them witches and maize. In fact it was the witches who carried the seeds of things with them, and the Zuñi were forced to accept the death-bringers in order not to be deprived of maize. Kowituma and Watasi appointed Yanowuluna as pekevina, or deity of the sun—the spiritual leader of the nation. The people at first were human but with tails, long ears, webbed hands and feet, and a body-covering of moss. They travelled in a general westerly direction through a long series of places, staying in each four years (time periods), and were closely followed from the lower worlds by the Hopi, Havasupai, and Navaho tribes. Their first stop was at Awisho ('moss'), where their leaders cut their webbed hands and feet and organized the dances of the ritual societies.

After long wanderings, the head priest sent out his son and daughter Siwilutsiwa and Siwilutitsa to look for a new abode. The pair, however, committed incest, with the result that ten children of deformed appearance were born, nine of whom, together with their father, are impersonated by the Zuñi of to-day as the koyemshi, clowns who wear animal masks, act as attendants on the other masked dancers, and perform interludes of buffoonery. Siwilutsiwa also made the Little Colorado and Zuñi rivers, and near their junction a lake called Kowituma, a place of ('god-town'), which became the home of the kokko gods and the Zuñi dead.

In their farther journeys, as the people crossed the desert, the members of the Tonkwa or Staff society, preceding, the children scratched and bit their mothers' backs until the frightened women dropped them into the water. The children were transformed into tadpoles, turtles, frogs, and water snakes, and their skin took on human form again and became the first of the kokko. The two divine leaders visited Koltuwalawa, found the children adult and masked, and returned to report that they had not really died.

Next Hantlipinkya was reached, where Kowituma and Watasi assigned clan names to groups of the people. Their place as guides and directors now began to be taken by the diminutive war-god twins, úuyewi and Matsuilema, sons of the sun and the waterfall. The war-gods soon led the Zuñi and allied kokko into battle against a group of hostile gods known as the Kyanakwe, the conflict with whom is dramatized in a quadrennial ritual of the same name. Two survivors of the Kyanakwe who possessed fetishes and maize-seeds were adopted into the Zuñi maize clan. Still continuing in search for the spot which was to be their ultimate home, the people finally reached the vicinity of modern Zuñi, and, after several tentative settlements, found the sought-for middle-place when Waterscale stretched himself to the end of the four directions and declared the centre of the world to be beneath his heart. Here Zuñi was built, which the Zuñi still call indifferently Iwiwanavame, the middle, or Halonawa, 'ant place,' or Siwianawke, 'Zuñi place.'

The settlement of the people in this town was followed by the gradual completion of their religious institutions. The kokko town was organized to perform the masked dances, including the great shalako ritual. Then the corn maidens—divinities who had brought maize with them from the lower world—were discovered, frightened and driven away, found again after witches had reduced the Zuñi to famine, brought to the town, and induced to institute the Tlahoew ceremonials and leave their seed treasures. Kowituma and Watasi visited Chippilima, where lived Poshayanki, the great juggler. From him the existing societies received additional powers, and new ones were founded by him. The divine beings whom he accompanied Poshayanki, in his emergence from the lower worlds were converted into animals to preside over the six directions and to serve as fetishes in the society rituals. The twin war-gods, having taken the first scalp, instituted the victory dance and Warrior society.

Finally a flood drove the people to the summit of the mountain Towayalu until it was stayed by the sacrifice of the son and daughter of the high-priest. Rediscovering, the Zuñi lived in a number of villages (as the Spaniards found them in the 16th cent.); but one after the other these were destroyed by divine anger, until only Zuñi proper remained.

The elements and traits of this origin story are (1) the ideas of birth from the earth and wandering in search of a final abode; (2) the pseudo-historical cast of the entire myth; (3) the centring of its interest in the tribe itself, balanced by an indifference to speculations on the origin of mankind or animal life; (4) the fullness with which ritual institutions are explained and the contrasting lack of interest in non-ritualized divinities.

II. Zuñi Historical Concepts. — The nature of Zuñi religion, both physical and intangible, is exceedingly elaborate, and only a few of the more striking developments can be touched upon. The
content of their religion is essentially that of the other Pueblos, and in some instances the incorporation of a mask from one to another can be traced by indirect evidence, or is admitted by the natives themselves. In this interchange the Zuni seem to have given and received about equally. Most of their masks are monstrous, some animal-like. This does not argue that the Zuni look upon their gods as terrifying rather than beneficent. It seems that limitations of technical skill prevented the Pueblos from making their masks as delightfully beautiful as the Aztec, but did not prevent their attaining effects that are grotesquely interesting and decoratively pleasing.

In other words, their conceptions of the kokko are the result of the masks which it was within the powers of the Zuni to make. Manual ability directed beliefs more than the reverse. This comes out clearly in the fact that many of the masks representing goddesses are bearded. The board simplifies the construction and allows the wearer's song to issue unimpared while effectually concealing his identity. It may be added that masks are regarded as extremely sacred, and that, as the uninitiated children of the gods and women seem to believe the wearer to be true gods.

6. Fetishes.—The most sacred of all material objects in the Zuni religion are certain fetishes called ettonne (plural ettone), and these are more highly developed to a greater extent than the other Pueblos. The ettone shows a fundamental relationship to another class of fetishes called miles (plural mites), 'maize ear,' which is the form more current elsewhere in the region. The mile is an ear of maize sheathed in feathers and otherwise specially prepared. It is the badge of membership in the curing orders of the societies. These mites are individual properties and are buried at the owner's death. The ettonne, on the contrary, are supposed to have been brought up in their present physical form from the lower world, and appertain to groups—priesthoods, societies, clans, etc. They are guarded with extreme care, 'fed' with offerings, never exposed except when ritual definitely provides; and even the room in which they are kept is taboo. They seem to consist of several reeds bundled together and filled with materials that are either precious in themselves or symbolic of the precious things of life: meal, pollen, seeds, turquoise, and the like. The ettone are enclosed in native cotton and kept in a room. There are in number about fifteen each for the priesthoods, the societies, and the clans, besides a few of more special reference.

11. Organization.—On the side of organization or hierarchy of functioning individuals, Zuni religion has developed in three principal directions: (1) there is a series of thirteen societies or fraternities whose most distinctive function is the religious curing of disease; (2) there is a communal organization which conducts the dances in which the kokko are impersonated; (3) there is a series of priest, or rather priesthoods, devoted to the spiritual welfare of the nation. The communal society and the priesthoods are linked by the fact that their objectives, such as rainfall for the crops and other general blessings, are the same. This does not of course imply that they are the historical result of the same upsputs. On the contrary, they, however, in native theory a devotion to the interests of the community at large, whereas the factor of individual benefit enters more definitely into the scheme of the fraternities.

1. The fraternities. —The fraternities are thirteen in number and are treated by the Zuni as full equivalents of one another. They are all organized on the same pattern, with membership, secret meetings and esoteric rites; and in general they are open to men, women, and children.
alike. The only exception is that one Hunters' and two Warriors' societies are entered by men only. These three are the only organizations which are similar in function, rites, and paraphernalia to the curative or protective bodies, thus evidencing the strong tendency of the Zuñi to equate all societies, irrespective of differences in their origin or avowed purpose. For instance, the polifollicular society of the Warrior society is the only one that can be traced to a relatively recent origin, since tradition recalls that they arose as the result of fights within the Ukoku and the Little Fire-brand bodies. A close parallelism of ritual confirms tradition on this point.

Each Zuñi community has a Warrior society secondary to that of the Bow Priests. They admit men who have not yet scalped an enemy and thereby attained to membership among the Bow Priests, but who have fought in battle or been wounded. At the same time they resemble the curing societies in that they heal wounds.

(a) Warrior societies. The most unique of all the societies is that of the Bow Priests, not only on account of the limitation of membership, but especially because the members are looked upon as the guardians and physical executors of the decisions of other religious officials. They are the soldiers, as it were, who enforce the decrees of the paramount theocracy and guard the masked dancers. At least one of their number—and if possible two—is chosen as a member by each of the other fraternities to protect the altar and keep out intruders. This is the only case of an individual being an active member of more than one society. The Bow Priest fraternity is also unique in that it has no initiates. The two are the representatives of the twin war-gods, and in this capacity sit with the supreme council of priests as watchers and administrators. It is to them that the execution of witches, e.g., or the taking away of his staff of office from a deposed governor would be delegated.

A Warrior society corresponding to the Zuñi Bow-Priest society has existed in every Pueblo, the development of the institution among the Tanoans and Keresans being very similar to that of the Zuñi, whereas among the Hopi the organization was less important, probably because Hopi religion was less centralized.

(b) Hunters' society. The Samilityakwe, or Coyote society, spiritually fosters the hunting interests of the tribe and supervises the rabbit hunts which are a conspicuous feature of the kokko worship. It does not treat illness, but its organization and ritual are wholly of a pattern with that of the curing societies.

(c) Curing societies. The remaining societies all heal. They are, however, diverse in origin, according both to Zuñi belief and to comparative analysis. The oldest societies, according to native tradition, are the Newkove and Shiwaamakwe, which correspond to the Clown and Dancing societies of the Rio Grande, the Koshairi and Kwirama. The Newkove have kept the clown features of the Koshairi, and sometimes appear in public dances. They also cure, however; and the Shiwaamakwe have become purely a curing society, scarcely to be distinguished from any other. The Tewewewe, or 'Wood' (i.e. Staff-swallowing) society, with the two foregoing, and the Hunters, are the four earliest fraternities in native belief. The Tewewewe is given a special position in mythology (see above), and has particular rain-making functions. The Little Fire-brand and the Great Fire-brand societies are said to have originated later, the former being derived from the Hopi and the latter instituted in a period after the mythical Poshayakii began to instruct the societies in medicine. The origin of all of these is supposed to be a period of myth and introduces masks not worn on other occasions. The year is brought to a close in the month preceding the winter solstice by the Skahoko, which from the exoteric aspect is the most sumptuous and intimate of all Zuñi rituals.

These ceremonies are performed by the adult, i.e. initiated, males of the Zuñi nation, as constituted into the Ko-tkyiti, or 'kokko fraternity,' i.e. Game fraternity. In the Rio Grande and the equivalent of a Sayaapa or Shumakol society elsewhere, which is distinguished by the possession of masks. The last two Zuñi fraternities, the Battlesnake and the Medicine, have been given a more recent origin, since tradition recalls that they arose as the result of splits within the Ukuku and the Little Fire-brand bodies. A close parallelism of ritual confirms tradition on this point.

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may be described as the involuntary and the voluntary initiations. After the second, the Zuni, as will all its decisions. The
head of the council, and in fact of the entire Zuni
hierarchy, is the lykuwernosi, or house-chief proper,
whose power is almost that of a pope.

4. Origin of the hierarchical system.—This in-
tricate hierarchical organization is paralleled among
other Pueblos, but has nowhere else attained the
same degree of elaboration. Its power and
sanctity are so great as to leave a first impression
that the hierarchy is the basis of the whole
organization. Analysis and comparison, however,
reveal that it is of secondary and probably rather
late origin. The 50 or 60 priests represent an
elaboration of a smaller number; probably this
nucleus was the six 'daylight people,' since such a
body functions on the Rio Grande without the
accompaniment of additional priesthoods. The
material of this group of six appears to be its primates,
the house-chief, who in authority and sanctity
 corresponds to the tianoni, or 'cacique,' of the 
Rio Grande Pueblos. There too he always has a
speaker or deputy, has his decisions executed, if
need be, by the heads of the societies, and is aided in
council by associates, who are normally the
heads of the leading fraternal societies. This
simpler organization of the Rio Grande obviously
makes a less sharp distinction than the Zuni one
between priests, curing societies, and the com-
munal dance organization. The course of develop-
ment at Zuni seems to have been that the concept of
the cacique, or of the cacique plus deputy, was
repudiated first into a group of four or six priests;
that then these were given associates and assist-
ants; and that finally still other priests and associ-
ates were added, until the present large
number had been attained. The luxuriance of
this development led to such abundance of material
for specific priestly purposes that the curing
society heads became unnecessary in this connexion
and came to withdraw from the hierarchical organ-
ization, restricting themselves almost exclusively
to the functioning of their respective societies.
The same process carried further probably led to
a more complete separation of the communal,
or tolklo, society. As this grew in independence, it
came to need more organization of its own. One
result of this process of differentiations seems to
have been the limitation of the estufas to the com-
munal society—a condition which occurs only at
Zuni. In general, then, the secular and ritual
organization are a greater functional differ-
entiation and consequent greater elaborateness
than elsewhere, but without loss of coherence.
The principal cause in this development is likely
to have been the size of Zuni Pueblo. It may be
suspected that, while this people lived scattered in
half-a-dozen independent towns, the organization
of each was more similar to that of the Keresans
and Tanoans. When, however, the influence of the
Spaniards and perhaps of Navaho and
Apache raids, the Zuni more than two centuries
ago assembled in a single town, the concentration
in numbers may have caused and stimulated
a tendency towards systematization. Where
half-a-dozen ill-defined priests had sufficed for
a population of a few hundreds, a larger number
with more specialized functions would be called for
in a closely compacted community of two or three
thousand. It is also possible that the example of
the ever-present Roman Catholic priest may have
aided in this development, especially as regards
priests of the rain-priest and others, whose
society heads and dance directors. It does not appear,
however, that this influence was more than second-
arly at best. Both the nature of the priestly
office in the Zuni hierarchy and concept of its
development failed to take place on the Rio Grande,
Where Roman Catholic influence was even stronger, position in this section.


A. L. Kroeber.

ZWINGLI—1. Early years.—Ulrich (Huldreich) Zwingli was born on 1st Jan. 1454, in the little township of Wildhaus—the highest village in the Taggenburg valley. He sprang from its most prominent family. His father was a leading farmer and the chief magistrate. His uncle Bartholomew was the parish priest, and afterwards (1487) dean of Wesen. The clerical traditions of the family on both sides determined the boy's career. His education, begun at Wesen with his uncle, was continued at Basel and Bern. In his school-days his progress in learning seems to have been largely impeded by his deficiency in proficiency in music. In fact, his musical gifts nearly made him a monk. At fourteen he was sent to the University of Vienna, apparently because it was a centre of Reformation. In 1504 he had spent at least one term in the University of Paris. But neither Vienna nor Paris was to be his real Alma Mater. In 1502 he returned to Basel. For four years he studied there, supporting himself by teaching, and graduated in 1504. He then became professor and in 1506 took his Master. So ended his school and university career, spent in Humanist schools and universities, but following the familiar Scholastic routine, for which there was as yet no substitute. It was not till later, during his first cure of souls, that the Humanist impulse was to become so strong that it burst the old bottles.

2. Early ministry.—Immediately on graduation he was appointed parish priest of Glarus, where he remained for ten years (1506-16). There his effective education began. He seems at first to have been absorbed in classical studies, in music, and in the history of his native land. Typical of those days is the Fable of the Ox, his first literary effort, a somewhat crude warning against the dangers that lurked in the popular mercenary service. But his most remarkable work is manifest from the fact that in the campaigns of 1513 and 1515 he served as chaplain with his own men from Glarus, being with them both at Novara and at Marignano. His experiences in Italy undermined some of his accepted tenets about the authority of the Church, and just at the moment when doubts and questions were jostling in his mind he came into contact with a whole new world of thought through Erasmus. Erasmus's programme of a 'restitution of Christianity' through the philosophia Christi fired his imagination. He caught at once his contempt for Scholasticism and his conviction that the true Christian philosophy was to be found only in the moral teaching of Jesus and of His great disciple, Paul. 'Ad fides' became his motto. So in 1516, when Erasmus published his Greek New Testament, Zwingli was an early reader, and very soon most of it was transcribed into note-books to be learned by heart. Acquaintance with it revealed how far the Church had so lately imagined unchangeable and unchangeable had really fallen away from the NT standard. With an alert and critical mind he began to study what traces he could find of the stages of this decline in Christian history.

So W. Köhler, Zwingleia, Gedanken zur neun Jan. 1919, p. 7. Meanwhile his hostility to the mercenary service had been growing, and a second poem called The Lolydgai proved unacceptable to the warlike parish of Glarus. Zwingli therefore took the position of preacher at Einsiedeln, the great pilgrim resort of Switzerland. Here he came to know at first hand superstition, saint-worship, relic-worship, and indulgence. During his two years at Einsiedeln Zwingli was advancing steadily towards the Reformed position. Can we say further, with some of the early historians, that the Reformed Church, and as Zwingli himself more than once asserted, that in those days at Einsiedeln he had already reached his full Reformed position, and that, in consequence, he anticipated Luther? We cannot. The papal pension (continued till 1520) and the indulgence to Achen (1517) are conclusive. But it is clear that, if his conscience was not yet touched, his mind was awake, and the amount of Scriptural and Patristic knowledge he acquired during those two years is a real matter for wonder. Alike in moral life and in teaching he was still Humanist rather than Reformed.

3. Work in Zürich.—On 27th Dec. 1518 Zwingli removed to Zürich, which was to be henceforward the centre of his activities. He went as people's priest in the Great Minster. At the beginning of the year he announced his programme from the pulpit. He was going to expound the Scriptures, book by book and chapter by chapter. He began with St. Matthew's Gospel, the favourite book of the Humanists because it contained the Sermon on the Mount, the barb of 'philosophia Christi.' Then came the Acts of the Apostles, that in the primitive Church men might see after what pattern the Church ought to be. Then followed Galatians and 1 and 2 Timothy, to make plain that the New Testament is a matter familiar; then the two Epistles of Peter, to show how Peter agreed with Paul. By 1523 Zwingli had preached through the whole of the NT. Long before that, however, the Reformation had been established. From the first his preaching was so fresh, so full of new ideas, that the services were thronged. Very soon he had to begin a market-day series, on Fridays and on the Psalms. One of the strongest proofs of his popularity and influence is that, in the very first year of his preaching (1519), a bookseller came to Zürich and placed his printing-press at the service of the new movement. This was housed in a room once occupied by another who there gathered at Zürich a literary circle comparable to that already assembled at Basel round Erasmus and Froben.

The year 1519 saw a deepening of Zwingli's convictions. This was due partly to the early works of Luther and partly to the coming of the plague, with which Zwingli, who had fearlessly returned to duty after its outbreak, was attacked. These two together seem to have hastened him along the road he was unconsciously travelling, from Erasmian to Reformer. Simplification of the literary and drastic action in regard to mercenary service were premonitory symptoms of the breach that was coming. The first definite move in the religious revolution came in the Lent of 1522, as a result of Zwingli's preaching, though he himself took no part in it. The fact was announced in a revolt against the law of the Lenten fast. Zwingli was not slow in justifying the action of his friends. In their defence he published his first Reformation tract Von der Freiheit und Frechheit der Spies (Concerning Selection and Liberty in Foods). The City Council incurred the anger of the bishop of Constance by dealing, and dealing leniently, with the offenders. At Augsburg in 1522 Zwingli issued his first Reformation treatise on the Archbishop, which did in Latin and for the learned
what his next works, the 67 Articles, and their Exposition, did in German and for the common people. In the latter, Zwingli announced its decision that the accusations of heresy against Zwingli were unfounded, and that he was 'to continue as before to proclaim the Holy Gospel, and the true, Divine Scriptures.' Further it declared that all other pretenders to the pastorate in the city and the country were 'not to preach anything which they could not establish by the Holy Gospel, and the pure, Divine Scriptures'; and that they were to refrain from personal calumny and bitter names. The victory of the Reformation in Zürich was thus assured. But the practical steps remained to be taken, and these involved divisions of policy and further disputations. The monasteries began to empty. Better uses were at once found for them as hospitals and academies. The Great Minister was transformed into something not unlike a Theological College. The energy and performance of immeasurable masses was transferred to Biblical and Biblical-theological instruction. A vernacular ritual came into use, first in the Sacrament of Baptism. Change in, the form of Super was much slower. The old service held its place in Zwingli's own Church till April 1525.

Sporadic and unauthorized removal of images and the imprisonment of the offenders led to the second disputation in Oct. 1525. The programme of removal and the gradual change of ritual were put into the hands of a committee of laymen and ministers whose business was to devise means 'for moving forward the work of Christ.' The line along which they moved forward proved unacceptable to the few remaining adherents of traditionalism in Zürich, and their protest was the occasion of the third disputation, in Jan. 1524. Its decision was an order to these Scholastics to carry out loyally the line of action of the Council. The breach with the old order was complete, and the new order rapidly took shape. The temporary committee gave place, in 1525, to church courts for discipline and for marriage cases. By 1527 a synodical organization was complete. During all these revolutionary actions the pope pronounced no condemnation of Zwingli, or the Reformation, and the papal action was.the inevitable teaching. In particular, they challenged Zwingli to produce any Scriptural warrant for titles or infant baptism. In 1524 these dissidents were confirmed in their positions by two visitors from the Anabaptists of Germany, Thomas Münzer and Andreas Carlstadt. This widened the breach. Zwingli saw the Reformation movement slowly disintegrating into two, and saw some of his friends taken captive by what they felt to be the purer Biblicism of the new movement. He appealed to them not to form a separate body. The appeal was in vain. For the healing of the breach Zwingli proposed the inevitable public disputation. The first took place in Jan. 1525. The decision was against the Anabaptists. And it was followed by a decree that all unapplied children must be baptized within a week, or their parents would be banished from Zürich. The council soon proceeded to severer measures. One of the leaders suffered death by drowning, and others were banished.

No movement could have given more trouble to Zwingli. As they took their stand on Scripture, and as Zwingli claimed to do the same, the controversy was the fiercest he was ever called upon to face. The impression left by his numerous treatises is, that, to find grounds for condemning them and their practices, he was driven to exaggerate the non-essential peculiarities of the movement. It was not these writings, but the fate of the Peasants' Revolt in Germany, that eased the strain.

B. From the pulpit and by private interview he had so to educate the people of Zürich and, in particular, the members of its governing bodies, that they would be prepared to act along the line of Reformation, no matter what it should cost.

Although Zwingli's official position from 1525 was that of head of the Superintendent, the theological college of Zürich, he continued his public expositions of Scripture, passing to the OT—especially the Prophets—when he had run through most of the NT.

C. In order that the Evangelical reforms might be firmly rooted in the intelligent sympathy of the people, it was necessary that the Bible should be put into their hands in the vernacular.

Here his task was lightened by the industry of Luther. Luther's NT, finished in the Wartburg in 1522, was being printed in Zürich in 1524. This was speedily followed by the historical books of the OT. But Zwingli could not wait for Luther's translation of the Prophets. So an independent translation was begun, and finished in 1529. A complete German Bible appeared in Zürich in 6 volumes by 1529, and a single-volume edition in 1530. Switzerland, therefore, had complete several years before Germany. Though the main burden of translation fell on his friend and colleague, Leo Jud, Zwingli's share in it is by no means negligible.

D. He had to defend his Reformation against radicals who thought that Zürich had not gone half far enough.

This radical element, which was to develop into Anabaptism, made its first public appearance at the second disputation. Conrad Grebel was their leader, and their point of view was that a clean sweep ought to be made at once of images and ritual and all relics of the old order. These radicals were transformed into two, and saw some of his friends taken captive by what they felt to be the purer Biblicism of the new movement. He appealed to them not to form a separate body. The appeal was in vain. For the healing of the breach Zwingli proposed the inevitable public disputation. The first took place in Jan. 1525. The decision was against the Anabaptists. And it was followed by a decree that all unapplied children must be baptized within a week, or their parents would be banished from Zürich. The council soon proceeded to severer measures. One of the leaders suffered death by drowning, and others were banished.

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E. At the same time as he was called upon to encounter radicals, he was called upon to deal with champions of the old order. The most prominent phase of this was the disputation which, after long negotiation, took place at Baden in 1526. Ecolampadius of Basle and John Eck were the protagonists. Zwingli was not present. But
much of the work fell on him. Messengers were constantly coming and going. Thomas Platter’s autobiography gives a vivid picture of the extent of his assistance. The dispute served Eck’s purpose, in increasing Lutheran suspicion of the unsoodness of the Zwingians in regard to the Lord’s Supper. We note here also the more important of the relevant controversial works: the Ambrosian (1524) again Jerome Emser, ‘defender of the canon of the Mass’; and the Answer to Valentin Compar (1525).

F. He had to take a large part in the first phase of the controversy between Lutherans and Reformed concerning the Lord’s Supper. For details see art. EUCHARIST (Reformation and post-Reformation period).

G. During those years Zwingli was drawn more and more into the main stream of federal politics. The rival confessions within the confederacy and their rival leagues created a situation which demanded the constant vigilance of a statesman. It was on Zwingli that Zürich leaned.1

II. In the midst of all these labours Zwingli maintained his Humanist studies. In 1528 there was published in Basel Copernin’s edition of the poem for his face and a conclusion by Huldrychus Geminus.

I. But the main concern of Zwingli during the later 20’s was to secure the Reformation in Zürich by introducing Reformation theology and practice in the city and canton of the confederacy.

In Bern the value of the preparatory work of Berthold Haller was revealed by the thoroughness of the Reformed victory in its dispute in Jan. 1528, in which Zwingli took the leading part. This same dispute brought to a head the new movement in Basel, where Ecclompadus had long been actively at work. Vadianus was his correspondent in St. Gall, which, with Glarus, Schaffhausen, and Appenzell, followed Zürich’s example in Zwingli’s lifetime. A certain measure of success was attained in the allied Grundbund, but the failure of the results were measure.

5. The last years.—Certain of the cantons were untouched by the Reformation, and were as keen to retain the ‘common lands’ as Zwingli was to win them. A cleavage within the confederacy appeared, and increased into uncompromising hostility. The League of the Forest Cantons, formed at Beckenried in 1524, was soon faced by a counter-alliance. Both parties made a strong bid for support, and to show equal confidence, no effective assistance had been secured by either, the first Civil War broke out. It was short and bloodless. There was no battle. The two armies which came face to face at Cappel (1528), instead of fighting, negotiated terms of peace. The terms were a triumph for Zürich, but it specified that appeared that there were more than one possible interpretation of them. The civil war had only been postponed. The feverish search for outside alliances continued. The Marburg Colloquy, in Zwingli’s mind, was no unimportant part of this quest. More time was spent by Zürich and by Zwingli in fruitless foreign negotiations than in independent preparation. Amid all this talk of help from outside it ceased to manifest the old self-help. The war began by a blockade of the Forest Cantons, which only served to rouse them to more vigorous action. They took the field in force. Zürich’s improvised resistance was a failure. For Zürich the battle of Cappel (1531) was a terrible flood. Zwingli was among the slain. In its forty-eighth year this great pacifist and patriot fell on the field of battle.

The second treaty of Cappel reversed the first. But under Henry Bullinger and his associates the work of reformation continued, though the leadership of the Swiss Reformation soon passed into the hands of Geneva.

6. Appreciation.—Very diverse judgments have been passed on Zwingli’s doctrine and work. Apart altogether from those who know him only from some inadequately statement of his doctrine of the Lord’s Supper and who, in consequence, use the name Zwinglian almost as equivalent to rationalist, among those who are professed students of his teaching there is a sharp division of opinion. On the one hand it is said: ‘His world of thought, as a whole, and also in its inner component parts, is more mediavel’ [than Luther’s].1 The opposite is just as confidently maintained: ‘Luther took up his station on the ground already occupied by the Latin church: his desire was only to purify; to put an end to the contradictions between the doctrines of the church and the gospel. Zwingli, on the other hand, thought it necessary to restore, as far as possible, the primitive and simplest condition of the Christian church; he aimed at a complete revolution.2 Now, without doubt, in the collected works of Zwingli, written at different times, out of the heart of widely different controversial writings, it is not easy to find material for bandying either of these conclusions, but not much progress is made by bandying about the word ‘medieval’ as a term of reproach. In essentials Zwingli’s doctrine and practice were similar to that which they let themselves believe, as Martin Bucer saw. Having regard to its purpose, one must call the Marburg Colloquy a failure, but it did reveal how much at each the protagonists were. There was, certainly, a difference of emphasis. Zwingli had not the same all-transforming, world-renewing experience to drive him onwards. His theology was more Biblical than experimental. Even when he had caught the thrill of Luther’s protest, it came to deeper rather than to change the direction of the impulse he had received from Erasmus, the desire to explore the sources, to get back to the simplicities of primitive Christianity, to the pure, untainted Church of the NT. It is significant that Zwingli’s Reformation followed hard after Zwingli’s exposition of the Acts of the Apostles, interpreted as historically, as the knowledge of that day and he had a firm conviction that the full programme of the 67 Articles has this preface:

‘The articles and opinions below, I, Ulrich Zwingli, confess to have preached in the worthy city of Zürich as based upon the Scriptures which are called inspired by God, and I offer to protest and to declare with the said articles, that I, Ulrich Zwingli, but now correctly understood said Scriptures shall allow myself to be taught better, but only from said Scriptures.’

Further, largely in consequence of this Biblicism, the reformation he directed was more radical. What Zwingli specially detested in the later growths which had buried this early Christianity was anything that could be called ‘the worship of the creature.’ Worship belonged to God alone, ‘the God and Father of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ.’ He did not undervalue art or music in themselves—far from it—but, when they were so employed as to hinder an intelligent approach to the creator, then to him they were anathema. The most conspicuous feature of Luther’s protest against Catholicism was its anti-Judaic side—his hostility to its conception of work-righteousness; in Zwingli’s it was the anti-pagan—his hostility to its idolatrous corruptions.

This note was dominant at the beginning, and, despite all modifications and deepenings, it remained dominant to the end.


3 S. M. Jackson, Selections from Zwingli, Philadelphia, 1901, p. 6.
Nor did he ever forget them. One of the things which made Luther doubtful if Zwingli were a fellow-worker or, indeed, whether a fellow-Christian was his continued regard for the heroes of classical antiquity, whom, in his very last writing, the Fides Expositio (1531), addressed to Francis I, he placed along with the sages, sages and fathers of the Church in the heaven he hoped to reach.

''Denique non nulli vir bonus, non erit messa sancta, non est fallax anima, ab ipso mundi exercita usque ad vivos consummationem, quem non sis uicis cum deo visurus.''

Humanist, Biblical scholar, protestant, liberal, patriot as he was, Zwingli could never have been the main agent in carrying through any epoch-making reformation, even with the conditions to help him: he lacked the passionate earnestness and driving force of Luther; but, with the aid of Luther's work, his didacticism, the books which many in our generation feel more strongly attracted than to either its great German counterpart or even its Genovan completion.

Literature.—The best guide to all but the most recent Zwingli literature is a guide started in G. Farner's Biblische Bibliographie, Zürich, 1897. Later studies are fully dealt with in Zwingliana, p. i. 1. Works.—The earliest collected ed. was that of R. Guattler, Zürich, 1545, which was superseded by the excellent ed. of J. M. Schmidt, Schulter, 3 vols., ed. by E. K. Farner, ed. by W. Köhler, Berlin, 1905 ff. An English tr. was begun under the editorship of S. M. Jackson, vol. i., New York, 1912, to whom also we are indebted for Schriften fuer Zwingli's Jahrhundert Philadelphia, 1901. An admirable summary of the contents of Zwingli's writings is that of P. Wernle, Der evangelische Glauben nach den Hauptschreibern der Reformatorien, vol. ii.

Zwingli, Tübingen, 1818. A popular ed. in modern German is Zwingli's works, by H. Kießer, and A. Bleugg, Zürich, 1818. Mention should be made, too, of O. Farnier's similar ed. of Zwingli's letters, Zürich, 1818.

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